and here is one of charles dickens desk, his chair, his lab which has been retrofitted for electricity, and his calendar set to the date he died, june 9. the story goes that when the berg collection open in october 1940, and it was a big event, the mayor of laguardia was invited. that's all fact, but we have it through oral tradition that the mayor being rather robust gentlemen sat in this chair and burst through the gain. and then it was retained. so supposedly that's the only non-original part of this chair. chair. >> but that's not a documented the stores to? i have not seen it documented in any way, but that's what is passed in oral tradition. >> thank you for showing as part of her collection. >> my pleasure.

>> you are watching booktv on c-span2, 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books every weekend. here's our primetime lineup for tonight. up next, bruce riedel. >> that all happens next on c-span2's of tv. >> bruce riedel who retired with 30 years in the cia talks about

the cia's involvement in afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, the last battle in the cold war between the u the u.s. and the t union. this is about one hour. >> good afternoon, everybody. i'm strobe talbott and it's my pleasure to welcome you to a conversation that i hope will engage as many of you as possible. bruce riedel and i go back a ways. we got to know each other in the 1990s when we were working on a part of the world is going to be focusing on here, which is to say south asia, which included primarily for us at the time india and pakistan, two countries that have intense interest in afghanistan which is the subject of his new book.

and bruce and i came to brookings around the same time. he is a 30 year -- 29 year i guess, better and of the intelligence community, not just cia, but he also did significant stands at the national security council staff in the white house working both on the middle east and on south asia. and he's not only a superb analyst, but i can attest that he is a very good diplomat policymaker as well. and he runs our intelligence project your in the foreign policy program. so let's get started just with bruce giving you the short version of what is a book much

meatier than the thinness of it would suggest. it's packed with information, a lot of which was new to me, and it has a very powerful thesis, which bruce, if you would share with the group and then we will take it from there. >> thank you for being here. thank you for that very kind introduction. thank all of you for coming. "what we won" is a book about a successful intelligence operation. the war in afghanistan, more properly the war against the soviet 40th red army afghanistan that began on christmas eve december 1979 and ended in february 1979, ended february 1989 with the retreat of soviet forces across the river back into the soviet union was a global game changer. one part of that is pretty obvious. the war ended the myth of the instability of the soviet army.

-- invincibility. from 1949 on the soviet ever lost a battle. the perception was the red army was invincible. it was not. it was defeated in afghanistan, and to add insult to injury it was defeated a basically illiterate afghan tribesmen assisted by the and the central intelligence agency. the soviet union would probably have collapsed at some point anyway, but the afghan war turns out to been a precipitating event in making that happen. february 1989 the soviet leaves. within six months the berlin wall fell, and even less from the warsaw pact as a military alliance imploded. for the united states it was a remarkably cheap victory. it's a difficult to know in retrospect exactly how much money was spent on the operation in afghanistan, covert operations are by definition covert and they don't publish how much money was spent.

a conservative estimate is that u.s. spent between three and $4 million in arming the mujahedin in the 1980s. at its peak the cia task force that ran the operation in afghanistan had roughly 50 people. i would submit to you in his of the federal government there are very few federal projects involving so few people and so little money that had literally so much bang for the buck as this one day. not only has the cold war come to an end by the threat of thermonuclear war, we just did over the world since the cold war, essentially came to an end as well. bubut in retrospect while weakes it was a global game changer in that respect, was also a global game changer in another respect. this was the beginning of what we know refer to as the global jihad. i want to be very careful here. the notion that the cia created

al-qaeda is in my view that history. we did not create al-qaeda. that's not how we operated in afghanistan. the cia in afghanistan was the quartermaster of the war. that's a phrase bob gates gave me an interview for the book. we didn't train anyone. cia officers met with into afghanistan, not a single cia officer was wounded or killed in the war. we had no casualties. because we took no risk. all the risks were taken by other people, principally the afghans and the pakistanis. the book is organized to look at the different players in the war, starting with the afghan communists and then the soviets. the russians made almost every conceivable bad decision you could make in this war, beginning with the intervention to start it which the cia completely was surprised by. the soviets leadership was aging, ill, largely

