medicaid don't have time to stand in the welfare office for four hours to get their benefits because they are working a couple of low-wage jobs. and trying to take care of the kids, as well. that is another aspect of the accurate picture that doesn't get shown. >> dr. golden, what is your answer to this question? should poor families be able to save money while they are still retaining benefits? >> yes. i think there is evidence that contributes to stability in the long run. that's why so many states have chosen where they have the possibility not to enforce tests that would get rid of all their savings. >> i felt the move to eliminate asset tests for medicaid receipt and snap receipt has been a mistake. there is no limit on assets in new york to offering up an option. people can have hundreds of thousands of dollars or $100,000

and still be eligible for these programs. i think that is a mistake. >> thank you. mr. mcclintok. >> did some states not follow the welfare reform requirements? i know back in california, the state excused people, the five-year time limit slightly reduced their benefits. the state's unemployment rate which had been running well below the national average had been running well above it. the reduction was miniscule to those experienced by other states. did you study such comparisons? >> i have not done a full-fledged study of all the states and their approaches. there was flexibility but supposed to be strong strings attached that would be enforced by penalties should they fail to comply.

>> mr. turner, any observations? >> the observation i have has to do with a growth of disability. it's taking over a lot of the low wage employment marketplace. 13% of philadelphia, working aged adults are, are either receiving ssi or ssdi. a lot of them came on when the rules were relaxed and allowed people with -- >> i'm looking for a contemporaneous comparison between those states that follow the 1996 act. >> i can comment both as assistant secretary then as researcher at the urban institute. early information from the late 1990s suggested there was not a race to the bottom by states. one of the worries had been all the states would all make choices that would cut back their benefits. states focused on work, but did not, in fact, reduce their investments. unfortunately, in the most recent few years, that hasn't

been the case because of the nature of the bloc grant. what you see is sharp cuts. >> in california performing very poorly compared with the rest of the nation after it essentially opted out of the welfare reforms the state only cost the state about $1 billion. the reduction in our welfare roles was minimal compared to other states. go to the breakdown of the family. seems to be provides strong safety net. first line of defense, the interdependencies between a mother and father and between the parents and the child are the strongest bonds in our human nature. parents care for their children when they are helpless. parents care for each other throughout their lives. children then care for the parents when they become helpless. is that system breaking down? if so, why? >> i would argue it's breaking down over time because the federal government is replacing many of the roles that used to

be the purview of parents and families. the greatest single income transfer program is between a father and mother and their children. once you start having the federal government providing benefits directly on behalf of children, you are taking parents out of the equation. >> so we are basically destroying that natural safety net that ought to be our first line of defense against poverty and against want? >> yes. >> do we have data on the reemployment of individuals as they approach the benefits cut-off? >> there is apparently a study in one of the carolinas people went back to work rapidly as benefits were cut back. i don't knowcts on that. >> there is u-shape where people become employed, the employment

rate goes down flat, right before it ends, it starts going up again. >> do we have data on how much, on the relationship between the time one spends on unemployment and their difficulty finding reemployment? >> we do know this recession has been a particularly problematic one on both dimensions with long-term unemployment and difficulty in reemployment. >> let me touch on the remaining time on minimum wage. do we have data how long people stay at the minimum wage? >> we have data showing that if you stay in a low wage job starting at minimum wage, the likelihood you'll be out of that category within six years is 5-6 chances. >> we know a lot about the fact minimum wage jobs are frequently intermittent and not as secure. i think there is a complicated

dynamic there. >> thank you. my time expired. >> thank you very much. this has been very informative, very enlightening. i appreciate all three of the witnesses spending their morning with us this morning. thank you so much. this hearing is adjourned. >> [inaudible conversations] hd, like us on

facebook, and follow us on twitter. "washington journal" continues. host: joining us now, senator bernie sanders, independent from vermont. the morning. guest: goo spinet joining us now senator bernie sanders good morning. first of all, your assessment of the ig report4w&#rlhtd/w!ní9s amount of time, completely unacceptable. there are 2 major issues it seems to me, pedro.

we have got to make sure every veteran in this country has quality care within a reasonable period of time. second, clearly with people falsifying data and pretending people were getting in and of reasonable time and they weren't, those people have got to be punished. also around the country, what we have seen in my state, for example, 98% of the veterans got an appointment within one month, which probably holds up as well or maybe better than the private sector. some parts of the country pretty good, some totally unacceptable. host: for the problems that are there, what are the root causes? guest: you have a couple of causes. our goal established by the a a couple years ago of saying that everybody is quite a common within 14 days and get an appointment -- everybody is going to come in within 14 days and get an appointment. in phoenix and many other parts of this country, we simply do not have the doctors and the

nurses and other medical providers that we need. my understanding is that in phoenix, for example, we need hundreds of new staff if we are going to take care of veterans a proper way with quality care. host: is this a money issue going forward, or are there other things involved? guest: i think it is 2 things. it is a management issue. clearly, what has happened in terms of people doctoring books is unacceptable. that is a management issue. on the other hand, you can of the best management in the world and if you have, as you do at the v.a., 2 million new veterans in the last 4 5 years and you don't have the doctors or nurses, you will not have quality care the way we should be doing. and the legislation that we just itroduced, senator mccain and , addresses both issues. it says that the secretary should have the ability to get rid of incompetent or worse, dishonest employees very come up very quickly, but it also

understands where there are parts of the country where we don't have the doctors and nurses that we need and provides funding to make that happen. you get to a point where senator mccain and you were working on this legislation? guest: good question. i think the answer is that most members of the senate and the congress understand that people who put their lives on the line to defend our country have got to be protected. basisthink on that historically there has been bipartisan activity for veterans also recently, unfortunately, it hasn't been, but i think senator mccain and i understand that there are problems that have to be honest -- addressed quickly. pedro, i hope we have the bill on the floor very, very shortly, and i hope we can get it done in a bipartisan way. bill thatyou have the you wanted or were there more things you are looking for that did not make it? guest: there are more -- yes. there are areas -- i've been chairman of the veterans committee for about a year and a

half. if there's anything i have learned, it it is that the cost of war is much, much greater than most people appreciate. when you lose 6700 men in iraq and afghanistan, we understand that. when 200,000 people come home with posttraumatic brain injury and stress disorder, we understand that. but the whole transition from the military, from active duty, being in the national guard, to going back to civilian life and reuniting with your family, reuniting with your kids, going out to get a job that you may have lost, there is a lot of stuff there that we have got to address. there are issues out there that this bill does not address. women, whoks, mostly have been taking care of their spouses since vietnam. 50 years. they need some help. they don't have the time -- it is a 20 47 job.

job./7 imagine being in an apartment with somebody who has lost legs or has post-traumatic stress disorder. we have men and women who have lost their ability to have kids in iraq and afghanistan -- spinal injury, other injuries. i think we should help them and their families. dental care, huge issue. thatveterans have teeth are rotting and the v.a. cannot take care of them. this bill takes care of some of what needs to be done. host: did senator mccain have to give things up as well? guest: yeah. host: such as? guest: talk to senator mccain. the: it would allow secretary to

details,far as those what support do you see from the senate and how is it different from the house taking a look at this as well? guest: the house is focused primarily on management issues. and they had a bill, which was a pretty simple bill, that said that the secretary has the power to fire immediately. i objected to that because i think that you do not want to put the v.a. in a position of being politicized. you have a new president coming in and you have these high-level executives, new president, the secretary, getting rid of 400 people today, and then four years later a new president comes in. you politicize the v.a. the v.a. is a health program anyone the best doctors and nurses, progressives or conservatives, democrats or republicans. that is what you are paying them, to be health care providers.

