>> i have a question also relating to financing. i want to know what you consider the role and impact of the new bricks development bank will be going forward as it starts in south africa and other countries can then apply to be part of this new development. thank you. >> i'll let them talk about the bric's bank because, i've heard about it, they set it up a few months ago and what it is, i'm not sure. measurability, now we talk a lot about revolution in africa that we don't know. the problem has been a lot of things have happened in mdgs,

but we don't have the instruments to measure them. we have 80% of kids in school. with 90% of this or that, but how do we measure them? sometimes we're rely on numbers given by multinational and multilateral, but sometimes by ngos who have an interest in keeping numbers as they are. that's what they get their funding from. we have to be aware that. the finance minister has had a meeting. when the president first talked about the cap, it was at a meeting with the minister of finance and development and they talk about this issue of capacity building, capacity building at the lowest level and at the highest level, and be able -- you cannot be accountable if you don't have the capacity. sometime it's not just corruption. it's mismanagement sometimes. sometimes just not knowing what you're going.

sometime money goes through the winter because instead of buying this, they are buying that. that is not what you need to resolve your problem. for corruption, what level do you want to tolerate? zero level. that's a dream. somebody will try to steal your money if they can get it on the site. so i think that the reality is, you know, that. measurability, i think that's -- >> okay. just a cup full of self-promotion things in here. we did a report on governance and economic growth at csis and i recommend if you're interested in that issue, we will get you one before you leave. we also did something on size and scope of corruption as well as we did something that i just want to reference. up ahead on the issue of domestic research, taxes.

if you look at just in africa, if i understand correctly the u.n. had in the year 2000 something like $100 billion was mobilized through taxes and fees for domestic research mobilization. and by the 2010 there was $413. some of that oil, gas and mining revenues that some of that increase for melody and people paying their taxes. some of that is a rising middle class. excludes all the large amount of leakage that dr. dukule was talking about. that's a lot of money that is being generated it though by taxes, even though it's not what it should be because there continues to be tax evasion and other challenges. but our people not paying their taxes. if you look at oda as dr. dukule was thank him it's about 50, 60 billion. i don't think we'll get much

higher than that. if it's 400 billion of domestic research and oda foreign aid is about 60, there's a lot more of this than it is of this, and so it's five or six times are seven times, sometimes the amount of foreign aid so i think you will see they'll continue to rise as you have an increasing middle class. african countries that are discovered oil, gas and mining, a report, there will be a lot more government money, money in government coffers. i do think it will be a challenge for a number of countries. so the problem though on this tax stuff is, this is not a very sexy or compelling topic. there are no political constituencies in chief of the countries that are going to get a congressional earmark, to use the american parlance for this, to pay for tax inspectors. tax inspectors without borders,

that gets to the heart of it. it's darn important that that's where the money is, but it's very difficult in the american system to find money or force money because the foreign aid dollars are spoken for. so everybody agrees this is important, but the bureaucratic politics in washington to how to allocate those monies go somewhere else. so not saying they're not valid and important projects and everybody fights and dies on that hill for their important piece of the pie, i'm sure will tell you why their slice is the most important. but i do think if that's what the money is and there's a lot of leverage their we have to think about -- we'll have a report on this issue of domestic research globalization but if you trouble sleeping at night i hope you read. but i do want to talk about the bric bank briefly. i think when you look at the bric bank as a political exercise. the bric bank as a purely

political exercise. i don't there's a lot of news stories about this, a lot of froth and sizzle. i am highly skeptical that this is going -- i think is the ultimate die with a whimper. however, to the extent that we are not tending to our knitting in the united states and other participants of the international system, to the extent that countries don't feel that they are fully participating, i think dr. dukule has talked about some of these issues, i'm not going to agree with all of them but he put a number of interesting issues on the table that to the extent that shareholding don't necessarily match to the size of the con, especially with the imf and the world bank, there's going to be defections from the bretton woods system. people exiting out of the. there's been a systems of -- when egypt had problems, when cyprus had a problem, the

russian said hey, we'll bail after banking system if you give us a naval base, playing imf. there's something called -- and asian self-insurance imf. so that both the world bank sides to this bric bank and a imf side to this bric bank. a lot of problems. the first is what currency. they said they want to great new currency. good luck. i'm not going to hold my breath. i don't think they're going to use the yen given the participants involved don't think they would use euros. hard time imagining that we use the dollar. if they do not use that all of the church to see if they'll do this in rubles. don't believe it. i'm not holding my breath. i know there's lots of press releases about this. i don't think it's real. i would say that the other interesting things are the agreement talked a lot about human rights. really interesting but lots of words of human rights in that declaration. maybe it's just me but i'm thinking russia, china, human rights. figure that one out.

