.. entering the united states while also facilitating the flow of trade and transportation. the last part is a particularly important piece. and even as we build and maintain strong layers of port security we need to take care not to impede transportation or commerce. our ports and waterways are the life blood of our economy. i'm told that more than 95% of all u.s. trade is handled via sea ports, 95%. and these ports account for over 30% of u.s. gross domestic product, that's more than $5 trillion in trade each and every year. as the former governor of delaware and someone who is ultimately responsible for running a major port at the city of wilmington owned and ran that port for many years ran out of money and the state had some money and we took it over and when i was governor this is something i know a little bit about but care a whole lot about. the port of wilmington located along the delaware river in the northern part of my state is just south of philadelphia,

number one sea port in north america for the importation of fresh fruit bananas, and juice, concentrate. if you had a banana this morning for breakfast it probably came through the port of wilmington. our nickname is top banana. the top banana port. port of wilmington isn't just important for the state of delaware, it serves as a key economic engine in new castle county, it's also a key port for the entire united states. so protecting our ports, safeguarding our economic opportunity is responsibility that we take very seriously. as the government accountability office and other experts have noted, u.s. port security has come a long way. shortly after 9/11, the maritime transportation security act of 2002 became law and empowered the coast guard with new authorities to ensure commercial vessels and port facility meet minimum security standards. a few years later the safe port act of 2006 authorized key cargo and supply chains security programs enforced by u.s. customs and border protection.

since that time cargo security programs have taken root. not only that many of our international trading partners and international trade and security organizations have created similar security programs and emulating the department of homeland security's good work. but we shouldn't and we can't stop here. i want to use this hearing we want to use this hearing as an opportunity to explore how the threat to ports has evolved, and what the next steps for dhs should be. i also don't want to imply that there's no room for improvement, as i frequently say. inferring i do i know i can do better. i think that's true for all of us. and i think that's true for the way we handle port security. in a recent letter to the congress, new secretary jay johnson i indicated we believe the 100% scanning mandate for inbound cargo shipping containers was impractical. not the best use of taxpayer resources. if that's the case, we must look for a better way to address security risks while preserving

the necessary speed of moving containers through our ports. so i welcome the secretary's pledge to make good faith effort to improve the department's capabilities. without getting in the way of legitimate flow of trade. i look forward to discussing this issue with some of our witnesses today. i also look forward to hearing how the department of homeland security plans to address emerging threats, how it can make programs more effective and efficient and how the agencies represented here today can work with international organizations and our foreign partners to raise the global standard for port security. as you can see from our lineup of witnesses, there's quite a lineup. port security is a key support. it's a perfect example of why bringing all these agencies together into the department of homeland security was the right thing to do. components present here today work seamlessly with one another to develop and implement the department's layered risk based strategy for port security. from the coast guard to customs and border protection, transportation security administration, federal

emergency management administration, and dhs's office of policy, each of you play a critical role and you've got to soar to the. also glad we have gao here today with us. you put on a whole lot of work in this area and we are grateful for that ability you for further help. again, thanks to everyone for coming. we are going to start voting in a little bit and we are going to do one of those deals that we've perfect did with the voting starts and maybe he will vote the first time. what is to review a comeback and i will vote tonight we will swap back and forth. hopefully we'll make it all work can be done in a punctual way. it's important that we now turn to dr. coburn just to thank him for insisting that we have this hearing and make this a priority. >> thank you, mr. chairman. first of all, welcome to all of you. sitting on the intelligence to many, are threat to baker in

terms of risk in getting it right is important. one of the commitment they made to congresswoman janice hanh from l.a., she is the l.a. port, which is our busiest and greatest vulnerability in terms of port that we would have this hearing into the oversight necessary to try to improve over doing. the mr. chairman, i would like unanimous sense to put her testimony in the record -- the houses out this week and we witness scheduled this hearing at this time had we know not. what we did that i'm happy that we are having hearings. i ask unanimous can then to be included in the record. i also note the house is passed legislation that the senate hadn't even taken up working better and what we need to do is address where weaknesses are, what we need to improve witness

senator carper mentioned, the 100% scanning obviously isn't viable or may not be viable, but we need to have a better approach than 2% to 4% scanning that we see today. we know that a successful attack on one of our ports would be devastating. reincorporation give a trillion dollars effect on our economy. that is a possibility. we cannot stop every attack it's going to come to this country, but we can make it much more difficult and markedly decreased the likelihood. they know the history of how we came together. after 9/11. we created port security grant program this message at 100% screen. the 9/11 commission recommended that as well. we also created the two-week

card, which has had some significant difficulties and is still not implemented. so my goal for this hearing is to refute the initiatives that were initially set out and assess how well they are working and whether or not they are working. whether they are secure as we can take him feasible and economical. i would release a $2.99 on port security grant program with no metrics to measure whether or not we've actually improved our security. there is no metrics. so we don't know. we spent 2.1 million cbp cargo programs that we were told lumumba prevent. there is $5 we spent. we have no assessment of what we've gotten for that money.

the program is intended to create an i.d. card for transportation workers to into secure areas including the ford will talk about and some of my questions will relate to the problems associated with that. it's unclear to measure and will help us know how much improvement we've made it. our ports. they prepare the testimony which i've read we will keep this moving as fast as we can. we have four votes started 9/11. with that, mr. chairman, thank you as well, mr. top banana. >> i've been called worse things. we will make this work and we appreciate it. i'll introduce her witnesses. alan mclean, assistant secretary for policy at dhs office of policy, also served as dhs is

general counsel for enforced name. she began her career with the u.s. customs service where she's your as deputy associate chief counsel. they join us from the coast guard for its assistant, not for prevention policies policies specialist in marine safety security and environmental protection. graduate of the coast guard academy, and of the massachusetts institute of technology. where i'm proud to say that one of our boys attended. when i went to ohio state i could barely spell m.i.t. the idea of ever having a kid that goes there i could not imagine. congratulations on that. thanks for your service. i want to ask kevin to pronounce your last name for me, kevin. >> mcaleenan. >> with the emphasis on the leen? >> you put an "a" in front of

the "c" it works better. >> there you go. and acting deputy commissioner at the u.s. customs and border protection. served as acting assistant commissioner of the cdp office of fuel operations leading the agency's port security and trade facilitation operations. brian kamoi appointed as the assistant administrator for grant programs at fema in april of 2013. before that he served as senior director for preparedness policy on the white house national security staff, from 2009 to 2013. stephen sadler has been the assistant administrator for intelligence and analysis at the transportation security administration since october 2011. he's joined tsa in 2003 and held several leadership positions. breyer to that he spent 25 years in the commercial maritime industry. and finally last but not least, steven caldwell, nice to see you. joins us from gao where he is

the direct -- director of issues issues on the homeland and security justice team. mr. caldwell has over 30 years of experience at gao and has worked on numerous reports on security and supply chain security. thank you all your entire statements will be made a part of the record and feel free to summarize as you go. try to stay within about what did we say five minutes? five minutes if you could, go way over that we'll have to rein you in. thank you for joining us. ellen why don't you go ahead. >> good morning, chairman carper, ranking member coburn. i am a career civil servant and testifying before congress for the first time. as this has long been on my career bucket list, i appreciate this opportunity along with my colleagues to testify on a matter of singular importance to the department. port security. since 2007 and the passage of the safe port act we now have several key strategic documents that shape and guide our efforts

on port security. the national strategy on global supply chain security. the global nuclear detection architecture. and the soon to be released 2014 dhs quadrennial homeland security review. dhs is focused on enhancing port security through prevention, protection, and resilience. pursuant to a risk based approach. while strengthening the global supply chain system, including the maritime transportation network, we are ever mindful that it is critical to do so by promoting the efficient and secure movement of legitimate goods. guided by the principles in these overarching documents, dhs's approach embraces five elements for a layered system of maritime port and cargo security. one, understanding the risk to better defend and protect against radiological and nuclear risks. two, obtaining advanced information and using advanced targeting techniques.

