technical capabilities to do so are limited. but the report suggests the number of steps they can be taken to make monitoring more effective, to develop additional tools and approaches, and to mitigate a not entirely eliminate the risk. mr. chairman, i have submitted a statement for the record that outlines key element to facilitate monitoring. helibond's that i would respectfully suggest to be part of an agreement with iran in a court to the way in which the united states and a national unity approaches monitoring and implementation of the agreement. the implementation of the monitoring regime should be sufficiently rigorous, to determine whether iran has made a fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and forward a culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. ..i believe that the monetary --

monitoring provisions will be the main determinant of the agreement success and established the essential foundation for all the other provisions. effect of monitoring needs to be able to detect a rapid breakout from some facilities known to us in a slow sneak out from covert facilities. in agreement with iran should hence provide one a full explanation of past iranian nuclear activities with possible military preventions and to iran's atomic energy agency about such such activities explains who is involved, what actions were taken and where they took place. there can be no international confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities has ceased. second a complete data declaration and robust inspection of iran's nuclear activities and material and equipment.

critical parts of iran's nuclear programs are still not well understood by the international community. a final agreement must allow access to sites persons and records sufficient to make iran's nuclear program transparent. third and effective means of monitoring all of iran's procurement activities with possible nuclear activities. a final agreement must prevent iran from continuing to import illicitly materials. the best way to accomplish this is to set up a channel for nuclear imports that might be allowed by the agreement. imports outside the channel should be permitted which would reduce ambiguities detected by the monitoring process. successful monitoring regimes in the past have achieved effective verification of compliance for a combination of measures which may be held up as a standard by which you judge the adequacy of the regime to be applied in iran.

based on past experience in iranian monitoring regime should include a combination of negotiated data declarations and inspection measures and national and international monitoring as well as the consult of the body for anomaly and dispute resolution. the key to all these measures working effectively is the synergy created among them. data declarations tell us where to look and retained inspections audit the declarations. national and you know black robe intelligence detect anomalies and challenge inspections to gather more information relevant to the resolution of those anomalies. i recognize that not all of the measures that i recommended my statement will be easily the go shevell or ready for rapid implementation but our goal should be to bring iran from its

prior pursuits of nuclear weapons capabilities into what i called earlier culture of compliance with international agreements and norms. we should seek to do this in negotiations with iran by seeking agreements and securing agreement to affect agreements. we can also reinforce the culture or compliance by vigorously implementing the monitoring regime. some of that implementation will fall in the international atomic energy. others will be busy carried out by the p5+1 itself including u.s. government agencies. the congress can play a positive and strong role in insisting on effective verification providing the resources necessary for monitoring and being attentive to compliance issues that may emerge. thank you again to the committee for the opportunity to present some of my ideas on this vital topic and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. we go to mr. heinonen. >> chairman rice ranking members

thank you very much for inviting me to talk here today. in my testimony i am focusing on the verification aspects of a comprehensive deal. i am basing my remarks on implementation of safeguard agreements and security resolutions in iran and complement them with experiences drawn particularly from verification activity and monitoring activity in south africa after its demand pulling up its nuclear program and some experience drawn also from safeguards in syria and north korea. timely detection of prevention prevention of the development and acquisition for states capability to produce -- development of weapons of mass destruction is one of the closest interstate.

there are things which we know in their aspects which we can perhaps use but also those which we don't know. due to the fact that iran has been running parts of its program without satisfactory applications to the iaea and disregarding security council resolutions is -- david albright has recently made compromises with negotiators drafting the conference a final agreement. i will now highlight some details which would be included to a final agreement. the strength of the iaea verification system is access to monetary equipment and people.

however the safeguard is not cheering everything. no system can provide absolute assurances that it fully comply with its undertakings. this is especially the case when applied to states that are noncompliant like iran. throughout the history of discussions of the nuclear program of iran iran has always brought transparency, transparency to build the governance of the international community for the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. president rouhani has recently offered again transparency is one of the tools. such transparency should be implemented in a meaningful and systematic way. even if iran decides to show limits such limits can bear

substance only of substance discussions take place explanations are provided and those are verified. hence openness should be clearly defined and become legally binding undertaking to be granted when problems arise. the state has to declare all nuclear material in its territory. thus military sites do not form sanctuaries but they iaea has to break the safeguard agreement and complementary access under protocol when appropriate. the purpose of the verification in the nonproliferation records. in order to assure that iran has fully complied with its safeguards obligations under the safeguards agreement and fully

implemented the verification and clarification of the requirements made by the aia board of governments and u.s. security council council but in addition to those measures additional measures are needed. iran has to provide all aspects of the past and current nuclear program including military issues. iran has to provide information on and material up source of -- resources like yellowcake. in addition to that iran has to provide informatiinformati on on all imports and domestic production on nuclear items as specified in the guidelines of the nuclear supply. this access including short notice in all areas with regards

to people and material as required to the iaea and finally a few words regarding a possible military diagrams. why does it matter? there are -- in 2003. on the other hand iaea has asked in his reports that some of this work has -- is important to understand the statements of iran's military related efforts noting that one of the last duties of people and organizations involved was to document the work they have done. one possible reason for such effort could have been to save information for further use. unless properly addressed it would be difficult to -- it would also render it difficult for the iaea to determine an ear nuclear

activities are not ongoing. without answering those questions the iaea will not be able to come to conclusion that on all nuclear -- thank you. >> thank you ambassador. >> thank you chairman rice ranking ranking member and go distinguished members the committee. thank you for inviting me having this important hearing. let me say effective monitoring of any agreement with iran will be exceptionally challenging. iran has demonstrated record of violating its safeguards agreement with the iaea the lack of transparency into iran's nuclear program was cited and i committed by iaea numerous reports from the director general to the board of directors. iran was negligence or land clearing the dash in 2002 the original plan in 2009.

in fact iran acknowledged both facilities after they were exposed by an opposition group and reported by the press. one has to be very cognizant as was indicated by the chairman and the others this morning. the director general report of november 2011 i think a very important report provided disturbing details regarding iran's nuclear warhead development effort so would allow iran to acquire the expertise necessary to produce nuclear weapons. although there was previous reporting on weaponization this report was in stark in its concern about the military dimension of iran's nuclear program. this is a very central part of it, the issue here. it's not only covert facilities but the militarization of their nuclear program. director general in june 2014 a

few days ago said the iaea needed needed time before they could provide credible assurance of a the absence of undeclared nuclear material in iran. a robust monitoring and verification protocol will be necessary to deal with iran's nuclear program. this will be very difficult, difficult program to implement effectively. at a minimum it will required unfettered and i emphasize unfettered access to people and places. indeed if iran were in compliance with the u.n. security council resolutions offer betting iran from enriching uranium for monitoring and verification process to be easier and indeed iran as they say was interested in a peaceful nuclear program not only through enrichment of uranium that one could achieve in the choir the peaceful nuclear program. since iran reportedly will now be permitted to enrich iranian iranian -- uranium the test will be more difficult. some of the monitoring issues are an accurate baseline of iran's nuclear program

meaningful him monitoring program that will attempt to verify come points with safeguards agreement. iran is declared 15 nuclear facilities in nine locations. this is the totality of their program? insurance of the undeclared nuclear iran. assurances that there are no covert nuclear facilities in iran capable of enriching uranium are necessary. locating covert uranium enrichment facilities is difficult since spinning centrifuges is silent with no signature or signal. a iran announces intent to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities and to build approximately 60,000 additional sophisticated centrifuges. again monitoring the declared facilities employing sophisticated centrifuges with greater capacity and confirming the nonexistence of additional

facilities will be a real challenge. the comprehensive decoration from iran on their program is necessary first step. in addition to all related facilities a list of scientists and technicians were working at these facilities and is necessary. monitors will require unfettered access to these individuals and the relevant records. the right to take -- was taken in every facility would send samples to iaea e. labs. the issue of weaponization must be pursued with access to known and suspected sites in relevant records. information dealing with the miniature -- nuclear warhead to an iranian missile must be pursued for obvious reasons. access to all nuclear r&d work and sites will be necessary with and i emphasize this anytime anyplace access to facilities that manufacture assemble and test centrifuges.

technical coverage of inspectioinspectio n will be necessary 24/7. technical monitoring of iraq plutonium facility are pushing completion will be required since his facility has one purpose. one purpose using plutonium for nuclear weapons. if iran is committed to the peace for -- peaceful maker program iran should be dismantled. those are some of the issues that a protocol will have to address on the task will be massive especially if iran is permitted to instruct enrichment plans requiring improved centrifuges with greater capacity. determining that enrichment does not exceed 5% is so critical are low-enriched uranium level will also be a challenge if iran is permitted to enrich uranium at numerous facilities. indeed determining there are no covert uranium enrichment facilities will be a principle challenge for any verificatverificat ion protocol.

