no one denies that people were hungry for monetary policy was often early 30s. thank you. >> thank you for a wonderful presentation. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> now from the roosevelt reading festival david kaiser recounts president roosevelt's preparations for america's entry into world war ii. >> i am bob clarke and i'm the deputy director of the franklin d. roosevelt presidential library and museum and is my

pleasure to welcome you to the session of the 11th annual was about reading festival. as an archivist myself this is one of my favorite events of the year because it's an opportunity for all of the wonderful research from to show off the fruits of their labor. we are happy to have you and all of them participating today. just a couple of housekeeping matters. will everyone please take out their electronic devices and turn them off so our presentation is not interrupted today. thank you. for those of you who haven't had a chance to see the exhibits that opened last year this time of year please come and find one of the library staff and we will give you one of these franklin d. roosevelt initial buttons that you can wear and it will get you into our exhibit galleries for free. thank you to our colleagues at c-span. they are always great supporters of our programs than we are happy to have them back. but make tell you a little bit about how the program will go this afternoon.

our speaker will speak for 35 minutes or so and then we'll have an opportunity for questions. after which i will then whisk them away to the new deal store where he will be happy to sign all the books you want to buy after you hear him. david kyser taught history for 1976 to 2013 at carnegie mellon harvard the naval war college and williams college of the taconic from here in massachusetts. "no end save victory" is his seventh book and the others include politics and more european complex american tragedy kennedy johnson and the origins of the vietnam war and the road to dallas the assassination of john f. kennedy. his op-ed and reviews have appeared in "the new york times," "washington post" the "boston globe" los angeles times and elsewhere. he regularly puts contemporary events into historical perspective and history unfolding.com. he now lives in water town in massachusetts. ladies and gentlemen, david

kaiser. [applause] >> thank you very much for that kind introduction and thank you all for coming. i tried to do two different things in "no end save victory." to begin with it focuses on 18 especially critical months in world history namely from may 1940 and 12 december 1941 but it also tries to put them within a much broader context of u.s. history. specifically the book is about how franklin roosevelt and his administration reacted to the world crisis and specifically to the fall of france and the threat and follow great britain in may 1940. those defense facing dioceses were truly critical situation in the short and medium run demanding an immediate response.

the world situation only became more complicated and more fraud over the next 18 months but meanwhile roosevelt and his collaborators reached and began to implement a series of decisions such set by the time of pearl harbor they were in a position not only to fight but to win the second world war within only three and a half years. i'm going to spend most of my time talking about that. but more broadly "no end save victory" is about the role of roosevelt and his generation in shaping american and world history and really creating the world in which everyone in this room has been privileged to spend their whole lives. i put this story within the context of the cyclical theory of history. it is a fact that elise is the 18th century to strip united states and the whole my thalamic world has been punctuated every 80 years by great prices that has put an end to an old border

and created a new one. in the late 19th century, late 18th century that crisis included the american french revolutions and gave birth to modern democracy. in the 19th century the american civil war ensured the continuation of democracy in the united states and a series of related events in europe happening at the same time in the democratic regimes there. the great crisis of the 20th century involves the depression of the second world war and for some time now the fourth great crisis in our national life in the 21st century. now this rhythm was identified in the 1990s by two brilliant amateur historians like william strauss and neil howe one of the striking things i found researching this book was that they were not the first to see history in the -- franklin roosevelt saw history this way in several of his most important speeches he specifically

compared to. maggie was leading the country through to the revolution of the war in the civil war and painted the three of them as part of the same process. we also know that he realized italy since 1936 that both american and world history were a turning point in the events that were taking place in the u.s. in the world were going to shape the future of civilization for sometime to come. he was determined to make, to shape is a democracy with both survive and thrive in the new world order would be created in with the help of his contemporaries and also with younger generations that is exactly what he did. i will be spending some time today on both of those aspects of why. so let's begin with the response of the world crisis. really beginning around 1937 at