three, increased collaboration with other federal agencies, foreign governments, and private stakeholders. four, implementing strong, domestic security regimes. and five, promoting proposedness by sustaining grant programs. within this strategic context, dhs can point to several key developments in the past seven years. risk assessments to aid us in understanding the threat environment and prioritization of resources. significant progress with international and private partners to incorporate risk management principles, and leverage trusted trader programs. the ssmentf more than the assessment of more than 1500 foreign port, 200 ohlone 23rd team under the international port security program. the establishment of 360 comprehend that port security plans by port operators and grant awards to achieve interoperable communications, installation surveillance

cameras that port facilities and funding for other similar physical security equipment and projects. looking forward, we face challenges of increased rates in the expansion of the panama canal and increased activity in the arctic. with increasing trade and shifting trade patterns, we must also confront aging infrastructure for a broad range of dhs assets. from coast guard cutters to x-ray and radiation and nuclear detection inspection systems. and forging a path for progress coming ths will concentrate on improving information collection targeting dissemination comic standing global capacity to secure the supply chain and addressing risk across all modes of transportation. with a continued focus on enhancing the capabilities of our component vendor partners to address current and future challenges to securing our ports coming ths will continue to dedicate substantial attention

and research is to implementing a layered risk management approach to security across all transportation pathways in an efficient and cost to play in building essential partnerships at home and abroad. thank you again for the opportunity to testify about dhs's private terrace on enhancing port security. i'd be happy to entertain any questions. >> banks. but when you have sent. thanks for your testimony. admiral thomas. >> thank you, chairman carper, dr. coburn for the cube to need support and the opportunity to discuss this important topic this morning. the coast guard in coordination with the other department of homeland security component in the industry implements a maritime security for them. our goal is simple. we want to detect and mitigate threats is far from our shores as possible. we accomplished a layered system depicted on the site before you

and display some to my last. as you can see on the slide, it does not start finish in the u.s. they began in foreign ports and facilities and terminals. this is the first player ever integrated system. coast guard international port security program connects assessments of foreign port to make sure they meet international security standards and build the capacity and partners. just as you cannot watch the flight from an airport then it's minimal security standards and enter usb ports unless that boys originated in a foreign port that this security standard as certified by the coast guard. additionally, coast guard platform for threat assessments bring together information from law enforcement intelligent communities to assess governance crab commentary set cookies and other factors that help us determine which thread emanate

from the sports. finally, oversees the committees from the customs and border protection and other dhs components help to ensure the safety and security before they depart for ports. if you look at the next several layers on the site come in international waters come u.s. economic senate u.s. territorial sea so-called dci these the usher layer. our regulations require each ship en route to the u.s. for provide the coast guard 96 hours in advance notice of arrival. this notice includes information about the best of the crew and passengers, customs and border protection required advance notice of information about the cargo, shipper, consolidator, receiving agents among other information. another federal agent music center for disease control may also require advance notice of arrival under certain circumstances. all this information is collected and shared at the national and port level. it is screened and assess so that prior to arrival of any

vessel, capital port has a consolidated comprehensive assessment of office says you did with that ship. when i say all this and i mean everything related to safety, security and the environment. as diverse as invasive species in cargo, crew members on a watch list, passengers exhibiting signs of illness or damage to the ship that may compromise the fewer the environment. the port that is able to coordinate a single the local state of federal risk mitigation plan for each ship that arrives. for the vast majority of the ships, local coordination is required to plan necessary control inspection or enforcement options. in some cases the threat rises to a level the interagency coordination at the national level was required to reactivate the maritime operational threat protocols. in some cases the risk will be mitigated by anti-initiative that captures in other cases allowed to enter the port that is subject to jurisdiction and

oversight prior to beginning cargo or passenger operations. these portraits are most often led by the coast guard, but they made clippers are from other department of homeland security component through the interagency who can bring their special capabilities today. in all cases among the best right that a port facility that fisa's requirements and the safe port act. these facilities by law have security staff trained to specific standards and access control system that includes credentials for each employee. they executed the declaration of security with foreign ships beyond the individual facility has prepared capable of coordinated prevention preparedness and recovery committees. this is due in large part to the combined in fact of the

investment to our ports. the grant program, establishment of maritime security and development of the maritime security plans. in summary, mr. chairman, we've used authorities and the maritime transportation security act in the safe port act to implement a security system to begin from foreign ports and continues to capture areas that vessel transit providers in remains ever vigilant in our ports that have robust interagency local state and federal coordination to mitigate threats and facilitate commerce in response while incidents. thank you. i look forward to your questions. >> you took one second too long. you're off your game today. pretty good. very good. thanks for the testimony. url. please proceed. >> good morning chairman carper, ranking member coburn had the privilege to appear before you today. ask your continued support along

with the collaboration of federal international private sector partners coming ths and u.s. customs and border protection to make investments in maritime cargo security. cbp has partnerships and enhance programs and invested in advanced technology. all essential elements of the multilayered approach to protecting the nation from the entry potentially dangerous or violet of shipments while expediting legitimate and economically vital. i picture hannity suffers today. in the first three years after 9/11 she created key programs to enhance their ability to suspect i'm cargo for risk. the increased security tai chi. the partnership weekends the program in the 9/11 attacks. throughout their entire supply chain. it has grown from seven initial members to over 10,000 members

today. the national targeting center also started in 2001 has developed world-leading capabilities to assess cargo shipments, crew and travelers for risk before they are laden or board vessels destined for the united states. at the ntc, they utilize the targeting system, intelligence, commercial information and traveler data to identify and mitigate potential threats. dhs and cvp have strengthened detection capabilities at domestic sea ports. since 2001, cup has acquired 1387 radiation portal monitors and increased its inspection systems from 64 to 314. these valuable systems help officers detect radiological materials, weapons and a list of substances. the support of congress, specifically through the safe port act, has been a key catalyst in advancing trade security and facilitation capabilities beyond these signature efforts. the act codified and made filings mandatory, building on

the 24-hour rule. this program provides additional advanced insight into the supply chain allowing us to identify potential risks earlier and more accurately. the act also cod nied the security nifb afternoon. cup works with foreign authorities to identify and examine high-risk u.s.-bound maritime containers before they are laden on vessels. they prescreen 80% of all cargo imported into the united states. cvp will continue to build on our progress by exploring and expanding new rules, such as trusted trade or mutual agreements. we will confine our targeting to better identify high-risk cargo and work to increase the percentage of containers scanned abroad. we'll continue to help lead the effort in developing increasingly effective and sophisticated global standards for cargo security. by utilizing risk-based strategies and applying a multi-layered approach, we can focus our resources on the very small percentage of goods or

seshsz that are high risk. our use of advance information, technology and partnerships improves goal supply chain integrity and reduces transaction costs for u.s. businesses. thank you for the opportunity to testify today. i'm happy to answer your questions. >> thank you for that testimony. brian. welcome. >> thank you, chairman carper, ranking member coburn. i appreciate the opportunity to be with you and to join my colleagues from the department to talk about the port security grant program which we believe is a critical part of the department's efforts to enhance the security and resilience of our nation's ports. senator coburn, as you mentioned, we invested $2.9 billion since 2002. while i agree with you that we certainly can continue to improve our measurement of both the effectiveness of those investments and our administrative management of the programs, we have clear evidence of the value of these investments across the program's

priorities, which include maritime domain awareness. we've invested in over 600 portwide projects that include portwide coordination and collaboration, interoperable communications, surveillance systems that assist in domain awareness. we've invested $161 million just in interoperable communications. we've also invested in improvised explosive device capabilities and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities. cyber security capabilities, as that threat continues to evolve. planning at the port level, training and exercises and of course the implementation of the transportation worker identification card program. and so in addition to these programatic achievements and, for example, just in vessels

that patrol our waterways, we've invested in over 500 vessels. in new york city, for example, the port of new york used over 30 vessels the day hurricane sandy made landfall and rescued over 1,000 people. so we know these dollars are making a difference. and these investments also facilitate increased partnerships, not just at the federal level with my colleagues here, but at the state and local level and with port owners and operators. we've seen in a variety of instances, you can assure congresswoman hahn that we continue to make investments in theo in the port of los angeles for information sharing and collaboration and chairman carper and the port well-maintained, and the investments they are, not just in inoperable communications, information sharing between the fusion center in delaware that

has allowed the building with state and local law enforcement and the port. i thought i would also tell you where we are in the fiscal year 14 grants april. $100 million is appropriated for the program this year. applications came in on may may 23rd. the field review says the admiral mentioned we worked very closely with the coast guard. we have a two-tiered review process. the port area in the local and state government through area maritime security committee's to prioritize projects. this application surrender that field review right now and will be referred for a national panel review here at the headquarters level later this month and we expect to announce a worse by the end of july. i will close by saying we look forward to the continuing