the other thing is that without any due process at all, somebody could be fired because of their race or sexual orientation or whatnot. they need to process. we put in an expedited process where they have a short period of appeal. ,"st: "the washington post their editorial wraps it up by saying "this may leave short-term pressures on the pa system and basically does nothing to change the system itself." guest: i don't think that is accurate, but let me also say this and maybe veterans want to call and. i can tell you, pedro -- i talk to a lot of veterans, and what we have seen in recent months in terms of falsifying data is a total outrage and people of god be punished. if you talk to veterans in vermont and all over the country, if you talk to their organizations -- the american legion, dfw, and all the other organizations, what they will tell you is that once people are in the va, the quality of care

is good. the quality of care is good. to my mind, what we want to do is provide better management, but we also want to make sure that every facility in this country has the staff the need to provide quality care that our vets deserve. implicit in the problems you are seeing right now is because of ofq, because afghanistan, an aging oblation of korean and vietnam vets -- aging published of korea and vietnam vets, we have seen 2 million people, to the system and that is overburdened the system, and in parts of the country we don't have the resources to deal with that. host: senator sanders, our guest, talking about his proposal for the v.a. host: here is lisa from

shreveport, louisiana, on our republican line for senator sanders. caller: good morning. i'm fromrs, shreveport, louisiana, i am a republican, and i admire you so much. you tell it like it is. i appreciate your honesty and i would like for you to run for president. this is the first time i have ever really voted for a democrat but i think you are very, very smart and i think you care about people and i want somebody new in there. guest: well, lisa, thank you very much. way,an independent, by the not a democrat or republican. but thank you very much for your thoughts. virginia,stock, independent line. caller: hello. good morning, senator sanders. s would like to mirror lisa' comments and go a bit further. i'm an independent, also, ninth generation virginian.

26-year navy veteran, disabled. one of my uncles is up 100% disabled that from the korean war. i spent 22 years with various agencies. my comment is brief. one, my father got excellent care at the naval hospital, and i know that your bill extends .fforts to our veterans some qualify, some may not. your bill covers some more. and dod facilities may service the needs of some of our veterans. aunt, the wife of the yesterdayorean vet -- one ofed away -- she was -- certainlyts

money has been put into that facility and other dod facilities. but i agree with you that there has been much lipservice over numerous administrations as to how we have to better served our vets, and unfortunately, many of the loudest voices, including your cosponsor, senator mccain, who himself obviously has had honorable service and gone through much trauma, but where is, as you said, put your money where your mouth is? guest: well, thank you very much . thank you for your service and your family service to the country. look, i think you hit the nail on the head. war is terrible, terrible things to people. vermont, we had a

meeting with veterans in korea and they still wake up in the middle of the night with terrible night nurse about what makes. skills -- nightmares about what they experienced. and ifads to bad things we send people off to war and some people never return, wounded in body and spirit, if you send people off to war, let's not talk about not having the money to take care of those people. if you have money to send them off, you have to understand it is the cost of war. years later we will be taking care of some of those veterans and if we can't do that, we are not much of a country. host: who is responsible for monitoring efficiency at va facilities? guest: the v.a. itself, and you have the committee and house and the senate.

host: as far as changes going forward, will there be changes with wait times and how these things are considered? guest: absolutely. v.a. has already done away with its 14-date standard. it could not be reached. but what we do want to do is have the staff to make sure that veterans, 20 days or 18 days from whatever it may be. in my state, 90% of people are --ting care within a month 98% of people are getting care with a month, which is pretty good. nost: what were your thoughts o cosgrove becoming a candidate? guest: if you look at all the attention and difficulties involved with the v.a., i hope we have somebody who has the courage to come in to that cauldron, where there is so much attention and criticism. look forward to working with

the president to make sure we have the very best person -- host: courage in terms of what? guest: look, it is a very controversial area. hospitalle running someplace walked into here and you have 2 congressional committees, everybody in the takes the media, and it somebody was a whole lot of knowledge, a lot of concern for veterans in this country and is willing to take the heat to make the changes that we need. host: is there an ideal candidate you would say should take a position? tvst: if i mentioned them on they would no longer be the ideal candidate but i have mentioned some names to the president. host: not you want to share with our audience? tom in kentucky. morning, gentlemen. i am a marine corps veteran, i served in camp lejeune in the 1950's. the water there has been contaminated since the early 1940's, and it was kept secret by the marine corps until the

1980's. for years they have been study after study after study. now they are using a law with the 10 year statute of limitations in these type cases. i am dying from als and i want to ask the commerce of the united states to do something for we marines veterans who are dying every day, and it is been 30 years now, and any help that you could give us, sir, i would appreciate it. thank you very much. guest: thank you very much. this is an issue that we have discussed in the committee and i absolutely agree with you. evelyn from vermont.

guest: i gave the graduation speech at the high school. senator.t's wonderful, thank you. my son is retired veteran and he served in the iraq and afghanistan conflict. when he got out, we bounced around a little bit. if i paid a little bit more attention i would've realized what was going on. spouse,'re a military all you care about is your husband coming home. he got a job right out of the gate, started working three months, and then one day he came walking in house and said, " honey, i'm sorry, i let you down. i lost my job today." i asked him what happened. my husband is a hard-working man. also veterans are. -- almost all veterans are. he was a mechanic and he was -- he said "it is like i was in

there." -- wasn't there." i knew immediately and the next morning i took them to the va hospital at white river junction and i told the nurse there him "you will see my husband today." they did. we decided to retire here in vermont, which wasn't really our first choice. we did not know where we were going to retire, to be honest. but we are here now. i want to know, with all these people, all the problems in the -- i've been married to a service man my entire life, all i have known. but one thing that is consistent that i've seen is the lack of care. s, it is not just the administration. people get so comfortable in their jobs because there is no

recourse. oh, i can sit here -- i walk in and the guy is drinking coffee when he should be working. host: thank you. guest: first of all, i am glad your husband got good care at the white river junction v.a. facility. it is an excellent facility. the new director there does a great job. most veterans would concur. we have 300,000 in coal use in the v.a. every onegests that of them is doing all they showed. many of those employees our veterans themselves. many of them see what they do as not just a 9:00 to 5:00 job. they go above the call of duty and you get really exceptional care sometimes.

there are instances where people , as in every area of life, are not doing what they should be. viewers talk about patient advocates. is there a need for improvement as far as the go-between between the patient and the doctor? guest: may be. many service organizations play that role. in vermont, the vfw and dav and vietnam vets do play that role. what, this fellow did not get the care he needed. around the country may directors meeting with the organizations. they should be open to new ideas. if you'reewer asks bill and senator mccain's bill will be voted on before congress goes on break. guest: i hope so. the staff has been working hard on this thing. we managed to get to the floor last night. senator reid wants to push it as quickly as possible so i hope we

will have a vote on this this week. host: from jupiter, florida, this is operate. aubrey on our democrat line. caller: a while back, i read that there was a petition going around vermont for a single-payer system. mynow this about veterans, dad died in a veteran hospital in boston from cancer. six kids in the family. if he had not had the v.a., i don't know what he would have done, he was sick for a long time. my brother was a vietnam veteran so we had world war ii and vietnam. the single-payer thing, i am hoping the aca is someday going to lead to this. there is a lot of redundancy in our system. to the canadian system, we are paying for medical care in so many places it. we can use

people say there is not enough money but there is plenty. guest: your point is well taken. as a nation, we end up spending almost twice as much as other countries. have 40 million people who have no health insurance and many more who have high deductibles and high copayments. let's be frank, the function of america health care is not to provide care to all, it is for insurance companies and drug companies to make a lot of money. that creates a very, very bureaucratic and wasteful system. am a strong advocate of single-payer program and i hope vermont leads the nation. i believe from the bottom of my heart that health care is a right. whether you are rich or poor, everybody in our country should have access to quality health care. i believe we should do that without spending any more than

