a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from vermont. mr. leahy: madam president, what the presiding officer: the time until noon is equally divided on the harper nomination. mr. leahy: is that time expired? the presiding officer: the hour of 12:00 noon having arrived, all postcloture time is expired. and the question is on the harper nomination. is there a sufficient second? there appears to be. there is. the lions are ordered. the clerk will call the roll.

vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators in the chamber wishing to vote or wishing to change their vote? if not, the ayes are 52, the nays are 42. , and the nomination is confirmed. the clerk will report the motion to invoke cloture. the clerk: cloture motion, we, the undersigned senators, in accordance with the provisions of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the nomination of sharon y. bowen of new york to be a commissioner of the commodity futures trading commission signed by 17 senators. the presiding officer: by unanimous consent the mandatory quorum call has been waived. the question is: is it the sense of the senate that debate on the nomination of sharon y. bowen of new york to be commissioner of the futures commodity trading commission

shall be brought to a close. the yeas and nays are mandatory. the clerk will call the roll.

vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators wishing to vote or wishing to change their vote? if not, the ayes are 50, the nays are 44 and the motion is agreed to. the clerk will report the nomination. the clerk: commodity futures trading commission, sharon y. bowen of new york to be a commissioner. the presiding officer: pursuant to the provisions of senate resolution 15 of the 113th

congress, there will be up to eight hours of postcloture consideration of the nomination equally divided in the usual form. mr. reid: madam president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent with respect to the harper nomination, the motion to consider be considered made and laid on the table and president obama be immediately notified of the senate's action. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: madam president, i ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding rule 22 the time following the scheduled recess recess -- the time following the scheduled recess until 4:00 p.m. be equally divided and controlled between the two leaders or their designees and that at 4:00 p.m. all postcloture time be expired, the senate freed to vote on qifertion of calendar number 755, that's bowen, and the senate proceed to note on cloture on calendar number 691, mastroianni, 733, chut kin in the order listed.

and if invoke cloture is invoked on any nomination, on wednesday, june 4, the senate proceed to vote in the order listed, the senate proceed to vote on cloture on 798, that's burwell, further that there be two votes, two minutes for debate prior to each vote equally divided in the usual form, any roll call votes in the first in the series be 10 minutes, if any nomination is confirmed, the motion to reconsider be laid on the table if no further action or debate, and that the president be immediately notified of the senate's action. the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: madam president, with this agreement we'll have four roll call votes today at 4:00 p.m. and as many as four roll call votes on wednesday at 11:00 a.m.

the presiding officer: under the previous order, the senate previous order, the senate >> so as you heard the senate's in recess until 2:15 eastern for their weekly party lunches. they did confirm keith harper to be u.s. ambassador to the united nations human rights council. he is first native-american to hold an ambassadorial post of any kind. the schedule for this afternoon has been announced. we expect the senate to vote on advancing the nomination of silvia burwell to be the seg tear of health and human services of the possibility this week a bill establishing a program to establish mental health courts. live coverage of the senate here on c-span2. coming up at 1:45 a group of republican senators will hold a briefing about veteran health care. senators burr, mccain and flake will take part. live coverage on c-span. senate house and governor

primaries are underway in eight states including mississippi where republican senator thad cochran is seeking the republican nomination. here is more on that race. >> host: in this race between chris mack daniel, the republican challenger to senator thad cochran, first elected back in 1972 to the house and has been in the senate since the carter administration has there been any reliable polling recently what to expect today? >> guest: there have been a number of polls out in this race. the question of reliability may be a separate question. mississippi is a fairly small state, only about three million people here and people i talk to say that it's a bit difficult to get an accurate read how things are looking. having said that though, it is, i think shaping up to be a fairly tight race today. >> host: why? >> guest: this has been an ugly contest for one thing. a lot of people say this is nastiest campaign mississippi has seen in more than a generation now. the campaign, sort of blew up

about 2 1/2 weeks ago. there were four people who were arrested and charged in what police say in madison mississippi arnde calling a conspiracy to take photographs of senator cochran's wife who has lived in a nursing home for the past 13 years with dementia. and an image of mrs. cochran we see used in the at the end of a anti-cochran video posted briefly online on april 26th >> host: let me share with our audience some of the ads. these are the two latest ads from the cochran and mcdaniel campaign related to this issue. first from senator thad cochran. >> just gets worse. now chris mcdaniel's radio co-host, fund-raiser and hometown friend charged with felonies. mcdaniel campaign scandal spreads. had enough. >> senator thad cochran is makes and voted against obamacare over

