ms. lasley made to mr. barletta is question and comment and seek further clarity from any member of the panel who would wish to offer it. when a member of congress says we all know terrorist networks are using our southern borders to enter the u.s. i think it's very important for all of us in a sworn response both to know whether or not that is a true statement. i have been told by dhs adequately as recently as last month that there's no evidence nor has there ever been a terrorists entering the u.s. through the southern border, our border with mexico or that terrorist plots have been fought or intercepted at the southern border of a terrorist plots have been carried out within the u.s. that have a connection to the southern border. that is what are directly from dhs. is there any further clarity to? >> will the gentleman yield? >> i will. >> and irene quds force

operative tried to cross the southern border, contacted what he believed was a mexican drug cartel, turned out to be dea undercover operative in mexico. his intent was across the southern port every nefarious objects with him to assess and the ambassador from saudi arabia here in the city at a restaurant that you and i may have been attending that i. that's the fact. i want to give an example. >> i will ask the experts on the panel to answer the question. >> i would reiterate what i stated earlier, that we do date don't have credible information that we are aware of other known or suspected tears coming across the border, particularly related to this threat stream. >> mr. milner, mr. wyden, would you like to clarify what we've heard so far?

either the members of congress or from your copanelists. >> yes, thank you, and building upon that, the number of known watchlist individuals that we've encountered at the ports, between the ports on the southwest border is minimal compared to what we see in commercial aviation. and you're talking tens versus thousands. is minimal from what we've seen from watchlisted encounters. >> mr. miller? >> no, i would reiterate what mr. wagner said. in addition we do have very robust information sharing with their counterparts in central america, in mexico com, with the state and local partners. in fact, we are embedded in the texas fusion center, our office of intelligence. in arizona with a robust intel structure so we continue to look at this. when and if that sort of intel with service we would take

appropriate action. >> i may submit a question for the record and i would like to share it with my colleagues that the answers i received from you. i would like to know once and for all what the facts support in terms of these repeated accusations that the southern border is unsafe, that terrorists are exploiting it to into the united states and i want to make sure we address the anecdote raised by my colleague from south carolina. i think that's important that i want to make sure that i know the truth on the. this is not new by the way. i'm going to ask for consent to cement for the record the el paso herald post friday december 111981, border check for libyan hit squads. we have been projecting our anxiety -- >> with that exact -- without objection. >> thank you, madam chair. about threats to the united states on the u.s.-mexican border as long as i've been alive. and does not mean we should not be vigilant, doesn't mean we should not take these threats

seriously but it does mean that we should only traffic in the facts and data and we should only raise these kinds of fears and anxieties when there are facts to support them. so i would just ask for my colleagues to do that. there are a number of questions i have, most of them would probably be more appropriate in a classified hearing. here's a general one, and with time for me would would love to get everyone's answer. we are at war in iraq right now. with service members flying missions. we have boots on the ground and advisors. were about to formalize that war proud to some greater degree after the president's speech tonight and potential with congressional action. what does a greater state of war in iraq and syria mean to you in the jobs that you do? what additional resources as the ranking member asked earlier, authorities, and procedureprocedure s would you

need to make additional threats following a greater u.s. involvement in those two countries? and i don't know if, if we can just do one of you into just briefly. i'm out of time so with the chair's permission, would love another 30 seconds to hear from ms. lasley. >> sir, i would say that we have an inherited, and that inherited increases as the threat increases to share information so that we can identify and stop individuals who want to come to this country. whether that's with our foreign partners, whether it's with the intelligence community are whether that's what our state and local law enforcement. and so i think we'll just continue to be very vigilant in making sure that that information is brought and shared. >> thank you very much. the chair now recognizes the gentleman from florida, esther claussen. >> thank you for the work you do. thanks for coming -- mr. clawson

-- and being willing to sit in the crossfire a little bit. and for efforts to keep us safe. as i want to own preparation for today's meeting, it felt like the dwp is yesterday's tool for today's world. and so at a 20,000-foot level, and the question that coming to my mind as i worked it with my team, do we optimize yesterday's tool for today's world, or do we need to go to a new program altogether? maybe that means at one end of the continuum would be visas for everyone, could be less restrictive for that come would be more costly than what we currently do, and would probably come we would hear some pushback

from the tourism industry and others. i'm not taking a position on that. but what i would like is for you to take a position on whether you feel we should optimize yesterday's tool for today's world, or do we need to break the mold a bit and look for something more current? implied in the question of course is bang for buck, how much are we spending, how do we measure what we get for those expenses. i understand 300 caught, but i know you have more sophisticated ways of measuring what we're getting for our resources in this effort. so i'd like to hear all four of your answer how you feel whether we ought to continue his current road, whether we can see around the corner is good enough with this information, or do we need to go to a new level to protect the future? start with mr. miller.

