wasting it with congressman latham when we presented the congressional gold medal to dr. bore a lot and i was standing about 10 feet from ambassador quinn and congressman latham and as i am talking to him, i got the idea we should places -- you care. i don't know what dr. warlock thought at the time but as they set away from the meeting we went to work to see what does it take to approve a statute and get placed in the united states capitol. as i walked away from the circle of inspiration for this great, great man, this great ireland am i learned on the morning replace a statute that congressman latham and ambassador quinn were having a discussion about pleasing the statue there. so whether is providence, whether it's happenstance, whether it's serendipity, we've got the same signal in the same place where you stand within 10 feet of where his ashes is today. i want to get up to speed on two

things this summer to celebrate the second century of his birth and also up to speed on the caucus rules in the caucus chaos and i imagine we'll have a little caucus chaos in the next two years in iowa. >> what are you reading this summer? tell us what is on your summer reading list. posted to her face but page or send us an e-mail. booktv at night stand that word. >> up next, trained to with romesh ratnesar, author of tear down this wall. this week ken adleman and "reagan at reykjavik: the forty-eight hours that ended the cold war." the professor provides they firsthand account of the 1986 summit between president reagan that laid the groundwork for a significant reduction the following year. this program is about an hour.

>> welcome. congratulations on this terrific book. let me start by asking the most obvious question which is why now. what did you decide to revisit this chapter of the cold war 20 years later? >> because i've been thinking about it for 28 years. someone i so wanted to write the book. i said about 28 years because i was there. it was the most important is in my. it was the most thrilling weekend in my life and i've been telling people about it for a long time. i was executive producer of the movie with michael douglas lang reagan and that started about eight years ago. so i was involved in that way and then the movie stalled in this happen may not have been in on and on. if it's such a gift to her, why

don't i just rated. the counter argument essay written five books before and i decided that was enough for moses. he retired. his sales were higher than i sales. someone said the most valuable copy of one of my previous books was an ion copy of which there were virtually none in an unsigned copy with the receipt from the bookstore. so i decided i wasn't going to write any more books. in the skip going in my mind and i decided why not. i decided to do it. the more i looked into it, the better. >> you say at the outset that reykjavik has been relegated to the effect out to history, largely forgotten most of the general public is vaguely aware this took place. what is it that has been misunderstood by historian for

the general public that may have caused people to kind of us to estimate the importance, what you clearly believe is extremely important event in modern history. why has it been so overlooked? >> the general. i'm the soviet union fell as a gigantic thing. the end of the cold war as a gigantic thing. the conventional wisdom is the old system of the soviet union, the economic bankruptcy of the soviet union, the fact that i had a fit session of dying leaders in the soviet union all that brought down the soviet union and nothing from the outside mattered at all. >> host: so when you started looking into writing this book, were there other books, other historians, other historians at reykjavik that have done their own books? is there much of a body of

literature about this about you that you found? >> well, number sped shore shultz, secretary of state and other memories at the time. no one did a deep guide to what happened in the best thing is no one had the notes, both the american notes in russian notes. what did that enable you to do quite that enable you to see them wrong and peek through the keyhole of the conference room and put your ear to the door to listen to what they said for a time and a half hours. i'd never talk to anybody for 10 and a half hours. if i talk to my wife for that long should walk out of here screaming. they talked about the most important issues of the world for hours. without notes, without talking points, without staff involvement, without memos. so they must've fell, ronald reagan must've felt this is more

like me than any time in my president be in the cow gorbachev must've thought this is more like me than any time in my time as general secretary. michael reagan, ronald reagan's son said he did a really cited my dad from this book. the other books say he did this on this day, signed this on this day, but they don't show was my network in the shows his the shows his mind at work minute by minute and his character of play. >> host: so these notes from the summit in addition to the other documents you consulted, where are they? were defiantly archival material? is available to the general public that they want to go look at this stuff? >> guest: some of it is that the reagan library. some of it online and some of it at reykjavik. it's been scattered around. the more i look at it, the more wonderful story. what made it such a wonderful dory is first of all the story.

this is a weekend, a stormy weekend in october with rain lashing out the window sill any creaky old house in the middle of nowhere, a desolate but in a desolate place, i find said to be haunted. neighbors called the haunted house or the ghost house and on the eve of the summit, the prime minister said his family believed in ghosts and that the house is haunted he thought the ghost of the most welcome there. so over a weekend and this kind of recoton christi lake setting, the most amazing things happen it may have been the two characters. patel gorbachev and ronald reagan were the most interesting and intriguing and charismatic in the 20th century.