thank you. >> thank you ambassador. you say the issue of weaponization must be pursued and we have all said iran has to sit down and come clean growth in the reasons enumerated at the head of the iaea says we are we are not getting any cooperation from iran on this. >> that's a fair point mr. chairman absolutely and you mention in your opening statement the high explosive test sites. they have to come clean on all these issues no question. >> what if they are not forced to come clean? what are the implications of that? >> i think there are consequences if they are not coming clean. that is what the monitoring protocol is all about. >> anyway let's go back to mr. mr. rademaker's key focus on his

testimony. the last line of the interim agreement notes that after implementing the final step of the conference of solution for an agreed amount of time then iran is treated quote the same. the same as any nonnuclear weapon state that is a party to the npt. i think mr. rademaker in your written testimony he said this is a giant get out of jail free card from iran because means at that point in time for no more, no more restrictions on nuclear items. no more restrictions on the number of centrifuges against spin or the level to which it may enrich uranium. at that point in time under the interim agreement we have already conceded the that whatever the timeframe after

that you treat iran like you treat japan or germany, completely legitimate. and what does that mean them for verification? what is the consequence because it really just is a question of trust is in that? we begin with the argument referring to trust but verify but it is completely a question of trust if at the end of the agreement everything is lifted and there is no more verification. mr. rademaker. spain mr. chairman i think you put your finger on what i see as the biggest single challenge before us and that is it's really a conceptual challenge. the concept of the joint plan of action is that there is this workout period where iran needs to behave to fulfill its obligations.

if they are not caught cheating during that time than all the limitations come off and they are treated like any other country. given iran's track record the clear evidence for decades the current government has been in concerted effort as has pursued a concerted effort to pursue a nuclear weapon. if they behave for 510 or 15 years are we prepared at that point to say okay we will let bygones be bygones and going forward to be treated like any other country. that's the promise. what i suggest to my testimony is logically for the iranians that's incredibly good deal. this is a get out of jail free card. all they have to do is behave so if what they want is a nuclear weapon they have been struggling. they have been under national sanctions under restrictions on their ability to report

components. it's been a slog for them to get to where they are and they have been very persistent and they have stood up only with help from the a.q. khan network. otherwise they procure things but it's all covert. if they behave for it period of the conference of solution they will be able to move forward with a civilian nuclear program with international cooperation. that is promised to them in the gpa. the logical thing for them with to be to take that deal, behave then once the conference of solution expires then very aggressively stand up a far more robust civilian infrastructure than they have been able to stand up now. tens of thousands of centrifuges much larger quantities of enriched material and then if you choose to break out do so

with a much larger infrastructure in place with a much larger stockpile of 3.5% of enriched material or even 20% enriched material because once the conference of solution and they can produce as much as 20% material as they want. >> one of the arguments to me by one of the ambassadors was if this comes to pass and iran of course is continuing its effort to destabilize other countries in the region and he listed country by country where they were you now from yemen where they tried to topple the government and were very close to doing so to their efforts throughout the region. we exhausted all the examples. you said a regime without intent and also having the intent to obtain nuclear weapons capability. you're in danger of leaving them with the hegemon for the region.

and with their ambitions intact both in terms of their capability of this weapon and knowing right now that they can destabilize other regimes and knowing when you lift sanctions that's going to be hard currency that they will use to destabilize their neighbors. the argument he was making i think was the veiled threat that other states would do the same thing attempts to rush to a nuclear weapon in order to try to offset the aggressive nature of this regime. what do you think this portends for proliferation concerns? >> are you directing that question to make? >> yes mr. rademaker. >> i think we have some history here that's instructive. in 1995 iran announced they wanted to build a civilian nuclear power --

and russia signed a contract with them to hell. for 10 years it was a policy united states under the untended administration and probably the first half of the push of administration to oppose that and say iran an oil rich country and ample energy resources what do they need a nuclear power reactor for? we need to solve this. it was a high priority for the u.s. diplomatically to turn off the bushehr reactor. one of the reasons we wanted to turn it off was because we were afraid it would provide a justification for setting up an enrichment capability to fuel the reactor and that is what the iranians did covertly initially and when they were caught the facility was revealed and they justified it because the set was fuel for their reactor. the focus of our diplomatic activity shifted to their program and by 2005 the push of administration decided to give up in the losing effort to prevent completion of the

busheir civil power reactor. i was in the push of administration at the time. talking points change. we stop talking about how they shouldn't have a nuclear power plant and start focusing on the enrichment facility. the moment we did that what happened? suddenly it turned a lot -- it turned out a lot of middle eastern company -- countries were interested in having nuclear civil nuclear power. they think upon administration is proceeding on the assumption that we can change policy again and we can sign off on enrichment in iran and say okay we are prepared to accept enrichment capability. and the other countries in the region are going to immediately say guess what we need in richmond too. and then how do we say how does the united states say to saudi arabia actually we only trust iran. we don't trust you our ally and

we only trust iran. >> my time has expired. thank you. >> thank you mr. chairman. let's continue on that. i am troubled as i said in my opening statement that while we are talking with iran they continue to enrich. i still don't understand how that happened. i just don't understand it. you mentioned mr. rademaker the one, two, three agreement with the uae. i had the uae ambassador in my office and he mentioned that agreement which does not allow the uae to enrich for peaceful purposes on their soil. canada has nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes and they are not allowed to enrich on their soil. if we sign an agreement with iran that of sensibly says they

can enrich on their soil but only for peaceful purposes how do we ever get any of the other countries do not enrich on their soil? i we been opening the door to you name it saudi arabia, turkey, egypt? why should any of those countries negotiated deal where they will not be allowed to enrich on their soil for peaceful purposes when clearly we are giving it away to iran and? i think once the united states sas we're prayered to accept enrichment from iran, this whole effort over the past decade to stem the spread of that technology to other countries, it becomes untenable because how do we explain to any other country that, you know, especially allies, friends of the united states, you're our friends, so we're not going to let you have this technology? now, iran, we're prepared to let them have it. you know, i couldn't write the talking points for our diplomats

to explain to our allies why we don't trust them to have something we trust iran to have to. so i think, you know, what happens when we permanently accept enrichment in iran is, by default, we have to accept it anywhere else that wants it. i don't know how -- you can try and make it financially attractive for them to not go in that direction, but for a country that's determined to have it, to tell them as a matter of policy it's a policy of the united states that only iran gets to have it and not you? i think it's not a case that you can persuasively make. >> the, rouhani has said to cnn that iran won't dismantle the single centrifuge. the joint plan of action calls for a comprehensive solution that says that, quote, would insure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. so is there a way to insure that rapp's nuclear program will

be -- iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges? >> i think the number of centrifuges, there's no question, the number is extremely important certainly for the monitors. you have a number -- and especially if they're even more sophisticated, and they're spinning and putting out that much more capability. absolutely, there's no question that the numbers are important. >> okay. let me talk about an editorial that was in "the washington post" be a few weeks ago, three weeks ago perhaps. the editorial argues, and i said this in my opening statement, that the -- that we can afford to wait, that that happens time is on our -- that perhaps time is on our side if the date comes

up in july and we don't have a comprehensive agreement, that it might be in the best interests of the united states to put it back another month or two or three or four, that iran is still undergoing a lot of economic difficulty as a result of the sanctions and that we might have more leverage if we let the date lapse beyond the july 20th date. that was, essentially, a washington post editorial. anybody have any thoughts on that? mr. hine omen -- hine omen. >> first of all, we should not forget the plan of action is very limited. today we don't know how many centrifuges iran has. iea has some definition about the manufacturing of the replacements of the centrifuges, but it has not got the number of centrifuges produced. so what's ooh happening now in

next -- what's happening now in next few months, iran is manufacturing components for the reactor, and it maintains the skills of the labor. in addition, producing additional enriched uranium. so in my view, one should put a cap to this and not to wait. the problem doesn't become easier by waiting. >> so you disagree, essentially, with what "the washington post" editorial said about the fact that iran is still being hurt with sanctions and that if we wait, they'll continue to be hurt, and it'll -- time will not be on their side. you, essentially, disagree with that. >> i think it's a little bit visual thinking. >> okay. thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you. mr. engel. we'll now go to ileana ros-lehtinen. >> thank you so much, mr. chairman. i've been on the record

