state. i.e. have appointed the administrator crag fugate to serve as the official said that u.s. government wide effort. .. working around-the-clock to address the efforts. number three, we are looking for more space for processing and temporary shelter.

the department of defense has loaned us lackland air force base in texas for hhs to house kids before hhs operably determines a legal guardian. releasing fort sill in oklahoma for the same purpose. hhs is also using that dod facility in ventura california to do with the processing of influx of people into south texas. we are also sending on company children to arizona for processing and then to hhs. gsa is also assisting in the efforts to identify additional space. number four, we brought on more transportation assets. the coast guard at my direction is loaning their assets to assisting in transporting the children from dhs to other shelters. i.c.e. is also leading to additional charter aircraft. number five, we are doing a prisoner screening for health reasons for all of those who come into our facilities in

south texas. the office of health affairs and the coast guard are lending resources to this effort. every child is provided a health screening on site. number six, we call upon nongovernmental organizations, volunteer organizations and charities organizations to assist in this effort. at our request the american red cross is providing humanitarian needs for the situation, including blankets and hygiene kits, faith-based groups like the texas baptist men have provided shower trailers in south texas. number seven, the department of justice is loaning resources and immigration judges for faster removal proceedings. in addition to all of this, we know we must do something to stem this tide. so number eight, and i've been in contact with the ambassadors and other officials of all four countries, guatemala, el salvador, honduras and mexico,

affected by this to talk about our shared border security interest and faster read a creation. i plan to go to guatemala myself in july to continue my personal engagement with this situation. number nine, we have reinitiated our public affairs campaign in spanish and in english, radio, print and tv, to talk about the dangers of sending kids over the border and the dangers of putting kids into the hands of criminal smuggling organizations. in this regard i wish to make something very clear. daca, the program that has been in existence now for two years, which is in the process of being renewed, is for those who came into this country in 2007, seven years ago, those who cross into this country, even children today, yesterday or tomorrow are not eligible for daca treatment. likewise, the comprehensive

immigration reform being considered by congress right now, the earned path to citizenship component of that is for those who have been in this country since december 31, 2011, about 18 months ago. those who cross our borders today illegally, including children, are not eligible for and earned path to citizenship pursuant to this legislation. i also wish to make clear that those apprehended at our border our priorities for removal. they are priorities for enforcement of our immigration laws, regardless of age. number 10, we surged criminal investigator resources, and i.c.e. homeland insecurity investigation and cbp for the prosecution of those who smuggle children, families, and others.

in may, hsi concluded a month-long targeted enforcement operation that focus on human smuggling along the southwest border with operations in el paso, houston, phoenix, san antonio and san diego that resulted in 163 arrests of smugglers. i directed a 90 day surge of 60 additional hsi personal to offices in san antonio and houston to work with the department of justice, to ramp up our prosecutions of smuggling organizations. number 11, in may i directed a unified campaign plan to do with the southwest border calling upon all assets of the department in a coordinated way to address security on the southwest border. and to fill the gaps if necessary to call upon other departments of our government to assist. i've asked that we consider all lawful options to do with the situation. if there are options, we want to

hear about them. finally, the administration has asked for congresses help. to continue to work closely with congress to make sure we have the resources we need to address the humanitarian situation. we appreciate the support we have received from congress in addressing the current situation. and as we work through the budget for the coming fiscal year. in this, we can and we must do all we can to address the situation. thank you. i'd like to turn over now to administrator fugate. >> well, good afternoon. when the president and the secretary made the decision that what we had been to of bringing all the resources of the federal government together, the president asked his secretary to utilize the national response framework. most commonly you think of this as responding to disasters with it. but is also coordinating mechanisms where we can bring all of our federal resources together to focus on challenges that we are facing. in this case the national

response from work and agencies that make up our supporting the two lead agencies, customs and border protection at the point of interdiction, and they're care of the show into which point they're turned over to the health and human services and supporting health and human services and the role in refugee resettlement. this is an opportunity that we saw that the secretary and the president directed to use tools that oftentimes you think about and disasters, but are the same framework for use to bring all the federal resources to bear on this challenge. as we continue to work through this icr role is to facilitation. were using a lot of capabilities with a but more directed and focused specifically to the unaccompanied children and the focus on their health and welfare through this process. as the secretary pointed out, a lot of initial response has been through the faith-based committee and they are acting not only of the point where we are bringing the basic care to these children but also a key

component in the resettlement opportunities of fostering children as they go through the program. so this process that we have been assigned to is to support the two lead agencies from the point of interdiction to the point of them being placed either reunite with family members or place in long-term foster care. and again it's the facilitation of all of the federal resources that are able to support this mission. i would like to turn over to your to lead agencies that are really getting with on the ground managing this, and i like to start out with the commissioner of the custom import protection first. >> thank you very much, mr. secretary, thank you. i noted in a number of issues that have been entered into by all of you regarding complaints that the been recently made. let me assure you i find in order today those complaints would be investigated. let me also, and they think i've demonstrated my commitment to not only those types of investigations and the transparency, but let me make a

really significant point. in my multiple trips with the border patrol agents, i have been watching them do absolutely heroic efforts, not only risk in children but taking care of them way beyond some of the skill sets. they are doing everything from mixing formula to bring in their own children's clothing, to taking care of these kids in a multitude of ways. as administrator fugate notes come it takes a toll on those agents, a human toll, but they are absolutely committed to making sure that these children are treated not only in the most respectful and humane way, but, frankly, the most loving way. >> good afternoon, everyone. i'm mark greenberg, acting

assistant secretary administration for children and families in hhs. the unaccompanied children that are rising and central america are vulnerable and insignificant needs. they are young, separated from their families and they just survived a hazard journey. hhs has responsibility to temporally take care of these children, to protect them and to work to place each child in the least respected setting and the best interest of the child. we fund a network of state licensed facilities that are operated by nonprofit organizations to care for unaccompanied children. mostly in group home setting. when children arrive in uses of their received medical screenings, all needed immunizations to protect against communicable diseases. they are screwing for tuberculosis. they receive a mental health exam. as they have often expressed, either in the home country or on the journey, or both. in the facilities along with receiving the mental and medical health service, they also receive nutrition, information on their legal rights, classroom

education, opportunity for physical activity and placement services to facilitate safe released to family members or other sponsors who can care for the. their average stay with us is less than 35 days. the safety of these children and the safety of the american public are our foremost concern. until the last several years, we used to receive referrals from cbp of about 7000-8000 unaccompanied children each year. the number has been steadily increasing. in 2012, we served more than 13,000 children. in 2013, over 24,000. and the projection for this year was 60,000 before these most recent increases. as the secretary talked about, we are currently using a set of temporary facilities to receive the increased numbers of children with the help of the department of defense, the facilities that are operating at

the joint base antonietta lackland, the naval base ventura county in california, and we will shortly be opening the additional facility in fort still oklahoma. we greatly appreciate collaboration and the cooperation of our federal partners, the overall coordination by fema as a work together to address the urgent humanity need for these children. thank you. >> we will take a few questions. [inaudible] >> if you're providing these children with so many services, everything from transportation to health care, education, housing, given legal representation as the doj has announced, isn't that incentivizing people to come to this country, more people are, rather than making it not an incentive? >> i would say no. first and foremost, i want to reiterate the point that he made a moment ago, which is that if you cross the border illegally

today, you are not eligible for daca treatment nor are you eligible for the earned path to citizenship that is being contemplated by the legislation that is now before congress, which i sincerely hope and believe congress will pass. it provides for resources. it provides for the earned path to citizenship and a variety of other things to improve our broken immigration system. frankly, it is also hazardous to send a child into south texas to a processing center, a processing center at a number of us here have seen them ourselves, are no place for children. and to put a child into the hands of a criminal smuggling organization is not safe either. so yes, we provide a number of things for children when we find them because the law requires it and because our values require

it. but it is not safe. it is not a desirable situation. and i would encourage no parent to send their child or send for their child through this process. >> itself if you were really affected by what you saw in mcallen. i'm wondering, how do you respond to that little girl who says she doesn't have a mother to return to? how was that giving treatment returned back where she has her father here? and i have a question for the hhs gentlemen. it sounds to me like you guys have seen this coming, but yet it seems like the agency was caught a little flat-footed and how to respond to this. can you maybe explain what you've been doing the last few years to prepare for this? >> first of all, we've known of a rising tide for some time now. i first heard about this during my senate confirmation process last fall.