thirdly, besides the setting and the storyline, the ups and downs, emotions, and the amount and besides the two characters is the consequence 40 hours end of the cold war. >> host: let's get to reykjavik in a moment and not people to hear the stories you have from the weekend. of course this is a memoir and a journalistic history of the summit and the endgame of the cold war. when you're working in the reagan white house and europe to some and a prominent role, did you believe or did you anticipate you might someday want to write a book about your experiences? did she keep a diary or consulting the notes from that time? >> no, it really was. i just went on in my business to do whatever i did. what was remarkable about this is a chaste and wonderful

documents in reykjavik at the reagan library, washington d.c. after the book went to press i had in my files a letter that ronald reagan wrote saying nice job. so the most personal document, ronald reagan's letter to me a few days later if not recover book while i go chasing these other documents all around. so it was not. >> i imagine many of your recollections for that weekend you may of found some discrepancies when we finally went back and actually look at researching the details. >> i am telling you because i can go for years and not tell you anything i did the whole year. so when something like this

happens, you remember a remarkable number of things. when you trace it come you could look at the photos, for example. i'll tell you one example. the summit was a surprise. and so, the kgb and the cia and the secret service knew about the summit before the state department. so they go when record back and rent all the rooms of the house. then the secret service goes to the u.s. ambassador who is not an overworked capacity to today. but he enjoyed deep-sea fishing. and he was told that the price is going to be in your heart on october 9th, 10th cover letter 12 and they were quite excited about it. he said that is if he's going to

take over your house. the ambassador by that time try to find room. and he laughed. so i remember thinking to myself as pretty shabby treatment of the u.s. ambassador. the only thing in these hundreds of years that happen between iceland and united states, the only thing that ever mattered was the u.s. ambassador was nowhere to be found. so that was my memory. years later i hear that his wife said he was at reagan's side and doing all this and then his widow. i thought maybe my memory is wrong. then further research of this i looked at reams of photographs of the white house photographer in those little rolls of film people use out for the white house photographer and there are

very few taken in sight, but they're a lot taken at the ambassador's house. even when we had lunch with the president twice at the ambassador's house, i'm thinking to myself that was ray. he was there. >> host: that segue to the start of this on the. october 11, 1996 through reagan and gorbachev disaffected face-to-face meeting. they met in geneva one year earlier. what had transpired from the first meeting in geneva and the start of the reykjavik summit. what were the expectations going into this second meeting between gorbachev and reagan? >> guest: the expert patients were low.

control was stuck at that time. you know, reagan was thought to be out of control hardliner that had put the world on the brink of nuclear annihilation at that time that things were panning out. his main priority was to negotiate with the soviets and show that he was a great negotiator and it was remarkable. one of the remarkable price of the research i did was on the plane to detroit in 1982 accepts the republican nomination, stuart, no advisory says why are you doing this? and reagan says without hesitating, who in their right mind in 1880 thought anybody was going to add the cold war? as a happen, he had a way to do that. he had approached. he had now come. he said we win, they lose.

his approach of really reducing nuclear weapons, having style wars, expanding military might, indeed legitimizing the soviet union with the evil empire in the modern world with the ashes of history that communism was going to and up all these things were deliberate, six-year attack before reykjavik. so he had a strategy. i don't know if he ever thought about it, but he had a strategy. so it was thought to be a summit. in fact, the remarks were the president is going says this is a meeting to prepare. >> host: came together quickly? >> guest: yes, tend this time. we have spent six months.

this was 12 days. >> host: and jack on the huge amount of attention to send on this tiny place. he's got 3000 journalists who said. and then you have three anchors from all three networks show up. the eight teams that the various television broadcast networks. in you. you repair your role as arms control director. so tell me what your responsibilities would be going into this weekend. >> host: auslander said it, i responsibilities would be nothing because there is not going to be anything substantive ever. this is going to be a granite grit kind of summit. it was kind of a media event and thought to be gorbachev needed

to elevate his stature within the soviet union and how better to do it in meeting with the president of the united states in the middle of nowhere. so that's what we expect it. that's at the cia had told us in the american ambassador in moscow have adelphia at the soviet ambassador in had told us. so we were going along with the photo op summit on that. we knew the moment came the first morning when reagan and gorbachev were sitting in a bubble. a bubble is a room with in a room. it is totally secure and it has big latches on the outside. bubbles generally are pretty big and when they had the arms control talks picking up 25 people in the bible.

