standpoint, it's very hard for us because we don't have expertise in police forcing. it's not what we do, on whether it's an appropriate use or not appropriate use. now, i can look at the pictures of ferguson and wince like everybody else in this room. but i think that has to be part of the dialogue and discussion of what we're going to do and how we're going to assess use of equipment. >> mr. kamoy, i wanted to ask -- don't know if i'm pronouncing your name correctly. >> you are. thank you, senator. >> i don't know if you're the appropriate person to ask this question, but on the homeland security front, what type of oversight is there in terms of the 1033 equipment. does homeland have any oversight over the receipt of that? >> we do not, senator. >> is there any coordination between the grants that homeland is giving in light of what the departments are receiving on the 1033 front? >> we don't coordinate in the

decision-making about local law enforcement requests. the process that mr. estevez has laid out, we don't coordinate that at all. >> you wouldn't know in issuing a homeland grant what the d.o.d. has done in issuance of equipment to local agencies? >> correct. >> so, how do you then know that in terms of the use of the homeland grants for this, that there isn't -- shouldn't be some follow-up? >> so, that's an entirely different story. i will say on the -- i know the defense department's equipment under the 1033 program is free. grantees have paid for, i believe, transportation costs using grant funding. but it's a very small percentage of use of grant funds. so, in terms of how grantees use equipment that has been acquired with our programs, for the state

program, even the urban area program, the grants pass through the state. 80% of the state program funding has to go to local jurisdictions within that state. so, we work with the state in oversight. in their applications they tell us more and more detail now about the projects they intend. certainly, we have the ability to drill down in as we are doing with the state of missouri and follow up on use of the equipment to ensure that it meets program requirements. so, we have this ability. we do not have real-time visibility on all acquisitions made at the local level. but working with our state partners, we can get pretty good visibility. >> can i ask -- i would like opinion from all of you, if you're able to answer. so, we focused a lot understandably so on these programs and the military style equipment to agencies in a ferguson-type situation.

what i'd like to know is the use of equipment, whether it's from homeland security, how have we evaluated the needs in a boston marathon bombing situation or a situation like that which seems to me quite different than obviously a ferguson situation. >> thanks for the question, senator. we work with grantees and provide them tools to assess the risks that they face and the hazards in their community. we try to provide them guidance on how to estimate their capabilities for addressing the threats they have identified. they certainly have discretion in terms of the kinds of equipment they think would best meet those needs. as we did see in boston, the equipment that was purchased, including the law enforcement equipment, certainly facilitated the response. certainly facilitated the pursuit and apprehension of the

tzarnaevs. >> miss mason, i wanted to ask you about on the justice end with regard to the burn jag grants. do we know how much of those grants are used for this type of equipment? having been attorney general of my state, a fair amount of those grants have gone to other things, i know, as well for example whether it's protecting children from online predators or providing assistance to victims of crime, even though there's voca and vowa funds, but there are said for how much are used fof the funds. >> thank you for the question. as you mentioned the jag money is used to address a full range of criminal justice issues in a state. what we've seen is that of the money that's allocated for the

law enforcement category, because there are courts categories, victims category, of the law enforcement category, 40% of the money allocated in that category goes to equipment. most of the equipment we're seeing people buy are computers, technology and things like that. and they're for vehicles, the jag money can only be used for cars, boats, helicopters without coming back to the director for specific approval. we're only in the last -- since 2005 we went back and did an investigation. we have approved only seven armored vehicles since 2005. >> thank you. my time is up. >> i think senator coburn has a few more questions and then we'll get to the second panel. >> i want to introduce to the record an article in the -- from october 16, 2013, ""the boston globe,"" this sets the record straight. tzarnaev was found because the

guy checked his boat. didn't have anything to do with money we spent. didn't have anything to do other than he was surprised to find this guy in fetal position in his boat and called 911. this needs to be in the record to set the record straight about what that is. >> thank you. >> i have one question for the three of you and then we'll go to the next panel. what have you heard directly from the administration in terms of review at your level about the review that the administration announced, based on what happened in ferguson? what information have you received that the justice department and homeland security and fema and at the defense department? what have you heard directly from the white house? >> we have already had meetings on the -- about the review. we've already been supplying information. so the review is in the active process at this time. >> as far as the justice department is concerned? >> it's all -- all of us are

involved. >> let me get them to answer specifically. what have you heard, brian? >> i participated in the first meeting of the review panel. it is a comprehensive review of the programs that are operation, the very same kinds of questions we talked about here. training, our oversight, auditing, noncompliance. senator, i look forward to reading that article. information that was provided to me by the massachusetts homeland security agency and the state police indicate that the -- >> and the infrared -- >> and the infrared camera was instrumental in locating him. i look forward to reading that article. >> here's the direct quote from the guy that called 911 to tell him, there's someone in my boat, he's injured, i think it's tzarnaev. >> we've been providing information to the white house. we're fully engaged. the only reason i wasn't there is because i was out of town. >> that's great to hear.

that's great to hear. that's called appropriate response. thank you. >> second panel with four witnesses. does anybody else have a question they really want to ask this -- one or two questions they really want to ask these three witnesses before we move to our second panel? >> i have two simple questions. before ferguson had the three of you ever met? >> no. >> no. >> no. >> not good. second question, do any of you now have any policy that requires you to track any kind of usage data for the equipment you're providing that is considered military grade? yes or no. >> no. >> no. >> we do have activity reports we require on a quarterly basis from oush grantees about how they use our jag funds. >> well, i would like to see and put in the record, since you're

the only one that says you claim you have usage data, i would like all the usage data that would show what military weaponry, camouflage, uniforms, helmets, all of the things we saw in ferguson, what data you if the witnesses will please be seated. we need to start the second panel. please. staff, if you will let the witnesses help them get seated so we can start.