thank you. >> sir, i agree with you. i think given the threat we need to look at the information we are currently collecting, whether it's in the visa waiver program or other avenues. and then, and take appropriate action and decide if we need more information to collect. as mr. wagner pointed out earlier, as operators using our targeting systems, generally more information is better as long as we can collect it the right way given civil rights and liberties, privacy and were able to operationalizing it. >> i would just add that the deputy is an important program but it does get us information sharing agreements and allows our close -- the vwp, very important information with those that were not getting from countries we don't have a the wp agreement with. it requires them to issue

electronic passports which helps secure the documents to report lost and stolen passports to us. the are of the benefits of what the overall program does get us access to and some visibility into, like mr. miller mentioned, we are taking a hard look at are we electing the right data elements and what other information could we make use of and how would we collect it? as we are with many of our programs, but i think the program does have value, but a good review and a side-by-side of what vwp versus the visa program would offer and what types of benefits is always a good study to undertake. >> aren't we doing it? is anybody doing that? >> we are reviewing the program. we are redoing a lot of our different programs. as we costly do in light of the to the threats that arise, and are the gaps in there, are the gaps in the data collection, gaps in the week connect our

systems. so yes, we are looking at a lot of these things. >> and i would say that's across the department to the department leadership is looking at all the tools we have in our toolkit and how we can optimize them to make sure that we got the data that we need and were stopping people from coming into the country who shouldn't be here. one of the tools we have if i could just highlight one i think we're trying to optimize is our watchlisting effort. we are making a concerted effort within the department to share as much of our departmental data with our colleagues in the intelligence community to make sure that individuals are, in fact, put on the watch list. we are responsible for the program on behalf of dni, we do therefore entire department working with our colleagues. and over the last three years we have significantly increased the number of nominations that we in the department have given to the

intelligence community from about 4000, two years ago 12 over 9000 issue. so that is one example how we're trying to optimize the tools that we have been know to stop traffic from coming. >> as a major win for information sharing agreement with the visa waiver program partners. we are increasing and strengthening those information sharing agreements and arrangements but in addition to be a visa waiver program we've expanded the number of those agreements and w we work very closely with our interagency partners on that watchlisting information to make sure our foreign partners have the defamation as well. i think those are very strong tools. >> i urge you and i urge us -- incremental, more the incremental efforts in what we're doing here. i'm a user of global edge for my business before i came here. it makes me nervous that you interview me but you don't pity the people that could be face-to-face that could be summer in europe, it could be wanted to come to our country. to my knowledge i don't think we do that.

am i right about that? in the current trend for programs because they would be edited upon arrival in the united states by cbp officer but there is no interview the issue that esta unless we have come it comes to a preclearance location where we interview them before they come on the plane or at lest some of our targeting systems and so the analysis of the reservation data caused some type of reason to have our immigration advisory program officers if they're coming to one of those 11 locations talk to them before boarding an address any types of questions we have. so the possibility is there and we're in a lot of vwp country. we're in london, heathrow. we're in manchester, paris, amsterdam, frankfort. major gateways, major places of travel, especially for vwp travelers. we have the opportunity it for other systems to flag them for additional review or scrutiny.

>> if you do a face-to-face with me i would really love you did it with potential bad guys coming from outside our country as well. thank you for your answers spent thank the gentleman to the chair now recognizes the judgment from south carolina, mr. duncan. >> thank you, madam chairman, and thank them for being here today and for your service to our country in february 2014 this year the director of national intelligence james clapper started out testifying before the senate armed service committee by saying looking back over my more than a half a century intelligence i have not expressed a time when we been beset by more crisis and threats around the globe. two days ago we had a staff meeting on flight indiana sure to be do with my staff. it was an isis produced video but they showed young iraqi men loaded in the back of pickup trucks and dump trucks taken out into the desert and murdered.

and hundreds of iraqis. it harkens times of cambodia and -- watch those videos. they were disturbing of been shot multiple times to make sure they were dead when they were laying in the trench. this is a real threat. we may not think as americans that we may not be interested in islamic extremism an isis and the establishment of a caliphate, but i tell you what, isis is interested in america and they are interested in you. in june, i traveled to europe on a codel. i couldn't get many members of congress interested in going. we were looking at the border security and foreign fighter flow's. in june. if i was have that same congressional delegation trip today i would have to turn

members away because the plane wouldn't be big enough to travel to europe to meet with our allies about foreign fighter flow's. i grew up during the cold war. nationstate versus nationstate tracking the movements of tanks in large number of troops along different borders, in mainly eastern europe. we are not tracking troop movement or tank movement today. we are tracking individuals. foreign fighters who leave not only european countries like this country to travel to fight jihad. oftentimes in radicalized in coming back to the united states of america to great and commit heinous crimes. -- create. is not a far-fetched idea? before i left to travel to brussels, a young man who i traveled to syria through turkey came back through germany. germany tracked his movements but failed to let the allies

within europe know about this individual. he entered brussels. a shot of a jewish museum. if at least three if not for individuals were killed. have you heard about that on the mainstream media in this country? probably not. i know about it because i was had to brussels and he was on our radar screen, but this was a jihadists fire, them back to brussels, shot up a jewish museum, kill individuals and tried to flee back to north africa through friends. was caught at a bus stop. free travel. free travel among those country, no border crossings. guess what, their visa waiver countries as well. they did know the individual to travel to syria and become radicalized that it would've been a conscious part of the visa waiver program, traveled back to his country and announced to the united states personnel, had a valid travel document, put aboard an aircraft and flew into this country. we need to be concerned about

that. we also need to be concerned about americans. we now identify a number that i traveled over to fight with isis, whether it's in serious iraq with islamic state and whatever else like going forward. we should be able to revoke the passports of united states citizens if they do travel to fight for another organization but, in fact, u.s. law under i guess section eight usc 1481 says that a u.s. citizen shall lose its nationality five voluntarily performing in passionate entering and serving in armed forces of a foreign state. there's a part of law that sets with the intention of relinquishing united states nationality. maybe we need to strike that in future law. but if you go on, and committing any act or treason against are attempting to force or bearing arms against the united states, that's exactly what isis and isil have said but if you go onto other laws we can revoke a

