>> it's not readily available. >> finally, does the hesitancy on the part of the dod stand anyway from, is there concern

about, about what we see going forward? since 60% of the $103 billion of dod funding, and we are not in a position to identify the total amount of waste, is there concern going forward there's going to be -- some of which are described, mr. johnson, i would suspect that our friends at dod would do differently than the way you described it in terms of changing standards and why the standards were changed. what do we do to help convince them that this is ultimately necessary? and again i would go back to where i started. i would really urge you, for all of the analysis that's been done, it would be immensely helpful for us to the conversation not just about going forward, but if we can't

acknowledge that we spent $100 billion we know billions have been wasted, but we can't really even identified some ballpark range of what that is and whether it comes from, then it makes it even harder to support -- forget the creation of a shared database. it makes it harder for secured funding if we can't even identify where the problems were. without i yield back. >> thank you so much. and now i'm so pleased to yield to a real war hero, both iraq and afghanistan, a fighter pilot, mr. kinzinger. >> thank you, madam chair. thank you all for being here. the important thing to do at the top of this is for what it to him why we are in afghanistan in first place, and that is it was a beautiful day in september and we were attacked right in the united states will without we are completely defensible by two oceans. thousands of americans lost

their lives. says that they on september 11, thousands of americans have lost their lives to carry the freedom for the afghan people. and i think importantly, too, thousands of afghans have lost their lives. we see today in pakistan of a postwar mission of afghanistan, the afghan people, the afghan tv forces are really stepping up to secure their country. is going to be a lot of challenges. in fact, two weeks ago the president announced his plan to withdraw it at all americans are its members from afghanistan at the beginning of 2014. combat mission any of the 2014. he will even place by the 9800 service members in the following year those numbers will be reduced to the amount necessary to provide security outer embassy in kabul. i would bring to memory the parallels between what's happened in iraq and to think what the president has outlined for afghanistan. in fact, today i read the news and found that that mold so, a

place i've been multiple times in the war in iraq has just fallen to extremist. we see what happens -- mosul. what happened in a post-american situation. the reduction of force will play a significant event on the afghan national security forces it as the gao supported between the school year 2002-2013 of 65% agency funding went toward supporting afghanistan security every such as developing the security forces and counter-narcotics effort. questions are with the looming u.s. troop drawdown more of the owners will be place on the afghan national security forces to maintain the stability of the country. a large portion of one of 3 billion we've invested gone to them into security. are they now prepared to take the lead and can help sustain an environment in which develop an infrastructure projects which we put in place will succeed? this is important because for 13 years we have thought to great and of him if they can take over. i want to make sure at the end of the day we are not in a hurry

to just totally campaign promise that 13 years of efforts by the american people and by the afghan people doesn't go to waste because i think in 20 years history books will judge us harshly if that's the case. so mr. sopko, i'll go you -- outdoor the first. are they an environment where they can succeed? >> answer that question a couple parts. yes, of course they can succeed. there have been great successes with the military. using the afghan military hold their own over the last fighting season, and i think everyone is hopeful that they will continue in the robust fashion. there are concerns. and the major concerns that we've highlighted and i believe general dunford has highlighted issue need to be bsa. if there's no bsa there is no

likelihood -- >> we will assume there will be. seems like they're on track. >> we are very hopeful. i have no inside information but that's what i've read in the press. both candidates have said they would sign it. but the second issue which i think again, i can't speak for general dunford. he is was the expert on the military capabilities, but if they particularly the back end, the tale of the ansf, the salaries, the support, the buildings, they getting the fuel, givin getting them to undd and have to do that which is what he is working on, and i think the vast majority of the assistance going forward will be trying to make that military capable to do that. we are looking at, we look at spare parts. we looked at fuel. we looked at letters the. in all of those areas there are serious problems. we have to make certain we get those right. >> i understand you're not a policymaker so not putting this on you, but i think my big

concern in this, in 2016 the president has put an president has put an outline this is coverage there's a is a good mission in 2016, advising a support the afghan government is a good mission in 2016. but in 2017 it's not a good mission because will pull all our troops out only for embassy security. my question is presuming, so we're basically two years in which to miraculously bring the afghans to where they can operate without american assistance, there's a lot of progress a lot of progress that has debate into years. it all troops happen to be out today, if we happen to pull them all out today, what you think what happened to the the future of afghanistan and those reconstruction projects if that would happen today? that gives us a benchmark for what we need to be in two years so it doesn't fall apart. >> i would have to refer to the testimony of think of general dunford who, i think was over and the house armed services committee, maybe it was the