dysfunctional, the principal advocate of going in was the then head of the kgb. he thought it was essential they went in. initially the poll the bureau did not want to go in, and then changed its mind. the soviets then made another disastrous decision in retrospect, which was to underresourced the war. the soviet union put in about 100,000 soldiers to win the war in afghanistan. in contrast what went into czechoslovakia in 1968, they used a half a million. anyone who looks at the map of czechoslovakia in afghanistan is going to see the plays we needed a half a million, is not buggy me and moravia, at the mountains of afghanistan. that decision meant many things. one of one was they could not close to the border with pakistan, pakistan became the base for the the mujahedin. but more than that, pakistan, particularly its intelligence service, the isi and was the gym headquarters of the mujahedin. it provided the leadership, it

provided a strategy commit provided the tactics. and if this war was anyone's war, it was the military dictator of pakistan in the 1980s. he is the person who made every article decision about the war. he liked to tell director of isi i want this december just right. don't let it boil too much that always make sure the water is getting hotter and hotter or the soviet union. he made the decisions to provide arms to the mujahedin. he organized the political leadership of the mujahedin keep essential is published. he decided which groups that which equipment. he decided that isi teams would go into afghanistan and actually command the mujahedin on the battlefield. he decided the mujahedin across a river and take the war to the soviet central asia. and he decided when he wanted to bring the stinger into the war. i know you all think it was charlie wilson's war. it wasn't.

it was zia-ul-haq's war. the other key outside blair was the saudi. the saudis match our three, 4 billion-dollar for dollar in government funds. that's well-known. what's less well known is that they raise private funds as well. which saudis donated enormous amounts of money to the war. again it's hard to know how much, but probably at its peak, saudi private donations amounted to about $20 million a month going into the mujahedin. the man who organized that was the then governor of we hot province, the prince was today's the crown prince of saudi arabia and heir to the throne. there's of course another famous saudi was involved in this story and that is osama bin laden i spent a lot of time talking about his role, basically he was the combat engineer of the mujahedin. he build the base for the mujahedin inside afghanistan with isi's help that with

state-of-the-art. had modern hospital and a vip hotel, and had miles and miles of underground tunnels filled with ammunition. just a brief word on the u.s. role. the u.s. role was a bipartisan agreed war effort. it was initiated by president carter. president carter was caught off balance by the soviet invasion, but within two weeks jimmy carter that buys a strategy with the united states would pursue for the rest of the war, and he assembled a coalition of states to support it. saudi arabia, pakistan, china, which was a key supporter of the war effort, egypt and the united kingdom and others, all were brought together under the leadership of carter and brzezinski, the tactics of the war and the grand coalition of diplomacy that started it secretly was developed in the last week of december and the first two weeks of january.

it had support from democrats and republicans. when ronald reagan came into office in 1981, he essentially just continued the carter policy for his entire first term in office. then in 1986 at the prodding of zia-ul-haq, he decided to increase the and bring in the stinger and the stinger of course changed the battlefield dynamics. whether it really led to the so decision to leave is hard to tell. the soviets might have left it indicates. the stinger was obviously going to be the force multiplier in that regard. and in that sense this operation is something pretty rare in history of american intelligence. a success story. there are lots of books about intelligence failures and a lot of them about cia failures. but in terms of the objectives, the two presidents provided to the cia make afghanistan a

quagmire like vietnam, and then drive them out and the cia succeeded. that it didn't see the global jihad was coming i think is in retrospect a clear failure. but that's looking backwards and it's a little unfair to the people at the time to make those decisions. >> and in just a couple of months i like to open this up to questions if any of you had them. looking out amongst the group, i see a number of people who are deeply knowledgeable and we'll get some good and even perhaps some tough questions. i should've mentioned in introducing bruce something that many of you know, and that is that president obama asked bruce to chair a policy review on afghanistan and pakistan. so if you kind of leap over this story to the lessons learned and maybe some lessons that were not learned in our own engagement in afghanistan. >> i think there's a lot of

