plan. some me what your plan is. i have a plan. something had been working on. free-market capitalism. my idea is health insurance on the free-market. bear with me. the history of the world, everything divided on the free-market is better and cheaper government give us those office, school the public school system is still with this. apparently going to kick up quite a fuss social security,

the pond's skin, put in jail if you're in the private sector. now bankrupt. earned income tax credits, fraud written pro grams in history and not saying something. and my favorite, the food-service, for those of you on the east coast. it's a total monopoly. trapped on the train. forgot to get food, you just wait for the announcement. you hope essaying the food-service cart is open. you can go stand in line for 40 minutes to get a two week old turkey sandwich for $30. last year amtrak food-service alone, $72 million. how to use -- only the government can do that corsica and watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. now from the internationals by museum here in washington d.c.

retired cia operative look said u.s. intelligence efforts during the revolutionary war and their role in defeating the british. from george washington's interest in the use of counterintelligence practices to the copper ring an espionage network operated in new york city, this is just under an hour. >> good afternoon. and the historian and curator. today's subject will be the american revolution. we are joined by an exceptional opera will introduce momentarily . before that a couple words about the revolution itself in the history about intelligence. this is one subject that is vastly underrepresented in historical literature, the impact of intelligence and the revolution. don't go into the importance.

and that is quite problematic. if you look at the strategic imbalance of the revolution to the advantages the british and over the americans, by ignoring the intelligence aspect you don't get the story about how the united states was the war. the british and almost every advantage, modern, professional army that had been battle tested they had a small continental army reinforced by militias that could not be counted on. the greatest navy in world. we had terrorist we gave the ability to as steel and pillage for paying. most of america's did not actually support independence. less than half of, and americans supported independence. thousands of for the british. many of the others just wanted to be left alone. not to mention the thousands of

german soldiers in the thousands of native americans that sided with the british cause. not to mention the fact the british have the world's greatest economy. the united states did not really have one of the time. no central bank and our time raising money. so how do we win? it is not just that we wanted more than they did. have a lot to do with the factor we used intelligence better than the british did. george washington, among others, was really get a u.s. in the information that came in from a network of spies and intelligence apparatus that he had set up during this time. about masters in history from the school at syracuse university. after he got his master's he served the united states marine corps and and quickly thereafter joined the cia. a cia operations officer in the

east asia division of the national clandestine service from 1969 to nine to 2003. he certain other things. mr. de glare offered the founding fathers of american intelligence and block dispatches both written for the cia and available to the public on the cia website. a good check those out. very fascinating. he has also written numerous articles. his true name as well as the pseudonym regarding american intelligence activities from 1765 all the way through the end of the civil war including articles about intelligence with the cra studies on intelligence and the association of former intelligence officers journal. american intelligence and the revolutionary war, would like to introduce the now whenever -- for every maybe. please join me in welcoming.

when he read a book you have a business plan. i did a kind of backwards. here's the point i want to make. that's a very distinctive cover. not my choice. it was the publishes joyous. to step back from the beach. okay. i'm going to walk around the beach this. maybe a little bit of a. and then to take a look and see what teenagers are reading my book. i have to tell you, one single male or female teenager reading my book.

obviously was the target audience. they said -- it consists of people in the revolutionary war. as the reductor said, this is a brand new way of looking at the war. we all accept often has the with the revolution when on. my fellow colleagues in the intelligence profession. because here a very interesting opportunity. as we get into the revolutionary war you find that all three of the key elements in the intelligence profession, counterintelligence and covert action played a key role in the americans' ability to win. and because i'm dealing with something as 250 years all have the latitude here of naming names, identities, sources of

affirmation, showing what the intelligence reports look like, showing what the impact was and talking about sources. something that i can to obviously in my own background. why this is fascinating is because over history intelligence methods don't change. the fact that the coal per rankle after their partner reports in a leather pouch under rock in a long island cal pastor and the fact that the day someone will leave an imprint did note on an obscure website to make is that sorgos and technology in terms of communication. they're is a learning experience in strictly from the point of being an intelligence officer. for now i've been told by much

more experienced officers that the first thing you're always asked is what is sure to book. abcaeight. i will tell you exactly why i started writing the book. i retired from the agency and spend a little bit of time consulting with the department of defense and reid after about four or five years you're really down all the chicana in terms of transferring the experience and capability you have to another organization. so this time i actually retire and take a lot of my own personal interests and hobbies and what have you. that worked for about two, two and a half weeks. it all came to conclusion around one saturday, or if had gone to a studio to work. i decided i was going to fix myself once you know, i found the kitchen was disorganized. i could not find what i wanted in terms of the ingredients, the plates and glasses of wanted. add some spare time.