and the reason i went there, i been to south texas before in this job, not focus on this issue but the reason i chose to go there in me is because i was hearing that the numbers were rising. very definitely when i saw it for myself, and i had a chance to talk with these kids, be with these kids, it was a very vivid demonstration to me of the problem that we faced. and so it zoomed to the top of my list in terms of things that are requiring my personal time and attention, along with my other obligations to homeland security. so i guess what i would say is, family unification for a child is something that is critical. so i want to see every child with a parent who is able to

take care of them, and allow requires that we do what is in the best interest of the child. and that's what we're doing and that's what hhs mandate is and that's what they are doing. they are doing an incredible job in the circumstances of handling this increase in this population. i'll turn it over to you. >> thank you. as i indicated in my remarks before, the number of children has been growing dramatically over these last several years, and we had been steadily building capacity to address the increased numbers. and as noted from what had been the range of 7000-8000, 24,000 last you anticipating 60,000 this year, we were steadily building the capacity that is

need to have the permit setting for the children. what has happened in this most recent period is that the numbers, particularly since the beginning of may, have grown at a pace beyond what we had predicted and beyond what the department of homeland security had predicted, and that's what has caused this most recent set of challenges. >> mr. secretary, thank you. two questions. one is, in we are assuming that most of these children are part of families that are also undocumented or they would have been claimed. is there a process where with a family claims a child they are reported to i.c.e., or does it automatically put put them in te road to deportation as well? and how does this process worked? and also for you, how do you think that the exchange, the review that you are undergoing

on deportation practices and the prospect of immigration reform in the house, the comprehensive reform? >> first of all, we do track the whereabouts of those who are different notices to appear. there are ways to do that in the process. so that is definitely the case. i would say that with respect to the parents, they are no doubt a variety of circumstances. some could be lawful residents. some could be u.s. citizens. i would not assume that every parent with whom the child is reunited is undocumented. there are a variety of circumstances i would assume. second, my review is still ongoing. i do believe that there are improvements we can make in how

we enforce our immigration laws and how we execute on our removal priorities to better ensure that we are removing those who represent the biggest threats to public safety, border security and national security. i think the thing that this brings home is the need for comprehensive immigration reform, which includes added resources for border security, as well as stability in the law right now. if congress acts, i believe we know our immigration law landscape for years, if not decades. and so there's a lot of anticipation about what comprehensive immigration reform reform would do, but it needs to be clear that if the congress

acts on the pending legislation, the earned path to citizenship is for those of been in this country now for a year and a half, not those who are crossing today. but i believe that one of the many reasons congress needs to act on that is so that we have stability in the law. and as a new immigration law landscape out there. >> secretary, you are being very ambiguous. you say one moment that we are acting in the best answers of the child, which is obviously to live in the united states, and the second is you're going to follow the law and they are not -- they apply deportation. does this mean that if kids come across the border they will be automatically sent home, or that they would be kept here? great incentive. what you're saying is inviting more people to come here. >> the law requires that we act in the best interest of the child. so when we turn a child over to

hhs within 72 hours, which is what the law requires us to do, except in certain circumstances, hhs acts in the best interest of the child, which very often means reuniting the child with a parent. that's what the law requires spent is there any limit to the legal requirement? because there are a lot of children whose best interests are to live in the united states. >> the law requires that we would turn a child over to hhs, hhs then ask them the best interest of the child, determines what is in the best interest of the child. very often that means reuniting the child with his or her parents in the united states. that's what the law requires. >> two questions. following up. a lot of our audience that is watching are hispanics come some of them are undocumented parents. we are getting calls. they are wondering, number one, if they are undocumented does that disqualify them to even get

to claim their children and keep their children here? number two, if their income is not enough they would not be able to keep their children? and number three, have there been deportation already of some of these children back to countries like honduras? we know that the ones that are from mexico you do the cross-border. >> my message to your readership, your audience, of those who may have children in central america who they want to reunite with is that illegal migration is not safe. illegal migration to the south texas border is not safe. a processing cancer -- a processing center is no place for your child. putting your child in the hands of a smuggling criminal or position is not safe. your child will not benefit from daca if they come here now. .net is for those who came here

seven years ago. the legislation been contemplated right now, the earned path to citizenship, is for those who came to 18 months ago. that is my message to those who are following you in the press. >> what about those who are already here in the center? we are getting calls from people who want to find the children. they know their children are here because they got a phone call saying they were in the center. >> i am not encouraging in any way, shape, or form illegal migration. >> no, no. , but what i'm saying is, what i'm asking, mr. secretary, mario perez isn't undocumented woman who has a child in a center already here. how does she claim her child? may be the gentleman from hhs can answer. >> hhs has a process they can expect that they are required under law to act in the best interest of the child. >> they will end up in foster care, for instance? could you point is what is the process?

if a parent is undocumented does that disqualify them from reuniting with her children? >> sure, let me clear fight. so when the children come to us, they are initially in these facilities, we seek to identify, do they have a parent in this country? if they don't have a parent in this country or that there is not appropriate, is there another close relative? and if that's not the case, can there be a friend is designated by the family? so our focus is moved the children out of the facility and to a sponsor for this period. we do have a hotline that it is possible to call to get information if a parent believes that the child is in one of the facilities, but we also are reaching out and making contact to make those connections. so our duty is to get the child to a sponsor while they are with

the sponsor they are still fully subject to the removal proceedings, and the removal proceedings and the sponsors have an obligation to cooperate with getting children to the proceedings, to cooperate in the removal process, into report to dhs and to the justice department if there's a change of address. >> and if the parent is undocumented -- >> i have a follow-up. if you could elaborate on two things. one, you said you found out about this during her confirmation hearing losses, he found out about this looming crisis at the border. so if you could elaborate about what you started doing then, or what dhs started doing their during this transition. for you, number one. number two, if you could elaborate on a timeline of what the investigation on the border, abuses of the children would

entail, how you're going to hold people accountable. what is the timeline for those investigations? when can we hear about initial results? >> what i said earlier was as is becoming acquainted with the issues, that face the department of homeland security, this was one of the important issues that i knew would be a priority in the confirmation process. we have been focusing now for sometime on the southwes southwt border. we devoted an unprecedented level of resources, long-term over the last number of years apprehensions which tend to track over all the tents that illegal migration. had gone down. we've devoted a number of resources, personnel, technology to the southwest border. there has been this recent influx focus in the rio grande valley sector. we have also in may develop a

dhs wide campaign plan to do with the southwest border is generally which calls upon the entirety of resources at dhs, which i mentioned in my prepared remarks. if there are gaps we will call upon other elements of the u.s. government to help us out. so we've been focused on the southwest border for some time now in terms of resources and personnel. i think we have time for one more question. i've got to get somebody in the back row. >> can you help us understand the legal requirement here, the best interest of the child? does that mean that a child who comes into the u.s. illegally, who has appeared here, has a different immigration posher than someone who's not a child who comes into the is illegally? does the best interest of the child make a difference in terms of education? >> -- adjudication.