we are spending. host: rockville, maryland, independent. caller: good morning. senator, you have nothing to be crowded out. your role with the v.a. is a scandal, people are dying and miserable. what i want to talk about in particular are the union work place rules. i heard very casually that the union does not allow surgeries after 3:00 p.m. how wasteful, how expensive. guest: where did you hear that? caller: c-span. guest: i do not believe it is true. caller: do you get money from the unions, do they help you get reelected? what is your relationship to the union? we know about workplace rules. in tradey believe union -- do i believe in trade unions, yes. nor,ise more small do

individual contributions than anybody in the senate. my average contribution is $47. i do not get money from the koch brothers. money comes of my from independent people who are making modest contributions. do i receive contributions from unions, i do? i am a union supporter. to suggest that problems with the v.a. have to do with the fact that they have a union is wildly inaccurate. host: they expressed concerns about the inability to fire. guest: that is not a union, that is senior executives. the issue was if you have a doctor or a phd, they have the highest level. do you want somebody to come in and say you are fired without any right of appeal at all? what happens if you are fired for racial reasons or because your boss was sexually harassing you.

what about political reasons? should you have appeal, you showed. in our legislation, you have a week to appeal and the board makes a decision in three weeks. host: how hard is it to let go of a manager in the v.a. system? guest: right now, it is not just the v.a.. there are appeal processes which can drag on month after month after month. i think that is a problem and that is what we address. ohio,from kathleen in democrats line. caller: hi. senator sanders, you are a treasure. c-span is a treasure. if americans want to know what the government is doing, they can watch c-span. senator sanders, i have spent the last six years dealing with my father, a world war ii veteran. lateare both in their 80's, my father just passed away. to the v.a. in

dayton, ohio 46 years. -- 46 years. theyg that process, determine my father suffered from ptsd. we try to get him a private room because he was having trouble with roommates. my father came, in on a stretcher and we were in there with the doctor. we were trying to get him tested for ptsd the doctor was polite and asked my father name, age, date of birth. ofdid not offer him any kind testing for ptsd. so my father could say yes or no to any of those questions. the day after, i asked for the records with my mother. we found that the doctor had falsified the records and said he had offered my father four different tests. they did not happen. i reported this to the v.a. i do not contact my congressperson to make sure that

the doctor suffered repercussions for that. i want to talk about reporting the falsification of records. i wanted to ask you, while i was at the v.a., i talked to lots of young veterans. many of the veterans sitting there with one arm or one like. and other veterans who were suffering from ptsd. they were sharing that when they would talk to a counselor, it was very difficult to talk to counselors who had not served in the military. can we make sure that counselors are -- and i have another question. host: we have other people on the line. guest: very good points. it is why the v.a. it is unique and why we have to strengthen it. a lot of veterans feel comfortable when they walk into a v.a. and they feel comfortable because there are other veterans there and they have experiences that are different than many

people in the civilian population. second, it is likely that many veterans want to talk to people who know where they are coming from emotionally and who have been through the same experience. i think the v.a. tries very hard to bring in counselors and psychologists who have that service. i will tell you that in vermont, we initiated a program, an outreach program that is -- the people who do the outreach are all veterans. they are knocking on doors and talking to fellow veterans. that works well because they have a shared experience. they both know what they are talking about. i agree, everything being equal you want to get folks to do counseling who know what veterans have gone through. took just to show you what place at the hearing, you can watch the whole thing on c-span.org. attorney general

richard griffin talking about issues at the v.a.. [video clip] today, we have ongoing or v.a.uled work at 69 medical facilities and have identified instances of manipulation of v.a. data that distort the legitimacy of reported waiting times. when sufficient, credible evidence is identified supporting a potential violation we areinal law, coordinating our efforts with the department of justice. to date has substantiated serious conditions at the fetus health-care system -- at the phoenix health-care system. we identified 1400 vete a primaryid not have health care appointment but were listed on the electronic waitlist. we identified an additional 1700 for ans who were waiting primary care appointment but

were not on the electronic waitlist. host: he spoke about working with the doj when it comes to criminal matters. should criminal investigations be put forward? guest: absolutely, i applaud mr. griffin as the inspector general for the vi in my view, he has moved very seriously. i think he is doing a really good job. host: surely, alabama, democrats line. caller: good morning pedro and senator sanders. i have a quick point about staffing. my father was a world war ii veteran and had excellent care at the iowa veterans hospital. my husband served for 28 years and might two sons were in the .ilitary

i applied for nursing school and i received a grant from the .overnment for every year they paid for it, i had to work in a psychiatric .ospital maybe you could do something like that for doctors and nurses. guest: that is an excellent idea. when pedro asked me earlier about provisions in the bill that i wanted, that was one of them. m thate a progra does that. it says to medical school people in medical and nursing school, if you are prepared to serve an underserved areas of the country, we will forgive your debt or give you a scholarship. it is working very well. for whatever reason, the v.a. is not aligned with that program and i went to see them become aligned. we can pay off the debt of people working within the v.a., that makes a lot of sense.

host: negotiations between you and senator mccain, where they cordial? where their arguments? give us a sense of what is going on? guest: we both have our personalities i will say that. at the end of the day, we are happy with what we accomplish. host: senator bernie sanders of vermont talking about efforts of the v.a. and other issues. jeff from west virginia, hello. pedro and senator sanders. i have been a supporter of yours ever since i saw you in a documentary about big corporations on link tv. you are one of the few guys in i politics today you has a real backbone. guest: thank you. veteran. am an army our country was not at war with anyone when i was in. ideaabout the

about some type of a v.a. medical id card. you can take that to any hospital or any doctor, any dentists, anywhere you wanted to go. you can use dvi as a record-keeping place, now that everything is online, the doctor will log onto the v.a. website and get your medical records. they can be transferred and use the v.a. as a medical record holding type facility. cut checks to the various hospitals and doctors. guest: i do not agree in this sense, you talked about dental care. one of the things we are fighting for, in the midst of a dental crisis in this country where millions of people cannot find affordable dental care, the v.a. does not provide dental care. privatizationthe

of the v.a. and making it more of an insurance company. that is not a good idea. what the v.a. does do is spend more than $5 billion a year in contracting to private providers with it all have the capability or cannot provide the service in-house. it ends up becoming a much more thing.ve given the needs of veterans, whether it is ptsd or dramatic --n injury or amputation ptsd or traumatic brain injury or amputation. i believe in strengthening the v.a. that is an important part of the legislation we worked on. has thise nation" headline. "bernie sanders could be the candidate we have been waiting for." how the responses that? guest: this country is facing

thatserious problems it was in the great depression. we have more of a gap in equality than any other country. the top 1% hold a huge amount of wealth and many people have nothing. there are huge issues. up in thethat i wake morning wanting to be president, you have got to be crazy to want to be president. collapse of, the the middle-class and the incredible power that the billionaire class has over the economy and over our political life as a result of citizens united, the koch brothers and other billionaires can buy elections. that is frightening. we talk about people standing up and fighting to defend democracy . people love god to talk about these issues. people love to talk about these issues.