reorganize the kitchen. yakima that did not work out too well. shortly thereafter i went to work writing the book. but the genesis of the book actually comes from over 20 years ago. mid-1990s i was in a management position at the agency. you have to take this time from the consideration. the mid-90s. a cold war is over with. we defeated the soviet empire. but the issue here is that now, like we always to because we won we're going to downsize because we don't have any enemies. peaceful and wonderful. the orders came down. and it's going to be cut. we're going to have to do more with less. that phrase normally strikes fear in the heart of any government plea. the way we decided to do it at the agency was to increase our

efforts. those friendly security and intelligence organizations that we deal with. first up, and larger facilities a little more meetings. the job by was and, i had to create some new spaces. luckily i had a technical architects and interior designers and others who could handle our work. but i went around talking. the one of the main issues was the liaison services understood that we had money. we were very good technically, but you know we have not done -- been in business that long. only since world war ii and maybe do we -- we did not quite understand how and of the mores of this ticket and aspects. we had to address this problem.

so i did a little bit of research. i ended up writing the pamphlet to you mentioned. the founding fathers of american intelligence where we identify george washington as the key figure in a collection of foreign intelligence. benjamin franklin as a key figure in terms of covert action , particularly propaganda. and john j. surprisingly enough, the key figure in terms of counterintelligence. it was kind of well received. we put our printer copies in the liaison room and name to each room after one of these principal figures. over the years it has become institutionalized. as was mentioned, it is now on the website and is a very popular download on the website. this all came about. now, as i said before, the key

point behind this book is to look at the revolution from intelligence point of view. i am not a historian. got about 40 years and intelligence. i can claim a little bit of expertise. the key here is as we go through the revolution starting in 1765 went through these evacuation's the book chronicles the impact it had, the mistakes that were made and how was done. take a couple of key issues. everyone in this room knows about your basic history in the american revolution. i guess we're going to start with the one principle that always comes to mind. was as chief of the contents

along the the key consumer crawl intelligence treated small battle staff, his analytical arm. in addition to that he also the section very much. the key managers. there would actually write specific orders on tradecraft to the various sundry spiring said. very unusual the chief operations officer. and even though it was a rather small element than the countries that exists today with some countries that existed there. the upper ones to get as quick as possible to protect the sources that have the capability to get the information. and you see that when you look at what washington did. ..

number one, you've got to be able to control the information if it's coming out from your side. if there's a steady stream only of what you want done. no leaking and also means often falsify internal reporting to junior officers so they can't inadvertently say what's going on. number two, you've got to have

sources. double agents primarily, or people who are friendly with the adversary to whom you can purposefully leak information so that you know the information is going to the adversaries command. and thirdly and this is really a key that most people forget, you've got to have that sources within the enemy command to know that your message is not only sitting there but also that it's coming back and you can reverberate it back in a way that makes the enemy truly believe they are making the decision and providing the foundation for that information. pretty darn sophisticated for a guy who was busy with a lot of other stuff. so how did he get to learn this? it's not something you learn by thinking about it. if you go back to its early diaries, early as 1753, you find the first time you sent to the ohio country by the royal governor of virginia to see what the french were doing, he started to hone his skills not

only in elicitation and debriefing, but also in observation. one key point he makes in his journal from the fall of 53 is very fascinating. he was kept at a certain french fort until he can many officer from the french forces would come in seeking. a new he was there. he was able to observe and have a good memory so we wouldn't have to write it down with fort looked like, the number of french soldiers, et cetera but he could have no feel for those french forces that were outside the fort or the indian allies they had. what do you do in his spare time? he walked up and down the river bank and counted all the canoes and extrapolated from there except the what type of a force could be moved at any given time. egypt in 1754, and he goes back out and involves himself in fighting with the french and you find these able to use deserters not only in terms of very

