supplies with me is probably spread among the different groups to avoid any suggestion of favoritism between groups, because their code is not as far as we're concerned. >> can i take you to mount sinjar, because there was a lot of publicity surrounding a? it was a warning report in "the guardian" a few weeks ago. >> as is well known, i do not read it. >> it was suggested that the crisis on mount sinjar certainly were not over. we've taken for granted a surveillance by the u.s.a., which suddenly withdrew from mount sinjar because they said their own a small number left. was that accurate? to know precisely what the state of play is now? are there still people not able to get off the mountain without assistance from somebody else? >> i think it was accurate. i mean, these situations are

quite difficult to assess in the heat of the moment. the humanitarian organizations were preparing for, quite rightly, a worst case scenario where without they were very large numbers of people trapped on the mountain. i think a combination of possibly overestimation of the number of people there originally. the fact people are insensitive resourceful, and night after night numbers of people were getting themselves off the mountain, and the involvement of the peshmerga forces, in rescuing groups of people, particularly some syrian kurdish forces, interesting people from the mountain. it became clear later on in the process that there was a far smaller number than we thought, and that the best way to getting them off with to reinforce the

land route that had already become established. we are confident now that there is nobody stranded on mount sinjar. who is trapped there. that isn't to say that it's perfectly peaceful situation there. there are still isil forces around the mountain, but we are confident that people who want to move off the mountain can do. we should also remember that there are significant numbers of people in that region who are displaced, from the period of the exodus from mount sinjar and before it, they remain displaced. so there still a major humanitarian problem in the dohuk area. >> now, the groups of peshmerga from syria, from turkey also assisted with the release of the

people trapped on mount sinjar. they include of course the pkk, which is still a prescribed a terrorist organization in this country, and they're obviously a key to continuing the fight against isis. are we going to be prescribed them or whatever the word is? can they be counted as no longer a terrorist organization? >> well, that a coastal the amount for the home secretary to consider, and she will do so on the basis of the evidence about their engagement in terrorist activities. it is not the case that silly because a terrorist organization carries out an act of humanity and kindness it will be, ceases to be a terrorist organization.

the process that the home secretary will follow will be to look at the evidence of any given organizations continue to link with terrorist activities, regardless of whatever else it is doing. >> will you make a recommendation, or we leave it completely to the home secretary without recommendation? >> that's a matter for the home secretary. she hasn't just -- she hasn't yet asked me for a few, but if she does i will give her one. >> what do you think the international community should do to protect iraqi minorities? clearly the persecution of christians, turkomans and so on in iraq continues. what do you think the international community should give? should there be a safe haven in the north? >> and women of course, not just ethnic, but gender discrimination as well. clearly the first thing we should do is collaborate

together to develop a coherent and credible strategy to push but isil and then to defeat its aboard ideology, which is the root cause of this problem in a land where christians, arabs, kurds, jews have lived together in relative harmony for hundreds and hundreds, if not thousands, of years. of course we must also support the international humanitarians efforts to support the huge number of displaced people, over 400,000 in dohuk alone. that's a short-term, approximate solution, not a long-term solution. the long-term solution is an inclusive government in iraq in control of all its territory with a constitution that respects both in letter and in deed the rights of minorities across the country. >> can i particularly ask you about the user the women?

i have raised it on the floor of the house a number of times the last few weeks. you know, we have conference in london that the prime minister and before secretary hosted at which we talked about the way in which these women are very often treated in war conditions. and then we have the yazidi women and many of them were captured. i don't know what the numbers are not that there were i think around 3000 the some of those reports were sold into slavery and into the brothels in the middle east. i just wonder, are we trying to find them as we were trying to help some of the 700 nigerian schoolgirls? we are not talking about 3000 adult women.

what has happened to them? >> i can't answer the question what has happened to them. the way these women are reported to have been treated is truly shocking. this is not just casual abuse of women in the course of the conduct of military operations, which is what sometimes happens your this is ideologically planned abuse of women. it is part of the ideology of isil, what is being done here and that's what makes it particularly shocking. i don't know if i got my colleagues the any thing specific about it, but i'm not aware of any operation currently going on to track and identify the location of these women. that would probably be very difficult to do given the circumstances prevailing on the ground. bear in mind that there are hundreds of thousands, probably a million or more displaced people moving around the region.

very difficult to track individuals at this point. >> is that not something our special forces to do? >> i repeat what i just said. it would probably be very difficult to do. these people will not i suspect be held as a group. they will be disbursed. it isn't, i mean this is a law enforcement task which requires specialist skills in tracing people. it's not the skills that would typically be held in special forces, either in the uk or elsewhere. >> foreign secretary, can i just returned us briefly to practical measures of combating isil on the ground? first of all, have thrown away behind the kurds on the frontline in iraq.

has the foreign office giving any consideration to assisting the kurds in syria? >> i don't think we are doing anything directly with the kurds. >> no. we will be talking to their political representatives tomorrow to follow up in fact on the role they had on mount sinjar and helping get many people off. i make it very for dissension there between the political wing of the syrian kurds and the military wing. but the main focus of our attention has come to been on the iraqi kurds. >> may i return to the more narrow objective of removing isis from northern iraq? a number of measures have been introduced, including arming the kurds and iraqi, it is not the

elephant in the room the iraqi army itself, numbering something like 250,000 men? which has been poorly perhaps led and structured and needs drastic improvement, and that is the into it comes to ground forces in northern iraq. foreign secretary, can you give us your view of that and perhaps a timescale for when you would expect the army to be licked into shape and able to take these extremists on? >> at is thinking is that the peshmerga are well motivated, reasonably lead and severely lacking in weapons and equipment. the iraqi security forces are demoralized, very badly led and badly structured, but all well-equipped with american weaponry. that's why there hasn't been a discussion about equipping the iraqi security forces. i think we see this, and i think

the like-minded group of countries share this view, as a process that has to be taken step-by-step. step one is the creation of an inclusive, and credible iraqi government in baghdad, which begins immediately to reach out to the kurdish and sunni communities within iraq with a program that recognizes the long-standing tensions about sharing of resources and levels of autonomy. as soon as that is in place, and we need is a program of support for the restructuring and reconfiguration, better to reflect the ethnic balance in the country, of the iraqi security forces, and i suspect a significant element of retraining, technical device and support will be required.

one of the issues that i'm sure that secretary hagel and secretary kerry will be discussing in the gulf this week is the appetite among countries in the region to provide, in the short term, some of that hands-on training and technical advice. >> very briefly, foreign secretary, can i suggest you are absolutely right? it has got to be a political solution in the end, soldiers only by time, but the way you word it, it sounds as though the timetable is politics first, army second. >> politics first. >> one can understand that a certain extent, but that timescale suggest many months before we even get to the iraqi army to address the extremist. am i right? >> no, i don't think so. the announcement that an iraqi government has been formed means that we can expect to move now

quickly, beginning to put together the package of support for the institutions of the legitimate iraqi government, including the iraqi security forces. clearly there is an implicit bargain, tha that of countries n the region, countries in the west, put packages of support for this government together, they will be doing it on the basis of the program that the government has public we set out. and if that proves not to be delivered, that would be a major setback because that program of outreach to the sunnis in particular is essential if any of this is to work. simply retraining, restructuring iraqi city forces while leaving the grievances of the sunni population and address is not a formula for the successful pushing back of isil. >> foreign secretary, a number

of commentators have spoken about a more decentralized, federal iraq with the kurds, the sunnis and the shia's. do you envisage this happening at all? is it plan be? >> sorry, i thought you're asking me whether it was plan a. as i read mr. al-abadi's program, including envisage is a significant degree of decentralization in the territory of iraq and the sharing of revenues in a way that addresses some of those underlying grievances. but i think it's very important that we are clear that it is not for us to define the internal structures of governance in iraq. and that is something that the people of iraq have to do. our advice to the iraqi government would be that unless they are able to do that in a way which has broad-based buy-in