the time of the sino-japanese war but particularly after things became serious in may 1940. now as i say, okay one of the extraordinary things that i discovered in writing the book was the extent to which franklin roosevelt was so often not just days or months that years ahead of his contemporaries and realizing where history was going. in 1936 accepting his nomination for re-election at the democratic convention he announced as many of you know that his generation had a rendezvous with destiny. but what did he mean by that? >> something very specific and i'm going to quote from the speech. in this world of ours and other lands there are some people who in times past have lived and fought for freedom as he grew too wary to carry on a fight. they yielded their democracy. i believe in my heart that only our success and stir their

ancient hope. they begin to know here in america we are waging a great and successful war. we are fighting to save a great and precious form of government for ourselves and for the world. that's even then well before the issue of armed conflict was firmly on the table he knew by trying to make democracy work we were in a sense fighting a battle on behalf of the world. now a year later in septembe september 1937 after the sino-japanese war broke out he gave the quarantine speech which i will turn to in which he warned that the complex in europe and asia were inevitably going to spread to the western hemisphere and that is what i think you believe. indeed i discovered that he tried in late 1937 to arrange joint naval action with the british to try to force the japanese out of china but that

failed when china would not go along with it. the next big turning point was the munich agreement in september 1938 when hitler thanks to his presumed military superiority particularly in the air was able to bluff the british and the french into handing czechoslovakia over to him. this was a great shock in the united states and it was at that point that roosevelt first of all talk about increasing aircraft production but secondly set in motion new military plans by the joint board the senior military authority. that plan which was completed in early 1939 was for a war potentially against germany and japan without any help from any other power. in other words they were already preparing for the situation in which hitler might have defeated britain and france. now, this nightmare suddenly seem to be coming true in april and may of 1940.

first, the germans under the british navy not only occupied denmark but managed to seize norwalk something which according to the rules of warfare they should've been able to do since the british promised they would use airpower. then came the invasion of elgin holland and france and within six weeks the collapse of france the armistice and virtually everyone thought the eminent invasion probably successful of britain. this threatened the united states and a truly disastrous situation particularly at sea. the united states had one of the two leading navies in the world equal to the british navy. the real mission of the american war period was to potentially fight japan it was big enough to do that. the assumption was the british navy would handle the planet. now there was a possibility that the united states would have to fight japan and germany and

italy and germany and italy would in the meantime have availed themselves of british and french fleets. there was a truly catastrophic situation and it demanded an immediate response. there were two specific fears about what the germans might do but dominated thinking for the next 18 months. both directed threats to the western hemisphere. one was that they might leapfrog across the atlantic by repeating the norway situation first in iceland and greenland and the clinton -- newfoundland and labrador and then they would be within bombing distance of the united states. the second they would send their army through this iberian peninsula and even in west africa. at that point they would be able to seize some of the atlantic islands that canaries in the azores and the cape verde's and would-be agent of miles from brazil. those were the nightmares of the

occupiers. so what was to be done? roosevelt in late may undertook a huge program. immediately called for 50,000 aircraft the largest air force in the world, 50,000 a year and they met that within two years. in june and july and the congress rushed through almost without debate a bill to virtually double the size of the u.s. navy. clearly preparation for living in this overwhelmingly hostile world. the ships that were authorized at that point were not going to be coming on line until 1944 or so and meanwhile we were in an imperfect situation. after much debate that summer we instituted selective service to draft in september that was very significant restrictions. the men were to be drafted for one year and secondly the draftees were not to be sent outside the western hemisphere,

a clear indication of what it really was. but the policy was very sincerely the defense of the western hemisphere. that was all roosevelt or anybody else was thinking about. that was all they thought they could do an effect they were very worried about whether they would be able to do that. in addition roosevelt formed the first of a series of new agencies of the national defense advisory commission including the secretaries of war and navy and representatives of labor and industry to help plan and encourage more production and that went through several iterations over the next couple of years. the thing that saved us really during this period in the second half of 1940 and early 1941 was hitler's own priorities. he might very well done many of the things we feared and indeed the german navy wanted badly to go to north africa and into the atlantic.