sophisticated debriefings but also in terms of spreading disinformation and using them as propaganda value to encourage more desertions from the enemy. by the time to get to 1755 we needs in a common unofficial aide to general braddock, you find that he's also learning a great deal about the operational security aspects of military movements, of putting a trick against troops, but also the mistake braddock made which was he did not have any intelligence forward with its main attacking force. 20 years in august 1775 he takes over the army. is already starting to develop the intelligence experience so it's not unusual that with someone like kim it has worked to his advantage. one of the things we need if you're going to start a revolution is you need political organization. in 1765 with the stamp act, you started to have small groups in

all of the coastal cities who decided that they're going organize politically against the stamp act and that type of taxation. in the course of 10 years, a group calling themselves the sons of liberty evolves into as sophisticated united front organization as anything we've ever seen that we normally associate with communist party type of organizations, the soviet union or the chinese. what's fascinating about this is a most american history texts, you look at the sons of revolution and you see a caricature. using a caricature of drunken people, maybe tar and feathered and some government administradministr ator or writing them around on a log or dancing drunkenly around a liberty bowl with a cap on top of it. let me tell you, there was a lot more sophisticated than that. starting in the mid-1760s, sam

adams who took a lot less credit than this thing deserves started to organize the various groups of individuals calling themselves the sons of liberty all along the coast of all the way massachusetts down to charleston. by the time you get to the mid-1770s, this is an organization that has put its people in all the key political leadership, congresses, committees of safety, the militia units and what have you. so you've got a front organization that started out with a very broad idea that they're going to oppose taxation and by the mitsubishi of an organization that has decided they want political independence. that an organization that cannot only put people in the street, often mobs, often much more sophisticated type of groups that can send a message, you've got a propaganda element where the majority of the printers who in those days with a newspaper

publishers, members of the sons of liberty and have established a courier route so within weeks the same perspective on a political event or an opposition approach to the administration of the brits can come all the way from massachusetts down through the southern colonies with exactly the same message, a very strong political force. in addition, you've got a paramilitary force. by the time you get to about 1773, the british recognize that where they don't physically have military, they have virtually no control. and these paramilitary forces, these militia forces led by sons of liberty are at this point making sure that they take over the powder, take over the arms from the various ministerial armaments in the colonies. of the time you get to 73 and 74

you've actually got these forces forming up, not engaging but forcing up to stop british forces from coming back to try and get these arms or to try to reoccupy a fort. by the time you get to 1775, of course you have concord and lexington. white assessing about this is that the very final evolution of the united front groups when intelligence point of view is it becomes an intelligence organization, and that's exactly what happened. first, the committees of safety were able to monitor exactly what the british were doing at the major installations and locations. for example, thanks to the committee of safety in boston, the militia and the sons of liberty knew exactly what route the british were going to take to get the concord because two months earlier they had monitored the two officers that

colonel gage sent out to go out of. they were able to do that through a second organization they set up which in theory is the founding of the first american intelligence organization called the mechanics, group led operationally by paul revere, but more leadership wise by two other members, dr. joseph ford and doctor and human church. this organization actually was offensive and the penetrations of john cage's command. -- benjamin church. by the time to get to lexington and concord may not only knew what place was going to be attacked, when the movement started by the exact route is going to be taken down there and, obviously, back. it puts an entirely different light on why the british took so many casualties and why these diverse militia groups roam all over central massachusetts were able to hone in as well as they were on the march going back.

it's because advanced knowledge. i always say if you want to connect something to modern affairs, let's look at what another former intelligence officer, vladimir putin it did recently in crimea. if you want to look and see how he was able to very effectively shut off the greater government of ukraine from crimea, all eager to do is look at the way the sons of liberty do it because it's exactly the same structure he worked over a period of time. and you find many other examples of that in the book. if you extrapolate you will see it still going on today. now, i think the second thing i like to talk about is a covert action campaign that we really don't give enough credit to. after the conflict actually started, the colonial forces actually found that they very low in the way of the just six

necessary to carry on the war. in the colonies there was virtually no capability to create gunpowder. very little capability to create firearms, very little capability to create heavy artillery. they found they needed that. how do you handle something why that if you're a revolution organization? you create a covert action campaign which is what was done with the assistance of france. like all good covert action campaigns, this start on a dark and stormy night in december in 1775 at the carpenters hall in philadelphia. when benjamin franklin, the head of a newly created continental congress committee called the committee of secret correspondence met with an individual traveling as a flemish merchant who in reality was a secret agent from the king of france. i'm talking december 1775 during