dialogue about how we can can can need to make the best man in the most effective and efficient way possible. we think they've made a real difference and i look forward to answering any questions you may have. >> at. nice job. please proceed. welcome. >> good morning ranking member coburn, distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify. the fee-based program provides a uniform industrywide biometric credentials to eligible maritime workers requiring access to areas of poor stability is an under the maritime transportation act of 2002. tsa administers with the united states coast guard. tsa is responsible for enrollment come a security threat intact ecosystems related to card. is responsible for enforcement of card use. since the program was launched in 2007 in wilmington, delaware,

we've conducted security threat assessments and issued cards to 2.9 million workers, including longshoremen, truckers and rail and vessel crews. the twic program is the first and largest federal program to issue a biometric credential. working closely with industry and our dhs partners, the program has evolved over the years to address concerns over the applicability of federal smart card best practices to a working maritime environment, such as the requirement for two trips to an enrollment center for card enrollment and activation ts by launching one to did in june 2003 nl last night and michigan. this provides workers the option to receive their side due through the map rather than in pickup in the nation cared last month tsa notes in the pilot phase of the program to a phased implementation for all applicant. we venture call-center capacity for applicants check in on

enrollment status. we've enabled web-based ordering for replacement cards. we've increased quality assurance at her enrollment enders. developing multiprogram enrollment banner across the country to allow individuals to apply for the twic to house the ministerial endorsement and tsa pre-check paper looks and a number of steps to wellness centers to 300 this year, adding to communis workers. tsa continues to evolve and modernized programs that these initiatives are strong collaboration at the department from a partnership with industry and supported this committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify nalick forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, mr. sadler. speaker caldwell. >> chairman carper and senator ayotte, thank you are asking to testify on port security. we've issued him as when a person for security since 9/11 and her most recent comprehensive report was issued in the fall of 2012 and it's a ten-year anniversary of the

maritime transportation security act. lester was planning. there is a national strategy for maritime security issued in 2005. gao review the strategy unit they supported plan and found them with most of the criteria gao has laid out for good national strategy. we've also looked at the more detailed functional strategies and incense cases we have found this to be wanting. at the port level we found that some of the plan specific to the reports have included the safe port act's requirement that they also cover recovery issues. going back to the functional plans, we found some deficiencies. for example coming ths after putting out a small vessel security strategy and lay not in implementation plan for that has not been tracking the progress of the component that meeting not, which leads some opportunities to the lack of disseminating potential lessons learned are able to track the overall progress on that

chatterjee. in terms of maritime domain awareness, there have been a number of prudence. coast guard through common operating picture program has allowed additional data sources into the use of the users. blue force tracking is the ability to track are a vessels and also increase back to us across the coast guard to other users. however, many of the original systems used to increase maritime domain awareness have fallen short of the capabilities that were originally planned for those in mainly these are due to some of the acquisition problems the average port noted such as not developing complete requirements in the beginning, not cost or schedule baseline or not on a dream their initial performance. re: security of domestic ports coming ths components come especially the coast guard have gone quite a ways in terms of implementing the maritime transportation security act. keeping provisions of the act called for security planning at

the port facility and vessel level and also calls for the coast guard to inspect those facilities to make sure the security activities are indeed in place. gao has audited those programs. we have found progress in most of our recommendations in those areas have been implemented. some areas remain problematic and as noted we have concerns about the port security grant program and the extent that they are monitoring the effectiveness of the actual projects. going back to 2005, gao found the program lacked an adequate risk assessment is and also lacked a means to measure the effectiveness of the projects in the grand. more recent work did find the grand were based on risk and goes back to the process that mr. kamoie started to describe here. more than a decade after the programs are, there is no performance measures in place to determine whether the program,

the port of facility level has improved for security and in many cases? project level visibility to know whether the projects were indeed implemented as described. regarding global supply chain security there's also been a lot of progress come especially by cbp. we've reviewed programs and noted management and operations have matured over time. we concur with cbp that implementing 100% scanning us to find and save what i can 9/11 is extremely challenging. however, we are less convinced that the existing risk this program does not have room for improvement. recent reports have found cbp has not been timely in terms of measuring the effectiveness of the targeting system or evaluating the supply-chain risk in foreign port including csi ports. we did keep them a fifth letter from the secretary to use mr. chairman and note that both of those issues are discussed as

potential improvements. closing, gao will continue to review for security programs for congress by this committee and others. we have ongoing work on poor cybersecurity as well as the disposition of high risk teeners. that concludes my remarks and i'm happy to answer any questions. thank you. >> thanks so much for the testimony. what a delicious sauce. the veteran on appreciated. i just wanted to get a follow-up, administrator sadler and certainly mr. caldwell about the twic program. he testified about the one as a pilot and now it is going to a nationwide mailing system. so how do you assess it is going and are you able to do this without your vote fraud? so can you give us a quick update? obviously appreciate the steps you've taken on this. just in terms of substance that

would like to hear from mr. caldwell about how effect the overall the twic program is in port security in gao has been quite critical and past reports about what we need to do to them for this program and its effectiveness. that is the issue i was hoping to get a little more in writing. >> restarted the pilot course up to last year in 2012 to 2013 in alaska and michigan. what we did as we transition to our new technical system, we started the implementation nationwide. we started implementing the one visit and may this year. so we plan to have a phase schedule to implement across the nation and we should have it done by this summer. so we think it is gone fairly well. we do mail the card out. i believe the fud about 3000 cars for twic right now but if

the held out. i'm about 5000 enrollments. so what we do is send the card out separately and then we send the pain in a different letter. so we try to send them out into different letters. >> so you haven't seen fraud? >> on the mailing tells? not yet, senator. do we let early stages of implementation. >> thank you. mr. caldwell, we are the middle of it though, so i wanted to get a quick thought on one of the things i think we have worried about overall is the twic program is is it making us more secure? are we improving the system so we can have some reliability with it? >> two things. i will talk about twic one and that is security and convenience and definitely more convenient. you are losing at least one of your steps in terms of internal controls of being able to verify the person's identity of having

them come in. congress pretty much took the go in that direction. so it is what it is. >> it's also good to follow up and make sure that the choice we made there, that i was obviously a supporter of comment that we made sure we are following up as well. >> yes. i do think it's a good idea to follow up to see if there is fraud. >> what i am worried about overall is are we doing anything with twic quiet i'm not trying to be funny. i get the goal. it makes sense. but obviously the concern has been how are we enhancing port security overall? >> we have those concerns as well. we have concerns pretty much from day one in a lot of ways it was implemented. for example, the reader pilot that was done recently, without the evaluation was done quite poorly and left out a lot of things that would be able to evaluate. what were the problems coming

up? was at the card itself? was the reader? was that the person the security gate when they did their test of the reader pilot, they did not include the detailed data you need to know to get that. obviously you know there's some concerns in terms of the shooting down in norco. >> i was raised. >> in the navy now is not accepting twic at least a self of the card expecting to get on the base, so obviously they have terms with it. i mean, there has been an assertion that it has improved security and they see that in the latest report to congress, but we haven't been strong evidence. >> so you want better metrics? >> gao wants better metrics. i guess, i suspect we will be asked to look at it again. >> are we doing better? that's a good question. are we doing better? bema compared to nothing, having a pass that is used in multiple

places at the background check is useful. you know, you can have felons and how students waved, so they still have those cars, but you don't have people get in the that have espionage against the u.s. or terrorism crimes of those kinds of things. that is pretty high bar, but one other way to look at it is twic was looking -- >> yes, that would be important. >> really the bar for a lot of the protection is will they prevent a major transportation security in the event and 90s where this kind of a judgment call about what they are committing murder, would that rise to the level of a transportation security in the name? not likely. >> if there's anything else you want to add, we have got to run. >> quickly, the first thing i want to say is first up to come you have to confirm your identity. >> first time, absolutely.