united states passport is the signature receive certification from a state agency that individual owes arrears of child support in excess of $2500. we can revoke their passport just because they don't pay child support, but you can't tell me we will revoke the passports of people who are going to fight with people in isis that as it were to the white house come we're going to fly the black isis al-qaeda fight over the white house have made threats to the united states, who have beheaded two american journalists, but we can revoke the passport if they fail to pay their child support? the secretary shall issue a passport -- go want to say supreme court interpreted a passport act of 1926 that gives broad powers to the sector to revoke passport when necessary for announced security purposes. we need to revoke the passports of these americans that have gone. we need to keep them from reentering the united states when we know who they are and we need to understand america, the challenges of tracking

individuals, foreign fighters. and as they flow around the world through allied countries where they end up. madam chairman, this i isn't apropos committee. i hope this isn't the last one. we've got a lot of threats facing our country. i hope that the president comes out strongly tomorrow night against this threat to the united states of america and the very freedoms that we enjoy. with the i will yield back spent thank the judgment very much. i think we are interested what the president has to say about this issue. i think, i would guess certainly in my district and i think most members when their home in their districts over the last month we heard about this isis threat over and over and over, and certainly i think the nation understands and looking for the president, he is the commander-in-chief to outline to the country how serious of a threat it is and what we need to

be doing as a country to address it. and really the purpose of this hearing -- in a moment. really the purpose of this hearing was to talk about what we can do legislatively to assist all of you but as i mentioned i have currently two different bills that we are looking at and introducing. and i would also encourage all of you, for instance, you're reviewing as youd you're always are about changes in esta, what kind of things would be helpful. peacekeepers in the information flew. you have to wait until we have a hearing to let us know of what you are doing. and i know that maybe which are looking at doing is better talked about in a skiff, and a classified situati still, please keep us in the information loop. does the ranking member have a comment?

>> id. thank you very much, briefly. let me hope to make sure that ms. lasley response to my question and to just put on the record that there is i think looming question of watch list, no-fly list. i think this hearing should lead immigrant public with the idea that we are being vigilant and that we are knowledgeable that isil wants to form an islamic state but we balance that with our civil liberties and fax. so i would ask for anyone who may have documentation, i guess it's indifferent jurisdiction but want to put on the record documentation on the status or the type of unaccompanied children. i would like to get the report to anybody who has access to the unlucky yield 15 seconds come and thank the witnesses very much speed you don't have to yield. i will recognize the gentleman. >> thank you, madam chair. my colleague and friend from south carolina when asked about

the connection to known terrorist plots and the u.s.-mexico border, mentioned the iran terror plot to assassinate somebody here in washington, d.c., there is, in fact, from everything that i know about this, absolute no connection to the border but, in fact, the plotter was interdicted at jfk airport where he was arrested due to our coordination with the government of mexico. a person with whom he thought he was given with was actually a dea agent posing as a cartel member. the border was never exploited, and while i think this is a series issue and again one against which we must remain vigilant, there is no connection to the border. i invite anyone, especially those who have subject matter expertise, to tell me if i'm wrong. but my understand is that the board is as secure as it is a debate that we do not have any known terror plot tied to the board but it doesn't mean there might not be some, doesn't mean we shouldn't guard against it

but let's again do with the facts spent i thank the gentleman for his comments at a recognize the gentleman from south carolina if you'd like to respond. >> and i thank the gentleman. i think the iranian threat was to come across the southern border. it was thwarted before that happened so you were right and wrong. i will say this. we have no idea who was in our country. for us not to recognize that we have open borders and that we have no idea who has entered our country illegally, what their intentions were. or whether it was their intended to get a job and provide for them or intention to maybe create a cell and do something nefarious in the future, we don't know. i met with the security force of the king ranch in your state, 30, 40 miles north of brownsville. 837,000 acres, as large as a state of rhode island so they've got their own security force. this was two years ago. he said, mr. duncan, he said, we

are catching on our property so otm's. otm now is a term that is only being applied in the press anyway to an accompanied children from countries other than mexico such as el salvador, nicaragua, honduras, guatemala. but before that otm mean anyone that wasn't of mexican to do. he said we are catching folks on our property that are african, asian, and daughter middle eastern. this is 50 miles north of the border if they came across the border illegally. i just met with a secret service agent on the sidewalk in washington who is riding a bike, former military guy served nine tours in afghanistan. that i today what he did in the military. he said part of his training was on the southern border watching and they saw thousands of people come across the border and they called cbp and no one showed up. he said part of our work was radio and communications

intercepts because they are getting ready to go to the same thing in afghanistan. he said everything we heard was that spanish. wake up, america. with a porous southern border we have no idea who is in our country. >> thank the gentleman. i think ever for the passion on this issue. obviously, there's a lot of interest in this, and i certainly want to thank all of the witnesses for their testimony today, and i know some questions that were asked will be, answers will be submitted in writing to the committee and we appreciate that. and with that speed madam chair, i just want to say thank you and i know you're ending. i just want to say this is a committee of fax. no one knows and has documented that those otm's work terrorist. spent i appreciate that. we would also mentioned that pursuant to the committee rule, then record will be held open for 10 days. so without objection the committee stands adjourned. [inaudible conversations]

>> [inaudible conversations] voters go to the polls in today's in scotland to vote on an independence referendum. a preview of the vote is next on c-span2. the senate is back in this morning and will vote on to know

mission for nuclear regulatory commission. live senate coverage at 10 eastern. spent defense secretary chuck hagel and the chairman of the joint chiefs general martin dempsey will testify about u.s. strategy to combat the militant group isis. we will have live coverage starting at 9:30 a.m. eastern from the senate armed services committee. that's on c-span3. and later in the day a look at the international response to the evil outbreak in west africa. witnesses include the head of the national institute of allergy and infectious diseases, and health workers who treated people infected with the virus. is a joint senate health committee hearing is live at 2:30 p.m. also on c-span3. scotland will vote on an independence referendum in today's. next, and looks at the pros and cons of scotland's leading the united kingdom. from the brookings institution this is 90 minutes.