senate armed service committee, just last month where he said if we pulled out today that would be a collapse. i have to rely on his expertise. we have not done a study on that. i don't have any audits on that. >> thank you. i think the point here is if all troops are out today we would see an utter collapse, instead of having a mission for the next couple of years where we are focused on withdrawal and we are focused on pulling out. it might be smarter to have a mission past 2016 which we can have a long-term game to get afghanistan where the need to be. thank you for being here, and i will yield back. >> think is a much. mr. connolly of virginia. >> thank you, madam chairwoman. i know you want to look forward, but i think before we do that we need to glance backwards and see what we've learned or not learned here reading your reports, mr. sopko, and press stories, including press stories referring to you, and listening to your testimony and that of

mr. johnson's today, i've got to chile, what has the awful sense of déjà vu all over again. we have been in vietnam, for example. lots of aid money thrown at vietnam. against eight mission in the world was in vietnam. it was not aspect of life in south vietnam. we weren't helping to finance. the waste, fraud, the abuse, the inefficiency, the lack of metrics to show what we did or didn't do positively has an eerie echo in your testimony today. when i, as the chairwoman those i used to be a senate staff member in the senate foreign relations committee. we just have a chart that was a helpful one called the all spigots chart. the all spigots chart showing all sources of assistance from the united states to direct development assistance, and other spigots.

when you refer to $103 billion total reconstruction fund, is that all spigots? >> ?-que?-que x does not include all of the dod money? >> no, it does not include war fighting. straight title x. this is just reconstruction to 103 billion -- >> for the duration of this war? >> and all u.s. funding. >> would that include syrup? >> yes, it would. >> so let's take that as our universe. i know you're reluctant to say how much got wasted. tell me how much your counter with in looking at it that you think actually performed fairly well by some metrics. we've got to have some metrics. >> congressman, i would love to tell you 50%, 60%, 70% or whatever, but i live unfortunately in the world of gadgets come generally accepted government accounting standards, and i can't say that. i know i could colleagues over

in iraq reconstruction once came up with a number and he was later shown to be wrong or nothing supporting it. i can't say the. i look at specific programs and the specific programs we can say succeeded or didn't succeed, or they run a risk. a lot of times we are going in and alerting people that you run a risk of fraud or waste or abuse. so i assume my colleague has the same. we can come in say, they've lost x amount come or they have succeeded. we have identified some successes. actually i asked, everything the last time i testified before another committee, i said i sent a letter to the secretary of state, secretary of defense, and head of aig said give me your success stories. and why. i thought that would be huge if we could use that in our noses of what we have learned. but i just can't answer that question because i don't have a basis for saying what percentage worked or. [speaking in native tongue] and pay the consequences of not

being able to answer that question. access to the public by implication all of it was wasted. if you can't cite metrics, not anecdotally, but metrics, 30% absolutely went to the purpose intended and is performing well. another 20% sort of in a little grayer category, and then 50% is wasted, or whatever the metrics may be. but if the answer is i can't answer that question at all, then it's just to the united states taxpayer, $103 billion in reconstruction was down the drain in afghanistan. 100%. >> with all due respect i think every inspector general if you asked whether it's the department of energy, hhs ig, could not answer that question. so i don't know if the american people immediately jumped at the

response and the answer that all of the money is being wasted. i don't think anyone come any ig, you cannot give us enough money to answer that question. we'll be spending spending all of our time trying to highlight what worked. if you actually look at our legislation, you look at the 78 act and my act, it's not to find out what's work. my brief is given to me why you is to highlight problems. not to highlight successes. >> yes, but you also demurred in the etched in my colleagues question, mr. deutsch, how much is wasted. so we are not going -- we can put a metric on how successful we have been, and neither can we apparently have a metric to mr. deutsch's question about how much do we feel confident was wasted in retrospect. >> if i can -- the biggest problem we both face as oversight indeed is that there is poor data being collected. when data is collected, i'll give you an example, usaid will

look at the alternative development program or the agriculture program. an enormous amount of data was coming into the usaid from the main partners. they didn't access the data, naturally they are ags requires them to approve. they weren't even approving them. for us to come income we can look at -- >> mr. johnson, i appreciate your answer. this is 2014. we have been running bilateral and multilateral aid programs since immediately after world war ii. this is not a new subject. >> absolutely. >> what do you mean we are just throwing money and aid has no record evaluate the efficacy of a program? how is that possible? let alone $103 billion. >> that's a good question. with the recommendations we've made, perhaps usaid and others in state department will be more accountable in terms of when

they come up and ask you guys are money and they don't have metrics. >> with a chair and don't be one last -- >> absolutely, please continue. >> i think that your. mr. sopko and mr. johnson, something that bothered me when i was in afghanistan, iraq, was serp. because it's in category of -- okay, in a sense it was well-intentioned walking around money. so a military officer, commander could see a problem and fix it on the spot. see a bridges out, let me help repair it. that program, however, became an enormous equivalent bilateral aid program run by the military who are not experts in economic development. and it's all cash. so one worries coming category of what could go wrong with that, i wonder if you could just share with us your observation and --