across all the communities in iraq, it will be much more difficult for regional countries, for the west, to support the iraqi government and much more difficult for it to overcome the insurgency that it is facing from isil. >> thank you. >> foreign secretary, a few minutes ago you referred to shipments we have made to the kurdistan region via baghdad. presumably those were shipments of weaponry supplied by other countries, is that correct? >> we have made, so far we've made nonlethal shipments of our own equipment and we've also made shipments of ammunition supplied by albania. >> yesterday the prime minister told me during his statement that the government were not prepared to directly supply weaponry itself, as opposed to

some other countries. can you tell us when that is going to start and what kind of weaponry that is likely to be? >> i can say that the defense secretary has today laid a departmental meeting concerning -- many concerning the gifting of military equipment to the government of iraq, including the initial kurdish regional government. initial package is scheduled to arrive in iraq tomorrow and will consist of heavy machine guns and emanations with the delivered value of just over 2 million pounds delivered value. >> and that's going to go to the kurdistan region? >> that is going to go to the kurdistan region. >> foreign secretary, can we move on now to russia and ukraine? you said last week that russia and i quote, has chosen the role of pariah, rather than partner. and that it has rejected efforts

to draw it into the roles based international system. doesn't have any impact on our diplomatic approach to russia? >> i don't personally believe in dissembling. i think it's very clear that russia has had the option of being in a partnership relationship with the west. indeed, that's been our strong preference and desire for the last, nearly 25 years since the end of the cold war, to draw russia into the committee of nation's, to the partnership with russia, recognizing that we won't agree on everything and with strategic differences of outlook, but in a sincere belief that we are able to work constructively together as partners. russia has shown by its actions that it rejects that notion of partnership. and i chose the word pariah deliberately.

we have a long-established taboo in europe on changing the boundaries of nation states by force of arms. that's not the way we do things. russia has shown itself to be completely oblivious to that established rule and willing to use force to pursue what it sees as its immediate, short-term interest in a way that is rejected by others every other state in europe. >> foreign secretary, the chronology of russian territorial aggrandizement is that it carried out the de facto annexation of transition in moldova which was followed by the annexation in georgia, followed by the annexation of crimea in ukraine.

do you agree that mr. putin's territorial objective is to carry out a de facto territorial annexation of the eastern part of ukraine? >> i don't think we know that. i don't think there's any evidence that that is the plan. there's plenty of speculation about it, but i think it is probably the case that mr. putin will have expected a stronger popular rising in support of the separatist movement than actually occurred in the donbass region when these events began to unfold. i don't think we know enough to say whether his current strategy

envisages annexation or not. certainly the words of the most recent agreement with point strongly away from that out,. >> leaving aside for the moment as to how you judge what is the territorial objective now of the russian government in ukraine. how do you respond to the criticism that has been made that the british government has done nothing like enough and, indeed, the american government, indeed other governments have done nothing like enough to bring home to mr. putin that the continuation of de facto military annexation violating the boundaries of sovereign states is both unacceptable and also redolent of the most extreme dangers, and to bring

home to mr. putin that if he thinks he can carry out a similar policy of de facto annexation of parts, or possibly the whole of the territories, of one or more of the baltic states, he could precipitate the horrors of the world war iii? >> well, i don't have respond to criticism of the united states or any other country, but i will respond to criticism of the uk government. i think we have responded in a measured and sensible way to an outrageous provocation. we have stood by the people of the ukraine. we have been at the forefront of the implementation of measures within the european union and within nato to provide

reassurance to the eastern member states of nato, and to impose economic sanctions on russia. i think these measures are more effective for having been imposed by the whole of the european union, and in the case of the reassurance of measures having been delivered and supported by the whole of nato, than they would've been if we had taken, within europe, a serious -- a series of bilateral actions. acting at 20 means that we have to be pragmatic about how fast and how far we can go. we have to take everybody with this. my judgment is that the level of response that we have delivered, delivered at 28 in both nato and eu, is sending an effective message, and is delivering a far more effective message and would have been delivered by perhaps a

stronger bilateral response. >> foreign secretary, can i ask about your assessment as to whether we have got the right or have had the right balance in our dealings with russian? i think we all agree it is important to stand up to the bully in the playground. relatedly, some of our neighbors and allies are waking up to that fact. but we could also argue that we ourselves have sometimes treated cheaply when dealing with russia. for example, perhaps not leaning enough on them when it came to russia's intimidation of georgia, in the hope that we could secure their sort of allegiance or certainly help when he came to iraq. what is your take on that going forward? what lessons do you think we can learn?

>> well, the first and most obvious lesson is the hindsight is a wonderful thing, and we can all now ask whether we were perhaps being naïve about the type of relationship that we could have with putin's russia. i do think we need to distinguish different things here. there are areas where self-interest means that russia will continue to work cooperatively with the west. where we have an alignment of interest in relation to third countries or problems in other parts of the world where i would expect that whatever the difficulties we have, we will continue to pursue a course of action which is in our mutual best interest. and with the benefit of hindsight, of course it is possible to say that perhaps we should have woken up to what now appears to be going on earlier in the process.

perhaps we should've paid more attention to mr. perkins rhetoric around the collapse of the soviet union being the greatest disaster of 20th century history. her house we should all have read his doctoral thesis on little more closely, where he sets up his view that energy policies can be a lever of state power. but all of these are with the benefit of hindsight. we have spent much of the last 25 years doing is genuinely and sincerely trying to draw russia by stages into the international community. i think that at one stage we all felt that was being pretty successful, that russia was becoming normalized, if you like, learning to play by the rules, becoming increasingly engaged in the international economy. and increasingly, a country we could do business with.

we should also emphasize that we have no dispute with the russian people. when you and i were growing up, the russian people were a mystery to us. now everybody knows plenty of russian people that live in london and across europe. people visit russia, do business in russia. it's no longer the great mystery it was, and we have no dispute with the russian people. but we do have a disagreement with mr. putin's view of the world, and more particularly with his ideas about what is acceptable in going about achieving his hhs. >> i don't suggest for one moment, foreign secretary, that you would be reading the doctrines, but perhaps mentors in your department should be reading them. in a way that leads me onto my next question. what has contributed to our underestimating the risk your? sir tony britain, the former uk ambassador to moscow weasley

said that british diplomacy towards russia and elsewhere has suffered because of a loss of language skills, particularly in the foreign office. we know we have reopened the language school and has been a good thing, but they're still agenda think that we are not committing or have not committed enough resource to eastern europe and russia. is that your take on things? the we need to invest now more given the scale of the issue in front of a? >> i think we are reinvesting in russia and eastern europe now, as our days we focus is there. but there is no doubt this is well-trodden ground. over a decade or more, the uk lost traction and disengaged from large parts of the world. my predecessor have spent a lot of time and energy rebuilding that engagement with the world, and that has included making investment, for example, in

language capacity. i checked this figure before i came here. we have 156 fco personnel who are registered as having russian language skills. that is probably fewer than we would like but a lot more than we would've had at the bottom of the curve. >> briefly, foreign secretary, can i suggest, i'm sure you're not saying this, this is not just about language skills? >> of course it's not, no. >> it is a fundamental understanding of the region, the peoples and so forth. many committee members are concerned that over the recent decades there's been a promotion the skills favor by management consultants at the expense of more traditional skills when, about for example, understand regions, their peoples, et cetera, which help us increase our understanding of the problems at large. would you accept that? can you be more specific as to what extra resource you're putting into this?