>> ladies and gentlemen, i'd like to welcome you all here today to actually one of the first event in our new revamped brookings conference space become actually thrilled that i put the microphone on that actually works but it seems very fitting to inaugurate our new facility or revamped facilities with a question of certainly next week in which is the potential revamping of the united kingdom, the part where many people would like to be happening and what simply is the referendum in scotland moves towards a yes vote. the renovation, it will be a complete overhaul of a system that we've all known for a good 300 years and many of us on this panel are the product of. we are absolutely be guided today to welcome to colleagues

who have flown under their own steam from edinburg to be with us. charlie jeffery and juliet kaarbo, who have been spearheading as they will tell you a major study of the implications of the referendum and of what will happen on and after september 18. this has been a huge study and this has been very much a symbolic of the whole debate about the scottish referendum. it's been very heavy on process. as we know many people around the world are watching this extreme close because this is a rather unique event. it's something that's been negotiated painstaking over a whole period of time. it's a product actually of decades of interaction between edinburgh and london on issues of evolution and autonomy, governance and that we are at the big date and the rest of the world is paying close attention but and, of course, a lot of events could not have been

anticipated when british prime minister david cameron and scottish first minister alex salmond sat down to thrash out the details of what was going to happen on september 18. .. to everybody for participating in this panel.

we're also joined on my right hand side, jeff dyer. financial times. geoff is originally from scotland. he will be the one person here with a again win scottish accent. this shows the diversity of the whole issue. juliet is originally from the united states and kansas oklahoma. she is resident of scotland and electorate at university of edinburgh. charlie can talk about his his own this is in terms 6 civic nationalism and political choice and that is also important. finally we'll be turning to my colleague here at brookings, jeremy shapiro for the united states perspective. before coming back to brookings where he has been a fellow for some type, area my also served aspects advisor to the assistant secretary for europe in the state department and also on the policy planning staff.

he was not assigned to think about scotland and united kingdom but we're hoping obviously that somebody might be thinking about this at this particular juncture and we'll ask jeremy to give his perspective what this means for the united states. thanks very much for joining us. i will first turn over to charlie, who will give us a sense of the perspective the referendum, the paradigm, the framework, how this is all evolved. i want to thank charlie and juliet for coming. they used their own research money to come here to explain to this audience and we're very grateful. >> thank you very much indeed, fiona. a great pleasure to be here at brookings and a great pleasure to see so many people here. we're indeed representing a broad program research what is happening in the scotland and the rest of the u.k. called future of the u.k. and scotland. if you type future, u.k., scotland into google you will

find us. what we're looking at is the big question. should scotland be an independent country, yes or no? that is what scott voters will have before them next week as they enter the polling booths. that's a momentous decision by any standard. it's a decision which could end what is generally seen as one of the most successful union of nations in world history. if we do end it, there will be immense domestic and international implications. so quite rightly the eyes of the world are on scotland. we will have in scotland by the end of this weekend some 400 camera crews in edinburgh. i think thousands of the print journalists covering events of the next week which is quite extraordinary. what they will see a nation exploring its rights to self-determination with great seriousness.

4.3 million scots have registered to vote in the referendum. that is 97% of the eligible electorate which is utterly unprecedented. we expect on that basis to see a turnout of at least 80%. we haven't seen turnouts at that level in u.k. politics since the immediate period after the second world war. what i think is striking is how the debate has been conducted. we have seen and had lots of press coverage, coverage of occasional bursts of online abuse and there have been a small handful of confrontations on the streets but that's just a very, very minor part of the debate. more generally we've seen extra order nearry flowering of civic engagement. people in their communities, in their church halls and town halls, more informnally

committing themselves to scotland's future. i think this is by some way the biggest civic engagement process in scottish history and i think from that we're going to have a very well-informed electorate as we go to the polls this week. you might ask, well, what do they think? up on the screen here we have the poll of polls, a moving average of the last six opinion approximatelies at various points in time and you can see that the at end of last year on the far far left of that slide the pink line at the top which is no, was at 60% plus and the blue line, yes, was below 40%. you can see in a rather uneven process a significant narrowing of the polls in the spring of this year but what you can see most strikingly is a rapid narrowing in the last couple of weeks. the last six polls carried out

over the last eight days show yes, support for independence at respectively 47%. 51, 50, 47, 48, and 49. that is already out of date by the way. it has narrowed by one further point. the average is now 51-49. expect a closeout come on thursday this week. a few words on the big themes that each side in the debate have put forward. and i will use the framing of negative and positive campaigning for this, because i think the negatives probably outweigh the positives. on the no side, largely led by the u.k. government but also by the cross party campaign, better together, we have had essentially negative message, a message which is all about risk, uncertainty, loss, you will be worse off and of refusal to

accept some of the idea the scottish government would like to pursue if scotland became independent including various forms of partnership with the rest of the u.k. to quote several figures on the no side, it is not going to happen. what we've seen there is quite a dismal vision. dismal in terms of content. it is all going to go terribly wrong. dismal in terms of presentation. i think there has been a certain level of difficulty in getting the message across. and i think that message of risk and loss has shown a diminishing return. it has lost its impact. i think that one of the reasons why on this graph you see a fall in support for the no side. what we're seeing now, is a big echo of those concerns, from the private sector, from finance and other areas of industry. today's u.s. version of financial times is carrying