100 times. rise up and say no to dirty politics and yes to our strong conservative leader thad cochran. >> i'm thad cochran and i approved thisr message. >> host: the latest from the cochran campaign. he has been in the u.s. senate for the last 36 years. this response from his challenger, state senator chris mcdaniel. >> it has been spent 41 years in washington even good men can lose touch with their conservative roots. sadly, thad cochran voted for billions in wasteful spending like the bridge to know where and raised his own pay eight times. the alternative? conservative republican chris mcdaniel. he will lead the fight to repeal obamacare. as a state senator he fought wasteful spending and put prayer back in schools. vote conservative chris mcdaniel. >> i'm chris mcdaniel and i approved this message. >> host: two of the latest ads in the mississippi senate primary. voters go to the polls today and emily pettus, give us a sense of

his background, chris mcdaniel and why he decided to challenge senator cochran and who is supporting him. >> guest: excuse me, chris mcdaniel is an attorney and he was elected to the state senate in 2007. he comes from jones county which is in the southern part of the state, what we call the pine belt. and he has been ambitious since he arrived at the state capitol. he has been very aggressive on pushing gun rights and other issues and he is many so one who was seen as sort of an up-and-coming politician among tea party supporters. that is where he is getting a lot of his support. >> host: up until this issue involving senator cochran's wife suffering from dementia and a mcdaniel supporter who blogs on behalf of chris mcdaniel, posting that video, where was the trajectory of the campaign? who was ahead in your mind? >> guest: i think up to that point people were probably looking at usual advantage of the incumbency. mississippi has a very long history of sending people back

to the senate for a very long time. in fact the last time the state voted someone out of the senate was in 1942. >> host: in terms of turnout today, what are you seeing so far? poles close at 7:00 local time, 8:00 eastern time. what are you expecting? >> guest: at this point the polls have been open just over an hour 1/2. we have a reporter out in the field who is telling us he is seeing kind of light turnout at this point. it could rain in parts of the state today which may affect people who role really apathetic and don't want to bother to get out to vote. the election officials in the state are predicting light to medium turnout. >> host: emily wagster pettus following the story for the associated press. she joins us from mississippi. thank you very much for being with us. >> guest: thank you. >> mississippi just one of eight states holding primaries for house, senate and governorships. poles will start to close at 8:00 eastern. we'll have updates on those races this evening on the c-span

networks. this morning defense undersecretary for intelligence, michael vickers discussed u.s. intelligence challenges in russia, syria and al qaeda and cyber threats everywhere. after his remarks a panel discussed these issues. the center for strategic and international studies hosted the event. >> good morning, everybody. welcome, we're delighted to have you here on a glorious morning. it's an absolutely fabulous. of course we deserve it for the winter we had, you know. it was a tough winter. welcome to all of you at the military strategy forum and my special thanks to our friends at rolls royce who make it possible for us to make this series available to the policy community in washington. we're very delighted to have mike vickers with us this morning. i was serving up in the armed services committee when, i

think, gosh, i can't remember the year, think it was 19, 1988 when we created the program 11 and the whole special operations command, socom and et cetera. . . >> bob gates felt that no one woule better to replace jim clapper than mike to be the undersecretary for intelligence. i think it's been masterful

service, mike. we've been lucky as a country to have you at this crucial time. i know it's been challenging and wearing assignment, but you've shouldered it so wonderfulfully, and the whole community is grateful for what you've done. we're going to have a very interesting session this morning, and kath is going to be leading the question and answer period. so would you, with your applause, please welcome mike vickers, undersecretary for intelligence. [applause] >> well, thank you, dr. hamre, for that really gracious introduction, and thank you to dr. hicks for your distinguished service to our country and to csis more putting on important forums such as this. i thought i'd make a few remarks this morning for about 20

minutes and then take questions as the standard format. next slide, please. >> [inaudible] apologies, technical issues. >> okay. which one hits it? that center button? okay, good. all right. [inaudible conversations] >> all right, good. i'm qualified now on this thing. [laughter] okay. so i'm going to talk about these four topics, and given that this is a military strategy forum, i'm going to try to move beyond my intelligence brief a little bit and talk about some of the implications for strategy, for

national security strategy, defense strategy and intelligence strategy as we, as we look at these issues. before i do, one of the themes i'd like to leave you with is the tremendous change that's taken place in our intelligence capabilities over the past decade and even greater change that we foresee looking forward. one of the aspects of this is the revolutionary impact precision targeting has had across our intelligence enterprise, whether it's in counterterrorism operations, whether it's in cyber operations or classic human intelligence and espionage. and to illustrate this, i'd like to -- if you'll indulge me -- i'd like to tell a joke that my former boss, secretary bob gates, used to love to tell about the old way we did business. many, many years ago supposedly an intelligence officer was

working at a, in a foreign capital at a diplomatic cocktail party, you know, trolling the diplomatic circuit as we often do looking for hard targets. and unfortunately, this officer had a little bit too much to drink, and so his mission attention wandered a little bit toward more amorous pursuits rather than traditional hard targets. and across the room at this big reception he spotted what he saw was a vision of loveliness in a flowing red gown. so using all his appropriate trade craft, he approached the target and made a pitch, asking the target if he could have a dance, and then to his shock the target immediately rebuffed him and said i'm rebuffing you for three reasons. first, you are drunk. second, this is not a waltz, it's the peruvian national anthem -- [laughter] and third, i am not a woman, i am the cardinal archbishop of