it is all right saying we are putting extra resource in, but this is a vague term. can we have some details of? >> again with the benefit of hindsight of course would like to have more russian and east europe focused resource, but i think if you look at how we have managed our diplomatic footprint over the last decade or so and look at how some of our other major allies have done it, we have degraded our russian capability rather lesson some of our allies have done. i'm going to ask sir simon to comment on this. >> i just like to add that i think we have over emphasize that that it. if you look at our ambassador in moscow, in kazakhstan or any ukraine and another -- other number of places, they are all absolutely steeped in the former soviet union. they have huge amounts of expertise and they all speak excellent russian. our ambassador in ukraine can

manage ukraine and our ambassador in kazakhstan can manage there. i agree it's not just the languages but this is an indication of the thought process. it's not what it was in 1990 but, of course, the fact that you mention eastern europe along with russia tells part of the story in the enemy can a 20 much bigger pool because if you're based in warsaw do i do think they should if you're based in a number of european countries that is what you spent a lot of time thinking about, but that is not quite the case now spent sir simon, canterbury to sir simon, can it be the comeback the? i accept the expertise is there, and one is reverent towards it but the fact is we've fundamentally misunderstood but did not read the intention behind president putin's stated objections. why did we get it wrong? ..

with the benefit of hindsight we've done rather better than some. >> thank you. >> mark henry. >> foreign secretary, has the which relations, cooperation, security between nato and federation should it be repealed and should location of nato troops be lifted? >> first of all, the russians have clearly breached the

founding act. in our judgment the reassures measures that we wish to take can be delivered without breaching the restrictions in the founding act of permanent basing of substantial troop formations in the new member countries. >> any reason why it shouldn't be? >> the first is that, from a purely military point of view, looking at what we want to do, the efficient utilization of military forces it is to rotate, relatively small numbers of troops through for training purposes to create prepositioned stocks of equipment for deployment hubs that we would deloy to in an emergency. all of these things can be done within the restrictions of founding act and judgment that we have made is that if there is

no practical need to breach the retricks in the founding act, there is value in maintaining the moral high ground and continuing to observe the rules based system that the founding act put in place and, to continue to remind the russians that they breached it. >> do you care about the rapid reaction force and what was discussed at nato summit. >> including rapid reactionary force and forces the way they will operate in eastern europe. there are no nato members, certainly the u.k., certainly not the united states who wish to position significant numbers of troops on a stacking basis in eastern europe. that wouldn't fit with the model we have of the way we train and use our forces to be highly

mobile, highly flexible forces. it's a cold war type model that just doesn't fit the way we do things anymore. >> okay. well there some fellow member-states as to whether article v could have been evoked in response to the crimea or anybody else in the ukraine. if ukraine had been a nato member and seems like cyberattack, economic destabilization, psychological warfare, use of volunteers, use of retire troops and soldiers getting lost in eastern ukraine a lot of what russia has done really couldn't be pinned down to art fell five. ukraine or lithuania it could have been a very different situation. how do you respond to that. >> ukraine of course is not a nato member and therefore

article v does not apply and never at anytime come into the equation. the ball tech states are nato members and benefit from the collective security that article v offers. you are of course right and i have sat in this very chair discussing with the defense select committee on a number of occasions the challenges that emerging technologies like cyber present to the definition of, various legal definitions involved around war fighting and military operations. and in many countries, including of the u.k., there is an active debate going on about how to address cyber in particular but also the other areas you mentioned in the context of where the boundary lines are drawn in the international legal system which governs permissible

responses to aggression. >> need a bit more debate, if president putin can say over the phone i could be in kiev in two weeks i'm sure he could be in latvia, lithuania, four, five even six weeks. now some of the prior to entry into latvia or lithuania, don't we need a quick change or quick reappraisal of article v in order to stop what we've seen in ukraine. >> no, we don't need any reappraisal of article v at all. what we do have to do though, this won't be the first time we've done it. s a a as military technology, te technology of war changes we need to keep our thinking up-to-date, this is true in i field, any legal field. the legal thinking has to keep pace with the reality of the

technology. we have a whole new domain of warfare now called cyber which didn't exist a decade, practically even half a decade ago. and there is a process that is underway thinking through how these different legal doctrines apply in the domain of cyber. >> speaking about the domain of cyber which i can give considerably more clear-cut but i mentioned psychological, economic, use of volunteers, retired soldiers. these are gray areas surely that -- >> well they are gray areas and this kind of, what russians call hybrid car fair is a challenge to us. and, one of, again i'm territory i covered in my former role. one of the challenges for the west, nato, is that we are a grouping of democratic and open

societies. we can't do denial of warfare proxy war veterans fighting campaigns. we can not do that kind of thing. we have to find a different way to respond to the tools that russia is using. russia using its relative advantages. one of the advantages it has it can do non-transparent -- we have to use, we have to use the relative strength that we have and we have demonstrated them in respect of the ukraine. our big comparative strength is the resilience of our collective economy in the west, which is far stronger, far bigger, far more resilient than the russian economy which suffers from significant structural weaknesses. >> will it stop annexation of eastern ukraine?

>> i have said, i don't think we have enough evidence to know to speculate on whether annexation of eastern ukraine is a, is an objective of the kremlin or not. but i can confidentially say that we have a asymmetric capability in the application of economic and particularly financial sanctions where russia is not able to respond in a asymmetrical way because of the difference in structural strength and size of our economies. >> thank you. >> while we're talk about article v, could you give us update what is going on in estonia? >> we are in touch with our estonian colleagues. we, there is little more to tell than what has already been published on the news media and it estonia official remains in

custody in russia and estonians are continuing to discuss with the russians to seek to get him released and returned to their custody. >> militias came over the border in the way that they had done in ukraine. might that violate article v? >> article v would allow a member state to call upon the other member-states under article v, if there were a military threat to its territory and as i have indicated in my answer to the last set of questions, there will of course be a large number of lawyers pouring over the specific circumstances of any particular threat to identify whether or not it meets the criteria for triggering article v.

>> mike gibbs. >> nato summit last week there was obviously discussions about owning, providing weaponry to the ukrainian government. the prime minister's statement yesterday mentioned that some nato partners were providing weaponry to ukraine. and i saw a list of five or six countries. the u.k. was not amongst them. why not? >> the u.k. doesn't believe that there can be a military solution to the conflict in the ukraine. ukraine can forces made significant gains over several weeks after the mh17 incident but we saw over the last two weeks that russia will not allow those gains to stand and they were a pyric victory. they merely were met with a response of a further illegal incursion by forward units,

forward russian units. we don't want to encourage the ukrainians to believe there can be a military solution to this doctrine. >> other nato forces, norway, united states, france i think, other countries clearly taken that view? >> this is a bilateral issue. this is not nato decision. bilateral decision. and the u.k., takes the view that it would not be able to supply military equipment, given our own very stringent export controls on military equipment in the current circumstances. it is a conflict there. >> but other e.u. member states are taking part? >> i'm aware of other e.u. member states talking about the possibility to supply equipment to the ukrainian armed force. i think we should distinguish between the supply of equipment

immediately during the period of conflict and discussions about supply contracts that would take, where delivery would take place at some point in the future. >> why has it taken us so long and proved so difficult to get agreement within the european union on effective sanctions and action against russia over ukraine? >> well, i'm not an experienced hand at e.u. negotiations, coming new to this but those who are tell me this has been a lightning speed response of the e.u. particularly galvanized by mh17, has moved relatively swiftly to impose sanctions that were frankly far stronger and more effective than many were predig. i think signals, as we read them, far stronger and more

effective than the kremlin ever expected. >> isn't the case though that several european countries have said that they would be shooting themselves in the foot to quote the hungarian minister to begin sanctions against russia because of dependence on gas and oil and trade with russia? and on the other hand we ourselves have got our oligarchs in london with their massive money in our bank accounts? >> of course you can't impose economic sanctions without inflicting some pain upon yourself and we've been up front about that at beginning, that it will cause some pain and financial sanctions in particular will impose some costs on the financial markets in london.