the working class is disappearing. i give some thought, i am not staying up every night. host: where are you in the decision-making process? guest: host:= we have -- guest: we have an election, that is my main concern. host: hillary clinton being asked about her presidential ambitions. what do you think? guest: i have none hillary clinton for a number of years. a very smart and experienced person. if i do this i would not be running against hillary clinton, i respect her. i would be running to raise issues that have to be raised and defend a working-class that is being decimated. host: michelle from illinois on our independent line. caller: good morning, senator sanders. i went to commend you and c-span. this is a wonderful program and i watch you carefully. we need 534 other senators and

congressmen such as yourself to fight for veterans. i do advocacy work. my question is how can we incorporate into all of our facilities the actual facilities that are part of the ig report to get an individual who can work with those facilities from the bottom to the top? areing at the bottom, these civil service individuals who work at these facilities. many of whom have not served. get somebody who can work with our patients as they walk in the door to the v.a. facilities and work with them every step of the way to get the numbers and good metrics to make the system work nationwide. what happens in health care in general and certainly in the v.a., people get lost in the shuffle filling out forms and

they set waiting for too long. v.a. a more personal institution is exactly right. when people come in, they should be welcomed and helped with paperwork, that should be minimized. the goal should be to get them into caring providers who will see them in a reasonable period of time. host: will you allow amendments to be attached to your bill? --st: what i do not support this is a veterans bill. i do not support the idea of somebody coming in talking about abortion or gay rights or the keystone pipeline or anything else. if that are amendments that are ideas to improve this bill to provide better health care to our veterans, yes -- by all means. i do not want to see the amendment p

>> we will need to learn again how to work together together, how to compromise compromise, how to make pragmatic decisions. in the upcoming midterm elections americans will have choices to make about witchcraft want to go down if we will make the

investments we need in our people i will leave the discussion to others. but for lot of us coming in the private and non-profit sector we have work to do to. government does not have been a monopoly on good ideas obviously and even if it wanted it could not or should not try to solve all the problems by a self. we have responsibilities to do what we can.

>> [inaudible conversations] if this hearing will come to order we will ask all the members here to take their seats. this morning we're focused on iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability and how to stop it. international negotiations over the iran nuclear program are coming down to the wire and with the urgent bush is going on as we speak

senior administration official sitting with the iranians today in geneva as being critical differences that remain. with the enrichment capability, a technology key to developing a nuclear weapon. the every and stated desire is to increase from the roughly 19,000 centrifuges today to over 50,000. the future of the plutonium bomb factory remains unclear. iran continues to stonewall international inspectors and adjusts the of the week that country's supreme leader characterize the requirement as part of the final agreement to limit the ballistic missile program as stupid, idiotic expectations i think we can presume this will be hard climb. meanwhile i iraq continues its support for terrorism

abroad for regional domination in the abysmal human rights record at home where those who were not of the right to police system are executed. nuclear capable ibm would be a national security disaster. while it may sound far apart the administration will push very hard to reach a deal before the july 20th negotiation deadline. this committee may soon be asked to judge a comprehensive agreement. central to this is evaluating the verification measures needed to ensure that iran cannot sheets. what types of traditions should negotiators do to mandate? with other elements? how does the of reliance impact its work?

some say trust but verify some said there cannot be trust but the question today is can there be verification? they are sharpened by the fact that i iran's leaders have invested massive resources and decades of effort into their own nuclear program there. in richer and facilities built in secret a violation of its agreement with the iaea one even dug into a mountainside on a military base. another violation. when it comes to the iran nuclear program they have a history of deception, a covert procurement and construction of clandestine facilities acknowledged only when revealed by the government adversaries. the dangerous regime has tied prestige to nuclear ambitions.

given the record of clandestine i inactivity clear consequences for violating transparency and cooperation requirements must be spilled out one dash spelled out with a zero tolerance for cheating. an immediate test of the willingness to cooperate with the thames with the international observer group of the potential military dimension it has refused to provide explanation or information to the iaea on past efforts including the military base where iran has gone to great lengths to eliminate all traces of any clandestine nine activity including demolishing buildings and removing a

large areas of soil of the site. the willingness to come clean should be the acid test for western negotiators part we must ask what good is striking an agreement in removing sanctions our only leverage if i read it keeps the capacity to secretly built nuclear bombs? fortunately negotiators have already made a concession to complicate the task the interim agreement would allow iran to have of mutually defined in richmond program to give cover the covert weapons program as technically speaking the ability to give the enriched uranium is perilously close for a nuclear weapon in.

if it left with a capacity to enrich the breakout raises to a weapon is a permanent threat that undoubtedly would increase as sanctions are used and the world turns attention elsewhere. this is especially troubling given how iranian leaders and spoken to israel was the one bomb country. many on the committee are troubled that deal bob administration has us on track to an agreement the leaves a permanent nuclear threat to the region and it to us. today's hearing will be the latest warning against the ill considered course of action will turn to the ranking member for his opening statement. from new york. >> mr. chairman, you and i have made a of a great deal

as other members of the committee about the bipartisan nature of our committee and how we have worked hard to make the most bipartisan in committee in the congress. i must say after listening to your opening statement i agree with it fully. i share your concerns and i think these are concerns of many members of this committee all sides of the aisle. so thank you for calling this timely and important hearing with the potential agreement on the weapons program and we need to carefully examine how it could be fully verified. one of the requirements what safeguards are needed to give us the confidence to develop a nuclear weapons capability. according to the iaea joint plan of action has pulled

advancements to a nuclear weapon but as it became permanent it would be inadequate the status quo leaves too many unanswered questions and it is too close to the nuclear breakout point the comprehensive agreement is needed to end the threat of a nuclear iran. we're just weeks away from the deadline with a joint plan of action set for a comprehensive deal there have already been an extension of what we did last week the head of the iaea made clear his agency could not finish the ongoing investigation of the every and nuclear program before july 20th that could work in our interest if negotiations are continuing but there is no deal with an extension. the negotiation have taken place behind closed doors so

we cannot evaluate those specific details. i hope you'll have an opportunity to give in an open session when appropriate. whenever the final form that this will not be based based on the old acxiom trust but verify but on the contrary another round of mistrust and the iranians deserved every ounce of suspicion they have spent years to develop the covert program that has brazenly violated the treaty. under this cloud of mistrust to carefully examine one of the most important parts of the deal. how to read verify firebrands compliance? may not make a mad dash for the bomb but everything i have seen tells me they will try to push the boundaries and test the will of the international community to respond.

one of my primary concerns even if able to reach a deal we still don't know what we don't know. illicitly for carrying equipment but it is important and to reiterate that congress has an important role in the relief must be approved by congress. and we will have to be convinced that brings us back to the questions facing the panel today what are the minimum requirements for a good deal? i know secretary kerry said no deal is better than a bad deal but will we agree on what is a good deal?

what verification measures are needed to give us full confidence it is not cheating or attempting to break out? . .

