area where we can fix the status of people that are here illegally by having them go back to the home country and returned in a legal status? >> there are many things about our immigration system that needs to be fixed. i hope this congress will act on. >> and you don't want to pick one of them. you want an all or nothing approach of? >> i think that we have an opportunity on a cover his bases, either in one bill or several bills, to fix a whole multitude of problems that i think every member of this committee realizes exist. >> so your answer is if we don't do it comprehensively in we should fix nothing about the current system? >> i won't be categorical in that way. i am saying that it would encourage the congress to think about immigration reform in a whole variety of areas. >> we can do that and i agree with you, but if we can fix something today, if tomorrow we could get something passed that gets rid of the bars so we could help a group of people that are

here illegally, return legally after the return to the home country, you would be opposed to that? >> i would encourage you to think about the whole range of -- >> so you don't want to answer that question. again, your answer is you want all or nothing. that's -- >> i didn't say that. i am encouraging the congress -- >> i know -- >> comprehensive solution to this problem. >> would the gentleman yield asked if i may, the -- >> my time at -- >> the gentleman's time has expired. , but that you would recognize the gentleman for an additional minute to yield. >> i just note that really it's up to the congress to decide what to legislate and the secretary doesn't get to decide. >> i yield back. and every clean my time and i agree with that, but the position of the said administration as has been demonstrated by the secretary and has been construed by a lot of the comments that anybody other side and by the president is that they want an all or nothing approach. i think that's rather unfortunate because we -- >> i don't think that's what the secretary said.

>> i have not said that spin but you won't answer the question. you won't answer the question if it would be okay for us to fix one portion of the immigration system that i think is actually preventing people from returning to their home country and come back legally. >> if the gentleman would for the yield, i would encourage them to bring that and many other items up to the floor for a vote. >> we will. >> the chair thanks the gentleman, and the chair and special effects the secretary. you've been very generous with your time, and i believe by my count you've taken questions from a 32 of the 39 members of this committee, and we know that there were some questions asked that you are not prepared to answer, wanted to do some research on. and if you would respond to those questions in writing as well as any other questions that members of the committee may propound to you in writing, we would very much welcome the. also want to take note of one other issue that was raised by

the gentleman from georgia, and the gentleman from california, and thank you for this, and that is with regard to the real id. as you know, the real id act allows states to issue drivers licenses to illegal immigrants as long as the licenses are real id compliant. something by the way that i have not, i am not in favor of having states issue license if you're not lawfully here. but lawfully here. but be that as it may, realize being complied notes the driver's license cannot be used for federal purposes and that the markings that clearly make it different from regular driver's licenses. at the beginning of may, your department rejected california's illegal immigrant license designed pursuant to the real id, and i thank you for that. i think was absolutely correct decision. that decision was made because it did not have markings that made it clearly different from normal licenses. that was a great decision, and i want you to know the number of members of congress who

supported that decision and thank you for having made it. >> doing my best to comply with the law, congressman. >> thank you, mr. secretary. 's concludes today's hearing. we thank you, secretary, for joining us. without objection all members let five legislative days to submit additional questions for the witness or additional materials for the record. and with that the hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations] >> [inaudible conversations]

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[inaudible conversations] >> and this hearing wraps up, a quick reminder that it is built on our website in its entirety. go to c-span video library at c-span.org. over on the house floor lawmakers working on one of the 12, 2013 spending bills. votes are scheduled throughout the day. a final passage vote is expected later this evening. you can see the house live right now on our companion network

c-span. back here on c-span2 this evening it will be booktv taking you live to national press club for an event with michael lindsay, president of gordon college in massachusetts. is also the co-author of view from the top. looks at 550 american ceos, senior government leaders and nonprofit executives. coverage tonight live at seven eastern again here on c-span2. following that, booktv on c-span2 continue with a look at afghanistan. will begin with -- >> then we will conclude, all tonight here on c-span2.

>> so my son paul was in the hospital at children's national. we were waiting to have his open-heart surgery. he had been diagnosed with heart defects and had the surgery otherwise he would die. part of the waiting for the should to come back from overseas was being in the hospital realizing all these other families are there, and you're kind of in the trenches with them to his family, maggie's family, maggie had been through nine surgeries in nine months, there's different problems. so as daunting as our situation was, we were really feeling for them. and we were in their waiting room every day, walk past maggie's bed on the way to paul's bassinet, and the day of pulsed surgery we came in and maggie's family wasn't there. she had passed away the night before. and it was really, really hard to imagine that that m. had spent so much time waiting for to get out of the hospital and

she didn't make it. so we went into surgery that day, eight-hour surgery, his first open-heart surgery was three, and as we were sitting in the cardiac intensive care unit watching through a clear plastic vantage, my son's heart beating, you know, which was a moment in and of itself, the nurse comes over and says, you have a phone call. they brought me the phone and it was maggie's mom checking on paul's surgery. the strength and the graves and the fortitude it took for a mother who had lost her child the night before to call and check on our child, i think was a moment that we will always remember. >> fox news channel anchor bret baier on his career and his book, special art which chronicles the life and their death struggles of his son, paul, sunday night at eight on c-span's q&a.

>> vice admiral james winnefeld, vice chair of the joint chiefs of staff said north korea currently stands as the top missile defense threat and that the u.s. is keeping close watch on their capabilities. he spoke at yesterday's missile defense conference hosted by the atlantic council in washington. this is about 50 minutes. >> all right, good morning, everyone and thank you for the very kind introduction. we have done time together. i had the privilege of testifying in front of her when she was in congress and then i got to work very closely with ellen on the start negotiations and have developed a very high esteem for your work and your passion, for your work and it's a pleasure to see here today and to be with you again, so thanks for that kind introduction. it's a privilege for me to be able to kick annual global missile defense conference.

it looks like you have a terrific present company excluded, terrific range of speakers and topics, and a wonderfully diverse audience, partners from academia and industry as most experts from think tanks, from congressional staffers and a few friends and diplomatic corps. and i know that looking at the list there are a few old friends of mine very knowledgeable friends mixed in among the crowd to boot. i appreciate the opportunity to talk a little bit today about how i think about missile defense and were i think we're headed and what we are up to. but before talking, or actually launching if you'll pardon the pun, specifically into missile defense i'd like to begin by setting a little bit of a strategic baseline as you will see it will impact what i say about missile defense. since everything that we do should be in one way or another derived strategically, chairman dempsey and i tend to look at strategy as linking and balancing in ways and means and then taking a look at the

results and risks. ultimately, we believe that at the end of the day the ends of our strategy, and this is reflected in the qdr, are fundamentally about protecting our national security interest. and that we ought to put a understand what those interests are and that some are more important than others. not only does this enable us to offer advice on when and how to use force, it means we can link those interests to our advice on how to allocate the ever decreasing means that we are being provided by congress. and in between the ends and the means lies a fertile ground of ways and how to go about getting it all done. the more creative and resourceful we can be in crafting those ways, and the tough we are on ourselves and how we manage our own resources, the better we can preserve our and with fewer means. one of our most important ways is deterrence which really comes

into forms. one is showing an adversary we can deny his objectives, in other words, his attack will fail, and alternatively that we can and will impose unacceptable costs on that adversary if he is foolish enough to actually attack. every bit of what i just said applies to missile defense. if we consider that at the top of our list of national security interests is probably the survival of our nation, then at the top of the list of threats to that interest is obviously a massive nuclear attack from russia. because we prefer to use the deny objectives tool of missile defense in situations where it has the highest probability of being successful and being most productive, as you know we have told russia in the world that we will not rely on missile defense for strategic deterrence of russia. because it would simply be too

hard and too expensive and too strategically destabilizing to even try. even the russians have a hard time believing this, it is the very great virtue of actually being true. rather, we rely for deterrence of russia on our ability to respond massively to an attack, and that as we know has worked for a very long time. but we have other interests around the globe where what we call limited missile defense, quickly comes sharply into focus as being very well, beginning with her determination to prevent catastrophic attacks on our nation. this is about ensuring we can deny the objectives of any insecure authoritarian state that believes acquisition of deliverable weapons of mass destruction is key to the preservation of its regime. the number of states trying to achieve that capability is growing, not shrinking. with our principal current concern, of course being north korea.

