to god. because i needed something beyond me. i needed someone to relate to what the world beyond my cubic area the size of this platform that i was living the whole time. but the ritual part of it, i like the ritual and i continued doing all sorts of rituals and i stopped observing the sabbath strictly and i stopped keeping kosher and i stopped doing these things in prison because i realized i don't take the bible as the literal thing. but you know i too feel stronger and i guess i feel stronger in the belief that there are forces

that are unknown to us or are barely knowable and definitely unable to be spoken about that are around us. >> this isn't as deep a question but it is a serious question. you all are all obviously very intelligent people say you had to known where you were hiking was near iran and iran is a special and friendly to americans. did you not have a map or any sense of how far you have gone? >> no maam. >> but beforehand. >> i remember we were in solomon nia and i remember seeing it on the map. it's on the eastern part of ir iran -- of iraq but it's not on the border. some people said go to this waterfall so we went to the waterfall. i remember thinking we are near the eastern side.

at one point during hiking and this is one of those thoughts that plague me in solitary confinement, i remember mentioning we are heading to iran totally without any notion that we were near it but just feeling like well we are heading east and near east and we talked. we talked about it for a moment and we were like no is probably a far better way more miles than you can hike in a day or a week. so we were very surprised. >> is one of those things when something really terrible happens to you of course we all went over 10,000 times. if we had taken less time eating breakfast and spending more time at the internet café and printed out the map and if the internet hadn't gone down, a million things contributed to what happened but mostly our guards were down because we were in a safe part of the middle east. shane and i both traveled and

more dangerous parts and it was word-of-mouth. >> i'm sure you guys are told this often but you are brave for reliving this over and over again. >> those are the kinds of comments we will allow you to say. [laughter] >> i have a question, a two-part question but related on your perspective of the media and you were watching while you're there because you mentioned you had television. i was wondering if you had this international campaign going at home and did you see the news that was being said about you from the united states or were you seeing the iranian and persian media and without question were you seeing skewed information? well-wisher complete perspective on what was being said about you? >> the news was absolutely absurd. some examples of pairs and english-language ticker that was all eyes on and there were times that it said israel commits the

most crimes in the entire world or the earthquake in haiti was caused by the united states exploding a nuclear weapon on the ground, like this kind of stuff. totally off the wall. we didn't get a lot of information about our case. we mostly got it from letters from family that everyone saw something would come up. it was like state tv. it wasn't satellite and it satellite and i was given press tv if you have seen that. it was a lot worse amount. but sometimes there would be a story from the outside like "cnn" that would be spliced ends of the first time we had television, the day that we had a tv we turned it on and there was a christian -- christiane amanpour and pictures of us in the background. it was this really crazy feeling because it felt like those kinds of shows wanted some kid that went missing and died and i was

watching myself as a memory. but you know we did get things like you know one of the three american spies to be tried separately so that made us think we could talk at nottingham about who would it be that goes first? might sarah get out and we would get these snippets that we would obsess about. >> let me just clear on the christiane amanpour thing. we didn't have that channel but within the iranian state television within their news program they would show a 22nd clip of "cnn" or abc or something. >> so they weren't showing the guards beyond the prisoner's? they weren't watching american media? >> a lot of them like abc farsi on satellite. they told us they had it in prison.

>> pretty much every prisoner that gave me information from the outside was from bbc. a lot of iranians have satellite so they watch it religiously. >> the way we figured out the story around the world was the news we would see would be a reaction to western media usually and they wouldn't give what they were reacting to so we were trying to figure out what the tea party was through the iranian reaction are the arab spring. they didn't say anything about syria and they wouldn't talk about bahrain. i remember when osama bin laden was killed, there was a lot of conflicting narratives that happen and an act example they said that they had a lot of people in pakistan that were angry that the u.s. had intervened and killed osama bin laden and the next day there was a story, what was that?

>> the newscaster was like osama bin laden has been killed and dumped into the ocean and that has nothing to do with the islamic burial rites. people realized that there must have been some media in the western media saying that they threw him in the ocean. >> then there would be the pictures. there was one picture they would show up him and it was probably in the media here too. they were casting doubt on it being him so it sounded like anger at the u.s. killing him but there was a conspiracy and he was actually alive. >> media was wild. >> we spent a lot of time trying to figure out what the hell was going on around the world and we have no idea. >> we will take these last two questions. >> i too want to thank you for your courage and recounting your stories especially as an iranian jewish woman i want to thank you for shedding light on some of

the horrific experiences that are live day-to-day in the prisons. two questions, one serious someone lighter question. thank you for sharing your experiences with the gentleman who declared himself as al qaeda. and i'm wondering if you experience other women and minorities who pretend -- perhaps were treated differently in prison and whatever you can tell us about them and then on a lighter note, are you still hiking? [laughter] ..

interrogation we knew who commensurate to dawn on us as things progress that we had a certain power that they cannot physically hurt as because we were valuable to them and that they were going to eventually catch us in and did not want to look to or applicable. they're wanted camino, to have happy endings. and that is something was a difficult thing and also give us power is stand up costs clearly in the beginning average just cry and plead for anything from the guards, another method of their time. toward the end i realize they could not mess with me that much that was one guard that told me i could not go out to sea shane

and josh. i was yelling at her and arguing she slapped me. and i just reached up and slapped back. and it's kind of established a certain level of respect. not hard to make you know, but established a certain level of respect. we became the closest i think you can become to france. i don't think you can be a friend of theirs that kind of power dynamic, but i used to give her shoulder rubs. she had four kids come of working-class woman. i told her i would miss her and meant it. >> and about people who, you know, there, detained after our release. there are other people. and just to let you know, our lawyer was detained. and when he tried to leave the country he was stripped of his passport. now he can't practice anymore. and that is just for defending

us. so, you know, the tactics continue. >> i figure change would take that one. >> whenever there is time. >> it was where to find out that we were -- we were called hikers in prison. that was our name. not something i ever identified with the for this morita remember after we got out. traveling around the country seeing family. i remember being in colorado on night. i was realizing that you know, i kind of wanted to turn away from that identity. and i realized, that's the kind of -- i hike a lot. and i like to hike. i have to either do it in secret or own it. maybe it can be simply returning -- the note of my can not the activists of the law died.

the seven. >> coupon going. >> i'm happy that all three of you are here in front of us tonight. so i know that your family and your friends really miss you unsupported your lot while you were in iran and send your letters and cards and pictures of the will times. sometimes the mothers of ready several times a day. so i just wanted to know how often you actually got these letters. were they censored? did you get some and piles? did you ever get them? what was that experience like? >> is today we spoke at a different venue. and i saw somebody who wrote a letter to me. she rode it. i remember the day and got it. i can tell you exactly what was

on it. i could do that for the other 50. when i got them i was shaking the letters at the sky, reading, laughing, crying. it was like the world busted open. end but that was from friends and family, extended family. after that it was only from immediate family. and it wasn't regular. once a month, once every two months. it was hard to ever know. we would ask. and at certain points i think it was around one year ran we got letters. a stunt getting letters from my brother. his only from my mother and father. my mom was writing that i read you every day, but i was in getting them every day. was this huge mystery of where we're going.

as the interrogators. about a year-and-a-half and we started this campaign of hunger striking. the first time we -- it took five days for the interrogator to come. when he came me chemists' letters from sarah for the first time. she had been out for about four months at that point. for the first time, my brother, shane sisters. that we didn't know if there were going to keep giving letters. he said, look, thank you for these. so you know, every 30 days if you don't bring a new batch of letters with all of them in numbers and letters we will continue to hire strike. it thank just takes so long. we could ride out.

so we realized that we never knew if we were getting all of them. we had a phone calls five months later, one of us said, right on the letter the next letter, the dates of the last three letters it sent. once that started happening : but more to say, the bulls the month before released. in short it was a big drama. but also to sarah and it was a lifeline. what would happen, we would go through the cycles of get the letters and feel this place. everyone cares and remembers. than two weeks later, well, i haven't heard from anyone in two weeks. i guess we are forgotten. group psychology between us would start going down. >> it's really interesting about the dates. because of the prisoners that i

correspond with now ask the same thing. it's universal is going to be taken away. a huge industrial dufflebag full of all of those letters. and every once in awhile when i'm feeling down and kind of myopia and forget to appreciate life and freedom eye just pluck one out marie it. [applause] [applause] >> when you decided to write a book and how you actually did it. it looks like maybe you each took different tacks to marry in your own voice, but how does that actually work? you are living in different cities. how did you come together to write this?