different e.u. countries have a different tolerance level of absorbing that pain but i think you point your finger on a important strategic point. i think both side learn ad lesson over the last few weeks. europe has been reminded how vulnerable it is in certain areas to russia particularly in terms of energy supply. there is a lot of talk at the moment about the need, the strategic agenda, not over the next weeks or months or even couple of years, but over a decade or more, to have a clear and effective program to reduce our dependence on, our collective dependence on russia as a supplier of energy. but also, it is clear that the russians have been taken aback by their dependence on western economic systems and in

particular things like our payments clearance systems. they too have resolved in the heat of the moment to take, to invest whatever it takes to reduce their dependence on the west, their economic dependence on the west in the future. i think we've both been reminded of that interdependence and certainly i would advocate that the e.u. should as an important strategic agenda seek to reduce dependence of e.u. countries on russian gas. not because we don't want to buy russian gas because at the moment we have a dangerous overdependence on a single source of supply that could be disrupted by design but also could be disrupted by technical problems or some other event happening within russia. >> are there lessons to be learned both by european union and by our own government about

the way the issue of handling of relations ukraine over the e.u. association agreement developed last year? and underestimation of the hostility of the russian putin administration towards not just ukraine signing the association but prior to that, effective scuttling of the armenian association agreement in september of last year? wasn't that a warning we could have taken on board at that time? >> well i think it is important that we put this in context. these negotiations started six, seven years ago. russia didn't raise objects to them at the time when yanukovych was in control in the ukraine and, if you remember, the sequence of events, we got right to the point where yanukovych

was con ten platings signing an agreement with the e.u. when events began to spiral. so i think. >> it would be wrong to see this the west having failed or europe having failed. i don't think russia was sending signals for the first six years of that seven-year negotiation. >> isn't it true in 2013 they made enormous efforts by offering lots of money to armenia for example, so that president could change their position over one weekend in september without even consulting his government or his parliament, and did exactly the same pressure with ukraine? wasn't that clearly a something that happened with regard to putin's attitude? what was that? >> yes, but i don't know what it was, i'm afraid i don't control or have access to or what goes

on in mr. putin's mind. >> would you like to speculate why the russians took this position? >> what i would say is this, the e.u. end entered into good faith with negotiations over a long period of time. this wasn't some rushed deal to try to spite the russians t was a long negotiation. russia did not race objections while its man was in control in kiev. we've got to be very careful about any suggestion that we would allow russia a veto over the relationships which sovereign, independent countries want to negotiate with a bloc like the e.u. >> i was just going to add, of course it also came as well a surprise to president yanukovych who was after all very close at that stage. he didn't expect that degree of resistance because, as you say, he was coming to expecting probably to sign the agreement.

>> would you like to tell us why you think the russians took this view? >> well the only, the only logic is that they saw, the russians expected to be able to control the situation by one means or another that they sensed perhaps they were losing the lever of control they thought they had with the regime in kiev. they became more concerned about the agreement signed. but we can also speculate. >> it may also be a cause that president putin didn't think we would get a signature out of ukraine. you may remember at that time there was quite a lot of talk of conditionality on the part of ukraine and the question was the european union prepared to sign the association agreement with ukraine because the various conditionality of the forms which hadn't been met at that

stage. >> thank you. >> could i bring us back to nato's response and nature of it. do you think, been quite rightly lots of talk about spending and so forth. would you address another issue. this need to have a comprehensive response to the sort of tactics we've seen by russia when it comes to the use of militias? because it's a gray area. i'm not sure nato has thought this through. and answer to my question, could, if you don't mind, that they have absolute clarity, with similar tactics used in estonia, by the russians or be seen in the ukraine. and es stonians tried to revoc article v, would we stand by that? >> article v is very clear and if an armed attack took place on the, that isn't what happened in the ukraine.

we russian troops pouring over the border in the ukraine. that has been very clear in the final stage of that campaign. article v itself is clear but, clearly there is a question, and i think i've already addressed this. i certainly explored it with the defense committee before. there isn't request about where you draw that line in international law that permits a military response. we're not just talking about article v here. we're talking about a broader question about what kind of attack on a state constitutes armed aggression that entitles the victim to make a military response? and that's a debate which is happening here. it is happening in the united states. it is happening in various forum around the world and i rejt the idea that nato isn't

thinking about this i raised it at least at the last three nato defense ministers meetings that i've been at and it is increasingly on the radar, driven by cyber i have to say because of the awareness that a major cyberattack could have major destablizing effect on a nation not dissimilar to a airstrike. that being said we don't have a clear internationally accepted answer to the question. i suspect the nations of the world will have to define, in the cyber domain what constitutes an armed attack which justifies a military response at some point in the future. >> meeting adjourned until -- is reached.

we still have a lot of questions to ask and we have only 25 minutes left. we may have to cut out a chunk. i shall have a look at that as we get going but the colleagues could be brief with their questions and foreign secretary, so with your answer. we move now to libya and to john barrett. >> foreign secretary, it looks as we have civil war again in libya. most western embassies in tripoli have been closed. it has got to the point where libyan parcel meant is now -- parliament is taking refuge in tobr u.k. we also had a call recently last month from the house of representatives for a new foreign intervention to protect libya's civilian population from militias, civilian casualties going through the roof. do you think libya is at a

breaking point, and if so would -- [inaudible]. >> what was the question? >> is libya at the breaking point, would you agree and if so, would the west, washington, london, countenance the house of representatives's request for a further intervention to protect libya's civilian population? >> i don't know i use the term breaking point but clearly the situation is very difficult on the ground and if anything, the evidence suggests that positions between the different groups are becoming more entrenched. i'm going to, if i may, invite sir simon just to update the committee on a conversation that he apparently just had with jonathan powell, the prime minister's special representative, special envoy just back from libya and that might be helpful. >> jonathan powell and i been to libya, visited the country just a very few days ago, really

looking to see what the scope was for trying to arrive at some sort of political agreement between the various parties. of course i won't for a moment underestimate the difficulty of this. there are some elements which suggested the situation was grave clearly. there are possibilities there, of fighting is probably not as bad as it was some while ago. it has died down in most parts of the country, for now. it could resurrect itself. and one of the side-effects, probably of the fighting has been there has been more or less coalescing around two camps in libya. therefore rather than trying to negotiate with a whole patchwork of different tribes and groups there are probably more, more like two main parties with whom to negotiate, as you say, the parliament in tobruk being one and the alternate parliament

which has been resurrected in tripoli, clearly on illegitimate basis. so it is clearly a very difficult situation but there are some prospects by which a political process could be arrived at. >> do you, the airstrikes by the u.a.e., or egypt was quite a development. dowel come them or do you see dangers from it? foreign secretary. >> i think we're always cautious binter ven shuns of this nature. it. it seems to be have limited intervention but in support of one side in the conflict where as our approach is to try to bring the different parties

together and impress upon them need for inclusive solution that will allow various different factions and tribes in libya to live in, to coexist peacefully and share in what could be quite a significant prosperity. >> those of us who opposed intervention -- >> can i add? >> do you think we made the same mistakes as we did in iraq in 2003 when we failed to plan for what happened after military intervention? >> well, the intervention in libya was made in response to an immediate, pending humanitarian disaster. i think intervention was right. it saved many lives. we were always clear that it was going to a limited intervention.