i'm highly skeptical. so it's great but i'm not going to hold my breath. and, finally, on things like what happens, dr. dukule was talking about relations are two-way street. what happens when this new development bank provide a loan to xyz country and they decide to take china out as the mining investor in zambia. the zambian election swung i think on chinese agents. other going to pull out or not quick stubbly the indians are going to bail out the chinese it is a mega financial crisis in china? i doubt it. very interesting to think to the extent we don't take care things like imf quota reform which is a highly niche topic, has to do slight tweaks and the shareholding, then people are going to take their bat and ball on go somewhere else. that's a fancy think tank term for this. but the thing to remember is, the exercise in my view but to the extent the united states doesn't 102 of the garden and is

partial a republican problem at partially a problem for the administration for not selling this, we are the only one of g20 countries to not improve the imf quota reform. there's a lot of technical stuff around this by basically it's a rejiggering slightly of the shareholding of the imf. people take their bat and ball and play crypto imf and to do things like this. if we were to fix something, make tweaks, this will go away quietly and people ask and copiers whatever happened to that bric bank. you can quote me on that. 10 years from now, you can also in my face and said you are totally wrong but i bet folks a sandwich and a club soda that i think this isn't going to be a serious thing in three years time. >> i would just, i think you touched something very important which is the reform of the imf and world bank. i think that's the key issue.

once that is done you do not need bric and did not be bric bank and all these crypto imf that pops around. like i said last two weeks, three weeks ago, how can we get the u.s. to agree to this one little reform? >> it requires presidential leadership and requires responsibility my party, the republican party. president obama has cut a deal with the republicans. he should cut a deal and he should send the vice president biden up there, but they need to find somebody who can make a deal. they've not spent a lot of political capital on this, frankly, if they've got other things in their inbox. they have tried, but i don't believe -- so it doesn't excuse republican in action on this, i do think there a number of things i could list for you that you could get an easy deal with the republicans on.

so i think it's a political conversation, it's not a question of the arguments of the marriage. i think the merits are there. it's a political thing that requires presidential leadership and republican responsibility. >> we're going to take just a couple more questions and going to go to the very back of the room. let's take these as the last two questions. >> marter's with united methodist church office. i think you, mr. ambassador. you didn't mention electricity. we had this whole power africa initiative, and the ambassador from botswana said she wished that power africa had come before. i thought that was interesting. you didn't say anything about agriculture at all. so two questions. electricity for poor people and agriculture. >> great, thank you.

>> hello, everyone. thank you so much, dr. dukule, for your wonderful presentation your i wanted to ask if you could speak a bit more about infrastructural developments as it contributes to the ability to accomplish the goals listed under the five pillars. thank you. >> a good way to end, particularly with the summit coming up. and maybe even just a little bit about kind of the next steps for this as you wrap up. and because of the presence of the summit and what you are hoping to accomplish there. >> would the gentleman, about electricity, definitely i think electricity should have been -- i think it was part of the things that we had back, nina, coming out of the cold war process. folky, we will open our markets but there are condition knows. they were summit conditions that the u.s. market was not really

open to africa. i don't think so. but there was electricity and that linked you to the issue of infrastructure. i think infrastructure is still the biggest problem in africa. to be transferred, electricity, roads, road network between countries and all of that. i think we still have big issues with infrastructure. and i think if we can come up with something from -- is the summit them i think she thinks this is a historic moment. that for the first on the us isn't okay, we can deal with all africa at one point, at some point. we can deal with the whole continent. not in piecemeal that sit around the table with a whole continent and start a dialogue. what will come out of this meeting? i think is symbolic. i think the first meeting, such

meeting, is always symbolic. let's start a dialogue and let's follow up with real tangible issues. let's set up committees. let's set up a group of think tanks between africa and the u.s. let the partnership be at a level of, not only academia, not only on the level of the politicians but also between the private sector on the whole continent. when we talk patricia maisch and we talk about economic transformation is first of all an issue that goes with the private sector. the private sector is part of our conversation. one of the high level meetings hopefully in south africa will be about partnership with the private sector. had we feel the private public issue and what's with the role of the private sector in the 2015 development agenda? and i think we have that.

what we expect from the summit, i think a dialogue on all these issues, on transformation, on new way of dealing with africa and getting out of the cluster of importing oil and gas from africa to go to different, you, to other sectors of the market. and also be more aggressive. and i think the u.s. has been very shy in africa. maybe has to do with our history. the history of the two continents, how, then, the last 500. u.s. has been very shy but africa has the chance now to change around and say okay, it is an opportunity. there is a market. it is a rule of law in the countries and put the possibility on the continent that can be tackled. so thank you.