lima. [laughter] so we're a little better than that today. we enable our case officers with more precision targeting and our other operators as well. next slide, please. so i'm going to go through a range of national security challenges, the continuing terrorism threat posed by al-qaeda and its affiliates being the first one. the key point here is while we've had a lot of success in severely degrading al-qaeda core in the pakistan/afghanistan border region, they continue to pose a threat, particularly a reconstitution threat down the road. but the three biggest threats are really al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula centered in yemen and the growing al-qaeda threat in syria. and al-qaeda's affiliates, of course, are spread elsewhere, and they're taking advantage of what we call the me tsatyization, you know, using a cancer analogy, across the

middle east and north africa. and that is conditions tar created -- that are created by ungoverned spaces and the historic transformation that's underway in that region. there's also, of course, the threat of a home grown violent extremist, as we saw with the boston bomber and others as well. and so this really remains job one for the intelligence community and our special operations forces as well. the syrian civil war that presents a particularly vexing national security challenge. it's a horrific civil war with 150,000 dead. it's a humanitarian crisis of mind-boggling proportions with some nine million internally displaced or refugees who have fled the country, about

two-thirds and one-third, and a continuing humanitarian crisis. and, of course, it's giving rise to a significant terrorism threat there as well. as the president thosed in his speech at west -- thosed in his speech at west point, we are committed to supporting the syrian opposition to help them in their stand against the brutal dictator, bashar assad, and to help them determine, help them fight for the right of all syrian people to determine their own future. and then, finally, to deny terrorists the sanctuary or the safe haven that they're currently enjoying in syria. and we'll work with the congress the or to ramp up -- to ramp up our support for the opposition. now we come to russian -- i get teased about using the word rah

van. ism. it has many aspects, but probably the host concerning currently is the -- most concerning currently is the destabilization going on in the ukraine in what we would term unconventional warfare. while russian forces have pulled back their troops from the border region, they have not ceased their support for pro-russian separatists in eastern ukraine, and that threat remains to the government of ukraine and its territorial integrity. cyber threats. these threats span the range from intellectual property theft to disruptive denial of service attacks to destructive attacks through malware. it's an emerging domain that has moved very rapidly. over the past couple years,

we've had destructive attacks against south korea, against saudi arabia and denial of service attacks against the u.s. financial sector as director clapper head clear in his -- made clear in his unclassified annual threat assessment. the likelihood of future destructive attacks is increasing. let's see, all right. there we go, my first test. okay. proliferation and use of wmd, the next issue for us. we continue to have concerns about the iranian and north korean nuclear missile programs. iran has made considerable progress in its ability to enrich and stockpile uranium, and it's continued to work on its missile programs. north korea, as director clapper indicated in his annual threat

assessment, we assess is expanding its use, its facility for uranium enrichment and has restarted its graphite-moderated reactor and continues to develop long-range missile programs, most notably the intercontinental kno8 that it has displayed publicly a few times. the, i already alluded to this earlier, about the persistent volatility across middle east, north africa and south asia that will likely be with us for a long time to come and will give rise to a range of national security challenges. this is really one of the key enduring challenges i think we face along with a couple of others on this slide, on in this slide and the previous one. all right. transition this afghanistan. the president announced -- in afghanistan. the president announced right before his speech at west point

that we will maintain 9800 troops in afghanistan, and by the end of calendar 2015, we will reduce that posture approximately in half and consolidate the force on kabul and bagram. and then no later than the end of 2016 we will reduce it further to a normal embassy-based presence centered on kabul. afghan forces assumed the lead for combat operations last year and at the end of this year, combat operations will cease. we will continue to train, advise and assist afghan forces and to pursue our continued counterterrorism mission in the region. the rise of china. this china of late has engaged in provocative behavior in

maritime disputes across the east asian lit to littoral. it's continuing its military modernization and has attempted to counter u.s. engagement in asia by asserting that the united states is a declining power, which we are most certainly not, and we will remain a pacific power. the key thing i would like you to take away from the previous two slides is that when you look at these in total, a number of senior intelligence officers -- director clapper, my good friend, former cia deputy director michael morrell and acting director -- haven't seen this range of challenges on an administration's plate in our careers. you know, we may be wrong about that, but that's our collective judgment. second point is that taken

together these are highly asymmetric challenges. these are not directly head on head. some of them are even further and unconventional or novel, as in the cyber case, or indirect in terms of challenges happening across the region or the relationship between economic power and national security power. the other point that i want to highlight is that unlike the cold war where we had one really enduring and not to be discounted national security challenge and then a series of crises. a number of these are likely to be more persistent and enduring. and so, again, that really creates some challenges for strategy as you deal with enduring, very difficult-to-solve, multiple problem sets. some of you may remember in the late 1970s in the department

of defense we developed in response to the situation in central europe an offset strategy to counter soviet military power and then followed that up through the 1980s with a series of other strategies to reinforce that and bring it into the cold war. as i look at it today, we need not just one offset strategy, but a series of them to deal with these specific challenges. and then the final point i want to make is that also critical to dealing with this set of enduring challenges and the continued economic and technological leadership of the united states which, as former secretary gates and others have said, you know, is a national security imperative for us. okay. now i'd like to talk a little bit about the relationship between intelligence and national security. we always say it's the first