>> we -- i mean, when we decided to write a book together i think we all assumed we would write it this way. there was not a process of kind of figuring out. we assumed we would all right in the first person. the way we started it is we just said let's take this time frame, the first four months and right about that. we just all went off on our own and are about it and came back and have the time of writing. we had to put it in order, figure out his parts would go win. it's really difficult. everybody -- there are three versions of everything. we then decided to kind of divide up the main events. create an outline. we would each write about these. in the writing process other things would come up. we kind of did little chunks and of right and then come back and put it in chronology and then add it intensively in each other's work to transition and do all that.

there were probably six months of just getting. >> of sure it's going to be successful. to you have plans to do anything more, a continuation or use the profits for a special program or whatever? >> no plans as of yet. but i will say that in writing the book and even in the process to decide to write a memoir our story is a story about the horror of losing our freedom in captivity and the absolute miracle of getting it back and all the people that did not give it back, the people we had to leave behind. a friend in prison that was executed off for left. so this story is not just our story. its many stories, and some of those people whose stories are in a broker in this room marina.

>> thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]n the

past and the road to peace". this is 90 minutes. >> we have a prized seat in the front row if i can induce someone to come on up.

good evening, and welcome. i am hoge warren and i am happy to happy to welcome you to this event. we are insider's view on the failed past and the road to peace" and. sain sain he is here to talk about iran's program and the conflicted relationship with the united states and his own close personal association over the years with the two principles on the iranian side in the current nuclear negotiations.

this makes him a perfect quest for ipi tonight because this is a -- guest -- because this is a tantling time for the united states and iran. the two countries have been sworn enemies for the last 35 years but as many people have pointed out they are also two countries that have much in common, tremendous influence, and parallel interest despite their profound differences. the current round of talks between the

that should happen one can imagine a situation where the u.s.-iran cease being enemies and become rivals who maybe to cooperate on issues where there is a common issues. the u.s. and china and russia are call in issues. that is why i used the word tantalizing at the offset. this is marked by deep and misoccurring trust on both sides. the result is a breakdown between the united states and iran that lasted longer than the

breakdown between china and the united states. building trust is elusive particular if one side doesn't understand what the other side thinks and why it does. that is the value of this book. and i can think of no better person to explain the iranian viewpoint to a western audience than seyed hossein mousavian who was at many events who did his und undergraduate here and has been doing research and teaching at princeton. i can recommend his book and it is for sale at the door. and i should tell you it is proved to be so poplar that we had to send out to the publisher to get more in. and he will linger a bit at the

end to sign copies and chat with you. he was here two years ago to discuss his first book and i am delighted to have him back here potentially at this moment for our two countries. welcome and the floor is yours. [applause] >> thank you. first of all, i would like to extend my gratitute to warren and his colleagues at ipi -- gratitude -- for planning this event. i came to the united states in mid-1970s and left the u.s. some weeks before the victory of islamic revolution 1979. i came back in 2009. 30 years later. in these three decades i had an

opportunity to be engaged in major events and occasions related to problems between iran and the west from hostage taking crisis in 1988-1989 to afghanistan crisis to the nuclear crisis, different administrations, different peri periods. working in foreign ministry. most of the time i spent on problems and relations between iran and the west. i was seven years in germany as ambassador and it gave me a great opportunity to discuss with you t.

we had critical dialogues with the difference on human rights, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and all of the issues including hezbollah. officially and unofficially. when i came back in 2009 to the united states it was different because i didn't have official hat or access to tens or hundreds of american foreign policy experts and journalist to sit with them and discuss very, very openly, sincerely and frankly the disputes and problems between iran and the united states. definitely these four-five years gave me a great understanding about the american perception and how americans view the

iranian's foreign policy making system and the disputes between iran and the united states. in this period it was very clear for me there is a big gap on correct understanding of iran. rarely can you find a foreign expert in the united states with the correct understanding of iran. of course no one can blame anyone because first of all we had no relation during 35 years and there is no exchange between journalist and scholars and academics and iranians and americans. that is why i felt in a unique

position knowing i spent nine years in the united states over thee decades in the iranian policy making system to write a book about the relationship between iran and united states. tehran and washington have experienced one of the most dysfunctional relations, if not the most. one of the most hostile relations if not the most. and during mordern history, i can rarely find -- modern -- such a style between the united states and any other country. even with the soviet union there was relations and ambassadors.

even with vietnam with the wars and everything the united states and ambassadors have official relations. but iranians and americans have failed to establish a had been and experienced all means of hostility. economic, covert, cyber, political war. the united states definitely tried over three decades to bring regime change in iran and failed. i try to explain the roots of hostili

hostility. rarely you would find this in the west living in iran and having access to the policy making system to write from the lens of iranian culture. policy making structure of the country and how iranians view americans and the united states. i did my best to be balanced in order to explain both point of views but i think that the advantage or my objective was more to explain the iranian point of view because of the vacuum in the west lit.

i talked about a century of 1856 to 1953. i have 25 years of relation between iran and the united states after the revolution, the time the united states supported the pshaw but the focus is during the war and eight years of the presidents and eight years presidency of the reformist and eight years president of the conservative or radical.

it doesn't matter what president we have, i have explained many events that all presidents tried to bring approachment between the iran and the united states. and they made a lot of tries over the 30 years and all have failed. there has been the same approach, not always from the u.s. administration but some of the administrations in the u.s. since 1979 tried to also bring an end to the hostilities between iran and the united states and americans have also

failed. that is why one of the main issues in my book is the root causes of the failures of the iran and u.s. during the years. it is about the mistrust, mutual mistrust, about misunderstandings and per exceptionss and calculations. the reason and mindset of the leaders why and what is the reasons and the evidence and the facts is he cannot trust the u.s. interesting issue is despite the leader doesn't have

leadership he doesn't have different approaches to the united states. you would see stories that i explained during many of the presidents and at the end it came to be correct because they all failed. i wanted to present a road map for iran and the united states to end the hostilities after over three decades. my main objective was to use my experience, my knowledge, my engagement in many many events between iran and the united states and iran and the west and understanding both parties to

present a roadmap. a comprehensive road map of how iran and the united states can improve the relations. actually tehran and washington have decided, wrongly i believe, to focus on the nuclear deal and want to discuss other issues after the policy. one of the major steps between tehran and washington which could pave the way for a normal relationship would be civilian

diplomacy. if you have hostilities between the states i cannot imagine the nations together. i do not see legitimate reasons why we prevented the two nations too normal relations together. that is why civilian diplomacy is one of the major issues i explained in detail. many, many other issues as well. the other subject i have introduced is about the end state on differences. we had many piece meal approaches during the last 40 years. the reason for the failure, one

of them, is because iran and the united states have relied on peace meal approaches. they have never engaged in a comprehensive dialogue and for the future my understanding is iran-america problem doesn't limit to nuclear. it is not only about terrorism. it is not only about peace process. we have to engage in a comprehensive dialogue to put all bilateral, regional, and international issues on the table to negotiate. to be able to agree on differences, iran and the u.s. want to see the end state on