it was not going to be boots on the ground. there were no boots on the ground. it was strictly limited in its dope. we're often urged when we do things to make sure objectives are clearly defined and there isn't any mission creep. i think the libya campaign is an example of doing just that, defining the limits what we were prepared to do, doing it and completing it. but of course that has meant that the final resolution of the post-qadaffi arrangements on the ground is still a work in progress. it is still a matter of dispute on the ground. >> you wouldn't argue that we abandoned libya to? >> we certainly haven't abandoned it. we're very much engaged in libya. we're training libyan troops, libyan government troops here in

the u.k. at the moment. we have a prime ministerial special envoy who was in libya last week speaking to broker some -- seeking to broker some type of agreement to the protagonists. we certainly haven't abandoned libya. we recognize that libya and libya's stability is quite important to us, not least in terms of libya's role in the root for flows of migrants into southern europe which ultimately have an impact on us in the u.k. >> thank you. >> can i move the subject on to gaza and israel-palestine, mr. foreign secretary. how would you characterize the u.k.'s role in bringing, introducing the cease-fire? what steps did we take to facilitate it? >> obvious le we welcome the cease-fire.

it wasn't the first one of course. we've been actively engaged in urging the parties to these talks to agree to a cease-fire as a necessary first step. certainly not in itself sufficient but a necessary first step. we haven't been direct participants in the cease-fire negotiations but we've been strongly encouraging of the government of egypt in the role that it has taken on. i was in egypt very shortly after i was first appointed and met with the foreign minister and the president assisi, to urge them to leave no stone unturned in bringing the parties to a cease-fire. and we continue to engage with both directly with the parties and indirectly with others who can influence them. and to try to insure out of this

cease-fire that has now held what is just over a week, nearly two weeks, we get substantive and meaningful negotiations which leads to measureable, delivered improvements for ordinary gazans going about their business. decrease of restrictions on them. increased flow of humanitarian aid. outstanding problems around fishing rights and payment of civil service salaries and on that will lead to the, reduction of the palestinian authority into gaza which we regard as a crucial next step to allowing matters to develop further. >> mike gibbs. >> as you are aware the policy

of government towards gaza has been very controversial. your former colleague said it was indefensible. former prime minister nick clegg, the policy, u.k.'s response risked damage to our reputation in the region. what's your response to those? >> i mean i clearly, deputy prime minister said we risked damage. he is making a statement of the obvious. of course whenever we take a position we risk, we risk our reputation in on sense. but, we are very clear, that, the resolution to the problem in gaza has to be through a cease-fire. negotiations around improving the situation in gaza, reduction of the palestinian authority into gaza. and then, a resumption of the

broader discussion about the two-state solution, as a final resolution of this very long-running conflict. >> and you don't therefore agree that the government could have said more or been more outspoken on the issues? >> i'm not sure what you mean by moreout spoken on the issues. we've been very clear from the outset that israel has a right to defend itself. first of all israel has a right to exist which hamas still denies. israel has a right to defend itself but it has an obligation in so doing with comply with the rules of our conflict and the principles around protection of civilians, inflicting the minimum damage possible. >> have they done that. >> well, this is an area, of course, there is a lot of noise

about and there will need to be a proper examination of the conduct of both sides during this period of conflict. one thing we do note for certain is that hamas launched rockets out of gaza, into israel, aimed at the civilians population. that much is clear. and israel is conducting its own internal inquiries, clearly to be credible with the outside world, they will have to be significant independent element in those. international u.n. human rights council established its own inquiries into the events that took place. we will encourage the inquiry itself is conducted impartially.

>> foreign secretary i want to preface my question, i've been to sarat, the target of probably largest number of hamas rocket attacks and i condemn unrevivedly use of rocket attacks against israel by hamas which are clearly indiscriminate. i visited gaza, after the 2008 israeli attack on gaza. there i saw the entire industrial estate flattened and i saw an entire hospital burnt out with phosphorus shells. my question to you is, does the british government consider it is legitimate against a terrorist a get to, to use military force against purely

economic and employment targets and against clearly social service institutions and buildings like hospitals? >> well, the law of armed conflict is clear and, the laws around humanitarian protection are clear. it would not be legitimate to target those kind of, that kind of infrastructure unless it was being used for the purposes of military activity? and clearly one of the accusations that is made hamas, during this conflict, systematically purposed military equipment in areas of sensitive infrastructure like hospitals and schools and in areas of dense population. seeking to use members of the civilian population effectively as human shields.

now that in it sell would be illegal activity. these are allegations. there are huge numbers allegations on both side. they need to be investigated on what happens, needs to be properly established. >> let's turn from buildings to people. does the british government consider it is legitimate that if a government like the israeli government believes it has identified a particular hamas terrorist or perhaps one or more hamas terrorists, it is then legitimate to destroy, using air to surface missiles, tank shells, artillery shells, entire buildings and neighborhoods, resulting in very substantial civilian deaths or completely innocent men, women and

children? and i just add as a rider to that, speaking as a former northern ireland security minister, that if a british government had dealt with a terrorist in northern ireland using military force in the same way as has been used by the israelis, then i am absolutely confident that the outrage in the house of commons would have been such that the entire government would have been forced to resign. >> well i think you're probably aware, sir, john of the rules about proportionality in response and so the question thaw pose can not be simply answered for a military response in pursuit of a military target to be lawful, it has to be proportionate. and it is not possible to make generic statement about types of

attacks or types of responses without knowing the full circumstances of each individual incident. it isn't possible to make that evaluation. people can speculate and people have speculated what is now needed is a proper analysis of each incident that occurred. now. this will not be easy, but i think it has to happen. there will be mistakes made in the prosecution of any military campaign. there will be incidents that occur which are not justified and then the question will arise whether they have occurred by inadvertence, by error, by failure or whether they have occurred as a result of deliberate targeting. so there are many questions that will have to be answered in analyzing exactly what did happen over that period of time. but i don't think it is

helpfuls to speculate and to seek generic categorizations of types of incident without knowing the details of the individual incidents in question. >> mark henry. >> well, foreign secretary i want to talk about one or two incidents. to get to the death toll between two and three thousand, we're not talking about one or two incidents. we're talking about vast number of incidents, tv footage which was seen, ambulances were fired on, health facilities being attacked by tank shells and, this idea there is going to be some forensic inquiry at some stage in the future that is going to bring israel to justice

belief. >> don't mind me saying you have prejudged the case on both sides have -- >> the one case, this was hundreds of cases many of which were captured on film. many of which were given by eyewitness accounts from u.n. officials and government itself said, that this death toll in gaza was unacceptable. >> my words. >> i remember what the prime minister said in the chamber. used every word other than disproportionate. and after repeated questioning a death toll of 2 to 3,000, compared to 60 something on israeli said is by no means a proportionate response to the total -- i have seen from the israeli side. >> i'm afraid that is mistaken understanding of proportionality test. first of all, let me say that the level of civilian deaths was horrific. i said so on many occasions. >> stating obvious.

>> outrageous and we want to do everything possible to insure that such a conflict can not happen again. but the proportionality test does not require us to look at the number of deaths on each side in the conflict. it requires us to look at the response that was delivered to each individual military action. >> i understand that. foreign secretary, but the point i'm making if you look at the outcome as a whole, then is a tis i cannily the very least -- statistically, the fact that some people died, even if a fraction of those attacks were disproportionate, you know, we wouldn't have the results that we've had. the point i'm trying to make as well is that earlier in your responses to different questions, for example, on we're very eager to say how effective sanctions to determine behavior

for example of russian forces and how they might behave in the future. why doesn't government talk about e.u. sanctions and more with arm sales in the way we would have expected it? >> because the government doesn't think that in this case sanctions would be appropriate or effective. and there has been an could flick. there has been significant numbers of deaths. and we deplore the fact that those deaths occurred. we have been very clear about that throughout. then, there are very clear legal constraints on the parts involved in this kind of conflict. and there are accusations on both sides of unlawful conduct. and they need to be investigated. we can't do that here in this committee. we don't have the information.