>> if i could come as the secretary said, every child has the same process. they have the chance to go in front of an immigration judge and pleaded the case an immigration judge will make a decision should the child be removed or not. they remain a priority of i.c.e. and i will let hhs make comments. >> just very quickly. the best interest is just in determining whether the child should live while removal proceedings are pending. >> mr. secretary? mr. secretary? >> we've got to go. >> one more. >> you guys don't want to talk about how many families have been apprehended and not released? >> very unsatisfying. [inaudible conversations]

>> president barack obama says he is weighing a range of options for countering the violent islamist insurgency in iraq but he warned the government leaders in baghdad the u.s. will not take military action unless they move to address deep-seated political troubles. president did not specify what options he was considering but he ruled out sending american troops back into combat in iraq. the last used troops went through -- withdrew in 2011 after more than eight years of war. that is the way the stories is being reported. as you see on your screen. the house foreign affairs committee chair, republican ed royce, says the united states has vital national security interest at stake. he issued a statement following president obama's south lawn works on iraq. this is a region in chaos the president and his team need to be acting urgently, not reviewing options in the days

ahead. that's from the house foreign affairs committee chair, republican and royce. members of congress our tweet out of their responses to present obama's comments today at the white house. speaker john boehner sent out a series of four tweets

>> tweets from congressmen, and we have a conversation going on our facebook page about the situation. the question, should the u.s. intervene in iraq? no more. we had one chance to do it right and failed. i'm not so sure we should have ever gone there, but once we did we should have persevered until the war was one. william pugh rights, do you want to fight the war in their yard or yours? no-brainer. let us know what you think at facebook.com/cspan. >> we will need to learn again how to work together, how to compromise, how to make pragmatic decisions. in the upcoming midterm

elections, americans will have choice to make a which path they want to go down and whether it will make the investments we need in our people. i will leave that discussion to others, but for a lot of us, in the private and nonprofit sectors, we have work to do. government doesn't have a monopoly on good ideas obviously. and even if it wanted it couldn't and shouldn't try to of all the problems by itself. we have responsibilities to do what we can speculate claims latest book is called "hard choices," about her time as secretary of state and how her experiences there shape review of the future today live on c-span2. watch booktv coverage starting at 6 p.m. eastern followed saturday morning with a book signing at arlington, virginia, live at 11 a.m. eastern. both events will be air saturday night starting at 8:30 p.m. booktv, television for series readers every weekend on c-spa

c-span2. >> a senate hearing this week examines the security of a radiological materials that can be used by terrorists to construct were, known as dirty bombs. witnesses included representatives of federal agencies responsible for securing these sources. this hearing of the senate homeland security and governmental affairs committee is just under two hours. >> the hearing will come to order. a little over a year ago, the city of boston was struck by a tragedy during the running of the 117th boston marathon. two terrorists detonated pressure cooker bombs near the finish line, killing three and injuring nearly 300. the horror of this attack will and began our first anniversary anniversary of the attacks will never be forgotten, but neither well the heroism that unfolded

immediately following these attacks. police, medical personnel, national guardsmen and women, volunteers, runners and spectators all ran towards the blasts to provide immediate aid to the injured. these acts of courage and selflessness saved countless lives. the tragic events of the 117th boston marathon remind us that we must constantly seek to counter the threats from joint is that the threats from homegrown terrorists and to improve our nation's ability to anticipate and prevent the next attack. today as we strive to improve our catechism efforts we have the opportunity to look back at the boston marathon bombing and ask ourselves this question, what if the attack had occurred differently? what if it was even more deadly? what if the pressure cooker

bombs were just simply bombs but dirty bombs? allows question is will regard to focus on today in this hearing. a dirty bomb is a kind of crude explosive device that when detonated disperses radiation around and beyond the blast. a dirty bomb successfully goes off, those who survived the blast could be exposed to harmful amounts of radiation that could cause of sickness or even death. moreover, a dirty bomb could render areas uninhabitable for not just days or weeks, or months, but for years. making that particular weapon a highly disruptive one. the boston marathon terrorists turned their pressure cooker bombs into dirty bombs, then the consequences of that tragic day could've been multiplied by an order of magnitude. i want us to think about that for a minute.

for instance, when the police, medical personnel, volunteers, runners and spectators all ran towards the blast to help the injured, what if they had been unknowingly exposed to harmful radiological material? in many cases this cannot be seen, cannot be smelled, cannot be filled, cannot be tasted. in this hypothetical, what would have been a heroic display of courage and selflessness cryptically spired into far more deadly and disruptive situation. today's hearing will focus on how we can assure that this type of situation does not come to pass. we will focus on the threat of a dirty bomb and specifically examine the security of radiological material here in communities across the country that could be used to create a dirty bomb. two years ago, at the request of senator daniel akaka, the

government accountability office issued a report examining the government's efforts to secure radiological material in u.s. medical facilities. gao found that in many cases, this radiological material was all too vulnerable to theft or sabotage. shortly thereafter, i joined senator akaka and senator casey in requesting that gao audit the security of radiological material used at construction and industrial sites. unlike the radiological devices in hospitals that are stationary and large, industrial radiological sources are often found in small, highly portable devices, routinely used in open, populated areas. we have and the poster over an example of the kind of highly portable radiological device that we are talking about.

this is a radiography camera. it's a camera that is commonly used at construction sites to survey pipes and foundations for cracks and imperfections. these cameras contain radiological material that if seized by the wrong hands could be used to help create a dirty bomb. as good as the type of portable advised that these are terrorists could walk away with. if he found that left unsecured. gao will testify today on the street of industrial ecological material like this camera but the message is from the audit are clear. despite government efforts, industrial radiological sources are far too vulnerable to theft or sabotage by terrorists or others wishing to do us harm. in fact, gao found four cases where potential dirty bomb material was stolen between 2006 and 2012.

moreover, gao found two cases where individuals with extensive criminal histories were given unsupervised access to potential dirty bomb material. one of those individuals had been previously convicted of making terroristic threats. we will learn more about these vulnerabilities and what i think are some commonsense fixes from gao, but let me just say this, we must do better. given the consequences of a dirty bomb, there really is no excuse for the vulnerabilities identified by gao. so i'll say it again, we must do better. if we are to protect against the next oklahoma city bombing, the next 9/11 or the next boston marathon bombing, we must stay several steps ahead of the terrorists. we must anticipate and neutralize their evolving ability to carry out terrorist

plots well before they are ever conceived. and executed. today, we will also hear from three agencies that play a critical role in securing radiological material in the u.s. and preventing dirty bomb attacks from occurring. and with that we're going to turn to our panel, and i'm going to make some brief introductions of each of you and then we'll invite you to present your testimony, and i'll ask some questions and some my colleagues will drift in and out and ask questions as well. and then time it will be time for dinner, hopefully we will be done sooner than that. but i want to welcome each you for joining us. it to become an thank you for preparation for this hearing. and for your willingness to respond to our questions. the honorable anne harrington is the deputy administrator for defense, nuclear nonproliferation for the

national nuclear security administration. does that fit on a business card? barely. that's a lot. a position you don't understand since what, 2010? 2010, thank you. prior to national nuclear security administration she served a stretch of the national academy of sciences committee on international security and arms control. she has also positions in the state department as acting director, deputy director of the office of proliferation threat reduction. welcome. next on a panel we have doctor who been. i'm going to try to production in and then you tell us. gowadia. that's a great name. director of the domestic protection office at the department of homeland security. dr. gowadia was appointed director of 2013 after being acting director since 2012. dr. gowadia, welcome.