every issue from piece process to terrorism to weapons of mass destruction. i give you just one example. we say for ten years some years i was involved in negotiations. the reason was iranians want to see the end states. for iranians the end state was recognition of the rights for peaceful nuclear technology including enrichment. and during our time, or p5 plus 1 was never in a position to accept the full rights of iran on this including enrichment and that is why iranians could never sign to any deal during the ten years of negotiations. for a period, the read line for the united states was no

enrichment in iran. this was the main reason they could get together for a deal. but recently the united states recognized this isn't correct policy. they changed no enrichment to no nuclear bomb. when the u.s. red line moved from no enrichment to no nuclear bomb then the end state for the united states should be no nuclear bomb. that is why they could sign a deal in geneva in november of 2003 because both parties could see the end state. iranians were sure at the end they write including enrichment would be recognized and respected. americans or the war powers they could see at the end iran would

agree to different measures, transparency measures, no capabilities measures making sure the international community knew iran would not seek in the future nuclear bomb. this is the case about every other disputed issues. if they can see the end from the beginning they can enter for a comprehensive deal on every issue. the other issue which i have discussed in the book is the wrong strategy both from washington and from tehran to focus on the differences and forget to talk about the commonalities. warren mentioned a statement from kissenger that iran and the

united states have huge common interests. it is true. iran and the united states both face the rise of one of the most dangerous versions of terrorism during the history of mankind. it is a threat to iran and the united states. they both are worried about the crisis of iraq and syria spilling over into the region. they are both worried about a break of sectarian war to the whole region. they both want safe passage of oil and energy from the region. they both don't want to see the possession of terrorist on the oil resources of the region which can be a threat to

international oil markets. and stability in iraq, and integrity prevents the collapse of iraq as a state and nation is a common in the between iran and the united states. and practically they have supported the same government in iraq and even in afghanistan for a decade. they have supported karzai despite the differences and supported al-maliki despite of problems and hostilities. this is one of the main problems and in order to build a future we need tehran and washington to begin to negotiate, to talk, to

cooperate on the issues of common interest. from drug trafficking to organized crimes to stability in afghanistan, iraq and syria, to security of energy, stability in persian gulf and many other issues which are vital to the national interest of the u.s. and iran both. i am not going to take too much of your time to explain every detail of the book but i believe there is a chance. there is a serious chance, i believe. when i am looking to the current situation of the middle east i see iraq and syria on the brink.

taliban is coming back in afghanistan. pakistani crisis seems to be going and the scholars are worried about the future of pakistan. whether we like it or not and whether the u.s. likes it or not iran is one of the most stable countries in the region. despite 30 years of the war and everything iran is one of the most stable countries. i look at the area and say iran and turkey are the most stable countries.

others have instability like iraq or afghanistan or they are vulnerable to the crisis. this is additional responsibility for tehran and washington to cooperate. i don't believe the crisis in the region will only be resolved by cooperation by iran and the united states. we need to engage other powers like saudi arabia and turkey. we need a regional corporation system which i have discussed in details in the book in the persian gulf and the region. i would prepare warren to stop here and go to the questions.

[applause] >> i am going to ask a couple questions of my own and then we will go to the floor. hussein, you mentioned saudi arabia and the need to include them. i want to ask you about something that is current right now. as we know the foreign minister of iran at one point proposed going to the gulf states to present a case that is not poplar in the gulf states. i think we wanted to go and there was no invitation forthcoming. i think that changing and one is hearing there is a chance there might be a meeting between saudi arabia and iran. can you report where that stands? the saudi arabians opposition to

the middle east a struggle between saudi arabia and sunni on one end and iran and the shiites on the other end. how does that stand? >> i don't know whether we have any change because still there is no official invitation for the minister to visit the area. >> i was going to say in the book also hassan tells a fascinating story of when why was chosen to go to saudi arabia and i think you met the king? >> yes, we was crowned the prince after the time. it was after eight years of war between iran and iraq which saudi arabia supported saddam

hussein and we had 300-300 iranians massacred. the hostility was extremely high. i went and met the crown prince and he was the main decision maker at the time. three or four others met in his home privately from 11 at night to 4-5 in the morning. and we were able to agree on a package for bilateral relations. that is why the relation from 1996-2005 at the end of the president's period and the whole period of the next we had the best relation between iran and

saudi arabia and even better than the relationship during the shaw. this is the reason i believe the iran-saudi arabia crisis can be managed easily. i understand the saudi arabians are concerned about the rise of iran. when they look at afghanistan, iraq and syria and everywhere they see iran has the upper hand. that is why they mobile mobilealized the forces but they are on the wrong track and they would be the victim. iran wouldn't be vulnerable to the wave of terrorism but i think saudi arabia would be. they are investing on the wrong track. the notion of bringing a balance between iran and saudi arabia in

order to sit and negotiate is really -- i really don't understand. because i feel that saudi arabians want to have a balance. it is in the role and influence of saudi arabia and in the region to negotiate. after 30 years of all types of pressures and sanctions and war and use of chemical weapons now iran is the most powerful and stable countries. how long we have to fight together in the region in order to bring balance -- i think the notion is wrong. i believe the terrorist are the same threat to iran, united states, europe and even saudi arabia. i mean they are against what

they say imperilism, u.s. zionism, shiites and all of the region. i believe they are all in one boat and they should sit together and discuss openly and frankly all concerns. there are two big covers. in the sunni war, saudi arabia is powerful and in the shiites iran is powerful. and i remember talking to crown prince who is the king now he told me the three pillars of the region are saudi arabia, iran

and iraq. and we cannot cooperate are saddam. today saddam is gone. and there is no reason three pillars of the region should not and could not fit together and create a regional cooperation between iran, iraq and the other countries. >> you said tonight and you said in the book that three different precedencies in iran including the presidency of the latest failed. why do you think this one might work? >> in my understanding i explained in the book he made the most effort, even more than

the others to reach the united states. he was the first president who wrote official letter to the u.s. president obama. he was the first president congradulated a united states president. the high level talks began during his era which the secretary of national security in geneva in 2009 and it was a very secret talk between the iran and united states began in 2012. it was again during the next

president. the reason i said warren, tehran and washington have failed in the last three decades is pie piecemeal approach. they have never had a comp comprehensive strategy. they need to engage in dialogue on all issues. just focusing for nuclear for ten years. a decade we are fighting on nuclear. really iran and the united states problems are limited to the nuclear? this is the problem. >> but in fact the negotiation we are looking at now is piecemeal and focused just on the nuclear and they said we will not deal with anything else consciously and they will try to settle on this and build on it.

i think from talking to you and reading the book you think that has a chance, don't you? >> the realities in the region i think would bring a mindset change to tehran and washington. iraq is one today. they feel a threat to the national security of the united states, iran, saudi arabia, and the region. that is why i believe there is a chance because unfortunately the recent crisis in the region is educating tehran and washington to engage as soon as possible in a grand bargain. >> if this negotiation -- my own

thinking is the reason this particular one might have a better chance is you have an elected leader of iran who was elected on a program in an election that was certified as fair and open by international authorities. you had a president who ran on a program and you have a foreign minist minister. i wanted to ask you suppose it doesn't work and there is a failure for whatever reason and as i said at the outset and

israel and one and we can talk about that in a second. what happened happen in iran if this particular negotiation bro broke down? how important is it this particular one succeed? >> i fully agree today we have a golden opportunity because here the combination of obama, kerry and chuck hagel is something we have never had after the revolution in 1979 in the united states.