disapproving the interim agreement and any subsequent agreement that does not require iran to cease all enrichment activities and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. we know that iran can't be trusted. we have decades of covert activities related to its nuclear program to back that up. yet we're now relying on two things. number one, that iran is honest with us on disclosing all of its nuclear activities and, two, that the verification, monitoring and transparency programs that we have in place are strong enough to detect when iran is cheating. but all of the verification and monitoring systems operate under the framework that is presented to us by iran. only what iran has declared as part of the program. and last month's iae, board of directors' report on iran's

nuclear program, the director general stated that the iaea cannot provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in iran unless and until iran provides the necessary cooperation with the agency. and we're all familiar with the pentagon report that stated that the united states does not have the capability to locate undeclared or covert nuclear facilities or programs. so it's still very possible that iran could be continuing its covert activity and neither the iaea, nor the u.s. would have any idea. and this joint plan of action did nothing to strengthen verification and monitoring programs or force iran to abide by the additional protocols. and, mr. hine a 9/11 --

heinonen, thank you, you testified to our subcommittee in january, and you stated that the jpoa provides iaea inspectors access only to surveillance records, not anywhere else at the activities -- at the facilities, that the surveillance measures are designed to cover only certain activities. how comprehensive are these surveillance records? is it possible that we are only getting access to what iran wants us to see, not getting the full picture, that perhaps the cameras only focus on the door and not what's going on in the room? and actually bad actors that seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and i'm thinking of north korea, of iran, obviously, of libya, syria, do so surreptitiously so what we now have is the administration and the p5+1

negotiating on the basis of only what has been declared. doesn't the success of any iaea verification and monitoring program depend on access to all sites, all programs, all of the information and people and equipment in order to get the full picture? one other major area of concern that we should all have and which goes largely unaddressed many times is the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. the 2010 u.n. security council resolutions on iran ordered the regime to fully cooperate with the iaea on all outstanding issues particularly regarding the possible military dimensions of the program. that is not happening, and the latest board of governors report states that not only is iran not complying, but there have been extensive activities that may have taken place at parchin,

especially seriously undermined the iaea's ability to conduct verification. so my last question is we're nearing the end of the six month time frame. there has been no access to parchin. does this undermoon the credibility of the -- undermine the credibility of the deal and the so-called monitoring and verification measures we have in place? so that question and, mr. hine mr. hine -- heinonen, how comprehensive are the surveillance records? >> iaea has several -- [inaudible] in place, and surveillance is only one. iaea has short notice inspections between one or two weeks. so there are additional measures which complement, so we are not relying entirely on the surveillance. but the it's important that sort

of -- [inaudible] is modified so that it actually covers the centrifuges and not just -- [inaudible] and i think more important is that it calls for remote monitoring mode so that we don't use this valuable iaea inspection resources sitting at the side and reviewing computer screens. >> we should modify it to include all of that. >> yeah. all of this. this is what i say in my written testimony. and then one small remark still. whenever we verify the correctness and completeness of -- [inaudible] and look items which may have not declared, we need to remember that this is a very time-consuming process. this doesn't come in one month or even half a year. i give the example of south africa. we started this verification in 1993, and the task force don't think because south africa nuclear program ran many, many

years without iaea surveillance. so it took until 2010 when the iaea was finally able to say that all nuclear material in south africa is in peaceful use. so it took that long time to come to this conclusion based on the practices and procedures of the iaea. so iran will pay something very similar. >> thank thank you, mr. chairma. >> let's go to mr. brad scherr han of california. >> thank you -- sherman of california. >> thank you. mr. lauder, i'm interested in your analysis that we've got to look at breakout possibility and sneakout possibility. i'm not sure i understand what you mean by culture of compliance. i think the culture -- let's face it, nelson mandela's not taking over in tehran. i think the culture will always be to try to maximize their

nuclear capacity. mr. rademaker, you brought to our attention what we knew, and that is after some period of time iran will be -- at least according to this agreement -- just like any other non-nuclear state except they will have signed and presumably ratified the additional protocol. let's say that's the situation. let's say everything they have now is frozen and dethawed 10, 15 years from now. and they're subject to the additional protocol and that's about it. and they want to sneak, not break out. how long before they have the bomb, how long before they have a dozen? >> i think my personal concern is that will be up to them, because -- >> assume that they make an all out sneakout effort subject only to the additional protocol.

how difficult is it to sneak out if you're subject to the additional protocol? >> i think there are two dimensions to breakout, and usually we talk about how quickly can they do it. and that's an important thing -- >> i'm talking about how quickly can they do it without being detected. >> right. but let me say i think for a country like iran, you know, the notion that they're going to race, they're going to violate international law, they're going to race to produce one nuclear weapon, you know -- >> mr. rademaker, you don't seem to be understanding my question. i'm not talking about breakout, i'm talking about sneakout. that is to say undetected efforts to develop a nuclear weapon. assuming they don't want to be detected but they're diligent, hard working and well financed, what can they put together in a few years of being subject only to the additional protocol? >> basically, they will be able to put together everything they want. they will be able to stand up a vastly more robust

infrastructure. tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of centrifuges, tons of enrichment -- >> and under the additional protocol can they then divert the low enriched uranium to a secret facility and put it up to weapons grade? i mean, again, assuming they don't want to be caught, assuming -- >> what robust their infrastructure, the more quantity of the material they have -- >> why don't i shift to one of the other witnesses. mr. lauder, can you answer the same question? if they're subject to only the additional protocol and they don't want to get caught, what can they do? >> one of the reasons i used the phrase "sneakout" in my oral remarks is we have, the international community has focused a lot about the rapid breakout from known facilities. one of our concerns has to be, just as you indicated in your question, mr. sherman, is if

iran moves at a slower pace but behind the scenes, facilities we don't know about, it can continue down that path to nuclear weapons in ways that normal iaea procedures would not necessarily be able to detect. and that's one of the reasons -- >> would they be able to put together without being detected subject only to the additional protocol five bombs in the five years after this agreement goes to, is eclipsed? >> i go back to testimony that the director of national intelligence clapper gave before the hill where he said that the fundamental constraining element or the fundamental point is what decision that iran will make. if iran decides -- >> i already told you the decision. the decision would be develop a nuclear capacity and don't get caught. >> right. >> work hard.

assuming that's the decision, does anybody have an answer to the question? >> in terms of time frame? >> yes. i said could they to five bombs in five years? subject only to the additional protocol? >> yes. >> any -- i just picked that number out of -- do you have a better estimate of what -- does anyone on the panel have a better estimate of what they can do subject only to the additional protocol assuming they don't want to get caught? mr. heinonen? >> yeah, thank you. certainly, additional protocol is important for the iaea in terms of verification, but we should not forget here that, actually, iran can do a plan how to do it. they see what are the strengths of the iaea, which are the weaknesses, and they actually can do a hybrid approach; do something at the declared facilities, cosomething in declared and in a combination. this is what you are afraid of. so i think this needs quite a thorough analysis and a

rethinking how the verification system is set up after the sanctions get relieved. and i also want to bring to your attention that, actually, this whole thing will be a step approach. once the comprehensive -- >> excuse me. my time has just expired. does anybody disagree? five bombs in the five years after they're subject only to the additional protocol? >> don't disagree, and that's why we need more than the additional protocol. >> you say you don't agree or you do agree with five bombs in five years. >> with the additional protocol, that's a possibility. what you need is unfettered access to everything. >> i agree with that, but let me just say i have a slightly different concern. if they choose at some point in the future to become a nuclear weapons state, you know, not sneaking, they just say, okay, circumstances have changed, we need to have nuclear weapons, if they do that today, they can

make a mad dash and in some period of months they'll have maybe two or three nuclear weapons. if they have a vastly more robust civil nuclear infrastructure after the comprehensive solution and at that point decide, okay, now we're abandoning the npt and becoming a nuclear weapons state, what do they have? it won't be two or three nuclear weapon, it'll be dozens. so what they will have upon breaking out with the much larger infrastructure that they will be -- >> knowing my time is expired, think they'll sneak out and then break out, because if they have five nuclear weapons, our response to their announcement of breakout and our response to their test will be considerably more similar to how we've treated north korea than how we treated gadhafi or saddam hussein. i yield back. >> we go now to mr. chris smith of new jersey. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, especially thank you for calling this extraordinarily

time ply hearing for the insight provided by our distinguished witnesses. as you know, mr. chairman, last week on june 4th we recognized the 25th anniversary of tiananmen square, and i raise this because bill clinton on may 26, 1994, delinked human rights with trade. beijing knew that human rights were a superfluous and adjunct, a talking point that had no real consequence if they violated it with impunity, and i'm very concerned -- fast forward to the joint plan of action -- that when iran looked us in the eyes, they knew that they could get major concessions, and they already have achieved that with the sanctions regime. how are we ever going to put that back together? and this could be analogous to the peace in our time, the neville chamberlain infamous quote after meeting with the germans. these are game-changing days, and i'm very concerned,

secretary rademaker, your testimony and your service has been extraordinary over the decades. you've reminded us that iran has a deplorable history of deception, construction of covert facilities were acknowledged only when exposed. a catch me if you can mentality, traveling around iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction. rapp, as we all know -- iran, as we all know, defied six unitedded nations -- united nations resolutions. and as you pointed out, iran persuaded the united states and others to set aside its policy of no right toen richment. to enrichment. you also call the biggest concession, the ill-defined time period. wait out a certain period of time, it's not defined, and you've elaborated a few times in your statement just a moment ago.