because they'r of their close on terms of capability, followed by iran. because we're not betting on dennis rodman as our current deterrent against future north korean icbm threats, we believe that robust and capable missile defense is our best bet to defend the united states from such an attack. and it is in my view our number one missile defense priority. which is why the systems that provide the defense such as a ground-based interceptor program, or gbi, our a quarter much higher priority and other items in our shrinking missile defense budget. but we do of the global national security interests, including strong support for our allies and partners around the world as well as protecting american citizens around the world, including our own troops where ever they may be present out there in the world. we also play a good bit of emphasis on regional missile defense. closely cooperative with a number of key partners in this area. but in the world of declining budgets, is likely we will come to rely more on those partners

to resources means for their defense as we work more closely together on the way. we are doing just that. so let me spend a little bit more time talking a bit about each of these to interest based missile defense priorities. defense of the homeland and regional ballistic missile defense. regarding the homeland, the fact of the matter is that iranian and north korean space launch and other activities include multistage systems that can feed the development of ballistic missile technology for longer range systems, including icbms. we have to take the threat seriously, even though neither nation yet has a mature capability and both nations know they would face an overwhelming u.s. response to any attack. while we were still obviously prefer to take a threat missile out while it's still on the ground, plus the launch, we won't always have the luxury of

doing so. and because it's our policy to stay ahead of the threat, we don't want there to be any doubt about our commitment to having a solid right of launch capability. so the latter, right of launch capability peace, most and how many missiles we cannot gun versus how many the threat can launch. it's that simple. and that is much more than just a function of how many interceptors we have in silos in the ground. it's also a function of how good those interceptors are in terms of capability and reliability. we in the military often say quantity has a quality all its own. in the missile defense world quality as a quantity all its own. if, for example, because of system improvements we only have to shoot half the number of interceptors for incoming warheads than we used to, then we can handle twice the number of inbound warheads. that's why we are taking so much

time and effort to improve the capability and reliability of our gbi system. in the wake of the less capability enhancement, we took against a target store years ago which flew perfectly until i watched it personal or fail in the last two seconds, the missile defense agency has done a terrific job of diagnosing what happens. as mentioned i'm a former f-14 pilot and is one of those people flying those very old a point i know when something is not working you bring out the entire system. you don't stop at the first thing you find wrong, and you don't stop at the first possible fix to anything you find wrong. ndaa has done exactly that. they have taken their time and they have done it right. last year they launched and improved the interceptor not against the natural target because that wasn't the point of attack but simply to put it through its paces to ensure that it actually solves the problem

that they have found. it performed magnificently. our next shot this time against the target is coming very soon and we're doing everything we can to ensure it's a success. if it is a success, candidly it will be a very good shot in the arm for this program and we will resume production on 14 more in progress missiles in keeping with our fly before by philosophy. we fully intend to put those interceptors into the ground by the end of 2017 in order to increase our capacity to stay ahead of the threat. as we announced last year with the extra 14 gbis we will have 44 interceptors in alaska and vandenberg air force. we also as you may know have an ongoing program in work to improve the actual kill vehicle that rides on top of the interceptor. but again the quality has a quantity all its own, not just about our interceptors. i would put my nickel in

censured because having enough and good enough sensors that can detect and discriminate the threat coming over the horizon could save a lot of waste in terms of how many interceptors we send up to knock one down. we have a lot going on in this area. thanks to our japanese partners we are deploying an additional tty radar to that nation by the end of this year to both improve our homeland and regional defense capabilities at the same time. we also continue to operate the writer asked me in the pacific to provide discrimination capabilities to protect conus and hawaii. pending congressional support of the fy '15 president's budget request we are planning to deploy a new long range of discriminating radar on the pacific region by the 2020 timeframe. additionally, we are continuing to pursue greater use of space, and to increase integration of existing sensor capabilities

across the command and control out management system to significant enhance our missile defense discrimination capabilities in the future. now, while your sessions today are primarily about ballistic missile defense, i don't want to overlook cruise missile defense, particularly as it regards the homeland. you might ask if we choose to not invest in the enormous resources that would be required to defend against a massive russian icbm attack coming over the north pole, and northwood we care about missile defense, cruise missile defense in the homeland? the element of surprise is nearly impossible with an icbm attack and thus will have time to react. we can't always say the same for a cruise missile attack. we are also devoting a good bit of attention to ensuring we are properly configured against such an attack on the homeland and we need to continue to do so. turning to regional missile defense, there's been a massive proliferation as you know in

recent years of regional ballistic missile threats, including an increase of more than 1200 missiles over the last five years. there are now almost 6000 known ballistic missiles in the world, and that's not counting russia and china. within this proliferation we see a number of technical advances, including advanced liquid and solid propellant propulsion technology and missiles that are becoming more reliable, mobile, accurate, and capable of striking targets over longer distances. son can target ships at sea or many have shorter launch preparation times and smaller footprints that are making them more survivable. tactical and operational measures to defeat missile defenses are also increasing. for example, several nations exercise near simultaneous salvo firings of short and medium-range ballistic missiles from multiple locations to saturate regional missile defenses. against all this, not only have

we brought our own missile defense capability to bear in which we deployed some kind of missile defense system in 10 different countries, and we have 30 ships capable of doing the missile defense mission, a number of which are on station at any given moment, we are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire their own missile defenses and to strengthen missile defense cooperation that will result in better performance than individual countries acting alone. for example, in the middle east, the trend is working with a number of our gulf cooperation council partners on missile defense, including supporting purchases through foreign military sales. the uae is procuring that was the first procurement expected next year, in addition to earlier purchase of patriot missiles. in saudi arabia, process of upgrading its existing batteries to the pac-3 configuration. in kuwait is also purchasing the

batteries. that united states also maintains a strong missile defense relationship with israel, and our cooperation on missile defense have resulted in a comprehensive missile defense architecture with that nation. israeli programs which the u.s. has supported such as iron dome, a david's sling weapon system, and the arrow weapon system in conjecture with operational cooperation create a multilayered architecture designed to protect the israeli people from varying types of missile defense, or missile threats. in the asia-pacific, we have a strong missile defense posture in the region for both homeland and regional missile defense. a cornerstone of our security and diplomacy has been our strong bilateral alliances with south korea, japan and australia. going forward, we will continue to emphasize the importance of developing regional ballistic missile defense systems. we know this is a very politically sensitive topic for several of our regional allies, but progress in this area would only increase our confidence in

the face of persistent north korean provocation. during last year's provocation cycle, it appeared that north korea might conduct a test of a regional capable ballistic missile that could potentially reach u.s. soil and guam. in response, many of you are aware, the u.s. army did a magnificent job of rapidly deploying a battery to the island. there it remains, readily deployable if necessary if somewhere else in the world but in the meantime defending u.s. soil from potential threats. with the unpredictability of the north korean regime, we may find ourselves doing more of this sort of thing in the future elsewhere in the region. and in europe, our commitment to nato missile defense remains ironclad as secretary hagel has said, as dems are by our strong support for missile defense capabilities either already deployed or being developed for the european phase-adaptive