during the period before it wasn't much different. however, when you ask me what happens if this fails, i believe the same happened to others because they all tried and they all failed. >> since we are talk about the

supreme leader a little bit and when i asked what happened happen to them i think i am saying what would the supreme leader say to them or do to them if they fail. i wanted to ask you just structurally how does the iranian government work? you have a president. you have a congress. you have a national security council. i think you served on it. and yet on top of all of that particular when it comes to foreign policy you had the supreme leader. how does it work? how do you, for instance, someone like you, communicate with a supreme leader and how does he communicate with you? >> the structure is similar to washington. you have congress and you have parliament. the supreme leader authority in our constitution is similar to president obama's authority in your constitution. president obama maybe able to

veto the congress decisions and legislation but the supreme leader of iran cannot veto legislation by parliament. we have national security council which is the most prominent institutions to decide on major issues related to politics and security like nuclear and like iraq and afghanistan. he is deciding there is a dictatorship and he vetos everything and no body has no authority and this is totally a wrong perception here. it is true that he is the

ultimate decision maker on foreign policy like president obama is the ultimate decision maker on foreign policy. but during his leadership he has agreeed with over 90% of the decisions made by iranian national security council. although in many cases he is not in agreement with conclusion. one example on the nuclear. the nuclear policy compared between the two different presidents you would see huge differences.

he didn't veto the decision of majority. >> he has the pow er to veto? >> rarely. perhaps one or two during over two decades of his leadership. i have explained one example that was veto was the time that iranian diplomats were assassinated in afghanistan and everyone was angry in iran and the majority of members of national security council

believe that they should go inside afghanistan after the taliban like when afghanistan was being invaded. but the supreme leader decided not to intervene. this is very rare. >> when you talk to americans about iran and the united states obviously one of the great issues is israel. while the rhetoric has changed and we do not want to wipe israel off the face of the map. for those that would be curious,

i want to ask you, what would you assume the united states and iran reach an agreement, is it possible to imagine iran any one day recognizing the state of israel? if that is not possible is it possible to imagine iran not protesting the existence to the state of israel? is there a possible compromise there? >> what is the change in israeli position during the periods? the israeli position has remained the same. therefore it doesn't matter if someone in iran denies holocaust or condemns holocaust. it is just some instrument to use and play against iran in

international public opinion. to play with the major iran. otherwise, just tell me any changes in the position when there was jews gathering were the new year, they powerfully condemned the holocaust. the israeli position is the same. therefore i don't believe a change in iranian position would matter. this is a fact. you can compare. second the problem is everybody is talking about iran not recognizing israel. 90% of muslim countries don't recognize israel. the majority of the united

states allies don't recognize israel like saudi arabia. why are you talking about iran only? for 40-50 years you have not been able to convince your allies to recognize israel and you blame iran? we have 57 muslim countries that don't recognize israeli. this isn't an issue with iran. but warren, can you find one evidence during president reins and any official stated wiping israel off the map? you would not find it during certain presidents. you would find some very high level statements that said we

would not disturb peace process. it was a green light signal that if there is a deal iran would be prepared not to disturb peace process. but was there any changes during the united states position when the statements were made that we would not disturb peace process? there was no statement about wiping israel off the map. during the last 10-15 years netanyahu's rating up and asking for military strikes against iran. and no body criticized netanyahu. why are you asking and putting pressure on the u.s. to attack iran but if iran denies holocaust like earthquake in the u.s., you know? if netanyahu ten times a day repeats attacking iran no one cares.

>> i was just saying it is the reality of the situation. it wasn't great public relations for him to speak that way at the time and it made it more difficult. >> even when he made the statement against holocaust i publically rejected his statements. >> i am saying i am talking about a president who had you jailed after all. let me ask you and then i will go to the room. in the introduction i imagined a situation where if the fuclar deal work -- nuclear -- deal works and you have a deal, you could turn iran from being an enemy into being a rival. we have differences and we will pursue them and we can pursue them aggressively and with great

competitiveness. and the analogy i said is this is like the united states and china or the u.s. and russia or even the u.s. in the old days and the soviet union. is that a fair way of looking at what might be the truth about iran and the united states? >> i look at this case a little different warren because rivalry between iran and the united states and the region perhaps during last 30-40 years, yes. but to my understanding the united states is going to leave the region within five years, ten years, they are going to leave persian gulf. they are not going to have any more military strikes. they don't want to have any invasion of any country in the

middle east. when it is iran, egypt, or syria. they are lost millions because of wars in afghanistan and iraq. on the oil issue, it seems they are going to be independent within some years and at least they would not be that much dependented on the oil from the region. therefore if the united states strategy in the region is going to be changed with engagement and military basis and spending millions to keep the military presence i think it is changing. if it is going to be changed the rivalry would be between iran and saudi arabia. i look at the issue more of the complication as we see the region and we need to find a

solution within the region and then discuss about the united states and russia. the fact is the two major powers iran and saudi arabia are strategic location of the persian gulf and 40% of the oil is coming from the persian gulf. on the occasion of the departure of the united states, the vacuum we would face soon, look at the vacuum after the departure from united states to iraq or afghanistan. and the crisis and the danger of spilling over to the whole region -- this is the reason my proposal initiative and

suggestion is a regional cooperation system as soon as possible between iran, dcc and iraq for peace, stability and security in the persian gulf. and a type of cooperation they have like in europe. we can have the same system in persian gulf. >> i would love to get questions from the floor. c-span is here tell -- televising this so hold the mike clearly and identify yourself or organization. i think we will take 2-3 questions at once starting in the front row.

can i ask you stto stand? >> hussein you expect me to ask you a question that is not easy for you. >> always. >> we differ on the spin you making of the relationship between iran and united states. it was the american war in iraq that gave iraq to iran so this is the point of view held by several people in the region and beyond. if you want to speak about the grand bargain which is a good idea. can you kindly tell me what would the elements me? how willing is iran to give up its ambitions in iraq and syria? this is the number one problem that iranians have with the arabs and the saudi arabians in

particular. iraq and syria are arab lands. and it is maliki in iraq who has failed iraq and the intervention in syria, including hezbollah, going cross borders and becoming one of the cross-border armies that fought in syria and gave rise unfortunately to the terrorist, the sunni terrorist, like isis or isil or whatever you want to call them. what is going to be done to have that grand bargain work? i would very much be interested in details on your part. and don't tell me about the secular region thing because you understand it has been rejected already. >> i think we will answer that one question. robin being the good journalist she is gets about 3-4 questions in one. we will get to the two of you afterwards. >> when you talk about iranian

ambition and you use the example on iranian influence in iraq you should never forget iraq invaded iran for eight years and it was arab regional countries supported them. irans were killed and damage. saddam used chemical weapons to hundreds of thousands of iranians were killed or injured. saudi arabia, arabs, the united states supported the use of chemical weapons. you forget this part of the history and you talk about today's influence of iran. iran's influence is defensive in iraq because you forget the part of the history when you invaded

iran. if iraq, arabs, they have not invaded iran after the revolution, the strategy if the region would have been different. you cut a part of history you should not. no one in iran would forget what iraq and the support of hundreds of billions was paid to saddam by dcc to support the invasion. this integration of iran was the target of this. saddam announced it as part of iraq and you and everyone supported. you forget the notion of refp change. if iran has influence in the

region this is defensive. grand bargain -- first of all is about cooperation on comm commonalities. the iran and united states have differences and they have commonalities. the vacuum in the last 35 years is about cooperation, negotiation on commonalities. ...

to find principles to settle their differences on these four major issues. the third is -- i reiterate my belief if they agreed they can establish regional corporation. and this is a must for the region. because to my and understanding, the u.s. is not going to pay for the region. answer my an understanding some countries would not be able to employ to u.s. supplies for the

security. so we need the region for security. this can be a part of a grand bargain because i believe the u.s. was opposing the regional corporation system. now the u.s. does not oppose the regional cooperation. and then the crisis. we have crisis in afghanistan, crisis and iraq, crisis and syria. syria, of course, it would need to have russia. it would need to have regional powers like saudi arabia, the iran and big powers like the u.s. and russia to manage this year in crisis. but iran should be a part of the solution. otherwise isolating iran and syria would never be able to put

a solution in place. that's why geneva one fails. that is what geneva to fail. if you are going to have geneva three without iran it. >> we will take to now. be. >> i'm a journalist. i have a question in regard to iran. does this present opportunities for cooperation between the u.s. and iran although both sides of officially denied that? and secondly, how do you see the future of iran? would you agree that a unified solution is a good solution, or would you see that there is enough? thank you. but. >> your question was about opportunity on iran. >> iran.