the course of three nights they discussed what help france would provide, and the americans, franklin, promised to things. he promised, number one, we will declare political independence from great britain. number two, he promised they will defeat the british army. what was the result? the result was the creation of a company that was phenomenal called -- led by an individual. for those are your literary oriented you might know him because he wrote the marriage of figaro which became quite well-known and operas but he actually was another secret agent operating for the king of france. underhandedly traded a company that by 1778 had over 100 sailing ships that delivered

hundreds of tons of gunpowder, stacks of weapons, cannons, other military supplies for two years that allowed the continental army to exist. without these military supplies, it was really doubtful that washington would've been able to fight as long as he had. at the bunker hill, for example, before the ship started rolling in, they had two shots per person. by the time you get to december of 1776, a very crucial time, they are down to about three shots per person but a much smaller army, probably 3000 people. a very important asset here. three people connected with the interests of enough or of course benjamin franklin who at that point became the diplomatic head of the paris commission, u.s. his first diplomatic session of rock over interest. and, of course, beaumarchais, operating behind the scenes under an alias company and then

thirdly a german named robert morrison in philadelphia was in the revolution. it was his job to get to the colonies to reduce the agriculture products that could be sent back to europe to repay the various loans. now, there is a very famous cartoon, political cartoon. i think it was from the "chicago tribune" but are not absolute sure. it might've been in the newspaper, had to do with world war i when "blackjack" pershing made the famous line loss yet come we are here, meaning we are returning the favor of what you helped us are in the revolution. and it's a beautiful drawing. as the american dope boys with the tenets and one rifle and long bandanna landing on the coast of france. and then up on the cliffs is a ghostly figure of lafayette. and the voice coming out of the american troops, lafayette, we are here.

the french historian told me that what lofty a chip responded was, yes, but did you bring your checkbooks? the reason for that is we never paid it back any of the loan that the british, i mean the french gave us against the british. we're talking millions of dollars which in those days was big money. never paid it back. interesting point to keep in mind when we get so concerned that other countries don't pay us back. let me tell you about probably what i think is the key point in the war where intelligence play such an important role. there's a couple of points, and if i time out how to go into another one, but it was december 1776, washington had just been swept out of new york. he was pushed across new jersey, it's snowing, he's down to about maybe an army of 5000 people

effective, maybe 3000. they have no ammunition but these guys are marching literally barefoot through the snow. the enlistment about to go up in january. this is a low point. washington action is thinking at this point that if i ca get you something, i'm going to take what troops i've got and i'm going west of the alleghenies and going to conduct a protracted war from back there. knows how that would've worked out. but then it turns all around because we all know what happened. we all know he decides to move across the delaware and to attack trenton, essentially attack princeton, two major victories which turns the whole morale of the army around, causes the colonies to resupply them with troops, causes some of the season to troops to actually sign on. and you start to see a few supplies coming. it allows him to have a safe winter. why did that all happened? it to happen because of intelligence. it happened because he knew

exactly the order of battle, who was sitting in princeton. he knew it was colonel raul haitians regiment, who i thought all the way from long island through manhattan and through new jersey. he knew they were a battle tested crude. he's a tough guy, but he also knew that they hav had been in constant combat now for about five months. he knew the new jersey militia had basically had them surrounded at trent and, had been causally picking away at them, had entered into their efforts to go and get logistics such as firewood or local agriculture products and consulate attacked their outposts and kept them on guard for all the times since the established their position at princeton. he also knew, in my belief, a lot about colonel raul come primarily from an individual named john honeyman and there's some debate about whether john

honeyman's story is true. i happen to believe it is and i explained that. honeyman knew the colonel and was a spy for washington and was able to to washington that the colonel was a strong prussian character who had no respect for the american soldier whatsoever. to the point that he refused to build fortifications around trenton. his famous quote is the americans are foolish enough to attack we will repel them with our bayonets. he also drank a little bit, which might've been one of the reasons washington chose the particular time to attack that he did. not that the troops were drunk because they were although sometimes you will hear that they were. so washington was able to have a great victory at a really cool time because he truly understood the enemy and understood the weakness of the enemy. same thing is true at princeton as well thanks to some crucial debriefing of deserters and knowledge of the troops who are