>> the other thing is this is the first time the maritime population has been defined. prior to twic, there is no definition as far as i know. i spent 20 years going in and out of ports. i am not sure who knew nationally. >> we now know that. >> we now have a population of 3 million people. i've added for workers before twic with information submitted by pores. we've added 900 past people. we did that prior to the implementation of twic has an implementation strategy. now we're up to 3 million people. the first thing is we define the population and at them every single day. we've got one common standard, but the biometric aside, one common credential, one, background check that did not happen prior to the twic across the country. in some places you have to buy a multiple credential within the same state. if you want one for coming to buy credential come another poor you have to buy another. i can't tell you what the background check was.

we think there was improvement by virtue of the fact of those things i just mentioned. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i'm going to slip out of boat and then come back dr. coburn and i can go back and forth. among the questions i'll be interested in asking about how do we measure success. i want to see if there's an consensus on how you measure success and miss their consent consensus around, and tricks and how are we doing? what are we doing especially well? what are we not doing so well? finally i always like to ask what can we do to help? dr. coburn, thank you. >> thank you. have fun voting. let's keep talking about twic for a moment. i dislike your assessment on somebody with a twic card ticket into a port and shoots people. how does that happen? no system is perfect.

i am just saying how did we miss that? >> at the time the individual was guided, senator, the standard for manslaughter includes all means water, voluntary and in voluntary. so when the individual came through, the crime had been committed in 2005. the conviction occurred in 2000 name. i believe you served about 800 days on his convention yagi served about two and half years. he was released from incarceration in 2011. we encountered him at december december 2013 in based on the standards we were using at the time, about voluntary manslaughter charge was not a disqualifier. so he got his card in january january 2014. as far as i'm using the card at the base, i would defer to dod. the one point i have to make is

the twic in and of itself does not give you access to a port. you have to have a business need. so we have gone back. we are scrubbing all the cases we had for disqualifications an involuntary manslaughter and we've changed our policy now that if you come in with involuntary manslaughter charge that will be a disqualifier. >> in turn mean you are still eligible to appeal? duracell eligible to request a waiver. you're still eligible to request a judge to review in your eligible to go to court if you don't agree with the finding that make you >> ray. that's the kind of answer i was wanting. talk to me about twic readers. >> i will defer to my colleague and coast guard, but to senator carper's point about what we can do to increase security and how it can be more successful, that is one way we could be more successful by implementing the readers. we have a biometric credential.

we believe that it works. right now it is being used as a visual identification card, but he needs to be used as a biometric biometric credential and is to be used on a risk-based basis as well. we believe it is critically important to install readers support. >> thank you, dr. i really appreciate the opportunity to answer that question. they say are responsible for implementing security and of the previous capital part myself, it is important to recognize twic and the twic reader part of a greater access control system for a facility, which has its own security system, which is in itself part of a greater system to secure our ports and entire chain i discussed. so when you put an access control system in a facility, you include fences, gates, guards, lights, cameras, credential of some sort and in some cases a biometric reader

for the credential. it is just a matter of layering security. as the chairman noted in his opening comments, if this was a security at all costs, we would have readers everywhere. but because we are trying to balance as we should do risk with the benefit and facilitate commerce, we have done an exhaustive analysis, which i'm happy to ask itu, that has ensured the readers go with at the highest risk facilities and i think the coast guard's proposed rule puts those for the cost benefit is currently the best. as we expand the use of twic and twic credentials beyond the maritime domain because right now it the only place where transportation credentials, reader costs will come down in the cost benefit may change in a way that just makes sense to put readers in more facilities. thank you. >> do you have a proposed date for your first round will be

completed and then an assessment made? of twic readers? >> i put out a notice will make an immersive 2600,, so we're working through the soil make adjust to mitsuko reuther go through the process and hopefully be published sometime next year and there would be a two-year implementation debut for the readers have to be in place. >> so we are two and a half years away from the completion of what the present plan for the coast guard are? >> we are two inaccuracies away from the date the 19th pay readers will be required at certain facilities. >> thank you. >> let me go back for a minute. ms. mcaleenan, one of your statements in your opening statement was spending money in a cost effective way, if you all don't have a tricks on the

effect of massive grant money that is that, how do you know it is cost effective? >> senator, i appreciate the question. i think it is a little out by matt lane. i would prefer to take a question back and get to enhance or working with my colleague from fema on where we are in developing metrics or answering that particular question. >> i don't think anybody will dispute we've done good with the money we've spent. i'm not saying that. anybody can answer this but wanted that i would love for gaa to comment as well. we've got a port system where we tear risks in the vast majority of money have gone to tier one ports and under the system you are utilizing today without any recognition of the money the 30 been spent, we continue to spend

money in the same rest because the service reduction recognized and you are tearing. so if you don't have metrics, associated with the money being spent in the ports of charity program, grant program, when do we stop spending money at tier one ports? in other words, how much is enough and how do we know what we have the best cost benefit analysis, the most cost effective program based on the risk in education and the other goal that we have. how do we know that if we don't have a metric based system? in other words coming here is why we are spending $2.9 billion. here is what we are hoping again here is how we measure whether we got it because there's all sorts of -- i won't -- in this hearing come i will privately give you a list of stuff you spent as a commonsense person

was there that does not to do it for security. we have two ports in oklahoma. port of muskogee import of a two set. we got 27 votes for the oklahoma highway patrol on that river and in terms the risk associated with those ports, those are low priority to me compared to the higher priority things on that port -- those two ports. my question is if we don't have a tricks do not share, when we look at this in total, you think you have altered a wonderful job in terms of laying this out, but how do we know and how do we know when to quit any money that gives this a diminishing return on the port security grant program? >> senator, i am happy to field a question. improved measurement is absolutely an area where we see a lot of opportunity. the mac let me interrupt you there. >> what is your measurement now? >> ineptly 13 come away for the first time is to tooted measures

related to sustainment of existing capabilities versus building new ones. we took the gao and mr. caldwell's reports and recommendations quite seriously and are looking very close lee at what ports are doing with the funding. for the first time in the fy 14 application cycle, or requesting project level data going in. you probably are aware of the history of the program and the flexibility that had been given at the local level against area maritime security plans. there remains a lot of flexibility, but we are increasing the oversight to request that level up front so we can get that information to form even more effect if measures of outcomes. on the grants management side, senator, we start we have

measures now in even over fy 12, measures of our monitoring. mr. caldwell mentioned the level of monitoring. 100 are sent of our port security grants now undergo some level of monitoring. we have a tiered monitoring this stem where our staff on a routine basis look at every award, look at the history of the grantee, the history of the outcomes achieved, their financial measures from drive down rate of expenditure rate of the obligation. that and it's reviewed in me to prioritize based on the risk we see in their management of grant on the way up to desk reviews were request information that grantees and typefaces. so what i would tell you as i look forward to continuing to work with you to continue to get the data we need to form more effect if measures.

i agree with you that everybody can point to the example is that they are really some stunning examples of how useful and the fact that this funding has been. i think you would also agree with the the polar panic that is not data and we will continue to refine our measures to get that data. >> as i noted, my underlying concern if somebody's going to sit up here 10 years from now and the amount of money spent on this program is going to be there. so how we spend the money today is really import because there's going to, time. i will repeat for you. social security disability runs out on me and 26. social security runs out of the money and 32. by 2030, the entire budget will

be concerned to medicare, medicaid, social security and interest on the federal debt. my questions are all based on the future and if we spend money really well now, we well spent money -- we won't need to be spending money in the future. so that is the basis. it's not a criticism. it is we need the best cost-benefit value for every dollar you sent out in port security grant. >> we agree with you and we are working with our partners on the vulnerability index, which is one of the things you mentioned that we understand what risk we have brought down and will continue to look at that to make sure we are spending the money as effectively as possible. >> thank you. admiral, one of mike turned and i can't go into detail, but let me give you a hypothetical and you give me the answer. let's say somebody leaves one of our certified ports overseas and

arrives here, but in between there and now something was added to that cargo. do we have the capability to know that quiet >> well dr., if not exact to sure if they leave a foreign port -- >> if they leave a foreign port, one of our allies, they repeat all the requirements you all have some place between when they laughed and when they arrived at the port of los angeles, someone has added a package. if that occurred at another foreign port -- >> not in the port. >> in transit. >> the only way would determine what has to happen. the entire crew would have to be complacent with the individual carrying this out because it is difficult to access particularly a container in transit but that a significant amount of effort and that would require probably

more than one person. >> let's don't worry about the details of that. >> if it happens, the only way we would know when this is a better question for my colleague from customs order protection would be because the containers that help them that we would feel to determine not. >> senator, we have two elements i think would be germane here. one, the emperor security filing gives us the so plan for the vessels so we know are each container is on a vessel, whether that's accessible during a voyage or not. we do see drug smugglers attempt to use what we call rick was her favorite custom see how, but his load inside the doors of the container and lock it back. that is only doable on a vessel in transit around the deck area. we know which could hinder should be accessed that we do routine skill checks upon

arrival to see whether those containers had been tampered with and whether the doors have been opened. there are different steps. >> inseminate counter figures feel quite >> they can try to, yes. we've had dozens of attempts to do that pretty effect only. >> so they've not been able to do that as of yet? i won't say, senator there's been successful counterfeit attempts. reduce train personnel to see whether they've been tampered with amazing number of secret is than other safeguards in the dust. >> this is a long time ago, but i will share the experience with you. nobody come to me and puerto rico, put it into for containers, all of the equipment, everything that was fair. all for containers arrive to one of my plants here. all the seals were there. we opened the container, everything is significant value

that could have been marketed gone. but the seals were still bare. so the fact is that was way before 9/11. i was in the 70s. the fact is people will try. so my question is, i guess my question is this, do we have the capability to track ships for the time they leave the port until the time they arrived here and know whether or not they've been boarded or accessed between disembark and embark make here. >> that's a question i probably can't answer in this venue. >> got you. thank you.