>> thank you all for being here. i don't want to hurry you but this say large panel. we've got people that want to ask questions. and time is ticking so let's get started. jim berman, am i pronouncing it correctly? >> biermann. >> i can remember that. jim biermann is the president of the washington, d.c.-based police foundation. the foundation established in 1970 has a mission to advance policing through innovation and science. mr. bueermann worked for redland police department for 33 years. served as chief for 13 years from 1988 to 2011. dr. peter kraska is a professor

of chair at eastern university of ken. researches changes role of police in society, including the relationship between the police and the military as well as the special equipment, tactics and training used by police over the last several decades. mark lomax director for national tactical officers association. previously served as program manager in west liberia, west africa, where he oversaw their police, s.w.a.t. and crowd control units. served 22 years with pennsylvania state police with majority of his career in special operations assignment. mr. lomax was invited to participate in the hearing at the chief bellmar from st. louis. accompanied by. wily price is photo journalist, award-winning, i might add, for st. louis american newspaper. covered the price presence in

ferguson firsthand. and hilary shelton, washington bureau director and senior vice president for advocacy for national association for the advancement of colored people where he has worked on a wide variety of legislative issues. mr. shelton, being an important person within the naacp, is also a st. louis native. we're glad you're here. i would like to thank you for being here. we'll begin with your testify, mr. bueermann. >> thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss this important topic. as the senator just mentioned, the police foundation's mission is to advance democratic policing through innovation and science. we conduct rigorous scientific research, provide technical assistance that help police across the country become more effective. like many americans, i've been closely following the events in missouri and the national discussion about the militarization of american civil

police forces. central to this issue is the use of military-like equipment and tactics of police. conversely, to police officers, their use simply represents safer, more effective ways of handling the dangerous situations they're paid to. both perspectives have merit. police use of military tactics can either be appropriate or not depending entirely on the context of their use. the anecdote to militarizing our police is community policing, transparency, accountability and paying close attention to the culture of policing. while the committee reviews these programs, i urge you to consider their benefits along with needed programatic changes. there has been substantial positive impact on the public and officer safety from the programs that provide equipment to law enforcement. for example, two weeks ago in

illinois, the cook county sheriff's department used armored vehicles to get officer it is to scene and extract six children and two adults being held hostage after a home invasion robbery. two officers were shot during the 20-hour standoff but the equipment prevented further injury to officers and helped the safe recovery of the hostages. in west bloomfield, michigan, a suspected barricaded -- a suspect barricaded himself in a residential neighborhood engaged in a fire fight with the police and killed a police officer. during the standoff, the police used their armored vehicle to safely evacuate the neighborhood. finally, this summer, the las vegas metropolitan police department used rescue helicopters obtained through the 1033 program 11 times during search and rescue in mountainous terrain and used boats six times on lake mead. my familiarity with federal programs that provide local law enforcement equipment, i offer the following suggestion and i -- that i believe will strike

a balance between the needs of the police and compelling community interest. every policing agency that desires access to federal surplus property via d.o.d.'s 1033 program should be required as part of the application process to provide proof that it has received public input and local governing body approval of the department's acquisition of the property and that it has adequate publicly reviewable training, transparency and accountability policies in place. i think it's important the 1033 program be retained with appropriate transparency accountability and oversight guidelines incorporated. completely eliminating it could have substantial impact on public safety. and doing so would make taxpayers potentially pay again for the same equipment they paid for while it was used by the military. i also recommend congress appropriate funds to adequately study this.

the impact of the federal government provides assistance to arequiring the equipment that may encourage this. in conclusion, i urge the committee and congress to examine and consider the federal implications for advancing the following five guiding principles of sustaining democratic policing. first, the police and the community must constantly focus on community policing framed around a set of organizational values developed in concert with the community. second, police organizations should reflect the communities they serve. when diverse communities see the police as not reflecting their members, they can lose faith in the police to understand their needs in meaningful ways. third, policing agencies must provide their officers with appropriate and effective value-based training, accountability technology like body-worn cameras and less lethal tubes. fourth, police should utilize best available scientific evidence about what works to control crime and disorder. finally, critical incident

reviews should be conducted after every critical incident involving the police to capture lessons learned and translate them to lessons applied so events like those occurring in ferguson do not happen again. thank you for this opportunity to testify before you. >> thank you, mr. bueermann. dr. kraska. >> senator mccaskill, senator coburn, members of the committee and wonderful staffers, thank you for inviting me. let me begin today's comments with two examples of police militarization. one old. in fact, it predates 9/11 and one new this year in may. in september of 2000 federal law enforcement conducted a joint drug with modesto, california, police department employing the model. the s.w.a.t. team conducted a dynamic entry a family's home suspecting the father, turned out incorrectly of being involved in low-level drug

dealing. one of the children in the home, alberto, was 11 years old and complied with all of the officers' screams to get into the prone position on his bedroom floor. a paramilitary police officer standing over him with a 12-gauge shotgun then accidentally discharged his weapon into alberto's back, killing him. now move forward to may of this year. a poernlg george police department s.w.a.t. team concluded a no-knock drug raid on a family's private residence. the officers threw a percussion grenade into the home. the device landed on -- in an infant's crib next to his face and then it detonated. despite being comatose for a number of days and receiving severe lacerations and burns, the baby did survive. not that it should matter, but the family was not involved in drug dealing. some might dismiss these cases as mere anecdotes but the facts, based on extensive national level scientific research are clear. these examples are emblematic of

historic, up until recently little publicly noticed shift in american democratic governance. the clear distinction between our civilian police and military is blurring in significant and consequential ways. the research i've been conducting since 1989 has documented quantitatively and qualitatively the steady and certain march of u.s. civilian policing down the militarization continuum. culturally, materially, operationally and organizationally. despite massive efforts of democraticizing police under the guise of policing. in mid-1980s a mere 30% of police agencies have-h a s.w.a.t. team. today well over 80% of departments, large and small, have one. in the early 1980s these agencies conducted approximately 3,000 deployments a year nationwide.

