i don't want to be in the same room. and i tried so hard to find the most comfortable setting for these people to be the same room to engage in such simulations and exercises. i've realized later. a lot of people have tried it in the past. maybe with another understands them maybe that would be feasible. a greater desire to cooperate, it will be possible. if it is not happening is not

happen. >> saudi arabia. something of a patching over, where do you see things between? >> i wish i were in that room where they at the foreign affairs ministerial meeting where they kissed and made of. they have told us that this thing is no. we have resolved their differences. the feud is over. i will you wish that i could believe that. you objectively examine the roots of the dispute, especially between the parties and the saudis this thing is far from over. the main issues that they disagreed on i still there.

just issuing a statement. things are okay now. support for the muslim brotherhood. >> he knows what they will concede on. the fact of the matter is that they still have a very different strategic path from the saudis and from the uae. geography and economics, and a very different situation. a range of issues.

the dispute. a fierce regional struggle. negotiations, intriguing for me. what are you negotiating about. nothing territorial. government negotiations. of course the eastern province, saudi arabia. all of these things have to be negotiated. who knows whether the talks will usher. it is certainly a positive sign. we have always believed that the key to greater stability, of course it's such a loaded term, but the key to greater stability is an understanding, some rules of the game for the competition between the saudis and the

iranians. really this is what is fueling a lot of the fires. several theaters basically in the middle east. we will see how that plays out because it will certainly have implications on relations among the gcc nations among themselves . >> any other questions? >> you said it earlier. the smart time to read. the programs on ballistic missiles. the cruise missile threat. the question is how good are we at countering that? is there any cooperation among allies in the persian gulf?

>> the u.s. in the main is an ages surface combatant force. they are very capable against a full range of iranian anti-ship missiles, landline chance he launched. very tough once. coming into their inventory. we have very good inch receptors for that. the next generation that is coming on line, standard missile six is even better. those of the standoff engagement weapons. close and hard cal and soft kill for now pace of that threat. the nato allies that operate in the gulf on occasion a right up with us.

they're on derivative or their own inventions. every bit as good. concentration of forces in the gulf. so we could fight back. the issues for attacking a u.s. warship war and allied warships. they do pose some problems. the anti-ship ballistic missile, less of an issue in this theater anytime sent. it will be coming to a theater at some place in the world.

we are working on how to deal with that. i think we have some ideas. >> are there any other questions ? >> please. >> thank you. you were saying that united states has a credibility issue in the region in terms of missile defense. can you give us an example. maybe turkey considering buying chinese system. culminations. and permission in terms of chinese helping the iranians develop the missile capabilities and specifically against u.s. forces in the region. thank you.

>> well, as an overall credibility issue. it does not just up the missile defense. syria to egypt to yemen to pretty much any other country in the region. you can say goodbye to end probability the turks by the chinese system. that is going to upset a lot of nato countries, and they know that very well. how much of it is employed to get the best price? i will leave it to other experts to really figure out the mind set on that. yes. the united states has a credibility issue. words need to start matching deeds. this administration has done a poor jobs. it is never too late.

>> okay. so president obama, saudi arabia, secretary of defense, we are seeing greater cooperation. how is it going? improve relations with saudi arabia and the gulf countries. >> when you tried to distinguish between the credibility problem. really strong disagreements. >> that has always been the case there have always been differences. >> that's true. the problem as for the first time in a very long time they are feeling increasingly vulnerable. that has changed.

they're is a reason why. this series of meetings, pretty much every single country, finding a number related to defense and others not so much. in alt. someone strongly say no it is clear i would point out that the gas deal, the russians are

trying to get a lot more of the petroleum energy out of the gulf global market. a lot more particular out of the gulf and we do, any of our allies do. creating mischief that might result in some sort of flareup of activity in the gulf which could impact shipping. i think it would be a matter of concern. my previous life we would let the iranians close the strait of hormuz. we still believe that to be true. doesn't mean that we would still control shipping. >> the ticket to factor this purchase. first of all, recent days, that

has not been finalized. and so i don't think it's a done deal. in that case, it's part of a general reorientation of turkish foreign policy. i'm not sure it's strictly related to confidence in the united states. a different approach that the current turkish government has. we continue to engage. they continue. the diversification. i think we can expect and continue to see them from elsewhere, but small amounts. egyptian steel. i'm not quite sure.

so the bottom line is we still are the main supplier of arms because they want to be able to operate with us. they're shopping around for alternatives. the bottom line is there are not a lot of alternatives. to go to russia, the syrian conflict, they are opposed. so they have limited options. there really is no substitute. in the problem is critical. i think the military relationship, but i think the problem is that lots of states have great. you know, the crisis in syria, it's an opportunity to correct that. there is change there in the coming weeks and months. >> have to discuss defensively. if returned to the panel.

i believe we're now going have of 30 minute lunch break and be back here at 130. please join me in thanking. [applause] >> one of the stories that i -- that resonated with me was the moment when they're dead and about whether not they need to inject c water been. it is a matter -- the clock is ticking. they're just about down to the wire. the plant superintendents would have to make the final poll.

get water in there very quickly. meanwhile, everybody wants to say, the officials and the japanese government officials of this kind of coming. and he gets an order from one of the supervisors that the government has not signed off on a set. well, he has already started. so he basically calls one of those people over and says, on going to give the order. he very loudly proclaims so everyone in tokyo can hear, of the sea water injection. to me that was a human element in that story in which in japan where ignoring the rules that kind of acting and tehran is not rewarded, here was a moment where a guy knew that if he did not act things would go even

worse than they were going. >> more about the tsunami and resulting meltdown at that fukushima nuclear power plant saturday night at 10:00 eastern on after words, part of book tv this weekend on c-span2. >> tonight at 7:00 eastern book tv will take you live to the national press club here in washington for an event with the president of gordon college in massachusetts. he is a co-author of the view from the top. senior government leaders and nonprofit executives. and then america in afghanistan.