approach. our contribution to nato missile defense. here i'd like to lay to rest the persistent misconception that in shifting away from the original program to place 10, two-stage judaizing europe that somehow the united states walked away from european ballistic missile defense. that's just not true and it's not, did not do justice for the great effort that my predecessor, general cartwright. he realized that the icbm threat from iran was progressing more slowly, and the medium and intermediate range threat more rapidly than we had anticipated. it made great sense at the time and still does to shift to the european phase-adaptive approach that is based on the sm-3 no, sir, exhibit a to my left, and away from the gdi. that's what we are doing. rather than only 10 missiles that were limited irbm capability, we will eventually have 48 missiles on the ground in europe that can very capably counter the real regional

threat. this approach brought in scepters into the theater in 2011 aboard deployed ships. we have broken ground on the first epa a sites in romania and it will be operational in december 2015. just one week ago we had a very successful test shot in hawaii that demonstrate the functionality of a shore-based aegis weapons system identifying its ability to launch, control, established uplink and downlink communications, provide guidance command, and provide targeted information to a standard missile three block missile. as of this year, the first of four ships to be station in spain, donald cook has deployed it to your. the u.s. as rock will arrive this summer. the final two ships, uss carney and uss porter will arrive in 2015. we are committed and this program is on the track and our nato allies are also making

significant contributions to the european missile defense mission through their purchase and deployment of bmd capable systems and deployment and support of nato nations. let me be clear once again. it's not the policy of the united states to build a ballistic missile defense system to counter russian ballistic missiles. aegis are designed to counter long range ballistic missiles that may be launched from other nations outside of the euro atlantic area against our european nato partners. this system is designed to defeat a launch out of the middle east come from the south and not a launch from russia and east. epa cites are not designed for it and can't counter russian icbms or regional ballistic missile because russia deploys too many missiles which are too sophisticated for the system to handle. our senses are not pointed in the right direction and the interceptors we intend to deployed at the beaches is sure sides were simply not have the

velocity required to intercept russian icbms. so let's lay that to rest. the most helpful thing that russia and china for that matter can do is to persuade north korea and iran to drop their ballistic missile program. we don't see that happening anytime soon, unfortunately. while we're on the topic of regional missile defense though i'd like to make the point that we need to keep our eyes closed on the cost curves. the simple fact is that it causes around $11 million could find itself being launched against a scud missile that is proliferating rapidly, would only cost $3 million. this curve is working against us but there are three things we can do about it. first, we can keep the pressure on how much our own interceptors cost it would be helpful in this regard to double to buy them in economic quantities but this is proving very hard to do under increased budget pressure. ..

we have an excellent track record with regional systems comprised of operationally configured add interceptors and sm greece. as i mentioned, we are working hard through gdi issues it makes it to raise the probability of intercept those missiles in. basically her test record using hit to kill has put this misconception to rest. to date, for operationally

configured interceptors, not development prototypes, fad is 11 for 11. gmd is 31st six. and patriot act three is 21425. that is not bad, but we are determined to make it even better. the second misconception is that it's easy for an adversary to employ ballistic sole defense countermeasures. to be sure, we will continue to do everything we can in order to improve her discrimination capability. as hard as that job is that so is the challenge of employing and deploying countermeasures. if the enemy is confronting a layered defense system, whatever countermeasure work in midcourse might not work in terminal and there are terminal countermeasures may be destroyed in midcourse. test is critical to success of any complex weapon system moment comes to defense countermeasures adversaries don't do much of it, which means they can't know very

well have their countermeasures perform. we've had her on countermeasures program, an extensive one with a how difficult it is to get that right. countermeasures take a payload space and have weight considerations, which are also a trade-off. bottom is countermeasures are not as easy as they look on paper. last is the narrative that missile defense needs to be 101st ineffective to be successful, especially nuclear weapons are involved. that is a simplistic argument. no system can achieve perception. it would be hubris for us to believe otherwise. so if deterrence does fail, we don't necessarily expect to stop every single missile. though to be sure, we'll try. rather come and effective systems we have in our further developing our intended to deter an adversary by and check in considerable doubt into his mind regarding the effect said the attack verses are likely

response. the enemy knows there would be a significant price he pays the missile launch against the united states and the worst of all worlds for that enemy is the attack is not only not affect his come of it evokes a nasty response from us. i can come the two pillars of deterrence. so i blew for missile defense enterprise if you'll pardon the quick is on an upward project tree. it is healthy at the regional level the sonics have cost her pants coming back for defense of the homeland. i give great credit for lopez and his able sat than his predecessors. shooting a poet with a bullet is not an easy technical problem to solve. it is probably easier to kill godzilla. or maybe even -- well, never mind. shooting a poet with a bullet is pretty hard. it's even harder when you're under time pressure. it is so hard when assets are spent and difficult to test.

and it's even harder a turbulent political environment in which an insurgency. if we continue to make progress. we are making progress in our work with international partners. we're making progress with the war freighter to testing and global holistic missile defense program that's flexible, survivable and affordable mimic progress in investing promising to elegy programs to ensure the missile defense program will be fully capable of defeating the complex to weeks to in the future. recall what i said earlier about the recent strategy and how they can help preserve iran when the means to client. the good news is many of the ways we do business in the missile defense area are very for new innovation. with so heart said one of my favorite quotes are the only thing harder than getting a new idea is getting involved by now. we will have to do a lot of work in very art to empower our people to do both of those

things. that is general tendencies in my greatest concern across the board that we will not innovate quickly enough or deep enough to be prepared for the world we will face over the next decade. innovation is the leadership opportunity for this generation of the defense practitioners and architects, which is why your session this afternoon on what is next promised this to be so interest him. as we all know, the advantage in warfare shifts between often been defense all the time. so where will rail content directed energy and big data lead us within the missile defense from? and what about the interesting strategic questions that will arise if and when technology actually does the name worth more path: more economical to defend against ballistic missile attacks. in any case, one of our greatest to manage his bizarre innovative spirit and the atmosphere we have in the country that permits

it. this advantage will enable us to better protect the american people and continue to stand by our close allies and friends around the world. 13 occult are interested in missile defense evidence by the fact you are here today. i hope this has been useful to you. i am interested in your questions and probably even more interested in your views and ideas. i look forward to the next or the session. fried, shall we get out of? [applause] >> well, that was strategically fascinating, technically and technologically thought-provoking and graphically colorful. bullet on bullet tougher than getting that god and of course how to return or dennis rodman. let me ask two or three very quick questions. i'll go straight to the audience and i'll try to hit on one

question on north korea, one on the situation in europe and then we will see whether we go to the audience at that point. he called north korea the number-one missile defense priority. is your assessment of that threat moving quickly enough alerts hasn't gotten much higher? how big of a problem is it that it's been difficult to get south korea and japan to work well together in "the wall street journal" he said there's enormous utility in having knitted together approach to missile defense would be really useful if those nations can set aside the long-standing differences. how possible it is that? >> you've asked about 30 questions in one question. >> first of all, we keep a close

eye and north korean capability. it's an opaque nation. so that's a bit of a challenge sometimes. we have to take what every c-series lee. people use the term rogue nation. they are the closest one to actually potentially achieving the ability to hit the united states homeland. we haven't seen untested missile that can do that. but we've seen a test for bits and pieces that could potentially do that. we have to take the conservative approach that they maybe there's sooner than people might think and that could happen suddenly. we are sitting by waiting for it to happen. that is why we have with have the capability to launch any missile coming down from north korea. remember that the nouns in terms of readiness that is always ready to shoot a something comes out of north korea. we take that very, very