my questions would be, one, human rights are very often the canary in the coal mine. i have, in meetings and in conversations with the foreign minister of iran, have said you can do a grand stroke. release the political prisoners release said abedini, and then we'll say, hey, there may be a sense of sincerity. i find it almost laughable in the preamble when it says on november 24th to the joint plan of action: iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. if you believe that, i'll sell you the brooklyn privilege. so, of course, trust and verify, on site verification are all absolutely required. but be i think we're setting ourselves up to fail, and now russia certainly is what kind of friend or colleague or partner are they going to be given everything that's happened in kiev and certainly in the

ukraine? so a couple of questions. the whole idea of the duration, mr. secretary, if you could really elaborate that even further. twenty years, twenty-five years -- it ought to be forever. and as you said, to think that iran might be construed to be japan, and i think in your testimony you made some very, very good points about the whole idea that argentina and, you know, they matriculated from a dictatorship to democracy, south africa. so the examples were very well taken. and you also said something if you elaborate quickly on you need to anticipate that the executive branch officials are going to become deeply invested in the success of the jpa. almost like a mission accomplished mentality when, you know, the threats to the region and the world are so high that that kind of political chicanery should be nowhere on the map. so if you could respond. >> yes. mr. chairman, i'm happy to

respond. the -- you know, it's sort of a conceptual thing. the concept of jpa is we're not going to insist on a change in government, we're not going to insist on a change in your guiding philosophy. we're just going to look at your behavior for a set period of time. and if you behave as you promised, then it is your get out of jail free card. you will, you know, be able to go forward as a fully-accepted, legitimate member of the nuclear club. and that's being promised to them up front with no -- all they have to do is comply with whatever's in that agreement and nothing more. to me, you know, the congress, the american people are being asked to buy a pig in a poke because we don't know who's going to be the leader of iran in five or ten or fifteen years when this thing expires. we don't know what they're going

to be doing with respect to promoting terrorism around the world, how much they're going to be meddling in syria or iraq. we just don't know, and yet we're making this commitment up front that, you behave, and here are all the benefits you get. i guess i would suggest that the judgment whether they are to be considered rehabilitated and treated like a normal nation is one that is really premature to make today. it's a judgment maybe to be made much closer to the event. and i don't see that in this framework. i mean, we're making the judgment today that if they behave for ten years or whatever the period is, then they will be deemed rehabilitated. and, you know, congress will have an important role here was with i believe -- because i believe the administration is going to need you to enact legislation permitting them to waive some of the sanctions that are currently in place. so legislatively you will address this.

i think in that context you autoto be thinking about to what extent are we prepared to accept this concept that all verification, all extraordinary verification ends and they become treated like -- they become subject only to the verification that other countries are subject to. the trust but verify, you know, that's the wrong concept for a country with the track record of iran. for iran, it can't be trusted. it has to be verify but verify, you know? i don't know how trust can even be part of the equation given their track record. >> we go now to mr. gregory meeks of new york. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you for this important hearing. and, because i for a long time have been worried about iran getting a nuclear weapon. i think that one thing that everybody on this committee says and i heard the president say it

also, that it's unacceptable. that that's a no-starter, for iran to have a nuclear weapon. and i was, you know, just thinking listening to you, mr. rademaker, at the beginning of your statements which really concerned me, was that on your return here we're still talking 20 years later or 5 years -- 25 years later. you said that the threat was in 1992 about iran getting a nuclear weapon. and unfortunately, here we are in 2014 with the same concerns. which i would believe that various administrations, democratic and republican, have had different strategies in trying to make sure that we can assure ourselves of iran not having a nuclear weapon.

and here we are still at this juncture, and this president has proposed trying to see what we can do talking with iran not only by ourselves, but an unprecedented level with some of our allies and some folks who may not be, you know, because i think you have to have everybody there with the p5 +3. p5+1. and as i hear the dialogue going back and forth, you know, the question that i ask myself sometimes and i fess the first question that -- i guess the first question that i would ask you, because it just seemed as though when we were successful with sanctions, it was when it became multilateral. and not just unilateral. and if we want to make sure that we contain iran and make sure they don't have a nuclear weapon and if they violate any of the,

don't allow the iaea to get in or anything of that nature, then i would think that if we have to ramp up sanctions, we would want to be able to do that with other nations because that seems as though when it has been successful. and so given iran's history and from what i've heard thus far which makes sense to me that if they don't follow through and they're not going to follow through, then we're going to need to make sure that we still have unity among ourselves so that we can make sure that those sanctions that we have to put on or implement are not sanctions that's just dope by the united states, but -- done by the united states, but are sanctions that are also done by the p5+1 countries. so they become very important to us, i think. so my, my -- you know, and i'm going back and forth in thinking. so the effort, at least the initial effort that's being made

to have negotiations under the p5 +3 and to make -- p5+1 and to make sure that the iaea has access to whatever they're doing there, it seems to me, tremendously important because we have not been there before. we want to verify what they're doing and what they're not doing, extremely so. i guess i'm trying to get a sense from you, do you think that the effort that is at least being made thus far, so in regards to the conversations that are taking place, we don't know what the end results are going to be. because of their failure, we've got to make sure we ramped up these sanctions, etc. do you think that we should make the effort that is being made currently by the administration? to anyone. >> i certainly believe we should make the effort, no question. and that's why the monitoring and verification protocol so, so important. all the points you have made,

congressman meeks, exactly right. unfettered access because we're concerned on the weaponization, we're concerned on the covert facilities there, they've not been forthcoming. absolutely. and the u.n. security council resolution 1929 speaks to this issue. iran should cooperate fully with the iaea on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the military dimensions of their nuclear program. so even you have the u.n. security council coming forth with a resolution saying this. so we go -- so the key would be a very robust, meaningful monitoring and verification regime. >> anybody else? >> i guess i've said some critical things about the jpa, but you shouldn't infer from that that i oppose the idea of trying to negotiate with iran an end to their nuclear weapons program and an end to the risk of nuclear proliferation to iran. i think a negotiated solution is

by far the best outcome, you know, as opposed to, you know, continuing with the sanctions. we continue with sanctions, and they continue with their nuclear development? that's not a good solution. military attack, you know, it's a temporary solution but not a permanent solution. is a negotiated solution is idealyou can get it. but, you know -- if you can get it. but it has always been possible to negotiate an agreement with iran. all we have to do is accept, agree to their demands, and we've got a deal. and, you know, that's, obviously, not acceptable. so -- >> but you want to get a deal that actually addresses -- we know it's not easy. >> right. >> i mean, if it was easy, it would have been done. we know it's hard. i mean, this is hard stuff. and that's why this hearing is good. that's why listening to you and having this dialogue is good. and hearing sides and hearing from folks and hearing from other countries is good, because

this is not easy. if it was easy, it would be done. this is hard stuff. and thank you for your testimony. i'm out of time. >> we go now to mr. rohrabacher of california. >> yes. thank you, mr. chairman. and want to thank you, chairman royce, for calling today's hearing and, and all of us should agree that one of the great foreign policy challenges we face and more significant foreign policy challenges we face are preventing a nuclear-armed mullah dictatorship in iran. i think that one of the things that has been lacking in this discussion so far today is the fact that we wouldn't care -- there's a fundamental difference here -- we wouldn't care if this was brazil, we wouldn't care if this was ireland wanting to have this nuclear facilities that

could result in a nuclear bomb. what we have is one of the world's worst human rights abusers -- china being the worst -- and this mullah dictatorship has jails filled with people that want to get along with the rest of the world. so perhaps the only way that we're going to succeed in not permitting the mullah dick dictatorship from having a nuclear weapon from what i'm gleaning from what you're saying, frankly, the only way we're going to succeed is if we get rid of the mullah dictatorship in iran. i mean, the bottom line is if we can't convince them -- and i'm taking it from what i've heard today, that we're not going to be able to take their word for it that they're not going to utilize in this new capability, i don't believe that we're going to convince them that through a

culture of compliance that they're going to change their ways because they want to fit into the culture. we're either going to have to get rid of them, or they're going to have the bomb. and when they have the bomb, they may well, as we know, they're fanatics. so the question is, shouldn't we be supporting the -- instead of relying on negotiations with the mullahs, shouldn't we be supporting those elements in iran that would like to overthrow the mullahs and establish a real democracy? .. to over throat to establish a real democracy? anyone want to go on record? [laughter] i guess not. >> but if i could i use that phrase culture of compliance as aspirational coal in the sense ultimately what we are

trying to do through negotiated measures or sanctions is to do bring about a more open and modern iran the inspection and process itself just to the soviet union. >> but i don't believe the mullah want to be cool to go along with the culture i have two minutes left are the russians still engaged in the technologies going on the centrifuge to make weapons possible? are they engaged in this?