lessons. first thing i would say though is we are not fighting the soviets war. we did not invade afghanistan unprovoked. we did not go in and kill the communist leader of the country which we have helped impose on the afghans before. we went into war because we were attacked by a terrorist organization taste in afghanistan supported by the afghan government. ..

the other lesson i would say is that it is critical to define the mission. the mission that was given to the agency from president carter and then by reagan was clear, understandable.

turn this into the soviet union or vietnam. and in that sense it was relatively easy to do. was probably going to be there vietnam's and/or later anyway. if you have a mission that is more vague like to let's say trying to build a moderate syrian opposition that is both anti has sought and anti isis which will support democracy and freedom, that is a lot more complicated covert operation. one of the lessons, keep it simple. what was the main motive for committing himself on his country to the extent that he did? >> a true believer. i found a great "reading the memoirs. she reports that her father who pointed chief of army staff went

to visit him one time in his home in his office, at his home actually . and the entire inside of the house is one picture after another of mecca, and he turned and said, you have turned your home into a mosque. a believer. he was not doing this clearly for pakistan national security. he believed that it was every muslim's duty to fight the gaullist atheist communist and defeat it in afghanistan. well i think that is in the history of the second half of south asia and the second half of the tortilla

century. we were lucky. there was a bigger evil. it is pursue will you could get another in pakistan. the problem as there is no more hanging him was a line. >> he died in the crash. just having left demonstration of the new battlefield tank to my guys duration which was a complete disaster. the tank did not work in miss the target when shot. he died in the crash. it is an open question

whether it was an accident or sabotage, it was probably sabotage. so many enemies that he could have been anyone. there is no reliable. the big mystery. not only is it a mystery, it changed the course. the measure had been more likely would have taking a double in 1989 or 1990 rather than 1992. kinesics assessors. he came into office in 198934 years old. no experience in international relations or in governing anything. an army in i s. i that basically saw her as the enemy and the person they wanted to overthrow. a very dysfunctional -- the

general headquarters of the voyage had been lost its commanding general. and in the crash that you refer to, you make much of this. the american ambassador to pakistan at the time was also killed. in fact i remember years and one. at the two casuals is a lure , some of us in the remember as the american ambassador in campbell. those died in incidents that were clearly related to the war. murdered by -- it is not really clear who. some kind of communist element that may have been doing the work of the kgb or may not have. it is not very clear. but they're guess -- deaths

are related to the war, but they did not die. we lost no lives fighting on the battlefield. never put any bets on the ground. we risk averse. it is interesting. the british were not risk averse. the british part of the alliance was that every spring they sent to or three teams of british intelligence officers and retired commandos into afghanistan to help train and assist the mujahedin with the pakistan support. he think about it, it is a strong and brave thing to do for a british officer to go into soviet afghanistan to assist the mujahedin. there was no rescue force. if they got in trouble there was no way out of. i had the opportunity in doing research for the buck to interview some of the british officers who did it

on the condition that i'm not name them or provide any information that would identify them. but their stories. behind the lines. we could have done it differently. if he were not risk averse we could have sent plan. the russians lack of the hard-line. one more question. i think you alluded to this. methinks you characterize it

mastery of this situation the weapons would have been quicker, and that might have sufficiently diminished to a mujahedin morphing. to you want to speculate? >> i think that is probably true. controlled the most radical factions, especially. i think that he would have not made the mistake that the pakistan is made. they decided in 1989, reached the stage in the development of a guerrilla army with a can go from being guerrillas to conventional army in fighting a conventional battle. that was a disaster.