at princeton, and the fact that a spy, a young gentleman, was able to tell him the defensive positions around princeton and the one unguarded area that the british had not put up a defense in. okay, so washington was unable to take princeton, another victory, another bit of morale, a few more trips, samore enlistments. at a very crucial time in our history. he ends up with an excellent deception plan that causes the british to believe that his army is about four times bigger than it does. this is a classic deception plan. among other things, ma troop strength, leaving them in places where merchants were tory connections traveling through, and just happened to see them on a person's desk when a person is called out of the room. or taking the same troops and as

the bridge prisoners are being exchanged, having them take root right past a troop concentration where troops with different flags are marked in secular to indicate that he has more than me has. or lighting of certain buildings to indicate occupancy that isn't there. all of which saves them in the crucial, crucially war period from december 76 until well in the spring of 77. finally the missing something about yorktown. i think we're all aware of yorktown, how important that was. what we seldom dwell on is that yorktown was made possible because of the strongest action plans that washington used or some nine months against the british commander and in new york, making him believe that the french forces and american forces were meeting above new york that their intent was to attack new york city, which kept clinton from reinforcing

cornwallis down in the tidewater area. and the book goes into some detail as to exactly the sources he used, some of whom were some of his most valuable intelligence sources because they were were individuals the british had recruited three and four years, and actually used as couriers to carry their command instructions up to canada and down to the south. so he was willing to use some of his best collection capabilities at this point for the deception operation. obviously, extremely effective. but we never hear much about that. what we hear about is how cornwallis was defeated. and it was due primarily to the deception plan that kept clinton believing that new york was the target and kill all of the americans and most of the french forces have actually moved south to the city. and at that point is too late because the french fleet have exact -- had effectively blocked off the tidewater.

now, i've had to also say a couple words about the two people that we always associate with spine in the revolutionary war. billy thing about the revolution were, if you read any book on it whether it's a biography or an actual book on the war, if you look under spies you will probably going to find two names. you will find nathan hale and you'll find benedict arnold. but the truth of the matter is most of what we know about nathan hale is frankly enough, creative primarily in the early 19th century. from an intelligence point of view of one thing to know about nathan hale is if you want to run a good intelligence operation from selecting an agent to having an objective to have you trained to use communicate and, just do everything opposite than what was done with nathan hale. he was a very brave man. he deserves a lot of respect for being willing to die for his

country, but he was an incredibly poor choice for his job. i'll give you one prime example. this was a man who did not believe in telling a lie. let me tell you, you don't want an intelligence agent behind enemy lines who is not willing to tell a lie because it doesn't operate very well. and also with all his faults and how badly the operation was structured, and i frankly blamed washington for this in the book because he had the ultimate responsibility, it turned out that the reason he was caught was not inherently because of the mistakes that were made. it's because the british had a better counterintelligence officer working against them, and individual named robert rogers, who some of you might remember as the head of rogers rangers in the french and indian war. second one, benedict arnold. benedict arnold is a very interesting figure because there's still people today who say well, he was a hero at a

certain given point and we've got to give them some latitude. he was really harassed by the continental congress, and the politics of this really bad to keep it out of his own pocket and wasn't reimbursed. some of this is true although it happened to many of the people and they did not become traitors. but when you analyze this strictly from an intelligence point of view, as i did in the book, you find that as opposed to this being a huge blow to the american cause, and rialto spotted one of the two biggest blunders pashtun in reality. because they hailed him so badly. is volunteering effort was almost put aside for other things. he was not vetted before. all because the officer handling, young major andre, was a staff officer much more akin to handling the social responsibilities of being in a to the commanding general and the intelligence aspects of it.

at benedict arnold improperly handled and kept in place, the damage he could have done to the revolution at that point may not have changed the course of the war but what if i changed the course of negotiations which led to peace. so i honestly believe if you look at the revolution from a political point of view or a leadership point of view or an economic point of view, i've actually read books that look at it from a marxist point of view, that adding the intelligence overlay house he and the to take a much better look at why things happenehappened the way to get o another aspect that frank i think it's been to a large degree ignored except perhaps in four of five books since the 1940s. [applause]