a so i welcome the testimony of our panel of expert witnesses to help answer these critical questions. as far as i'm concerned i want to see a dismantling of iran's program not just a point where they have nuclear breakout capacity and not the point where they perhaps push it back a few months. i want to see them dismantle their program and i think thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. engel. we go now to ileana ros-lehtinen of florida chairman of the subcommittee on middle east and north africa who has been focused on iran for a very long time. >> thank you very much chairman royce and ranking member engel for holding this vitally important hearing. while the administration continues to negotiate a bad and weak deal with iran while keeping congress in the dark it's important for us to continue to highlight the menacing nature of the iranian regime and the flaws in the

administration's approach to this deception. we are almost at the end of the six-month agreement yet the administration has failed to properly consult with congress about important parts of this deal. where are the details? congress has been steadfast in our mission to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and it was only because of our efforts on implementing iran sanctions that iran has even agreed to negotiate. i authored authored with the support of so many members of this committee the strictest sanctions against iran and now we see all of that work undone by the administration that misguidedly and dangerously trusts iran despite stiff gates of evidence that tells us mullahs are untrustworthy. time to wake up. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. we go now to representative ted

deutch of florida the ranking member of the north african subcommittee. >> thank you mr. chairman. this morning's hearing is on verifying compliance. i fear the hearing topic might be a bit premature. we are now coming up on july 20 the end of the six-month period and before talking about the clients we find yourself asking what meaningful discussions are taking place on the number centrifuges? what is the plan to mothball iraq? has there have been any access to parching at all and finally and i think most importantly when will iran complete the military dimensions of its program? these were the fundamental points we had to deal with during a six-month period and as we approach the end of the six-month trade the notion that we can simply extend for another six months because we don't have a deal yet is not an acceptable one. we need to have some sense that

there is movement on the part of the iranians toward a resolution rather than only delay and i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we might do that. thank you mr. chair. >> thank you mr. deutsch. now we go to mr. to ted poe chaired the subcommittee on nonproliferation and trade and. >> since the giant planet direction was signed by around the p5+1 in november the administration has been negotiating with the iranians for it a final deal. i hope our negotiators are not the same ones that worked in the big deal with trading for bowe bergdahl. it seems the white house would rather have any agreement even a bad one than no agreement at all great iran is insisting on the right to enrich which will allow them to cheat and come up with a romp. this could take a few months or maybe a few years. they could develop a bomb so fast that we would not be able

to detect it or stop it and then saudi arabia turkey and egypt will want to develop nuclear weapons. we must insist on absolute dismantling of nuclear weapon capability in any agreement. we are not dealing with nice people. we cannot believe they will be honest about nuclear development. we must remember the ayatollah still insists on destruction of israel and the united states and we must remember the iranians are still still developing intercontinental ballistic missiles which can be used against united states so i have a lot of questions to ask. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. we go to brad sherman of california the ranking member of the subcommittee on terrorism nonproliferation and trade. >> i greet with the -- that this committee was pushing for strong sanctions on iran over the objection of three administrations and iran was brought to the table only because congress imposed sanctions that were resisted by the executive branch.

in these negotiations a lot of the focus is on whether iran will enrich and equally important is whether they will stop file. iran's persistence enforcement mechanisms betrays an interest in invasion. it is easier to reactivate a centrifuge cascade that it is to reassemble international sanctions. accordingly we not only need to negotiate with iran but mechanisms there will be to detect invasion that we negotiate with their european and asian partners on automatic sanctions reapplication will apply if any violations is detected. finally our experience with the soviet union illustrates that you can negotiate a deal and enforce a deal even with an untrustworthy partner and even if that partner has capacity for

invasion than iran. i think a deal is physically possible. the question is whether we will reach one. >> thank you mr. chairman. we are joined to help us think through these critical issues we are joined by a distinguished group of experts here. mr. lauder, mr. john lauder is a senior adviser to 2020 strategic consulting and served as deputy director of the national reconnaissance office for national support and was director of the dci nonproliferation center. we have mr. olli heinonen at a senior fellow at the harvard kennedy school of government center for science and international affairs. previously he served 27 years that the international atomic energy agency in vienna where he was deputy director and head of its department of safeguards. we have ambassador detrani.

prior to assuming his role of president of the intelligence of national security alliance ambassador joseph detrani served as a senior adviser to the director of national intelligence and he was director of the national counter proliferation center. and we have mr. stephen rademaker. prior to joining the policy center is a national security project advisor mr. rademaker served as assistant secretary of state for the bureau of arms control in the bureau of international security and nonproliferation. friday that he served as deputy staff director and chief counsel of this committee and we welcome him back. so let me say without objection the witnesses full prepared statement will be made part of the record. that is to encourage you to synthesize this and give us a five minute. the members will have five

calendar days to submit statements and questions and any extraneous material for the record. mr. rademaker if you would summarize your remarks we will begin with you. >> thank you mr. chairman and congressman congressman engel. it's a real pleasure for me to appear before the committee. it's always nice to come home to an office building. i joined the committee staff in 1993 and one of the foremost issues of concern of the members of the committee in 1993 was the risk that iran might acquire a nuclear weapon and to me is really astonishing here we are more than 20 years later and this remains one of the foremost threats to national security. i just want to observe at the outset that i think this committee has consistently paid attention to this problem for more than two decades and he provided extraordinary

leadership to our nation and i think the american people are very well served by the leadership that this committee is provided under a number of chairman over the last 20 plus years. i'm glad to see you're continuing to pay attention to the problem is demonstrated by today's hearing. i have submitted a prepared statement and so perhaps i will just summarize the key points that i make. the first i make in my prepared statement is that iran is not like other countries that say they want to develop civil nuclear energy. they have a track record of deception covert procurement of the totality of the evidence strongly suggests that iran is interested in building a nuclear weapon. they can't be treated like a normal country and that is why the question of verification of

any agreement that is reached with iran is critically important and that is why this is a timely hearing we are having today. the second i make and i say if you only take away one point from my testimony today i wanted to be this. today we are very much focused on verification of the joint plan of action in the so-called comprehensive solution is being negotiated now between the two sides in vienna and a lot of the focus, most of the focus in verification discussions is how do we verify their compliance with the jp a eight and had we verify their compliance with the conference of solution. i think that's important given iran's track record and i'm joined by experts that will have deep insights into how you go about trying to detect cheating by iran on those agreements. my critical point to you is the focus of verification has to be

broader than just compliance with the current agreement and the one that's being negotiated right now. it has to -- verification has to look at what has happened in the past and answer questions about the past. it also has to and this is even more important, think we need to be worried about permanent verification because as i explained my testimony the framework of the joint plan of action in the conference of solution is that there is to be a long-term agreement here but it's not a permanent agreement. it needs to be time-limited and that is agreed by the obama administration and the p5+1. what is being negotiated now will be in agreement that applies for some period of time. my understanding is the iranians wanted to be in effect for five years. others are saying at least around 20 years. i don't know what the p5+1 is at seeing that the duration of this

conference of solution is going to be somewhere between five years and 20 years. that remains to be negotiated. all of these discussions you are hearing now about limits on the number of centrifuges and the amount of bridged -- and rich material goes will apply well a conference of solution is in effect that the gba is crystal clear that when that term expires when the agreed duration of the conference of solution is reached all of these limitations and then iran comes like any other country. everything goes away and let me read the language. this is following successful implementation of the final step of the conference of solution for its full duration for period that they agreed to the program will be treated in the same manner as that of many nonnuclear weapons state party. what that means is after five years or after 20 years or whatever the period is nuclear

sanctions in iran go away. that's the u.n. sanctions on iran have to go have to go way, our sanctions on iran have to go away. all of that will end at that point. restrictions on nuclear commerce with iran and so iran can be singled out and treated differently than other countries. we can't have export controls that treat iran differently than other countries. nor can the rest of the international -- iran becomes a legitimate partner so the idea of a conference of solution is for a period of time if iran behaves if they are not caught cheating and they uphold their commitments of the conference of solution at the end of the conference of solution they go from being a nuclear pariah to in the rear partner. and at that point they are subject to the same verification that germany or japan or any other country subject to and that basically consists of two things. it consists of iaea verification

and the comprehensive safeguards agreement and secondly the additional protocol which is an enhanced verification that iran is committed to ratifying and implementing under the gpa -- jpa. there will be more robust verification agreed to under the conference of solution and the parties are talking about that but the more robust verification will and when a comprehensive solution and then we revert back to the additional protocol encumbrance of safeguards. the same verification at every same verification of every other country in the world is subject to and i think it's a critical question with a committee to ask whether you are prepared today to agree that iran behaves for certain period of time then we are prepared to end in their sanctions. we are prepared to end special scrutiny of iran and treat them as if they were -- i point out in my testimony there are other examples of countries that have