seriously. our long experience with this and many other partners around the world has taught us a united integrated approach just raises your capability significantly in your ability to detect, find, fix and finished a missile threat coming at you. so that has to be thrown against a mosaic of politics and international relations among nations and we are told we can get across them of the barriers there to having trooped what ration in the pacific in all regions on ballistic missile defense. they just make a heck of a difference to the countries were together on this problem. >> in the chance that one could push this forward versus a far more distant hope and goal? >> i think we would love to push it forward at the shangri-la dialogue that is happening this week. it's a question of how far can you push it. we have to be patient with

allies who have their own concerns. but we can take a step forward every so often we might actually get to the gold standard here of a regional approach someday. >> and then on north korea, clearly what you do, what you have to respond to is not what we are watching on the ground. is your assessment, is the administration assessed under the leadership of north korea and potential instability, unpredictability pear growing as the threat escalates because of that? >> we certainly had hoped when the new north korean leader came into power that we might find a more cooperative for a rational actor as it korea that could actually work to get rid of their nuclear program, get rid of their ballistic missile program and open up the economy with the worst that would accrue from a mars runcible north korean policy. that has not happened and that

the executions and continued execution and purchase of north korea, it does not appear as though we will see peace break out for a jeffersonian democracy in a science to it. so we have to play it as it is and work very close with our regional partners to contain not to and also make sure we are prepared for defense. >> thank you. you obviously have not had lines. he made a clear statement on the u.s. adaptive approach to this defense in europe and how it is not aimed at russia. on the other hand, the favors of russia are rethinking their security situation. so what influence does this have an entrance of threat assessment there are lot of icbms out there. how does this change the way you are looking at russia at the moment and the questions are getting about this old defense.

>> to my knowledge we haven't gotten a lot regarding the epa and its relationship to russia. we have been clear with our allies the epa is not about pressure. in fact, the missile we put in the ground there is certainly not capable of hitting an icbm coming from russia and it is oriented towards the ran into the south. the regional threat potentially from russia if that were to happen and we don't do that in a moment in terms of a threat to nato although we are prepared for that a much larger, more massive piece at the epa is not designed to cope with. we are hopeful that russia sunday will wake up and realize we are not designing the system to counter their ballistic missile threat. >> and beyond the epa issues of missile defense, they are

looking at new systems themselves further those. what is your assessment? >> it is a smart move. any nation is to look after its own interests in the case look after its own cruise missiles or ballistic missiles and take a close look at what their security needs are and how they are going to fill those. we believe coming in our direction to fill those is probably a pretty smart idea, but that is the sovereign vision: we'll make on its own. >> one last question and then i will go to the advanced good russian president vladimir putin recently intimated the installation of u.s. missile and leaders in the epa would spark a new arms race in his new in terms of what he's saying. there have been recent russian test of icbms and more had. some people are worried and certainly nobody wants a cold war situation.

but i am just wondering as you look and have to plan for the future, you have seen some sort if not your cold or situation from a new situation to respond to one last part of this question. could we see u.s. missile defense defense systems in europe set to be up reached the remaining 15 to 2015 trigger a buildup of russian bolus vessels? first i was it the cold wars not necessary as tarted by weapons. they are started by pete will in people's attitudes and their security feelings. we don't necessarily believe their pressure and modernization of nuclear deterrence has anything necessarily to do with a new cold war. a lot of their systems are really old and they are aging out and they have to replace them. so if nixon if irate nation that

had aging systems that would replace them with better systems, market systems and that is exactly what they are doing and exactly what we are doing. when i look to the future, we will replace some systems that are more capable. it is going to be much more

in the back, the young woman,

please. you can identify yourself and your questions. we met rachel oswalt, this is on the plane redesign of the ground-based interceptor. the defense agency and yourself have said this is the most highest priority projects. so i was a little surprised when the pentagon recently in announcing how it responds to the potential return of full sequesters said that it would cut camino, and the plan to redesign the kill vehicle. can you talk about pentagon thinking on that? >> sure. i don't have the budget details in front of me to be quite honest with you. but i don't recall we've cut the new kinetic kill vehicle. we are still investing in that program. i would want to be first to jim's earrings and the budget folks i'm not. the current kill vehicle was designed in note was up very quickly in a very accelerated program to produce missile defense capability.

there have been improvements, upgrade and stand designed to keep the missile capable and reliable. it is time for a look at new technology, new capability and more deliberate acquisition program to getting a new keel vehicle onto those interceptors will be more reliable in the future. we should still invest in it. >> thank you very much. gentleman next to her. >> thank you very much. in this speech he mentioned a lot about russia and north korea and iran, but little about china. what is the missile defense policy regarding china? and do you think the system in

east asia will not only be aimed at north korea, but also china, particularly when taiwan is concerning the missile. thank you. >> okay, first question on our policy towards china. it is our policy that we will not try to undermine the chinese strategic nuclear deterrent and that we value strategic stability with china even though we don't necessarily believe we need dirty. so that pretty much says it in a nutshell. regarding regional bullet of missile defense systems, that is printed is oriented at mentioned before to the fairly unstable regime in north korea. and if there are any ancillary effects that china has to consider regarding how that influences their own security, that is for them to judge but

the principal purpose of our cooperation with south korea and japan has to do with korea. >> thank you. in the back corner on the right. >> thank you. leandra bernstein. general when i felt, there have been some threats from the russian defense ministry that this the european ballistic missile defense system continues that it will be struck potentially. it is viewed as such a threat that it would be potentially struck with escon air missiles that's been discussed and not so much a concern about seeking out russian icbms, but rather stallman in russia is the concern. so if you could address that.

and secondly, i have a little bit of a provocative question given the audience. but your view on the potential for directed energy but. >> okay. first of all, i take it as a compliment you, general winnefeld, not admiral winnefeld. but regarding the threat -- any threat to strike a list of missile defense, i think russia realized as in any rational actor would realize that would be a very, very provocative and foolish act to preemptively strike a ballistic missile defense say. that would be in article v in contact nation. it would be hugely provocative act. it is hard for me to believe that any serious russian what can you preemptively striking ballistic missile defense system

oriented to the southward area within missile just boggles the mind to imagine not. so this is probably numbered in moscow rattling the saber. somebody not fairly seeking for president putin. the bottom line is we are committed fully to the defense of our nato partners will continue to flame the system in order to protect them from rest to the south, namely air in. regarding directed energy, certainly directed energy as a potential in applications is something we are looking not another to applications of course we are very careful in the ways we would employ those web ends. but there is nothing to rule out ballistic missile defense capability. we've experimented in the past. it is a very worth while x earnings, but it hasn't gone further. you are well aware of laser

capability we put on the seventh already seven. we are not exactly deploying that today. so it's not mature to knowledge she. investing in the rail comment has a lot of potential for defense capability. >> one reason we haven't talked too much about his middle east in the area around iran. in the event of any deal with iran's nuclear weapons program, how does that affect progress toward deeper gcc missile defense cooperation? it might have one view towards it, but it could have another impact politically support for expenditures. >> sure. if we're able to strike some sort of do with the reigning rushing regarding their nuclear program, that doesn't do it eliminate iran is a threat and

it certainly doesn't lessen our commitment to our partners in any way, shape or form. we have an in relationship to the partners on ballistic missile defense getting better all the time. mark closely knitted together and i don't see that changing one bit if there's some sort of a nuclear deal with iran. they still have a lot of conventional olds that we have to take seriously a night at the event being remote just because of a nuclear deal. >> thank you, admiral. one-on-one psychic, please. >> you have to ask the question whether you want to or not. >> i'm a senior fellow here at the olympic council. president to bomb is going to poland next week. as was mentioned, poland is undertaken at dawn defense program buying the key petrie at system. how do you see your missile defense becoming an element of

the u.s.-born relationship? dcf in potential relationship to the essex team in the u.s. security relationship? you see a future for air missile defense being a pillar in the u.s.-born security relationship? >> maybe pillar is too strong of a word. we have a great relationship with poland bilaterally and through nato. they are a joy to work with to be quite honest with you. i recall in the deepest darkest days when europeans didn't care too much for americans in the last 10 years i could go to poland and i would be received warmly by not only polish military government officials, but on the street. you look in store windows and the like. they are a great and wonderful people and we have a good relationship with them. i'm a ballistic missile defense i come a lot of it has to do with where they go forward in their own investment strategy for ballistic missile defense.