line of defense. this time going forward, we really, really to mean it. the benefits that it gives us is it informs our national security policy. again, if you're the president ask and his top advisers and you're trying to make is sense of this wide array of challenges, intelligence is the first thing you need to have to understand the world in which you're dealing with. and then for our operators, our war fighters and other operators, our intelligence capabilities really enable what we call intelligence-driven rescission operations. -- precision operations. when directed by the president, the intelligence community provides him with additional options in between diplomacy and the overt use of military force. these are very important as well. and then, of course, our principal raison d'etre is preventing surprise, very challenging today as we look forward. i would add one other point as

we look at this, and that is intelligence is a significant source of advantage for the united states today. and it's an advantage that is very important to us, but it's also one that has to be used aggressively but also prudently to make sure we're helping our leaders solve problems and not adding to their problems. and, of course, as you conduct operations, there's inherent risk in them. and so the risk gain is something that we look at all the time and continue to evolve. all right. now i'd like to talk about some investments we're making in capability areas to sustain this intelligence advantage well into the future. i've grouped this into five areas to focus defense intelligence and our integration with national intelligence on the defense strategic guidance

that dr. hicks worked on so ably a couple years ago, i guess it was. and the president signed out. and then our quad remember y'all defense review which we just completed and soon to be released national intelligence strategy. i group our major priorities into five areas; global coverage, the ability to operate in what we call denial environments, a key power projection challenge for us, sustaining our capabilities in counterterrorism operations and adding to them in counterproliferation, building out our cyber capabilities and then strengthening our ability, our capabilities in counterintelligence and security. so let me touch on a few of these. first, global coverage. this really enables everything we do across mission areas. and as budgets flatten or decline, it become withs even more important -- becomes even more important given the global

distribution and diversity of challenges that we face. i can't say too much about the specifics in many of these areas, but with i will say a few things. the first, as director clapper said in colorado springs a couple weeks ago and betty sapp, our director in the nro mentioned at a conference in florida about a month ago, there are big changes ahead in the way we use our overhead space architecture. some of the biggest changes, in my view, that we've seen in several decades. it will be possible, as director clapper mentioned, through techniques such as activity-based intelligence and associated architecture capabilities to go with it to have persistence we've never had before to where we can look at things for long periods of time. and you can imagine the benefits

that will give us. the second aspect that i believe will be revolutionary as we go forward besides persistence is integration. rather than having an overhead architecture, as betty sapp described it, that isn't set as individual systems with supporting systems, we will have for the first time going forward a really integrated architecture, and there is tremendous benefits that come from that. we're working to strengthen our crypt analytic capabilities and then our national-level defense be human capabilities through an initiative we call the defense clan clandestine service. in the anti-access to aerial denial environment, this is really associated with our rebalance to asia and to keep

pace with high-end challenges. we're working on assured, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and the resiliency of our space architecture. and that's about all i can say at that point. but the third bullet is really kind of indicative there, and that is we're focused as a strategy on adapting some of the techniques we've learned in counterterrorism where we have gotten incredibly precise and apply that to these higher-end environments. in the counterterrorism area, the predator and reaper -- the unmanned aerial aircraft unaffectionately known as drones -- have been the signature weapon of our counterterrorism capability over the past decade. much as the improvised explosive device has been the signature weapon of insurgents and terrorists. it has enabled the most precise

campaign, counterterrorism campaign in the history of warfare, and it is our most effective instrument. we are very healthy in this area, but we are looking to make enhancements in some advanced sensors as well as extending the range of our second generation platform considerably. our integration between our operators and intelligence is another key advantage in both of these areas and something we're working to sustain as well. and then back to the challenges chart. as the ct problem evolves and shifts on us, we're at a turning point not just in national security strategy, but also in the counterterrorism arena of the need to rebalance and rethink some of the ways we've done business, what has really worked, what is adaptable to the

evolving threat, what is not and what do we need to invent anew. okay. on cyber capabilities, we're making significant progress in developing a cyber force to defend our networks, to support combatant commanders and to defend the united states if called upon to do so. and the associated support structures to go with it, intelligence capabilities as you would in any new domain whether it's space, cyber or others. key to making that cyber force effectively, and we've had a number of great sessions including some here at csis, is really our partnerships with industry, our partnerships across the u.s. government with the department of homeland security and the fbi, but also with industry in terms of particularly in the area of information sharing. and then, finally,

counterintelligence and security. as a result of wikileaks, snowden, fort hood and the navy yard review, navy yard attack, excuse me, and the reviews associated with those four incidents, we've taken significant measures now to strengthen our capabilities against insider threats whether it's workplace violence or espionage and are establishing an insider threat center going forward. we're also working with the congress and with the opm looking to -- and the dni looking to shift our, the way we evaluate people for positions of responsibility and security clearances through a method called continuous evaluation. if you think of rather than snapshots in time where you do an investigation and then you wait several years and you do it again, this is more to continuous stream like you do with credit checks. and we believe it will have a