>> senator, did you want to touch on the metrics issue? >> we see no weakness so whether it is the nationals strategy or the functional plans, we have not seen metrics as to what bn status and how we are going to measure that. but we have seen problems with the program level most often because this are easier to look for and find. we have found an improvement of the metrics of how the programs are run. one of the first things we do is do you know how the program is run and a lot of times we'll find weaknesses in those internal controls. those are improved across the board. when they see these programs, a lot of it is better management of the program. .. measuring results of the program and what they're trying to achieve. i would also agree with you the importance of cost benefit analysis a lot of times will get

a discussion from the agency, well, that could be expensive and we don't have enough money to do it. in the end if you end up spending $3 billion on grants, that's an outstanding record we've had for nine years that they come up with performance measures on the port security grants so maybe a couple of extra million dollars to do those analysis to develop those grants in hindsight looks like money well spent. maybe one example of cost benefit analysis that was done rigorously involves the advanced the first ones they put in were very light. it was not very rigorous in terms of the testing testing. we pointed that out when they did the rigorous testing and then they looked at how much those would cost marginally compared to the additional capability they are going to get. they canceled the whole problem problem -- program. eventually they were planning to

spend $3 billion so that was a case where whatever the testing or analysis cost i think in the end it led to a good result. >> all right, okay. let me ask mr. kamoie do you have plans to reinstate fiduciary agents to the esp g.? >> we do not senator. >> and why is that? >> when the fiduciary model was used it was at a time when a probe regions levels for the program were retired starting in

07 and after rounds of stimulus funding. the agent model was absolutely necessary to assist the agency in distributing and monitoring the funds our internal capability with staffing has increased to manage the program officiating the model to become less necessary. and in terms of monitoring performance there was a varying level of performance by fiduciary agents and monitoring and so given our increased staffing and our their increased capabilities we think it's more appropriate that we monitor and oversight for grant grant funding and how it is spent. the other thing i will say is that the allowable of the of management and administration

costs from the grant program to fiduciary agents of three to 5% would result for example this year in three to $5 million in overhead costs that we think are better invested in actual port security projects. >> you have the flexibility and appropriation bills to use some of that grant money for grant management? >> senator i will have to check the language and get back to you on that. >> would that help? rather than spending three to five millions on fiduciary spend it on managing grants especially cost-effectiveness of grants and looking at that, i am pleased with the progress that is being made. i just don't think we are there yet and so i would love to know what we need to do to help you to be able to get to the point. my model for grants with the federal government is the division of library museums and sciences. if you get a grant from them you can guarantee that they are going to check on you. they're going to do a metric.

they're going to know whether you followed your plan in the grant and if you are not they pull the grant and you don't ever get another one again. so everybody has a different expectations of the fact that some grant money is going to things that aren't really for security, if you have that reputation i guarantee you everything but the puts the way you wanted to be put down even though you have flexibility. >> i will absolutely take a look at that. we are learning to -- willing to learn lessons. >> the best run grant program. >> appreciate that. >> the other thing is the spend down. we are still in terms of -- we are granted that we have along was to go once bends down and where are we on that in a status because these are long-term programs? >> early on in the program when ports were doing larger capital project infrastructure building

with multiphase complicated projects it took a long time to spend down. a lot of those projects have been completed and we have taken a number of steps to assist grantees in the spend down. we remind them quarterly and we are in touch asking them to draw down and we have shortened the period of performance for grants to two years but your question was where are we. in august of 2012 and we can follow up in writing on these numbers but for the program years 08 to 1180% of the available funds were not yet drawn down. a year later for fyeight to 12 of course every year one goes off the books but we moved the needle down to 44% of funds not being drawn down and we did a check at the end of april in right now we are at 39.3% not

yet drawn down from 08 to 13. >> i'm going to have to recess and senator carper will be back in a moment. >> thank you senator. [inaudible conversations] >> i am glad you waited. let's see, let's just see if we can see if there's any consensus on the metrics that we are using how do we measure success? let's start with you

mr. mcclain. what metrics a leafy using and using these metrics how are we doing? well and maybe not so well? >> i think there are are several indicators that evidence success and progress in securing the ports. i would note that in the last seven years our relationships, our programs internationally, those global partnerships, the capacity building, the agreements everything that's necessary to supply the whole global supply chain i think there has been significant advancements in that area. i also think that our improvements in the advanced data and targeting area make us more secure. coast guard support assessments, 1500 ports. i think there are a lot of indicators that there is a global recognition of the need

to tackle this issue on a broader basis. >> all right. the same question admiral paul thomas. >> thank you mr. chairman. you know i was in galveston texas on september 11, 2001 and for the three years that all of this we scramble to figure out what it meant to secure our ports area from my perspective it's clear that we have achieved a lot but i think one of the first things we did and mr. caldwell mentioned the strategies we recognize in order to build a secure port we had to first build regimes and we had to do that locally. we had to do it nationally we had to do it internationally and we had to build awareness so we could figure out what was going on and be able to pick up on the anomalies and we needed the capability to respond to those anomalies. if you look at this rebuilding lots and compare them to where we were september 11, 2001 to where we are today there is clear there has been progress. with regard to regimes certainly

thank you to the congress for the maritime transportation security act and the save toward act acts but that's for the international regime which is the international ship and port security code as well as regimes implemented as far down as individual port authorities. i'm not talking about just regimes that are required by the law. i'm talking about they understand the security is now part of their business product so in that regard their clear measures. really an intangible probably from here i can tell you there was no awareness of recognition that security was part of the problem in the port. we have got the message across with regard to safety and environment that's how they get it is part of the business as well so i think there's a metric there. certainly with regard to awareness and capability we have those capabilities federally locally internationally all of which i think are clear evidence that we have been effective in terms of enhancement. i'm with you. i think we can never rest on our laurels.

i am concerned about emerging threats like cyber. we need to develop metrics there >> we will come back but how are we doing and what metrics are we doing? i want to come back and see what is on the to-do list for us. kevin. >> mr. chairman i will touch on five areas. broadly her ability to identify to mitigate risk is the metric we seek to measure ourselves on. first on the data front as it allen alluded do we are getting advanced information on all cargo shipments manifest information and transformtransform ation and import security filing which is 12 elements that are critical. in terms of targeting and assessment category to we are analyzing all of that with automated targeting system which we think is a sophisticated capability that is constantly improved and we are working with london the gao's ideas working on the effectiveness of those targets with more granularity.

three examining at the earliest possible point in the cycle. currently 85% of shipments that we identify as potentially high-risk are examined before they are put on vessels destined for the u.s.. our examination requests are csi partners at 58 ports are accepted 99% of the time and we think those are very solid metrics. 100% of containers identified as potentially high-risk are examined before they are led into the u.s. stream of commerce of 85 are sent prior to waiting and the rest of the 15% before they are allowed to enter the u.s. on arrival. securing the supply chain category for. over 50 are sent of all cargo containers by value are part of our heart worship with their 10,750 partners. we have increased the security supply chain through that partnership but we also need to be wrecked and icing other country systems including european union. six other agreements to ensure broader visibility globally as

an allen alluded to the international partnerships and five our efforts to address the highest consequence threats. we are scanning 99.8% of all arriving containerized cargo. 99.8%. just about everybody arriving is scanned with sophisticated sensitive technologies or id. no funding radio -- the vast majority of cargo is released before touches the dog. rct -- are getting fewer exams. we have establish mobile technology offices for agricultural specialist to clear shipments right there on the dock instead of waiting hours and having those bananas sit in wilmington. the u.s. chamber of commerce and 71 others wrote to the secretary this week in an open letter saying that this regime is working well and the

facilitation piece in particular we have achieved through this layered risk approach. those are the metrics we look at and i'm having to elaborate on the specifics. >> mr. chairman i think why you are out we agreed in the port security grant program that we have measures. we have made progress but we agree we can continue to make progress. on the programmatic side of effectiveness measures we look very carefully at the six priorities of the grant program. enhancing maritime awareness, enhancing improvised explosive device detection chemical dialogical and radiological explosion enhancing cybersecurity capabilities maritime security risk mitigation projects planning training exercises and the transportation marker identification of implementation. right now we have a measure we are looking at building new capabilities across those six