you, you're taking the gross numbers and you're drawing extrapolation from them but of course many of the rockets that were launched against israel were intercepted by the iron dome system. therefore didn't cause casualties. that doesn't mean they were not unlawful. the launch of them remains unlawful act, everyone of them. >> i condemn those actions after they came out. if this would have been a boxing match this would have been stopped at the first round. >> mr. chairman, we and many others would have loved to stop it after the first round and i can assure members committee we spared no effort. >> my colleague mate the point, minister in government, the government, would have resigned as a result of action like this. and how is the prime minister and yourself -- >> i think, with respect to sir john was referring to action by the british government. we're not talking here about

action by the british government. >> actions that could have been taken in northern ireland and actions were taken by israeli government here. >> well the record will speak for itself. >> remaining few minutes can we discuss iran, foreign secretary. >> may be tight on time so i will ask the one question which a number of issues that we can tackle. one you're about it respond back to our report. if you could just, maybe give the flavor today of what areas you may disagree with us on. two, do you think a settlement by november with iran on this nuclear program is becoming more or less likely? and just, that the final item is, there was announcement our embassy would reopen in tehran. the announcement was made on the 1th of june. nearly three months have passed.

why is it taking so long? >> okay, on the first question, the committee's report, the government's response to the committee's report will be published on the 12th which i think is friday of this week. is that right? friday of this week? in general we're in broad agreement with the report's findings. not surprisingly there is on difference of emphasis on certain points. one area i could perhaps mention now the question of trade with iran. our position is that, it is important that iran sees agreement on a comprehensive deal as to means restoring its trade relations. so we are not encouraging companies to trade with iran. of course within the committing restrictions it is for individual companies to decide whether they wish to trade with

iran although it's quite challenging because of the scale and breadth of the restrictions that are in place. on the question of the nuclear nuclear negotiations these are at a sensitive stage. i don't want to do anything that makes them more difficult. i think both side understand the red lines that each other have drawn. and, i would hope that over the next few weeks, there is going to be a determined effort by both side to see if more common ground can be found. in particular, during the united nations general assembly in new york. there will be opportunities for various bilateral and multilateral informal meetings to occur and positions to be explored. we are very clear that we want to see a deal done. but we do not want to see a bad

deal done. this has to be a deal in order to reassure the world, the international community that iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon and that its interests in retaining nuclear enrichment capability purely directed at a civil, nuclear program which we're some way away from being convinced of that position yet. finally on the question of the embassy, it is our intention to reopen the embassy. we have to make sure that this is done in away to provide proper protections to our staff, allow them to go about their business and perform their functions effectively. there are technical issues still remaining outstanding to be dealt with the iranians. we are gauges with those problems with us.

we do not expect anything in there that is a showstopper but there are processes that need to be gone through. we're also acutely aware of the fact that one of the principle purposes from the iranian point of view, getting embassy reopened is to have a fee-for-service available in tehran. and we need to insure that we can put in place an effective visa service when the embassy is reopened or we run the risk of disappointing people in iran who have been looking forward to the reopening of our embassy as opportunity to make obtaining of a visa rather than more straightforward and simple. we want to make sure two things, reopening of embassy and provision of local visa service go properly hand in hand. >> foreign secretary, thank you very much. >> thank you. >> now 5:52. we keep to our side of the bargain. >> thank you very much. >> we did not ask you on

nigeria, boko haram, on drones and future direction of the foreign office generally. we may well right you on those. on behalf of the committee, thank you very much indeed and also sir simon. thank you very much. order. >> today a hearing on the domestic threat posed by terrorist group isis. live coverage of the homeland security subcommittee on border and maritime security at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span3. so night the senate debate between democrat rick while land and independent candidates, former u.s. senator larry pressler and gordon howey. three candidates looking to replace retiring senator tim johnson. our live coverage starts at 8:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span2. president obama speaks to the nation tonight about his plan for dealing with the

terrorist group isis. senator bill nelson of florida is introduced a resolution authorizing military force against isis. here are his remarks from the senate floor. >> mr. president, i have filed today and would like to insert in the record, if i may be granted, the senate joint resolution that i have filed today. >> without objection. >> mr. president, this is a resolution that will express the authorization for the use of united states armed forces against the islamic state in iraq and the left haven't. -- levant. mr. president, it is a resolution that has been

necessitated by legal scholars since the president has used his existing authorization for the use of military force in iraq, most recently against isis, isil, isis, it is the same thing. the levant is that area broadly from about baghdad all the way to the mediterranean. that is isil. isis, i, s, is, s is the islamic state in iraq and syria. we know this organization that is calling itself an islamic caliphate, it knows no

jurisdictional boundaries. it has taken large swaths of territory in syria, as well as iraq. and, when the president success fullly employed -- successfully employed the use of air power, both manned and unmanned, against isis targets as they were marching toward erbil, the capital of kurdistan, and likewise as they were marching toward the most sewell dam, thee presidentnt used his authority n iraq and also his authority in commander and chief, to protect americans. there were americans in erbil. there are americans in baghdad.

there are americans in other places in iraq. and, the protection of the dam in mosul was to protect those americans down river, because if the dam were blown, that would have flooded all down river and it would have flooded baghdad. legal scholars disagree with me that the president has the authority, under the constitution as commander-in-chief, too go after isis in syria. i describe isis as a snake, if the head of the shake is in syria, which it is, a lot of their organization, a lot of their leadership is there, then

we ought to go after the snake where the head is. and decapitate the snake. in doing that, we're going to have to go into syria. now, i believe that theid president has the authority to do this under the constitution anyway. but there are some who disagree. so rather than quibble about legalities, i have filed this legislation. there is no pride of authorship. the senateus is obviously goingo debate this. i believe you're seeing polls from today where 90% of the people of this country are concerned about isis and some huge number want us to go on and attack isis in other places than where we are attacking now,

then, ihe think it is obvious tt the united states isat going to have to continue this attack on isis. of the now i want to compliment thehe president. often as i talked about this issue, people have come or members of the press and say, well, the president has. dillydallied and forth. i don't think he has at all. i think the president indeed employed a very successful strategy of going after isis in iraq. stopped their march on erbil, in fact, stopped their march on the mosul dam. and is going after them in other locations, in coordination with the peshmerga of the kurds as well as the iraqi army. and indeed the president started

on august t the 25th. the surveillance flights over syria. so that we can collect the intelligence that is necessary as you prepare to go after them in syria. but the president has done something more. he has started to put together a coalition, realizing that the american people have no appetite for american boots on the ground in syria, to put together a coalition so that maybe the free syrian army, maybe other members of the arab league, maybe some other members of nato would participate. but the way we drew this resolution, it talks about the there would not be a recurring

military presence in the, in the implying of an american army on the ground. it leaves the flexibility that clearly there would be american boots on t the ground, just as there already has been when we sent our special operations forces in there to try to rescue theca two american journalists that subsequently met such a brutal and uncivil end. >> senator bill nelson from yesterday. he will be joining his colleagues in the senate as the senatorsan are about to gavel in thisee morning. we have want to remind you the president is going to address the nation tonight on his plans for dealing with the threat from isis and violence in iraq and syria. the president speaking from the white house starting at 9:00 eastern. you will be able to watch it here on c-span networks live and online at c-span.org. the senate today will continue work on a resolution proposing a

amendment to the constitution that would grant congress the ability to place limits on campaign contributions. senators also plan to vote at 2:00 eastern today on whether to proceed to the paycheck fairness act which would require employers to pay men and women with similar qualifications the same wages for similar jobs. live coverage of the senate here on c-span2. the presiding officer: the senate will come to order. the chaplain, dr. barry black, will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. eternal god, our rock, our fortress, and our deliverer, you know when we sit and when we rise.

before a word is on our tongue, you know it completely. guide us and our lawmakers with your spirit's wisdom, keeping us from paths that lead to ruin. may we seek the wages of righteousness that will bring us life. make the mouths of our senators fountains of life that will produce peace and stability in our world. give us all a reverence for you that will enable us to serve your purposes for our lives in

this generation. we pray in your sacred name. amen. the presiding officer: please join me in reciting the pledge f allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. the presiding officer: the clerk will read a communication to the senate. the clerk: washington, d.c., september 10, 2014. to the senate: under the provisions of rule 1, paragraph 3, of the standing rules of the senate, i hereby appoint the honorable edward j.