>> thank you very much, dr. dukule. and thanks to dan. thank you all for joining us. i do think, you know, there's mixed feelings about the summit coming up, but i think the point is right that it's the beginning of a dialogue. may be getting over some of our phobias about africa and our notion that somehow making money and investing in africa, taking money is kind of unseemly for the united states. in fact, investment and trade are the things that are eventually going to drive the transformation. you've got structural transformation as the number one killer, structural economic conservation and inclusive growth. that puts the electricity issue that you mentioned, the agriculture issue that you mentioned and the infrastructure issue right at the center of that. so please join me in thanking dr. dukule, and we look forward

to -- [applause]. [inaudible conversations] a couple of blighted instead to you about today. a senate panel will look at possible changes to the u.s. tax code. that is why from the senate finance committee at 9:45 a.m. eastern on c-span3. later in the day a confirmation hearing for robert mcdowell, president obama's choice to replace eric shinseki as veterans affairs secretary. he will testify before the senate veterans' affairs committee and you can see live coverage of his testimony starting at 3 p.m. eastern also on c-span3. you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter.

>> ahead of the centers for disease control, dr. tom frieden, called the mishandling of live anthrax by his agency unacceptable, and it showed a lax culture of safety at the cdc. he testified before the house energy and commerce committee last week. >> good morning. the subcommittee today examines the cdc anthrax incident last month that potentially exposed dozens of cdc researchers to

live anthrax because established safety procedures were not followed. last friday, the cdc director announced the findings of cdc's own internal review of the incident and the corrective actions being taken. cdc's review identified a fundamental flaw: the agency had no written study plan to ensure the safety of its workers and the proper handling of live biological agents, like anthrax. the department of agriculture's investigation revealed more disturbing details. during the inspection, cdc workers could not locate some of their anthrax samples. it took more than a week for the inspectors and cdc management to track down the anthrax samples that are in cdc's custody. agriculture inspectors also uncovered that cdc was transferring dangerous materials from biocontainment labs in ziploc bags. disinfectant that cdc labs used for decontamination was expired. this is troubling and it is completely unacceptable. the centers for disease control is supposed to be the gold standard in the u.s. public health system and it has been

tarnished. we rely on cdc to protect us and uphold the highest standards of safety. but the recent anthrax event and newly disclosed incidents have raised very serious questions about the cdc's ability to safeguard properly select agents in its own labs. the cdc director has called the potential anthrax exposure a wake up call. but as our investigation has uncovered, this is not cdc's first wake up call. i'm not even sure wake up call is the proper term. that is a gross and dangerous understatement. it was a potentially very dangerous failure. a wake up call is catching before the danger occurs. once a person is exposed to a serious pathogen, the danger is of a much higher magnitude. in 2006, the cdc bioterrorism lab sent live anthrax to two outside labs on a mistaken belief that the shipped anthrax was inactivated. later that same year, inadequate inactivation procedures led another cdc lab to inadvertently ship live botulinum to an outside lab.

in 2009, cdc learned from newly available test methods that a strain of brucella, which can cause a highly contagious infection, had been shipped to outside labs since 2001 because researchers had believed that it was a less dangerous strain. one must question the scientific qualification of such scientists. reports by government watchdogs demonstrate that these events are not isolated incidents. between 2008 and 2010, the hhs office of inspector general issued three reports documenting concerns at cdc labs such as ensuring physical security of select agents and ensuring personnel received required training. an audit in 2010 found that a cdc scientist discovered select agents in a drawer in an unsecured lab during a reorganization, and another cdc scientist found 16 vials of a select agent stored in an unsecured freezer that was reportedly left over from an outbreak investigation many years earlier.

this is reminiscent of the recent discovery of smallpox vials in a storage room on the nih campus. the smallpox was undocumnented, no one knew it was there, only discovered by accident. in 2011, the oig found that cdc did not monitor and enforce effectively certain select agent regulations at federal laboratories, including those at the cdc. in addition to the inspector general audits, several gao reports in recent years have raised concerns about oversight of high-containment labs, including those at the cdc. despite the number of red flags, these incidents keep happening. we learned last friday that cdc scientists in march shipped influenza strains to a department of agriculture lab that was contaminated with a very deadly flu virus. this cross contamination was discovered on may 23, 2014, but it took six weeks for this to be reported to cdc leadership. what we have here is a pattern of recurring issues, of complacency, and a lax culture of safety.