but hitler by the late fall of 1940 was focusing on the real goal. he told the navy don't worry we will do all that but only after the soviet union has been taken care of and if you have not done that i think history may have turned out differently. roosevelt -- i'm sorry. there were two other critical -- i'm sorry. the hemispheric defense priority is also reflected in the deal he reached with the british in september of 1940 when he gave churchville 50 destroyers in exchange for bases. those bases were not window dressing. they gave us position in an arc from newfoundland in the north to the mid-atlantic and down to trinidad. this was pushing our line of defense out in the atlantic in case the worst happen. there were two critical developments in the same month of september 1940. first was the tripartite pact in which germany italy and japan

agreed that if united states became engulfed in were either in europe or asia they would all go to war for the u.s.. the second one was roosevelt had a secret report again from the heads of the army and navy called the problem of munitions and war production which told him it would be approximately two years until the fall of 1942 before the united states would have enough ammunition stockpiles to take any major military operation. i think that weighed heavily with roosevelt for the rest of 1940 and most of 1941. after roosevelt was reelected and i enjoyed treating the election at length in the book but i won't go into that now. there were other interesting developments. first of all admiral stark wrote what was known as the dogma memorandum which i read is

essentially a plea to get into the war right away to save the british who were suffering heavily from u-boats before they fell. roosevelt decided not to do that which i think is interesting. he made clear in a subsequent meeting in january that he was still living with a strong possibility that the british might be defeated in the half of the dash first half of 1941. he introduced lindley's the plan to give them unlimited authority to transfer weapons to the british or to anybody who would be of interest to the united states. lindley he said and i think he met -- meant this sincerely was the best way to keep war from our shores although he didn't say how long. it was clear that he didn't know that the real purpose of lend lease was giving him an excuse to expand america more productions and to go way beyond

the requirements of hemispheric defense. he knew this was a world crisis ended wanted us to prepare to fight with everything we had. now, there was a somewhat slow period during what some of his closest collaborators were pushing him to enter the war but he wouldn't do that. meanwhile the british were not invaded but they were getting beaten in the mediterranean and that wasn't looking hopefully there. then came the great turning point that most things into a new phase in june. actually we are on the anniversary or we will be tomorrow, the german attack on the soviet union. roosevelt was one of the few that realized immediately the enormous significant at this. he wrote his grand admiral leahy

that if this turned out to be more than a diversion in other words if the russians could hold out it would open up the possibility of sending german domination of europe. in fact roosevelt against the bitter complaints of stimpson and general marshall who were desperately trying to obey the american army insisted on sending all possible -- to the soviet union as he insisted on sending help to the british before. everyone expected the soviets to go down but they did not. in any case this did make him more aggressive initially along the same lines. he pushed the defense lines further out of the atlantic. he occupied iceland which the british had before that and begin sending patrols further into the atlantic and make plans to send convoy ships from a

planet. meanwhile something more important happen in early july on the production front because roosevelt left everyone endowed in the first half of 1941 as to how much production was going to be. he was pushing for more but the existing programs were adequate to meet the existing political objectives namely the defense of the western hemisphere. in july roosevelt gave the war department directive asking them to prepare the estimate of the requirements to defeat all of our possible enemies in a coming war. this was the genesis of what became known as the victory program. it was in a couple of months as we will see and a very important step towards not only fighting but winning. meanwhile the japanese also reacted to the attack on the

soviet union. they had dreams of empire they were pursuing. they knew this crisis was at hand. after big argument they decided not to attack the soviet union themselves but they decided in july they were going on what they call the southward advance which meant the conquest of malaya, the dutch east indies and also the philippines. in the decision the japanese cabinet reached to undertake the southward advance they said they would not shrink from war with britain or the united states to carry this out. the first step in the plan was to occupy southern indochina that the french couldn't defend since they had been defeated. we knew from our magic intercepts that i was only the first step towards for expansion and it was at that point in late july that roosevelt agreed with some of the more bellicose advisers to cut off oil shipments to japan.