i understand you served in multiple positions at the domestic nuclear detection office since 2005 and prior to that work worked at the departmt homeland city science and technology directorate, the transportation security administration and the federal aviation administration. our next witness on this panel is mr. mark satorius. executrix for operations at the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission. in the voice heard as chief operating officer overseeing day-to-day operations of the agency. mr. satorius joined nrc 25 years ago as an operating license examiner and then as a reactor inspector and senior project engineer. mr. satorius, a u.s. naval academy graduate served as the officer in the u.s. navy's nuclear power program and is a nuclear trained submarine officer. thank you for that service, to.

final witness this morning is mr. david trimble who served as a director of the natural resources environmental group, u.s. government accountability office. is the primary author o of the o report underlined the threats presented by the security of domestic industrial radiological sources. in his current role at gao mr. trimble provide leadership and oversight on nuclear security and cleanup issues. previously focused on environmental -- if i'm of the causes including control of toxic substances, clean water, clean air issues and management. before joining gao in 2009 he served at the department of state political military affairs bureau responsible for export compliance and enforcement issues. those are the introductions. i'm sure it doesn't do justice but i'm delighted you're here and you're willing to help better informed this committee, and hopefully the senate with

the potential threats that face us and we might do about it. ms. harrington, please proceed. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify on the department of energy national nuclear security of administration effort to enhance the security of vulnerable high-risk radioactive sources in the united states. i would like to thank you for your continued interest and the interest of the committee and its leadership on this important issue. i would also like to thank my colleagues from the department of homeland security and the nuclear regulatory commission for being constructive and indispensable partners in the effort to reduce the risk of radiological incidents. the office of defense nuclear nonproliferation which i laid in conjunction with our federal local and industry partners works to enhance the security of civilian radioactive materials in the united states and internationally.

i have provided details on our programs in my written testimony. we do appreciate the comments and recommendations from the general accountability office and we're actively in the making their recommendations to expand outreach to increase the number of program volunteers and defense grenades with other federal agencies. i want to use the time allotted for my oral remarks to look at the path forward and the strategic approach where developing to address the challenges of securing the materials that can be used in a dirty bomb. the importance of securing high-risk radiological sources was highlighted at the 2014 nuclear security summit when the united states and 22 other countries signed on to a so-called gift basket, committing to secure all international atomic energy agency classified category one radioactive materials at a level that meets or were possible exceeds the guidelines that the agency's code of conduct on the safety and security of radioactive sources.

the goal is to accomplish this by the 2016th nuclear security summit. the recent theft in mexico of a truck carrying a large cobalt 60 source demonstrates how much our own sector depends on the quality of security outside our borders. commitments like the ones intimate under the nuclear security summit process contribute in a meaningful way not just to security of individual countries, but to our joint security. while we continue to breed with a limitation of security enhancements for high-risk radioactive materials, several factors have led us to consider a new strategic approach to addressing a dirty bomb threat. through actions that achieve more permanent a sustainable threat reduction. factors that we considered include the large number of radioactive sources worldwide, the fact that we secure or retire existing sources even as new sources and new devices are

being introduced, the long-term costs of sustaining security systems, the limited options for disposal of these sources, and the general constraints within the federal budget. the grand challenge we should consider is how we can achieve permanent risk reduction rather than continuing in the current preventive posture. just as we demonstrated that highly enriched uranium, or heu, is not necessary for producing critical medical isotopes and that we can eliminate heu from the technology cycle, can we apply the same principle to radiological sources? we should strive to not only further enhance security but reduce the size and complexity of the overall problem and achieve permanent threat reduction by decreasing the number of sites and devices that require i do pretty radioactive materials. the centerpiece of this strategy is to engage in a worldwide effort to provide reliable

nonreactive alternatives to the highest activity radioactive sources that pose the greatest risk. or to find ways to reduce the amount of material needed for a given function. we will need to have the engagement and active participation from the research, industry and medical communities, but the potential benefit, removing the risk of a dirty bomb altogether are significant. considering a range of incentives for replacement where commercially viable alternatives exist is something that we are investigating, and we are also collaborating with our research and development office to explore and assess technical improvements that could be developed and transferred to industry for commercialization. we recognize we may not succeed in replacing the need for all sources. for example, radioactive and national sources such as mobile

well logging and radiography sources may not have an acceptable and viable alternative. in such cases we are collaborating with industry partners to develop innovative and sustainable security solutions. we have seen that other countries are willing to go above and beyond international norms and standards for radiological security through collaboration with our program, and through commitments they've made at the nuclear security summit. we have also now seeing domestically that's an agreement states have taken radiological security to a higher level. while we have an important role to play in this regard, we also encourage all other states to show the same and you should have to demonstrate leadership and commit resources to take radiological security eon to minimum requirements. thank you for your attention, and i'm happy to answer any questions.

>> ms. harrington, thank you so much. thanks very testimony. thanks for your service. dr. gowadia, would you please, please present your testimony at this time. thank you. >> thank you, chairman. good morning, chairman carper, and i would extend thanks also for holding this hearing. it is a good opportunity for us to appear today to present to you and discuss with you the domestic nuclear detection office efforts to prevent and prepare for radiologiradiologi cal events. i am honored to be here today to testify with my distinguished colleagues. their support and assistance our fundamental to the mission you have given my office. at the domestic nuclear detection office we are singly focused on the nuclear threats and seek to make nuclear terrorism and prohibitively difficult undertaking for our adversaries. in coordination with federal, state and local partners we develop and enhance a global nuclear detection architecture which is a framework for thinking, analyzing and reporting on nuclear and other

radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. although my office focuses on detecting and locating radioactive details once you are lost or stolen, we work very closely with our colleagues at the department of energy and the nuclear regular for commission who are responsible the safety and security of these materials. our approach to detection is based on the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement and technology. by ensuring intelligence informed operations are conducted by well-trained operators using the right technologies, we maximize our ability to detect radiological and nuclear threats. the first leg of the triad tomato just an information sharing, is very frankly the backbone of the robust protection architecture time and i could indicators and warnings are crucial to the deployment of resources and operations. additionally, we analyze past nuclear smuggling cases and terrorist events and bring this knowledge to bear on the development of future detection

architectures and systems. the domestic nuclear detection office offices join us as it enables information sharing and also provides adjudication support and situational awareness to our stakeholders but to increase the awareness of lost and stolen source of we readily publish information bulletins for our state and local partners, summarizing relevant news articles with useful facts about radioactive material. second leg of our triad is law enforcement officers in first responders. those on the frontlines. the domestic nuclear detection office works to ensure that the of the necessary capabilities and are well trained and ready for the mission. since 2005 through many collaborative efforts with provided radiation detection training to over 27,000 federal, state and local law enforcement personnel and emergency responders. annually the conduct approximate 15 exercises that stress operate ability to detect illicit radiological and nuclear

materials while enhancing collaboration and building trusted networks. to date the domestic nuclear detection office has engaged with 29 states to raise awareness of this threat and assess our state and local partners as they develop their own detection program. we work with them to build a flexible multilayered architecture that can be integrated in the federal asset into a unified response in the event of a credible threat. by the end of 2015 we will have expanded these efforts to cover all 50 states. the india no further supports law enforcement operations by providing mobile detection deployment is. these are designed to supplement local detection and reporting capabilities especially in support of national security and national and other special security events. the program was instituted in 2008, and the trailers house equipment for up to 40 personnel. in fact, this year on july 4 we will complete our 150 the deployment of the mobile detection units.