>> on the same day president obama announces a plan to keep 9800 troops in afghanistan at the facebook.com/booktv with all the former afghanistan interior minister said that the training of the country's national police force still faces challenges but has come a long way in training and recruitment. his remarks came during a discussion tuesday on afghanistan's future hosted by the u.s. institute of peace. this is about two hours. >> we will go ahead and get going. my name is andrew wilder. i need to welcome all of you. thank you for taking the time to join us. particular thanks to our panelists who have come a long

way to join us today. a topic that i think is extremely important. there was a time when i actually looked at issues around policing in afghanistan quite closely. it was many years ago. we look forward to getting an update. however, i do fear that some area, all the issues changed and i did research. published in 2007 called cops and robbers. i put a question mark. some people wonder whether i should. the struggle to reform the afghan national police buried at the iowa start today by reading the final paragraph, the conclusion. afghanistan is unlikely to ever again have than level of international attention and resources devoted that it has today. i was wrong on a point. this was written in 2007 when in that year alone the mission of

the importance of the police around the 2006 and the resources given to policing in 2007 alone was more. there was a recognition. there is now in a unique and pretended to move away from the multitude of individual police reform projects toward a more coordinated, comprehensive, longer-term approach that stands a much greater chance of effectively reforming the afghan national police. there is time to clarify today is blurred vision and to achieve consensus on a common vision, strategy for developing a police force will operate as cops rather than robbers. and i highlight in that paper some key areas which i thought was the key. first and foremost, the need to develop a shared vision and

strategy. at that time, major counter insurgency operation, afghanistan and certainly from the u.s. perspective, there is a desire for more boots on the ground. the need for training of the police. some of them based in the north led by the germans, the reform efforts. you have the afghan government which was to really factor then to the objective. and i would describe that largely has regime protection. we are naive to arguably say that there was effective police force in terms of the objectives there is competing vision that

is never really clarified, and that remains an issue today. you had donor assistance. alas the issues around the ministry of interior, and some, again, a common vision on what the reform objectives we did not have political will, hard to see a lot of the reform objectives. prioritize quality over quantity quick fixes, at that time the afghan national a salary. some might argue perhaps the afghan local police with some open we will hear more about today can often undermine achieving longer-term objectives the need to prioritize this security sector which would be a huge issue and a particular concern as resources for afghanistan and allen downward trajectory, but also the police

reform is first and foremost a political undertaking, not a technical one. that is something that has remained, the willingness to understand the politics and back to that end. so i am hoping to get more good news. i no there has been. now observing on election day. and i think just seeing a role of the police say, protecting elections, we know that there was a lot of violence on election day. but compared to what many of us anticipate it was more peaceful. the afghan national security forces deserve a lot of credit for that. i think the outpouring of support that we saw following and for the a in be in particular is quite a testament to some of the achievement that

had been done, pictures of young girls handing out roses to the afghan national police, not saddam would have predicted for five years earlier. was a morale booster. and a confidence-building exercise for the public. i think this issue in the future is easily important and we are fortunate to have a gifted panel of experts here today with lots of experience working on this issue both in terms of the afghan national police, but also on the issues surrounding the afghan local police. this event is also to be -- to launch some papers that have been done recently. the most recent being the afghan national police 2015 and beyond. i am fortunate to have her with us today. prior to that we did the counter insurgency local militia and state building in afghanistan

which, of course, looked at the afghan local police. fortunate to have flown across the pond and. prior to that a year ago we published police transition in afghanistan. i think we will give presentations on all of these offs and an opportunity to hear their presenting and then discuss. but it is my great honor to introduce our guest of honor today, as minister of the jolly, the minister of interior afghanistan from 2002-2005, firsthand experience of what it was like trying to reform the police sector afghanistan. currently a distinguished professor for strategic studies at in the you saw. prior to being at the ministry of interior, a 20 year career with voice of america covering

south and central asia in the middle east. and prior to that he served as a colonel in the afghan national army. published widely and all anticipating. working for several years, the military history of afghanistan. fest. [applause] >> thank you very much. police to open the session. i am sure that we have a panel of distinguished efforts and

later on, national security forces in afghanistan. the afghan national police, from the days that it was first established, to the -- today when we saw the successful protection and security of the first round of elections. always had been very successful for example the security of the constitution. and the prevention.

this will not tell you about the overall capacity of the afghan national police, the forcible do the kind of job at the same time . actually, afghanistan national police. the police action became of fighting force. most of the box of police were certain. the traditional police. being forgotten. before that additionally, helping to function. the section of the population.

security and growth. they were all combined together in the center. with the war and violence, guns, security, and the role of law in charge of local governments, the criminal investigation police and security forces. so a compilation of these categories providing the kind of comprehensive. unfortunately after 2001 the reform, the police, we saw two major problems. first off, there were many the

can with different priorities got different procedures. and on the other hand. the building at the same time. so most of the building in fact was influenced. and that was the major problem in the beginning. however, even during the building process, and that the same time in 2003 when all provincial governments, district governments, municipalities, the police can also immigration

services, all those, the budget of the minister of interior was one of the 37 million. that is a fraction of what happened after 2009. after 2009 the budget of trading after a national security forces , i wish we had a fraction of it. it would be different. at that time a police officer was making $16 a month as a salary. he would get himself paid. that was the beginning of major corruption. however come how i remember you had said lease trucks trying to

build. at that time the police reform was going on in the context of security sector reform. because different countries came to take one securities sector. they came. resources and also priorities. it was when they were funded by the united states. it was slow, but it was good. the lead nation was germany. germany was the godfather. however, germany wanted to build the police.

just as there were being built by another country therefore it is different country. at that time the police could arrest violators. that's why the police building of the force did not go very well. 2009 we saw that there was more interested in investment. that actually helped. that actually started to draw serious attention.

who says the what you have today has many, many problems facing the police. the major question is what is going to be? it is going to become a problem of law enforcement to protect the population or a security force to protect the state? unfortunately with the upsurge of violence in 2006 there was a rush. that continued today. there was not the kind of force that would resolve the best

forms of fighting insurgency. protect the population. by itself it becomes an asset. when i was looking at the challenges facing today in afghanistan i counted to ten and stopped. the first one was the number. they say 850, 700,000. it will go to 160,000. but it is an odd assortment. you have the police force, the uniformed police, we call it, the counter-terrorism police the

border police, but altogether there is no connected. because both they set up preforming ministry of interior. so saw each minister would come and make changes. the same old. make no changes. and there is no continuity. the second thing is that this government, forced initiative, as i said, and that started from day one. two dozen for -- in 2004 before the provincial election the contractors placed to do 40,000

police officers by october of 2004. .. the third was out sourcing of police. one of them in the minix air

with police or british cards. some of the spirit and says were not very successful. we will hear about the in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, some of the germans were not successful. the problem is that you can come of the militia or tribal militia or tribal contribution work only when they become part of one system. not system breaks down, it won't work. so therefore, the state has some kind of influence for the tribes community's believe in the viability of this date.