today i estimate a very conservative figure of 60,000 per year. and it is critical to recognize that these 60,000 deployments are mostly for conducting drug searches on people's private residences. this is not to imply that all police, nearly 20,000 unique departments across our great land are heading in this direction. but the research evidence along with militarized tragedies in modesto, georgia, ferguson and tens of thousands of other locations demonstrates a troubling and highly consequential overall trend. what we saw played out in the ferguson protests was the application of a very common mind set, style of uniform and appearance and weaponry used every day in the homes of private residences during s.w.a.t. raids. some departments conduct as many as 500 s.w.a.t. team raids a year. and just as in the two examples above and in the ferguson situation, it is the poor and

communities of color that are most impacted. it is hard to imagine that anyone intended for the wars on crime, drugs and terrorism to devolve into widespread police militarization. at the same time, it is also hard not to see that by declaring war, we have opened the door for outfitting our police to be soldiers with a warrior mind set. i mentioned police militarization predates 9/11. this is not just an interesting historical fact. it is critical because it illuminates the most important reason or causal factor in this unfortunate turn in american policing and american democracy. it is the following. our long-running and intensely punitive self-proclaimed war on crime and drugs. it is no coincidence that the skyrocketing number of police paramilitary deployments on american citizens since the

early 1980s coincides perfectly with the skyrocketing imprisonment numbers. we now have 2.4 million people incarcerated in this country. and almost 4% of the american public is now under direct correctional supervision. these wars have been devastating to minority communities and the marginalized and have resulted in a self-perpetuating growth complex. cutting off the supply of military weaponry to our civilian police is the least we could do to begin the process of reining in police militarization and attempting to make clear the increasingly blurred distinction between the military and police. please do not underestimate the gravity of this development. this is highly disturbing to most americans. on the left and the right. thank you. >> thank you. mr. lomax. >> i want to thank chairman -- >> you need to turn on your microphone. >> good afternoon. i would like to thank chairman,

ranksing member coburn, sandra mccaskill, members of this community to have the opportunity to speak with you today. since its inception in 1983 the ntoa has served as not for profit representing law enforcement professionals and special assignment in local, state and federal law enforcement agency. the mission of the ntoa is to enhance the performance and professional status of law enforcement personnel by providing a credible and proven training resource as well as a form for development of tactics and information exchange. the american law enforcement officer recognizes probably more accurately than most they're not in conflict with the citizens they serve. to the con temporary, the brave men and women of this profession willingly place themselves between danger and the public every day, at personal sacrifices to themselves and their families.

this is evident by the law enforcement memorial, walking distance from where we sit today. law enforcement agencies in the united states have taken advantage of the 1033 programs since its inception, but certainly at greater frequency after the terror attacks of september 11, 2001. dhs, doj grants and the d.o.d. 1033 program allows agencies to acquire the necessary equipment rapidly and at a considerable cost savings to the local tax-paying public. the 10e 33 program has allowed local agencies to acquire heavy duty, high-wheeled vehicles, forklif forklifts, generators and vehicles that improve operational capabilities and responder safety. the threat that firearms pose to law enforcement officers and the public during violent, critical incidents have proven armored

rescue vehicles have become as essential as individually worn body armor or helmets when saving lives. moreover in the dhs, fema type resource definitions, law enforcement document, it is recommended s.w.a.t. teams have tactical equipment, including armored rescue vehicles in the event of a disaster. most tactical commanders utilize these resources judiciously and are sensitive in the real and perceived appearance. it's not uncommon for agencies to take receipt of such equipment and receive little or no training on how to utilize it, when to deploy it and equally as important, when not to deploy it. prior to obtaining equipment from 1033 program or utilized commercially through grant money, agencies are not mandated to demonstrate training levels for the use of that equipment. it is incumbent upon that agency to obtain the necessary training

based upon regulatory or voluntary compliance standards associated with such equipment. such training could take place at the requesting agency location. another challenge is that there are not enough specialized law enforcement teams developed specifically mobile field force teams in every jurisdiction around the country. consequently when law enforcement is faced with civil event, they access what they have available, the local s.w.a.t. team. 87% of law enforcement agencies in the united states have fewer than 50 officers. with the exception of large metropolitan cities or jurisdictions that have had prior civil disorder events, most agencies have not invested in a mobile field force capability. there's also lack of training for planners, public information

officers and first-line supervisors. this must change. the mtoa published standards in 2011 which outlines the most basic requirements for tactical teams in terms of operational capabilities. training, management, policy development, operational planning and multijurisdictional response. the standard, however, is a voluntary compliance standard. subsequently many law enforcement leaders view them as unfunded mandates. the ntoa's position, though, is when an agency makes a decision to develop a s.w.a.t. capability, it should also make the investment in training, equipment and best practices that are required to support such an effort. again on behalf of 40,000 law enforcement professionals the ntoa represents, i thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on these current issues and challenges and look forward to answering the questions the committee may have.

>> mr. price. >> good afternoon. my name is wily price, staff photo journalist at st. louis american newspaper in st. louis, missouri. i would like to thank senator mccaskill for inviting me to the hearing today. the shooting death of michael brown, an unarmed teenager, by a ferguson, missouri, police officer on saturday, august 9, 2014, may very well become the turning point in moving forward in changing the way policing is conducted in this country. especially in neighborhoods of people of color. first, mandatory body cameras to ensure account anlt for the way citizens are addressed during routine stops. this policy would allow us to examine the methods police use during these stops. these are special challenges to policing in urban areas where there are strong feelings, often

negative, about the conduct and the role of the police. though strong feelings, often negative, about the conduct of the role of the police. the uprisings in ferguson are an example of inept and insensitive police behavior at the highest decision-making level. it raises the question of how much force is appropriate to control a group of angry protesters armed initially with rocks, bottles and later molotov cocktails. what police used to defend themselves at the early stage of the confrontation was a high level of military weaponry, not often seen on the streets in the united states. what we saw were large military-style weapons, including armored vehicles, normally seen on national news during conflicts concerning the middle east war zone. most americans were -- would not be so shocked if this were a response to an overt terrorist

attack on an american city. but not during a spontaneous protest over the shooting of a young african-american male by a white police officer while walking in the street in the middle of the day. most believe that we can spend this kind of money on weapons -- i'm sorry, most believe that if we request spend this is kind of money on weapons, why not use those same resources to better train the police in community policing and train them also in the best way to resolve conflict. if heavy military weapons are to be deployed, they should be in the hands of trained officer subject to competent high-level police command. this show of might in ferguson escalated the understandably strong feelings by the very people the police are sworn to serve and protect. the days of unrest were followed by growing protest from people who already felt disrespected