>> hi. margaret williams, and beyond. two very quick questions. the first one is regarding turkey. i am wondering if you could elaborate on how you think iran sees their relationship with turkey going forward, particularly iraq and what has happened in muzzle and elsewhere. secondly, can you talk about him and how potential for some sort of dialogue between iran and saudi could possibly materialize. >> yemen is the easiest. compared to iraq and syria. iran and turkey have had a cordial relationships for 400 years. there is really been no deep

reaches hostility between iran and turkey. the half had for 30 years, 40 years after revolution to look at the economic relations between iran and turkey. anand and my those big nations in the region. you have egypt, turkey, iran, of big civilization in history. the biggest nascent -- nation in the region. none of us can be neglected for any kind of region and arrangement. i always believe that the iran tester correlation is crucial for stability in the region. also for relations with europe and the west which always can play a role here

for a short time in syria there was a feud between iran and turkey. immediately recognize that this is not in their long-term interest. now they're trying to not desert the bilateral relations because of the syrian issue. iraq definitely is. i mean, but whether they officially, the iranians are americans officially stated and not, you cannot deny the current terrorism is a threat to iran and the u.s. we cannot deny that iran and the u.s. both are avoiding further u.s. political intervention in the region. i mean, before it was different. now they have a common understanding, washington and tehran, they both want

to avoid further u.s. military intervention in the region. they are both very worried about the position of oil sources in the region by terrorists. i mean, this is of concern for the u.s. to my concern for iran because the safe passage of oil is extremely important for both tehran and washington. from the early days of the syrian crisis iran was born in the international community that the crisis would spill over into the region. no one unfortunately paid attention. it was clear that the route would be the first victim. to my understanding after iraq in jordan and then lebanon and in saudi arabia. if there is not an immediate

solution to teheran, the current crisis in syria and iraq. they are interrelated. we cannot do one without the other. there are very related. as i said, tehran and washington have supported this same government in iraq. they want to prevent a disruption of the post said on hussain system. this would be a failure and boehner sectarian war really is a matter of concern for tehran and washington. integrity have an iranian, including some of my friends in tehran, they believe washington is after disintegration of iraq. i personally do not agree this is the case. i believe washington is seeking integrity of iraq.

they do not want disintegration because they know if there is disintegration pin and syria were iraq and then the region would be vulnerable to further disintegration. it is very clear. >> okay. um hmm three in a row. >> first, i have noticed you have not offered a word of gratitude to president bush for having taken care of iraq and saddam hussein for iran. maybe he deserves a bit more memory. i do wonder whether he may exaggerate a bit the intentions of the u.s. to plan of the region which i have not seen signals of a wholesale yet. let's focus on the region itself. must be a blow to the iranian sense of importance

that for all of the convulsions of the arabs during and the rise of would be islamists democratic movements nobody looks to the islamic republic of iran as a constitutional model for anybody in the arab world, even islamist democracy which then raises the kutcher -- question what are iranian purchases in the broader region? what kind of influence does it really exert on any of the other countries other than through the couple proxies', has allowed and passat to homemade has provided tangible of rebels. and those relationships matter of conviction, she added loyalty more simply expedient, cut the right deal with washington and you can cut these loose and in. >> hold that thought on they are saying.

>> catherine n. gerard. i would like to know a little bit about the role of the revolutionary guard with respect to relations of iran and the u.s. what their role is created. >> from global parliamentary services. could you say a little bit more about the possibilities of cooperation or date on or whatever between iran and saudi arabia? because one of the country's you referred to that is facing possible problems is pakistan, and there is really their rival new through proxy's and particularly malicious that is affecting the stability of the country. i would like to hear a little bit more has to wear iran in saudi arabia may go.

>> all right. him. >> iran and saudi, and definitely they have all lot of contention in the region. no doubt. but whether all we can find a solution are not, i believe we can. i personally have been involved for a decade of good relations between iran and saudi arabia. i personally consider backing a bill as a moderate he, and i really cannot imagine the moderate part of it saudi arabia , although the root cause of finances and logistic support is coming from and not only saudi arabia but, i cannot imagine

any one liking to see such hostility between iran and the u.s. between. ♪ and saudi arabian and new. and nine maintain iran should use the opportunity that timing king abdullah is alive to create a new rapprochement between iran and the u.s. because i really don't know what is going to happen between 85 yes. after this transition, the problem we have in saudi arabia. no one knows what will happen after king abdullah. several -- in 1988 and an element 1989 and an unborn when president bush invited

iran for good well for a run to facilitate the release of western hostages, american hostages. although i have explained in my book, another friend and foreign ministry, were invited to manage this steelman. and we did it. but very frankly we could not make a deal. it was the revolutionary guard facilitating the release of hostages. in 2001 the war on terror when, again, the u.s. invited iran to cooperate. it was impossible without the revolutionary guard corporation and to bring iran and the u.s. to cooperate to fight in

afghanistan. it was the revolutionary guard. and so it depends how you deal with it. if you are nice, they will be constrained. [laughter] been there would result. they have a sense of power and organization. there are extremely powerful and know how to react. iranian regional objectives, i have explained in my book one store in. it was my mission to germany when i met foreign minister genscher and. and the fed issue he raised with me was the possibility of the regional cooperation system in persian gulf. but you don't like it. and she doesn't like it.

them that peron would be positive. he was really sharpton every then he asked me to manage to iran to support the president. and pit he was given car plunged to go for regional cooperation. it was in 1919. not in 2014. it rose right after the war. and almost shocked. he came to washington, and washington declined. before you can see from the beginning iranians have been seeking for a type of regional cooperation. and reliably was the foreign minister in 1991, 92, 95. he paid a visit to all

countries. that time i was in foreign ministry. and he raised the unwillingness to establish such a corporation. but gcc was not in position to agree because of u.s. position, opposition. to really to believe iran is going to have a dominant role in the region. the conventional understanding here, iran is preparing more regional cooperation with the neighbors, including saudi arabia and. when i said about the u.s. departure from the region, i never mean immediate. gradually with the intent of 15 years, it is my understanding that the u.s. is going to tear the gradually decrease its role

in, investment in the region which could take five, ten, 15 years. it is not going to happen in one year. >> i have time for three more questions. one for my colleague. i will go one. the woman in the address. and. >> thank you for your speech. average four to reading your book. my question brings us back to iran and inside the country. in it is very fuzzy when people report that president will have on hard time convincing the hard-liners, this big umbrella, the hard-liners began you tell us what your assessment is of the hard-liner challenge, and do you think -- of far can he go before the tight rope that he is seemingly walking around the.