this is not sound science and we will not tolerate these practices that put the health of the american public at risk. it is sloppy and inexcusable. dr. frieden, i thank you for testifying today. i have questions about whether the corrective actions you have announced will ultimately solve the problem. we will be looking forward to your testimony. cdc has already reassigned one lab official from his duties. taking personnel actions, though, will not address problems that based on the number of incidents and reports over the years appear to be systemic. cdc needs to ensure that proper policies are implemented and followed. dr. frieden, you said last friday that you are distressed about the delay in notification about the influenza shipments. i want to know if you are concerned about why cdc workers are not reporting everything and whether you have any reason to believe they may be afraid to report these incidents. cdc is not going to solve human errors unless it gets information from its own people. since 2007, there have been 17 reports at cdc indicating that a

worker was potentially exposed to a select agent or toxin. thankfully, as far as we are aware, no one at cdc has become sick from improper handling of select agents. but cdc should not assume that its luck with these near-miss events will continue. sooner or later, that luck will run out and someone will die. cdc needs to strengthen its safety procedures. the risks from these deadly pathogens require fail-safe mechanisms and redundancies similar to those used in other contexts such as handling weapons. the subcommittee will also review the oversight system of federal laboratories' compliance with select agent regulations, and to explore the possibility of an independent agency to oversee the cdc labs. i thank all the witnesses for testifying today. i now recognize the ranking member. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. last month i attended cdc's labrador in atlanta, made a series of mistakes that could have deadly consequences. a transferred anthrax to to with

allies, potentially exposing thousands of individuals to anthrax. luckily, nobody has yet fallen ill. like all of us i'm deeply troubled at what we've learned about this incident. how did it happen? cdc conducted its own internal investigation that identified numerous failures. there is no standard operating procedure for the mouse is being conducted by the cdc site is. there was no approved study plan. the sciences use of pathogenic strain when nonpathogenic strain could have been used. the scientist used unapproved sterilization techniques for pathogenic anthrax and then proceeded to transfer the material without confirming that it was in active. this is obviously an alarming series of failures, but there were other problems at cdc that made this incident worse. cdc has provided to the committee a disturbing report from the u.s. department of agriculture, animal and plant health inspection service.

after the anthrax incident they conducted their own inspection. inspection identified serious problems in lab operations and decontamination procedures. they also detail the major problems with the cdc's response to the incident reporting that the agency was inadequate prepared to handle the kleenex -- cleanup. i think we can all agree the reports on this incident are bad. but what's even more troubling to me is that in context they reveal a broad problem with cdc safety culture. we received report after report from gao, the hhs, aig and aphis offering a multitude of warnings and recommendations on operations of high containment labs. cdcs after action report identified four of the cases in the last decade where cdc shipped dangerous pathogens off-site. the democratic committee staff

prepared a memo describing the results from six different aphis inspections at the facility in 2013-14. over all in the six inspection, aphis identified dozens of observations of concern. 29 related facilities and equipment, 27 related to safety and security, and 39 related to documentation and record keeping. in some cases the aphis revealed that would appear to be only paperwork problems. and other cases they found many more serious problems. they found reports of scientists using -- blowing fumes in the wrong direction. not one of these inspections give cdc a totally clean bill of health. i'd like to make this memo part of the record, mr. chairman. i think your staff has seen. the record shows he's had ample warning. and shouldn't focus on the problems and high containment

lab long before the june anthrax release. i just don't understand why they didn't heed those words. dr. frieden has indicated that he was as surprised as anybody by the scope of the problem, in fact, dr. frieden come you're so surprise is a problem in and of itself because what it shows is that there's a fundamental problem with the culture of identifying and reporting safety problems up the chain of command. now, i'm sorry to say, mr. chairman, these lab safety issues are not new to me or the committee. this is one of the detriment of having been on this committee for 18 years. we've had multiple hearings on this problem at the cdc over the years. and thousand six and 2007 we had terrible problems at the cdc facility in fort collins, colorado, just north of my district where we had vector borne diseases that were being very sloppily handled. fortunately, we built a new facility since then up in fort

collins. it's a beautiful facility and were able to handle these diseases. but these issues are not resolving themselves, and so dr. frieden, you've got a strong record at cdc. i know you've got answers and recommendations and your acting aggressively to make sure this doesn't happen again. i appreciate that. we all appreciate that. but what we all need to know is what the plan is to change the culture at the cdc. we cannot legislate -- we can do a lot but we can't legislate a culture change. it has to come from within the agency. i'm also glad to have gao and aphis witnesses here because in retrospect your warnings should have been taken more strictly. i can assure you, these warnings are being taken very socially right now, not just by the agency but by the people here on this panel. thank you very much. >> recognize the chairman of the