>> you are highlighting an issue that we have series concerned with. i think many members of congress have sued concerns with come and i think if i could make a comment, probably a little bit out of my league i think was a wise decision that in your consolidated appropriations bill of 2014, i think serp funding was pretty well cut. but there was nearly two points $29 billion obligated of which to .26 billion has been disbursed in gende genoa this ye sent an inquiry letter to dod and isaf regarding all the on obligated funds, all the performance metrics and any assessments that have been done. were still in the process of doing that and what's it is done i'm happy to report back to you and the other committees on what we are funny. i think there are she's concerned. it was a good intention, but if i can answer, use that question to try to answer your question,

and mr. deutsch's question is, even taking that cerp money, some of it actually works. it is going to be so difficult to focus and try to do that. you are just taking the cerp. that's only $2 billion. to do that for everyone of these programs, it's going to be very difficult to say what percentage worked and what percentage it didn't. we have to get the metrics and we have to apply their metrics. what my colleague and i are saying is, we aren't given the metrics, or they don't use the metrics. so how do we determine whether cerp works or not? i have been there rated by dod for even questioning -- berated -- the cerp proposal because it saved lives. now, i don't know what that means. maybe it did save lives and maybe that was the metrics that they wanted to use. it's hard for me to then take that, saving lives come and sing 2.2 billion dollars was wisely spent. that's where you see the

predicament we're in, and i think i can say mr. johnson is probably in the same predicament over a gao. >> thank you mr. connolly. while some of us may say when i was in iraq, when i was in afghanistan, here is a man who's really in iraq, an iraq vet who still serving our country valiantly in the air force reserve, mr. collins is recognized. >> madam chairwoman, i appreciate that. you might want to stay for a moment because we disagreed so we're getting ready to agree wholeheartedly right here. look, he also pointed out some things. i came for some of the questions and going to get to those in a minute. but let me just say if anybody from usaid is here, dod is here, over here watching by camera, the only way is if these were supposed to oversight what is being spent, tell me that they're not getting the metrics to spend money, they are not getting the metrics on how to even evaluate these programs,

then maybe it's time to cut the money off. maybe it's just time to say, let's stop. if you can handle this because -- this is the problem i've seen so far, and i'm for being in the military, we've got to rebuild, i've got no problem with that. i have a huge problem with no accountability. the people of the ninth district of georgia do not get it. we'rwe are not spending monopoly money. we're not spending money that just pops out of the air. summaries is free healthier, free this. it comes out of my back pocket and your back pocket. it is tax dollars. we've got a fee system that is problems and issues. with other issues in this country and we of this problem what we are just blowing money and we don't even get the metrics were you guys can't even do your job? are you kidding me? madam chair, this is amazing to me. i feel for you that you're trying to do a job with no metrics. you're trying to get a job in

which that a given money and sago spending, be happy to see if it works or not. we are not going to provide to the metrics. if dod gets upset at your question, so wet send them to me. i will ask them same question and they can get mad at me. this is ridiculous. i have cemented language in the state and foreign appropriations bill forcing usaid in state department to take a closer look at the funds it is allocating tuberous reconstruction projects over afghanistan. frankly as we just said over 100 billion, between dod, usaid, the others. what a promise to we have if we continue this? i agree with my friends, mr. kinzinger. there's some things we can to hopefully keep this country stable and not have to send our sons and daughters back there in a matter of a few years, or send others of there. but how can we take it seriously if usaid and others can't even provide measures because they don't want to ask how can we

have any effect? either one of you would like to answer that. >> it is definitely difficult, and that's part of the way we do our work. we need to measure u.s. progress against u.s. i did not strategic goals and objectives. in order to do that we need metrics. is metrics need to be collected routinely and not every so many years, but they should be collecting those depending on the type of program is throughout the lifetime of the program and making those available to us. they should be approving those metrics that they're asking their partners to carry out in some of the projects, and quite frankly we did find several deficiencies in that area. i think later on, it probably came up, how do you gather and collect information in a war zone or in and of i'm like this? they have done in other locations. they are done in pakistan where they collected it using other alternative means to get the data and to have those metrics and report on progress. i don't think it's something