the final leg of our triad is technology. in addition to acquiring and deploying radiation sensors for the department home in secret operational we maintain an aggressive transformation. the domestic nuclear detection office clapboard with better research and develop and partners as well as with industry and academia national laboratories to bring the right technologies to front-line operators. operators are always included in all of our efforts. for instance, we recently led the element of the next generation handheld recapacitate identification device. these are regular use by law enforcement and technical experts in the field. we work closely with operational partners to identify key requirements to the design of the system. the final product is now a device that is likely easy that is likely easy to use, reliable and even has lower lifecycle costs. with your support we will continue such collaborative efforts to develop regulatory

technologies and offer significant operational improvement and enhanced our national detection capability. thank you again for this opportunity to discuss dndo's efforts. i century appreciate your interest and support for the entire nuclear security enterprise. your leadership and our collaboration will help us ensure a safe, secure and resilient homeland. thank you. >> dr. gowadia, thank you so much. mark satorius, please proceed. when you left the navy, how many years had usurped? >> i've years of active duty and then 18 years of reserves. >> okay. so 18 years of reserves service so that's like 23 years? >> yes, sir. >> that's how many years i serve. five active, 18 reserve. our job was to track soviet nuclear subs but we did a lot of low-level stuff because vietnam war, including around the

islands in the south china seas. >> yes, sir and you often spent time looking for you so brings without much success. >> we were not stupid enough to try to look. we knew we couldn't find them, they were so quiet. the only way we found them was through sound. but i'm very proud of your service, and you are retired captain. >> us are, i am a retired captain. >> so am i. captain, my son calls me captain my captain. and i always say as you were, sailor. captain, welcome. >> thank you and good morning, chairman carper. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today on behalf of the u.s. nuclear regulatory commission or nrc. radiological source security has been and continues to be a top priority at the nrc. in rc continue to work with a 37 agreement states and domestic and international organizations on a variety of initiatives to make significant radioactive sources even more secure and less vulnerable.

the events of september 11, 2001, change the threat environment and resulted in significant strengthening of the security of radioactive sources. immunity following 9/11 the nrc working with other federal and state agencies prioritize action to enhance the security of radioactive sources. these initial actions resulted in the nrc issuing a number of security advisories to embassy and agreement state licensees to communicate general threat information and recommend specific actions to enhance security and address the potential threat. wants him as he identified actions at licensees need to take to enhance the security and control of significant sources, the agency issued orders that impose legally binding requirements on our licensees. in addition, as mandated by the energy policy act of 2005, noc convened an interagency task force on radiation source protection and security to

evaluate and provide recommendations to the president and the congress relating to the security of radiation sources in the united states for potential terrorist threats. this task force submitted its first report to the president and congress in august 2006, concluding there were no significant gaps in the areas of radioactive source protection and security. the second task force report is provided in august 2010, and if the report will be submitted this august. at a hearing held july 12, 2007 come by the permanent subcommittee on investigations of this committee, a web-based licensing verification system was discussed. in an effort to better track transactions of radioactive material nationally, the tennessee developed a portfolio of automated tools to verify licenses and track credentials, inspections, devices and sources and events. this portfolio includes a national source tracking system,

the web-based licensing system, and the license verification system. the nrc also ceased relying on the presumption that applicants for a license were acting in good faith, and instead instituted a policy by which the noc and the agreement states would verify the legitimacy of applicants when first dealing with them. we also issued pre-licensing guides that includes various applicants and licensees screening activities to ensure radioactive sources will be used as intended. the nrc also has implemented a process called the integrated materials performance evaluation program, to assess its own regional materials programs as well as those in the agreement states. the program provides the tennessee with a systematic, integrated ever liable and evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective programs and it provides an indication of areas in which the

noc and agreement states should dedicate more resources for management attention. through a significant collaborative effort between tennessee and the agreement states, the agency developed a radioactive source security will making to replace the earlier orders. ..

needs to fulfill compatible requirements by march of 2016. the efforts and material security have not ended with the publication and implementation of our radioactive source rule. they want to make sure they promote the secure use and management of radioactive sources. this concludes my remarks and i would be happy to respond to any questions that you may have. >> it's nice to see david, thanks for joining us. >> my testimony today discusses the challenges the agency's face in securing the radiological sources in the united states to improve security. the vulnerability of the sources was highlighted last december when a truck in mexico carrying a cobalt 60 high-risk radiological source was on hand of the report issued today we

examine two types of radiological sources mobile and stationary. we found both of the challenges even when the licensees follow the security controls. the import ability of the mobile sources makes them particularly challenging. the officials have stated that the transportation of high-risk sources a is of the utmost vulnerable part of the supply chain. the requirements to ensure security for the mobile forces provide a general framework that is to be implemented by the licensee while the orders halt to secure the sources they do not explain how to do this by specifying those that must be used carrying mobile sources. why all 15 radio blogger the companies we visited matt in the security requirements we found great variations with some companies using the most basic to secure these high-risk sources. the risk is underscored by the incidences of theft all after

they instituted increased control for the sources in 2005 area in addition we identified the two instances wher where an authorized individual both claiming to be state inspectors approach to the crew while in the field and in one case the individual was wearing a jacket. this person gained access to the truck and saw detailed information about the source and left with two accomplices only after they made calls to confirm this identity. re: stationary sources these the involve air space wheinvolve pag plan from a storage warehouses and panoramic radiators to sterilize food while all of the facilities we visited a general security requirements some facilities are still used stilld vulnerabilities. still usable abilities. they had unsecure skylights and one facility had eight rolltop door that was open and unattended and the walls into the cage inside or where they were stored and it didn't go to the ceiling. another had a radiator on the wheels near the loading dock that was secure.

in addition to these potential security vulnerabilities we found that some facilities secured the sources such as the while walking companies didn't have to comply to increase the security requirements. licensees of mobile and stationary also face challenges determining which employees are suitable for trustworthiness and reliability which is required before an employee is given access to the high-risk radiological sources. the dnr certification is intended to mitigate the risk of a threat which they state it is the primary threats to the facilities with radiological sources. under the security to decide whether to grant an employee access even in the cases where an individual has been convicted of a crime or making a terrorist threat. about half of the licensees we visited said they face challenges making this determination and if they stated that they had granted the

certification with criminal convictions giving them access to the high-risk sources. one example they had been arrested and convicted multiple times with forgery, failure to appear in court for driving while intoxicated by driving with a suspended license and twice for terrorist threats. notably the two convictions were not included in the background information provided to the licensee. this person was not convicted of threats against the united states but making threats against the individuals. our part also examines the steps federal agencies are taking to better secure the industrial radiological sources and they have a program to install the measures the facilities containing high-risk sources and both the nsa and dhs have projects to track the sources. in addition at the time of the review they were preparing best practices for the licensees. the report includes recommendations to review and consider revising the process

and the gap that accepts them from being secure. thank you and i would be happy to answer any questions that you may have. >> thank you so much. i think we have a couple of photos here. if you could respond to a couple of questions i think that your report included a number of visuals that were especially interesting. we've taken i think three of those photos and put them on the large charts and i'm going to present each of these to you in sequins and i want to ask you to describe the photo and the security concern that it represents. concerns that it represents. here's the first one. what is -- >> this is one of the sites that we visited. this is a warehouse storing the camera. the vulnerability that we identified and this is the large door is obviously left open and

unattended. >> and what is inside that is of interest? >> these are the ones that had picture and so the warehouse would be the sort of central location where they would be stored when they are not on the field being used. >> 8be two or three or a couple dozen? >> it could be any number of cameras located inside and they would be in this case they would be in a storage room behind the container so because they were in a locked container they are meeting the security requirements notwithstanding the open door. >> any idea how many of those devices would be required to create a weapon of concern? >> i would be sure to the table here but i belief one would be