and frustrated by the local law enforcement on a daily basis. that concludes my statement. >> thank you, mr. price. mr. shelton. >> thank you very much, senator mccaskill. i want to thank senator harper, senator coburns and others gathered here today. i want to thank you for inviting me to testify and the naacp on this topic. i'll hilary shelton, director of washington's bureau. the naacp deeply appreciates the needs of local government, including law enforcement agencies to secure equipment as cost effectively as possible. we have supported increased resources in personnel for local police departments since the founding of the association 105 years ago. over the last couple decades, given the slinking state and federal budgets and oftentimes increasing demands, the communities represented and served by the naacp suffered

disproportionately from reduced state and local funding. our concern is when military equipment, weapons of war commonly used to fight a vowed enemy of our country, are transferred into local domestic law enforcement agencies with little or no oversight, training or specific and clear integration, when and how they are used in civilian circumstances. the tragic killing of michael brown in ferguson, missouri, the ensuing protests, and the resulting demonstrations of force by local law enforcement attracted the attention of many to a heretofore little known program, the defense department's 1033 program, by which the federal government transfers excess military equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies. while americans were rightfully upset, it is a sad commentary on race in america that this is not a new phenomena to most americans of color. the war on drugs and war on crimes have been predominantly waged in racial and ethnic minority communities and too often against african americans.

since 1989 military equipment has been used by law enforcement agencies to fight the war on drugs. thus, it should be of no surprise racial and ethnic minorities have grown accustomed to seeing weapons of wars in our communities, on our streets and even entering our homes. on saturday, august 9th an an unarmed college-bound african-american teenager michael brown was shot by a police officer in ferguson, missouri. the ensuing protests began peacefully. people were angry, admittedly outraged, but peaceful. protests were met by local law enforcement agencies in ambush protected vemdz, mraps, with assault weapons aimed at them. the resulting impression on people in ferguson and throughout the country and world watching these events is that these americans were being marginalized. their concerns, protests were not valued or respected by local law enforcement.

one cnn report said it looked more like belfast, or the middle east, than the heartland of middle america. the fact that population of ferguson is over 67% african-american has not been lost on many of the protesters nor on the u.s. or international observers. as a matter of fact, i was at the united nations when all this broke loose and they were asking me questions about ferguson. people who could not speak english knew the word ferguson. what steps does the naacp recommend so solve the problem with overmilitarization of local law enforcement agencies? we need to move away from the war on crime to be trained to stop stereotyping people based on what they look like, the clothes they wear and the neighborhoods in which they live. if the department of defense's 1033 program is allowed to continue, it should be restructured to emphasize nonlethal equipment and that the

equipment be used not to pursue the flawed war on drugs or civilian protests and demonstrations, but rather it be used to promote the idea that law enforcement is designed to protect and serve. the citizens who are within their jurisdiction. included in the requirements necessary to receive such equipment must also be policies, training and oversight which includes the racial profiling act, pending in the house and senate, and the law enforcement stuff and integrity act being introduced by senator john conyers. local agencies should develop policies calling for thoughtful of restraint and should be a requirement before any equipment transfer or funding occurs. we need full transparency and disclosure. not only should the department of defense be required to disclose what equipment was distributed and to bhoem but state and local law enforcement agencies must be required to publicly report on the equipment they requested and received and the intended purpose.

finally, the naacp would like to strongly advocate for more programs such as the department of justice's community policing, or cops program, and for increase in the funding of c.o.p.s. program. it's intended to incentivize better law enforcement practices through community engagement. it remains a primary vehicle through which the federal government awards on police transparen and accountability. in summation, american policing has become increasingly militarized through weapons and takttics designed for war. the lines between federal military force and civil law enforcement has become increasingly blurred. sadly americans have born the brunt of this. we need to correct this program. not just check it. we need to continue to strive for a democracy under which all americans can live. we should not allow any american government entity to be considered at war with any

other. i thank you again, chairman harper, coburn and mccaskill and all the others here today. i look forward to your questions. >> thank you so much. i'm going to go ahead and defer my questions and allow the other senators who are here to go first. >> thanks for your testimony. mr. bueermann, at what point do you think the federal government's obligation to local law enforcement begins? >> that's a great question. i think that one of the benefits of the federal government is trying to create a national cohere answer around what policing should look like around the united states. that's a difficult place for the federal government to be. there are leadership training programs like the national academy that the fbi puts on at the fbi academy that helps police leaders across the united states better understand these kinds of issues that we're talking about today. so, certainly that would be an appropriate role for the federal government. as somebody who used to be a police chief, i really appreciated the ability to

acquire equipment in my department we used it primarily for vehicles and office equipment for our community policing stations or community recreation programs we could not have afforded if the 1033 program hadn't existed. from a local perspective, i thought that was a wonderful way for us to get a return on our federal tax investment. but i certainly understand the issues that are at play in this discussion. >> dr. kraska, appreciate you coming and appreciate you working with us. tell me what the difference is between a militarized and increasingly federalized police force and a standing army. >> it's actually a bit of a complicated history i won't get into too much, but we have to remember that the posi act of 1878 had been in place, untouched for quite a long time, until the 1980s drug war. and it wasn't until the 1980's

drug war -- it was actually the reagan administration that wanted to completely reveal posi, but what happened is they just amended it significantly to allow for cross-training and weapons transference. and just as an aside, i don't want to make too much of an aside, but we also have to remember that the department of defense has been very actively involved in training local police departments as well. not just providing them equipment, but providing them training. i've got a great quote -- i'm not going to read it now, bus if you ask me to read it, i will, that talks about even have navy s.e.a.l.s and army rangers come to a local police department and teach them things. it's not just weapons transference. the federal government has increasingly, since 9/11, played a significant role in accelerating these trends towards militarization. and, you know, the extent to which the 1033 program, the

department of homeland security funds, et cetera, have contributed to it, i would certainly call it significant. but i think we have to remember that the -- that the militarized culture of a component of policing, and it's just a component of policing. this isn't a unified phenomenon in all police in the united states of america. hell, we have a police department next to us, the lexington p.d., very smart, very wise, they don't do this kind of thing at all and they would never do it. the policing community is a bit split over this. i don't want anybody to get the impression because of the experts we've heard that policing is all for this stuff. because it's just not true. there are lots of folks that aren't. anyway, back to federalization. so, i think the federal government has played a significant role in probably the last 10 to 14 years. >> the rest of my questions i'll submit for the record so we can move on in our time. >> senator johnson. >> thank you, madame chair.