abandoned nuclear weapons programs and we have accepted that. once they abandon their nuclear weapon program which become like a normal country. brazil and argentina are examples but what was different in those cases was not only did they say they were banning the nuclear weapons programs and taking steps in that direction but in those cases as it was a fundamental change in government in south africa the apartheid regime ended and military governments gave up our and elected governments. it was logical in those cases to accept that there had been a fundamental change and the government perhaps was no longer interested -- interested in nuclear weapons. ahmadinejad can be the leader of iran when the conference of solution lapses and ahmadinejad will be treated as if -- this country will be treated as

if it is japan. so when we talk about verification i think yes absolutely we need to focus on verification of the jpa the conference of solution because for a country with iran's track record we have to be suspicious that there'll betrayed cheating that we have to get to the bottom what happened in the past. there are lots of unanswered question and the jpa does not compel to iran to answer these questions. it it sets up an mechanism for discussion but there are no consequences attached if iran fails to cooperate. if the questions remain unanswered jpa goes forward nonetheless and something needs to be done about that to make sure we get answers to the degree to which they pursued a military nuclear program and even more important in the future. i think the committee needs to consider are you satisfied with the standard safeguards and additional protocol is the only verification that will apply to

iran's nuclear program upon the expiration of the conference of solution. >> thank you mr. rademacher. mr. lauder. >> thank you very much chairman rice ranking member engel and members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to be here today to help address this vital national security topic long-term iranian compliance with a potential nuclear agreement. i appear before you today in my capacity as someone who was monitorinmonitorin g and verification over several decades. the views that i will be presenting are my own and are not intended to represent the views of organizations with whom i've been affiliated such as the intelligence community the department of defense and the end science forecast on the assessment of nuclear treaty monitoring and verification. my statement draws in part on those experiences and on the defense science forecast report as well as the work of a the nongovernmental task force on

verification requirements for nuclear agreement with iran. neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether compliance with any particular nuclear agreement is verifiable. indeed we do not yet know the details of the monetary provisions that will emerge in the iranian agreement under negotiation or if such an agreement will be concluded. the defense science forecast report underscores that monitoring nuclear programs is very challenging and that the technical capabilities that do so are limited. what the report suggests is the number of steps that can be taken to make monitoring more effective to develop additional tools and approaches and to mitigate but not entirely eliminate the risk. mr. chairman i've submitted a statement for the record that outlines key elements to facilitate compliance monitoring elements that i would suggest should be part of an agreement with iran and cord to the way in

which the united states and the international community approaches monitoring and implementation of the agreement. the implementation of the monitoring regime should be sufficiently rigorous to determine whether iran has made a fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and toward a culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. i believe that the monetary -- monitoring provisions will be the main determinant of the agreement success and established the essential foundation for all the other provisions. effect of monitoring needs to be able to detect a rapid breakout from some facilities known to us in a slow sneak out from covert facilities. in agreement with iran should hence provide one a full explanation of past iranian

nuclear activities with possible military preventions and to iran's atomic energy agency about such such activities explains who is involved, what actions were taken and where they took place. there can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities has ceased. second a complete data declaration and robust inspection of iran's nuclear activities and material and equipment. critical parts of iran's nuclear programs are still not well understood by the international community. a final agreement must allow access to sites persons and records sufficient to make iran's nuclear program transparent. third and effective means of monitoring all of iran's procurement activities with possible nuclear activities. a final agreement must prevent iran from continuing to import illicitly materials.

the best way to accomplish this is to set up a channel for nuclear imports that might be allowed by the agreement. imports outside the channel should be permitted which would reduce ambiguities detected by the monitoring process. successful monitoring regimes in the past have achieved effective verification of compliance for a combination of measures which may be held up as a standard by which you judge the adequacy of the regime to be applied in iran. based on past experience in iranian monitoring regime should include a combination of negotiated data declarations and inspection measures and national and international monitoring as well as the consult of the body for anomaly and dispute resolution. the key to all these measures working effectively is the synergy created among them. data declarations tell us where

to look and retained inspections audit the declarations. national and you know black robe intelligence detect anomalies and challenge inspections to gather more information relevant to the resolution of those anomalies. i recognize that not all of the measures that i recommended my statement will be easily the go shevell or ready for rapid implementation but our goal should be to bring iran from its prior pursuits of nuclear weapons capabilities into what i called earlier culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. we should seek to do this in negotiations with iran by seeking agreements and securing agreement to affect agreements. we can also reinforce the culture or compliance by vigorously implementing the monitoring regime. some of that implementation will fall in the international atomic energy. others will be busy carried out

by the p5+1 itself including u.s. government agencies. the congress can play a positive and strong role in insisting on effective verification providing the resources necessary for monitoring and being attentive to compliance issues that may emerge. thank you again to the committee for the opportunity to present some of my ideas on this vital topic and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we go to mr. heinonen. >> chairman rice ranking members thank you very much for inviting me to talk here today. in my testimony i am focusing on the verification aspects of a comprehensive deal. i am basing my remarks on implementation of safeguard agreements and security resolutions in iran and

complement them with experiences drawn particularly from verification activity and monitoring activity in south africa after its demand pulling up its nuclear program and some experience drawn also from safeguards in syria and north korea. timely detection of prevention prevention of the development and acquisition for states capability to produce -- development of weapons of mass destruction is one of the closest interstate. there are things which we know in their aspects which we can perhaps use but also those which we don't know. due to the fact that iran has been running parts of its program without satisfactory applications to the iaea and disregarding security council resolutions is -- david albright

has recently made compromises with negotiators drafting the conference a final agreement. i will now highlight some details which would be included to a final agreement. the strength of the iaea verification system is access to monetary equipment and people. however the safeguard is not cheering everything. no system can provide absolute assurances that it fully comply with its undertakings. this is especially the case when applied to states that are noncompliant like iran. throughout the history of discussions of the nuclear program of iran iran has always brought transparency,

transparency to build the governance of the international community for the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. president rouhani has recently offered again transparency is one of the tools. such transparency should be implemented in a meaningful and systematic way. even if iran decides to show limits such limits can bear substance only of substance discussions take place explanations are provided and those are verified. hence openness should be clearly defined and become legally binding undertaking to be granted when problems arise. the state has to declare all

nuclear material in its territory. thus military sites do not form sanctuaries but they iaea has to break the safeguard agreement and complementary access under protocol when appropriate. the purpose of the verification in the nonproliferation records. in order to assure that iran has fully complied with its safeguards obligations under the safeguards agreement and fully implemented the verification and clarification of the requirements made by the aia board of governments and u.s. security council council but in addition to those measures additional measures are needed. iran has to provide all aspects of the past and current nuclear program including military issues. iran has to provide information on and material up source of --

resources like yellowcake. in addition to that iran has to provide informatiinformati on on all imports and domestic production on nuclear items as specified in the guidelines of the nuclear supply. this access including short notice in all areas with regards to people and material as required to the iaea and finally a few words regarding a possible military diagrams. why does it matter? there are -- in 2003. on the other hand iaea has asked in his reports that some of this work has -- is important to

understand the statements of iran's military related efforts noting that one of the last duties of people and organizations involved was to document the work they have done. one possible reason for such effort could have been to save information for further use. unless properly addressed it would be difficult to -- it would also render it difficult for the iaea to determine an ear nuclear activities are not ongoing. without answering those questions the iaea will not be able to come to conclusion that on all nuclear -- thank you. >> thank you ambassador. >> thank you chairman rice ranking ranking member and go distinguished members the committee. thank you for inviting me having this important hearing. let me say effective monitoring