that can't be done in afghanistan. the agencies need to commit to doing it. >> can add something to my colleague? if something that congressman connolly alluded to. and that is, lessons learned from iraq, lessons learned from vietnam. i cited a report done by aid in 1988, and it's a lessons learned report on aid's operations in afghanistan from 1950-1979. i couldn't find anybody in our embassy or anybody at aid who have ever read it. this is 12 years. if i was being designed to aid, i think i would want to read my lessons learned report from 1950-1979. i spoke to a very prominent general, a wise general who said, i'm in the army. we do lessons learned reports by going to the bathroom, pulling paper. we write them like crazy.

the problem is they are not apply. i think one of the things you can do, and congress can do, is mandate that each of the services of these lessons learned report, but more important that aid in state to do them. and in the future as we all mode, this will be an all government approach to a problem. and that means we need to mandate that aid, state and dod and any other agencies involved, probably the intel community, do combined lessons learned, reports on contingency. remember under goldwater-nichols, you created purple in the military. you have not created purple in contingencies. you have not required to state and aid to do the same in depth analyses and lessons learned like all of the various -- i know you served in the military so you understand the lessons learned reports.

you're not seeing combined doctrines coming out on the next contingency. so i throw that out. if you want to make certain we succeed, maybe not for afghanistan but at least we learned from our mistakes before we do it again. that's something you may want to consider. >> madam chair, if you'll indulge me for one moment. i understand what you're saying. what bothers me is, is just a look at this, as a simple business plan. you don't get money for just i have an idea, let's throw money. is there a way maybe we could metrics, the magic tested the blood first before the money is never transferred? once the money is gone it doesn't matter. they don't care. i think the problem we have here, and i go back to mr. connolly's statement, whether it's good or bad i think i come from a background where neither or. i'm a male but if you do nothing has happened and everything is happening, i will discount it and chile were it's wrong. something in the middle has gone well and a lot of things have gone wrong. we may look at this repeatedly,

the people of american ninth district, they want the truth, honesty of what's going on. they will accept the truth even if it's hard but they will not accept incompetence. this is simply incompetence that you have unveiled. it may be failed in committee service, usaid may call it whatever they want to call. dod may want to call it what ever. it's incompetence. sign and simple, fireable incompetence. i don't understand how we continue to do this and it's just frankly disturbs me. i don't think we've learned a lesson. you just dated we've not learned anything. we have to do half losses. when i transferred out of iraq i did a lessons learned and i to tell the person come in who took my job here's the lessons learned. it didn't just involve where's the latrine and word the de facto? it had to do with what we found on the ground. and how you worked it out. i applaud your work but in some

ways i feel for you. you were a no win situation and this country ought to be ashamed of what we're doing in this area because we can do better. if we truly want to fix it, we truly want to work it, we can do better. the agencies of talking today, my office is 513 canyon, comics when you're incompetence to me. i yield. >> just and conclusion as our memo points out, as of marc march 312014, cumulative appropriations for relief and reconstruction in afghanistan total approximately $103.17 billion since the year 2002. this is more than the united states has ever spent to rebuild a single country. segar findings financial audits were not conducted from 99 of those 144 assistance awards, and usaid did not meet the strategies objectives to use performance indicators to measure and evaluate its

performance towards beating the strategies goal and gao has previously reported on systematic weakness and usaid's monitoring and evaluation of programs carried out by inhibiting barkers in afghanistan. gao and other oversight agencies, however, have have highlighted gaps which a usaid continued to inconsistently applying reformists management procedures, fall short in maintaining institutional knowledge and needs to improve oversight of contractors. the subcommittee will continue to do its work. and we thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us. with that, the subcommittee has adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