it'll be a lot easier for us to nip at them if they are frankly buying u.s. systems. there is a natural act to arrest to arrest if they were to buy systems for not that the nato alliance, what have you, it would be much more of a challenge to integrate that sort of capability into a nato context or bilateral contacts. certainly we will cooperate with them at every step of the way. we have deployed feature-rich intermittently to poland as a gesture of support and also to show them what the system is capable of doing, that sort of thing. i see an to check very. i don't know if i call it a pillar or not. >> please. yes, right here. >> thank you, admiral. my name is jamie when it's vietnamese-americans.

geopolitically, how do you view the situation in the south china sea and east china sea and how would that affect our global missile defense strategy overall? thank you. >> the south china's he is sort of a separate issue in a way, maybe slightly on to ballistic missile defense. is there something more specific? >> marriott, how do you see the alliance if there has been the connection between china, north korea, air and am now russia comes into the picture's. so from the art date to the pacific into the indian notions. if they all have that alliance, the global defense there, or we keep a full, are we ready to protect ourselves against that

group of nuclear missiles, nuclear powers? >> the very simple answer i can give you is we had regional allies in the pacific to whom we are completely committed to their defense. however that represents itself, then we will work with our part is to defend them. i don't know that i see a vast conspiracy between packets and in china and russia in the want to do offensive action in the escape. but if it were to occur with allies and partners out there we are committed to. >> one more question. sorry couldn't get to everybody. we have time for one more question. >> tony capacity with bloomberg news. quick question. what is the implication that the next cd to test fails the house

armed services committee says it will happen next month. what is the implication for plans to expand the network if in fact it fails. what kind of pressure is bowling, nda under to make it a success? >> we wanted to be a success because we worked very, very hard on this challenge we've experienced and i don't think we can go into the exact reasons why it failed, but we understand this very well and our test last year was an amazing access in my view in fixing that particular problem. i'm not going to figure predict it will be 100% chance of success, which are medically raised the odds it will succeed. i don't know how hypothetical i want to get on that. if it does fail, we would look at the reasons why it failed to see if there is some sort of outside the system or some fundamental to the system the cause and to the question of the viability of the program.

i personally don't it's going to fail. there will be additional pressure. the critics of the program will raise their hand and face the come we told you it's not going to work. we have succeeded in hitting and killing her resentment of missiles that and we are committed as important. national security interest of the country and ranks only a low survival of nation. it is in our interest to continue to work program and move it forward and continue it. again, very hypothetical situation you are presenting, but we are still committed to the program.

[inaudible] >> i don't think it would be a shot to the head. if it were to fail, how that happened. we have had a successful test, but we haven't had a lot of tests. i would say the last ce two weeks i've admittedly not against a target for putting it through its paces be maneuver the vehicle all over the place was very successful and i believe what a pity targeted to his win against when that day. we have to wait and see what happens, but i don't think it would be a shot at all. >> admiral winnefeld company been very generous at the time. as you can see the advanced people would be happy to go on for another hour with you here. i want to thank you for your opening comments, which were really rich and give us the context and in the q&a where your frank about a number of issues. we really appreciate you got this conference off to a great

start and left us with a lot of food for thought and discussion throughout the rest of the day. >> maybe i can get some feedback on what is next at iran. >> we be happy to give you all of that feedback. >> thank you. [applause]

returning now to give an account so yesterday with a panel discussion on missile defense cooperation in the arabian gulf. this is about an hour and 10 minutes. >> thank you very much. my name is michelle nunn from the carnegie endowment for international peace, formally at the atlantic council and i am very delighted to be back here with my former colleagues at the council that brent scowcroft center. thank you for inviting me. we are here now for a conversation on defense of the goals and to discuss this we have really out and in panelists. we have vice admiral kevin cosper of, who among his many

distinguished and this was former commander of the u.s. fifth late in the u.s. naval forces central command. we have mike eisenstadt who is director of the military security studies program at the washington and the two were near east policy. one-time u.s. army reservist who from looking at your bio you have served in every significant u.s. military action in the middle east for the past 25 years. and a senior fellow here at the scowcroft center was the founding director of the institute for near east and gulf military analysis. so i think you will agree we could have no better qualified panel to discuss defense cooperation in the arabian gulf and i dares way we could hardly have picked a better day for you. president obama has just made a major foreign policy speech at west point. he's also recently visited saudi arabia. secretary haeckel had been out

to the coast meeting with defense ministers. so this issue in very much at the forefront of u.s. policymaking, washington policy discussions. so there are some major issues here. we have been hearing a lot about the issue -- the degree and nature of u.s. commitment to the security of the golf of our allies in the polls. we are going to discuss the extent to which the united states can persuade both allies to overcome the kind of historic rivalries and suspicions they tied in order to act more could he really inerrant defense. be it against a potential threat from iran or elsewhere and also whether the united states, both allies and other allies could be working together more effectively to turn the tide in the horrific war in syria. so these are all very relevant

issues and i am hoping that in our discussion we can discuss the particular case of defense of the golf, missile defense of the golf, but also broaden it out to discuss u.s. policy in u.s. golf relations and the dynamic among arab states and how wallabies play into the defense picture. each panelist is going to start with a few minutes of informal remarks and then we will look in the floor for discussion. might, let's start with you. the overall aim is defense and missile defense. could you start us out with an overall sense of the defense of the golf, the role of missile defense in the goals vis-à-vis iran and also any lessons learned from serious so far? >> sure. thanks, michele and tanks to the bank account or for organizing this. by way of introduction and putting things kind of in the broader context, i would just say is my first comment that

much has been accomplished in the last decade or two in the areas of missile defense, but a lot remains to be done. by march the threat has kept pace with the response. if you back a decade ago, the only thing we had in the region the way of missile defense was equipped and then today now we have to place the tongue and the pastry at pack two and three and the ability to deploy fad in the region and we have in the persian gulf two to three capable ships to provide later defense. during the same period the capabilities of our allies have increased dramatically as well and they are operating with the same system says the. uae has also gotten fad. arcade abilities in their capabilities have grown. they are dealing with perhaps the lurches conventional missile

force in the world perhaps. we're talking about missile force my kids. as many as 1800 includes a short and medium-range ballistic missiles. so this poses a challenge. i think it is a manageable challenge if we accomplish a few things. first of all, taliban attack capability on iran's missile capability before they are launched in order to get out of threat tumor mentioned proportions. if we make every shot count, that is why function of battle management. finally, if we avoid duplication with our partners. i won't go into it, but it's important to get these three elements right if we are to ensure this remains a manageable problem. it also needs to be mentioned that we are all sinners a similar problem in the maritime region with development of ballistic missiles that are built to target the aircraft

carriers. they have the persian gulf to call it, which would witnessed a few football affiliates. return of the fence whether it really is the capability. they will develop the capability at least on paper because targeting a carrier is not a trivial matter. it is maneuvering and there's all kinds of things you need to do in terms of developing reconnaissance capabilities in order to have the ability to target. but this is something that we've traditionally focused on missile defense against land-based targets. now we have to look at the maritime arena as well. secondly, second point i want to assault the u.s. seems to do more to counter iranian committee rants rockets and missiles, i think our missile