that led to a last round of talks with japanese to see if war could have been avoided but making -- given the japanese decisions there would be none of that. the oil embargo is sometimes blamed for the one i think that's a mistake. in addition russellville has been accused of seeking war in the pacific to get into on the planet. that i think is a misreading based on the fact that we know how it turns out and they didn't know how was going to turn out. what the situation was from their point of view was by the second half of 1941 they expected to be at war in the atlantic before too long. they knew again from the magic intercepts of japanese travel that the japanese took the pack seriously and would commence the work we became involved with war in germany. therefore it didn't make any sense to be nice to the japanese anymore in the pacific since they were going to end the war

anyway when we got involved. then came the next big step for meeting with churchill in august in the warships off of newfoundland and the issue of the atlantic charter. now roosevelt publicly declared a new goal. the atlantic charter laid out the new world order after and i quote the discussion of the nazi tyranny. in other words although the united states was not yet formally -- formally at war it was committed to the distraction of a nazi regime. this is typical of the way all through this roosevelt gradually escalated his rhetoric as he gradually escalated power. indeed the phrase no end save victory comes from the state of the union in january 1941 which was the first time he hinted the victory over the enemy powers might be the goal. in september the war department

stimpson gave roosevelt the estimate he asked for a victory program. it called for the potential mobilization of 8 million men for a huge air force for everything you would need. roosevelt received it calmly from stimpson but there was one big problem is stimpson recognized. there was no way the administration could undertake this program with the destruction of the civilian economy until we were in the war. still a month later in october in a press conference roosevelt acknowledged and somewhat elliptical language that he asked for the preparation of an all-out program. again step-by-step letting the american people in on what the plans were. i have reached the eve of the war but now i'm going to detour for a few minutes to get into the second part of the book and

particularly to turn to broader issues involving roosevelt, his generation, his leadership of his administration and his leadership of the nation. following strausman howe identify roosevelt as a member of what they called the missionary generation. americans born roughly from 1863 to 1883. roosevelt as you know was in the tail end of that period in 1982. his key cabinet members have actually help an older. as strausman howe pointed out the missionary generation occupied a parallel place in american history to my own generation. they are both what strausman howe called profit generations. the profit profit generation is born in the wake of the last

crisis. roosevelt and his contemporaries in the wake of civil war and i and my contemporaries in the wake of the second world war. they grow up hearing from their elders that all the great problems of the world have been solved and they had nothing to do with -- but as young adults they tended to rebel against that and carve out a new mission for themselves. eventually they're the ones that destroyed the old order and put something in its place. they call them the missionary generation that their mission was earthly. their mission i concluded was to bring order out of the chaotic world of the gilded age into which they were born. this is what roosevelt was trying to do first of all and during the new deal and then the war by creating a new world order. critically the missionary generation tried to create this new world order based on moral values that they thought had to be the foundation of national

and political life. just to make that point i would like to quote from the first nondress in which roosevelt is discussing the need to cope with the economic devices and here is how he described where the crisis came from and how was going to be solved. practices of the unscrupulous moneychangers and indicted in the court of public opinion rejected by the hearts and minds of men. the money changers have fled from their temple of civilization. we may now restore that to the ancient truth. the extent to which we can apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit. happiness lies not in the mere possession of money. it lies in the joy of achievement and the thrill of creative effort. the joy and moral stimulation of work no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of the profit.