markey, a senator from the commonwealth of massachusetts, to perform the duties of the chair. signed: patrick j. leahy, president pro tempore. mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: following my remarks and those of the republican leader, the senate will resume consideration of the motion to proceed to s.j. res. 19, postcloture. that's the legislation for a constitutional amendment to allow us to set campaign spending limits and not have a battle with the billionaires traig to buy america. -- trying to buy america. at 2:00 p.m., all postcloture time will be considered expired and the the senate will proceed to vote on the motion to proceed. we expect this vote to be done by voice. shortly after 2:00 p.m., we expect a roll call vote relative to the paycheck fairness bill. that bill deals with, for example, my daughter doing the exact same work as her male counterpart. she should make the same amount

of money. that's what this legislation is all about. we tried to move forward on this once before. we were blocked by the republicans. we'll see what happens today. it seems fair that my daughter should make the same amount of money for doing the same work as her male counterpart. mr. president, yesterday i had the opportunity, the good fortune to be invited to the white house with speaker boehn boehner, leader pelosi, and leader mcconnell. we spent more than an hour with the president and vice president talking about what's going on in the world. we do know what's going on in the world, separate and apasht from that meeting in -- separate and apart from that meeting in the white house. that is murderous, vial trivial group that's taken over parts of iraq and is trying to move into other parts of the world in the

middle east. they have brutality that is unprecedented, especially unprecedented in that they want to advertise how vial they are, so vicious, going after everyone -- civilians, women, children -- trying to eliminate anyone who they think disagrees with them. they've targeted minorities, they've targeted jews, christians, and anyone that they disagree with, religious minorities. we saw that. we had thousands and thousands of ancient religious minority trapped on a mountain by these vicious, vial people. of course, they're after any american. the innocent journalists, two journalists, they beheaded and advertised the beheadings.

two journalists who were out just covering the news. the islamic state, or isis, whatever we want to call them, will be stopped. they must be stopped. and they need to be destroyed, and they will be destroyed. president obama has taken decisive action during the month of august to protect americans and help prevent the humanitarian catastrophe. yesterday the president described his initiative to take on this terrorist group as we move forward, and i support him. mr. president, president obama has made it clear that it's going to take decisive action to destroy the islamic state through the use of airstrikes and drones. this is a smart, strategic, and effective approach, and i support it.

but, mr. president, there are people here in congress who are taking advice from dick cheney. he was here yesterday. i think they better be very careful with the advice that they take from dick cheney. dick cheney is more responsible than anyone else for the worst foreign policy decision in the history of the country -- the invasion of iraq. almost 6,000 dead americans, tens of thousands wounded, thousands and thousands grievously wounded. our fighting men and women di dd yeoman's job, they did us proud. but, mr. president, was that war necessary? in hindsight, it appears to me, that it really wasn't. not only have we lost thousands of americans' lives, it has de-stablized the whole middle east, and hundreds of thousands

-- hundreds of thousands, hundreds of thousands, hundreds of thousands of iraqis have been quilled. -- killed. they're now dead. but, mr. president, there are some pushing hard here in congress to authorize the use of military force right now -- right now. dick cheney was here yesterday. i guess that's who they're following. but, mr. president, wouldn't it be a good idea for us to stand back a little bit and see what the president of the united states has to say tonight? he's addressing the nation. let's allow him to speak to our country, to our fellow citizens, and lay out his plan. it's absolutely critical that the american people and congress

hear directly from the president of the united states. here in the senate, we're going to have an all-senators briefing tomorrow afternoon. the administration will come to one of our classified rooms here in the capitol complex and lay out to us in detail what's going on that's not in the news. so every member of this body will have a chance to get as much information as possible. the president speaks tonight. tomorrow afternoon there is a briefing. mr. president, it's clear -- the president has said so publicly, his officials has said so publicly, different officials that work with the white house -- he is doing his utmost ... he has just returned from europe. much of what they did in the nato conference was spent dealing with what they're going to do in the middle east with this isis group. he is working to build a

coalition including sunni-arab states. for this mission to be successful, of course, sunni-arab countries must play a role, and they will do that. that's being worked on as we speak. mr. president, it's clear to me that we need to train and equip syrian rebels and other groups in the middle east that need some help. it's called title 10 authority. the president has tried to get that from us, and we should give it to him. that's one way of helping to build an international coaliti coalition. congress should do that. it doesn't cost -- the republicans are worried about money. there is money to do that. the chairman of the armed services committee is here on the floor today, and he can certainly vouch for that. that would give authority for the president to help equip these rebels.

going it alone is not going to work, mr. president. we must have the support of the international community, if we're to rid the world of isis. we know that france -- i at least believe that -- will step forward. i believe england, great britain will step forward. i understand that poland is part of the coalition that's been put forward. and there are many other countries who are -- who the president met with in europe just a few days ago. we need to build a coalition. that's what he is doing -- rather than declare war today. title 10 authority is something we need. i repeat, going it alone won't suffice. i also believe that as commander in chief, the president has the authority he needs now to act against isis. i believe the vast majority of members of congress agree with that. for now, it's critical we support our commander in chief, as he takes this decisive action.

i'm amazed, mr. president -- amazed -- that some members of congress want to rush to war, because that's what they're talking about is a war. how did that work out for us last time? not so well. the bush-cheney strategy of rushing into conflict doesn't work. it didn't work then, and it won't work now. let's be cautious. let's be deliberate. i repeat, former vice president cheney was here yesterday giving the republicans a pep talk. he's going to -- he gave them advice on foreign policy. please, mr. president ... please ... taking advice on foreign policy from dick cheney? that's a terrifying prospect. we should be learning from our past mistakes, not repeating them. airstrikes and strategic use of

drone and, of course, covert action are the most effective way to take out isis without committing troops -- american troops. ... troops in harm's way. so i support president obama's decision not to send in ground troops. that's not an option for the american people. i can guarantee everyone that within the sound of my voice. but now that the republicans are taking advice from dick cheney on foreign policy, i'm concerned that they once again will rush to commit u.s. troops to a ground war in the middle east. we could accomplish the mission in a more strategic way. i say to democrats and republicans, let's destroy these despicable terrorists, but let's do it the right way this time. the president knows the american people know that we have to take decisive action. the president knows how to destroy terrorists and their

organization. osama bin laden is proof of that. so let's give the president of the united states time to do this the right way. troops out there that are defending us as we speak, mr. president, are not dernlings they're -- are not democrats, they're not republicans, they're not independents. they are a fighting force to protect americans. we need committed, decisive action to stop isis. mr. mcconnell: mr. president? the presiding officer: the republican leader. mr. mcconnell: last month i got to spend a lot of time with

the people of kentucky, and since there's been no shortage of issues to keep people up at night over the past few months, i got a lot of straight talk on a lot of topics. i heard a. lot about the crisis on the border, about lost health care plans, the chronic shortage of good jobs, stagnant wages, even ebola, the spread of which is a threat that must be taken seriously. yet, one issue that just kept coming up was america's role in the world and the growing sense that some in washington are more or less content to let others shape our destiny for us. for many, that concern was crystallized when they witnessed the barbaric execution of an american citizen by an isil terrorist and the halting reaction to it by a president who has yet to find his footing when it comes to dealing with this group that clearly has the

will, the means, and the sanctuary it needs to do more. last week the white house announced that the president plans to explain the nature of the threat that isil poses in a speech to the american people tonight. well, after spending a month talking with folks in kentucky, it's pretty clear to me at least that the american people fully appreciate the nature of the threat. after the beheadings of two american citizens, they don't want an explanation of what's happening. they want a plan. they want some presidential leadership. so i hope the president lays out a credible plan to defeat isil. i hope he outlines the steps he intends t take beyond simply the defense of baghdad, irbil, sin jar and am merly and what