dr. kraska, in your testimony, what i have written down on my notes is equipment versdz procedures versus operations. how much of it is really about procedures responding to just the events in society versus the actual equipment? i mean, what is really -- what's causing what? >> great question. and, of course, difficult to answer. i do know that the militarization trend began as part of the drug war. it hasn't had anything to do with terrorism. it hasn't had anything to do with threats to national security. it's had everything to do with prosecuting the drug war. and that's when we saw the precipitous rise in not only the number of s.w.a.t. units but their amount of activity. that's when we saw departments doing 750 to 1,000 drug raids

per year on people's private residences. that's when we saw police departments all over the country, in small little localities, sending off two or three officers to a for-profit training camp like smith and wesson, getting training and coming back to the department and starting a 15-officer police paramilitary unit with no clue what they were doing whatsoever. that all happened as a part of the drug war. so, i have a hard time making any sort of credible analysis that what we're seeing is just a reaction to an increasing insecure homeland situation. this stuff has been well in place and it's still absolutely happening today in the same way it was in the 1990s and the 2000s. >> so again, i'm -- i'm coming from a manufacturing background, trying to solve problems, going

to the root cause. what i'm hearing, because again in my briefing, this equipment transfer really first started from a defense authorization bill targeting the drug war. >> absolutely. >> we spent -- i know the last three years, because of another hearing, we spent $75 billion fighting the war on drugs. we're not concreting it, are we? so, what do we need to do? i'll ask mr. lomax. what do we need to do procedurally -- what's the solution here? >> thank you, senator. the solution relative to equipment and procedures or the drug war? >> i'm not -- if this is all really caused initially by the drug war, the militarization buildup is in reaction to the drug war, these no-knock raids are about drugs. what's the solution? >> i think the solution starts at the top, leadership. the solution comes from decision

making, policy, procedures, getting back to what your initial question was to dr dr. kraska. the nexus between equipment and procedures, i think, procedures come first. policy, documentation, transparency, decision making. so, again, it's not the equipment, per se. it's who's making those decisions on how to use it, how to deploy or when not to deploy. >> i mean, is your -- are we making any progress on the war on drugs at all? been engaged in this for decades now. >> again, that's a question that needs to be taken up by the legislators and congress and the policymakers as far as how we're doing on the war on drugs. >> and i realize these questions are somewhat removed of militarization of the police force, but i'm looking -- based on the testimony, this is the reason this militarization began. mr. shelton, what is your solution?

i mean, obviously, drugs have devastated communities. you know, crime has devastated communities. >> it's got to change. the paradigm we're using now, criminalizing in the way we are and actually putting people in prison is outrageous. quite frankly, as mentioned by dr. kraska, 2.4 million in jail. most for nonhigh vent offenses. you talk about health care approach to the drug problem in the united states and get away from much of the criminal, now military approach, to the drug problem in this country. i should talk about problems with police officers and overaggression and even practices of racial profiling. we have strategies for that as well. one of your colleagues has a bill before the u.s. senate, that goes a long way to restore the trust and integrity necessary for law enforcement to be necessary. we know that will go many, many miles toward fixing the crime problem in our society. as we talk about these issues, it makes no sense to me that we

have 79,288 assault rifles that were given by the department of defense to local police departments. 205 grenade launchers, 11,959 bayonets. i'm trying to figure out what they're going to do with 3,972 combat knives. indeed, that is what is with local police departments now. it makes no sense. >> again, war on drugs but also war on crime. mr. sheldon, a recent article written by walter williams, he lists the statistic from 1976 to 2011. there's been 279,389 african-americans murdered. a rate of about 7,000 per year. 94% of those murders are black-on-black. that's a real crime problem you have to be concerned about. and, by the way, i would think local police departments are also concerned about. >> absolutely. as a matter of fact, the issue of dealing well crime in the african-american community goes back to our founder over 105

years ago, w.b. dubois. the crime problem in the african-american community has to be addressed, but it cannot be addressed successfully if we have the distrust in police officers we're seeing because of programs like this one. we're going to have to establish a new trust pattern in our country. also, i was very happy to hear dr. kraska mentioned the issue of those who are most effected in addressing the issues of crime, are those reflective of those communities in which they're there to serve. all that has to be part of the paradigm. the only time things begin to cool off in ferguson, missouri, quite frankly s when the first african-american attorney general of the united states went to ferguson to show that the top law enforcement officer in our country was there and that that their concerns would be taken very seriously. that works across the board. >> okay. my time's running out. thank you, madame chair. >> thank you. senator ayotte. >> thank you. one of the things that i'm trying to understand is

everything depends on the situation. would you agree with that, in terms of what's appropriate to deploy, what is appropriate in terms of a response, and also, i think, it all comes down to appropriate training as to how to respond to a situation, because, would you all agree with me, that we're going to respond differently to a situation like the marathon bombing versus the situation like ferguson? and part of that is training and what we need to respond to those situations may be different. >> if i might begin. just before -- we need clear policy on how to respond to circumstances like that we experienced in ferguson and other places. policy, then training -- i'm sorry. policy, then training and then accountability. those are the triumbrant to move

this along. >> one of the things i wanted to follow up on this idea of, for example, s.w.a.t. teams, because having been -- worked with the police in my state in a number of settings, they've responded -- they've had to respond to some pretty dangerous situations that did involve, for example, a drug -- a drug crime, that where you had, you know, high-level individuals who were quite dangerous, quite armed. and that it was the most appropriate that a s.w.a.t. team respond because they had the most training of how to deal with a situation like that versus sending, you know, one patrol officer or a handful of patrol officers that aren't oriented towards dealing with a situation where you have, for example, an armed drug dealer, not necessarily user, but someone profiting off the situation. you know, then i've been to situations where we had a hostage situation and we had a s.w.a.t. team situation there where, you know, truthfully, i