sufficient. >> okay. let's look at the next photo. what do we have here? this is inside one of the radiography cameras. but as we can see here while the walk on the door don't go the way to the ceiling which is a rather in perfect derrière, now again that is notwithstanding the vulnerability they are still able to meet the requirement of the nrc. >> john used to be the homeland secretary as you will recall and i remember sitting here a at the

talking about border security and we were talking about a building along the mexican border with the u.s. offenses and the law and something to the effect of the above defense somebody would come along with a 25-foot ladder. that just reminds me of that. one more photograph that has been enlarged let's look at that and maybe you can tell us about that photograph. what do we have here? >> this is a picture of a skylight and in the locations that we visited we had identified skylights at the facility. they ranged from warehouse radiography cameras to scientific research facilities to large panoramic radiators so

they are quite a range of facilities that have these vulnerabilities. notably in the program where they go in on a voluntary basis and it's one of the areas they would target in terms of closing the means or securing a skylight. >> can you tell us where it exists? were the devices that we are talking about were they walked up and secure? >> they are still meeting the requirements because they would still be in a container inside of the facility but from our view it is to provide another way of getting inside of the building to gain access to the container. >> as we all know there are

locked containers and others are quite secure. can you comment on that please? >> we saw that most poignantly looking at the trucks that radiography is traveling with their mobile sources into some of them were secure with a very simple padlocks and some had high security locks and inside the dark rooms where they would be stored sometimes people would just have a sort of army surplus container with the cable that provides a second walk in the requirement. some took the mission much more seriously while reinforcing this deal containers and they bolted it down to do much more of the job to secure those containers so it's a great vulnerability as we observed in the field. >> just ask the panelists what they have received. any thoughts before we ask a different question?

>> i would just say this is the first i've seen of the pictures and have been made aware of the issues that were found in their report. being an organization that strives to continually improve, we have a new security rules that i mentioned. we will look at that rule and see if there are things but as a regulatory body, we put regulations in place that are risk informed and performance-based and we do not typically have one rule fits all. we leave it to the licensees. it's their responsibility to take the requirement and put their program in the place to ensure that they are compliant with our regulations.

we do provide guidance to that will instruct and operate their program in a manner that will comply with the regulatory requirements but we leave it up to the licensee to put their program in place to document a write-in security plan. i would have to understand the security to understand completely all the details but i wanted to provide that perspective. >> is this basically -- oh, we also inspect these facilities and where we have the problems where they do not comply with the regulatory we have an enforcement program that can issue violations into civil penalties and orders that will

modify so we have a very robust enforcement program and like i said, we inspect these facilities on a wood alliance with the potential danger that might fall on the members of public if they were to be exposed and they know that the program is quite robust. i'm a former inspector myself. it's about a new program that has formal classes that have to be taken and passed successful successfully. there is a mini at companies where you are under construction ainstructionas you perform thesn activities and then finally, you are qualified as an inspector so it's a rigorous pro game only inspectors can perform these sort of reviews of licensees.

>> did you say the regulation had been updated recently? the >> i had mentioned in the 2005 timeframe that we had done an assessment and we had looked at what things we needed to make in the requirements and what we typically do is we will issue orders that modify the license and have them perform certain activities and we will then take longer and go through the rulemaking process which is a two to three year process and involves outreach to stakeholders and members of the public to help us in that endeavor and so that process took place and we issued at regulation in march of this year. it involves as you heard a background check to ensure that

individuals that are allowed to have access by themselves that they are trustworthy and reliable and that they perform that review and make the determination whether the individual needs a trustworthy and reliable and we also have issued a -- as my colleague indicated we issued guidance documents of best practices for performing these types of reviews so the individual that is responsible for making that call has guidance on what to look for. the other thing that it requires is a liaison with local law enforcement so that if you have a plan in the course of the required detecting and assessing and responding to the potential

theft of the source you have to lay out a plan with the law enforcement so they can respond. they are required to inform the nrc and they are required to call us as soon as they are done with that as we have been early notifications we can outreach to the partners to make sure that this lost or stolen source has actually been dealt with. >> can you give an idea of how often these reports were reported and come in? >> i would say several a month. and the vast majority of those

since 2005 i'm sorry, 2010, 11, 12 and 13 there has been no category one source lost or stolen. for category number two -- category one as opposed to category two. >> the standards and the code of conduct identifies if not safely managed or secured or protected with cause permanent injury to a person that had otherwise contact with them for more than a few minutes it would probably be able to be close to this amount of material for the period a few minutes to an hour. and these are used in the radiators and strong sources that category two is one step

down from that where if you were in close contact in an hour or two there would be serious injury and possibly a fatality. >> i would assume that for category number one at the level of the risk it would be higher and maybe even inspections would occur more often. give us some ideas what inspections would occur. >> for the category one sources it varies. some are every two or three years depending on the strength of the material and its potential to harm members of the public and also for category number one, the part number 37 requires any time the source is removed from the storage

container it sets off an alarm so that is a new requirement. >> is that for the category number one devices? but we ask the panelists would you comment on the rule that was just described with what should we be encouraged by or concerned about please? our site visits were assessing the current rules fight 37 didn't kick in until this year and it won't rule out for the states until 2016. what i would highlight however is many of the problems that were identified in the report i don't belief would be addressed for example the issue of the code location where some of the sites are not able to be subject to the security requirements because they are separately stored therefore they are not totaled to hit the threshold

that triggers the security. do not believe that. some of the specificity that we talked about in terms of the types of locks i don't belief is addressed and that is the issue about trustworthiness and reliability in the process by which that is done. so the decision is still being left to the licensee and there is no process or criteria that would disqualify someone from being given such certification and there is no process by which for example if you had a conviction or a red flag that would trigger a greater nrc involvement. >> would you react to what mr. truman just said the >> i would like to take one of his points very briefly which is the coordination and this is one

of those places we can play a special role. reaching out to the law enforcement can be very complicated. there are many different layers. you might be in a tribal area. it might be a university campus with its own security police. it could be an environment where you have local, county and state police so part of what we do collaboratively to go a bit above and beyond what is in the actual rule is to organize tabletop exercises that involve all elements of the communities. these exercises are really help bring together the different elements of the community that would be involved in response to any kind of incident and so far

with our colleagues at the department of energy who do counterterrorism and counter proliferation we have run well over 100 of these exercises all over the united states. >> how often? >> several each year usually. but we found that the feedback is extremely positive. but if you were to try to regulate the exercise, i'm not sure how you could do it but this is one of the steps by looking together at how we can collaboratively improved the security posture we have come up with some approaches like this that i think we feel are very positive contributions to the overall security. >> speaking for the detection officer i can tell you that the

collaboration one is very critical because it is a trusted network and all of the work that we do in our meetings and our government coordination council they help us buil to build an ay to get the early indicator so that the law enforcement acts with the detection capabilities can respond and help them find the sources so we certainly support the regulatory work and the additional work that was just mentioned because it definitely enables our end of the mission spectrum, but detection. >> how do the safeguards that have been described it this morninthis morningcompared to tn placed in other countries around the world whether it is radiography cameras or other

devices? even radioactive materials. how does our work compared to that with other countries? >> this is a global challenge and i think that it's to the credit of the countries involved in the nuclear security summit process that they have really brought the radiological security to the floor since 2012 summit when it was added to the list of active target for collaboration. i mentioned in my testimony that the summit the united states and 22 other countries made a commitment that by the time of the 2016 summit, we would have taken steps to ensure all of the sources, so that now is on our collective plates in the united states to deliver that and we

will work collaboratively with other countries, but i would venture to say that the photographs that we saw here today could reasonably represent the similar challenges in the international community. in fact i was at a conference in southern africa earlier this year and as you know very rich in natural resources and the countries are extremely worried about the threat because of the number of sources, the lack of regulation, the lack of secure procedures come about lack of a strong independent regulator to provide a framework and so we will work with those countries collaboratively to try to help them improve their profile. >> when i was the governor of

delaware weren't you involved in the association whicthat associa clearinghouse for good ideas and i remember many cabinet meetings when we've are discussing particularly challenging things in the state and saying to my cabinet they had figured it out and they were the gold standard and we had this clearinghouse for good ideas and we had the ability to find out what other state was addressed as satisfactory to contact before i have to get in touch and it was actually very helpful in many of the instances. do we have that kind of capability with maybe looking i don't know from state to state but to see who who has the best practices or maybe from country to country? maybe it's us but could you speak to that please?