>> actually the iaea knows very little about the iran nuclear program correctly because of the limitations therefore it cannot fully investigate. >> for the russian and engineers still engaged in this project? >> there has not been direct engineers involved there is some with the weaponization part. >> so the actual building of this facility was a russian project? >> no. it was up power plant.

>> that is what i am talking about was it built by the russians? >> yes. >> does this review should not make a difference if they have the nuclear power plant? >> did indeed the centrifuge to start. >> i and a stand that but the point is when the russians came on board i remember going to the ambassador 1999 the american ambassador suggested we give the russians an alternative place to build several nuclear power plants because it would lead to this moment and nothing happened i said the same thing to condoleezza rice would year later and nothing happened. when they first started building the power plant we were leading up to this day and i would hope i'm sorry it looks like the

cooperation level has gone down since this moment and perhaps it'll show a side of good faith on their part if they would cooperate with us to do with the iranians indulge me for one more question. to any of you know, of an offer of the rusher and -- russian government to withdraw from the project early before the nuclear power plant was done? any offer made that could have prevented us from this point? >> i was told there was an offer we did not pay attention to its under george w. bush administration. think you very much.

>> mr. rademaker you referred back to the two decades ago and and looking at the panel with a comprehensive agreement so how confident were weighed there was not a facility? but certainly that there were not other enrichment facilities beyond that time? let's start with that. >> the answer to your question we have never been confident that there is a secret facility then for a

long period of time that is all that we knew of even more secretive underground facilities so is there a third underground facility somewhere? i don't take anybody could say we are confident there is not that is why the question is critically important in does near-term and the of a comprehensive solution betty van after words because when that comprehensive solution it will go way down. >> anyone know some of the panel confident these are the of the enrichment facilities?

>> one of the reasons why all of us has been strong proponents of additional monetary measures that are comprehensive to go beyond certain facilities is to reduce the uncertainty about what is the wing on elsewhere -- going on elsewhere that is why it is important to get the precise and detailed accounting about past activities to be a part of the agreement. >> that troubles me the of most. no a little more away from the exploration and we have been talking for how long? and when was the first report?

>> the first time was during 2004. >> so we negotiate during the interim period to get to the comprehensive agreement for a decade. a decade we have worried about possible military dimensions that is striving congressional action and why we have been engaged in the deliberations over several decades but for 10 years we have 480 and known about this but yet what access have we been given during this initial period and what have we been given to the a other areas to richer iran has come clean on those military dimensions?

>> bet is one of the robust regime as we go for it knowing what you just said. >> i appreciate that but it is the chicken and egg situation a. how do we agree to the comprehensive agreement with a adequate lovell of verification if to date the most concerning issue the iranians have not been willing to provide any access at all? . .

we should expect that the iranians granted us access in the areas for more than a decade we've had these concerns, mr. rademaker? i just wanted to interject a point, that regrettably this is another area where the jpa is deficient. the jpa, there is one sentence in the jpa that talks about the history, it doesn't use the term military dimension, but that is what they're talking about. let me read you the sentence. this is how this question, this critically important question is addressed inn' the jpa. it says, they create a joint commission of the two sides. the, the p five plus one and irrather thannians. -- p5-plus-one. and will work with the iaea to work with past issues of concern. that is all this says. there isio a mechanism to work with the iaea to try to figure this out. nothing? the jpa depends on this working out. if this mechanism utterly fails to achieve sat faction for the

iaea. that is unfortunate but doesn't stand in the way of the rest of the jpa. what is going on here, i think regrettably what happened our negotiators found this to be a very hard issue. i think iranians have a lot to hide. there is a lot of history here they don't want to talk about. this became a sticking point in the initial discussions and the answerbe that the negotiators, e p5-plus-one ultimately settled on, well, we'll shift this issue to the iaea. it is going to become to the iaea's problem to get to the bottom. we'll have joint commission. if we don't get to the bottom, well, that is just too bad. >> i'm out of time but, mr. chairman, i appreciate that. i just hope that given that it is now more than a decade that we've worried about the military dimensions of the iranian nuclear program per the iaea, longer for rest of us, at a bare minimum, congress should be

informed on the very detailed nature of what ever talks have taken placees surrounding that issue before we should be asked to budge an inch on any sanctions relief and in fact whether to extend beyond six months. i yield back.s >> mr. deutch, you and i should talk after this hearing on that very subject. i appreciate it. let's go now to mr. steve chabot of ohio. >> thank you, mr. chairman. last year the asia subcommittee which i chair and the middle east subcommittee chaired by ileana ros-lehtinen, held a joint hearing to discuss linkages between covert and illicit activities in iran, north korea and syria. it has been reported for some time that north korea has been assisting and supplying iran's missile s program. given the history of the north korea and the failure of the u.s. and international community to stop pongyang from acquiring nuclear weapons, what lessons should be applied to the situation with iran moving

forward? and, what provisions if any in the agreement prevent iran from outsourcing their nuclear program to another country as was in the case with north korea? i see you nodding mr. lawyer, i will go to you first if you like -- lauer. >>ko i will go first. i'm sure ambassador detrani will addi something as wells. one ofas the reasons i argued in my statement to have an effective means of monitoring iranian procurement, particularly if they're allowed to have a peaceful nuclear program as part of whatever agreement emerges, to make sure in the noise of those procurement efforts that iran is not able to outsource significant parts of its nuclear weapons development program to, to other states or to, to non-state actors, a.q. khans of the world, to states like korea,

and get a good handle on what procurement they're taking because there has been this long track record of iran looking for various sources throughout the world that could aid its nuclear developments. >> ambassador detrani? >> sir, let me just note on iran -- fort north korea, we hae a real example here how important verification and monitoring is. in 2008, when we were proceeding with the dismantlement, programs to disman tale pongyong, there was program they agreed to orally. when we asked them to put it in orally, that was very robust monitor verification program. access anywhere, anytime, samples taken out of the country, they refused to agree. it shows how important

verification piece of the equation is with north korea. i would think the same with iran, with a very robust, meaningful modest verification protocol insists on unfettered access and samples and so forth i think that would be very critical moving forward and that is the example we got from north korea. >> okay, thank you. letso me shift gears for just a moment. what, where does israel fit into all of this? and their views on iran compliant issues? and just what attention is being paid paid in that area? mr. rademaker? >> israel obviously is very concerned about the iranian nuclear program and with good reason. iran has, iranian leaders have on multiple occasions made comments about how israel should be wiped from the face of the earth or wiped off the map of

the earth. so for a country like israel that is obviously i alarming you have those kind of statements of intention coupled with technological activity that seems aimed at producing a nuclear weapon which would actually enable them to do precisely what they are saying they would like to see happen. so, the united states has a lot to be worried about. i think iran's other neighbors in the persian gulf region have a lot u to be worried about. and israel has a lot to be worriedn about. israel is paying a lot of attention to this program. my understanding is there's a great deal of apprehension in israel about the current course of the diplomacy. as ien said earlier it is always impossible to negotiate a deal with iran, just agree to what they're asking for and we can have a deal. i think the israelis are concerned that the deal that was

struck last year leans too far in the direction of iran's negotiating objectives. they are allowed to continue enriching. they get sanctions relief. the momentum in the direction of tightening sanctions has all been reversed. and then they are promised this get-out-of-jail-free card that they can continue to enrich at a level that's being negotiated right now and then when that period expires, they can do all of the enrichment they want. they can do all the reprocessing they want. none of that will be limited. the israelis are i think deeply concerned about that and my sense it has given rise in some tension in the bilateral relationship between united states and israel. >> thank you,o mr. chairman. my time expired. >> we go to karen bass of california. >> thank youi, mr. chairman. the obama administration a final agreement that leaves iran a