defense has to go beyond just rocket and missile defense is, beyond active defense is. i mentioned a moment ago defensive options, contact options for iran's missile at iraqi capability. that is part of it. the other part is having the ability by the adversaries. missile defense is deterrence by denial and enables deterrence by denial. you also have to have the ability to deter by punishment. so our aerial strike capabilities and most of our allies are an import part at deterring some part of the package are capability you try to create a building missile defense is. secondly, we have to also pay greater attention to civil defense. this is an area where israel has done a lot. there's reports increasingly moving in from the ground. hospital facilities in the bank

of israel is living facilities on the ground to enable continuity in wartime. in the polls, i don't think this is an area where a lot of our allies need to do a lot more they may have been doing. especially in the new political environment in the wake of the air of spring with the arab uprising, the ability of a government to protect the civilian population in wartime is increasingly important and they can't ignore this. they can only ignore this task at their peril. this is one area where we have to do more to partner with our allies and you also consider and some of these countries are 80%, 90% of the population is with third country nationals in east asia, south asia, the united states, civilian losses could a political consequences in wartime. protecting the silly population is important and that is part of building the resilience of societies and their to face threat posed. i think it's also important to

keep in mind that while strengthening missile defenses is vitally important, we also have to have the ability to neutralize the other elements of the adversaries deterrent array. in the case of iran to engage in terrorism, to distract the persian gulf and favorite capabilities. defenses may push them into other areas to rely more and other areas in their deterrence and defense stopped you. you have to have a comprehensive approach. missile defense is one of the key pillars. you have to knock the day, but you have to also keep the pace in these other areas as well. finally, the last point i want to make here has to do with america's credibility. we see a lot of buffer is a form of manifestation of commit to allies into defense of the goals. but if there is a perception in the region that we won't have the will to use these

capabilities will only be willing to use perhaps our active defenses but not use the active component, you know i'm in the strike options we would have in order to degrade iranian defense is striking capabilities to do with of military force. that might undermine the confidence of our allies in the security guarantees providing in the form of missile defense is. so we have to pay attention. it not enough to the hardware in the region and say this is proof of our commit them. there has to be a political component and this gets to where the administration is right now it turned that the lack of confidence in the united states in the polls were again for positioning of capabilities is just not enough. two final points with regard to area. one of the things we have to consider is in looking at the threat emanating from iran, we have to focus no longer in the

polls, but if bishara al-assad remains in power, we have to consider the possibility if not the likelihood he will be reliant on hezbollah in the post-civil war if the civil war continues or whatever arrangement going forward area and will play a role in its quite possible that man may trade he used in the area on the left and the sincere post and as a staging area for operations against the sea-based leg of the european face adaptive approach. in other words, to use a steering coast is a staging area of operations in the eastern mediterranean. this is a very speculative thing, but something we have to keep in mind. there's a lot of civilian sea and air traffic in the road than they might try to use the strap it as a cover for using civilian boats coming uavs to create

the magic approaches to dealerships. these are capable ships, very fast moving. they might do things that kamikaze drugs and stuff like that that could hinder their ability to respond and that is something we have to keep in mind in the future going forward. the final point has to do with deployment of patriot missiles. this underscores the need to keep in mind the possibility that we will have to deploy an expeditionary fashion in the future. again out where and underscores the need for nato to develop an exercise to do so. it is interesting to look back at the timelines. a request by turkey for the patriots was made in early november. nato approved in early december and the final battery canon line of february. three, three and a half months timeline for respond to the

turkish request. can we do better? i think this is something we're going forward. there's a need for an expeditionary defense capability and we have to look at ways to do it faster in the future and i'll leave that aside final comment. be not just a very quick follow-up. he talked about a more assertive iranian rule in the mediterranean. should bishara al-assad said power and syria. whether there's some agreement on the nuclear issue, does that affect out one way or another or would you see a red wine to go in the direction regardless i'm even if there is some sort of agreement on the nuclear front? been a koran and behavior and it seems they've drawn back and send areas where they were pushing in the past. that is an area where we see them going.

this is an area where they are of vital interest of theirs. it is not affected negotiations. if there's an agreement from our point of view, there is no reason why an agreement should affect their operations in syria. they will still be going forward and there prefers assuming it's one thing they want to do. if that's one of the things they're looking to do. again it is something we need to keep in mind. >> okay. admiral cosgrove, mike has talked a lot about the ever-changing nature of the threat environment in the polls and in the region more broadly the mediterranean and so forth. another issue that comes up is the lack of integration of defense is across the gulf and

in the region more proudly interoperability and other kinds whether among arab states or between united states. could you tell us more about your view on having operated extensively in that arena? >> might raise some really important points. when he was explicit on an gather i inferred on. the requirement for missile defense goes beyond defense is specific sites which is more akin to why the expeditionary pack threes are very much about discrete response to military sites during an expeditionary respond in the build phase. that is not missile defense.

it does include first and foremost as people. it has to include its economic and other vital resource as an has to to include its military are some of the purposes you've mentioned for counterstrike or preemptive strike, whatever you want to call it. at the end of the day, all of that has to add up to some level of the nation's credibility in the polls. so that is one overarching point. the other thing is lots of things in washington get dismissed as not being rocket science. this actually is rocket science and i don't want to insult the audience, but the technical hurdles for integrated missile defense are not insignificant and there's a reason only a handful of countries in the world have attained his so far. so this is not a small step for any group you nation and it

would be a major step for the gcc. at note point will they be able to defend everything, but they have to have sufficiency to defend the things that really matter. michelle used the term interoperability are basically in a systems level that is to systems that have their independent functionality to exchange data to enhance the functionality of each and maybe a little synergy from that. either way, i am not a systems engineer, so don't bash me on the question. integration is a much higher level can't touch. it implies architecting something, two or more systems are key components in order to create a new or hyper enhanced capability. integrated missile defense is the latter. the key word is integrated. in fact, if it is not integrated, it is not going to work. for instance, a given age issue can defend it self, can

increasingly have the ability to engage missiles xo atmospheric and a new atmosphere listed missiles at the need arises. that is not integrated missile defense. it is a combat systems capable of missile defense. put a bunch of agents together with some fad were pac three and you tend to get the integrated missile defense system. while countries like iran where i was able to live for a while and a challenge on their hands, integrating something sufficient for the defense across the three criteria people economic and military resources and credibility. i think there is a reason secretary hagel and gates have used the term integrated as they are aspiring to this higher level because the physics of the problem trifid mayor.