otherwise you won't find them. the reason the people enough guinness and during the instability go to war alert, go to networks is because they do not see this date protect. otherwise enough guinness and, they are denied areas for the status week. in 2014 to come to tuition loya jirga, there was overwhelming support for a strong, centralized state. then they went to other option but i'm not going to discuss those here. this security -- the focus on security for police has weakened other capacities.

building cases, building evidence for cases is becoming very affect to because today one police officer is kind of in charge of police charity function. the next day he calms to the investigation peace. so there is no kind of his two chanel continuity. the coordination is always a problem. while the contribution from many countries only works when the priorities are the name, priority of the afghan government and priority of the international community. i hope in the future the international police

coordination board would he come more kind of authoritative in order to bring the. the police officers has another problem is not based on the capacity for their training. one data general changes uniform from the minister of defense in kosovo to the head of the police department. and he brings the experience of the military to the resource. this is not something new from the beginning minister of interior was loaded with army office tears. they were mark hurd security.

there are many other things, that looking forward. we can establish the afghan team feature only through the support of success. and that can happen when police function as a community. there is no doubt as long as there's instability that can didn't come the police will be forced to do some security. however, there should be some established. first, all the forces that are providing security ship at the same time should become capable of switching to jobs for many calms. in the past the paramilitary

force deployed across the border. in the same time they were doing some heavy lifting. but you are first going to become a police officer. this is some thing that we should be enough guinness and. if a person comes from the minister defend, they are general and the ministry of defense. if he wants you to appoint thomas police -- [inaudible] the continued international support is required for this sustainment. after 2014 when the bulk of the nato force asleep at tennessee in, this is going to be a challenge for the international

community would make to continue to fund the afghan national security forces. without that kind of support with exciting with the united states, there is the possibility when police were not pulled together. it was particularly risky because in some unit for some parts of the national security force it balances itself. if that force cannot pull together, then it can fragment it. priorities should be unified in the future. i think where we can do this as the kind of more empowered international elites.

and then make for generation institution loathing. i think it is regretful that it took us six after resisting to both -- to resist the decision of the government and local governments from the minister of interior and give it to another entity. since then, we have all these problems between the governors and the police force. as i said traditional afghanistan security stability provided by the combination of governing, security and the rule of law. that actually fragmented in 2006

at your last. i think somehow the government is an important person. it does not represent the sense of government becomes all consult department in the province report to them. it does not have a budget because the budget of a private is the department. the government does not have authority because all the departments including police report industries. that situation should he reviewed and. then i think there is a vision. to talk about division of police police in the future. as long as the capability and the current flaws are not

correct de facto king division would be implemented in the future. so therefore, patients can work. proportional in afghanistan there's no connection between the islands, ways and means. and finally, managing the afghan local police. afghan local police this time has worked very well in some areas. there are two reasons for this to my particularly the south. first with taliban failed to recover the areas lost after the search that switch to terror attack takes ss nation of influential people and communities. people themselves became

supportive of local police. you can be a in kandahar, anywhere. many years ago or shuey is the nonsense table area in the area. today it is very secure because of the affluent countries. in particular in some districts that listen to, it has been very successful experience. those were used the idea to be in power militias are very unpopular in afghanistan. and i think we will fire back. so after local police as good as long as it's managed.

how to deal with that later on. the regular police becomes powerful to extend all over the country. are you going to integrate into the afghan national police or the worst-case let it go. then probably the possibility of seeing the militia. so therefore come as seaports. first of all, afghan national police have come a long way. it cannot be -- it is not comparable to date the situation in 2003. sachar, the afghan national security force needs to calm from the regular civilian police. it cannot happen overnight.

and finally, the police source has integrated with other elements of the stability and security rule of law in the country. it cannot become a single instrument of security and stability to the country. thank you very much. [applause] the mac thank you very much, minister jalali. it is now my pleasure to turn the program to my colic, former head perito who has done a lot of work in afghanistan on police reform issues and has for many, many are split or security sector reform works. so bob will moderate the rest of the session. >> thank you very much in thank you, mr. minister for your

presentation. i'd like to welcome you all here this afternoon. my name is bob perito. for many years i was here at usip. it's great to be back again. our focus today is looking forward for the post-2014 transition of the afghan national police. as you just heard from our first two speakers come on this is not the first transition they have a national police have undergone. it seems the transition is a general cure eristic and establishing care eristic of the afghan national police. so today we find ourselves in a situation where as a result of a long-term u.s. military training program the afghan national police are basically militarized counterinsurgency force of around 150,000 or. the question before us this morning is is that a force that afghanistan needs going forward into the democratic future.

to discuss this issue, where the very very distinguished in all of experts who have looked at this from a number of perspectives. two of our panelists today are authors of the report and cantor introduced those reports. they are available outside the room if you have a tip than that. if you look in your packet of materials or if materials as he came into the room, you have the bias of our panelists. so i will limit my introduction in the interest of time. when the panel has finished their presentation and we ask each of them to speak for about 10 to 12 minutes, then we will open the floor for questions and recognize the number of people in the audience. this is a group of people who know this issue well. our first panelists this morning -- i'm sorry, not this morning if we been together since 11:00 this morning. we got off to an early tire.