>> just make it very simple for you next week. what is our role here in washington? imbibing hal obama, the problems the president obama in congress seem, this is exactly the same as radical as the hard-liners, a exactly where amish. >> thank you. >> hello. thank you for your presentations. i am an international security consultant. and i have a question visa the your position that the u.s. is gradually, gradually disassociating or disengaging like the middle east? and i want to bring you forward two years from now where we have an incoming -- this is a hypothetical. an incoming republican president in washington, republicans or the majority

in the two houses of million of what you to put your book and its recommendations to years from now on the future in a want you to pay particular attention in your response to the issue of u.s. commitments to. >> i have no doubt about u.s. commitment to israel president obama's the tab for the piece process. it was not iran. the u.s. president, john kerry, that 2-state solution they oppose the u.s. president. but this point about this fact, i know about the u.s. commitment to security of israel, i have no doubt, but the issue is whether israel

is making rate policies or they are isolating themselves some and blaming the lsc. this is whether we would have a republican president or not, we may have. him this is, to my understanding -- many am wrong. i really -- for me it is difficult to imagine a republican president i think america has a good lesson in >> and then the final question. a former colleague from the new york times. >> thank you. wonderful presentation. >> my name is adam beckham of former times person and independent. much of the discussion has been framed in geopolitical terms, but the question that occurred to me is, the school of thought in part by people war in one of very

well which sees the instability in the region, especially originated in syria, the failure of political systems to respond to environmental issues. and so i wondered if you might be able to comment a little bit from that perspective and also, if you are except that you -- >> what you mean by that? >> well, syria and half and then led to instability and the failure of the regime to respond in a meaningful way. i mean, tom friedman did a documentary. so i wonder if you could respond a little bit to that and also if you accept that view, the you see opportunity for cooperation between the west and the iran and environmental areas ? >> on surrounding myself i believe the president

booktv.org made a mistake at the beginning. he could have had better treatment preventing the crisis. one. second, today the reality is that the assad government is part of unburned integrity have statement and nation of syria. believe it or not, assad today is collapsed. who is going to govern syria who has the better alternative. what is alternative? who is alternative? do we have a united opposition? do we have a united war in syria? the fact is that the army in new and the security establishment of syria still are relatively united.

compare syria with iraq. a problem today with iraq. the u.s. made the big mistake to dissolve iraqi security system at the beginning. for ten years the u.s. invested billions of dollars some to educate or to train or to organize a new army and security system. and you see that the army is weak today to confront its 1,000, 2,000 insurgents. this is the failure of the u.s. but i think the iranians are wise enough to support assad and his government to prevent the collapse of army and security establishment. no one knows what is going to happen after environmental issues. one, i think on weapons of mass destruction in the middle east, the only

realistic major success has been dismantling have cyrian chemical weapons. we don't have anything else. and this is only and only because of trilateral cooperation between tehran washington and moscow. therefore, you can see if there is real cooperation what can be the result? no one else could convince assad to give up his chemical weapon because the chemical weapon was against the israeli chemical weapon. the refugees, i mean, today really there is a big room between the regional countries, iran, and the u.s. and for humanitarian assistance. we have 9 million refugees

displaced. perhaps 50 percent of syria is destroyed. we need the refugees to go back to their home. if there is any possibility of cooperation between iran and the u.s. and syrian first of all, i believe that we need to bring the original powers to corporation. my idea is our five plus p5. --, permanent members of you in security plus five regional $1.1. iran, saudi arabia they need to be together to find a solution for syria.

second abcaeleven need to agree on some principal one they're helpless. they don't have any real united opposition to negotiate. some principals like integrity of syrian manhattan, like the rule of majority. i think ron regional power, they can agree upon and then after a rain on the principle there would be a transitional time. the refugees come back. billions of dollars for investment for humanitarian affairs. resettling the refugees in

cerium and then go to a free election. make sure of that this is a reelection. then then whomever the syrian select, everyone will respect. >> thank you for that question penney's it enables us to bring the argument back to the united nations. as i told you before, i am going to keep an ear to chat with those of you are unable to get your questions asked. anchorage you to buy books. did you find more books? excellent and i urge you to read it. it is an excellent book. i want to thank him for being such a wonderful guests tonight and all of you for asking questions. [applause]minutes.

>> good evening. i am the international affairs program director for the world affairs council in

washington d.c. on behalf of the council i will commute to this event 2013 an accord was signed in geneva switzerland between the members of the u.n. security council, germany, and iran, a preliminary grim which would set the path from more comprehensive deal on the iranian nuclear program and ambitions. this came at a time when there was little hope for a revolution to the crisis. aside seemed entranced and their respective positions. however, diplomacy and negotiation conventional wisdom said with the best ways to resolve the crisis. as the alternative a military strike would be catastrophic in the six months one sense both sides have taken steps to demonstrate their commitment to the preliminary deal and to reach a new one in the future.

iran has reduced or halted some of its uranium stocks and agree to allow international inspectors to its facilities. the signatories have looked at the sanctions which have crippled the iranian economy the current negotiations by continual exercise in trust and the parties involved. trust that the signatories will keep their word. given their endeavors nature what happens if these talks fail to reduce the comprehensive agreement required. again, many have ruled out military action and see it as bad if not worse than iranian detainees. what are the alternatives to the policy? the seemingly endless stalemate that has existed since november. matthew chronic -- matthew kroenig, author of "a time to attack: the looming

iranian nuclera threat" challenges the assumption that a military strike is out of the question as well as some other commonly held policy was a related suzie iran nuclear program. military action, he argues, should not be regarded as an option. matthew kroenig is a nuclear proliferation specialist, internationally recognized authority on the iranian nuclear program. his work as a researcher and teacher at various universities in the united states. before accepting a council on foreign relations in 2010. through the and became an adviser on iranian policy for the office of the department of the secretary of defense of the pentagon in 2011 to a nuclear security fellow his previous book was published in 2010, and his articles appeared no "washington post", the national interest, and foreign policy.

most notable is his february 2012 article on foreign affairs which became the basis for his current about. matthew is an associate professor at the international field chair in the department of government at georgetown university and an non-residents senior fellow at the center of international security at the lead to council. please join me in welcoming matthew kroenig. [applause] [applause] >> well, thank you very much for that introduction, stephanie. it is a pleasure to be back here. and to be here tonight talking about my new book, it's time to -- "a time to attack: the looming iranian nuclera threat." before i talk about what the book is about what like to talk a little bit about what the book is not. the book does not argue the we should take immediate military action to read the book does not argue that dodger action is our best option. it does not argue that it

should be our first option. some people see the title and jump to conclusions. rather, argue we should solve this problem through diplomacy if all possible, and there are no experts who disagree with this position. everyone believes that we should solve the problem through diplomacy. no one is saying we should take immediate action. no one is saying we should just give up and acquiesce. since there is so much agreement on that question it is not really an interesting one. the more interesting question, and i think from a foreign policy perspective the more important question is what happens if diplomacy fails. diplomacy fails to stop iran from building nuclear weapons are we prepared to live with a nuclear-armed iran, the threat that would pose for decades to come. if not, are we prepared to take military action to stop iran from building of their weapons. the argument of my bark in the argument i have been making for several years as we should try to solve this diplomacy but if diplomacy

fails should be prepared to take limited military strikes on iranian key nuclear facilities. while it is a bad option in many ways, it is less pat and acquiescing to an unclear aren't iran and the threat posed by that ford tickets to come. the argument is to sense -- essentially if diplomacy fails there will come a time to attack. the second thing the book is not is controversial. at least in my view this argument is not controversial. rather, it presents a challenge of. president obama and other administration officials have said several times that a nuclear-armed iran is unacceptable and the unisys will do whatever it takes. so i don't believe the argument at this plan is controversial. there was a point when it was. stephanie mentioned, in 2010i worked as an ambassador @booktv adviser. i for started to come to

this conclusion. and as stephanie also mentioned, reuter article in foreign affairs run made this argument public to the first time. it was controversial because the u.s. government and obama administration had taken a public stand on this issue and you had many prominent analysts arguing that if diplomacy fails we should simply learn to live with it and to deter and contain it just like we do the soviet union during the cold war. so i wrote my foreign affairs article. many people disagree strongly with me. opinion pieces in public debates including a public debate here in washington d.c. but a few weeks later president obama came to my rescue committee in march 2012 president obama gave an interview where he laid out to prevent iran from acquiring nuclear weapons in an apparent iran was unacceptable. policy was not only to contain but that it was impossible.