and it is the devil in the details when you put it all together because it has to work across and amongst the different components virtually every time. we had very good success in old one, the u.s. versus firing pac threes at a high success of having hits in the air. did not escape the warhead, but we typically got ahead. we were firing on average three pac missiles per thread. so there is another dimension of this, which is that the fire and i will talk about that later. what does it mean to shoot down a ballistic missile? by the way, i agree with the setup for this conversation. it is that the high end of challenge for any country's military higher-end of challenge and certainly for the gcc states. in many respects, i think it shows some of the challenges

they have in other areas. more familiar with maritime defense including air and missile defense in the sphere. so while we're going to be particular to this defense, some of the lessons and applications are appropriate more broadly. what you need to be successful in missile defense? we like to think we have intelligence. we are really talking about warning. if you have strategic intelligence, chances are you're not going to have discrete type of intelligent about when it's going to happen, where it's going to be launched from and what it came down. that is pretty important information. you are probably not going to have it until the absolute last minute of which case the second step of this cycle surveillance has to be effective more or less all the time. it is not a ring the bell. equipment has to be amended operating more or less continuous way to keep apace

with tensions rising or other demand signals. if you want to detect a ballistic missile in your gcc country, you will use a long-range search radar. the missile is clarity in the air. already has an address on it. so you're a detect in this thing well into flight if it breaks across a horizon of your radar 400 kilometers away from where you are dandy. so the fight is on and you are just getting your first indication of it, but the information operated into a track. it has to be sufficiently identified. not a lot of people throw a woman i map me at that speed, so i will say it's hostile. and then you have to make a decision at the decision unlike many operations is pushed far to the left. you have to make a decision because you are dealing in seconds or at most a handful of

minutes. the decision time is critical. that may bring to bear other sensors to give you more discrete information to help at the decision-making, but then again it may not. if the u.s. as part of this company might have a further on the detection and the warning, but not always as we've learned to our detriment overtime. the system then has to designate the target. that is asserted to my technical term in some of these systems do it internally, but it has to say from radar a to radar via or in some cases the moat, that is what i want you to shoot. that radar has to acquire in time and space and back on it. i know where it is. i know where it's going. i can reject its future flight path to some degree of accuracy. then you have to assign a missile launching systems or intercept your to the target. you have to upload the intercept

their irrelevant information because it has to be able to find it and then you have to launch it in uss the same systems managing the battle give you pretty good assessment feedback. not always, but usually. the sort of simplified with a loop that i have just gone through would've taken up up a measurable amount of time of an actual engagement in the polls of some in less than 500 kilometers. think in terms of malt role high-end single digit scum that beads and you get a sense of how quickly these things are coming back you and how quickly you have to make decisions and follow a decision to not compress battle space. so that tactical compression of time is one of those details that really is complicated for

sophisticated nation, political decision-makers and military decision-makers extraordinary complicated multilateral settings. even the history of cooperation amongst and between both states would be extraordinarily difficult in the current environment to get where you need to get so that it would work. what is needed quiet u.s. leadership, u.s. technical assistance will be the vital component of any attempts to develop an integrated air and missile defense system in the gulf. as mike said, tremendous progress over the last decade in that regard and frankly in the maritimes here also. it goes far beyond just the sales, foreign military sales of discrete systems. this involves our expertise being brought to bear any training, tactical procedures, helping the precision, delegation protocols, between

and amongst nations to share information across a coherent network. i believe it would be essential in the near term and probably desirable over time to a strong u.s. commitment of the flow of missile at eric defense in the golf. not only does it bring extended surveillance in its own cell of interceptors, the countries they are what progress asymmetrically as they build up their own capability and the threat does have a certain avenue of approach that you might need to concentrate on. so i think that mobile surveillance would be important. probably more than anything else, the gcc has to commit to this themselves. secretary hagel was talking

quite strongly to those. it is expensive to build deficiency and especially for all the reasons i just described. you need intercept errors. you need the support systems. you need the maintainers. you need all the backend to make sure the system of systems going to work and that is live and has to be sustained. if they don't have that commitment to it, it won't occur. it is a 24/7 mission. missions right now that could conceivably come unlikely to be attacked, but this speaks highly trained and highly focused operators. this is not part-time work. there's lots of hurdles to getting that degree of training depth and focus. ..

okay. so mike has talked about the evolving nature of the threat and the admiral has spoken about this. so what about the political science? you know, is this going to happen? is the commitment to going to be there on the part of the gulf? and what about on the part of the united states?

>> i will try to fill some of the gaps. for those of you know me, the problem with harbor is that it does not operate in a political vacuum. let me start with my bottom line . without closer political relations and a greater trust among the copartners this whole defense cooperation business is not going to go very far. that's my bottom line. you have to be politically commit to the politically committed to collective exercises. and you have got to be sitting in one room basically with senior military leaders. you can't really send your representative because you don't get along with your counterpart, and you have got new gaming exercises, right? high-level tabletop scenario-dependent exercises

that will most probably center on the iranian threat. all of that stuff is happening today because politics and a stop. we, for good reason, have a tendency to criticize defense cooperation in the gulf. let me just highlight a couple of bright spots been in and hit on the major issue of integration. so air defense integration. you can see pretty much aircraft in saudi arabia, egypt, jordan. you have access to the same data on their radars they were able to develop fiber-optic systems where it provides them with our common picture throughout the entire peninsula. that is as far as air defense.

unfortunately we cannot say the san about missile defense bury the priority has always been there was fully integrated eyas our capability and a share early warning system. there are still trying to modernize, but the problem is going back to the politics is simply do not agree on what the system will look like. share the same threat assistant and persistent. the question offs, and i was just asking kevin, if the americans are manning it it's not much of a problem. and i am not really sure to what extent there will be control of the system, but it is still a question to be raised. we don't share the same threat assessment.

in the united states went to japan to achieve that objective. trust me, they did. they get it that an upper ability is very important. the united states is either incapable or very slow to provide the credibility problem. i don't know why it took forever . every single meeting. leaders and air power. you need the data link systems. add the pair that jackie really

want to achieve the greatest. you just cannot talk about this all the time. yet to pare defense of with offensive capabilities. to provide. the united arab emirates would stand up munitions. and those have made the iranians those provide a greater effect for at least these two countries combined with missile defense.

standoff munitions are very important, and they are causing some iranians to not sleep very well at night. let me say a final word. the above mentioned that a fully integrated system can protect the skies of the gcc and is fantastic news. the problem is, if you don't pair that with a credible cyber defense options are vulnerable. so i would urge whoever is working with the gcc nation, primarily the united states, when you are trying to integrate defensive capabilities and form an integrated cyber defense system please think more carefully. everything is integrated. you're automatically much more vulnerable cyber from. we can discuss much more the politics and the infinite dispute among the gcc countries,

but i am happy to leave it to q&a. then we can get into the fed. >> okay. we will open it up to questions. i also wanted to give the panel us a chance, if they wanted to have any remarks or comments on each other's. is there anything you want to say right now before we open it up to questions? >> i would like to say, it is a lot more fun, but it is not likely that most scenarios would it will have preemption as a true alternative here punitively against perron. put me in another country, we might perceive the threat to be so and. and so there is a bit of catch appear. we will talk at a time, but that balance between the ability to

see yourself credibly into counterstrike forcefully is a big part of it. i'm just not sure that you're going to take the first tac. >> actually, if i could just amplify, i agree. when i was talking about attack operations, after the initiation , in the event of a conflict have to a have interdiction operations against the adversaries infrastructure in order to disrupt his operations, and ordered to have of your number of missiles coming in. we won't be able to do prevention or preemption, but, you know, once attack operations have to be a part of it. >> i agree. >> okay. all right. questions from the audience. wait for the microphone to come

to you and please introduce yourself. let me know if your question is for a specific panelists. >> sidney joseph rebirth from breaking defense. a question for the whole panel. in terms of u.s. support for providing technology to especially for offensive capabilities, but even for the defensive capabilities and all of the networking, how much is the slowness, the reluctance, the priority on his route in the best of? a fundamental reluctance to give any arab or muslim country level of equipment that we give israel and could potentially one day use against israel. >> okay. >> i cannot tell you how many meetings i have sat in with

folks from certain agencies that are involved in that process. my understanding is that today is much less a factor given its reduced strategic relevance in today's environment and the middle east. that is not to say it is not a factor, but primarily the reason why things are slow is because the bureaucracy and because there's still a great need despite reforms made by this president to reform the mother is still a great need to frankly overhaul the entire thing. at one of our workshops year, about the much more strategic approach. the gulf partners are simply -- a lot of european allies are simply fed up with the system. it takes forever. they're is a willingness to provide stuff.

by the time their is a yes the price would have gone up. frankly, whenever they wanted in the first places changed because their consensus has changed. so there is still a massive need for reform and, frederick, an overall of the entire process. >> if i remember correctly in the end i recollection is that we ended up pleasing several because of process is so time-consuming. we could promise them several years down the road. we ended leasing the equipment was already in the inventory. that is my understanding. reliability issues.

a big, big deal. one of the big initiatives that have been trying to be pushed forward, the combined air operations where you could do face-to-face coordination. they have access. there are so many problems a constant problem as well. so there are problems, political problems on the gulf side of problems on our side with the bureaucracy and issues related to technical data and the like that really are the source of lot of problems. >> since i retired a couple of times on the u.s. export side, defense of sms. once burned twice shy system.

this system at large. and so, like a lot of the things in washington many people it to say no. i think that bias. it is not simply bureaucratic. there are sovereignty issues on both sides. we want the recipient to sign. you will do bad things with the technology agreement. so in europe and great britain and japan.