number of advantages. okay, let me conclude by talking about the importance of intelligence integration. this was a focus of the 9/11 commission, and there are four areas i'd like to talk about. some of in this, honestly, predated 9/11 and has been at work in the process of a couple decades of work, and then, of course, others have really accelerated since then in responding to evolving threats. the first one is integration within agencies. the cia i knew in the 1980s is not the cia of today. it is vastly more integrated in terms of its major components and directorates, and it produces big dividends by doing so. our intelligence agencies work much closer together. it's hard to find a case where a single intelligence agency has been responsible for a significant intelligence breakthrough or operation.

the bin laden case, the particular example of that, were cia, nsa and nga worked in extremely close partnership to produce the intelligence case that we need, and that really is the model going forward. director clapper and i have made it a top priority to make it clear that our national and defense intelligence programs are integrated and transparent to each other. we make a number of joint investments together, we depend on other's capabilities -- on each other's capabilities to do our missions, perform some critically important national missions and our tax call operations in the -- tactical operations in the department depend on national capabilities. and finally, our partnership between the department of defense and the central intelligence agency is very important across the board in a number of intelligence areas and in capabilities. and so with that, i'd like to

conclude, and i'd be happy to take your questions with dr. hicks. [applause] >> thank you very much, secretary vickers, for your great remarks, and good morning to everyone. i'm kathleen hicks, i run the international security program here at csis. and you covered, truly, the water front. and i think it gives us a very rich conversation opportunity here with the audience, and i'll turn it over to them for questions in a few minutes, but there are a few things i thought i'd start with. this last issue that you raised, there's two issues on your last slide you raised, one generally on integration and specifically ending on the dod/cia piece. let me take the first part of that. we really have come, in the time that you've been in your positions within the department of defense from 2007 to now, from the world of trying to transition from need-to-know to

need-to-share to, i hope, a culture of need-to-share. of that was the intelligent. but now, of course, we've had a series of incidents that test that, snowden being the most recent. i'm wondering if you can give a sense of where you think the community is and where the community needs to be on this issue of how much to share, how to control information, have we swung too far or, in fact, do we just need to accept that there are risks that come with a need-to-share culture? >> thanks. well, we continue to have a strong need to share intelligence. our national security strategy depends on enabling partners. that requires intelligence sharing. and to make the national

security apparatus effective across the interagency, both domestic and foreign, also requires a high degree of as well as sharing while also protecting need-to-know. so in that vein, we are modernizing our information technologies to try -- our information systems, technology systems, excuse me, across both the ic and within the department of defense to try to strike a reasonable balance there between the need to protect information and also distribute it. in the ic it's called eyesight, which is the ic-ite which is intelligence community, intelligence technology, information technology enterprise. and in the department we're moving toward a system called the joint information environment. both of those are cloud based and will give us some security advantages along with other

technologies. so in a way it's really the right balance to be struck, but there are, you know, some things like bin laden had to be compartmented intensely, as you know. others less so, but we can't really move back from the information sharing environment. we just have to do it more responsibly. >> and then you ended on the dod/cia nexus, and that's an area where you have been particularly effective at bringing the two agencies together. the president in his west point speech last week reiterated his call to transition more operations, more emphasis from cia to do to d on the counterterrorism/direct action piece, and i'm wondering if you can speak a little bit about how that transition is going. he had talked about that

previously, and what the challenges are facing the department of defense as it takes on these missions, these direct action missions instead of some cases being done by the cia? >> well, i don't want to go into much detail here. let me make a couple points. one, our santa to the president for -- assistant to the president, lisa monaco, will be making a speech in the very near future as a update on what has progressed since the president's speech at the national defense university last may. and so i don't want to steal her thunder, and so i'll leave that to her. but also suffice it to say we have been working since last may and, actually, before to implement the president's guidance. dod does precision counterterrorism operations and makes sure we have an integrated

counterterrorism capability across our ic and the department to meet the president's needs. >> good. and let me stick with isr moving beyond -- not necessarily unmanned, but just isr in general. i think you made a compelling case for why intelligence so important in an environment that's as diffuse in its threats, as unpredictable, and we can talk about ukraine and others. but there -- but the pressure on isr in that kind of environment is incredibly intense, and you alluded to the flat budget. the budget environment is not conducive to a great deal of increased investment in many areas. how well do you think isr fares in that budget environment, and are there areas of particular concern that you have in terms of how we make sure the entire intelligence enterprise is well resourced? >> sure.