and reykjavik that order the smallest dog lover. so we have eight of us sitting side-by-side unfolding chairs, the kind that wal-mart would be a shame to cell. side to side they telling us what he knew about the first meeting. secretary of state. all of a sudden the latch opens up. the door swings open and there's a seven-foot a secret service agent who says the president of the united state. so we did what any red-blooded american would do. he said appeared to rob eligibility. reagan looks a lot less that up with water.

and then we come to a crisis because we had an eight seater there and there are nine of us now. there was the chief of staff of the white house. there was the secretary of day. there was the national security adviser in the arms control. so i know if i was going to say, what i did was offer the president a chair. and i hit the ground and i was on the floor and meanwhile this gigantic secret service guy had latched the door once again. and so we were in there. and it was a great, great moment because reagan cracked a few jokes at the gorbachev is really serious about doing things. we sat in what way. he kind of try to tell us the approach gorbachev is taking any sat there for about 30 minutes.

i was shapleigh leaning against the presidential knees and we knew that our assessment was wrong. the intelligence was wrong, the reports were wrong. this is going to be a real thing. postcode reagan and gorbachev at this point to what to know each other that well. the meetings in geneva and exchanges of pro forma letters but they haven't had a lot of hard tire time. so reagan is basically claiming that from a relatively brief meeting with gorbachev that morning. something is different here because the geneva summit was very well scripted. in many ways the resume till summit. everything is very well scripted, very protocol minded and nothing much comes out. this is just the opposite. nothing was ready. it was, as you are and there is no protocol.

one of the things i've noticed that i should've put in the book was the whole weekend they never shared a meal. they never shared a drink. they never shared a social event. it was like we were double dating. neither of them was that busy outside the main talks. but it never occurred to anyone why don't we invite gorbachev over to lunch. postcard back to the bubble. so what is reagan like in a setting like that? is he in command of the issues? is he actively engaged in what you're talking about? >> guest: what he did was soulless gorbachev was serious and really wanted to lower ends. he told us gorbachev to the inflexible and was worried about it. so while that was good and all that was right. then you try to tell us what proposal is gorbachev came up

with a nose for a mishmash. they turned to schultz had been a month and trying to figure out what it was gorbachev had set as well. the whole lingo of arms control was awfully specialized and complicated and very few people knew it and even fewer deer that. but reagan then said he gave me a piece of paper. so we brought out the paper and make them thought it was a very kind thing for gorbachev to do. we'll thought the gorbachev knew his man. he wasn't going to take away those numbers. so he dove for the paper and thanks the president very much they had talked about what it meant. >> host: you deal with a lot

of the details of what was discussed in terms of how many nuclear weapons each side was willing to cut into bite size. the contention and reykjavik as he detailed the strategic defense -- "star wars" as it was known then. so just describe again, while boys sti? why was it so important to reagan and why did gorbachev opposed it so vehemently? >> guest: it was so important to reagan because he got us out of the kind of nuclear impasse we had an incident the 1940s and 50s that has reagan thought about it two gunmen -- two cowboys at the time to each other's head and there is mutual annihilation and he wanted to get away from that. he was very valued based and just wanted to get away from

that. gorbachev that the united states can do anything, that sdi is going to be real. it's going to negate our ballistic missiles. it's going to negate soviet power and if we try to compete is going to ruin the soviet union. so reagan had this mystical view of what sdi could calm. gorbachev had a frightful view of what sdi would become and all of us knew that he was a small and at that time relatively insignificant research program in the pentagon. but these two guys just elevated and i think are of a view of it, that it was going to bring down the soviet union, and the soviet union. >> reagan didn't conceive as such. i guess this is a big source. what did reagan really in tend

to achieve with this pursuit of sti? >> guest: he intended to protect the united states against incoming ballistic missiles. postcode becomes much more. he becomes the big source of discussion during these two days. i was very interested to learn the details and you really get a sense in your book of your book at a yearbook of the granular back and forth between these two dealers. >> guest: without touting the book too much comment chapters three, four and five gives back in forth of what these two men are discussing. what you do is you see them raw. you see them by themselves. you see what their real views are. >> host: how many people are in the room with the? >> guest: two of them. two foreign ministers. there is to notetakers that