of any agreement with iran will be exceptionally challenging. iran has demonstrated record of violating its safeguards agreement with the iaea the lack of transparency into iran's nuclear program was cited and i committed by iaea numerous reports from the director general to the board of directors. iran was negligence or land clearing the dash in 2002 the original plan in 2009. in fact iran acknowledged both facilities after they were exposed by an opposition group and reported by the press. one has to be very cognizant as was indicated by the chairman and the others this morning. the director general report of november 2011 i think a very important report provided disturbing details regarding iran's nuclear warhead development effort so would allow iran to acquire the

expertise necessary to produce nuclear weapons. although there was previous reporting on weaponization this report was in stark in its concern about the military dimension of iran's nuclear program. this is a very central part of it, the issue here. it's not only covert facilities but the militarization of their nuclear program. director general in june 2014 a few days ago said the iaea needed needed time before they could provide credible assurance of a the absence of undeclared nuclear material in iran. a robust monitoring and verification protocol will be necessary to deal with iran's nuclear program. this will be very difficult, difficult program to implement effectively. at a minimum it will required unfettered and i emphasize unfettered access to people and places. indeed if iran were in compliance with the u.n. security council resolutions

offer betting iran from enriching uranium for monitoring and verification process to be easier and indeed iran as they say was interested in a peaceful nuclear program not only through enrichment of uranium that one could achieve in the choir the peaceful nuclear program. since iran reportedly will now be permitted to enrich iranian iranian -- uranium the test will be more difficult. some of the monitoring issues are an accurate baseline of iran's nuclear program meaningful him monitoring program that will attempt to verify come points with safeguards agreement. iran is declared 15 nuclear facilities in nine locations. this is the totality of their program? insurance of the undeclared nuclear iran. assurances that there are no covert nuclear facilities in iran capable of enriching uranium are necessary. locating covert uranium enrichment facilities is

difficult since spinning centrifuges is silent with no signature or signal. a iran announces intent to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities and to build approximately 60,000 additional sophisticated centrifuges. again monitoring the declared facilities employing sophisticated centrifuges with greater capacity and confirming the nonexistence of additional facilities will be a real challenge. the comprehensive decoration from iran on their program is necessary first step. in addition to all related facilities a list of scientists and technicians were working at these facilities and is necessary. monitors will require unfettered access to these individuals and the relevant records. the right to take -- was taken in every facility would send samples to iaea e.

labs. the issue of weaponization must be pursued with access to known and suspected sites in relevant records. information dealing with the miniature -- nuclear warhead to an iranian missile must be pursued for obvious reasons. access to all nuclear r&d work and sites will be necessary with and i emphasize this anytime anyplace access to facilities that manufacture assemble and test centrifuges. technical coverage of inspectioinspectio n will be necessary 24/7. technical monitoring of iraq plutonium facility are pushing completion will be required since his facility has one purpose. one purpose using plutonium for nuclear weapons. if iran is committed to the peace for -- peaceful maker program iran should be dismantled. those are some of the issues that a protocol will have to

address on the task will be massive especially if iran is permitted to instruct enrichment plans requiring improved centrifuges with greater capacity. determining that enrichment does not exceed 5% is so critical are low-enriched uranium level will also be a challenge if iran is permitted to enrich uranium at numerous facilities. indeed determining there are no covert uranium enrichment facilities will be a principle challenge for any verificatverificat ion protocol. thank you. >> thank you ambassador. you say the issue of weaponization must be pursued and we have all said iran has to sit down and come clean growth in the reasons enumerated at the head of the iaea says we are we are not getting any cooperation from iran on this. >> that's a fair point mr. chairman absolutely and you mention in your opening statement the high explosive test sites.

they have to come clean on all these issues no question. >> what if they are not forced to come clean? what are the implications of that? >> i think there are consequences if they are not coming clean. that is what the monitoring protocol is all about. >> anyway let's go back to mr. mr. rademaker's key focus on his testimony. the last line of the interim agreement notes that after implementing the final step of the conference of solution for an agreed amount of time then iran is treated quote the same. the same as any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the npt. i think mr. rademaker in your written testimony he said this is a giant get out of jail free card from iran because means at

that point in time for no more, no more restrictions on nuclear items. no more restrictions on the number of centrifuges against spin or the level to which it may enrich uranium. at that point in time under the interim agreement we have already conceded the that whatever the timeframe after that you treat iran like you treat japan or germany, completely legitimate. and what does that mean them for verification? what is the consequence because it really just is a question of trust is in that? we begin with the argument referring to trust but verify but it is completely a question of trust if at the end of the agreement everything is lifted and there is no more

verification. mr. rademaker. spain mr. chairman i think you put your finger on what i see as the biggest single challenge before us and that is it's really a conceptual challenge. the concept of the joint plan of action is that there is this workout period where iran needs to behave to fulfill its obligations. if they are not caught cheating during that time than all the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record the clear evidence for decades the current government has been in concerted effort as has pursued a concerted effort to pursue a nuclear weapon. if they behave for 510 or 15 years are we prepared at that

point to say okay we will let bygones be bygones and going forward to be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest to my testimony is logically for the iranians that's incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave so if what they want is a nuclear weapon they have been struggling. they have been under national sanctions under restrictions on their ability to report components. it's been a slog for them to get to where they are and they have been very persistent and they have stood up only with help from the a.q. khan network. otherwise they procure things but it's all covert. if they behave for it period of the conference of solution they will be able to move forward with a civilian nuclear program with international cooperation. that is promised to them in the gpa.

the logical thing for them with to be to take that deal, behave then once the conference of solution expires then very aggressively stand up a far more robust civilian infrastructure than they have been able to stand up now. tens of thousands of centrifuges much larger quantities of enriched material and then if you choose to break out do so with a much larger infrastructure in place with a much larger stockpile of 3.5% of enriched material or even 20% enriched material because once the conference of solution and they can produce as much as 20% material as they want. >> one of the arguments to me by one of the ambassadors was if this comes to pass and iran of course is continuing its effort to destabilize other countries in the region and he listed country by country where they

were you now from yemen where they tried to topple the government and were very close to doing so to their efforts throughout the region. we exhausted all the examples. you said a regime without intent and also having the intent to obtain nuclear weapons capability. you're in danger of leaving them with the hegemon for the region. and with their ambitions intact both in terms of their capability of this weapon and knowing right now that they can destabilize other regimes and knowing when you lift sanctions that's going to be hard currency that they will use to destabilize their neighbors. the argument he was making i think was the veiled threat that other states would do the same

thing attempts to rush to a nuclear weapon in order to try to offset the aggressive nature of this regime. what do you think this portends for proliferation concerns? >> are you directing that question to make? >> yes mr. rademaker. >> i think we have some history here that's instructive. in 1995 iran announced they wanted to build a civilian nuclear power -- and russia signed a contract with them to hell. for 10 years it was a policy united states under the untended administration and probably the first half of the push of administration to oppose that and say iran an oil rich country and ample energy resources what do they need a nuclear power reactor for? we need to solve this. it was a high priority for the u.s. diplomatically to turn off the bushehr reactor.