so as secretary hagel made clear in the quadrennial defense review, areas of key focus for him is intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber, special operations forces. and so we have the priority, we believe it requires. that said, as you know we have to be very focused in our investments and what we prioritize. and so in isr or in other capability areas -- undersea warfare, long-range strike bomber, etc. -- we're focusing on a critical set of investments that are very important to our asia rebalance. and those have been protected in the department. as well as the continuing capabilities we'll need for the counterterrorism problem and the instability across the greater

middle east and then the cyber challenges. and so that's why i've grouped the capability areas that we have. one of the challenges that we face in isr but really across the department i would say is that now more than ever you have to have an intelligence portfolio approach to investment. and so, you know, you may recall with the different national security challenges we faced in the 1990 one could think about a joint force that had capabilities that could stretch either right or left if necessary. we've long since -- and thanks to your leadership, we've long since abandoned that notion in the department. and so we carefully adopt across the spectrum of challenges we've had a series of target investments in each area, more of an outside-in approach. high end and then low end and see what meets in the middle. and that seems to be the best

way to meet our national security challenges right now. but with flat and declining budgets, it reminds a challenge. >> let me press you just slightly harder on that. are there areas on the intelligence side that are particularly worrisome to you? i'll give you a complete hypothetical, but maybe this is one. you know, growing the required human in the right, you know, language skill sets with the right focus given, again, the diffusion of the threat. are there areas that you can point to that something we should be thinking about as a country as we move further into the 21st century on the intelligence side? >> sure. so for some of these investments , they depend on either technological advances or making sure significant resources are provided for some of our global coverage and anti-access aerial denial capabilityings.

for -- capabilities. for others, such as strengthening our human capabilities, it's really more about human capital. it's not a big budget issue as it is a professionalization, language, training, posture, integration. a number of things that take time to transform a force, but, you know, it's more in the softer side of business but no less hard because you're changing institutions from one to another. and then in cyber, a very, very evolving field developing the capabilities, but they depend on other capabilities as well. but then also they depend on public/private partnerships. and so without -- in each case there's a critical dependency that's different, however, in these capabilityish areas. and so those are the challenges i try to wrestle to ground with director clapper. >> okay. let me just ask one more question, then i'll turn it over to the audience. i know we have a lot of folks

here who are ready to test your, test your knowledge base across breadth of what the department is doing and what the intelligence community is doing. let me ask you a really obvious question about ukraine which is, you know, how well prepared do you think the intelligence community was to see russian intent in terms of the annexation of crimea in particular, and, you know, are we now refocusing energy on russia as a result of that action and subsequent activity by russia? >> so i guess i would answer that, you know, russia's a complex intelligence challenge, and it's something that we have been working since the end of the cold war in the intervening decades, but it has been triggered really by there's been

spikes because of buildups to crises or actual crises. so, for example, the invasion of georgia in 2008, and then most recently ukraine. the invasion of crimea was done very suddenly, and so as director clapper and others have said, the intelligence community did a pretty good with job of providing overall warning to the magnitude of the problem, but there's things we could always do better in certain areas. and then, you know, we're very good at once confronted with a crisis in responding to it and getting better and better. so we've continued to improve as the crisis has shifted to, you know, what i described as unconventional warfare in eastern ukraine. and then, you know, the next

part of the challenge -- which you alluded to in your resource question -- is really the longer-term challenge posed by this significant change in russian behavior and how we adapt the community to it. so we're in, you know, a work in progress, but it's definitely on leaders' radar screens. >> okay. i've left large swapts of the world uncovered, so i'm sure we'll have some questions on those. i see one all the way over here. and, please, when you ask your question, state your name and your affiliation. >> hi. thank you for being here today. my name's christine from -- [inaudible] but i also just returned from egypt as a monitor for democracy international. and my question having just been on the ground there is from a dia defense standpoint, how are you evolving policies for intelligence sharing with key international partners, especially those with challenging transitions on their hands?

>> well, our intelligence sharing is usually done, almost always, on a bilateral basis, and it is tailored to the specific requirements of that partner, and we do it -- our individual agencies, depending on the case, may have relationships with counterparts in a given country. but we do this on an integrated fashion, approach, what we call the director of national intelligence representative. so we funnel both our military intelligence as well as the various forms by our national agencies through this one conduit to a national or to a international partner, and that applies in egypt's case as well

as others. >> okay. we have one right here. >> thank you. [inaudible] mckay institute. i'm from georgia. you mentioned as one of the challenges russian -- [inaudible] and i kind of like this word because it largely describes the mood in russia. but rah van. is much larger than geographic link to the ukraine. so my question is your assessment, what is the geographic scale of the russian -- [inaudible] and where are the areas you anticipate next crisis linked to the russian -- [inaudible] thank you. >> well, that's why i had that broader challenge of that rather than specifically the

russia/ukraine crisis on that slide. and i think there are a number of challenges. there is, you know, as we saw in georgia in 2008 and ukraine most recently on the boarder and in crimea, there's a power projection challenge in what russia calls its -- [inaudible] abroad. but then there also is a plan panoply of other influence means and unconventional threats that range from energy coercion to cyber to unconventional warfare as we see. and those threats may be the greater longer term challenge,