nuclear. i want to know from the panelist, whoever chooses to answer, what you think of an idea, if a sick-month breakout window would be a sufficient period of time to detect and counteractou an iranian breakou? sure, go ahead. >> well, certainly six months is a very short period of time in international dip homesy. it matters how iran will deviate from the agreement or how it may really gait. there are several options there. if it goes for example, in such aer way the only evidence which the iea has which only take about three months to delegate, six months is too much short time. yosiu need to take additional

samples. you can perhaps analyze them first. but it has a lot of vulnerabilities and itha is also very difficult to estimate the unknowns. what kind of parameter you have there. how long it will take to find out. you need to prove it, et cetera. so six months is, for me, from the very, very shortened. >>ne yes, mr. lauder. >> if i could just add, i think some of us feel that there may be too muchse emphasis on a timeline because it's very hard to say for sure, well, iran is six months away from a weapon or it is 5.5 months away from a weapon or even react in that time. and i think that's why several of us have been advocating that the really important thing to get right in this agreement is the to layer on sufficient monitoring measures so you really have a sense what that exact status of iran's program, to the extent you can get it

because everythingst else falls from that. >> yes. >> forgive me if i sound like a broken record but the six-month breakout time, that's fine but, bear in mind, that six-month limitation, that six-month period will only apply during thee period of the comprehensie solution. when the comprehensive solution ends and that will be in five years, 10 years, 15 years, then all of the things that give us that six-month window go away. they will be no longer limited in the number of centrifuges, amount of material, the moment that solution expires. it won't be six months anymore. it will be six weeks or six days. >> i heard you say that earlier. what do you think it should be? it shouldn't be five years? it should be then years, 15 years,ee forever? what are your thoughts about that? >>d on the comprehensive solution. >> right. >> i think the enhanced verification requirements, the

restrictions, well, i don't think, given their history i don't think iran should be permitted to enrich at all. i think it should remain u.s. policy they're not permitted to enrich but the restrictions on what they can do and the enhanced verification that applies to that i believe should extend indefinitely until the international community can reach a judgment that it is satisfied that iran is now like south africa. they ever turn ad corner and no longer a nuclear proliferation risk. it wiledl take more than good behavior for a finite period of time that i feel comfortable there is real change of heart in iran. >> you and other panelists mentioned several other countries, south africa, brazil. are there any other examples internationally where it has been without a specific timeline? youwh know what i mean? in other words we continue to --

>> let me also apply that program and gave that program up. >> i'm sorry. >> libya also gave up their program. >> all right. thank you. i have yield back balance of my time. >> thank you, karen bass. now we go to adam kinzinger of illinois. >> thank you,f mr. chairman. and thank you all for being here and helping educate us and talk about some of these important issues. i mean as i look around the world and i look around especially the middle east, i guess i'm excited that the administration is so giddy about the prospect of negotiations with iran, i think of a lot of the pending negotiations, we heard yesterday from the administration about how they're hopeful, you know, that the situation going on with the release of five taliban will help lead to a reinvigorated taliban to come negotiate with the united states. i reminded some folks in the administration that in fact pakistan is in negotiations with the taliban right now and about a day or two ago, 18 people were killed inem the airport in a fit

with the taliban. look at the situation in israel. the israel, palestine negotiations and allt the effot that the administration is putting into that, while we would all love that to be solved it is probably questionably a regional conflict, a smaller conflict on the basis of conflicts that surround and envelop the entire middle east. look at theq negotiations with russia, how well some of those have gone and syria and situation we find ourselves in there. so i don't have a lot of hope in the future of negotiations from this administration. and, i would ask, if anybody, and i'm going to ask this rhetorically, feel free to comment later, if you think of any success we'll had with negotiations with an enemy of the united states under this administration? we had our boot on the throat of iranians at a time when we really could have, i think, ended the question of nuclear arms in iran but we backed away. and it is always interesting to me how the iranians feel like

they can be in any position at all to have any bargaining power at the table and have any demands at the very beginning. we determined they should not have the right to a nuclear weapons program and i think that pretty much says it. but that said, i want to go on to issue that hasn't been touched on yet very briefly. ask four of you to comment to the level of your expertise, talk about the iranian ballistic missile program. they're developing a ability to deliver nuclear weapons through a ballistic missile program. yet they claim they have no desire forer weaponnization of their nuclear program. i'm curious, whoever wants to go first, talk about the situation where iran finds itself with ballistic missiles. mr. lauder? >> well i, the iranian ballistic missile program is a capability that is of concern, ought to be of concern. and in fact, if it, would be

difficult to negotiate at this stage given what has transpired already but i would think that it would be very important to begin to find a way to additional constraints on that program and, to add, additional monitoring against the program. i mean, you may recall, in the heyday of arms control agreements between the united states and soviet union, for example, we chose to focus on delivery vehicles because they were easier to monitor in some ways, than nuclear weapons themselves orwe weapons program themselves. i think constraints and monitoring on the iranian ballistic missile program would be a very useful compliment to the types of things that we've been talking about so far. >> but dlo we have the ability o do that in the long -- look, when you're negotiating with the russians and you have arms limitations agreements you have two superpowers both with vested

interest trying to calm the situation. this is asymmetric situation. iran is no soviet union. do we really believe we can put in place a way to monitor -- this is what i'm going to ask you. are there ways to put in place toly monitor what they're doing and do it in a way that they're not hiding anything in mountains or underground. >> ith think one of the challens we face as you very wellpoint out this is very much a asymmetric relationship. this is not where the united states is concerning some of its capability compared to something that we're asking iran to do. we're asking iran to stop doing what ith has been doing illicity in against international norms and against international agreements and we're trying to trade off of sanctions relief against, against that. we know how to monitor missiles. we certainly, we certainly have a track record of things that we could puta in place if we could bring iran to that position. >> but your point is right on

though. that is so central. if we're talking about weaponnization, miniaturization, that is delivery system. you have to look at the ballistic missile program. that is one program they work witht north korea on and they continue to develop and that is central piece to any meaningful verificationie protocol. theul missiles have to be very much a part of that. >> mr. chairman, i have number of other things but i yield back. >> we go down to mr. william keating of massachusetts. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i would like to thank the panel for their very important discussion this morning. i think it underscores to me and many of our members the need for congress to be informed fully before the agreement is to go forward and many of the issues you brought up are critical ones. my role on the committee also as rankingr member on europe, your asia and emerging threats there. so i would like to shift into more of a european perspective of things. how do you assess the role of

our european partners in the p 5 plus one negotiations. with karen stepping down as representative and will that have any effect at all and comment on that and our partners how they're viewing the situation and give us your expertise in that area as well. >> my only comment on that would be the europeans have to be extremely concerned the last question about ballistic missiles. if north korea has capability and working to touch europe with their ballistic missile systems and if there is a nuclear program and they're mating it, i think europeanth nations have to be extremely concerned about the nuclear program in iran, no question. >> could any of you comment on the effect of u.s. dealing with ouram european partners as welln this? what things could raise as potential conflicts, what things could, we do to ameliorate things going forward?

is. >> sir on your question about cathy ashton, obviously she has been a central player. i think her departure will make a difference although we don't know exactly what difference it will be because we don't know who her replacement will be. everything will depend on the personality of her successor. more broadly speaking the observation was made earlier that for our sanctions policy to work we need the cooperation of our economic partners and you will, therewo have been plenty f hiccups along the way but by and large in recent years the cooperation has been pretty good. i think congress has provided incredible leadership in the sanctions area. the, the shorthand, that is applied to this is the menendez kirk amendments to the defense authorization bill. there have been two of them. but the way they imposed financial sanctions in a

creative way designed to discourage the importtation of air iranian oil but it was done very cleverly and cali greated way that has actually worked -- calibrated way that actually worked and there is a lot of conversation about frozen iranian assets in foreign banks. you know, these are not funds that are actually frozen but fund being held in those banks ant d can not be repatriated in cash form to iran because the u.s. sanctions policy that congress mandated and that other countries are cooperating on. so, the partnership has worked pretty well. i think in terms of the actual diplomacy it is interesting. i was involved in it to some extentit when i served in the bh administration and i mean there are times that some of our european partners take a harder line on iran than the united states does and you know i think for example the current french

government has been pretty firm of its demands to the iranians, gratifying, sometimes sobering to see our allies take harder line on the iranian nuclear program than the u.s. government. >> if the pf plus one moves forward and there is long agreement or ambiguity or lack of robust verification you talked about this morning isn't in place, what are the concerns as a group? what for instance, would happen if the e.u. would move more ahead or some countries lifting those sanctions unilaterally as a group, do you see that as a real concern going forward? that kind ever disengagement with -- >> lifting a sanctions like that would be, would be i think a terrible move and it would move us in the wrong direction. i think we have to be united on something like this. >> and then, lastly i just want to touch base a little bit on russia.