our first panelists is ambassador kathryn royal, armor headed the international police court needing board secretariat and former deputy ambassador of the united kingdom. it will be shawn stith from a former director of the security assistance force, minister of interior and ministerial guys to recruit. the panelists will be author of one of our report was then managing regarding the former senior rule of law in training in afghanistan police development machine. finally, we are going to change subjects in the middle of our presentation here and take a closer look at the afghan local police. we have two distinguished discussants have written a very interesting report. when a stock or jonathan goodhand who is one of the

co-authors and professor at the key of london and his phd candidate, aziz hakimi who assaults the co-author of the report and also as it met the university of london. so we look at started. i'm going to turn the microphone over to ambassador step five. >> thank you great match. great pleasure to be here. i need to preface my remarks by saying while it's still a serving member of the diplomatic service, my last attempt or burger king as has secretariat and also adviser to the minister of interior. therefore the foreign office can't take any of the blame for anything am about to say. it is great that people are interested in this subject because it's a feel for quite a while it was one of those cinderella subjects. everybody would be happy to pay absolutely having a good

functioning police force is vital to any country and in a successful transition and that is sort of one of those mother had apple pies they been too can make and it's not just about security. it's about legitimacy, so it does go to the heart of any station you saw that recently in ukraine. when did the government as its legitimate the. it was about the police. all sorts of things about the government. but we did not behave in afghanistan certainly at the beginning and i think the minister said that outfit very well. we did not behave as if the police really wise to do something that this was an foundation for where we were all going on this. and we find ourselves in a very complicated situation the minister also described as having to build the institution in the middle of a fight. not an easy time to do it.

and they sort of collapse was sort of it. we sat an enormous task. we've made obvious mistake before. we need to root together and have a real partnership as a civil military partnership and the international side approaching this. one of these things in nature and attention to is a pamphlet that was done at fort leavenworth for lessons learned here 2007, very, very good pamphlet from zero to blue. i was able to sort it had myself

speaking in front of the assembled, slightly hostile ntn i can say, you know, the military, the american military identified 13 golden lessons about which do policing in this situation. i think to say probably be broken in lebanon. said maybe we should have another go. in 2012 which is quite shocking. the most critical lesson in not pamphlet are three and three of the biggest mistakes we've made. you need to focus on policing early for the recent i've just said is such an foundation. that was it took a very long time for us to unders and this was someone else's country and maybe away at to take that opinion here is lee. and you need to distinguish the

police and the army. the relationship police have with the population is fundamentally different. that is the basis of the different. the principles that the community that the minister also spoke about his absolutely vital and not at all central to the work we are doing in afghanistan. also thoroughly agree with what the minister said about her disjointedness. we had adopted her to have a policy that was fundamentally to adopt the province or the forest and different nationalities had picked up different forces, taken in florida you could argue the case that they done a pretty good job. but how does that relate to anything else? that was a bit of a mystery and how it related to the idea that please integrated into just the system as part of government did not pay.

fundamentally, we haven't really created an anp. even now you don't join in p. you join the border police. so you actually don't even have to miss to shuttle way you feel your loyalty is something called the anp because that is just a name. as the minister said in 2009 a really important new phase in all of this. i can't express too highly of my sort of duration for being stood up and generative force in the timeframe it's a good absolutely extraordinary. when i arrived in kabul first of september 2110, you could need 10 generate the force of the timescale we were talking about. we did. mtma did. we wouldn't have the discussion

about where to go, how should turn this into police cars that they haven't been generated in the first place. and certainly not coming from the perspective of those taking mtma got it completely wrong. they put the foundation of the number semaphores that could start us off and give us some serious to build on. i also think sometimes overlooked one of the most part things for afghanistan as a whole has put literate yet the forefront of training and development. and you know, i would start to me young guy who are joining the afghan national police. i was done at home and if they break talking to people in the third estate winery for you joining the police click configure sentence. i didn't quite put the question like that, but it's in the back of my mind. a number of them said to me, because i know in the course of my surveys i signed up for three years i will be taught to read and write and that will allow me to go back out of the police into the civilian world and i

will be looked to after my family better into that. so not only has mtma than a generation at a suit on the development and that is some way must forget. that is the name of that recruits people. he gets people into the police and it's a huge stimulus for that, but also developing country. on the other hand, we didn't build a police force. we pelted security force, paramilitary force. they're extraordinarily good reasons for that. but we need to start preparing for the future. i was talking to general allen about this and he said he always recognized as there needed to be a proper eye out for a tipping point when the need for security diminished and you had to go on in the rule of law for us. i agree with him to a point. the problem is there isn't

really a tipping point. you have to start preparing for the rule of law force. there isn't a moment when you can say you go from one to the other. you have to have your priorities -- you have to do it all in and shift the balance of what you're doing depending on what the activity is doing. different priority in a different balance in different places in the country. one of the things you could say in somewhere like herat with less problems insurgents eat, having a rough focus on the rule of law and an ability to do that earlier cassette flagship, a pilot for other places to look too would start looking at what the police force might look like. perhaps because her doing it so late in the day and such pressure were not able to do that and built these two capabilities that one, run in parallel, shift the priorities. but that's what we need to get to a not so pretty to keep doing now. i became the head secretary at

the military say it was fallin told. it was because in the run-up to 202012 nato summit this issue that the minister also spoke about was to eat the rule of law force or creating paramilitary to the head. it came to a head because the non-american donors would be nice for a billion euros a year for the next 10 years to finance it, but were told they couldn't influence what it looks like and it wasn't going to be what they wanted the rule of law. they said that we would won't pay. that stimulated a discussion. so the result of that was we need a proper discussion. ready to tackle some of these really difficult issues. we've grappled now what generated the force and they've got a long way towards that. and we really need to look at what sort of police force is going to be. prosser managed not to institute and become a little more

fortunately someone finally said we've got a big but the right andy. but use them you never get back to life. i unfortunately got the job of doing that. i had some pretty limited aims, which was just as well because they didn't have the budget for the first five and. i also had a staff that was made up of voluntary national contributions, which meant i had some people i needed to entertain. but that's the way of the international organizations. there were some fairly limited goals. focus to actually agree on the discussions started on this, but i haven't got us anywhere. there was not a peep of thing that struck me that if we were ever going to coordinate international support, the only

way to do was to say we will get our support coordinated behind with the afghan wants because anything that is ours today. 2002, 2003 we could instead in a consensus around it. so the first thing to do was to get that to happen. and then to try and get international is to agree to a minor support behind it and spent that i've seen the repair to support the afghan spirit the other thing was to come up with some implementable plans and this is what we're trying to aspire to. those are the aims for the year's work. i managed to help the afghans produce a vision in that time it sacker toward the process that