>> today on c-span, gil kerlikowske, the net of customs and border protection talks about the changes he's making in border enforcement. live coverage from senate's for strategic and international studies begins at 10 a.m. eastern time. at 12:30, an update on the escalating violence in iraq as islam is militants gain control of key cities. live coverage from the washington institute for near east policy on c-span and c-span.org. >> when i started covering congress, you had people like senator russell long, wilbur mills, danny rostenkowski, howard baker, people who were

giants in their own way. a couple of those guys got themselves into trouble, but over all these ar these were peo knew how -- they were all very intelligent. they knew how to craft legislation. a new have to do a deal and they all worked with who ever the president was, what it was their party or the other party. yes, there was politics but at the end of the day the usual featherweight to come together. and make decisions for the good of the country. >> today you just don't see that anymore. first of all i think the quality of members of congress, the house and senate, in terms of their intelligence and the work ethic has diminished. they are still great people and i shouldn't malign some of -- there are wonderful members on both sides but i think they're the minority. i think increasingly people are driven by the politics and by the own self survival, and i think the hardest what it is

raising money, not learned the issues, not crafting deals tickets making speeches and positioning themselves to get reelected. >> in the award winning journalist lisa myers is leaving washington, d.c. behind. find out why sunday night at eight on c-span's q&a. >> around the talks between the u.s. and iran began this week in geneva with the aim of reaching a deal on iran's nuclear program. at a house foreign affairs committee hearing, witnesses talked about iran's compliance with the current interim agreement and what else the international dignity can do to keep iran from building a nuclear weapon. this hearing is two hours 45 minutes. >> this hearing will come to

order. we will take, ask all the members here to take theirmbers seats. this morning we are focused on iran's efforts to acquire athisg nuclear weapons capability and how to stop it.bility international negotiations over iran's nuclear program are coming down to the wire. indeed, an urgent push is going on as we speak. and with the urt bush is going on as we speak senior administration official sitting with the iranians today in geneva as being critical differences that remain. with the enrichment capability, a technology key to developing a nuclear weapon. the every and stated desire is to increase from the roughly 19,000 centrifuges today to over 50,000. the future of the plutonium bomb factory remains unclear.

iran continues to stonewall international inspectors and adjusts the of the week that country's supreme leader characterize the requirement as part of the final agreement to limit the ballistic missile program as stupid, idiotic expectations i think we can presume this will be hard climb. meanwhile i iraq continues its support for terrorism abroad for regional domination in the abysmal human rights record at home where those who were not of the right to police system are executed. nuclear capable ibm would be a national security disaster. while it may sound far apart the administration will push very hard to reach a deal before the july 20th

negotiation deadline. this committee may soon be asked to judge a comprehensive agreement. central to this is evaluating the verification measures needed to ensure that iran cannot sheets. what types of traditions should negotiators do to mandate? with other elements? how does the of reliance impact its work? some say trust but verify some said there cannot be trust but the question today is can there be verification? they are sharpened by the fact that i iran's leaders have invested massive resources and decades of effort into their own nuclear program there. in richer and facilities built in secret a violation of its agreement with the iaea one even dug into a

mountainside on a military base. another violation. when it comes to the iran nuclear program they have a history of deception, a covert procurement and construction of clandestine facilities acknowledged only when revealed by the government adversaries. the dangerous regime has tied prestige to nuclear ambitions. given the record of clandestine i inactivity clear consequences for violating transparency and cooperation requirements must be spilled out one dash spelled out with a zero tolerance for cheating. an immediate test of the willingness to cooperate with the thames with the international observer group

of the potential military dimension it has refused to provide explanation or information to the iaea on past efforts including the military base where iran has gone to great lengths to eliminate all traces of any clandestine nine activity including demolishing buildings and removing a large areas of soil of the site. the willingness to come clean should be the acid test for western negotiators part we must ask what good is striking an agreement in removing sanctions our only leverage if i read it keeps the capacity to secretly built nuclear bombs?

fortunately negotiators have already made a concession to complicate the task the interim agreement would allow iran to have of mutually defined in richmond program to give cover the covert weapons program as technically speaking the ability to give the enriched uranium is perilously close for a nuclear weapon in. if it left with a capacity to enrich the breakout raises to a weapon is a permanent threat that undoubtedly would increase as sanctions are used and the world turns attention elsewhere. this is especially troubling given how iranian leaders and spoken to israel was the one bomb country. many on the committee are troubled that deal bob administration has us on

track to an agreement the leaves a permanent nuclear threat to the region and it to us. today's hearing will be the latest warning against the ill considered course of action will turn to the ranking member for his opening statement. from new york. >> mr. chairman, you and i have made a of a great deal as other members of the committee about the bipartisan nature of our committee and how we have worked hard to make the most bipartisan in committee in the congress. i must say after listening to your opening statement i agree with it fully. i share your concerns and i think these are concerns of many members of this committee all sides of the aisle.