full committee, mr. upton for five minutes. >> this is a very serious hearing for sure. two years ago after allegations about problems in cdc building 18, the home to the world's deadliest agents and pathogens, this committee investigated by the cdc was complying with federal safety requirements in the operation of its main lab facilities. in response to our concern, cdc director tom frieden said the committee a letter september 12. the letter i would like to include and record outlined the agency's efforts to ensure better oversight and safe handling of select agents at cdc labs. these measures included rigors of training, constantly good safety measure, multiple layers of engineering and operational systems. the letter also stated that a senior official who was not identified would be designated to report to rec league to the cdc director on safety at cdc labs. these measures have very similar

to the corrective actions that dr. frieden outlined last week to address the current lab crisis. why should we believe this time that things are, in fact, going to be different? we at cdc two years ago to identify each biosafety incident that it taken place at its main lab since january 1, 2005. cdc provided the committee with a list back in 2012, but we now know from cdc's interim investigation report released last friday that, in fact, the list was not complete. improper shipments of pathogens in 2006, including anthrax, were not included in the cdc's list of safety incidents that, in fact, was provided to this committee. cdc staff has now acknowledged to committee staff that the 2006 incidents, which were reported to the hhs ig should have been included. we don't know why they weren't. this raises the question of whether cdc leadership is

receiving all the information about its allen biosafety systems. add to the possible anthrax exposure the delayed notice provided to cdc leadership about avian flu shipments and the discovery of smallpox vials in a cardboard box in an fda storage room on the nih campus, and these incidents no longer appear isolated. a dangerous, very dangerous pattern is emerging and there's a lot of unknowns out there. when dealing with pathogens such as the ones being discussed today, unknowns are frankly unacceptable. what you don't know can hurt you. why do these events keep happening? what's going to be next? cdc needs to solve a safety problem now as a team. the agency needs to get as much information as possible from its workers about true safety of biosafety at -- two state of biosafety at cdc, and keep this

committee and the american people fully informed. there is zero tolerance for unlocked refrigerators and ziploc bags. those days have to be over. yield to marsha blackburn. >> i think the chairman for yielding to a want to thank our panel for being here. and as you can hear, i by person basis we have plenty of questions for you. we are deeply concerned about the incidents that have occurred at the federal labs that are run by the department of health and human services, cdc, with the anthrax specimen. dr. frieden, we appreciate the time you spent with leslie but think we do have plenty of questions for you about the safety. and the carefulness. you know, we would think that the priority would be safety and caring and making certain that you are tending to the culture of safety within these labs. nih with the piles of smallpox,

and the fact that this was in an unused portion of the storage room. who all would have access to that? and then, of course, the cross-contamination of the influence of sample. we've all talked about the three of these events. and the fact that they have occurred within the framework of time, the fact that there seem to be a dismissiveness of the serious nature of these occurrences but the fact that the cdc's own report pointed out some of the contributing factors in this, and the lack of a standard operating procedure. and best practices. and the fact that this is not now and among the employees at the agency. we know that there are some remediation measures that are being implemented, but the culture of safety, or lack thereof, continues to be a

concern to us for public health. i yield back my time. >> thank you. of recognize mr. waxman for five minutes. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman, for holding this hearing. i think it's important for us to investigate this incident involving the release of potentially viable anthrax on cdc's campus in atlanta. when i was chairman of the oversight committee, we held hearings after the 2001 anthrax attacks. we look at the safety of postal workers and the public in handling mail. the postal service and cdc's response to those attacks. we had hearings again in 2003 and 2005 where we found there were still gaps in biological detection of anthrax and in communicating test results at risk to the public.

those hearings showed why cdc's work on identifying and containing public health risks from these types of biological agents is so important. this can also pose risks, that's why this oversight hearing is important. in 2009 when i was chairman of the full committee, we held a hearing on the proliferation of high containment biolabs and the lack of oversight over such facilities. mr. dingell also the hearing in 2007, so this is not our first introduction to the subject. at our request gao, the government accountability office, also look into lab safety. gao reported a number of studies, one as recently as 2013 on the problems associated with the governments fragmented piecemeal approach to these labs. no single agency has oversight

over all high containment biolabs. there are no national standards for operation, and we have no record of how many labs even exist. the health and human services inspector general also issued numerous reports on high containment labs and their handling of select agents. the inspector general identified issues with the treatment of select agents and the safety of the individuals working with these dangerous pathogens. the ig recommended that the centers for disease control labs improve training for individuals handling select agents, improve record-keeping, and take appropriate measures to improve safety. the american people out on the centers for disease control to protect them, and we want to be able to assure them that the cdc is conducting its research in safe and secure ways. i am supportive of dr. frieden's