[inaudible] that's better. thank you. know we'll have the opportunity to ask questions. after the question and answer buried he will be in the back sunday books. we certainly have a pretty significant supply of these books. wiki bordering them and he will be something later on, but first opened up for any questions. wait for the microphone please. that way we can pick it up on the camera. >> my question is actually not directly religious book itself but i'm just curious as most people are i'm sure touring the museum and we know most cia agents are spies who are clandestine effort, but then every now and then you hear people say oh, i retired from the cia. so are they supposed to know that they work in a cia or not everybody is a spy and the cia knows? i don't know what the difference

is, are we supposed to know or not? >> when you on active duty, if you're an operations officer you are not made public in most cases. but also it's misconstrued to us by his son who has access to information of value to the cia officers seldom have that. normally a cia officer's job is to recruit and effectively manage and collect reporting from what you would call spies, someone actually has the access. so when they see a person first himself as a spy or herself as a spy, you've got depend upon what thinking they did. i don't know. i'm sorry, that would be whole course in itself last night countr--[laughter] >> when we went to world war ii and we hope of the french against nazi germany, do you think that we felt indebted to

the french on some level because of their help to was over the revolutionary war? >> i think we probably repaid that debt after world war i with the horrible bloodshed and the amount of money that we poured into. i think it's, at the point of world war ii it was simply the need for a strong ally presents to overcome a vastly superior german army at the time. >> thank you very much. you made only brief mention, of course this is a great talk, i've long wondered why ncaa there's a statue of nathan hale who failed and not one of robert townsend who was a great success. you also mentioned andrea, who

was a fascinating man, not the least i have written about them. and on his tomb at westminster -- not westminster, yeah, westminster, 15 had a brilliant and lengthy -- what do you call it? [inaudible] yeah, epitaph, thank you, epitaph which includes the phrase that he showed too much zeal, which, of course, is what killed him and what destroyed the chance to have arnold as an asset. >> exactly. i agree with you do often wonder we have nathan hale their. there is a statue outside of the auditorium between the main building and the auditorium at the cia had course of nathan hill. the typist at gc probably in one of 50, 175 places around the

u.s. their heroic pose of an individual. truth of the matter is when no idea what nathan hale looked like. except another part of the entire myth. but he deserves credit because he was more than willing to die for his country. the culprits of course has got a renewed interest because of the amc series turn, and a book that is a historical fiction book called the secret six that is able to point out characterizations a little bit better because they're able to use this, a fictional approach to it. >> the issue of spying on allied powers has currently service. i'm wondering during the revolution were their espionage operations against our french allies? >> by the british and irish, the british didn't excellent job of penetrating the french

government and also penetrating extreme wealth our diplomatic -- >> spying on the french? >> no. we are too busy basically hanging on. there was, however, one -- welcome in paris the french government obviously watched the three commissioners, the american commissioners very carefully and there is reporting on that. but in the army itself one of the foreign contractors, an interesting point, they started a tradition that today people seem to think just started during one of the gulf wars which was the hiring of contractors to serve in the u.s. army. the continental congress hired a lot of formula to officers in specialized fields like engineering aperture because the expertise didn't exist in america. one of those officers, dekalb, ashley was a french spy who, while -- he died gallantly leading maryland trips but he reported back privately his view

of how the war was going to the french government. something a military attaché we do today who was attached to a foreign government. in my previous experience, the national interests of there's countries are always different. so consequently it was always good for policymakers to know what somebody else's agenda is. >> my understanding is that spying was not a very gentlemanly thing to do in the 18th 18th century. and what's interesting about nathan hale is he was a gentleman. and i believe that his friends try to talk you out of taking on this mission because it wasn't a very gentlemanly thing to be a spy. and i wonder you might talk about that a little bit and if george washington had any feelings about that? >> he did. that's a very good point. the first individual selected by

colonel bolton, and colonel mills rangers which the army claimed to be the first military intelligence group which is the reason their insignias 1775 on it, that was the group that washington asked to select someone to go behind the enemy lines the new york. the first individual that he wanted to do this job refuse for exactly the reason you said. he said no, i'm a gentleman. you're right, many of nathan hale's friends did try to talk him out of accepting it because it was not considered gentlemanly. the comment of washington is very interesting but it goes back to what burden was saying about the cold or rain. while the war was going on, washington was fairly generous with his money, even more generous with his advice on how this very complex espionage ring in your was supposed the run. known as the culpeper ring. or right after the war was over