i would suggest to you that barack obama when he took over in 2009 chose not to treat a serious crisis be facing the same way. he and his collaborators treated as a contemporary breakdown of a fundamentally sound system requiring a couple trillion dollars and the federal reserve period. the difference in his response and its effect on the country from roosevelt needs further elaboration. in the same way when roosevelt addressed the world situation in the speech -- quarantine speech he also referred to the threat the japanese post to them. this was september 37. quote the landmarks and traditions which mark the

civilization toward condition of law order and justice are being wiped away. without a declaration of war and without warning or justification of any kind civilians including vast numbers of women and children are being ruthlessly murdered. nations are fomenting and taking sides on civil worker in nations that have never done them on. nations claiming freedom from the cells. innocent peoples innocent nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a great devoid of justice and humane considerations. roosevelt continued to use this language all the way through to pearl harbor and after and so did his closest collaborators. simpson and knox were two of the most critical ones. they were both prominent republicans.

since then have been secretary of state and knox had been a prominent newspaper publisher and attend the republican vice president for candidate in 1936 when he delivered the bitterest attacks on the new deals social dominance experiment etc. get roosevelt had relationships with both men and of the late spring of 1940 on the eve of the republican convention in fact he brought them into into the cabinet as secretary of foreign secretary the navy forming an effective national government in the republican party was happy about this. not only that into roosevelt's extraordinary style. both during the new deal years and at this point roosevelt surrounded himself with men and women of very strong views who were very articulate and were not afraid to speak out and he encouraged them to do so.

those in this case he allowed simpson and knox to make a series of speeches on the radio essentially advocating american entry into the war in 1941 even though he was not willing to do this. he wanted them to call the american people's attention to the danger. he wanted them to encourage public opinion but he kept the power to make that decision very much in his own hands. the second aspect of his leadership is the more important one and i go into this in some detail in what is my favorite chapter in the book. it relates again to the war. what roosevelt did was to list the american people and great crusades, great tasks. he created new institutions to do this.

again he appointed dynamic leaders to those institutions and turn them into national figures. during the new deal era the great tasks involved putting millions of people to work restoring agricultural economy, soil conservation taping the rivers river's america with dams providing public power and so on. when the spirit can't organize labor took the opportunity to expand itself. and now faced with a world crisis and particularly feeling as he did the production was going to be the key it would decide who won the war of roosevelt did something similar. he created these new production agencies. he goes -- got business leaders such as william newsom and labor leaders of the amalgamated clothing workers involved and

the great thing about these enterprises particularly the wartime enterprises was they inspired even the more excluded groups in america to take part in them. as a way of gaining ground. the labor movement viewed all these new aircraft plans as an opportunity to organize more workers than that is what they did. the civil rights movement which was already an important political force although its victories lay ahead saw the draft and the war effort has a chance for americans as they were called to prove themselves. they wanted them in the military. they wanted them in every combat task in the military. they were not fully successful. they didn't get any help from some senior leaders in the war department but they did make some gains and they laid the foundation for further gains.

roosevelt had an extraordinary ability to get americans including republicans and democrats and americans of all races to think of themselves merely as citizens. frank knox made a wonderful statement to congress about this when he was taunted by roosevelt in the past. i was very struck writing about the 1940 election by two editorials i wrote, two of the few editorials that supported roosevelt for president. most including the "washington post" and "the new york times" were against it in 1940 because of the third term. the amsterdam news editorial sounded may i say very much like what we might expect to hear from a black publication commentator today. he said while roosevelt disappointed us in many ways. the armed forces are still segregated but he has also, the

new deal has done a great deal. the "chicago defender" editorial moved me almost to tears because it simply said we are for roosevelt because he's for the great mass of the american people and the peoples of the world. there was not one word in the chicago paper in the editorial that told you this was being written. this ability to put the american people to work to enlist them in real tasks i think was his most striking achievement and sadly one which most differentiate his time i'm sorry to say from ours. let me move now and a few last-minute to the last crisis. in early november we began intercepting cables from tokyo to washington stating that the talks had to be included by the

end of november because something was going to happen then and that was the final deadline. we knew that was going to happ happen. actually at about the same time the war almost broke out in the atlantic. we were prepared to mediate with battleships of our own but the battleships turned back. the tension builds all through november. it was clear something was going to happen at the end of the month. in the last days of november talk to the japanese were broken off. the commands in the pacific were warned of imminent war.