effort at cdc. we have worked with him on numerous issues in the last five years, and he has shown himself to be an effective leader and a strong communicator, and i appreciate the quick action that is taken in response to this incident. i'm encouraged to see that dr. frieden has appointed dr. michael bell to oversee safety protocols and procedures. this investigation has shown us that cdc needs to change its safety culture, in the hope that doctor bell can help instill a new mindset at the agency. still i am concerned that it took the disclosure of several cdc staff to anthrax to finally spur cdc to action. so we want answers from the cdc about how this incident was allowed to happen in the first place. and i look forward to hearing from aphis and gao about the problems they've identified in

the past, have cdc should have limited their recommendations moving forward, and what role congress should play in making sure that happens. mr. chairman, this is not the first hearing on the subject. we have looked at it before. we need now finally to be sure that all of the recommendations that we that are put in place so that we can stop something like this from happening again. thank you, and i yield back my time. >> thank you. i would now like to introduce the witness on first and for searing. first dr. thomas regional director for the cdc and prevention. dr. frieden his company by mr. joseph henderson, who was deputy director of the office of security and emergency preparedness at cdc. doctor jere dick is associate deputy minister at the animal and plant health inspection services at the u.s. department of agriculture.

and nancy kingsbury, applied research and methods. >> mr. chairman, thank you very much for committee opportunity. i know this witnesses on the second panel and it will be a little while before we will be hearing from the second panel, but it is an honor and a pleasure to introduce off of the second panel sean kaufman. mr. coffman is president and founding partner of a company called behavioral-based improvement solutions. his background is long-term employment with the cdc before forming his own company in my district, the 11th congressional district of georgia and woodstock georgia and i would encourage all the moves on both sides of the aisle, if you haven't had chance. i know we tried to read all of the tests were, a sometimes we skip one or two along the way. but i will assure you that the testimony, written testimony

from mr. kaufman really hits the nail right on the head with regard to this overall issue and i would commend to you and i'm proud to introduce him to you in anticipation of the second bill. mr. chairman, thank you very much and i yield back. >> to the panel tenure of where the committee is holding investigative hearing it when doing so has the practice of taking testimony under oath. do and you have objections to taking testimony under oath? all witnesses indicate new. the chair advises you all that you're under the rules of the house and the rules of the committee. you're entitled to be advised by counsel. do any of you advised to be advised by counsel during today's testimony? all the witnesses indicate no. in that case would you all please rise and raise your right hand and i will swear you in. [witnesses were sworn in]

thank you. all the witnesses answered in the affirmative. you may not give a five minute written summary of the written statement. dr. frieden. >> chairman murphy, ranking member degette -- [inaudible] chairman murphy, ranking member degette, members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before you. on dr. tom frieden, director of the cdc. with me is mr. joseph anderson was the office of secure the safety and asset management. i will review the problems that come to light in the past month and tell you what we're doing now to address improving lab safety. the fact that it appeared no one was harmed and that there were no releases does not excuse what happened. what happened was completely unacceptable. it should never have happened. if i leave you with just one

thought about today's hearing as it relates to cdc, it is this. with the recent incident, we recognize the pattern at cdc where we need to greatly improve the culture of safety, and i am overseeing sweeping measures to improve the culture of safety. cdc works 24/7, and our scientists protect americans from threats, including natural occurring threats like ebola and mers and drug-resistant bacteria and man-made threats such as anthrax. but we must do that work more safely, and we will. there's a recap of the recent incidents that our summers in a report which has been completed, and we're just at the outset of our investigation of the influence of contamination. i would be please to go through

the two diagrams that we provided to the subcommittee which outline what we know to date. but in brief the anthrax incident shows deeply troubling problems, and lack of proper protocol, incorrect and activation procedures, failure to ensure that we were transferring materials that were sterile women thought they were sterile. use of a very low strain when a non-dangers form would have been appropriate. in the influence of cross contamination, we are still trying to understand how the cost contamination occurred and investigating how that could've been such a long delay in notification. the risks to employees from the anthrax exposure was, at most, very small, and the risk of released to the public was nonexistent. but that does not change the fact that these were unacceptable events. they should never have happened. in the past as the committee has

outlined, they were a number of specific incidents, and they do believe that cdc staff worked hard to address the specific findings of past investigations, but i think we missed a critical pattern. instead of just focusing on those when we issued the anthrax report, we provided not only these two incidents, but the prior episode of what happened. because what we are seeing is a pattern that we missed, and the pattern is an insufficient culture of safety. we are now implementing every step we can to make sure that the problems are addressed comprehensively in order to protect our own workforce and to strengthen the culture of safety and to continue our work protecting americans. i've taken a number of specific steps. i've issued a moratorium on the transfer of all biological material outside of all beos three and four laboratories at cdc. cdc. i have closed the two laboratories that were involved in this situation until we are