the u.s. and e.u. imposed sanctions on rush is that's oil and gas sector at some point. what implication if any will increase european demand for our gas and ability to sustain international consensus regarding sanctions onea iran? >> that's pretty complex question having to do the functioning of global energy markets. both iran and russia are major energy exporters. he and they both benefit from higher prices and both benefit from emergence of shortages. so it is one of the challenges that i believe the united states faces in dealing with russia, the fact that think something like 30% of european gas consumption is russian gas and, there is effort now to build a

pipeline across turkey into southern europe ideally to be filled with gas. iranians i think would be happy to put their gas in the pipeline if they were allowed to do that. i think it's a central 10 net of u.s. policy we don't want that to happen. but the energy equation is a complex one and, iran as a government is guilty of gross financial mismanagement. so theiran energy resources are relatively undeveloped compared to what they could be with better management. >> we go to mr. randy weber of texas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. our colleague down on the left, mr. meeks, said that negotiating with iran is not easy and i think, mr. rademaker? is that howot you say that? said that negotiating would be easy, my words, roll over and play dead, if we give them

everything they want. was it you who said that? my opinion is if we're not careful in these negotiations we'll get what we got in the guantanamo trade. we get to keep one conventional weapon. they get five nuclear weapons. turns out adam kinzinger is correct, that negotiations have not been rather kind to us if i putr that rather glibly. if we don't think there is not danger in negotiating with iran we're fooling ourselves. anybody here on the panel that the first time that iran referred to the united states as the great satan? anybody? >> khomeni came in '79. >> november the fifth, 1979. when ayatollah khomeni called us the great satan. for 35 years, they have been exporting terrorism, calling us the great satan, soon after, i don't know what time, it was in

israel, was the small satan. so, should we be saying, when we talk about negotiating with iran, the terrorists, hire we are negotiating with a group of people who will, a radical islamic, fundamentalist, jihadist terrorist khomeni, who the jihadist believe in exporting terrorism to the extent they will strap explosives onioning boys and girls to kill other boys and girls and innocent men and women and we think we can negotiate with them? i believe it was you, mr. lauder, who said that we need a list of all of their scientists who are working on their program? and i don't know if yoru saw "the wall street journal" article on may 27th where there is a group of opposition leaders who have identified moshin zada as probably father

of their nuclear weapon, would you agree with that? mr. chairman, if i may, mr. chairman i like to get this letter into the record. >> mr. weber, without objection we'll include that. >> okay. would you agree with that? >> i think it is very important that were have access as part of the monitoring regime, of key personnel that are part of iran 's nuclear program. >> do you agree he is the that's right of their nuclear program. >> i don't know, most nuclear programs probably have multiple fathers. >> do you know this gentleman? >> i know>> the name, know the individual, yes, sir, know of the individual. >> mr. ambassador, you're shaking your head. okay, turn your mic on please, sir. on. your mic yes, i have heard the name before, sir. >> you have heard the name. >> associated with the nuclear program. >> would you give this credence then? or just something you heard in passing? >> no, i think that -- you think

thatia is accurate. okay . you mentioned also, mr. lauder, that the facility, first of all, that once we should get that list of those involved, those scientists, we should have anytime, any place, access for 24/7. i think that was you that said that. in today's hearing. which i can't agree more. andha we keep getting context tt we have terrorists who will kill innocent children, men and women, whos have been lying, doing as such for over 35 years. how long do you think we ought to give them a chance to prove themselves, trust but verify, 24/7 anytime, any place access? should it be 35 years? should they stop exporting terrorism to syria or i should say supporting in syria? you can go right down the list, afghanistan, iraq, all the terrorism they're supporting,

should s be 35 years, 35 months long enough or not long enough? we'll start with35 you, mr. rademaker. >> the question is -- >> how long should we expect them to be compliant before we can trust them? >> i have a hard time answering that. sort of likeom the supreme court on -- >> is three months -- >> what is obscenity. i will notee it when i see it. i don't think you can measure this by a timeline. i think the measure of whether you can trust iran -- >> okay. >> will be the totality of -- >> i gotcha. >> atmosphere, who is in power there. what policies they are pursuing. >> i gotcha. what do we catch them with if we're diligent. i'm almost out of time. let's grow to mr. lauder real quick. >> i agree with mr., some of the comments mr. rademaker made earlier. we have to be f about this monitoring and verification regime for the long term. there may be aspects of it -- >> six months, karen bass, six

monthsat for breakout, six monts is not long enough, agreed? >> for a monitoring regime, has to be longer. >> mr. heinonen, i'm out of time. what do you think length of time ought to be? >> more than six months but depends also on the compliance. how the compliance is debt with. what kind of process we'll have in place when something comes up with when we see that iran has not complied. the track record is pretty poor there. we had a number of red lines which havew been -- >> forgive me, mr. ambassador? >> i say this will be indefinite. part of the mpt, iaea is there. you have to have the monitors, extra protocols and, the unfettered access is going to have be there indefinitely. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> we go to mr. david sissel lien knee from rhode island. >> thank you, mr. chairman.

thanks for the useful testimony on this very serious issue. thises underscores the principle challenge we face as a country. how do we reach a agreement with a party with very serious consequences that has been untrustworthy and deceptive? i think in part our success depends onqu our ability to monitor effectively and to respond effectively to any failings in the agreement. i wantve to first ask the witnesses, the joint plan of action calls for a comprehensive solution that, and i quote, would ensure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful, end quote. we have also heard president rouhani say that iran will not dismantle ae. single centrifuge. so my first question is, is there a way to insure that iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges? >> let meus just start off by saying they're talking about

building additional centrifuges, even more sophisticated centrifuges, that flies in the face where we're going here. we should go other way around. they should need fewer centrifuges and not enhancing and that is where they should be going. >> is even possible to develop or sustain a program that is exclusively peaceful that does not require the diminution of production of centrifuges? >> certainly the number is now and the figure was 19,000 people putting out -- recently a year ago, they had enough uranium at 20% purity level which would have given them maybe enough to get one nuclear weapon. so yeah, so what they have now is sufficient to get them in the nuclear business, no question about that. >> you looked likes you were to say something. >> yes. the iranians of course will tell you that today their nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. they will say, actually we don't have to do anything because it is an exclusively peaceful

program. we of course don't accept that. if your question is how many centrifuges can they be operating and we can be confident that it is exclusively peaceful? my personal answer with the current government, with its history, with we know about have been, the answer is that they should have, for me to say i'm confident their program is exclusively peaceful the answer is zero centrifuges. unfortunately we're in a situation under the jpa it is clear they will have some number of operating centrifuges. that troubles me because i don't understand why they need any. and, i think it is something of a logical conundrum. because their argument is, we're developing infrastructure to produce fuel for our civil nuclear program. well, if you buy that, then they actually do need a lot more centrifuges than they haver no. andr so, this idea that you're

going to you know, negotiate some number and it's going to be lower than what they have now and that is evidence of a peaceful program, well, some minimal number of centrifuges makes no economic sense in commercial terms. makes a lot of sense in military terms. that is where we are. we're negotiating down a centrifuge program whose side will only make sense in the context of a military program. so i think it would have been more logical to go with requirement that they have zero operating centrifuges. >> which gets to my next question. many of us think there were not consistent constraints in the joint plan of action and development. viewing the current state of technology, it is sort of frozen inse time and what your thoughts are should be in the final agreement that would impose responsible constraints on research and development such as, to insure the security of our country and the limitations

of a final agreement? >> most certainly access to the facilities. access to the scientists, the technicians. access to the notes, data. access to past records. it is important to really go way back with iran on this to confirm where they are, to determine what is that state of capabilities. i think that is all necessary. >> in addition to the knowledge of that, are there any limitations we should attempt to secure a agreement to limit research and development in their nuclear capability? >> first of all, we need to keep in our mind that this technology, once you have a centrifuge you can produce uranium for peaceful purposes or non-peaceful purposes this is the sentiment of the intentions. it is not a technical topic. it is behavior of the state and economic rationale as mr. rademaker. i see it as very hard to argue that iran needs enrichment for

power plant and their concern is nobody sells them enriched-uranium. but iran doesn't have uranium in its soil. so if you are not able to buy uranium, then you are well-dressed but nowhere to go with uranium. so you need to think about the rationale justification and base our argue manner to that. >> thank you, i yield back, mr. chairman. the. >> we're growing to go to mr. ron desantis of florida. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i've been struck by watching the ayatollah's reaction to how things have unfolded. he spoke the other day in front of a banner that said america can not do a damn thing i believe. he said basically said they have renounced the idea of any military actions. so i think, i'm trying to