now has finally produced sometime later a set of two year plans that look vaguely implementable. the vision is genuinely asked the. one of the things i did was to put myself between the international community and give the afghan space to do it themselves. once they were given that space, they knew what they wanted. it was rubbish to say they did what they wanted. one of the rows i opposed him was much criticized for us we are not going ternate discussion with a piece of payer. we are going to have a discussion with their afghan counterparts in going to be put on paper. we have this terrible habit of saying by the way here's your suggestion. the completely close down debate and we ended up with nothing. we are going in with nothing and

we are going to talk about it. you have no idea to say you cannot put anything on paper. we prove to them that you could do that. there were problems with that, differing visions. one of the problems is what i think is a false dichotomy between community policing. community policing is getting the community to tell you for the ieds are very. the counterterrorism community policing got us into trouble about it a debate we are still up for showing how the numbers got to get out of. the lack of afghan capability is still there. i walk a lot through the institutional capability because bob will kill me, but i would like to say a few things about the problems coming up. we've made huge progress there's no doubt about it.

the doubts i have in my mind and my successors will have to do with afghan commitment here puts the next minister going to do? are we going to get it passed to the next minister? that's vital. the stovepipes they talked about being no anp. but it's got to be resold. the cutting across a personal interest, both in the midst two should that is not there to save the personal interest of the various people, but actually serving the afghan state is the biggest challenge of all. the political threat. in the last couple of weeks, karzai have time for an odd to the antiterrorist, that's very, very worried and it just shows you how easy it is to underestimate a good staff. civic education. you have to be assaulted me in afghanistan to remember what a proper police force looks like. so that means soul generation of young people in afghanistan need

to be told what to expect from the police. they need to understand what the right sorry and what their duties are towards the police force cannot civic education has to be done. how to share the budget between the army and police in a way that actually create hazardous security wanted the country. we are part of that problem. make no bones about that. i think if there's a real issue there. who was going on the international side be the body that are there talking to the police on the ground discussing things. up to now it has been nato isaf. resolute support won't go the same. another president has now come up with a number. that is fantastic news. unfortunately, there is still a lot of discussion about what the mandates going to look like it where policing it into that. there's an awful lot of people who say nader was not an policing anymore. but if nato decides to do that we are all in deep trouble of a throw to win off lot of money. so huge progress.

i see for myself the daily bravery of the members of the afghan national police and phenomenal people who are really doing their best and extraordinary thing at twice the rate of the army. they deserve our support. >> thank you. thank you very much. it's a big topic. a lot to cover. we will ask shawn to speak next we'll ask our panel is to keep in mind a time limit here because we do want to get the questions. go ahead. >> i too will do a quick practice here to my comments. all of my observations are based on eye roll survey name nato's isaf and the minister of interior poker there. i am not a law enforcement profession or.

i've got the budget and experience that policing. afghanistan or elsewhere. i've done two tours there in 2011 and 2012 and most recently in 2013 and 2014. i've been back here in the u.s. for about 10 days now so my observations may be a bit dated given the change that occurs. they are also informed by interactions of over 40 plus international stakeholders and also donated our side influence within the ministry of interior and i afghan leaders within the ministry and within the provinces for the provincial chiefs of police. they are also based on my observations of police performance in such recent issues as the loya jirga, the god of the islamic festival, but never used the celebration and

those inviting international leaders into the kabul area and of course the presidential elections. as has been mentioned, nato and isaf originally focused on force generation. and what a tremendous effort occurred there. in less than three years besides that the police force went from 67,002 what is really over 200,000 personnel right now. they are the largest of the afghan national security forces because they include the 157,000 members of the afghan national police, but also the afghan local police, 30,000. to 20,000 members of the afghan public protection force. 10,000 double serving. u.n. say security, the central prison director for the nation

and the judicial security unit. if you added all together, comes the closer to 230,000 members that fall within the mli infrastructure. it is a resilient capable and increasingly credible force and credible with both the coalition operation and with the people of afghanistan, especially in the wake of the election security and that is the key aspect in ensuring security and credibility of the government of afghanistan and the coalition staffers and supporting lan. at the same time, the mli and the anp have plenty of challenges. photo: fluent is paramount throughout the anp, throughout the moi.

i personnel turnover and especially leadership positions. turnover and not many people at the forthcoming but they are rotated in and out of different positions. if a fragmented command and control structure. as you've heard, the minister mentioned even within the 150,000 sections it is not a homogenous organization like the army has. no, it is broken up into the afghan uniform police, which provide about half of that for us, but also the border police that given the task of securing the nation's orders for the first 50 kilometers from the border in lan. if they are met by a foreign invader, whose role is there to stop them? the police for the first 50 kilometers. you've got the afghan national civil order police modeled on

the john thornbury model, rather than paramilitary i prefer to think of them as a police force of military capabilities but still tasked with law enforcement. the afghan anticrime, the afghan local police, the public protection force, the general directorate of police special units, s.w.a.t, basically. all of those answer to decentralize police force, but to provincial governors, district governors, it better. that is a tough organization to try and manage and yet they seem to make it work somehow dealing with multiple variables, complexity simultaneously that we often don't understand. given all of that, we also need to focus now on institution building and reform. this is really the underpinnings of all of the operational

capability because all those police force is coming to 200,000 person force relies upon paid to be processed by the ministry, relies upon supplies and food and facilities to be provided via ministry. it is the establishment of entering and repeatable processes, institutions, a bureaucracy if you will, but a well running iraq or see that the ministry really needs of the police forces of afghanistan really need to in your. transitions are occurring within that force. geographically the afghans are in the lead throughout afghanistan. even not that geographic transition process started in 2011, the police are key to point out that in 20% of the districts, the police had always been in charge because neither

the coalition or the army had ever had entering president than 20% of afghanistan. the police were, aren't always have an in charge of those areas. additionally, the establishment of the privacy by the police rather than the army is increasing. police are still present in every single district in precinct of afghanistan. that is not found and that can be said by any other security force. at the same time, institutional capabilities need to be established in transition from coalition provided for under britain to enduring afghan capabilities. a few of those areas. human resource management. while that is the key to this police force, they are establishing and taking ownership of end to end