was glad that the s.w.a.t. team was there, because they had the training and they trained particularly for hostage situations that would allow the police to have the right training and to know how to negotiate, number one, to know how to handle a situation, not to have bystanders harmed. what i'm trying to understand is to make a broad swath of saying 60,000 s.w.a.t. operations -- that's a broad brush. i'm trying to get at maybe from all three of you in the first to have commented on this is, what is it appropriate for us -- it seems like it's appropriate for us to some have individuals who have this type of training, because i've been there at these scenes with them where i would have wanted the right s.w.a.t. team trained to deal with the situation. and we successfully ended situations because the people there had the right training and weren't -- and trained for this specifically, weren't just taking the patrol officer off

the street to address it. how do we distinguish from that and this situation where, you know, the public -- it's a protest situation where it's people exercising their first amendment rights and this isn't an easy question to answer, but i think this is what we're grappling with here. particularly, we have asked a lot more of the police post 9/11 in terms of what response we have asked of them as first responders. maybe we have sent mixed messages. i'd like to get your comment. i know that's more of a statement of the but i'd like to hear your comment on some of those thoughts. >> senator, if i can start this off. what you have just articulated -- it's a great question. it ultimately is the crux of this discussion, because anybody who thinks that we're not going to have tactical teams or high-powered weaponry in policing in the united states has not been paying attention to the realities of police

officers. the memorial not far from here has 20,000 names of heroic americans who gave their life trying to protect their own communities. there is a time and a place for any one of these particular tools. i made reference to the fbi's national academy. one of the problems we have in this country is there is not a national co-here ens about when we should use these particular tools. you can find out the hard way, this is the rational for doing critical incident reviewed to understand those learning opportunities. but at the end of the day it comes downs to leadership, whether expressed by the local city council that selects the police chief, by the police chief himself or herself that decides whether they should or shouldn't have a tactical team and under what circumstances they should use that. if you leave it to the police officers like any of us, they have a burning desire every day to go home to their families. so much of their world is framed around the perception that what -- what that what i'm about

to do, the service of a search warrant could be dangerous. i have served lots of search warrants. i understand -- >> not to interrupt you. but ply own state in the last two years, we lost one officer exercising a search warrant in a drug situation. and we lost another one in a domestic violence executing an arrest warrant. >> i don't know any police officer that doesn't recognize that nobody made them become a cop. that is a voluntary of course tag -- the voluntary occupation. ultimately, this leadership issue is a function of the relationship that the police department has with the community. the professor talked about the police department next door to him that has a great relationship and they wouldn't do certain things. if they needed a tactical team, have i no doubt to protect their citizens or their officers, they would employ that. it is when you use it and that common sense and that wisdom

that comes from leadership and the proper training. that's where i think the federal government should spend a lot of its attention on how do you stimulate that and that ability to do the right thing. >> often times these kind of conversations devolve into an either/or argument. it's critical to recognize that there are absolutely lots of situations, kcolumbine, where yu have to have a professional response. military special operations, you have to have that. no doubt. what i was talking about was 60,000 deployments, was i was not talking about 60,000 deployments for those swag situations. they are incredibly rare. those situations absolutely require a competent response, active shooter, terrorist,

whatever kind of situation. our research demonstrated conclusively that 85% of s.w.a.t. team operations today are pro active, choice driven, raids on people's private residents. 85%. what that means is that the original function of s.w.a.t. in the 1970s was the idea that s.w.a.t. teams were to save lives. they were to respond in a way to very dangerous situations and handle circumstances well. what happened during the 1980s and early 1990s drug war is that function flipped on its head. we went from these teams predominantly doing reactive deployments, maybe one to two of these in an entire mere muniti .

this has devolved into what i'm talking about. widespread misapplication of the paramilitary model. misapplication. unjustified growth. having many, many, many, smaller police departments -- most of these departments are small. our research showed that 50% of these small police departments, 50% are receiving less than 50 hours of training per year for their s.w.a.t. team. the recommended amount from the ntoa used to be 250. i think they have reduced it to 200. 250 hours versus 50 hours. these are not well-trained teams. these are a localized 18,000 police departments all doing their own thing with no oversight and no accountability. that's why we're seeing and we have seen hundreds of these kinds of tragedies that i have mentioned but lots of terrorized families that have been caught

up in the drug operations and drug raids. thank you. >> thank you. anybody else? >> senator, a couple of comments relative to the s.w.a.t. that you saw. there is a need, like the panelists have discussed in the last couple minutes, that the number one priority of s.w.a.t. is preserve life. number one. when you think of a s.w.a.t. team, most people think of the tactical enter team. as part of the s.w.a.t. team you have intelligence. you have negotiators, you have security and so forth. the number one goal of a s.w.a.t. team, preserve life whether it's pohostages, civilians, suspect. over the years, the use of s.w.a.t. has been -- out reached this main purpose. but going back to the reason for s.w.a.t. is those small particular situations that you

have personally observed where the training, the equipment, the expertise saved lives. >> thanks. thank you. for mr. beerman and mr. lomax, i am very sensitive to the cry that goes up about unfunded federal mandates. this is a different situation. we are pushing in wholesale fashion military equipment to local police departments. do you sense that the police community would be offended if we put a few more rules of the road on the ability to receive these resources from the federal government? why wouldn't we require that if you are going to get federal funding in this spags thce that would have to have 200 hours of training and that the size of your police department would be relevant to the decisions as to

what you would receive and that a s.w.a.t. team on a very, very small community, particularly one that's a suburb, where there could be regional access to specialists in the rare but very, very important situation where that kind of training is absolutely essential to protect life of innocent people and most importantly the lives of the police officers? why can't we begin to do more with -- if we're going to give you money, we're going to make you jump through a few hoops. is that something you think the police community would not accept and understand that this has gone too far? >> i've had this conversation with several police chiefs since ferguson erupted. i don't think that they would be alarmed by this. i think there's an expectation that there is going to be an adjustment in the program and the thoughtful police chiefs