write down what they say. one russian, one american. they by and large agree on most things that are two translators. so that's all. so during this time, those of us who aren't in the room but met with reagan before and after get a general idea of what happened, but not very much. there's only 25 years later going to announce that i say holy cow, it is amazing that breaking is just as knowledgeable as gorbachev, which everybody thought at the time was impossible. gorbachev was the hot kid town. he was a generation younger than reagan. so much smarter, so much younger, so much with it. reagan did no issues very well. he was kind of daughter read

around. you don't get that from the notes at all. you get the idea there's no intellectual gap. there's no knowledge gap between the two in terms of negotiation, there is no gap between the two. one of the wonderful parts of looking at these notes, both the russian is that over the 10 and a half years, gorbachev says to reagan i think 11 or 12 times, i am making all the concessions. you've given me nothing. you know what reagan says each of those times gorbachev complains? he says nothing. he says absolutely nothing. he must be sitting there thinking, what is wrong with suits me just fine. what are you complaining about? i like it that way. so he never answers gorbachev gorbachev gets madder and madder. they can't we have the notes of

gorbachev on the plane from reykjavik back to moscow and he has his staff on the plane. he says staff, you know, i made all the concessions. reagan gave nothing. they probably thought who is the here? why did you do that? but anyway, that's the way it was and it's marvelous, so i was really lucky to be there and then took the memory of what happened there. >> host: a lot of talk about the wisdom of these details that are wonderful. your own experience and reykjavik. one image can beautifully as the site of the two military officers from each side holding the nuclear football's and the

codes that would launch a nuclear strike. he said that's the most memorable sight you recall from that summit. why is that? >> guest: these two men were as close as you and i together and holding each of them in their smartly pressed uniforms, standing there, never looking at each other that i saw over the weekend, holding a briefcase, clutching at and how to codes to blow up each other's country. that's what they're talking about in this room. it's a small little house. so they didn't have any room to spread out. we were upstairs in one of the parlors. a russian parlor and an american parlor and it begins the period and then there was a conference room on the first floor in two

guys in the hallway and every time one of the leaders left bear holding a football, to go and see the two leaders go into the room as i did it to see their guy standing right outside, not looking at each other, give me the willies. i look at them several times over the weekend saying that's what this is all about. >> host: the dnc, the upstairs parlor that you write about as well, what was happening up there? u.n. basically the two negotiating teams from both sides are up there and you don't know what is discussed down below. he said it is kind of a congenial atmosphere. on this sunday, october 12:

1886 they were gathering in the hallway of the top leadership of the soviet union, top leadership of the united states. we had just gone all night with some of these. we've started at 8:00 at night, ended at 6:20 the next morning. i walked back, showered and reported in the bible to the president about 8:00 that we had accomplished more in arms control that one night that we had in seven years in geneva. and while the two were meeting sunday morning all of a sudden from both parlors but diplomats came out or the officials came out. we had the most extraordinary conversations. it was like real people for the first time. i talked to acra mathur led their team the night before. two daughters, betty asked me about the german joint chiefs

and asked him about his prior service and the stories about washington. and now, it was like normal people. and we have never had -- i've never had conversations with the soviet leaders like normal people. we were searching for each other tatami secret. we weren't trying to find anything about it and it was amazed. >> host: and i suppose that is part of the transcript nature of the summit. you wouldn't believe that a meeting -- choose ceos in the united states would not need to gather her thoughts on the agenda, without who's going to attend both sides. that is kind of standard for me.

no agenda, no who's going to participate. a time set for anything you >> the only planet earth and of the summit and this may be apocryphal era may or may not be. the president said he needed to get home because the first lady did not come to reykjavik. so the president said he promised her he would be home for dinner. >> guest: is several times times and it's very distinct because they're so unusual that she had the stage to herself. she changed her out at four times the first day of the summit. i thought it was robust, but anyway, she used the game plan staying on board a ship that was called for the soviet sinatra singer who sings her song was the impossible dream.