so thank you for calling this timely and important hearing with the potential agreement on the weapons program and we need to carefully examine how it could be fully verified. one of the requirements what safeguards are needed to give us the confidence to develop a nuclear weapons capability. according to the iaea joint plan of action has pulled advancements to a nuclear weapon but as it became permanent it would be inadequate the status quo leaves too many unanswered questions and it is too close to the nuclear breakout point the comprehensive agreement is needed to end the threat of a nuclear iran. we're just weeks away from the deadline with a joint plan of action set for a comprehensive deal there have already been an

extension of what we did last week the head of the iaea made clear his agency could not finish the ongoing investigation of the every and nuclear program before july 20th that could work in our interest if negotiations are continuing but there is no deal with an extension. the negotiation have taken place behind closed doors so we cannot evaluate those specific details. i hope you'll have an opportunity to give in an open session when appropriate. whenever the final form that this will not be based based on the old acxiom trust but verify but on the contrary another round of mistrust and the iranians deserved every ounce of suspicion they have spent years to

develop the covert program that has brazenly violated the treaty. under this cloud of mistrust to carefully examine one of the most important parts of the deal. how to read verify firebrands compliance? may not make a mad dash for the bomb but everything i have seen tells me they will try to push the boundaries and test the will of the international community to respond. one of my primary concerns even if able to reach a deal we still don't know what we don't know. illicitly for carrying equipment but it is important and to reiterate that congress has an important role in the relief

must be approved by congress. and we will have to be convinced that brings us back to the questions facing the panel today what are the minimum requirements for a good deal? i know secretary kerry said no deal is better than a bad deal but will we agree on what is a good deal? what verification measures are needed to give us full confidence it is not cheating or attempting to break out? . . it seemed to me that we could have and should have made a deal

saying to the iranians if you want to talk with us in six months, you stop enriching while we are talking. i don't think that was so much to ask. the fact that it wasn't done troubles me. i'm told it wasn't done because iran wouldn't agree to. if they didn't agree to something as simple as that, what does that tell us, i fear, about the agreement to any kind of acquiescence to any kind of comprehensive agreement. a so i welcome the testimony of our panel of expert witnesses to help answer these critical questions. as far as i'm concerned i want to see a dismantling of iran's program not just a point where they have nuclear breakout capacity and not the point where they perhaps push it back a few months. i want to see them dismantle their program and i think thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you mr. engel. we go now to ileana ros-lehtinen

of florida chairman of the subcommittee on middle east and north africa who has been focused on iran for a very long time. >> thank you very much chairman royce and ranking member engel for holding this vitally important hearing. while the administration continues to negotiate a bad and weak deal with iran while keeping congress in the dark it's important for us to continue to highlight the menacing nature of the iranian regime and the flaws in the administration's approach to this deception. we are almost at the end of the six-month agreement yet the administration has failed to properly consult with congress about important parts of this deal. where are the details? congress has been steadfast in our mission to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and it was only because of our efforts on implementing iran sanctions that iran has even agreed to negotiate.

i authored authored with the support of so many members of this committee the strictest sanctions against iran and now we see all of that work undone by the administration that misguidedly and dangerously trusts iran despite stiff gates of evidence that tells us mullahs are untrustworthy. time to wake up. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. we go now to representative ted deutch of florida the ranking member of the north african subcommittee. >> thank you mr. chairman. this morning's hearing is on verifying compliance. i fear the hearing topic might be a bit premature. we are now coming up on july 20 the end of the six-month period and before talking about the clients we find yourself asking what meaningful discussions are taking place on the number centrifuges? what is the plan to mothball

iraq? has there have been any access to parching at all and finally and i think most importantly when will iran complete the military dimensions of its program? these were the fundamental points we had to deal with during a six-month period and as we approach the end of the six-month trade the notion that we can simply extend for another six months because we don't have a deal yet is not an acceptable one. we need to have some sense that there is movement on the part of the iranians toward a resolution rather than only delay and i look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we might do that. thank you mr. chair. >> thank you mr. deutsch. now we go to mr. to ted poe chaired the subcommittee on nonproliferation and trade and. >> since the giant planet direction was signed by around the p5+1 in november the

administration has been negotiating with the iranians for it a final deal. i hope our negotiators are not the same ones that worked in the big deal with trading for bowe bergdahl. it seems the white house would rather have any agreement even a bad one than no agreement at all great iran is insisting on the right to enrich which will allow them to cheat and come up with a romp. this could take a few months or maybe a few years. they could develop a bomb so fast that we would not be able to detect it or stop it and then saudi arabia turkey and egypt will want to develop nuclear weapons. we must insist on absolute dismantling of nuclear weapon capability in any agreement. we are not dealing with nice people. we cannot believe they will be honest about nuclear development. we must remember the ayatollah still insists on destruction of israel and the united states and we must remember the iranians are still still developing intercontinental ballistic missiles which can be used against united states so i have