lottings of stories like that. that may have an effect on opinion in these last days but that may be double-edged. i think scots can be rather averse to people telling them what to do. on the noside we've seen little positive campaigning. very little about why it is good and certainly very little about why it would be better, why scotland would be better, if it stayed in the union. we've seen a bit of a change in the last week on this. as the no side firmed up an offer and more specifically a timetable for additional powers for the scottish parliament should cot land remain in the u.k. but the negatives have outweighed the positives. big themes on the yes side. generally a positive message. generally aspirational. generally talking about the possibility of a better society,

social justice, democratic legitimacy, a different kind of role in the international arena which juliet will talk about in a few moments. better policy@tuned to scotland's needs and not driven by the heartland of the u.k. economy and southeast of england and an aspirational message about continuing friendly partnership in many areas with the rest of the u.k. after independence. all aspirational and positive and i also have to say very vague and often quite unconvincing especially in the emphasis on partnership because it relies on the willingness of the partner and the partner said, well we're not really very willing. in the last weeks we've seen a much stronger negative message from the yes side. in fact i think they have managed to conjure up a present takal perfect storm which has three elements. if we stay the national health

service, that icon of postwar british society, will be privatized. if we stay, social inequality will increase. if we stay, we will continue to be governed by a political party, conservatives which is deeply disliked in are in scotland. nhs, and conservatives brought together with real traction and one of the reasons why the polls have closed. i think there we boil down the big decision to pretty much this. the no side says, if you leave you will suffer economically. the yes side says, if we stay, we will have a future of social injustice. that's the choice. if we vote yes, what next? we'll see a negotiation of extraordinary complexity. it will deal simultaneously with the disentanglement of scotland

from the rest of the u.k., no easy task but made much more difficult by the complications of the domestic political timetable, including a u.k. election in may next year, which will be held while those negotiations would be underway. the same time as that, the scottish government would be working with the u.k. government to work out the process and the terms of scotland's membership of the international community, no easy task. those negotiations will is a number of key issues. currency arrangements will be at the heart. that will no doubt be connected to discussion about scotland's share of assets, in particular oil and gas reserves. but also liabilities, in particular the scottish share of the u.k.'s accumulated public debt. my sense is on that cluster of issues the two side after a yes vote would discover a mutual

interest in messages of reassures and able station to markets. some of the hard rhetoric that we've heard before, may well ebb away into a common endeavor to calm things down. eu negotiations will be challenging, not the least because of other countries which have similar situations to that of scotland and the rest of the u.k. nato membership will be challenging. not the least because of the scottish government's commitment to remove the u.k.'s nuclear weapons bases, part of the wider nato deterrent from scotland. we could expect package deals, perhaps, extending across different areas, currency and nuclear weapons is one package which is often evoked in that sense. i imagine we would actually see quick agreement on some of the key issues, not the least because of that pressure for

economic stability. but also long transition periods for implementtation of the working out finer details. final big challenge there will be how to insulate all of that very, very sensitive, lots of different simultaneous negotiations, from what would be a febrile political atmosphere in the u.k. if we vote no, what next? there will be less urgency if we vote no. there will be a limited challenge if we vote no to economic stability and there will be minimal international dimensions to the question. we do have a timetable for the delivery of the ballots for the scottish parliament and the no side set out and that starts on the 19th of september. and rapid process draft legislation would be available prior to the 2015 u.k. election

decentral race of tax powers and welfare policy. there will be plenty of issues around that, not least because the prounion parties are divided between themselves but also within themselves, on the content of the additional devolution powers. there is a big question whether any compromise they come up with will actually satisfy demand in scotland and i say that because whatever happens, close to half of scots, if we vote no, will have voted to leave. if we vote no, this is not an endorsement of the u.k. as is. there will be tremendous pressure to placate that drive which led practically half of scots to vote no. placating the scots won't be easy. but also if you placate the scots you might well stir up resentments in other parts of the u.k. we're already beginning to hear that a little bit in wales but particularly in england where there is, i think

a growing sense of resentment about the cushy deal scotland is perceived to have. so to conclude if yes you will be observing and some of you no doubt will be participating in a process of enormous significance and no little drama with important international ramifications. if it's a no, you will be observing a inward-looking debate no doubt with its own dramas as the u.k. casts around for a set of internal arrangements that might offer some constitutional stability. i don't doubt actually we will find them. whether we get to that situation we'll have to wait until next thursday. thank you, fiona. >> thank you, charlie. i think you laid that out wonderfully for everyone. juliet, the larger implications. >> thank you, thank you, fiona and to you and your colleagues at brookings for inviting us and letting us talk about these issues today.

i'm going to briefly talk about foreign policy in the referendum debate. what the yes says about what a independent scottish foreign policy would look like and internal and external reactions and then i will conclude challenging a couple of assumptions on both sides in this debate. i should say that foreign policy not a key issue which voters are likely to decide and cast their vote on next week but foreign policy is the most distinct area that would change with independence, given that scotland already has devolved powers in many areas of public policy, health, education, others, it is foreign affairs sovereignty would give scotland considerable new powers this is also been a part of the discourse, at least at the elite level. so with would an independence scottish foreign policy look like? the yes side has outlined some directions, although not completely specific, that it would take a scottish for inch policy. i like to characterize state

foreign policy aspirations in terms of four pillars, profits, protection, principles and pride. let me say a few things what an independent foreign policy would look like along these pillars. the yes side embraces liberal trade, economic foreign policy in its discussion of the advantages of continued eu and wto membership. we would see continuity in economic foreign policy, very similar to current u.k. economic foreign policy although a much smaller economy. there could be a big difference in scotland gets in the e.u. and the u.k. votes to leave the e.u. you would see kite a difference between u.k. and scottish foreign policy. continued membership in nato, something its party rejected until the referendum campaign began. this and a scottish defense force would be cornerstones of scotland's protection.