legal resources he thinks are required to complete a successful campaign against isil. but the fact is the rise of isil is not an isolated failure. the spread of isil occurred in a particular context, and we hope to defeat this threat; we need to come to terms with that now. so before speaking with a little more specificity about isil and the ongoing threat of global terrorism, i'd like to just briefly restate my concerns about the consequences of the president's foreign policy as i warned a few months ago. because isil's military advance across syria and iraq carries a much larger lesson, a lesson that should prompt the president to reconsider and revise his overall national security policy and better prepare the country and our military to confront the threats that will survive his

time in office. first, it's important to note a few of the consistent objectives that have always characterized this president's national security policy. drawing down our conventional and nuclear forces, withdrawing from iraq and afghanistan, and placing a greater reliance upon international organizations and diplomacy. as i noted on other occasions, i have serious differences with the president over this approach. in my view, we have a duty as a superpower without imperialistic aims to help maintain international order and balance of power. and in my view, that international order is maintained by american military might. indeed, american military might is its backbone. but that is not a view this president seems to share.

the defining book ends to the president's approach were the executive orders signed his first week in office which included the declaration that guantanamo would be closed within a year, without any plans for what to do with the detainees. and the executive orders that ended the c.i.a.'s detention and interrogation programs at the same time. in may of this year the president also announced that all of our combat forces would be withdrawn from afghanistan by the end of his term, whether or not the taliban are successful in capturing parts afghanistan, whether or not al qaeda's senior leadership has found a more permissive environment in the travel areas of pakistan, whether or not al qaeda has been driven from afghanistan. now all of this underscores something i've been suggesting for some time. the president is a rather reluctant commander in chief.

because between those two book ends much has occurred to undermine our nation's national security, and yet tragically the president has not adapted accordingly. we've seen the failure to negotiate a status of forces agreement with iraq that would have allowed for residual military force and likely prevented the assault by the islamic state of syria and the levant. we've seen how the president's inability to see russia and china as the dissatisfied regional powers they are intent on increasing their spheres of influence has exposed our own allies to new risks. the failed reset with russia and the president's commitment to a world without nuclear weapons led him to hastily sign an arms treaty with russia that did nothing to substantially reduce its nuclear stockpile or its tactical nuclear weapons. and of course russia was undeterred in its assault on

ukraine. the president announced its plan for naval pacific. this failure to invest in the marine forces that will mean our dominance in the region for years to come could have tragic consequences down the road. and of course we've all seen how eager the president was to declare an end to the war on terror. but as the president was focused on unwinding or reversing past policies through executive order, the threat from al qaeda and affiliated groups only metastasized. uprisings in north africa and the broader middle east resulted in additional ungoverned space in syria, libya, egypt and yemen. there were prison breaks in iraq and pakistan and libya, and the release of hundreds of prisoners in egypt. terrorists also escaped from prisons in yemen, a country that

is no more ready to detain the terrorists at guantanamo today than they were back in 2009. the president's response to all of this has been to draw down our conventional forces and capability and to deploy special operations forces, an economy of force trained in assist missions across the globe. speaking at west point in may, he pointed to a network of partnerships from south asia to sa hi l to be funded by a partnership fund for which congress has yet to receive a viable plan. and in those cases with indigenous forces -- where indigenous forces prove insufficient and a need for direct action actually arises, the president announced his intent to resort to the use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles for strikes as has been done in yemen and somalia.

by deploying special operations forces, the president hoped to manage the threat posed by al qaeda in the arabian peninsula, boko haram, terrorist networks inside libya that terrify egypt, the al-nusra front, the taliban, isil and other terrorist groups. but as the nature of terrorists insurge sis has einvolved, -- evolved the president sees no need to rebuild our conventional and nuclear forces or to accept that leaving behind residual forces in iraq and afghanistan is an effective means by which to preserve -- preserve -- the strategic gains we made over the years through tremendous sacrifice. the truth is the threat of some of these al qaeda affiliates, associated groups or independent terrorist organizations has simply outpaced the president's economy of force concept. in some cases the host nation

military which we've trained and equipped has proven to be inadequate to defeat the insurgency in question as with the case with aqap, the taliban or isil. in some cases, the insurgency does not affiliate itself with al qaeda or build upon territorial gains before aspiring to attack the u.s. homeland. so the growth, advance and evolution of isil presents a turning point for the president. will the fall of anbar province and the threat posed by isil to jordan, saudi arabia and turkey lead to a reconsideration of its entire national security policy, the kind i've alluded to here and elsewhere? or will the president confine himself within the book ends of shortsighted national security policies that were conceived on the campaign trail in 2008? if prior events or arguments

left the president unpersuade, the emergence and recent actions of isil should convince him the time has come to revisit his prior assumptions and rethink his approach. isil is large and it is lethal. and its rapid growth has outpaced the capacity of either the peshmurga, iraqi security forces or the moderate syrian opposition to contain it. ominously, isil has developed expertise in small-unit infantry tactics, the use of insurgent tactics and as a terrorist organization. as a result of oil sales, ransoms, bank robberies and donations, it is also well funded. so we need a plan. we need it now. the president has now declared that defeating isil is his objective and that is a very

good start, but americans don't want a lecture. they want a plan. a credible, comprehensive plan to deal with this menace that clearly wants to harm us here at home and that is only becoming stronger by the day. the chairman of the joint chief of staffs, general demsey, said that defeating isil will require military action within syria. the chairman of the joint chief of staffs, general demsey, has said that defeating isil will require military action within syria. and the president has now declared that defeating isil is his objective. tonight the president needs to set forth the military strategy and the means required to defeat isil and to link those actions to any additional authorization and appropriations he'd like to see from congress. and if the president develops a regional strategy, builds a

combat-effective military coalition and explains how his strategy will lead to the defeat of eiffel, i believe he'll have -- to the defeat of isil i believe he'll have significant congressional support. this is no small matter. if congress is asked to support a strategy it needs to be a strategy designed to succeed. not a mere restatement of current policy which we know is insufficient to the task. the president must seize this opportunity to lead. this is not the time to shirk or put off his solemn responsibilities as commander in chief, because passing off this threat to his successor would not only be irresponsible, it would increase the threat that isil poses to americans by enabling it to secure its gains within iraq and syria. in my view, isil's campaign across syria and iraq represents the president with an opportunity.

it is an opportunity to reconsider his failed national security policy. the president and his advisors may have convinced themselves of their standard straw man argument that anyone who disagrees with his approach is dead on serial occupation or bent on invasions but that is really a false choice, and it's certainly not a plan. it's time to put the straw men aside and to realize this fight -- the fight isn't with his critics here at home. it's with isil. and that's why this morning i'm calling on the president to present us with a credible plan the american people have been waiting for. explain our military objectives, rally public support for accomplishing them. that's what the commander in chief should be doing at a moment like this. if the threat from isil demands the commitment of american resources and the risk of american life, the president has a duty to explain that to the

nation and the congress this evening. even if it doesn't conform with the tidy vision of world affairs he outlined as a candidate six years ago. and if its strategy is a little more than a restatement of current policy, if all he plans to do is manage this threat and pass it off to his successor, we need to know that too because americans are worried and they're anxious. they want and deserve the truth. most of all, they want a plan, and that's what i'm hoping for tonight. now, mr. president, on one other entirely different matter ...

i rise to mourn the loss after united states marine and a kentuckian from the hometown of abraham, lincoln, lance corporal matthias n. hanson, killed on february 21, 2010, aof wounds resulting from kuking operations. he was 20 years oavmentd for his service in uniform, lance corporal hanson received several awards, medals and decorations, including the national defense service medal, the global war on terrorism service medal, and t