areas and sustaining existing capabilities. but again that measure could be better. on the administrative management side we have made progress in measuring our ability to effectively and efficiently release the funding, monitor programmatic use of these funds monitored grantee financial management of the funds, monitor the closing of awards and grantee drawdown. we are making progress mr. chairman and we have an opportunity to make even more. >> thanks. mr. sadler. >> for us it's about getting good quality information and data for us to make the right decisions on when we issue a card. it's about continuing to get that information after we issue the cost and monitor the individual to be sure they haven't done something that is disqualified whether on a terrorism watch list or some type of criminal issue. i think the other thing that is going to make this better is

installing readers. we believe that the coast guard who we are close partners with as with everyone else on the panel has made the right decision to take a risk-based approach and put readers where they need to be. and we think that's going to be a major improvement for our program. i think the last thing we have to do is share information which we do on a daily basis. so we need good quality information to make good decisions with. we need the information to keep on coming so we can continue to make good decisions after we issue the credential. we need to install readers and we need to continue to share information which we do on a daily basis with our partners. >> mr. caldwell. >> thank you very much. the most difficult question is how do you measure security risk and i think we actually looked at that quite a bit across a lot of the areas. i think one of the bigger problems we found is the coast guard program called the risk

analysis model where they can actually at the facility level try to measure the risk-based on vulnerabilities and threats and various scenarios. i think they did that. the coast guard also took a step trying to develop a more sophisticated measure of how much coast guard programs actually reduce risk in the port environments. so a percentage reduction of risk subject to coast guard influence in the programs and we are critical of this because in the end it was subject matter experts in the coast guard sitting down and thinking about what those reduction managers are and putting a single point percentage on that. we had a couple of criticisms in terms of ways to try to make that better and particularly with so much judgment you want want to get their brains instead of the point estimate like that but i don't want to criticize the coast guard in the sense that they were trying to think

larger about their suite of programs and to what extent they would use risk. they're looking at whether they want to keep that measure or not. it was a measure they were using within the coast guard or said they were using but they actually weren't using it for that much. if you have a performance measure but you're not really using it to monitor things for prioritize resources you have got to question whether it's a useful metric in the end. >> some of you began to answer the second part of my question and i want to take another shot at it. my staff and colleagues often hear me say these words. the road to improvement is always under construction and that's true here as well. i just wonder in terms of thinking metrics and thinking we are making progress but not making nearly enough. there are some areas where we have not made nearly enough and we can measure where we have not made nearly enough and are there

any of those? who can help make -- enable us to make progress us the legislative branch and committee? who needs to help out? ellen -- ellen do you want to go first? >> mr. chairman just to set the scene here we certainly need an approach that is flexible, innovative so that we can take on the adaptive adversary and we need something, an approach that's risk-based so we can make the most cost-effective use of our resources. that said we recognize that we don't want to have a negative impact on global trade so we are looking in the near term to specific improvements in the area of the targeting algorithm.

working with our partners at some of the csi ports to increase the percentage of scanning that is undertaken. we are looking at it and i think this is the key point that i hope doesn't get lost in today's discussion is looking across all pathways focusing on a single pathway doesn't necessarily reduce overall risk. so as we know we need to consider improving security across all transportation pathways. and lastly i would note that we are continuing the dialogue with stakeholders to see what additional or expanded roles they might take in improving security in our ports. >> okay thanks. admiral. >> i think there are a couple of various i'd be concerned about. the first is complacency as we get further from 9/11. the sense of urgency decreases and so from the congress down to the security guard in the facility we have to make sure we maintain a sense of urgency with

guard to poor security. the thread is adaptive and as good as the physical security system is that we have in place is there are emerging threats like cyber that we have not begun to address and i believe the coast guard has the authority we need to do that. we are working on what the resources might be so we may hear about that. the other area that would be of concern is the the high high-end threat that these to be intercepted as far offshore as. we need to maintain the ability to get out there and identify a threat off our shores and that's a challenge because it requires ships and holocaust are -- helicopters. those two things are areas where we need to make sure we continue to build our capabilities to build our plans for action. >> thank you. kevin. >> mr. chairman i would echo a couple of the comments that

ms. mcclain made. on the targeting side there is ice an opportunity to improve our analytics and their capabilities to assess risk and we are pursuing that aggressively. we have a good system were taking current intelligence manipulating the data and identifying risk but we want to continue to get better so that's an area and we do get congressional support to tip continues to improve in the area. the radiation port monitors we need to be able to dial the algorithms. they reduce the naturally occurring radiological material alarms that we face on normal commodities like bananas for instance and other things that do hit on our part lines. we don't want to waste time on those alarms. we want to focus on what could potentially be dangerous material. i think there are continued opportunities globally. we are currently working with hardness broadening the scope of csi but also looking at other threats to the supply-chain

contraband commercial fraud that could support criminal activity and so forth. enhancing global supply security. there is always opportunities to take that to the next level and to build capacity with those governments and custom services that are willing to step lord but don't have the internal capacity or funding. then of course the dirt. continued opportunities there not only in the supply-chain side but looking at whether from a terminal operated perspective there might be greater security work from a private sector area so we are pursuing all of these angles. >> those are great points and i really appreciate responses. we will come back and ask the same question. >> do you want me to answer those? okay thank you. let's talk about the 100%

mandate and the fact that we are at two to 4%. i think those numbers are right. please correct me if i'm wrong. ngo i would love for you to get in on this. there's no question the 9/11 commission said we need 100% security and what we hear is that that's not practical. so the question somewhere between two to 4% and 100% where do we need to be, how do we need to decide where we need to be, how do we become more effective in terms of container inspection? admiral. kevin? >> senator i will start and i'm sure my colleagues will want to chime in. on the 100% mandate the key question for us is not the percentage itself but are we inspecting the right percentage? are we inspecting and identifying those containers that are high-risk and mitigating that thread at the earliest possible point?

why you'll you had to step up to vote we talked about some of the metrics that we are following and what we are accomplishing on that. i'd like to reiterate one of those elements for you. on those containers that we identified as possibly high-risk we are currently examining with our foreign partners under the security initiative 85% of those containers whether they are laying on a vessel destined for the u.s.. >> so that's 15% better not being inspected? >> they are getting inspected fully at the first port of arrival to the united states so we are checking them before they enter the stream of khan nurse nurse -- commerce before they are shipped destined to the u.s.. >> if that 15% one of them as a nuclear weapon and it gets a little late, isn't it? >> yes but that's not the only layer. >> i understand that that when we think about this you are

saying 85% of those deemed high-risk so what is or old to get to 100% of those being high-risk who ask. >> increasingly to target with the right ports for and how we can encourage them to examine anything we think is high-risk so we have 50 csi were ports covering over 80% of cargo destined for the u.s.. we think we place the csi locations in the right places. we are currently assessing how the threats have changed, are there certain strategically important ports we can add capability and work with additional countries to encourage them to take measures before leaving? also we just mentioned as you came in sir working with terminal operators in the private sector. working with customers to sell the security benefit that we can then benefit from and sharing

information. >> any comments on that? >> the container inspection world really does belong to customs and border protection although i can certainly attest to the impracticality of looking at every containers it comes there are yards. i have seen the targeting that we do jointly on cargo and the automated process is effective and very adaptable. if there is a new intel stream that comes in we can quickly change their targeting and identify cargo that might be associated with a newly identified threat. >> all right, so here's the question as a common sense ujkaj. we say we are not capable to do 100% screening. worse screening. where's the setting that says here's what this will cost and this is what will slow down commerce? has that been done in? >> number of that in that regard and i would offer the gao

tachometer as well. we have provided several papers to congress estimating up to $60 billion in costs. the european union has done a study in the private sector has done several studies. the challenges are the 800 ports with cargo destined for the u.s. an average of three to five purport and another 5 million to implement this kind of system prior to laying in his lane. that scope just makes it very challenging to get to that level. a lot of questions on who is responsible and how it's monitored and so forth. >> if you take the rand study even though it's dated now and say if one sneaks in and you have the tragedy that they spoke about at the port of los angeles estimating a trillion dollar effect on our gdp $16 billion doesn't seem that great so where do we go? >> he senator thank you.

i have thought about this a lot and we have done several studies on it read as far as the one study you are asking for the only place i've seen it isn't a recommendation we have made and i think cbp department would have been better off if at that point they said this is said, this is the feasibility study and this is the cost-benefit analysis. we are going to do it and try to put this thing to bed or at least a what the trade-offs are. there've been multiple studies they have done so all the little little pieces they have done since then have almost gotten there. but i don't see that. i would like to stop to talk about one popular myth that the 9/11 commission never called for the 100 president sent scanning of maritime cargo. >> what the they call for? >> they call for 100% scanning of their cargo. they said almost nothing about ports in maritime.