the communists could not control areas of the country defense cities and use mass artillery and tanks to fight basically an infantry-the force. it was a disaster. i don't think they would have done it. would of been much more clever. the afghan can use government planning on the internal dissensions within it. the afghan communist government fell apart in 1992 for a number of reasons stop providing any economic aid. two, the ethnic divisions within the afghan communist party came to a head. the head of the afghan party was of boston and not jubilant. most effective of afghan communist fighter was and is back. he was live marine commander

of pro-soviet forces in the 1980's. a committed communist, also a human rights abuser of monuments levels. the first figure introduced into the book will, of course to my go on to have a conversion to islam, democracy, and capitalism. our ally in 2002 and on the cusp of becoming the vice-president of lift in a sense of a. [laughter] >> soaker. we finally stunned him. whoa. >> hello. my name is dr. donald. when i was at georgia tech a did a lot.

>> i alluded that pakistan. beyond the that and we continued to provide pakistan. i don't think that it makes sense myself that mr. ball also turn over his foreign policy to me one of the first things i would do some military assistance to pakistan. i characterize our policy of providing military assistance to pakistan unless ticket. the aftermath. it was worth a try in the beginning. on intelligence i think that we have to be very careful

in our dealings. we need them. no question about that. but we need to be very careful. yes, sir. right there. the gentleman next to you. >> what does that mean? to you think this is it is true or is it just another exercise? >> some context. >> it is several which drew. engage in a major military operation. the borderlands of infamous north waziristan. the pakistan tell a ban. it is a frankenstein have the taliban movement that has turned against pakistan. it is very difficult as an outsider, especially one sitting on massachusetts

avenue to get much ground troops. my suspicion is that very careful operation that those after parts of the palace of the pakistan have turned on the pakistani state. very carefully it does not go after terrorists and militants in that area which have long connections to the is high, most notably the high connie clan which also operates in this area. i think what we are seeing in pakistan is the gradual realization. i think that at the same time they know better than many of us how big is. and not a reasonable strategy is to -- which means in the in that as mrs. clinton wrote in her book a package and we will continue to encourage poises states on the zero that

there will only buy non pakistan the spree do you think that the u.s. special forces szigeti osama bin lot and focused on that problem. >> what is clearly focused the pakistan is on was that the air defense system and radar system was insufficient. the pakistani post-mortem which is secret but which they fully algeciras published on their website spends more time focused on the question out of the american spy than on the much more interesting question, who was helping to hide? i think it did help focus

minds, particularly in the civilian government, big depreciation. careful because i know it's pretty strong. both plans recognize that this policy of encouraging poisonous states in the backyard is ultimately self-defeating for pakistan. unfortunately they don't control the people who put them in the backyard, the pakistan the army. i do not think that they are convinced yet. and mistake. how high up in the military demand tea think it was known? how i up in the civilian? >> i don't think he had a clue. i don't think there is very much that he knows about how

the isi operate. my take on who knew is based on my understanding of what the isi is. in the interest of candor i spent a lot of time working with them. as the end of -- in a professional intelligence organization. you do not get promoted by blowing a the embassies of other countries or harboring international terrorists just because you feel like it that morning. you get promoted because you do with the boss tells you to. it is a hierarchical organization. the inspector general knows what is going on. it does not mean that there cannot be assets of the isi that behave in rhode manner. after all, if you are recruiting terrorists who

want to commit suicide you are not dealing with the most stable human beings in the world. they will do things they do not normally anticipate. if the isi knew it osama ban-lon knew he was in that house, then the director general . and says the director general in the time just prior to moving into that house, i think he would have known. just retired chief of the army staff. >> somebody in the back. >> a college student. originally going to ask something similar. ask that question for me. his the similar pakistan a policy relating to kashmir,

is there an overlap between the organizations that are running those same terrorist policies, and to what level is cashmere an american concern? what about. [inaudible] >> partly in a previous pope i looked at this question. i said at the beginning a true believer. the war in afghanistan was not only an opportunity to fight the soviet union to fight as similar war. and the isi network that was built to support the mujahedin in the early 1980's by the late 1980's is now supporting is similar she had inside kashmir.