>> i can start and i will speak from an agreement perspective. we have 37 states in the unitedd states signed an agreement. that signed an agreement. the governor signed an agreement with the chairman where they first want to take over the responsibility for the safety and security of certain radioactive forces and we have a process that we review the program and it has the right staffing and training. >> why would they want to take over that responsibility? >> many reasons. the principal one that i hear is that we charge fees for license is and regulatory activities we are 890% recoverable agency so we charge fees.

they often times can do it for less money so it's kind of a service to their constituents where they are able to provide those users safely and compliant with the requirements and less cost to their citizens. >> others on the issues whether it is in this country or outside of the country. >> well as you mentioned the senator before and i had the honor to testify before him several years ago and he was a leader in this area and he worked very hard -- >> what do we suppose inspired and? >> i am not sure. i would ask my team especially

who runs this program she worked very closely with the senator and the state of hawaii to bring them into full compliance with all of the regulations and as far as i know they were the first state to do that. can you step a little closer to the microphone please? just take a moment. okay. maybe you can spell that for us later. >> it's joanna and i. i think the senator was a visionary and cared about a lot of post threats and there were a lot of indicators post septemb september 11 that talked to

others on this issue to look into the area and i think that with the audits which were somewhat painful i think in the end it raised the visibility of the vulnerabilities that we have both domestically and internationally and he was an advocate that if it can be done in my state i have medical facilities, i have navy base, i have a lot of things in my own backyard and we can increase the security posture that can serve as a model going forward with other states. so we didn't fully focus on why but the major metropolitan areas and other states across the country on a voluntary basis.

but his foresight and his advocacy on this issue articulated the need for others to step up and step forward. >> thank you very much. >> i would just add the previously we've done some work in this area and we can look at the issue and we've looked at how they were handling this issue in france. we haven't looked at the organizational sharing aspect that we have looked at how other countries have tackled these issues. >> i guess it would be understandable if other states and other nations had these devices to have the materials in

them whether they are mobile or stationary and if other countries do not secure them into those materials were obtained, they could be used for bad purposes in those countries or maybe anywhere. what do we have to reduce the likelihood of another country did not secure the radioactive material as well what do we have in the way that we protect our own borders and points of entry to be able to detector intercept any of the material coming in? thank you for that question. we believe in a multifaceted approach to our security. so this begins well overseas.

in my office we worked very closely with the atomic energy agency so that we can promulgate the best practices across the globe of all 159 member states that now have access to best practices and building architectures from exercising, training and awareness and even being able to keep some of the courses at the academy so that is our first outreach. we also work to encourage them to have approaches in the nati nation. as i go through my answer you will see me building the layers so that we can make it a harder and harder undertaking for the adversary. we use information such as manifest data that focuses the overseas efforts and then certainly collaborate with our intelligence community partners so that we can get the early indicators, the early intelligence warnings and surge

as necessary. at the border itself we have robust capabilities. almost 100%. dude. 100% of the vehicle or traffic gets similarly scanned and we have the law enforcement officers and border protection and every border country carries detection equipment. all incoming general aviation are met by customs and border protection officers that have the right equipment and these are just some of the examples i can think of. and of course with your continued support people continue to make the right investments and appropriately balanced abilities to build strength after strength at our borders and with our

international partners. >> those are actually all encouraging and so we are grateful for the work that is being done i like to say everything i do i can do better and the improvement is always under construction. give some examples of what we are doing better today then maybe what we are doing in the not distant past and maybe mention a couple areas we can do better still and for others as well. >> i will start. one of the things we do is inform our efforts based on the look at the risk. my office is responsible for coordinating the architecture and implementing its domestic compliment so we have to balance of resources to get the maximum bang for the buck so we are analyzing the schemes and

building a better fee of information so that it can be better responsive to and more responsive to a credible threat so that is something that we are getting better. i could not agree with you more so no matter what we are giving we can always do something better ou i watch better and wih the adversary being that we have to grow and stay ahead of that capability as well. you heard the administrator talk about exercising in this nuclear material and they are not something the law enforcement officers use on a day-to-day basis so we must practice and keep our skills up to speed, and we do that with some of our exercised field exercises where we use the uncommon sources to expose our officers to things they don't see on a normal basis. these are some of the activities

integrated exercising i think it's something that we could do better moving forward. and our communications coordination function always can be better. so she mentioned the global nuclear detection architecture. there was a white house review last year and in the context of that review some very specific areas of the programs that we run at the department of energy were identified as necessary to fill certain gaps. for example the second line of defense programs works very closely with the dhs. we installed radiological detection devices in ports where there is a lot of outgoing cargo

traffic to the united states so we try to catch things before they are even headed to the united states and we are particularly interested in the nuclear material but the radiological sources are also a very big concern and a large number get caught in the system identifying the isolated and then handled appropriately. also internationally since 2004, and we just actually celebrated the ten year anniversary of the global threat reduction initiative we have done an enormous amount of work internationally to both secure the sources and identify the pathways and work with countries to develop best practices and work on the international code of conduct for the security of the radiological sources that this is an extremely active area

of programming for us and one where we will continue to be active. one of our biggest accomplishment was first identifying and then retiring the radiological generators. these were massive sources and one of them could have been used for many dirty bombs so that was a huge content over multiple years. but if we had a similar kind of work going on across the globe for the last decade. >> one of the things we are doing better today that we were not doing in the past has to do with our source of security rulemaking that we mentioned before.

there are six focus areas in the rule making that makes us a more effective rule and that includes in the controlling personal access for the significant sources being stored on the security programs and rigid security programs that lays out how the licensees are and coordinating and tracking radioactive shipments. there's a manner to be able to find them. i think the international efforts we have discussed today in terms of protecting the

country highlight in an editor at way what we bring up in our report because as those pathways become more difficult for anyone to navigate, the easiest path is domestic. why try to bring something in from overseas if you can go to the local hospital or warehouse to get the source? so this underscores the importance of the making sure that the requirement for domestic and medical users are robust and the weaknesses identified at the points pointd highlight in terms are going to get better. the co- locations in the vulnerable facilities are subject to relations and improving how we do background checks and getting better guidance on who should and shouldn't be given such access, examining whether they should be playing a better or a bigger role in that class providing

more specific guidance to companies and licensees that are not security professionals. these are commercial companies during a business that may have some health and science that are not security professionals so they need more help than what we are giving them right now. >> let's go back to the cameras before. one of the questions i asked i think category one or category number two. >> they are category number two and they have a source that needs to be replenished very often because of its half-life. >> it would be about every three months. >> okay. our we aware of any efforts to actually use a dirty bomb in this country or another country