>> that's good to know. >> but moving on, we do think the challenges are likely insurmountable. the safe port act left a lot of things undefined and i think through the pilots cbp try to understand what those undefined things would be in terms of cost and who does it and what's the point? i think there is a concern that it would create a false sense of security in a couple of ways. to scan the container if it's kind of within a regime that we trust, a port that we trust than we know maybe that container we have some confidence that after just scanned and that ship it's going to be monitored for something like that but a lot of times we won't have that case. a lot of cases where they do the scanning our off-site. that truck is to drive three to five miles and a lot can happen

in that period. one thing the coast guard commented on that island said it's more likely that a weapon of mass destruction would come in not through a highly regulated regime like containers but through some small vessel coming and and snuck in some other way. i also agree i think intelligence in the end would be the key if there are weapons of mass destruction smuggled in here. i'm not sure a ts by itself would catch that because they have looked at probably millions and millions of containers and use the risk race analysis and still finding things. it's not like when they find drugs in these things there are is a one-to-one match between we have created that one high-risk. find stuff that got them through their system drugs or other contraband. i think our approach is than to look at the programs that we have and would have liked to

seen that feasibility analysis. at this point we have closed the records and that is water under the bridge but doing better with what we have recognizing we are not going going to have a perfect system. that's going to be optimizing your targeting system which means you are monitoring it on a regular basis and testing it to see how it's doing. it's having the best csi footprint you can in terms of high-risk ports. maybe they can shake hands with those partners and they will keep helping us and move some of those operations to other ports. >> do have specific recommendations on porch from the gao? >> we have a recommendation that they use. the porch risk model they used in 20092 initially planned the 100% scannon thinking about that and use a similar type model. we actually tried to reproduce that and found 12 of the porch they were in were remote was ports or half of the csi ports

were high-risk ones but we recognize there are some ports that are going to let us in. we have some nasty players out there that are going to let a u.s. joint program in there. we do have recommendations and we understand and i'm not sure i can disclose details of individual ports but there is movement in terms of additional csi ports for opening and closing. >> let's go back to grants to the tier for system for a minute. if we are not doing analysis do we reevaluate the ports in terms of peers tier 1, tier 2 and tier 3 into four. is that done is that done by an

oily? how often do we analyze high-risk ports, one in number two is without the metrics but they are getting better how do we take what we have improved and measure it to show a decreased risk for a tier 1 port so that the dollars you have can go where the risks are the greatest? >> thanks for the question senator. we reassess the risk of the nation's ports every year. we use the risk formula that incorporates the most recent data we have available on threat vulnerability and consequence and there have been times where changes in the risk data have resulted in the changes in the grouping of ports. for example last year in fy13 there were eight, tier 1 ports in san diego had a change in its

relative risk formula because these are relative to one another. so this year it is not a tier 1 port. we are making those adjustments. we work very closely with the department's intelligence and analysis unit to populate the risk form with the most recent data so yes we are looking at that continually. your second question as to what the measurement and really what i would consider to be buying down of that risk and the vulnerability, i agree we have got progress in terms of agreement on measurements and metrics to show that progress. to show show it in a way and when the chairman comes back his question was about how can the congress help and here i think we might ask of the chairman and you senator that we have a continued dialogue about the

types of data that when a boat you to have more confidence and the american people to have more confidence that we are making that progress. and that we are being effective sturdz of the taxpayer dollars. i would agree with you that we certainly have made progress and we have plenty of good examples, but we would like to continue to work with you to get at the data and the measurement that would show that in a more compelling way? >> each port has a port security plan, right? >> right. >> what a total cost would be to bring it up on a cost effective benefit, how much total and all the tier one ports that we need to spend to bring them where they need to be. do we have that? do we know that? >> i'm not aware of that analysis.

>> that's an important we because if you don't know what they need, we'll never get there. >> well, so, i mean, we certainly at the captain of the board -- >> i know you know where the weaknesses are, and i know that's where the grant money is going, but i'm saying in the big picture if we're going to spend $100 million this year on port security grants and the total bull for bringing our tier one ports is $2.5 billion, you know, we're 12 1/2 years from bringing that, and by that time we're going to have the question is don't we think it's important to really know? here's the total cost to get us where we want you and which juan of those top aide ports ,-com,-com ma which one has the greatest vulnerability and should we not be spending 70 million at one port and 30 million at the other eight on the basis of what the total need is to bring them to that level

where we feel confident? >> we will absolutely take a close look at that. we have moved the entire suite of grant programs toward performance measurement against the core capabilities in the national preparedness goal following up in implementing the president's directive presidential policy on eight. through the threat thread hazard identification and risk assessment progress -- process we are asking grantees to do a lot of what you are talking about in terms of identifying capabilities and using the investments to close the capability gaps so we are moving in that direction. but i'm not aware of a single analysis where we have put a price tag on a port and what it would take to close the gap in every port against that level but we will certainly take at look at that. >> i think it would be really important to know because you

are going to have limited funds from here on out. it's not going to change and spending, sending the dollars -- this is all risk-based. sending the dollars were the greatest risk is should be our priority. i would just recommend you look at that. see if i might we will take a close look at that. the maritime security working groups at the port level. at th local and port level i think they're getting at a lot of that, but i agree with you, we could make it more progress. >> if i could just -- until your points, the first had to do with how do you account for a risk down with previous grant p money in determining the risk ranking for the next -- we wul do that as part of the coast guard's maritime security risk assessment model that gao mentioned. if we have invested in a system that reduces the vulnerability

or mitigates the consequences, that gets reflected. that's part of the formula that we use for the tier of the next we're year. it is in there. the other piece that you ask about is have we defined what a secure port is. i watched the initial focus be on securing individual facilities. let's make sure we have fences and cameras and guards and rpm's and get facilities. then i saw evolve to we need to really secure this port as a system as well. how do we link these fences together? we invested in things like communication systems that would allow everyone and surveillance systems that were focused on the common infrastructure, not on the private sector. have we been able to address

when we need to recover? we invested in trade. it's been a naturalel use. i believe we're still in that evolution because we have emerging threats supper as cyber. i think the next round of grants is putting money towards cyber vulnerability assessments so we can then understand what it's going to take to secure the cyber infrastructure of the maritime. i don't know that we'll ever be able to say we're there, but i do see a very logical progression on how we focus our planning and our investment. >> we have a diagnostic system for cyber within homeland security. is the twik system applicable to that system? >> let me take that one, sir. >> yeah. >> right now the way the twik system works is that the contractor provides to the

system. it then gets back to the tsa. the system whether it's on the enrollment side, the date wra center side, up to the tsa side has built the federal standards. they have to go through a certification and accreditation. they go through auditing. they go through testing. it's not monitored through the dhs system. it's monitored through the tsa operation center. everything from the contractor's date wra center. >> i would like to have you answer >> the next question to ask all of you is what do we need to do? as a committee and in the congress to make sure we continue to make progress? >> my ask of you in the committee is for continued

dialogue and i shared this with ranking member coburn before he stepped out. they continued dialogue about the types of data and the types of measures that would give you the confidence and the american people the confidence that we are investing the grant dollars in a way that is most efficient and most effective and we are all good stewards of these resources. i agree with admiral thomas. the threat is evolving and so too have our measurements of where we are headed next. i would appreciate the continued dialogue with you about how we defined the measures of success that would give us the confidence we are all looking for forward. >> thanks. mr. sadler what we can do to help continue to make progress? >> i think it's continued support and from tsa's point of view the readers out in the coast guard's point of view understanding that.