who could make this stuff up? so she used the game plan did not about the fashion runway show and her new wares so she went through the day. nancy reagan didn't know she was going to be there and stayed back in washington and feared the hold weekend because she was prancing on the world stage. the summit have a lockout. there is no leaks, no briefings at all. so she had the stage to herself i'm not. so she just used it like not. so that was a lot of fun or just gave a nice part of a professor your. >> host: said the verizon session and reykjavik, there is no deal. they are still loggerheads over

sdi and gorbachev makes this sort of surprising statement. what a gorbachev put on the table and how did president reagan respond? >> guest: that both a great saturday night during our all-night negotiations, finally after 20 years agreed to equal limit a strategic arms. the breakthrough that would make the summit one of the most important summits in history. the next morning the intermediate missiles in europe are pretending the two nato, gorbachev said let's eliminate the. another regardless breakthrough. so on the nuclear front, breakthroughs like we've never had before. it was christmas. herbert day. it was gratis. all of a sudden on sunday he says what it all back, but you have to give up sdi. he said you can find the

research and a phrase that he had interestingly enough never used in any of the preparation. but anyway pop in his head and so he stuck with that. reagan said i'm not going to give up his t.i. or the laboratory and i made the point to the president that one point that if you could find an airplane confined to the laboratory, no one would even drive the car and sdi is far more complicated so just understand what you are doing. i had refers to are experts on sdi later tommy when i got back to washing 10% 80% about the test but scheduled would have to be scrapped and the congress with tests on the any program like that. so reagan said no. they said you don't got to admit

what not come forth and back and forth and both of them wanted to get an agreement. they wanted the summit to be a success. but there is a part they wouldn't compromise on. so they left each other and reagan was furious. he was just fuming. according to one of two possible explanations, right at the end when gorbachev says well i don't know what we could have done different. reagan jabs his finger is to his chest and says he could have said yes and those in the limo. we saw great in five minutes later at the ambassador's house and his personal aide years later, 20 years later gave an oral history in which he said he never saw the event matter or more depressed except with nancy reagan is going in for her cancer operation. we saw him at the house going back and forth and he was

furious. he was very saw the way on the way out to reykjavik, out of reykjavik to the airbase. there he was going to spend five minutes talking to the church that are over station for nato deployment there and he would not. he was fierce until he stood in front of the 3000 troops. whenever he was in front of the troops he just lit up and you could see from which they are it wasn't ronald reagan. >> host: the way it was portrayed it was portrayed in detail in the book in the immediate aftermath was that reagan had walked away from the deal of the century. gorbachev had effectively proposed scrapping all nuclear weapons and reagan said no. but you agreed with reagan

turning to deal down. >> guest: i did. i did not know how important. i thought it he was right that we would go back to the nuclear side keep our options and. but i thought sdi was going to be important. reagan didn't want anything to do with it. he wanted to protect the united states with a shield. i had no idea and i say that in the boat. i had no idea that this is going to start a chain reaction at the end of the cold war. no one would've imagined that because what happened was gorbachev gets back and says tuesday. sdi, this guy really is convinced there's no way. gorbachev strategy wasn't going to make reagan a deal that he can't refuse. he finds out much to his horror

and misery at reykjavik there's no deal. so this guy set really convince. number two, he hears reagan say there's great progress on sdi. he goes back and says they can't make a deal. i've got to compete in a high-tech way. within weeks, he called the meeting of the supreme soviet, tells them there has to be fireworks are more active reforms. they are rushed into print. they would have succeeded anyway. gorbachev left no doubt because he did it in the worst way possible. in the book, gorbachev really wanted to inform in the worst way possible. that's just how we did it. from those reforms the soviet

union was formed. poster we can talk about the implications of reykjavik and how contributes to the cold war, which is i which is the second half of. i did want to just ask you to talk about your first assignment when you get back from reykjavik it's probably not what you expected to take. but it's a great little anecdote of the book. what did you have to do? >> guest: it was a series of mishaps. thursday night we got to reykjavik and i didn't sleep all that well. friday night we were busy. saturday we pulled an all nighter. i don't know about you, romesh, but i never pulled all nighter. sunday i just exhausted. six hours in the last three days, just absolutely fit to be

tied. don regan asked me to fly the press plane back. i get homophile 2:00 in the morning monday the 13th of overcome in 1986 and i find out the freezer had broken down and the car doesn't work. and so, you wake up the neighbor and we take the wagon and all the meat that is melting and he's going to loan me the car to get for the today show at 7:00 in the morning. but then i come back from "the daily show" and the cbs morning news and i get back and all i want to do is close the curtains and he got the girls off to school and everything like that. all of a sudden i get calls from bill crouch, chairman of the joint chiefs from don rumsfeld with whom i'd worked many time.