processes for recruitment or retirement. they are reforming their own processes right now to build inefficiencies the coalition had thought of. it is tough because they don't have an automated system. bollocks implemented right now, they're still challenges with it. chronic dividend implementation and execution at the lowest levels. i will need to be maintained. strategy plans and policies another area of progress as the afghans themselves only with coalition guidance, but not capability replacement again updated their national police strategy, their national police plan and a penny of their of the nsf developer planning a multiyear programs this year. it is important to note while the ama is pointed out as having superior products in that regard, it is done on a

contracted basis underwritten by coalition fund name and nonorganic capability to the ministry of defense. there are areas that need improvement, areas of material sustainment require a lot of maturity in their process development documentation and implementation. that is everything from financial execution of their budget, acquisition, procurement, contract management as well as logistics, the timely order of warehousing and distribution of materials to the operational forces as well as the mate as of their extensive facilities. while the army has decided to maintain 149 locations in afghanistan, the police have to maintain over 1640 permanent facilities for the nationwide present. it is a different kind of game

for the police. other areas of progress in good police intelligence. they've changed the paradigm. they've recognized the police intelligence is that military intelligence. the majority of their actions will be the result of the population willie mae providing information to the police so they can respond when the people are in need. other areas are slow will be time to domain. gender integration will require cultural changes well beyond the afghan security institutions and movement to full western-style community policing multigenerational and its implementation. the complete transition to traditional policing roles, the establishment of entering repeatable and self-sustaining and is very a processes will

take time. it'll take years to fully implement and mature. there'll also be reliant upon the aligned coherent and consistent approach of forces supporting their efforts and really the establishment of a comprehensive, achievable and resourced plan by all international part errors and i want to -underscore plan is to be critical, not a collection of good ideas, but an articulated plan that leads from our current state to our final goal. afghan war commitment to the effort will be critical as well as the integration of the ministry of interior with other aspects of the government at large, including the ministry of foreign affairs to ministry for

sector reform and the ministry of defense, partners in security operations only would these prerequisite will transition all capabilities to afghan. >> thank you very much. it's like to introduce michelle and ask her to talk about her report. >> well, first of all, and before i begin, it would be remiss if i didn't say thank you to usip for giving me the opportunity to go back into afghanistan again this year and really look at some of the aspects of the afghan national police development that i was able to see at the beginning in 2009 and i'm starting to see come to fruition and i'm frankly

grateful to usip for having the vision and the willingness and the afghan national police and beyond. the anp are key to the future security of afghanistan. the afghans know that and share that. in fact they are preeminent in that sense of importance. i would also be remiss if on this day after memorial day a donut knowledge the sacrifices that those individuals who have worked over the years on behalf of the international coalition to help build the ministry of interior and the afghan national police. the sacrifice on the military side in terms to death and law

enforcement professionals have played a huge role in helping the afghan national police get to where they are today in their personal sacrifices are not publicized, but they are great. i wanted to make sure we don't forget what this has cost us. it is more than dollars. it is last. i am very fortunate as they say here in that first of all my major version turned by the industry porgy waal had saved it to read it and i don't have to hammer it into you in 12 minutes. so thank you for that. i am one of the few people who has actually contact did a comprehensive security sector reform-based assessment of the afghan national police over a period of time. i have conducted not be half as the u.s. government and now most lately usip and assessment that

looks at the languages between policing governments and just is. from the policing is, every year since 2009. and i think it is a sad state that frankly on the degree of continuity that we have in the international community and our engagement with afghanistan that there are more people like me. because until you are able to luck out and put some perspective on what has been achieved, what are the challenges remaining, what are the gaps to be closed, and this has to be opportunistic. it is also tough to be optimistic. i remain us to sit here bullish on the transport. i've seen them in a disastrous state and through the years i've seen a number of capabilities increased measurably. strategic planning an articulated arm vision for policing in afghanistan.

in afghanistan i was asked to help the coalition to come up with a strategy for the rule of law. whatever that meant in the afghan contest. because at the continuity and the fact that police development was over in a line of operation for security and governance of justice develop and were in their own minds of operation for governance and rule of law. there had been very little connection between the two in the thinking of how these things all work together. so mtma, looking up what had happened to the train for another 2006, 2007 timeframe you instinctively sent and had to be done that is greater than train and equip said they wanted a strategy that would allow us to move forward and connect policing to justice and the rule of law.

i was told at the time that there was no vision for the future of the anp. i began to engage the senior leaders then i realized i was drilling what professional police officers who would some cases had been policing in this country for 30 years through three regimes that they had vision of what policing was in afghanistan. but we didn't understand it and we hadn't really stepped back and take in the time to articulated. so that's what we begin to try to do. and mtma began talking in terms of building an institutional culture and building and operating force. how do we address all three top-down and bottom-up? as we started to engage with the afghans and bring them into the

strategic planning process and strategic thinking process, it was very clear they had thought through many aspects of these and in particular there is this question that shawn stith brought up about change management that has occurred over the last three years with the anp to build an institution in the critical question is how you build in the ability to manage transition and change. and this is where we talk about it in the report this year. this is where the afghans have i believe really made significant progress. as we look forward in last three successive ministers of interior have in fact articulated a vision for where they want them to go and how do they built this institutional culture or restore the tradition of policing in afghanistan and with each successive ministers vision and a refined and saw there, you

have seen more of these elements put in there about community policing on the relationship between the police and the government they serve in the government with whom they have to interact. and so, i believe this is one of those areas that is significant for the future of the anp. it is one of those areas where we have international community have an opportunity to quite frankly be opportunistic, to link our governance development programs that continue in 2015 and yawned to clear deliverables that will help the ministry of interior strength in its own vision and strength of noses touche malfunction that enable it to manage change and manage resources necessary to carry the vision forward. i want to talk about this issue very quickly of building an operational force and the problem of a national police force and what that means in the afghan context.