and nuclear-armed iran cannot be contained in previous so some people dismiss this as political rhetoric. trying to look tough. yet others question whether obama would really be willing to do it, but his officials, his top official at the white house on at least policy for the first few years, his top official of the white house for the first few years of the administration doesn't matter of factly that if it comes to that point the president will be willing to use force. ' them in the book. so over the past few years or so i think the establishment position on this question has been a near 180-degree turn and has shifted so much that now those who suggest we can live and a pair aren't iran are the ones are dismissed as extremists. rand paul recently got himself a political hot water for suggestion maturing in and nuclear-armed iran should be on the table as an option as i see it, the foreign-policy establishment is caught up

of the argument i have been making for several years. what like to think that my work and my arguments have played at least some part so in some not arguing that military option should be a first option but a last resort if necessary. and i don't see this as controversial book presenting american state approach for dealing with the problem. that is enough about the book is not. what is the book about? well, in the back of the book there is an endorsement from the ambassador. i admire him a lot. one of the things he says on the back of the book is that this is the most thorough examination of the issues involved in assessing the irani in a clear challenge to. that endorsement means a lot because it was what i was trying to do. as i was checking with the issue much right to write it

for everyone who was interested in this issue regardless of what you thought the best way for addressing the nuclear challenges, if you came in with an idea of what the best ways to address it. providing a guide to the general public and the policymakers, anyone who wants to learn more of the policy options available and addressing the issue put it. what it will mean for the future. so what would like to do tonight is take a little bit of time to talk about each of those things. first on this issue as many of you may know, the nuclear program in iran began with an unclear collaboration

agreement with the united states in the 1950's under a peace agreement. the united states put up a nuclear research reactor. throughout the 1960's and 70's the united states was negotiating with the shah and his government to help iran develop the nuclear energy program. many people look back and say the united states is inconsistent if not downright hypocritical in its approach to mass proliferation because it was willing to help the shot is a clear program back and calling to help them acquire nuclear weapons. so it was good enough for him but not for. the united states has changed his position. but what i argue in the book is the united states has been remarkably consistent to its approach. our approach has always been to encourage the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, new panera technology but to resist a military application. that was our policy with the shot and is our policy today with iran and really are

willing to have him to outline to let them have possible technology but don't want them to build a clear weapons. cities possible nuclear discussions. they came to an abrupt end. marine korean domestic politics credit and their relation with the united states. possible the clear collaborations with other western powers. those were torn up. at the beginning the new leaders were not interested in nuclear technology. the first supreme leader ayatollah khamenei says acquiring nuclear weapons was against the tenets of islam, but he would change his mind in the 1980's iran had a devastating war with its neighbor, iraq, saddam hussein's iraq. and in that were set on the same used chemical weapons many times against iranian forces. so at the end of the 1980's

as the war was coming to an end to the supreme leader chased his mind. and in a letter to supporters explaining his decision to sign a cease-fire with pseudomonas in something he did not want to do, drinking from the poisoned chalice. so better signing a ceasefire with his bitter enemy. but in this letter to his supporters he said that the military position was hopeless. no alternative but to afford to resuming the war with atomic weapons that will be the necessity of war at that time. this is 1988. explicit interest from the top leader in iran in developing nuclear weapons. so at that time the representatives from iran began meeting with the pakistan a nuclear scientist you may have read about in that news about 15 years ago. transferred essentially for the atomic bomb kits. toronto libya, north korea. ..

so these weren't the kind of peaceful technologies innocent technologies the united states had provided like research reactors. these were tailor-made for making material or nuclear weapons. so at this point the iranian nuclear crisis began and we have been dealing with it ever since for the past 12 years.

after talking about the history of the program and going through and talking about the election of president were hahne in the interim deals struck in november that stephanie talked about i talk about where we stand today. how close is i ran to having nuclear weapons and does i ran want nuclear weapons? something i teach my undergraduates at georgetown university in order to nuclear proliferation to happen you have the supply-side and demand-side and those things have become together. on the supply-side the country must have the ability to build nuclear weapons and on the demand the will to produce them. in the book i talk about the supply and demand. first let's talk about the supply how close is i ran having a nuclear weapons capability. weapons-grade fissile material to create a nuclear device to feel it. second i ran has to be able to reform in explosive device a

nuclear warhead and two delivered through ballistic missiles submarine launched missiles are the platforms used. some people look at the timeline and those three things and say we have years to solve those problems but that's misleading because really all that matters is the first stage. the reason that is all that matters is because right now the united states the international community if necessary to take military action could destroy those nuclear facilities to prevent i ran from producing weapons grade for some material that once i ran gets the material became sober and i ran can move the material anywhere. we wouldn't know where it is. they could be on the reach of our best bunker-busting weapons. if we are serious about keeping all options on the table and whatever it takes to stop i ran are real red line has to beat the production of one bombs

worth of fissile material. you might hear in public discussions i ran is two months away or six months away. how long would it take? right now the best estimates after the interim deal and after i ran put these in place as part of interim deal the bus estimates are that of the supreme leader made the decision right now to -- to its first nuclear weapon it would take roughly two or three months. now if we get comprehensive nuclear deal the comprehensive deal would reduce iran's capabilities and extend the timeline but not by much. in short on the supply-side i ran is almost there. i ran is close to have and the

ability to produce nuclear weapons. what about on the demand-side? does i ran want nuclear weapons? we often hear in public debates we often hear reports from the media that the international community fears i ran is trying to build nuclear weapons but it claims is only interested in a peaceful program. it's told as a key said she said story so what i do in the book you say let's treat this as a social scientist on i'm a political scientist and we have two hypotheses. one that iran wants nuclear energy and to top iran wants nuclear power and let's look at the evidence and see what the evidence supports which hypothesis is most consistent with the evidence. so i go through and look at the evidence and what i show his there are 14 reasons, 14 things iran is doing that makes no sense for energy program and really only makes sense to build nuclear weapons. this makes sense given iran's strategic goals. it says its goals are to first

continue to for this regime to continue to exist to protect the regime and second he wants to deter foreign attack to be able to deter an attack from israel or the united states and third iran's leaders say they want iran to be the most dominant state in the middle east. so those are your goals acquiring nuclear weapons make sense. it allows you to deter a nuclear threat and acquiring nuclear weapons hoped to become the most dominant state in the middle east. having a few nuclear facilities don't help you to do those things. in short i believe iran's leaders want nuclear weapons and they are close to having them. so we have a problem. so what are the various options we have for addressing the problem? in the book i go through all of the options and i see three options as the most viable. first diplomacy, second deterring and containing a

nuclear iran or taking nuclear action. i have a chapter on what i call the nonstarters the options and sometimes people put forward that really won't work. some people look at the prail real options and say diplomacy might not work but the other two options of military action and deterrence entertainment seem bad so there has to be some other way. what are the other ways that people have suggested? some say we can stop iran's program through covert action and maybe continue to put up cyberattacks and sabotage their facilities and assassinations of iranian nuclear scientists. maybe we can just keep doing stuff like that. the international community can do stuff like that. maybe that will stop iran. what i shown the book is these mysterious activities and accidents have been happening to iran's nuclear program for years but every three months if you look at the iea reports every three months iran's capabilities continue to increase. despite all the stuff that has been thrown out there their