trying to answer the calls. during one of these times come in those days you only had one line. all of a sudden i get a call and call this number from the white house. it's don regan, chief of staff of the white house. he said can, i need a favor from you. and because he was normally go through staff aides rather than call me. he said no, the president needs a favor and they said the president just hung up talking to us just prime minister and promised he would be there to brief us. so i say i can't go. it's absolutely going to be catatonic. i've got five hours of sleep in the last three nights, whatever.

australia is the end of the world. he says i know, that's great and everything else but the president just mention you in the car is coming to take you to dallas for the flight. so i go out there for a day. >> host: you said that hop really wanted you to tell stories about ronald reagan. he wanted to tell stories about ronald reagan and then he got a new salvo. he wanted to do that. and then the price at which they were going hysterical at the time and i told stories about reagan and he showed me a sailboat and pictures he had gotten up to sailboat. and then he went out and told

the press he had only budgeted an hour for this meeting but because of the importance he spent an hour and 40 minute of which time we spent probably 10 on reykjavik. but it showed he was a good ally. it showed the united states cared about him. he did that much or care all that much, that he did care because he was very cooperative in the united states on an issue that was for the hawks got the liberal part of the party were one of arms control. so is the director of arms control i can satisfy that. >> host: before we get back to reagan and gorbachev, i wanted to ask you about a cared for that plays throughout this book. some of you have heard it mentioned sergey aftermath. tell me about him and what his

role was at reykjavik and a little bit about his story and why he decided to feature it and have it as running a secondary care or throughout this narrative. >> host: i thought it was tremendous what he did. he appeared set me on saturday. none of us who knew he was going to be there to head up the soviet delegation. he was a five-star marshal. our last five-star marshal was omar bradley and he was the most decorated and soviet history. one of the few to be a hero of the soviet union and he appeared. all of us have heard about them and he controlled his delegation we have been dealing with all these guys who are ethically taking enormous amount of time given propaganda speeches. that night at 8:00, they said i

want to do this is an sitting next to them started haranguing and what he did was amazing. he put his hand on the guys arm. look at them, gave them a five-star stared. simmer down and said as you were saying. two or three times with one of these guys would fire up there, propaganda, he would stare down. so yeah the greatest concessions on the strategic arms to what i consider a very reasonable point of view. and so without and so that was from 8:00 at night on saturday night until the next morning. the next morning it appears in geneva the next year in 1987 and

we had been negotiating all day with the foreign minister of the soviet union had us for. i'm sitting with george shultz, secretary of state and we're talking a little bit about arms control by that time. so i decided to break the mold. i said i read, the cia reports rod that you are the last soviet in uniform who fight in world war ii and you had an amazing time. what can you tell us about it? he just lit up. what he told us was when he was 17 years old starting when he was 18 years old his tank at times was stationed outside and the german north division was

attacking on the road. he was not in the building for eight teen months. during the russian winter 20 degrees below zero. he was never in a building for 18 months on the road to keep the invasion. meanwhile more than a million cut in a field value people were dying. so he told us the story and was just blown away by appeared on powell asked questions on the tanks and there were two soldiers talk about their link l. and their events. like everything in life you say okay, this has been 40 minutes you've got to go and then secretary of state to her shoulder said let me just tell you that was wonderful. thank you for sharing.

that kind of termination, that kind of greatest foot american so it either in soviet people and symbolized by what you did. there's a wonderful moment. acrobat looks and says thank you, mr. secretary. appreciate that. but the truth is had removed from that road, stalin would've had a shot. i think to myself, is not a great remark. doing a perfectly fine stalin would've had a shot. he came up with a great phrase that there are no people who surrendered. they are just traitors. so anybody in the pow camp was killed. and then i saw the signing ceremony in 1987 and he said it was his proudest moment of his

life. in the east room of the white house. he and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and the united states were down visiting a terry basis, which was unheard of. and then while the wall was falling in that time in 1989, which was a year and a half later said his government had been. but i was over in a conference in moscow and not aftermath was then not chief of staff of the armed forces about that he was gorbachev's literary adviser. so i sent him a note to say hello. he says, right over. his office was right down the hall from gorbachev. we had a wonderful hour talking. and that hour he showed me around his office and his chandelier. but the phone they are the different colors and shapes and

sizes attract even more attention and we said goodbye and i thank them for all the cooperation. absolutely wonderful at reykjavik and being a hero at reykjavik. the soviet union starts to fall. september 26th in 1991, reading the post about the fifth. not article by michael dobbs. in his office, with the chandelier, took the robe from mystery, tied it and with the chandelier, committed suicide rate in orbit chops office. and as if that wasn't bad enough, something happened a week later. but when i read that paper on september 26, it was early in the morning.