the main facility outside of islamabad where all of the equipment, all of the weapons and ammunition that the cia was providing to pakistan that the saudis in chinese communists and others were providing was the dual use facility. part of it was supporting the war in afghanistan. part of it was supporting the war in kashmir. probably, believe in he is perhaps the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world. if they carry out another attack like the attack on my end 2008 they could precipitate war between india and pakistan. and the war is to me the most dangerous scenario that i can think of for going nuclear. two days before prime

minister was inaugurated there was an attack on the indian consulate's. that attack was carried out to. the united states government has officially said that attack was carried out. the intent of the attack as best we can put it together was to take hostages inside the consulate, holds those hostages for ransom. has that worked out we would have had an enormous crisis. >> quick question somebody could bring a microphone to her. i just want to pick up on a reference to india. the principal in the motive for essentially supporting where a soviet invasion? was it because of the close relationship between india and the soviet union or was

it more related to india verses pakistan? >> in this case it was a complementary. gone to the soviet union. detected. saw in him quite frankly india's nightmare. they overlapped neatly. that said, i think her government was always uncomfortable with being in a position of being the only democracy supporting the soviet union and afghanistan no illusions. it was a marriage of convenience. there was no ideological sympathy. an interesting question is why -- what factors produced the decision to bring this to year.

why did he decide to get the water to boil? one of the big factors. if mrs. gandhi was around that would be careful of the boiling the water. a playboy and a flaky. >> hi. i am a visiting. [inaudible] i have had basically non proliferation balance. and from what i found, giving counter administration to upgrade into a treaty. the administration or

dismissive of pakistan so while i don't dispute your opening statements the united states does not take any part to answer spreading global is hot. you can dismiss it as a bad history. dismissive of palestine. this drive toward engaging. a very strong element to it to which you alluded to when you were answering questions i just want to know how you look ahead. says u.s. feel responsible? and some point to had they

been taken seriously we would not have had this. non stage actors. >> the first thing i would say, if you go back and look at the record of the intelligence community in the 1980's. declassified national intelligence estimates, they have no illusions. the intelligence community was selling first carter and then reagan pakistan is building a nuclear weapon. it is supporting the war in afghanistan because it believes in global she hide. two presidents decided that it was more important to to defeat the soviet union than it was to try to alter the

course of pakistan me history. i have the opportunity to interview jimmy carter on this. he also provided access to his private diaries. it is clear from that jimmy carter had decided that hanging to what torching the american embassy and islamabad, killing two of our marines in the process, pakistan was too important to. i want to be careful on this question. global jihad. the cia did not trend. interviewing a lot of cia officers who were involved,

osama bin london was not on their radar screen until the end of the war which is an intelligence failure. that was not the priority. the priority was killing russians, not focusing on the arabs. that was a mistake. but there was no question that the board itself created the intellectual environment in which the global geoid emerges. one of the figures are profile and the boat is a palestinian. in 1983 he wrote a book called the defense of muslim lands. the common sense with the american revolution, the inspirational book created a global she hide. his closest partner was osama bin on.

>> yes, sir. >> i have two questions. one, if i recall correctly, in afghanistan. masada. a suicide bomber. if the stinger had not been introduced how much longer greedy thank this war would have drawn upon? my second question, where was china during this time? why did they feel that way? >> the chinese were critical . not only provided a lot of the armaments -- because

after all china produced soviet-style weapons. the chinese-made ak-47, looks a lot like a soviet-made ak-47. determined during the war to take the war inside couple. the cia could not find a rocket propelled weapons that could fire into couple from insurgents controlled territory they might have come on there own any way. he saw this chinese is a critical player. one other thing. chinese are universally regarded by the afghans as the best quality weapons they got. the weapons that they got from egypt they regarded as