with, and i note in my book the absolute truth after the war, the infantryman and intelligence agents is really considered a much less friend like an hour during the war. he writes very tellingly, now i am not sure of all the money i spent on coal for ring was worthwhile. truth of the matter it was. but for exactly that reason because washington also was a gentleman and i'm not suggesting that townsend wasn't or anything like that, but you're right, that concept but it's beneath me to spy. i think franco day it is still true. >> now, this is directed towards the french. in the world wars, do you think if we would and have cried out for french to help us, do you

think the wars would have gone quicker and more swiftly? >> the french government was in a position where they were not adequately prepared to actually declare war on the british until after the battle of saratoga. where the american forces proved they were strong enough to defeat an army in the field. and it was really touch and go. i mean, we came so close in december 17762 totally dissipating as an army that it was remarkable. the fascinating aspect of saratoga is that historians estimate that 80 plus are sent back of the gunpowder used by the american troops during the two battles that comprise of saratoga campaign came from portugal as an company. without them there could've been, but that of a bench when franklin to use of propaganda and some of the aspects, at that point the french crown had

turned over its armament by selling off its old armament for shipment to the u.s. to the point that he was able to take on great britain, along with spain. [inaudible] >> if i could jump in. you talked about the fact that it was so long ago, you the luxury of talk about sources and methods, use real names. the other hand being so long ago, documentary evidence is problematic and certainly when you talk about intelligence and how close to that of washington to a lot of these spy rings. a lot of what i've heard about intelligence from this comes even after the war when washington is building the continental congress with the amount of money out of pocket. how difficult was it to come up with actual evidence for writing this book? something new because the time in between makes documents were difficult to come up with. >> the primary documents are

often difficult not just because they're so old but if you've ever tried to read the spelling from someone who wrote in the 18th century, god help you. you really need glasses. but washington is very good about protecting the sources. however, occasionally he would flip. in the case of the ring, a lot of subsequent documents were found in the papers of certain individuals, tha that of all sof his staff people. and also in the pension records because by the 1830s he found extensive tension records explaining what they did during a war and justifications that involve officers affirmations of their actions that allows you to look at. there's one individual, just because this speaks to point named david mcclain, a find elevator guide was one of washington's very good intelligence officers on several occasions. not only a rental company also did a personal reconnaissance that allowed wayne to eventually

to a bayonet charge and take the place. use also in some other places. it is a document are really fascinating because this was a very disorganized guy. this was a guy who we neti pot would take every piece of paper hit on and would simply write down what he thought. so you have a bill for a course, one time and on the back of something written such as arnold is involved with the british, which he did right. of course, he would have no idea when he wrote that. whether you voted before or after the fact because he had written it on the back of the piece of paper. it was a real challenge. i have done original research. i seldom went through the 26 volumes of correspondence and then what back and went to cincinnati and look at some of the correspondence. that's what it took 20 years. >> were the british, the military spies that were

british, were there any other reason other than greed that they were spying for americans? >> we've got to be very carefully about who was a spy for the bridge because everybody was british until july 12. seriously and it's not fair to call someone who is loyal to the crown a spy. very few examples of high level spies within the american structure. benjamin church is the best example, and he was a nasty spot. he did it strictly for money. this is the guy i mentioned earlier who was one of the leaders of the mechanic, the first intelligence organization. but it didn't mention was general gates had the first intelligence organization in the traded because he did have church reporting on it but it put them in a very fascinating situation because if he bothered to arrest all of the leaders of the mechanics, then the committee and the sun delivery would've set up another group

and they wouldn't know who they were. so it's kind of a cia problem, because it would have is the devil yo you know versus the wwi tried to arrest people as opposed to monitor what they are doing. >> after we were supplied by the french company, did we find a way of making our own guns? did that companies keep supplying a? >> after the formal alliance with france, french warships could then escort, transport bring military supplies in. before then it had to be clandestinely through harbor instances are often through caribbean islands or things like that. once the weight of the french military came to play it was an entirely different deal. >> but we never got to the point wherwe