it was fascinating to me when i was doing my field research in january of this year that every single afghan i talked to at every level of government inside government, outside government, civil society organizations, individuals, even shopkeepers because i was able to get out and about this past january, even individual afghans when i would ask them about the afghan national police and its future, the very first thing they wanted to talk about was the need for the police officers themselves to understand the culture in values of the country. several people pointed out from the get-go that if the national police force is going to succeed, particularly a structure, as is currently structured, police officers have to be able to go from province to province, district to district and understand the underlying values and the people in districts in which they serve

so they can engage with them, gather the information they need in order to keep the community safe and also to facilitate this transition from military security operation to law enforcement led operation operations under afghan criminal procedure and rules of evidence. ..

wabush just to carry forward. the last thing i'm going to say because i know that i'm about out of time and i'm very sensitive that i wan but i wanto be able to ask questions come to me the greatest impediment out of all of this has been the absence of consistency and continuity in the international community approach. with every single change in leadership, whether it is on the civilian or the military side, there has been a change in the emphasis and the objectives and

the international community framework for the security sector reform which passed the ambassador pointed out was volunteer for a province or volunteer for a function or an organization has allowed these shifts and prioritization with leadership changes so that it's been nearly impossible to have a consistent development approach. and when we talk about building an institutional culture and an operational force, this is a generational undertaking and we have to recognize that and accept it and that means there are certain decisions that should not be made below the strategy and policy level. there are objectives that need to be set at the top and have to be adhered to at the operational level in the development missions or whether we are talking about military train and

advise missions under the operation resolute support, so these are decisions that have to be made at the policy level and agreed upon by the international community and i believe that if we can get this kind of at least some degree of consistency and continuity that it will confuse the afghans a lot less but it will also enable us in this time of resources to put our focus on some critical institutional development issues. we mentioned a couple of them and thinthe special report. the ambassador has mentioned a couple. it will allow us to focus on those over an extended period of time so that we can build the institutional capacities in a way that the afghans can then adapt that are called shirley resource appropriate and that will become an enduring. i believe in the afghans, i

believe in this mission. i wouldn't have committed to the amount of personal time and effort if i didn't. when you think about the task not only the coalition to combat the afghans have taken on it is monumental change management, contrast this with our own effort and our own government to stand at the department of homeland security and it starts putting it back into perspective and i think you can appreciate what's gone on. i believe that we can sustain this dot ibb that we have to do it strategically and carefully in a very focused way. thank you. >> we are now going to change our focus on moving from the transition of the afghan national police to look into an element of the national police force the afghan local police.

the afghan national police strategic plan into strategic vision documents you will see that it's supposed to be phased out by 2018. so we will ask jonathan if this is a good idea and asked him to talk about the research. >> thank you for inviting us here today. first of all, it seems in some ways slightly strange to be talking about the militia in the context of the debate, but the fact calls us something about the hybrid nature of the security environment in afghanistan. i know it seems to be very clear for the soldier, policeman and militia man but many may have

the new all three even simultaneously so there's a lot of ambiguity that we should remember. but i'm going to talk very briefly to get some background on the study and then talk about the findings. this is the first study of its kind. he has been the person here doing research on militias and it was based on researching the three provinces. and as i said it is one of the first. the research question we are asking is what happened of roles and the impacts on the security dynamics. and how do we understand it in relation to this sort of complex of interventions going on in the country? the first thing to say is there

is a history behind it, and it didn't come in on a blank slate. and that we have seen in the fragmentation and the means of violence and the strong continuities between the 2,000 period. about a marriage end emergence f military entrepreneurs and also a long history of the formation of the past. sometimes it is about supporting the strength and the power and other times it's actually been about fragmenting. one of the ways of dealing -- one of the ways of trying to deal with this history has been thbeenthat the marketization fog in the militia networks into the states and with the result of what we see in afghanistan is

what we might call the rising state and the formal set of structures and institutions under paid by the networks and power relations links to the various military actors. this has been an ongoing kind of set of trade-offs and paradoxes anin the way the national actors tend to deal with the security in afghanistan. on the one hand trying to be a rocket science and some programs do the activities we've been talking about and on the other hand there've been various ongoing attempts to work in the formal hybrid structures that further the means of violence. this increasingly became the case post-2006 with questions about the failure of the top-down state building and the overly centralized attempt to to

build the state from them bottom. working on the militia can be seen in relation to this conte context. this is where the counterinsurgency doctrine came together and this is based on what many of you here will be aware of but it was about the concept channelization of the kind of different relationship between the rule making and politics, so it wasn't about allowing politics to take over, it was explicitly political. david has written about this 80% public takes, 20% fighting. it's about persuasion as much as it is about coercion. so this interest came and was

very much linked to and inseparable from this idea that it was a battle for the governance, and the need to reach out to the society and to provide security at the local level and that's where the ideas that the militia kind of reproducing the recycling and experimented with. and it also came out of a long term history of experimentation and counterinsurgency doctrine to the war in vietnam and most recently than in iraq. many of you know about the system where in the direct rule franchising the means of policing to people on the

periphery. and in afghanistan there was the reinvention of the ids like the tribal forms of policing. one thing that we highlight in the report is how these ideas often are the worst. the first of all misunderstood the nature and healthy reached from the certain political geographical and second, that misunderstanding of how it's been changed and one can simply reinvent tradition. the point here is to say that the experiments in the formation came out of a complicated set of imperatives both in afghanistan

and more broadly. how they played out on the ground was the result of the complicated set of orange fence and negotiations in the power plays and the outcomes vary much from one context to another and not ones that were planned. >> i would start with a reinforcing very briefly what jonathan was saying because if you look at this study is done in the context of the counterinsurgency and also its impact on the statehood because what we need to remember, there's been this afternoon the panel discussed the need for transitioning to the civilian policing and traditional but i think what we try to highlight in the report is the political

economy which has the roots in the 1980s the armed groups that came to power post 2001 many of the actors that we studied were partners in the military that defeated it could have abandoned the end became the new powerbrokers. it's important to remember that because quite often we forget there's a large political economy that probably wouldn't change that much though the resources would be withdrawn but i think there would be more attempted when seeking in the revenue in the international resource drawdown. so it is in that context i think it's important to remember that war isn't going to die down. they will be in the forefront of

the fighting to discuss civilian eyes in the police in the past ten years there's so much effort to me it seems a little oversimplistic and i think on that note it's important to contextualize because just like when the american military was responsible for training the afghan police, they invested a lot of money into this force and it's been to the tribal police force not necessarily related to the state. it's been a paramount eyes and i think that it's important to remember.