its military would focus on its territorial integrity and also take a regional defense role in northern europe, in the north sea for example. its defense budget is modeled after other small european states and it propose as focus on maritime forces. it rejects the tried dent submarine as charlie mentioned, the u.k.'s current nuclear deterrent reside in scottish waters. it wants the weapons removed as soon as possible after independence but has not given a deadline. so that is the protection. it is with the principles pillar that the yes side seeks to put the most daylight between the south and how it characterizes u.k. foreign policy the yes side emphasizes it would have different international priorities from westminster. most clearly in their words, in matters of "war and peace." the antinuclear argument is also based on value statements, such as trident is an affront to basic decency. the yes side is clearly laying

out aspirations for an ethics-based foreign policy talking about scotland being a champion of international justice and peace, international development, human rights an climate justice. but there are just a few clues in how these values would actually be implemented. scotland would not be an isolationist country but its participation in international peacekeeping would be governed by principles of need for international legitimacy and respect for international law. many times along these lines we've heard assert ad hypothetical argument the independent scotland would not have participated in iraq. pride play as place in most states foreign policy and it is a state's projected self-image. there is little talk of pride in the yes, sir campaign materials. but, occasionally they talk about scotland as an outward-facing nation exporting goods, peoples, ideas around the world and referred to scotland's proud military tradition as

well. so what's the no side's reaction? the no side vests as charlie mentioned uncertainty, risk and constraints on scotland as a small state. the no side argues that the international memberships that scotland seeks are not automatic. the e.u. membership might be vetoed. even if granted not likely to come with the opt out that the u.k. currently has and scotland says it wants. the no side points out that membership in nato could come with responsibilities, possibly including retaining the u.k. nuclear deterrent in scotland. the numbers for defense intelligence in terms of spending a personnel says the no side just don't add up and could create a security risk. the no side is very familar to those of us who study international relations, reflecting a realist perspective, small states don't matter, can't have the influence big states have, are dependent on military alliances and must often compromise their values in exchange for security. thus according to this view,

scotland's interests are better represented at home and abroad by a u.k. that has a permanent seat in the u.n. security council and has high-profile, well-respected large diplomatic service with considerable expertise. the yes side had some counter reaction to the no side's position on the foreign policy they argue that membership and cooperation with others will come because it is in others interest. a stable intelligence environment in scotland, for example, with shared intelligence is critical to the u.k.'s own safety given shared geographical space and thus cooperation is likely. the yes side also argues that small states don't need equivalent protection of big states. don't need a broad global profile and don't attract enemies and threats sometimes big states do. and consistent with research on small states the yes side points out that small states can often bunch above their weight and have influence because they are small states. they are often, for example, more trusted because they are

seen as less a threat to others. so what has been the international reaction to this? well, publicly at least most states conformed to international law, non-interference in democratic process and said this is matter for the u.k. and the scottish people. where external actors weighed in this is largely been on the no side. comments from external actors include states such as the united states, but also international organizations and businesses and these comments largely see scottish independence as an unwelcome and puzzling disturbance. the negative international reactions have many sources but chief among them are states own concerns about their domestic problems, worries, debt, scottish secession would spill over into their countries. there is others that voiced general concerns about precedents and a so-called balkanization of europe that the scottish independence move would set off there.

are concerns about the weakening of a stable ally, the u.k. this is probably the basis of both the u.s. and french expressions of concerns about scottish independence. now i don't think the international commentary has much of an impact in the internal debate and on vote next week. perhaps the financial market reaction next week was more important. when states intervene there risks backfiring among the scottish populations. so i will end by questioning two assumptions i see in the debate on independence and foreign policy. and to be fair, one assumption on the no side and one assumption on the yes side. first, the no. international reactions that support the no side. in the arguments that an independent scottish foreign policy would fair poorly assumption is that all else is static and only question of scottish independence is changing. the u.k. for example is presented as a major power that better represents the people of scotland in the world but this

not an uncut and untested view and not one vulnerable to change. power balance in the world are changing. emerging powers are more important and big powers also don't always have influence. the u.k. defense is in the midst of downsizing and likely to face further budget cuts as well. there is assumption that u.k. foreign policy is statically a faithful ally and nuclear power. here too there are signs of change. the house of commons vote on syria last year showed a real lack of trust in international intelligence, a being la of enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention. and a there are real disagreements even in the current governing coalition in the u.k. over the worst of trident. the pro-u.s. position in the u.k. is still strong but arguably not as strong as it used to be and may not be in the future. my point here these are not issues that divide westminster versus scotland. they are debated within westminster too and even without scottish independence they may affect the u.k.'s role in the

world. on the yes side there has been a strong assumption of rational interest-based cooperation by others. they argue that of course britain will share the pound and the intelligence and e.u. and nato will let scotland is because it is in their interest to do so. it probably in in their interest to do so and it is not about starting assumptions but we know states don't act always according to their interests or they have competing interests which can complicate external relations. consider the rest of the u.k. as scotland's most important negotiating partner in a post-independent world. the u.k. will hold national elections next year and if the conservatives win they promise a referendum on the u.k.'s eu membership. the negotiations with scotland on trident, on the pound, on the division of assets, on the military division, on everything will be happening in the middle of these political and likely very contested campaigns.