by that time, colin powell was chairman of the joint chiefs. i called him up before 7:00 in the morning. the secretary said he sent a briefing already. i said whenever he gets the chance to just call. she said hold on a minute. and so, the phone rings. kenny. he always called mckenney. he and my mother called to kenny. i felt the same thing. i didn't even say what i called for. i did say called for, but we all knew had a week later the funeral takes place. nobody from the foreign ministry. just his daughters, his wife and a few friends and this is the most decorated in soviet

history. and then a few days after he was buried, dig dig up his body and still the uniform throughout the body away. a story like that i just couldn't imagine. i listened away devastated because they said there's an honorable man in a dishonorable cause, but somebody i really admired and we shared special moments. he wrote to and possibly three suicide notes. one was published in the book. another to his wife and according to what i just heard a few weeks ago, a third went to gorbachev to gorbachev was going to release after his death. i asked his assistant, who i brought this was about two weeks ago. i said why don't you release it now. he said i don't know, i'll ask orbit chops when we get back to moscow. so i'm waiting for him to tell me. but that storyline i've had friends tell me read the book

that storyline is part of the nose emotional and treated her of the reykjavik story. >> host: in the last few minutes we have, i want to kind of reflect on this really extraordinary relationship between reagan and gorbachev. this photo that has become iconic in so many photos from the summit the last two years of the cold war that are now so familiar and you can see in the photograph there was a chemistry between these two men. what was it? how do you explain it and how much of it was forged in that weekend in reykjavik? >> guest: it wasn't entirely -- they're missing a great deal of friendship between the two of them. there is a mutual admiration and there is kind of a mutual need for each other because reagan had come through the iran-contra

they thought it was ridiculous. and so any time they turn to to domestic affairs it was a nightmare. their only salvation was on the international stage and the only thing going on on the international stage with each other. so they needed that. they enders to and they respected each other. there is a wonderful story that i put in the book figures later gorbachev was in london than attending a conference at oxford or cambridge and some british academic, since everybody knows ronald reagan is the way he and didn't know anything about that. typical academic, typical british remark. gorbachev interrupts income even though it on my panel says

professor, that's wrong. ronald reagan is the man of judgment, a man of integrity and a day that. you don't know what you're talking about. .. you know, and they both realize that. something special happened to me

something special happened to him. something special brought us together. and when i think about the book and reykjavik, one thing that i should have added in the book was, you know, many people are right. what happened there was so extraordinary. in a way so mysterious and so extra worldly. maybe they are right. maybe it is the ghost house, a haunted house. >> well, it is an extraordinary story extraordinarily well told. a thank-you for your time. it is a lot of fun. >> that was book tv signature program in which authors of the latest nonfiction books are interviewed by journalists in a

public policy makers, and others familiar with their material every weekend at 10:00 p.m. on saturday, 12 and 9:00 p.m. on sunday, and 12:00 a.m. on monday. you can watch online. click on after words in the book tv series and topics list. a look at some books being published this week. the relationship between the obama's and the clintons. a reading of the declaration of independence in defense of equality. social science professor taking a close look at the historical document. the military career of george armstrong custer. from boy general to a tragic hero. the founder for the center of public integrity looks at the causes and consequences of mass

deception. the future of truth and the decline of america's moral integrity. what so proudly we hail, the life of the author of the star spangled banner and francis scott key. columnist for town hall presents her thoughts on the current administration. the war on meals and one woman's case for hope. look for these titles in bookstores and watch for the authors in the near future on the book tv and booktv.org. >> , i think my colleagues in journalism will give a similar grade. the freedom of information process has become a joke. it was already well on its way. this administration has perfected the stall, delay, redaction, excuses and it is shocking because i feel very

strongly the information they withhold and protect many times blonds to the public. there is no sense of that when u.s. for it. they covet it as if they are a private corporation defending trade secrets rather than understanding what they hold this information gathered on our behalf. >> the changing face of network news and her career tonight at 8:00 on c-span q&a. >> book tv continues with an interview from our college series. one professor sat down with book tv to discuss her books. it sure looks up the role that religion and the church played in helping migrants survive the difficult journey to the north. this is about 30 minutes.