sure that they can be reopened safely. i've appointed dr. michael bell, a senior scientist to be director of laboratory safety to bring directly to me as a single point of accountability. he will review the moratorium and listed by lap number confident that can be done safely. he will also facilitate expansion and use of the safety culture throughout cdc. cdc scientists are world famous for their rigor in scientific investigation, and we will now apply that same rigor to improving the safety and own laboratories. i'm convening a high level working group within cdc internally to advise us on every step of the process, and an external advisory group with outside experts for top and will to take a fresh look and see what we can do to do better. we will look at every inactivation transfer protocol and other protocols and approve them as needed. we will look at future

incidents, if they occur, with a command structure which have been used earlier in the anthrax exposure. i will ensure that appropriate disciplinary -- discipline is taken as indicated by our investigation and will apply lessons learned from this experience to our function as a predatory agency and our select agents regulatory program. in hindsight we realize we missed a crucial pattern, a pattern of incidents that reflected the needs of who the culture of safety at cdc. but as with many things, recognition is the first of them are taking a number of additional actions to establish and strengthen a culture that prioritizes the safety of our own staff, encourages reporting of actual and potential situations that may place but and others at risk, assess those risk in implement redundant wrist to keep them at an applet minimum. part of that culture will be

increased reporting of problems or potential problems. one of the aspects of a culture of safety is rapid reporting of problems. so if we do uncover problems in the coming weeks and months, this may well be the result of strengthening our culture of safety rather than failing to address it. we have concrete actions underway to change processes that allow these incidents to happen, reduce the likelihood of occurrence in the future, and apply the lessons broadly. we will do everything possible to live up to the high standards that congress and the american public rightfully expect us to achieve. i look forward to your questions, and thank you for inviting me to testify today and for your interest in this important topic. >> thank you. dr. dick, your next. make sure the microphone is on and very close to your mouth. thank you. it's not on. the green light, there you go. thank you. >> thank you and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the

opportunity to testify today about the animal and plant health inspection services inspection into the release of possibly live anthrax at the cdc's campus. i'm doctor jere dick, associate administrator for aphis within usda. aphis conducted a thorough inspection of the incident to learn how it happened and determine appropriate remedial measures. we will continue to monitor the cdc's response to ensure all necessary corrective action is taken. and that when work resumes at the laboratories it will be done in full compliance with the health and safety of employees and the public at the forefront. usda was designated by congress as the partner with cdc and the oversight of select agents because of our expertise and

experience, essentially working with select agents over the past century. through our efforts to prevent dangers to these agents from impacting u.s. agriculture and the environment. for decades, aphis is also safely operated high containment laboratories that handle select agents, including those of concern to human health. our personnel, our leading diagnosticians and experts working in the high containment laboratories. to ensure objectivity, aphis and cdc signed a memorandum of understanding in october of 2012. which makes aphis the lead inspection agency for cdc entities. since the m.o.u. was finalized, aphis has carried out 11 inspections of the for cdc laboratories. aphis takes any potential release of a select agent or toxin very seriously, with the

goal of quickly ensuring that the release is contained and determine what led to the release to ensure no future incidents. on june 13, cdc officials discovered a potential release of anthrax, and notify aphis. cdc voluntarily closed impact of labs on june 16. aphis make its inspection a priority and quickly began its work to ensure that all select agents were secured and that there were no other breaches in biosafety four in biosecurity. specially trained aphis inspection team of veterans and a plant pathologist spent nearly two weeks billion on june 23, conducting a facility review of the laboratories and interviews with cdc personnel. aphis briefed cdc officials on july 2, outlining deficiencies

so they could immediately begin taking corrective actions. aphis found the laboratory did not use an adequate activation protocol and did not ensure that the protocol was, in fact, invalidate. the initial response to this incident by the cdc laboratories was inadequate. both in securing as well as disinfecting laboratories. for example, individuals without approval to handle select agents were able to access space containing or potentially contaminated with anthrax at least four days after the incident was discovered. we also found that employees didn't have appropriate training in some instances. we found no clear management oversight of the incident at the lab, and no clear single manager overseeing the overall cdc incident response, which

resulted in employee confusion about how to respond. in addition, cdc's occupational health clinic was not prepared to respond to the potential exposure of a large number of workers. aphis currently has in place a cease-and-desist order with a select agents and the toxins to -- attitude impacted select agent laboratories. we will require that corrective action be taken to ensure the integrity of these research programs. we have directed cdc to provide aphis with its plan for coming into compliance by july 25. and before allowing cdc to resume select agent work in the laboratories, aphis will conduct a reinspection to ensure that all corrective actions have been taken. mr. chairman, this concludes my