one of the reasons we wanted to turn it off was because we were afraid it would provide a justification for setting up an enrichment capability to fuel the reactor and that is what the iranians did covertly initially and when they were caught the facility was revealed and they justified it because the set was fuel for their reactor. the focus of our diplomatic activity shifted to their program and by 2005 the push of administration decided to give up in the losing effort to prevent completion of the busheir civil power reactor. i was in the push of administration at the time. talking points change. we stop talking about how they shouldn't have a nuclear power plant and start focusing on the enrichment facility. the moment we did that what happened? suddenly it turned a lot -- it turned out a lot of middle eastern company -- countries were interested in having nuclear civil nuclear

power. they think upon administration is proceeding on the assumption that we can change policy again and we can sign off on enrichment in iran and say okay we are prepared to accept enrichment capability. and the other countries in the region are going to immediately say guess what we need in richmond too. and then how do we say how does the united states say to saudi arabia actually we only trust iran. we don't trust you our ally and we only trust iran. >> my time has expired. thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. let's continue on that. i am troubled as i said in my opening statement that while we are talking with iran they continue to enrich. i still don't understand how that happened. i just don't understand it. you mentioned mr. rademaker the

one, two, three agreement with the uae. i had the uae ambassador in my office and he mentioned that agreement which does not allow the uae to enrich for peaceful purposes on their soil. canada has nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes and they are not allowed to enrich on their soil. if we sign an agreement with iran that of sensibly says they can enrich on their soil but only for peaceful purposes how do we ever get any of the other countries do not enrich on their soil? i we been opening the door to you name it saudi arabia, turkey, egypt? why should any of those countries negotiated deal where they will not be allowed to enrich on their soil for peaceful purposes when clearly we are giving it away to iran

and? >> i agree entirely with your question and that was the point i was just making. think once united states says we are prepared to accept enrichment in iran this whole effort over the past decade to stem the spread of that technology to other countries becomes untenable because how do we explain to every other country especially allies and friends of the united states, you are our friend so we are not going to let you have this technology. now iran, we are prepared to let them have it. i couldn't write the talking points for diplomats to explain to our allies when we don't trust them to have something that we trust iran to have. i think what happens when we permanently accept enrichment in iran is by default we have to accept it anywhere else that wants it. you can try and make it a financially attractive for them to not go in that direction but

if a country that's determined to have it to tell them it's a matter policy of united states that only iran gets to have it and not you i think it is not the case that you camp persuasively make. >> rouhani has said to cnn that iran won't dismantle a single centrifuge. the joint plan of action calls for a comprehensive solution that says "would ensure iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful. is there a way to ensure that iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges? >> i think the number of centrifuges is extremely important. certainly for the monitors. especially if they are more sophisticated and spinning and putting out that much more capability absolutely there's no question that numbers are important.

>> let me talk about an editorial that was in the "washington post" a few weeks ago, three weeks ago perhaps. the editorial argued and i said this in my opening statement of that we can afford to wait, that perhaps time is on our side if the date comes up in july and they don't have a comprehensive agreement that might be in the best interest of the united states to put it back another month or two or three or four that iran is still undergoing a lot of at is focus the sanctions and they might have more

leverage if we let the date laps beyond the july 20 date. that was essentialessentially a "washington post" editorial. anybody have any thoughts on that? mr. heinonen? >> first of all we should not forget that the joint plan of action is very limited area today we don't know how many centrifuges iran has. it has not cut the number of centrifuges through do so is still likely building additional centrifuges. it's manufacturing components for the reactor and it maintains maintains -- in addition to producing additional enrich uranium so in my view one should put a cap on this and not wait. the program -- problem does not come easier by

waiting. >> you disagree essentially with luppo "washington post" editorial said about the fact that iran is still being hurt with sanctions and if we wait they will continue to be hurt and time will not be on their side. you essentially disagree without? >> i think it's a little bit of wishful thinking. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. engel. we will now go to ms. ileana ros-lehtinen. >> thank you so much mr. chairman pair had been on the record as approving the interim agreement and any subsequent agreement that does not require iran to cease all enrichment activities and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. we know that iran can't be trusted. we have decades of covert activities related to its nuclear program to back that up.

yet we are now relying on two things. number one that iran his honest with us on disclosing all of its nuclear activities and two that the verification monitoring and transparency programs that we have in place are strong enough to detect when iran is cheating but all of the verification and monitoring systems operate under the framework that is presented to us by iran. only what iran has declared as part of the program. last month's iaea board of directors report on iran's nuclear program the director general stated that the iaea cannot provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in iran unless and until iran provides the necessary cooperation with the agency. they are all familiar the pentagon report that stated that

the united states does not have the capability to locate undeclared or covert nuclear facilities or programs. so it's still very possible that iran could be continuing its covert activity and either the iaea nor the u.s. would have any idea and this joint plan of action did nothing to strengthen verification and monitoring programs or force iran to abide by the additional protocols. mr. heinonen thank you. you testified to our middle east and north africa subcommittee in january and he stated the gpo a provides iaea inspectors access only to surveillance records not anywhere else at the facilities that the surveillance measures are designed to cover only

certain activities how comprehensive are the surveillance records? is it possible that we are only getting access to what iran wants us to see and not getting the full picture that the cameras perhaps only focus on the door and that's what's going on in the room and also bad state actors that seek to acquire nuclear weapons and i'm thinking of north korea and iran and obviously libya and syria do so surreptitiously so what we now have is the administration and the p5+1 negotiating on the basis of only what has been declared. doesn't the success of any iaea verification and monitoring program depend on access to all sites, all programs, all of the information and people and equipment in order to get the full picture? one other major area of concern that we should all have and

which goes largely unaddressed many times as possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. the 2010 u.n. security council resolutions on iran ordered the regime to fully cooperate with the iaea on all outstanding issues particularly regarding the possible military dimensions of the program. that is not happening in the latest board of governors report states that not only is iran not complying but they have been extensive -- there have been extensive activities that may have taken place especially seriously undermined the iaea's ability to conduct effective verification. my last question is we are nearing the end of the six-month timeframe. there is no -- been no access to parchin. does this undermine the credibility of the deal and the so-called monitoring and verification measures that we

have in place? that question and mr. heinonen are we only seeing what iran wants us to see? how comprehensive are the surveillance records? >> iaea has several measures in place. iaea pass inspections between one or two weeks. there are additional measures so we are not relying entirely on the -- but it's important that it actually covers the centrifuges and exit and entrance routes. more importantly is that it goes to the monetary mode so we don't use the iaea inspection resources in reviewing computer

screens. >> we should modified to include all this. >> this is what i say in my written testimony. and one small remark whenever we verified the declarations and items we need to remember that this is a very time-consuming process. it's doesn't come in one month or even half a year. i give an example. we started this verification 1993 and the task force in the south african nuclear program ran many years without any iaea surveillance so it took until 2010 when the iaea was finally able to say that all nuclear material in south africa is in peaceful use. so it took that long of a time to come to this conclusion based on the practices and procedures of the iaea.

iran would be something very similar. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> lets go to mr. brad sherman of california. >> thank you. mr. lauder i'm interested in your analysis that we have to look at breakout possibility and sneak out possibility. i'm not sure i understand what you mean by culture of compliance and i think the culture -- let's face it nelson mandela's not taking over in tehran. i think the culture will always be to try to maximize their nuclear capacity. mr. rademaker you brought to our attention what we knew and that is after some period of time iran will be at least according to this agreement just like any other nonnuclear states except they will have signed and presumably ratified the additional protocol. let's say that's a situation.

let's say everything they have now is frozen and de-thawed 10 or 15 years from now and they are subject to the additional protocol and that's about it. and they want to sneak a breakout. how long before they have a bomb? how long before they have --. >> i think my personal concern is that will be up to them. >> assume that they make an all-out sneak out effort subject only to the additional protocol. how difficult is it to sneak out if you are subject to the additional protocol? ..

>> >> just does you indicated did your question mr. chairman, if iran news that a slower pace club facilities that we don't know about, it could continue down that path to nuclear weapons in ways that normal iaea procedures would not be able to detect. >> would they be able to put together without being