understand from their perspective, he sees sanctions being eased, force being ruled out. so what incentive does he have to want to change his course of conduct? to me, he is absolutely incentivized to want to continue to enrich and to have a nuclear capability. does anyone want to quibble with me about from the ayatollah's perspective, haven't we provided him, as he sees it, a road map to continue on? >> i think you point to a well-founded concern. what brought iran to the negotiating table in the first place? it was pressure, economic pressure, political pressure. that pressure has been relieved to some extent i think on the

military side they are a lot less concerned about the threat of a u.s. military strike today than they would have been a year or two ago. we have negotiators meeting with iranians right t now, meeting today in geneva. you know, maybe they're making progress, i don't know but i'm sort of concerned that iran right now, i think they know what they need to agree to get to a deal. they're refusing to make that deal. they're holding out for better terms. is that because they're underless pressure and they calculate that the pressure is going to diminish over time? is that, in other words, that the current trajectory is in their favor. yeah, i worry a lot that's what they're thinking. maybe that our diplomats are too because i think they're probably frustrated they can't get the iranians to say yes to whatever proposal they have made to them. >> well, look, we, sometimes i think my frustration, saw some

of this unfolded, looking particularly at people in the state department, they will deal with iran and treat them in a way that i think imputes too much of a western sensibility into how iran conducts themselves. i don't think they recognize enough the extent to which they're motivated by their very vier you lant form of -- vier you lant form of. >> -- jihad. and united states being the great satan. they see them playing us like a fiddle d i understand they have negotiations. i'm absolutely not optimistic that will be done and iran willingly disarm itself. i hope i'm wrong. i think nevertheless where we arewe and i yield back the balae of my time. >> mr. brad schneider of illinois. >> thank you, mr. chairman. echoing what has been said

today, thank you for calling this hearing and allowing us to conduct bipartisan way on issue of grave importance. mr. rademaker, let me start with you. you touched on in your testimony and subsequent conversations the fact that iran, the concern that the deal being negotiated is a time-based agreement. thatti iran just sits tight fora period of time and it is free to proceed, however the country wants to, under terms that would treat iran like japan. i think the sense that we all need to understand is that iran is not japan. iran is a revolutionary reg "geep." it has hegemonic ambitions and clearly demonstrated nefarious contempt indeed. the argue that it could be treated like japan, i would argue that such a state could never be treated like japan or treated as jpoa as any non-nuclear weapon state party to the npt.

iran is different. today as we sit here, today is 40 days away from the july 20th deadline set by the agreement. and again, as previously mentioned there was talk about moving iran back on the pathway to a nuclear weapons capability. i think many of us have stated here before and again today that moving iran backwards is not sufficient. the goal should bere to mover rn off the path to a nuclear weapon. by thatmo long way of introduction, mr. rademaker, for the whole panel, is there any reason why we should be giving up as you stated, the goal of holding iran to zero enrichment, holding iran to not having iraq plutonium reactor, holding iran to fully disclose their previous potentialth military dimensionsf their nuclear program? >> well, first of all, congressman, i think you and i are in violent agreement about

our perspective on this. in answer to your question the rationale for allowing them to enrich, i'm really wrong person to ask to provide such a rationale, where i come down the correct answer they should not be allowed to enrich given their history. i think, you would, if you want someone to give you a reason to permit that, perhaps you need someone from the obama administration. >> does anyone have any case that would justify allowing iran to enrich? i think the sense is that we are all in agreement that shouldn't be. before november 20 fourth last year, when the -- november 2th, permanently closing all pathways for iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. seems the concern that this is not closing those pathways at all. mr. lauder, in your written testimony you talked about the

sense of, well, how do deal with non-compliance. how do we deal with non-compliance before we even have an agreement? what should we do now to make sure iran has the incentive to go forward? >> i think it is an excellent question and i think it comes back again to this theme of, to begin to have any confidence that this agreement will be complied with, we have to go back to iran's past. and have to press them to make a full disclosure of what they have done in the past under nuclear programs. we still have the leverage of sanctions. we still have the leverage of nothing'se agreed to, everything's agreed. but that, that understanding, iran has done in the past, becomes the foundation then for the monitoring regime. and we do have to, we do have to push for that. >> ambassador, i'm sorry,

mr. heinonen. >> when 2003 we reached agreement with iran, there was a paragraph for iran to come with a past history of their nuclear program and they nailed to do so. we need to look what was the reason for the failure? was there some other mechanism we should apply. i think this is the most important element of this new agreement to be concluded. >> ambassador detrani. >> may i comment, sanctions are abiding. we know why the iranians are back the table. they need relief. sanctions going after financial forth, illicito activities, this is so key. that is the pressure. that is the pressure to keep them on a path. and as long as we keep that pressure on, my personal view, my personal view, you keep the pressure on, if they want relief they have to fall, that is where

the verification and monitor comes in. if the they are not performing that -- >> my personal belief. we need to make sure that iran understands that no deal, no deal is better than a bad deal. no deal is not sanctions we understand in november of 2013 but orders of magnitude greater to bite in those sanctions if that is not deal in our terms and does close those gaps. with that i yield back. thank you very much. >> we go to mr. ted yoho of florida. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, gentlemen, for being here. we sat here over several times over past year-and-a-half and several of you have been here and i remember ambassador bolton was here and everybody was in agreement that iran would have fissile nuclear material to construct five or six bombs by january or february of this year. has iran accomplished that mission? do we have enough material to do that. >> my sense is no, they do not.

my concern when they had 20% purity ando. enough kill low up- kilograms up there to have one. >> we don't have all the information so we can't say with certainty they don't have that correct. >> we're looking at facilities we're aware of. there may be other class facilities as iaea indicated. >> mr. lauder and ambassador detrani, you're saying very difficult to monitor and verify iran's compliance iranian, us, jpa agreement. do you believe these details should have been worked out prior to any agreement starting and releasing sanctions? if you're going into association you need everything on the table, i want to know everything you have moving forward, would you agree with that? >> sir, i don't have all the modalities ofer the negotiators what they were using. i believe they gave them relief on certain number of sanctions so they could move forward. >> if we can't verify now or monitor it, we should have had a way to monitor that stuff, all

those parameters before we moved forward. i would hoped so. how about you, mr. lauder? >> i, i think it is very important before there's further loosening of the sanctions, which have brought iran to the table that we do get this complete and full accounting of iranian activities and have the data declarations that we need as the basis of our monitoring regime. >> in your opinion, does the current situation in iran's nuclear program or whatever they're doing in our agreement, does it allow iran to get closer to having a bomb if we stay on the current track? mr. rademaker? i think the obama administration would argue that the current arrangement diminishes the risk of nuclear breakout because it limits the number of new centrifuges that iran can deploy. itra limits the, actually,

prevents them from continuing to enrich to 20%, 20% level they were doing in the past but on the other hand, there's been some recent analysis done by the bipartisan policy center, it is on their web site, the, they are no longer producing 20% enriched material but their production of lower enriched, 3.5% has gone up about 25%. >> what i heard today on this panel -- >> the advantages or progress is substantially less than the obama administration advertised. >> what i've heard on this panel today they have got way more centrifuges than they need to have for nuclear power production. and so i think we're all in agreement that they are moving in thatve direction. they have been moving in that direction in the last 25 to 30 years, playing cat-and-mouse game. do you believe that u.s.-iranian interim agreement was detrimental to the u.s. husband

security, oar israel security or regional security the way it was negotiated to release sanctions at the time they did? do you think it was detrimental to do that? real quickly because i'm running out of time. >> i think it was highly detrimental by basically legitimizing centrifuge enrichment in iran because up to the time of this agreement we said was not permitted. >> ambassador detrani, what do you think? >> [inaudible]. >> talking about -- >> your microphone please. >> the report from the iaea they have converting to uranium part of their inventory of 20% purity inned uranium. the iaea report speaks about the a framework for cooperation. what we've seen from the iaea there has been movement from the part of iran in response to

relief on some of those sanctions. that is very interim type approach to it. certainly sitting in israel, you're looking at existential threat you're looking at something different. >> that brings me to my last question. do you feel iran abided by the terms of agreement? >> i don't have particulars on that. according toey iaea, the iae is much more positive report than i've seen in the past, with the exception of the weaponnization and militarization. >> if they don't abide by that what should we as a nation do? more sanctions, preemptive strike, prepare for the day they do get a nuclear bomb? . . to prepare for the nuclear bomb? >> sanctions are big and have impact. >> i appreciate your time. >>