a lot of questions to ask. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you. we go to brad sherman of california the ranking member of the subcommittee on terrorism nonproliferation and trade. >> i greet with the -- that this committee was pushing for strong sanctions on iran over the objection of three administrations and iran was brought to the table only because congress imposed sanctions that were resisted by the executive branch. in these negotiations a lot of the focus is on whether iran will enrich and equally important is whether they will stop file. iran's persistence enforcement mechanisms betrays an interest in invasion. it is easier to reactivate a centrifuge cascade that it is to reassemble international sanctions. accordingly we not only need to

negotiate with iran but mechanisms there will be to detect invasion that we negotiate with their european and asian partners on automatic sanctions reapplication will apply if any violations is detected. finally our experience with the soviet union illustrates that you can negotiate a deal and enforce a deal even with an untrustworthy partner and even if that partner has capacity for invasion than iran. i think a deal is physically possible. the question is whether we will reach one. >> thank you mr. chairman. we are joined to help us think through these critical issues we are joined by a distinguished group of experts here. mr. lauder, mr. john lauder is a senior adviser to 2020 strategic consulting and served as deputy director of the national

reconnaissance office for national support and was director of the dci nonproliferation center. we have mr. olli heinonen at a senior fellow at the harvard kennedy school of government center for science and international affairs. previously he served 27 years that the international atomic energy agency in vienna where he was deputy director and head of its department of safeguards. we have ambassador detrani. prior to assuming his role of president of the intelligence of national security alliance ambassador joseph detrani served as a senior adviser to the director of national intelligence and he was director of the national counter proliferation center. and we have mr. stephen rademaker. prior to joining the policy center is a national security project advisor mr. rademaker

served as assistant secretary of state for the bureau of arms control in the bureau of international security and nonproliferation. friday that he served as deputy staff director and chief counsel of this committee and we welcome him back. so let me say without objection the witnesses full prepared statement will be made part of the record. that is to encourage you to synthesize this and give us a five minute. the members will have five calendar days to submit statements and questions and any extraneous material for the record. mr. rademaker if you would summarize your remarks we will begin with you. >> thank you mr. chairman and congressman congressman engel. it's a real pleasure for me to appear before the committee. it's always nice to come home to an office building. i joined the committee staff in 1993 and one of the foremost

issues of concern of the members of the committee in 1993 was the risk that iran might acquire a nuclear weapon and to me is really astonishing here we are more than 20 years later and this remains one of the foremost threats to national security. i just want to observe at the outset that i think this committee has consistently paid attention to this problem for more than two decades and he provided extraordinary leadership to our nation and i think the american people are very well served by the leadership that this committee is provided under a number of chairman over the last 20 plus years. i'm glad to see you're continuing to pay attention to the problem is demonstrated by today's hearing. i have submitted a prepared statement and so perhaps i will just summarize the key points that i make.

the first i make in my prepared statement is that iran is not like other countries that say they want to develop civil nuclear energy. they have a track record of deception covert procurement of the totality of the evidence strongly suggests that iran is interested in building a nuclear weapon. they can't be treated like a normal country and that is why the question of verification of any agreement that is reached with iran is critically important and that is why this is a timely hearing we are having today. the second i make and i say if you only take away one point from my testimony today i wanted to be this. today we are very much focused on verification of the joint plan of action in the so-called comprehensive solution is being negotiated now between the two sides in vienna and a lot of the

focus, most of the focus in verification discussions is how do we verify their compliance with the jp a eight and had we verify their compliance with the conference of solution. i think that's important given iran's track record and i'm joined by experts that will have deep insights into how you go about trying to detect cheating by iran on those agreements. my critical point to you is the focus of verification has to be broader than just compliance with the current agreement and the one that's being negotiated right now. it has to -- verification has to look at what has happened in the past and answer questions about the past. it also has to and this is even more important, think we need to be worried about permanent verification because as i explained my testimony the framework of the joint plan of action in the conference of solution is that there is to be a long-term agreement here but