that have i spoken to about this would agree with what you said, that there needs to be some governing affect on the transfer of some of this equipment. i don't think you have an objection other than the one you had earlier if you are giving away equipment, how does that make sense about equipment? but tactical equipment, whether armored vehicles or guns, should be connected -- i made suggestio suggestions -- with a local public input capacity, a public hearing about this. some guidance from the government relative to accountability measures like the body warn cameras or training issues. because many of those arguments, local police chiefs would make to their local city councils and some fall on deaf ears. they can't get the council to pay attention because there is a price tag. you may be helping many police chiefs elevate the level of training they would like to see

their people receive. >> mr. lomax. >> yes. i agree with my colleague here that, number one, for the vast majority of chiefs and sheriffs out there, adding extra steps as far as documentation policy and accountability would not be a problem. i think in that affect, this program has done tremendous contribution to police departments in the last 25-plus years. that right now, there needs to be a paradigm shift, a way of thinking differently. perception is reality. right now, the perception is there's a millization of this. it would kind of ensure training. and as jim mentions, it will

give them more power to say we need more training to procure this equipment. also, there needs to be local input. i believe -- i think senator johnson mentioned it earlier that this should be a local issue, too. from the state to the local, they should have input into their police departments and how they are properly equipped. >> doctor? >> excuse me for being a professor and talking on and on. i will actually read a thing that i had written before, hopefully pretty quickly. if with respect to possible to allow a small component of u.s. police to obtain military grade equipment for the extremely rare act of shooter situation, perhaps the programs might be of benefit. however, the unavoidable unintended consequences of such programs render them not just dubious but dangerous.

military gear and garb changed a war-fighting civility among police are population become the enemy and the police perceive of themselves as a line between order and chaos that can be controlled through military model power. the ethic, the massive community policing reform programs intended to instill in american policing, that is an ethic of community empowerment, developing trust between the community and police, democratic accountability, all those things have been smoothly displaced by military paradigm. a recent addition in cops magazine by the director of cops said very clearly, he said, we're seeing the growing mill tearization of policing lead to the destruction of community policing. so it's a cultural problem. it's not just a regulation, let's put a few tweaks and bumps here. when you hand these departments this level of weaponry and these

goods, it changes their mindset. remember, most of these departments have 25, 30, 50 officers. 15 of them serve on a s.w.a.t. team. now they have an armored personnel carrier, a $325,000 armored personnel carrier paid for by homeland security. what do they say? here is an example. we have racial tensions at the basketball game. we're going to bring the m-rap to the basketball game friday night. that's a quote. changes their mindset. i can't see a way that the transfer ens of military goods from wartime to our civilian police agencies is ever a good idea. >> it's interesting you say that. just in preparing to for this hearing, we took a look at -- a search and amazon for police officer toys. and what came up -- it's in the

packet of pictures -- the next picture, the one with the -- yeah. this is the first thing that came up. this is a helmet, military helmet. it's a hand grenade. obviously, the kind of weaponry that we have not pra decisionally thought of police officers. these are what parents are buying for their children who say they want to grow up and be police officers. so this is something that has gotten, i think, into our culture that is very, very damaging. speaking of community policing, i have watched as community policing has gone down and down and down. by the way, the homeland security grants have not gone -- the homeland security grants are bigger than community policing. so why is it that i don't hear as much about -- from my police

communities and the lobbies organizations about the cuts to community policing like i do when there's any talk about the homeland security grants? why is it that there doesn't appear to be the cry -- we need the voices of the police community lobbying for community policing money. i watch community policing work as a prosecutor. i watched it work. with a drug problem, a serious drug problem. that and drug court were two things that were working in kansas city. what do awe tribute the fact that the policing community doesn't seem to be as worried about the funding for community policing as they are for some of these streams of funding buying this weaponry? >> this is a cultural aspect of policing.

it also is the responsible of every american, quite frankly to say to their locally elected people that this is what we expect from our police department. we expect our police department to be one that is fair and equitable, that treats everybody with dignity and respect. at the same time they grapple with different and challenging situations. the best count erterrorism strategy is community policing. there is an absolute need -- you heard it from everybody up here today in front of you -- to co-produce public safety between the police and the community. that will never happen if there's distrust, if the police departments don't reflect the community they serve, if we don't have a constant discussion. if there is any silver lining that comes out of the events in ferguson, it's that we begin this discussion that should have happened probably in 1997, not in 2014, about how we use this equipment, whether it comes from a federal government or out of a

city's general fund in an appropriate way that doesn't damage the relationship the police have with the community. if we do not do that, thun we shouldn't be surprised when that becomes a problem in the future. >> what about the idea that this be in the active shooter situation or hostage situation or te or terrorism situation that this be housed under the control of the state national guard to then as an access point that would provide more accountability and it was utilized and would require that it wouldn't be utilized by anyone who hadn't had appropriate training and only utilized in circumstances where it really would save lives and protect police officers as opposed to the incredible change we have seen that these are now, okay, we have this thing in the shed, let's figure out how to get out and use it. >> you have just articulated the

reason we should study this particular phenomena more. we're trying to work on solutions. because we don't know enough about how this equipment is used. we heard that from the earlier panel. >> they have no idea. justice department said they do. they just know what they're buying with it. they don't know how it's being utilized. >> we should spend more time and money researching. you make a great point about regionalizing certain kinds of assets. there are lessons we could learn from other fields that do this. this could -- i think, this could be one of the guidelines attached to this kind of programming that you have to demonstrate what the regional approach is to using these kinds of equipment. we see that already in some federal programs. this should be a regional asset and not necessarily a localized asset. the problem is there's 17,000 police departments in this united states. each one has a slightly different challenge in front of them. so there needs to be a thoughtful approach to this that ties this stuff together. i think that ensuring that the locally elected body weighs in