the worst quality weapons that they got. the chinese did it. by 1979 the soviets split had gone so far that it was not -- there was no chinese affinity anymore for the soviet union. they wanted to see russians killed. they may not have wanted to see communism come to an end . if first question, the singers to adjusting your survey was the change on the battlefield. with the russians have left any way? they're is a healthy debate about that question among soviet apologists. some say yes, some say no perry my opinion is this, whatever happened, it accelerated the decision of the soviets to get out. may not have been the

critical factor, but when they started seeing helicopters coming down so fast i think even the soviet general staff said we cannot win this war. we either need to put a half a million and/or pull out. >> friend of brookings. >> the soviet invasion of afghanistan. we had a church hearings and the accusations of cia as a rogue elephant. a follow-on to all of those controversies reports that the cia was in turmoil, disorganization and very much hampering its operation

yet it appears the cia was operating effectively in this particular instance. i am curious to note how that may have happened, how those perceptions applied to contemporary times. >> there is no question that the cia in 1978, 1979 was an institution show starts, i would put it, not only by the church committee the power of the war in vietnam they used to feed. one of the indications of that is the risk diversity.

or that might not turn out to be. they wanted to keep as possibly deniable. they wanted new stars. the headquarters. if you look back at the decision making of the carter and reagan administration inside the white house the cia is usually the one single us to less, not to more. at the same time there were keeping the congress fully informed, both sides of the hell, both political parties, this was by the late-1980s a cia that was also engaged in illegal, unconstitutional covert operations in central america and the famous iran-contra scandal. a remarkable ability to compartmentalize how his

operations are running. on the one hand to my would argue, very successful and completely legal as much as a covert operation can be. a completely legal operation while he was carrying out rode the illegal operations in other parts of world. what it means for today, i think risk averse the is a good thing in an intelligence organization. i think intelligence organizations should be the ones to say to presidents, yes, we can arm the syrians but you should realize they're is a lot of downside to what will happen and it is going to be hard. i think the intelligence professionals responsibility is not just to say yes, sir. we can do it but to say we can do it but it may look a lot like the bay of pays when it is over.

i do not know when do that today. i hope that they do. >> this gentleman over here. >> the washington institute military and security program. you touched briefly on my question in your answer to the previous one. begin supplying funds to the syrian opposition. what particular lessons learned or successes or failures can we take and applying it to future u.s. training programs and also how can we avoid the intelligence failures that gave us the global jihad. >> the second thing i can into. of 360-degree awareness. be aware of what is going on in the office next door to you spy on the isi so that

you know what they are up to and have no illusions. i think there are several lessons. the military was reluctant to. fall into the wrong hands. they predicted the of what former. probably less than six weeks so of our first lesson but, if detected you can provide weapons only to the good guys can't forgive him. it is not going to happen. the good guys will either give them away.

or turn out to be the bad guys. in the reagan administration had no illusions. lesson number two, keep the mission simple. do not try to create a freedom loving democratic organization. you are fighting an insurgency. these are not likely to be jeffersonian democrats. if you don't like that, don't go down that road. lesson number three, get in front of pakistan. unless you want to do it with american boots on the grounds, which i would argue we don't, you have to find someone who was willing to provide sanctuary for this insurgent movement. there are really only two possibilities.

>> african american. and so some of my family's saw the afghan resistance. but it mostly at two with the tension that existed. a large number of afghan a lead are acclimated or

marginal eyes are forced out of the country despite the warnings that this type of approach is pushing for leading to serious consequences. this would amount to a fanatical regime in the future of afghanistan the sacrifice and the damage that was done. we had a bigger strategic interest. and just wondering. afghanistan feels the effect of that because some of the most fundamentalist came to the forefront. and we're dealing with that.