we pointed out in the report but it's not the first experiment. i tend to argue that it goes back to 2001 to the beginning of the military intervention because a lot of the actors that we served from the northern alliance has a sense of continuity and ther that there a number of experiments. when we talk about the afghan government, the authorized it in 2010. that is in the decree that was signed after period of intense negotiations under the commanding general petraeus.

we highlighted that it was a compromised solution and it allowed general petraeus to expand internationally because he needed the force as part of the search. so the afghan minister was about trying to control it and i have some sort of foresight on the competing rationale that's an important point to remember for someone like president karzai who was also controlling it. and initially it was thought of as a short term solution in the areas where there were no forces were no government forces and

this is one of the things we highlight in the report because it needs so much oversight by the government forces generally we use them in the areas where it's beyond government control that's where the government starts and it's difficult to monitor with all sorts of issues that this is the sort of contradiction. for it to be effective it needs a strong oversight. the creek area -- criteria was simple because the first experiment joined the military force in 2009 called the public

protection force that was discontinued for a variety of reasons because the u.s. military wasn't happy with it and there was too much central control bureaucracy so from that, the idea was to expand to other problems but it didn't so they used the special forces to do it on an ad hoc basis in the south primarily but it didn't have to control where the ministewhat theminister of inteo it and i think that was the beginning of the sort of problems between the afghan government and the u.s. military because he saw it as a way that they didn't have control over it and they were and how learning the local commanders and that was seen as a problem in the

legitimacy of the state oversight. an additional comparison in the cases because it offers a way for us to do it in the geographical areas. briefly on the findings, in a case study we made the point early on that we did this as a historical research so we look at these groups going back in the 80s and 90s and then post 2001 to because we are drawing a picture of the context of who are the people that came to power, how did they manage the forces or the control and so

a lot of them had a natural means of greed and what happened over the years going back to the 19 '90s it was a very fragmented security environment with competing militia groups and commanders. even in the one about leave there were three commanders in d each one was undercutting the other. it was very difficult. the general but trust them they wanted to control this because the resources. we talk about the various agendas involved for the americans expanding it in the controlling it. local powerholders thought it was important to control it.

this, the findings indicate that injecting these kind of resources actually lead to further fragmentation but it couldn't consolidate or lead to the improvement in security or the reasserting government authority because that was one of these main rationale is to link the central government to the local level, and that's reason why we call it to the local police. actually very different security environment because if you go back to early 2001 when the telegram [one district in babylon most of the commander that took power belonged and had

close ties with the telegram so they essentially changed the caption and the allies of the americans. and with the forces. but because of the dominance of national police, the commanders felt marginalized and renegotiating so then instead of bringing them together actually the gap was wide and led t it la series of problems in the integration command and

creativity the center of the town we had the government forces and within the villages where one couldn't go to the other area. they succeeded pushing back the insurgents in the group security but preserved the power coalition which if you compare to babylon has the totally opposite effect and references were made at the time as a way of empowering his own networks. very briefly and this is important to mention there is a lot of talk about human rights abuses but we also looked at the recruitment and how they are in danger to the community because

in the contest of environment they stand up and say i'm with the government and you've become a target for the telegram. one of the things that we kept reminded in terms of the success was because it was heavily targeted by the telegram which points to the ability and this is something that we need to keep in mind. we talked in terms of the pressure and why people join to maintain symmetry between the forces as well as it was for economic reasons and i think we've -- with that i will come to the end. one was thought to expand the program further over what to do

with this force. there should be stronger oversight that brings you back to the early paradox that i mentioned to step up in the areas of the identities and the strongest oversight. the important thing is and this was pointed out in a number of interviews it is through the minister of interior to pay the recruits rather than commanders because that's where the dynamics are created. and last committee turned it into the national afghan police. and with that i will end my presentation. thank you. >> thank you very much. the way this is done because we want to capture your questions on television if you want to question we ask you to move to one of the two microphones on

either side of the room would like you to state your name and affiliation and appeal everyone to be brief. we would like to get as many questions as possible. now is the time please move to the microphone. we both take advantage in a couple of minutes while people are living around the room so that i can ask a question and my question is today it was revealed or announced to the united states will be leaving 9,800 military personnel behind after the withdrawal of the military forces at the end of 2014, and i want to ask the three experts that have been concerned in the process what they think if this is adequate

and how it will be presented. quick responses and then we will move to questions. >> i think the numbers are at least consistent with what the commanders have long proposed as being sufficient for a regional presence throughout the country. it will o of course limit to the coalition and age meant to the ministry and the capital engagement as well to the four other regional modes to provide both training and oversight of different police capabilities. >> what's going to be important is finding those troops and making sure that we use them to the best effect and get the money from where i'm sitting it's important that the policing

is giving its importance. >> the only thing i would add to that is i think it actually could be positive that we have fewer numbers. this means less opportunity to get in the way that it does focus. the other thing is i do think that we need to be very careful that we look at how to monitor and oversee our investments with a more consolidated presence we have less eyes and ears on the ground. i noticed i was actually shocked at the degree to which people in kabul had such little visibility of what was going on outside there was a huge difference i noticed from before and i think that needs to be addressed as we look at the forrest foster for the 9800.

as democrats tak >> let's take the first question. i would like to take two questions and then we g both brk and have the panel respond. please. >> can you hear me all right? >> i have two questions, one for the panel [inaudible] >> the microphone is for the television so please hold it up. >> two questions one is about the future of the policing. i was formerly with the nato forces in afghanistan. before the panel what i didn't hear you mention is corruption and the elements and how it's going to affect the policing in afghanistan in the future. some have said that the greatest enemy right now i think the police perception which was done

two years ago indicated less than one third of the population has any confidence in the national security forces the transparency is rated as 143 out of 145. the question is i did not hear that as a factor and i would like to know if you think it is a problem and if you do, how it should be addressed. i've often wondered how well the members are vetted and how we know what their loyalties are into that they are not predominantly local rather than national and what will happen if things keep sticking in afghanistan. i didn't see your recommendation and i want to hear that as a revelation that he ma you may h. >> thank you for two questions.