>> thank you, juliet. we'll turn now to geoff dyer from the financial times. "the financial times" has been running a whole series for quite some time now on the contours of this debate and many of the issues that charlie and juliet laid out on the table and clearly geoff and his colleagues will be very busy in the next few weeks especially if juliet led out, no matter what the outcome this will feed into a much bigger debate in the united kingdom in the run-up to what is going to be a very contested general election next year in may 2015. i think one of the issues that juliet mentioned here we should put out on the table which is the continuatino of u.k. claim over its u.n. security council seat. here in the corridors of brookings i heard from a lot of my colleagues who cover other areas of the world, particularly some of the rising powers that there will be a big demand from some of them for rethinking of the u.k., national security

council seat. there anyway as we all know and certainly the outcome of the referendum will raise that even higher. as juliet said, nothing will be constant in this debate. there will be more issues on the table as we look forward. but, geoff, we asked to you give a big perspective on the these issues and obviously you have quite a lot to say on this matter. so over to you. >> thank you very much, fiona and thank you very much for brooks kings inviting me here today. i appreciate the invitation. charlie and juliet laid out the issues and underlining thinking on both sides of the campaign. i don't want to go every at same ground. what i may do i will try to outline the issue of what an independent scotland might look like. what happens if there is a yes vote next week even though it is complete touch and go. it is a toss-up, what will that actually mean and what will it look like? i think the key point to

understand, yes vote next week is almost the start of the issue. it is not the end of the issue. a yes vote will be the start of a very complicated divorce proceedings and might be quite an amicable divorce proceedings and it might be a nasty divorce proceedings and till will be a divorce proceedings and start of the end of the process. a base outline of what an independent scotland might look like are still very unclear. there are core questions about et cetera place in the world and what the state will look like and institutional questions, they haven't been resolved. there are a lot of question marks over them. that is one of the key issues in the debate. charlie already mentioned a independent scotland would like to be part of the european union, a key part of snps sales pitch to the country. scotland actually likes to think it is more pro-european than rest of the u.k. that wasn't

necessarily always the case but that is part of the sales pitch at the moment. opinion polls sometimes some polls show that is true, some polls show that is not true but it is a very much a core part for the platform of the snp. small independent, country but still part after bigger broader world that the e.u. allows us to be. it is very important to them because it is crucial for trade relations under an independent scotland. just the idea that business as usual can carry on even if we take a big risk voting yes, lots of things carry on as normal. however it is not necessarily majorly clear that scotland could become a member of the e.u. it would reach most of the qualifications of course. but there are three big potential obstacles. the first is like the spanish yes question. there are other countries in the e.u. might object. spain is one most likely to have a real problem with scotland

becoming a member the e.u. it doesn't want to encourage a separatist movement in catalonia. it might ultimately reject scottish membership that is quite big incentive to drag things out, to make things difficult. to show to the catalones there is price to be paid for taking this move. that would be very tough negotiations scotland would face. there is the question whether the u.k. would ultimately back it. again it seems unlikely the end of the day the u.k. would say no but as there is will be this complicated negotiation ahead there is one of the bargaining chips that the rest of the u.k. government would have. scotland can not become part of the e.u. until both sides signed off on the separation agreement, the divorce agreement. that is another factor. the third bit is the euro factor. in theory these days new members of the e.u. are supposed to become members of the euro as well. now, given the crisis in the

euro the last few years, one might imagine there would be a little more reluctance to push that role wholeheartedly. scotland would have to be become part of the euro to be part of the e.u. that is not something scottish nationals want to do at the moment. most of the issue would ultimately be resolved and sensible compromise signed but there will be a painful and difficult negotiation. scotland wants to become part of nato as we heard this is part of the general, business as usual, we're not going to rock the boat too much. you don't need to worry that an independent scotland will cause radical changes. that is not going to be completely simple negotiation either. as i mentioned the, scottish national party are very, very antinuclear. you know, there is called it a basic affront. there is also a sort of

anti-american populism that is part of snp pitch as well. they talk about america's illegal wars. now, in scotland that didn't want to have nuclear weapons and played up against american foreign policy in the middle east would not be unique in nato. there are other countries that have a similar profile. that is at least a wrinkle or complication. they would have to do something one would think to soothe some of the american concerns about that. and then america would also presumably have concerns what defense spending might be under an independent scotland. is it committed to maintain certain amount of defense spending but also entirely possible to imagine awe sorts of pressures on the scottish government. independent scottish government in the first years that would push it in the direction of trying to cut defense spending. everything the u.s. wants from nato at the moment, not have another country that will fall substantially below the 2% mark. that is slightsly tricky issue. nato, spain, is also a

possible -- and nato as well. again i don't think that ultimately these problems, these potential obstacles would block scotland from becoming a member of nato but again till with be a difficult, long drawn out negotiation and things will not be as simple as they are projected in the campaign. fiona mentioned u.n. issue might come up. the final one i want to talk about briefly is currency issues which has become one of the core issues in the campaign and really the most difficult issue that is going to face an independent scotland if we vote yes next week. charlie mentioned he thought ultimately there would be a sensible, establish compact between scotland and the rest of the u.k. to sort things out. i'm not all more clear about that. i'm more skeptical about that. this is a key issue because there is really no easy path for independent scotland on currency issue. let me lay out the various

options scotland would have. it would be, became a member eu would be euro option. obviously that was preferred option for snp at a certain time but that is not option basically with all the problems the euro had in recent years. other options would have scotland issue its own currency. ultimately that would be an mechanism give it the most autonomy, the best chance in the long run to have independent, effective scottish economic policy but the path to establishing its own currency would be very complicated, very difficult. you have to establish credibility, build institutions. there would be lots of worries and mismatches of certain liabilities and assets. there are lots of currency risk. a real risk quite a lot of economic turbulence in short and intermediate term before scotland got to the stage of having a credible independent currency. sterlingization option, which would have scotland continue to