>> the afghan people paid a horrific price. no american casualties. at least some money and half . another five or 6 million afghans became refugees. another became engine with displaced people. we just gave them the guns to do that. they got very little but the benefits of victory. and being a part of that, the revolution was sabotage or subverted or drawn to the interests. and the figure who most epitomizes the concern of measure had been about what was going on was mentioned earlier. a profile of him.

based on extensive interviews with him. and it was very clear to him that the isi was stealing their revolution for its own purposes. and he was virulently anti pakistan. we see it today in the presidential alexian. of bella bella who won the first round. overwhelmingly the 21st century reincarnation. the top of the atlas is the belief that pakistan is up a friend of gas and. i just want to raise that. we should not finished today on afghanistan without the

knowledge and that we are at a critical moment in afghanistan history. they need to be in the game now worn and the percentage. whenever you think of their rights and wrongs of the situation, president obama, disaster in afghanistan after what just happened would be is most thorough indictment of foreign policy. i don't have our recipe other than we need to have a thorough audit of the selection. it is astounding to believe that there were almost 7 million votes cast in the first-round and over 8 million in the second round.

that is the best round game mobilization in the history of elections and it just does not add up. >> what i am about to say, full disclosure or parochial and situation employed. i think he is the first brookings' non-residents senior fellow to be a candidate. i would like to ask a two-part final question. it has to do with two russian leaders. gorbachev and prudent. in your research did you find evidence that another motivation : shot at for ending the misadventure in afghanistan was that he had a suspicion may need to reform the soviet union so that there was basically a domestic, you know, we have

to fix our own country and get out of afghanistan? with regard to what our colleagues, 35 years after the soviet union invaded afghanistan in a post-soviet leader invaded another neighboring country. ukraine. and there are -- had been -- there is some evidence and certainly some speculation that that could be disastrous or at least pad for russia over the long run for reasons that relate to afghanistan. i remember as a journalist going to central asia about three months after the invasion and being told by central asian authorities to, of course, or soviet officials the reason they

had gone to afghanistan was because it was the equivalent of a forest fire and they wanted to keep the forest fire from jumping over into the culturally and historically islamic parts of the soviet union. and he testified going into ukraine and the grounds of basically russian chauvinism which i don't think probably plays very well in those parts of the russian federation underpopulated by the descendants of turkic people and models, islamic people. and elsewhere. and so i wonder if you have given any thought to whether mr. pelton could have learned a lesson from afghanistan. >> first on gorbachev, i don't think there is any question. probably on winnable. a drain on soviet resources and a barrier to his

objectives. so for him getting out was an essential step to a larger -- that reasoning was completely lost on the american intelligence community which was convinced that the soviet union was not about to reform itself. about to become bigger and better than ever before. nothing in the intelligence record at the end of the war that suggests the american intelligence community had even a whisper. >> the commander in chief at a different you. >> the commander in chief. while reagan had a very different view. cooney, kgb officer stationed in east germany during the war must follow the war very closely. i don't think he learned any lessons. i think that he looks at it

from a technician's standpoint. if only we were smarter spies we could have run certainly from his handling of chechnya. i don't see someone who is trying to diffuse islamist sentiments. he is trying to do to the islamists in chechnya with the soviet union tried to do to the afghan people in afghanistan. drive them out of the country or kill them or so intimidate them that they will except russian authority. i think in the long run that is not going to work. it is interesting. in his first statement he identified two enemies, russia and america. >> already an indication. particularly in the younger cohort.

this has been a terrific conversation. want to make three points. a sky has written a book. please get it. buy it. that will be available right outside. second, we have all lot of good conversations. this one was distinctively a good conversation because of the degree of knowledge and expertise and experience that was evident from those of you who were good enough to ask questions. i am sure there are a lot of you in the room of could have pushed bruce in a very constructive way. finally, you can imagine those of you who have not, what a pleasure it was and what an education it was for an amateur like myself to spend time with their real specialist like this working on that part of the wr