in a sense, because they are highly asymmetric, and, you know, they're not traditional military power. and so our strategy with our allies and partners needs to take account of those as well. but that's how i see the longer term challenge. >> very good. i have one right there. yes, the gentleman right here. >> thank you. matteo -- [inaudible] princeton, university. i'm a little puzzled by the administration's attempt to the seven-year rule this terms of espionage saying that espionage conducted on other -- that state-led espionage on corporate entities done to advantage other corporate entities of one country is essentially unfair. i find this puzzling for a number of reasons; few other countries recognize this rule, it would be extremely hard to enforce, not last because if you know that a country is

conducting espionage against you, you have no interest in revealing that kind of thing. so i was wondering, could you tell us what -- first of all, could you allay some of these concerns that tells us what the rationale is behind this attempt by the administration to set these new rules and whether you think it has a reasonable chance of being successful. thank you. >> so i won't -- you know, the president was very clear in presidential policy directive number 28 on our signals intelligence architecture that the united states does not and will not engage in economic espionage and to benefit american companies and international competition. as you noted, that practice is not universeally followed by some other countries in the world. i would defer to my economic colleagues on in this, but, you know, we think a global system

that will produce economic prosperity for all is, you know, would be most conducive to having open international competition without states stealing private secret cans and handing them -- secrets and handing them off to their own national companies. if you follow that logic, then companies bear additional costs that they would have to do to protect their systems that i think are not economically productive. i'm drawing on some of my economics training in grad school. but i don't think that's the kind of international system we or international countries should favor. and i think that's true across the board. so, one, i don't think it's necessarily new, but it is definitive on our policy on that.

>> eric schmidt with "the new york times." secretary vickers, thank you. a two-part question on syria. if you could explain to us a little bit more about the options the pentagon and the administration is considering for dod to assist arming the syrian rebels and what operational and other challenges that poses. the second part of the question is at least for insurgents along that border between syria and iraq, it seems to be disappearing. can you assess for us the isis threat in western barn right now and assess -- anbar right now and assess how iraq has been able to deal with that threat given the support the u.s. has provided so far. >> okay. thanks, eric. so, first, on expanded assistance to the syrian opposition, i don't want to go further than the president did in his west point speech. we are developing options across

the administration and consulting with congress on this, and i'll -- that's about as far as i can go right now. on the threat posed by isis, as you called it or as we call it, isid -- islamic state of iraq and the levant -- the it is a challenge both -- it is a challenge both in syria and in western iraq which is why we look at this increasingly as a regional problem. this is the remnants of al-qaeda in iraq that most of them, most of the leadership went to syria after being significantly degraded in iraq. and they have ambitions to pose threats broader in the region

and outside the region. and so it is a very ma left lent -- malevolent terrorist group and one that we're increasingly focused on. they broke away from al-qaeda recently. you know, i guess al-qaeda was just too nice for them. and then as far as your question on iraq, through our office of security cooperation, we continue to provide assistance to the iraqis and across the instruments of the u.s. government to meet the challenges in iraq. >> [inaudible] >> well, listen, iraq is, you know, the conditions that give rise to the challenge there, you know, have a lot to do with political challenges they've had

as well as a significant terrorist threat. and so there has to be a political and economic solution as well as a counterterrorism solution to this problem. and they've made some gains in beating back isil in anbar and containing its threat elsewhere, but it's a significant challenge to the government. >> hello, david -- [inaudible] renaissance strategic advisers. you mentioned in the context of cyber working with the industry as a partner, but industry really works across other areas with the intelligence community as well. given all that's happened in the last three years, how is the department's working with industry going to change going forward either in subtle or important ways? >> well, i think it's an imperative, you know, that it be

very honest, you know? the current environment and developments haven't helped that partnership. there's some important legislation moving through the hill right now to try to set the conditions for that that we support, and it's just something, you know, as a country we're going to have to solve because the threat isn't going away. >> okay. how about right here? >> sir, george knuckleson, ct and special operations consultant for so-com. kathleen, you alluded to the relationship, i think, between the cia and dod, and, mr. vickers, you probably remember at the o, -- oss dinner john brennan got up and said there was not a better relationship that exists today. how much of that is personality driven? and a few years ago the former

dni testified in front of the senate committee about do we need to relook at title x and title 50r authorities? do we need to look at something to codify those relationships under something like a title 60? >> the fact that a number of us have worked together for a lot of years clearly helped, but i forgot the french politician who said graveyards are filled with indispensable men. i think that we've put enough things in place that it will survive the current leadership. it's a very good way to do business and the challenges we face dictate it. i don't think we need a, you know, we've evolved a lot since