program advances. i think it's possible it would advance more precipitously that it shows on its own covert action will not -- second some people argue maybe we can have a japan model as an option. the japan model option is that like japan may be iran could have been advanced nuclear capability essentially have everything that needs to build nuclear weapons at that wanted to to become a screwdrivers turn or two away but iran won't do it and iran won't turn the final two screws and we would just live with it. i argue that's not a serious option because there's really no reason to believe iran would stop short. once iran puts a screwdriver to away want to set the point where the west can no longer physically stop if they think there's no reason to believe iran would refrain from building nuclear weapons. the japan model quickly would become the north korea model. and third what about regime change? some argue regime change is an option and usually people are

talking about george w. bush regime change where we take the country but rather with the government help and maybe there'll be some kind of new revolution in iran and maybe some new government will come into power that will be more willing to deal with us and we'll give up the nuclear program. i argue that would be nice if we could get is that there's really no sign this government is going to fall anytime soon in the nuclear clock is ticking faster than the regime change clock. we will have to make difficult decisions on how to deal with the nuclear program before a new government comes to power. having dismissed the nonstarters again to this year's options in the first is diplomacy. as i said at the outset if we could solve this diplomatically that would be her best best option and abet the longest chapter in the book is on diplomacy so again contrary to this idea that some people jump to that i give short shrift to diplomacy or the military option is the best option. so i talk about the history of

negotiations with iran from 2002 up until the interim deal. i talk about the various designs a possible conference of deals. i talk about the ideal deal in which iran would have no enrichment capability whatsoever which would be the best deal from the west point from the west point of you and i talk about this limited enrichment deal which is what seems we are currently pursuing. we talk about advantages and some of the disadvantages of them. i think there are real disadvantages that leaves iran six months away from iran's nuclear breakout capability. i also talk about diplomatic plan b because of this round of negotiations break stanley wouldn't have to resort immediately to military force. it would depend on iran's behavior after that. if iran dashed immediately to build nuclear weapons if we would have two to three months as as i talked about before but it's also possible and perhaps more likely that iran instead of dashing to a nuclear weapon would go back to the approach it

was pursuing last summer before rohan he was elected slowly building up that -- of that capability increasing its stockpiles so this would slowly shrink that time in which case we would have a year or so before we had to take military action. i talk about diplomatic plan where we could engage in diplomacy to get iran back to the table 1 more time and try one last time to solve it diplomatically. i also argued in a chapter that we need to be realistic. we all hoped diplomacy will work but it might not. president obama himself has said there is quote the chance of a conference of deal is quote no better than 50/50. his former wmd adviser gary seymour were mentioned or puts the chances are closer to zero and so there has been some optimism expressed in recent weeks that they're still a sizable chance we won't get a comprehensive deal. moreover even if we get a conference of deal that would

necessarily solve a problem. it leaves iran six months away from a nuclear weapons capability. if you get this deal declared an end to the iranian crisis people will stop worrying about iran and economic pressure will be lifted trade blows them world leaders will focus on other issues and i think in that environment it would be tempting for iran to cheat on the agreement potentially build back up its capabilities and dare the international community to try to respond. after all it took us 10 years to build a sanctions regime we currently have in place. i worked a sample -- dismantle that would be hard to resemble reassemble that. even if we get a conference of deal i think there's a reasonable chance iran would try to sneak out or at some point attempt to build a nuclear weapon. if diplomacy doesn't work because we can't get a conference of deal or we get a conference of deal but it breaks down what happens next? this gets to be what is worse question.

one option would be to simply give up and acquiesce to a nuclear-armed iran that a nuclear-armed iran almost everyone agrees it would pose a grave threat to peace and security. first i think it would lead to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the middle east and we shouldn't exaggerate this. i don't think every country in the region would have nuclear weapons but over the course of 10 or 20 years or so at least one or two other countries would acquire nuclear weapons in response. saudi arabia, and maybe egypt maybe turkey so somebody might be saying one or two countries are 10 -- and 28 years but cold comfort if we are in a nuclear crisis. after all i hope to be around in 10 or 20 years from now and i think many of you do too as well. i also think it would lead to proliferation around the world. i think iran would be at risk of becoming a nuclear supplier and in my first book a book that

stephanie mention at the beginning called exporting the bomb systematic analysis of why countries have exported in the past and to all the analysis suggests iran would be at risk of doing that potentially transferring enrichment technology to other countries like latin america and asia leading to further proliferation of nuclear weapons around the world that way and in this environment when there is proliferation in the region proliferation around the world i think the global nonproliferation regime or bradley would be weakened. countries would see the great powers united states wasn't serious about enforcing nonproliferation. i think the regime could collapse and lead to widespread proliferation. second i think iran would be emboldened and we become more aggressive in its foreign policy. we know iran restrains its iran restrains his foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from israel or the united states but if it had nuclear weapons that could feel emboldened to push harder. it could deter retaliation

through the threat of nuclear retaliation took a step up its support to terrorists proxy groups and gain a more aggressive course in the region to achieve its goal of becoming the most dominant state in the middle east which is says it wants to do. in the scenario you can imagine the middle east becoming an even more crisis prone region and in a crisis from region with a nuclear-armed united states and other potential nuclear-armed states we would have nuclear crises every few years and the potential for nuclear war. i don't think iran's leaders are suicidal. i don't think they're going to wake up one day and say today is a good day for nuclear war but i do think iran will have geopolitical conflicts of interest with other states with nuclear-armed states. they will get into high-stakes crises like the united states and soviet union did during the cold war. think of berlin and the cuban missile crisis. there's a risk of things spinning out of control.

some people look back at the cold war and say nuclear deterrence works. i look back and think we were incredibly lucky. if there's an arms race in the least i think that would be the place where there would be danger for nuclear exchange. nuclear exchange in the region could well mean the end of the state of israel. it's a very small state. i think israel's state aren't exaggerating and once iran has ballistic missiles which could potentially result in a nuclear attack on the u.s. homeland. so a lot of threats posed by nuclear-armed iran. we could put in place a strategy to deal with it a deterrence and containment strategy led to put in place against the soviet union during the cold war that this would require major increase of u.s. political and military commitments to the middle east. it likely requires signing defense agreements with their allies in the region signing

formal treaties with saudi arabia and other gulf states and perhaps with israel. let's call a spade a spade. this is essentially done is it's promising to fight a nuclear war on saudi arabia's behalf and israel's behalf. during the cold war people asked what the united states be willing to trade new york for paris? would we be willing to bite a nuclear war if france were attacked? this would mean people would be asking what the united states be willing to trade new york for riyadh and five nuclear war that risks new york is for riyadh is attacked? this is a threat to increase the credibility of the threat and we would do things we did during the cold war. we went forward-deployed forces in the region and nuclear weapons to make it very clear to iran that any attack would potentially result in a nuclear retaliation. we would likely have to help israel develop secure strike capabilities. one of the risks of nuclear war would come about because it's

likely both iran and israel might think they have for strike advantages. helping iran launch hard on ballistic missile cycles to make sure they are survivable so this would be a costly strategy requiring major commitments and it's not like iran would have nuclear weapons for one day. this is a strategy that would need to remain in place for decades as long as iran had nuclear weapons and was hostile to united states. i think even with that strategy we couldn't deal with many threats posed by a nuclear-armed iran. i think if the containment strategy we could deter iran from starting a nuclear war. i think we could deter them from purposely transferring to terrorist groups but i think many of the threats we couldn't deal with. i think it's likely iran would transfer sensitive technology and would we be willing to fight a nuclear war with iran because