at the coast guard is promulgating the rule but there's a lot of things that's going to happen before they get to the point where they can do that so when i say we need the readers that's not in any way insinuating that there is some delay on the rule side. there's a lot of work that went into getting to this point so we would ask for continued support. we can buy down some risk and use the full capabilities and to the admiral's point before it's critical that we maintain mission focus. it's also critical that we make a risk-based we make risk-based decisions that would protect the right areas and then data quality identity verification's reduction in fraud. it's ensuring that the right people get the card and the right people keep the card after it's been issued. >> all right, thank you. mr. caldwell. >> certainly i'm still busy

trying to answer the question you asked before but i will see what i can do here. for the agencies to deal with -- first of is just keeping the programs flexible. the coast guard is trying to make their structure patrols in things like that not predictable if there's a deterrence out there. i like what i see at cbp when they are doing what they called their key cider dockside scanning or a ship will come in and they will target the ship based on whether the containers are high-risk at not. they will be scanning at this seventh one or the tenth one or things like that or could be more flexible. .. it's an area where dhs and coast guard had been monitoring the situation, and they're talking about taking action, but i think

they do a report we're issuing tomorrow for senate commerce that will have a lot more detail on our thoughts on that. then something for this committee, and i think it's starting to show up on the radar of the agencies as well is for what we have, we do have to sustain it, and you have vessels, and you have scanners and you have aircraft that have -- that are pretty important in this regime, including some of the interdiction and deterence and just the daily things like scanning containers, and some of these are reaching the end of their life. i know that cbp is trying to ten years to 13 years, but at some point, you're going to have a lot of -- in this regime and all the things that go with it it takes -- it will take some sustainability and translate the resources. >> the resource is pretty much got the last question which was what is our to do list, and i

don't know that you and admiral thomas and had a chance to do that. >> mr. chairman, i think i just echo some of the points that were made earlier and emphasized that in moving forward, anything we do need to take into consideration that we confront a multitude of threats. and so to be cost effective and efficient, we need to always bear that in mind. i think the second point we made earlier was the big picture on security across all pathways by downgrades could don't want to encourage a balloon effect where we put all of our security assets over here and th the actl adversary circumvents the fact. so the picture has got to be across all pathways and then echo mr. caldwell's point about the aging infrastructure and

funding in accordance with the president's budget. >> admiral thomas, anything we should be giving on the legislative side? >> i don't know how much to add to what has been set. there've been specific authorities as we continue to analyze and threatened the ports, but i think that we have the right access through the staff to get that information to you. i would say this type of oversight and focused by the committee on this issue is really important to stave off that complacency that i concerned about, so we do appreciate that. >> for quick things echoing several things mentioned, continued support for the programs we discussed today in the automated targeting system and we are actively working on the recommendations that were mentionementioned and the capitn sustainment of the critical technology equipment along with the domestic office working with the team and of the plans.

but you articulated at the beginning understanding the critical economic expeditious and facilitated movement of the cargo aspect of the mission, that continues to be critical and understood. working for the secretary on the agreed path forward, keeping us honest on the good-faith efforts we've identified and we discussed today and also working together on the best framework for the future. >> i think doctor coburn had a question dealing with fiduciary agent and i just want to come back and ask -- part of my question i just want to come back and say the second half of the question. i need to be someplace else in eight minutes, so whoever would -- brian, i'm going to ask you to take a shot at this. here's my question. rather than the use of the

agents for all ports, when the ports of decide for themselves if they would like to choose one. >> we have considered that proposal and don't think it is in the best interest of the program. if some are using the fiduciaries and others are not, having the benefit that we have theorized by moving away from the fiduciary agent model is as the appropriations have gone down and our capabilities internally have grown in terms of program oversight management and monitoring. we've got a pretty good window into in the data into the guarantees that are partaking in we've lost some of the disability. it's across the fiduciary agent model and then the other thing is with the management and the administration fee, the

fiduciary agent had access to three to 5% of the funds. there is a range of opinions on the committee about the fiduciary model that we have decided that the best thing and the most efficient management of the program is to bring that management in-house. the first question is what effect has increased security along the land borders had on the maritime border security. what effect has increased the security on the land borders have on the maritime border security. and if you could just take 30 seconds. >> yes mr. chairman, two quick points. the programs that we developed

and how we deal with those programs in the maritime context and second, i think it pointed out to us -- and quickly to go back to south florida in the 80s how we need a risk based approach across all pathways to secure any single pathway. >> in the realms of airport security we have seen the balloon effect particularly on the southern part of the west coast and also in the caribbean and we secure the land borders for the illegal drugs and contraband and other illegal activities they taken and so we adjust for forces and that really the impact that we have seen. >> i agree. we have not seen a significant impact in terms of changes in the threat within the commercial flows. we have seen the effect of security between the ports of entry push activity out on the

west coast as well as up through puerto rico. >> there's a second-half to that question that i do not have time to ask or answer. i was going to wrap it up here. really glad doctor coburn encourages to have this timely hearing and it's a good amount of progress to report on and stole 20 of work to do. and i'm encouraged that since the team is at play it certainly helps and we are part of that team. but thank you all for your preparation in coming to help make this a hearing. it is clear to me that one of the most important takeaways from today's hearing is that it's critically important that we strike the right balance. it's not -- is easy to say but hard to duke in the strike the right balance in security and make sure that we do not unduly impede the transportation. as we all know how 95% of the

trade moves on water, but the port surge is accounted for. and with that, i'm going to -- some of my colleagues are going to have some questions to ask and we may have some ourselves, but the hearing record will remain open for 15 days. may 19, until may 19 i should say june 19 at 5 p.m.. statements and questions for the record and all of my colleagues, thank you very much and can each oto eachof you for joining us t. i think the admiral said that oversight is a good thing and we've heard that a lot, so we will not disappoint you.

in audible conversations [inaudible conversations] the reason we are trying to focus on the speaker is because it is the speaker with a full majesty and the weight of his position. they made certain allegations at this point he has not yet answered to. would you prefer -- >> i will yield -- >> we don't normally have that on the case to the public. but the interesting fact is the whole tenor of your remarks

going back to 1970 and say going back to 1972, taking up the context you were there for one fifth the load and that was to imply the members of decide were un-american and their activity. would you respond you knew that there was nobody here. you knew that there was nobody there. there. >> give us your perspective on the two. >> he was a giant. he was the politics in the house. he knew the politics of the house and he kept much of it to himself in terms of other members, but we've received a great amount of intelligence all day long and he always believed it was the art of the possible.

he was a broker in the democratic caucus and within the house. and what you saw was newt gingrich made a decision because they worked with a majority. so they started attacking bob michael, the leader, and everybody on that side in his own party because he said the only avenue to the majority is through confrontation and we are going to take him down and this was an argument about the misuse of tv dot coming to the floor where he would ask these rhetorical questions and make these charges and he knew that in fact the chamber was empty but that is when the camera was very tight for the speaker at the time, whoever they were, and then several came to show that the chamber had people in it or was empty and of course that changes the whole dynamic. but that was a process that is now many years later has torn

this institution apart and it's really paralyzed. >> congressman george miller sunday at eight on c-span2 and eight. president obama and the british print mr. david cameron took questions from reporters earlier today at the summit in brussels. you can see the entire news conference in a few minutes at 8 p.m. eastern on our companion at work, c-span. right now, here on c-span to come a few minutes of the president's comments about the release of the army so sergeant bowe bergdahl. >> that is a par for the course but i will repeat what i said two days ago. we have a basic principle. we do not leave anybody wearing the american uniform behind. we had a prisoner of war whose

health had deteriorated and we were deeply concerned about him and we saw an opportunity and we seized it and i make no apologies for that. we had discussed with congress the possibility something like this might occur. but because of the nature of the folks that we were dealing with and the nature of these negotiations we felt that it was important to go ahead and do what we did. and we are now explaining to the congress the details of how we move forward. but the basic principle that we don't leave anybody behind and the recognition that means exchanges with enemies is not unique to my administration and dates back to the beginning of the republic. and with respect to how we

announced it, i think it was important for people to understand that this is not some abstract and, this is not a political football. you have a couple of pairings whose kid volunteered to fight in a distant land, who they hadn't seen in five years and were not sure that they would ever see again. and as the commander-in-chie cof the united states armed forces, i am responsible for those kids. and i get letters from parents who say if you are sending my child into war makes sure that child is being taken care of and by rights to many letters to folks who unfortunately don't see their children again after fighting a war. i make absolutely no apologies for making sure that we get back a young man to his parents and that the american people

understand that this is somebody's child. and that we don't condition whether or not we make the effort to try to get them back. >> as the president and other world leaders met in europe for the separatist militia continued attacks in eastern ukraine escalating the violence along the russian border. this coming as the g-7 summit place in brussels. here's a headline from the british guardian. guardian. g7 leaders warn russia of wide ranging sections over ukraine and putin is told to recognize the elections and stop the arms crossing the border and cease support for the separatist groups within weeks. reporting western leaders have announced that the russian president but a near putin had a matter of weeks to stop destabilizing ukraine and seek a settlement with his new counterpart in kiev or