>> thank you to all the panelists. directed mostly to it admiral. that is on gcc integration on defense issues. tremendous success in the maritime domain where the u.s. has led all the gcc states, plus 17 are 18 other countries that are successfully battling things of that nature. but all that is done offshore. there are few concessions on savannah the that the countries have to make in order to cooperate fully. moreover, the target to those operations is really not controversial. not many people are friends with pirates, so that does not instill reluctance of one state

not to participate fully, whereas on missile defense or other defense cooperation, especially if it is aimed to each of the gcc states has a different view of threat assessment. and the history of the gcc in general is that anything that requires some kind of sovereignty concession has blocked any integration, whether political, economic, or defense oriented. with that, i would like to ask, what do you think the prospects are for creating a truly innovative system that is down across the gcc as opposed to a bilateral integration with the u.s. it's in the metal and you have a smoke and have system. related to that a lot of the gulf partners will so we would like to do the integration but you won't release the technology , export controls prevented from integrating a systems internally. this has been especially a point

made by the emirate's of late. if you could comment on that. >> i think it would be easier to overturn bureaucratic hurdles before they went to great to the cultural part of that. one let's become a little bit about the maritime just four seconds. i think you raise some good points. the purpose of that combined maritime force coalition never had anything to do with a ron. that is still true. chests we change the terms of agreement in which case of the not gcc countries will want to sign up, 22, 23 countries total ever take. so i think there are interesting subtleties there about how -- i don't want to call it mission creep, but for instance piracy

was not part of the combined maritime forces remain until 2010 or something like that. captain phillips, it just wasn't something that they did. something i did the u.s. fifth fleet's. everything was bilateral or trilateral. personal view is that the bilateral multilateralism is the prudent way. western european friends will be part of this. it is the way to go. and it will tend to deal with some of those release ability issues. there are times when we are not in the room. the answer is yes. >> well, i think the gcc can

look at nato and see that nato countries were able to increase defense cooperation with that losing much of the sovereignty. it will probably take more than a week, what did something to look at. >> he said one of the systems of fast-moving projectiles, not a lot of nations, this has to be hostile. we are working systems to reliably should that down. he set the as our nation

proceeds with missile defenses they will shift their focus toward terrorism, whether cyber or disrupting the gulf. would like to know if this is a strong attack. what is stopping the country like iran from bombarding yes with missiles like war is still low my system? >> first of all, they can't reach this. i have to believe that the bulk of the belief that would sort of take the nuclear part of it then made the point. building a overtime.

the defenses are catching now. still significant. if you take to to get a killed they just out shoe you. if you are defending something that is truly vital you can't afford to mess. it was not a prediction. it was kind of a continues statement spells. if we build defenses that neutralized by effectively neutralize the missile capabilities they will then rely more on other elements. the fourth leg of their concept. and so, you know, the bottom line is they use them for parades. the use it in lieu of -- no, i agree that they are primarily a

conventional bar bus system, but i think the iranians, we tend to associate missiles with w. indian nuclear delivery system. they use it for propaganda systems. that is why the airline operates while denying having a clear weapons ambitions, that ben can roll up the muscles and kind of strike fear in the hearts of the neighbors. nestle still would remain important to them on a symbolic level. during the crisis and in the the ability to reach out to earn investment rises, there are certain things that missiles can do that other means. so it will still be an important part of the doctrine and force structure, but you can neutralize that. they might then be inclined to rely on these other legs and therefore you have to, and building your ability to counter

this threat have to have a balanced approach, not just missile defense, you know, defense against cyber combat counter chair. >> when you mentioned firing a missile or decoy, talking about u.s. forces in the region. right now those missiles can reach the u.s. homeland. although if you believe intel assessments, by now the chef at one. we are in 2014. they don't luckily. the thing we often forget. cheesy planners and the pentagon and the fifth fleet do not forget all that no matter how robust those forces are in the gulf, they are actually very

vulnerable and heavily concentrated. you have some pretty critical access in that region. would they be stupid enough to fire anything? we don't know. pretty sure that there would be a swift and decisive response. but the fact that they had developed, especially short range medium-range missiles to the extent where they are really a factor even though they would never dare to fire a missile is something to think about.

>> the atlantic council. last year on this panel one of the panelists talked about the uae and our need for greater cooperation between the gcc and nail on missile defense. it was along the lines of there are lessons to be learned. a multilateral organization. it might be a useful catalyst for gcc corporation. situational awareness. they use see any pickup in terms of the relationship in this area do you see potential?

smarter people. there certainly is the desire to strengthen. what does that mean exactly? i really don't know. others will follow suit. something that has become clear regarding greater cooperation. how feasible is it? , try to copy whatever is happening inside the nato defense cooperation, i will defer to kevin, but i am much more interested -- and you mentioned that already. i am much more interesting exercises and studies regarding products and how they really think about gaining scenarios.

the gcc, it is either not happening at all. in certain rooms i cannot be there to know whether it is happening to mulliken for sure. they're is a lot happening inside nato. >> i think, to get below the political level, try to figure out that would work. but frankly, the u.s. view of nato, talking about how metalworks, the 500-pound gorilla phenomenon. but aside from that, i think you hit on the key thing.

the ability to come together and talk about things that are real, tangible experience, knowledge, skill quite tremendous amount of expertise that could be brought to bear and should be brought to bear and is being brought to bear both bilaterally and the gulf. tsk non u.s. military sales in the gulf are factor. coordinating nap to build a coherent fighting force out of the sort of the rise of capability of they have on the runways are in airports or army units would be a major accomplishment. the knitting together, the cultural knitting together that nato is able to do.

>> a little twist on this. for low-level quiet cooperation between israel and the gulf countries in the area. we are seeing things, with regard to natural gas sales and water sharing agreements among jordanians, the viejo in the chip to my now because of their shared perception there has been for a longtime intelligence sharing between is wrote in the gulf states, particularly about if the israelis want to strike. a thing that is a bridge too far. in terms of cooperation, that is one area, sharing him lessons

learned. there might be potential for quiet cooperation, and civil defense, an area where is row as a lot. >> in my previous capacity one of the things i want to do is try to conduct exercises that would involve at least all of the defense at-chase. it was a great idea, but it never worked. every time i would pick up the phone and call one of the defense that-as an the first question would be on the other side. you're going have a lot of people from the pentagon, defense community. for now we don't have anybody.

you are welcome to join. i don't want to be in the same room. and i tried so hard to find the most comfortable setting for these people to be the same room to engage in such simulations and exercises. i've realized later. a lot of people have tried it in the past. maybe with another understands them maybe that would be feasible. a greater desire to cooperate, it will be possible. if it is not