it's not a permanent agreement. it needs to be time-limited and that is agreed by the obama administration and the p5+1. what is being negotiated now will be in agreement that applies for some period of time. my understanding is the iranians wanted to be in effect for five years. others are saying at least around 20 years. i don't know what the p5+1 is at seeing that the duration of this conference of solution is going to be somewhere between five years and 20 years. that remains to be negotiated. all of these discussions you are hearing now about limits on the number of centrifuges and the amount of bridged -- and rich material goes will apply well a conference of solution is in effect that the gba is crystal clear that when that term expires when the agreed duration of the conference of solution is reached all of these limitations

and then iran comes like any other country. everything goes away and let me read the language. this is following successful implementation of the final step of the conference of solution for its full duration for period that they agreed to the program will be treated in the same manner as that of many nonnuclear weapons state party. what that means is after five years or after 20 years or whatever the period is nuclear sanctions in iran go away. that's the u.n. sanctions on iran have to go have to go way, our sanctions on iran have to go away. all of that will end at that point. restrictions on nuclear commerce with iran and so iran can be singled out and treated differently than other countries. we can't have export controls that treat iran differently than other countries. nor can the rest of the international -- iran becomes a legitimate partner so the idea of a conference of solution is for a

period of time if iran behaves if they are not caught cheating and they uphold their commitments of the conference of solution at the end of the conference of solution they go from being a nuclear pariah to in the rear partner. and at that point they are subject to the same verification that germany or japan or any other country subject to and that basically consists of two things. it consists of iaea verification and the comprehensive safeguards agreement and secondly the additional protocol which is an enhanced verification that iran is committed to ratifying and implementing under the gpa -- jpa. there will be more robust verification agreed to under the conference of solution and the parties are talking about that but the more robust verification will and when a comprehensive solution and then we revert back to the additional protocol

encumbrance of safeguards. the same verification at every same verification of every other country in the world is subject to and i think it's a critical question with a committee to ask whether you are prepared today to agree that iran behaves for certain period of time then we are prepared to end in their sanctions. we are prepared to end special scrutiny of iran and treat them as if they were -- i point out in my testimony there are other examples of countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons programs and we have accepted that. once they abandon their nuclear weapon program which become like a normal country. brazil and argentina are examples but what was different in those cases was not only did they say they were banning the nuclear weapons programs and taking steps in that direction but in those cases as it was a fundamental change in government in south africa the apartheid regime ended and military governments gave up our and

elected governments. it was logical in those cases to accept that there had been a fundamental change and the government perhaps was no longer interested -- interested in nuclear weapons. ahmadinejad can be the leader of iran when the conference of solution lapses and ahmadinejad will be treated as if -- this country will be treated as if it is japan. so when we talk about verification i think yes absolutely we need to focus on verification of the jpa the conference of solution because for a country with iran's track record we have to be suspicious that there'll betrayed cheating that we have to get to the bottom what happened in the past. there are lots of unanswered question and the jpa does not compel to iran to answer these questions. it it sets up an mechanism for discussion but there are no

consequences attached if iran fails to cooperate. if the questions remain unanswered jpa goes forward nonetheless and something needs to be done about that to make sure we get answers to the degree to which they pursued a military nuclear program and even more important in the future. i think the committee needs to consider are you satisfied with the standard safeguards and additional protocol is the only verification that will apply to >> thank you. >> thank you very much, chairman royce, ranking member engel, members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to be here today to help address this vital national security topic. monitoring iranian compliance with the potential nuclear agreement. iap before you today in my private capacity as someone who is labored on monitoring and verification over several decades. the views that i will be

presenting on my on and are not intended to represent the views of organizations with whom i have been affiliated such as the intelligence community, the department of defense, and the defense science board task force on the assessment of nuclear treaty monitoring and verification. my statement though draws in part on those experiences and on the defense science board task force report as was the work of a nongovernmental task force on verification requirements for a nuclear agreement with iran. neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to whether compliance with any particular nuclear agreement is verifiable. indeed, we do not yet know the details of the monitoring provisions that will emerge in the iranian agreement now under negotiation, or if such an agreement will be concluded. the defense science board has force report underscores that monitor nuclear programs is very challenging, and that the

technical capabilities to do so are limited. but the report suggests the number of steps they can be taken to make monitoring more effective, to develop additional tools and approaches, and to mitigate a not entirely eliminate the risk. mr. chairman, i have submitted a statement for the record that outlines key element to facilitate monitoring. helibond's that i would respectfully suggest to be part of an agreement with iran in a court to the way in which the united states and a national unity approaches monitoring and implementation of the agreement. the implementation of the monitoring regime should be sufficiently rigorous, to determine whether iran has made a fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and forward a culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. ..i believe that the