2009 and beginning of the administration and the title x, title l, title lx debate. we are very, very integrated and go back and forth, and that part of the system's working very well. >> right back here. >> peter humphrey, i'm an intel analyst. are you happy with the level of our dependence on foreign intelligence services, or maybe possibly should we be moving a fraction of our budget to get our own independent capabilities at times? or, in fact, are we going the other way just to save money? >> well, we have plenty of independent capabilities. and, you know, periodically in some country or crisis you can find you were too dependent on

foreign liaison reporting, but i think we've learned from those experiences in the past, and so we leverage, i mean, we depend on an international network of intelligence partners, but we have robust unilateral capabilities as well. and, you know, one can always adjust the system, but globally i think it serves us quite well. >> okay, how about right here in front. >> steve winters, washington-based researcher. i think many computer experts feel that in an attack on a network the advantage is with the attacker, and the defenders are really in the weaker position. i would suggest that here at csis yesterday by one speaker that in the case of, say,

attacks, for instance, for espionage purposes on u.s. networks deserved a type of response against attacker rather than just beefing up the defenses. so if these experts are right, what is your advice to the administration, basically, when you have to tell them we can't really stop the attacks because the attacker has the advantage? what's the policy? various suggestions have been made. for instance, code of conduct between countries about what they're going to allow to do or, you know, proactive counterattacks to attacks to disincentivize attacks. so what advice are you giving up the chain on this? >> well, i'll keep my advice up the chain private, but let me try to answer your question. so, one, i'm not sure i agree with the premise that the offense has an enduring

advantage in the cyber realm. i mean, it's a very dynamic field, and cybersecurity has evolved, you know, a big growth industry, and it's evolved quite a bit. that said, you know, there are a lot of what one would describe as soft targets, and so if you're looking to steal something among many things or attack something among many things, that's a hard defensive problem. and it's also, as i mentioned earlier in response to, you know, cyber policy, you know, and economic strategy it's not, you know, it's not sound economics to have to invest be so much in defenses. and then in this terms -- so then in terms of the appropriate response, even if offense gets harder, it still will be feasible, and there still will be softer, relatively softer

targets to harder targets. and so the instruments you can deploy against that -- policy is one, code of conduct is, is this really in people's interest to carry out this kind of conflict? you know, again, this is a new and evolving domain, and so some of the policy discussions are in their early stages. as well as potentially other methods; law enforcement, blocking an attack, you know? tailored to the circumstances. so i think in cyber as in anything else you need to deploy the full range of instruments and, you know, it's an evolving field. >> okay. last question right up front. >> jennifer -- [inaudible] with change in media group. my question is what's your solution about the cybersecurity issues between the u.s. and china, and what's your response

about the new chinese report released on may 26 accusing u.s. hacking of china and the hacking activities in companies like microsoft and google? thank you so much. >> you repeat the last part on google and microsoft? >> yeah. there is new report from china accusing u.s. of hacking of china, the hacking activities involved companies like microsoft and googlement -- google. thank you so much. >> so i'm not aware of a report about microsoft and google. back to the question about cyber norms and cyber policy, we have a cyber working group to work with the chinese on establishing

of cyber code of conduct and others that, you know, is an important initiative, and we certainly hope it will continue. >> okay. secretary vickers, you have been extremely generous with your time this morning. we put you through the ringer, and i appreciate you being as forth be coming as you were able to be -- forthcoming as you were able to be. obviously to, you have a position that is particularly difficult in terms of providing us unclassified information, and we appreciate your willingness to come down here today and talk to us. so please join me, would the audience please join me in thanking him. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> well, the u.s. senate today confirmed keith harper to be u.s. representative to the u.n. human rights council on a 52-42 party line vote. his confirmation makes him the first native american to be u.s. body. the senate right now in recess for their weekly party caucus meetings. white house counsel john podesta and chief of staff dennis mcdonough are reportedly meeting with them. the claimer will vote on four more of the president's executive and judicial branch nominees. the senate wednesday morning will take its first vote to advance the nomination of sylvia burwell to be the next health and human services secretary. see the senate live, as always, here on c-span2. at this hour including a group of senate republicans including john mccain and tom coburn are holding a press conference introducing legislation they say would provide veterans with greater flexibility in their health care. that press conference has been underway for a short time now,

buck see it live on our companion network, c-span. also this afternoon the brookings institution is looking at the results of last week's european union elections. that discussion gets under way at 2:15 eastern on c-span. >> c-span's new book, "sundays at eight," includes financial journalist michael lieu -- lewis. >> we are living through a really traumatic period, and it is not over. and there are real, structural problems. i mean, yes, we're going to -- that we're going to be living. i'm not an economic forecaster, but everything i read suggests we're going to be living with unusually high levels of unemployment, a lot of pain if from overindebtedness. i mean, look at it, a quarter of the country's on food stamps i saw on tv. it's not a great depression, we're not reprising exactly what

happened in the '30s, but it's a version of that. >> read more of our conversation with michael lewis and other featured interviews from our "book notes" and "q&a" programs in c-span's "sundays at eight" from public affairs books. now available at your favorite bookseller. the senate republican leader today criticized the obama administration's proposal announced yesterday to cut carbon emissions by 30% by the year 2030. mitch mcconnell of kentucky said the new proposed regulations would hurt the economy and put coal miners out of work. assistant majority leader democrat dick durbin of i'll then responded and talked about the impact of global warming. we'll show you that exchange until the senate returns at 2:15 eastern. >> they promised that obamacare