much like in boston where we have the efforts to unfortunately use pressure cookers to kill and maim a lot of people. we have seen that i use of poison to kill people in some ways, so we have actual demonstrating uses of technolo technology. we have any documentation about the attacks in this country or other countries where it was actually tried or maybe failed. >> i do not, sir. there is the general threat that we use every effort to maintain the safeguards. i'm not sure if my colleagues are aware of any attempts to produce a dirty bomb using the sources. >> if you want to follow up with the classified briefing on the

topic, we could go into that in more detail. if each one is not appropriate to answer in this space, just say so. but people can go on the internet and learn all kind of things including how to build weapons, nuclear weapons can't pressure cooker bombs, and i presumed dirty bombs. given the access to that information by do you suppose -- maybe it is because of the security measures we talked about in this country that are getting better and maybe that is true in other countries and it is not as easy as it seems and

maybe people just decided that it is just too dangerous to hurt or maim other people or find some way to do something less damaging to the perpetrator. although they don't seem to care about whether they live or die. but why do you suppose we have not seen it attempted more? >> they deserve credit for all they've done to try to secure these forces. i think where the conversation is there's more that we can do and that is where that report is coming from and really it is premised on the idea that it only takes one to make a really bad day.

it is certainly one of the drivers that we made it very hard for people to get their hands on these things. >> i would echo a lot of what you said. but in a different setting we can go into more specifics. >> the >> i separate the statement about taking this up in a different environment. >> does the nrc have any mechanisms to review the unescorted access to the decisions made by licensees? for instant if they grant_access to an individual with a violent equivalent history, whether the nrc be immediately be aware of

this action or would they be able to take immediate action? >> we would be able to inspect it at our next scheduled inspection activity. that's when we reviewed the decision-making by the licensed staff on the trustworthiness and reliability. >> the guideline is what is being reviewed for the various factors were considered that the actual decision is left to the licensees are there is no prescription that if someone has convictions for certain things that they are not allowed to have access. >> does that sound satisfactory? should we be concerned about that? >> i would respectfully be for to my regulatory colleagues and support and advocate for his

mission because again more security that you see the easier it becomes. >> do you think it would be helpful but the licensee get a second opinion from the respective state regarding the trustworthiness of the individual? >> senator, i don't think that it would end of the reason as a regulatory body that we expect our licensees to perform these activities we give them good guidance that they can follow and if so that they will repeat the right decisions but i would say that it is not in our purview to be consultants. we review what the licensee has done on whether they comply with our regulations. >> does it expressly prohibited by licensees from granting access to individuals tediously convicted of making threats?

>> they do not. >> okay. maybe one more question and we will start voting in just a few minutes. this would be one for ms. harrington and this is on security enhancement at the national nuclear security administration global threat reduction license and tribal governments and other agencies to build on the existing regulatory requirements by providing voluntary security enhancements and i would just ask you how many security enhancements as the national nuclear security administration put into place on industrial construction facilities and a a follow-up would be what obstacles stand in your way from some form of upgrades from the

sources? >> i don't know if they break out of the industrial facilities but according to our allies if there are approximately 3,000 buildings in the united states containing the high-risk radiological sources. of that number we've already worked in 650 buildings providing our security upgrade program and we intend to complete another 45 in this fiscal here. so, that is i think a reasonable accomplishment that only gets us up to 700 out of 3,000. we've also recovered -- those are in the out year plans but

with the budget environment as it is, we have had to extend the target date for completion further than we had originally thought would be possible. the other part of this is the disposition pathway for the sources and that is often a challenge because you either have to find a secure storage facility for long-term storage or some other way to safely dispose. it is the license responsibility to do that unless the sources that they have that have no disposition pathway in which we can step in and assist. >> if you have something to add, feel free to do so briefly

otherwise i'm going to bring this to a close for now. anything else you want to add at this point? >> not at this point. i think my colleague has these enhancements and we bb that compliance with our regulations provide adequate protection for the public. senator i do need to correct one statement i made if i could do that very quickly and that is not all category on all categors are inspected on a yearly basis. the inspection is based on the safety and robustness of the device and of some of the sources are not scheduled for the periodic instructions in one year three years, four years, five years. >> let me just say our job in the committee is to do

oversight. we have the responsibility of oversight for the department of homeland security and we also have a broad responsibility for the whole federal government and other committees have subcommittees that are responsible for investigations. some of them take it seriously and others do not. it's hard for one committee such as this one to exercise meritorious oversight over the federal government like we have 50 or 60 people and as good as we are in a staff that is a little bit too much for us to handle. one of the things we can do from time to time his partner with the gal and ask them from time to time to look at the particular issue and that is questioning how we are doing. what are we doing well maybe what are other countries doing even better that we could learn from or in those particular

states. i hope and pray that the subject of today's hearing is something that will always be a subject for speculation and that nobody is inconvenienced in any way because of this nature. you never know. what we can do is try to make sure that we are doing everything we can to hope for the best and prepare for the worst and i am encouraged to share that information with other nations so that they can better protect their own folks. but i certainly don't want to hear the question why didn't somebody do something about this threat? why didn't somebody do something to protect against it? and i want us to be able to say

we worked hard to protect our people and our country from a threat of this nature. everything i do i know i can do better and i think that is true of all of us and every federal program and so it's probably hard to reach but it's a good goal so i would conclude by saying how much we appreciate your being here not just preparing and answering my questions but also we appreciate the work that you do for the country. thank you for your service. get it. the wreck or remain open until june 27 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and questions for the record and again thanks to each of you and with that and to the majority and minority staff for helping us prepare for this hearing.

the hearing is adjourned. president barack obama says he is reykjavík to waiting out a range of options for the violent insurgency in iraq but he warned the leaders in baghdad that u.s. will not take military action unless they move to address the political troubles. "the new york times" reports sending in u.s. troops is not one of the options on the table. he spoke this afternoon from the south lawn of the white house. here's the reaction from members of congress. james imhoff says the motion deserves better answers than president obama and the democratic representative iraq

is a quagmire we cannot control. it's time to stay home. texas republican representative, chaos and catastrophe in iraq is the result of obama's failed foreign-policy. this morning washington journal talked to a reporter about what is going on in iraq and here is a portion. >> is the u.s. going to intervene militarily in iraq and your view? >> it depends on what you mean by intervention. if you're talking about sending more advisers i think that it's very possible. we already have some very older women extremely limited capacity. if you are talking about airstrikes are they've been really asking for that for months and they have not gotten it into president obama said yesterday that the options are on the table. i would say you can't be excluded by don't think that it's likely in the immediate future. >> why not?

>> because when president obama took office one of the signature foreign-policy accomplishments was ending the war in iraq and i think from a political standpoint he is reluctant to acknowledge that it never really ended. that ended with the american military presence, not the war. >> looking at your article in this morning's "new york times," the army was crumbling long before its collapse u.s. officials say. is there time to ponder and look at the situation for a while? >> immediately after the forces left iraq, now president of hamas national security adviser gave a speech in which he boasted that the violins without a historical low end of the message of th and the administrn is everything was in good shape that in reality is all of these reactors were at work. if there's going to be a

solution it can't just be one thing, airstrikes or advisers it has to be kind of a holistic solution as the administration likes to say it has to involve political reform and more inclusive iraqi government come it's going to require the informed forces, better commanders, and i think from the military standpoint it is logical to think that if the situation deteriorates the might need additional help from the united states. .. as sweeping as the insurgent advances have been with the fall of mosul, and they control fallujah, now they're in tikrit, moving where the oil refinery is, i don't think they're going to topple the city per se, but i think there's a very good chance that they're going to infiltrate the areas, the so-called belt around baghdad, and use