testimony at ibf the ditch any questions that you are members of the subcommittee have. >> thank you, doctor dick. dr. kingsbury, please point the microphone very close to your mouth. a lot closer than that. >> thank you, mr. chairman spent dr. kingsbury, bring the mic really close, place. >> really close, is that better? okay. thank you very much for inviting us to come to talk to you about some of our past work on biosafety issues. as mr. waxman noted in his statement, we've been doing this work for quite a while. we start with the original anthrax attacks, and we've got onto a number of other issues over the years. basically our past work as a couple of major things. one of them is a lack of strategic planning and oversight of the whole picture of biosafety laboratories. aphis and cdc are only a part of that picture, and since 2001 there have been an increasing number of biosafety laboratories

both within that sector but also across the whole government. there are six or seven different agencies involved, and no one entity has been charged with developing a strategic plan. we became particularly concerned about that as budgets begin to shrink, recognizing that the management and operation of these laboratories is an expensive venture. if they're not properly maintained, other kinds of problems can arise. we've observed that there is a continued lack of national standards for design, constructing, commissioning, and operating these laboratories. there is guidance. the biosafety and microbiological and biomedical laboratories guidance is available, but it's not required and there is no process by which an entity needs to make sure that they are following the guidance. we think the broader government perspective about both, how many

of these laboratories we need and for what purpose, and also a better framework for oversight is still needed. we have done some work since this episode became -- the most recent episode became public. we did take the team to atlanta. i want to thank dr. frieden for his staff cooperation with us when we were there, coming together with something i'm prepared to sit and talk about on something like 10 days notice is a bit of a challenge for us, but his staff was very good at providing everything we asked for. i'm not going to add very much to that debate. i think the two previous witnesses have covered the details pretty well. the one thing i would add, however, is while we agree that there is a requirement to have standard operating procedures that are reviewed at appropriate levels for biosafety, we believe it's also important that those procedures be validated.

by that we mean independently tested so that we can be assured that if these procedures are followed, the would be no further episodes and i will just add that one thought to the debate about the incident itself. thank you very much, mr. chairman. that concludes my statement. >> thank you but i will not recognize myself for five minutes. dr. frieden, is anthrax and biological agents that has a use in warfare? >> yes. >> the mishandling and have real consequence. consequences but if some were sickened by anthrax what would some of the symptoms be? >> anthrax can cause a variety of symptoms for the most severe forms our respiratory anthrax, can cause severe illness or death. >> i have an image of some lab, some workers handling, testing for anthrax, et cetera. i don't know if this is a lab of some of the work are investigating. when i toured labs, there've been a number of levels there

what's required for breathing, for covering clothes before and after is pretty severe. i've got to ask this question. these are not live but this is a ziploc bag and everything, what in heaven's name would go through the mind of some scientist thinking a ziploc bag is enough to protect someone from anthrax when you have other incidents of all that, paraphernalia so as to where we did with anthrax. have you talked to the personnel involved with transport in anthrax and asked them why? >> i have been directly involved in the investigation. i will be directly involved in the remediation of the problems that we find. many of the issues that are mentioned in the aphis finding relate to what was done with the material that was believed to have been inactivated. so once the laboratory had said, here is killed anthrax, it was handled by the lower containment

laboratories as if it were not infectious. our subsequent studies suggest that it's likely that it was not, but the core error there was that failure to speak but dr. frieden, this is like saying i didn't know this gun was loaded that somebody got shot. but you should always assume it is. for someone to say i didn't think anthrax was live, it is an acceptable and quite rightly i wonder if you have the ability to not only reprimand such personnel, but to fire them, to suspend them, from working with the pathogens that are deadly. or quite frankly do they understand that the extent to which is what could have left them in a condition where they were charged with criminal negligence, negligent homicide, reckless endangerment? do they understand the seriousness of this the american public health because i think the idea first of a two key system as is used in other circumstances is quite

appropriate. both within the high containment laboratories and to verify that stuff coming out is safe to does, because tough has to come out of the laboratories to be tested or worked with elsewhere. in terms of disciplinary proceedings, what we want to do is strike the right balance. on the one hand, we recognize they need to make sweeping improvements in our culture of safety, and part of it means staff need to feel comfortable any time saying there may be a problem here coming forward. at the same time if our investigation finds that there is negligence, that people knowingly failed to report or took actions that were likely two or should've been known to endanger themselves or others, then we will take appropriate action. >> dr. dick said that people who were not approved were able to handle select agents, were able to access space containing potential anthrax, four days after the incident was

discovered. my assumption is the scientist and the it's a pretty smart people but it's actually distributed think they are not thinking of this -- well, let me ask this. it's been weeks since you learned about the march 2014 cd shipment of h. five in one influence the. ..