on this, local communities have an opportunity to voice their opinion, whether this makes sense or doesn't make sense for us to have this particular piece of equipment means there's a much more -- a greater likelihood that you will see a regional approach to these things and not necessarily an individual department with one officer department has an m-wrap. we should know -- >> or 13 assault grade rifles. that is almost comical it's so out of bounds. one of the things that i witnessed in ferguson and i would like to you weigh in on this, mr. price, the chicken and egg situation that really occurred where you had a spontaneous demonstration, you had the vast majority of which was very peaceful beginning on saturday. we did have looting on sunday night. aside from the looting on sunday night, the vast majority was

peaceful until the following weekend when you began do see a lot of people embedded among the peaceful protest tlerz for a confrontation. there's no question in my mind that the idea that all of this equipment was brought out early in the week contributed to a mentality among the peaceful protesters that they were being treated as the enemy. >> that's correct. >> that they were the enemy. >> yes. >> that this was a military force and they were facing down an enemy. these were peaceful protesters that in america were supposed to be celebrating as part of our constitutional heritage. talk about, mr. price, how the freedom of the press worked in here. what were the challenges you faced as you were there with your camera day in and day out from being able to cover what was going on because of that

mentality that were almost a siege mentality that began really on monday following the shooting on saturday. >> senator, one of the big problems i had with the police was that sometimes they lumped the media in with the protesters. particularly during the daylight hours whether they took on a policy of no standing protester or media could be found stationary. the problem i had with that was you have us locked into -- >> a pen? >> a 2-mile radius. they wanted us to keep in motion. wouldn't it be easier if once they do slow down, you have them corralled and eled in one locat? there's there's 80 to 100 people here. why should we move? particularly when you ask photographers to move with them. there was tussle from time to

time. you saw a couple of the cnn correspondents live on the air being forced 20 or 30 feet down a certain area. i felt like they were aggravating a peaceful stance. they are tired of walking up the street. now they will stand and chant. you want to keep them in motion and you want the media to go with them. i felt like they were aggravating the situation as opposed to keeping it peaceful. >> i'm assuming tactical officers receive training about when -- putting in this kind of military presence when -- during daylight hours when you have lots of children and elderly. this crowd -- there were young people in the crowd. but it was the middle of the afternoon, and you had a mounted sniper weapon pointing at people

that never, ever envisioned having someone point a sniper weapon -- this person was -- this happened on wednesday afternoon. it was about 3:00 in the afternoon. so, is there somewhere in the training that that would be appropriate under those circumstances? >> senator, i'm not sure the particulars of what was going on at that time. hopefully, the doj investigation and other investigations will determine what was going on. a lot of times there may be intelligence out there that something is going on that maybe we don't know what's going -- what's happening. >> believe it or not, i was told the reason that happened is that he was using his scope in order to observe the crowd. have they heard of binoculars? you know, it seems there's a better way to monitor a crowd

that is peacefully protesting than pointing moun ining mounte weapons at them. it seems common sense would tell you, that's going to make the situation worse, not make it better. >> you are right. >> i was told he was up there in order to observe the crowd. >> correct. >> most police departments that handle civil protests correctly know that the last thing you want do is instigate. it was a wonderful article in the "washington post" that interviewed chiefs of police that understand this and how you sit back and don't antagonize and don't display this level of weaponry. if i might, i will throw out a one quick speculation. i'm willing to speculate before the doj report comes out. i think what you saw was a high level of fear of victimization among the police. it's a huge cultural issue right now in policing where so many

for-profit training groups and training ak inging akad meecadi this. it does lead to an intense fear of the other, of those people, of the community you are serving. >> there had been looting on sunday night. they burned down a store. i mean, let's be fair here. it wasn't like this activity was completely lawful. there was a lot of unlawful activity that i think really shook the bones of the law ennoe enforcement community that they would have that kind of lawlessness. that is something we have to be very fair, we have to factor that in to their response. >> absolutely. but i would have to say, you have to look at a situation like hurricane katrina where the initial response from fema was

not what's been traditionally done in this great country, which is humanitarian aid. the initial response from fema under the department of homeland security was, this is a security threat. they spent almost four full days supposedly securing the area, later of which we found out was false, that there wasn't an area to secure. people were in dire need of help. securing the area before they gave humanitarian aid. that's the mentality i'm talking about. security first, aid second, mindset, which is our what our good friend said down the table. >> right. did you have something you wanted to add, mr. price? >> yes. in the picture that you just showed, the distance between the police and the protesters was probably 100 feet. >> very small? >> very small. i mean, when they were standing there, even when the police were shouting to us like in that

photo, you could hear what everyone was saying from the police department as far as moving back, disbursing. the use of a scope, even when that truck rolled up, all the photographers were looking around like, what is this for. we began to think that there was something else going on behind the scenes that we did not know about. >> you assumed it wasn't for you? >> yes. exactly. we were wondering why the truck was there, because, again, it brought up suspect that there was something going on that we did not know. other photographers were questioning each other about what was going on. this went on for three or four days. again, the police aggravated peaceful marchers when they were just standing there chanting. instead of letting them chant and you have them in their environment, they moved them around. which irritated them. that's all they did. >> right. right. well, i want to thank all of you for being here. we will follow up with another subcommittee hearing, i'm sure, on this subject as we -- i would

certainly ask you for you to begin working on what you think, based on your knowledge of the police community in this country, what would be reasonable changes in policy that would begin to get us back to a place where we have not done -- where somebody -- a young man who wants to grow up to a police officer thinks what he needs to get is a hand grenade. obviously, that's a problem. i would like us to work on that together. we will continue to work with all of you who have come together. certainly, the naacp is part of this national discussion. obviously, i'm on the ground in ferguson a lot trying to figure out how we navigate through a still very, very difficult road ahead as we figure out how to regain trust in that community with that police department. the great people of ferguson

deserve to have a police department that they feel comfortable with. so there's a lot of work yet to do. the hearing record with remain open for 15 days until september 24th at 5:00 p.m. for the submission of any other statements and any other questions for the record. if there is any information that you all would like to provide for the record, get it to us before then. we will replain in contact with you as we work on this praf. thank you very much.