use the pound sterling but not be part of the institutional arrangements of the u.k., similar to way the panama uses u.s. dollar. that is technically entirely possible but there are lots of problems. obviously the scotland wouldn't have central bank, to defend its banking system or have a backstop for banking system. it would need to build up some kind of a reserve fund which would mean essentially cutting spending for a number of years in order to build up the fund. that is economic cost to scottish welfare spending that has not been discussed which is implicit in the sterlingization option. for all those reasons entirely understandable why the snp is putting all the money on option we stay part of currency union with the rest of the u.k. we'll vote for independence and renegotiate the terms for our existence essentially within the current currency union so that scotland would ideal have

membership in the bank of england. become one of the shareholders essentially of the bank of england. so the monetary policy would be part of conditions in scotland t would have access to all the facilities the bank of england could offer, the lender of last resort facilities that could offer to the broader scottish economy. from snp and independent scott point of view that makes sense. where i go to charlie, not at all clear to me that really makes sense for england if you like, for the rest of the u.k. i think of that both from economic reasons and for political reasons. the economic reason would be that all the risks essentially would be on the one side. the way to think about it, if scotland got into trouble, and if independent scotland got into trouble, england would have resources to bail it out. if england got into trouble, scotland wouldn't have resources to bail it out. so, it is classic moral hazard. all the risks lie on the english side. there is very little reason i could see for them to actually

want to sign up to this type of currency union. they're exposing themselves to huge potential risk down the line and scotland run different economic policy. to essentially free ride to the back of stability. the bank of england could offer them. that is, and even if they did decide to sign up to the currency union the price they would ask for would be very, very rigid. fiscal rules, limits on scottish government public spending. financial rules essentially asking for bank of england regulation of the entire scottish financial system and possibly even pooling of fiscal resources. even though scotland would get in theory control of all this revenue from north sea oil, we would make some of the money available back to the broader u.k. the implication of that is that a notionally independent scotland under currency union would not have a great deal of autonomy and independence the way it runs its economic policy.

again that ising that hasn't really been, in my time in scotland, something that was not really coming through in the argument what a currency union would mean for an independent scotland. even if you accept charlie is right the establishment would ultimately want to do a deal between england and scotland because they wouldn't want a crisis north of the border, politically it is not at all clear to me that it would be possible for them to do so. one of the ways to think about is the following. the striking thing about this referendum just how little england actually seems to care what is going on in scotland. one example, quebec, had the last referendum on the weekend beforehand there was several hundred thousand people i think marching in the streets of montreal. canadians from outside of quebec, asking quebec to stay. there will be no demonstrations like that in scotland. that is not happening. that is not part of the debate. in england the sentiment is the complete opposite.

of resent mane. if you want to go, the words are words i couldn't really use at brookings. it is not a very poe lie atmosphere. there is going to be a general election sometime in the next year. maybe quite soon but certainly sometime in the next year. seems impossible for a non-scottish political party to get elected on platform, yeah, we should do right by the scots they will need us. i think opposite will be case. i think english electorate will demand from political parties very tough conditions. from the english point of view, currency union says we want out but we want all the benefits of staying in. that is the way it plays in english politics. i don't think that is politically sustainable argument. for both those reasons i'm a little more pessimistic how that will play out. i think it will be very complicated and very difficult and probably not be the kind of answer that is scotland or the snp would like.

finally as a more pessimism, you know, these very tight opinion polls, they're fantastic for journalists, right? this is great story for my newspaper. seems to be a terrible outcome for scotland and britain. i have no other, i have no sort of alternative to referendum to majority vote. i'm not suggesting that is wrong way to do things, 5-49 result, whichever way it goes is terrible result. shows a very divided country and fragile political consensus in to take a very big step. it cuts the other way as well. 5laugh 49 is not by any means a endorsement of union -- 5-49. i think we're in period are political fragility and volatility. i will leave it there. we get into a lot of things in q&a. >> thanks, jeff. that last point you left us with actually makes the united

states, whale we're having this big debate about our own divisions internally between the various political constituencies seem quite mild which is quite an achievement. with that i will turn over to jeremy to give us the perspective how things look from here in d.c. where we're all sitting. >> thanks and thanks to all the other previous panelists for coming. i think jeff gave us a very good view just what on a optimistic presence scotland would be on the international scene. what i would like to cover what the u.s. government essentially is thinking about the scottish referendum. and also how the u.s. would react if there is a yes vote. i think as juliet mentioned, the u.s. doesn't really talk about this very much. they have, they have talked about some concerns over specific issues, particularly

nuclear issues, but haven't really taken a position on, or at least an official position on the referendum. this is for, a rather clear reasons. in the first instance it would, it would just be rude to comment on the internal deliberations of a democratic country. it is not unprecedented, shall we say for the united states to do so but it is impolite and in general principle for the u.s. not to do that kind of thing particularly with allies which it recognizes have a legitimate system and engaged in a legitimate process. i think it is very clear on the u.s. side that is what is going on for better or for worse but of course the united states has an opinion. i think they recognize however tating that opinion is not always even very helpful to promoting it. the u.s. weighed in,

semiaccidentally i think on the question of british membership in the european union a year or two ago and it created quite a firestorm in britain. one of the things it did was sort of align both sides on, it turned out that both side cared very much what the u.s. thought and just became a lightning rod. so i think that they have since that time, taken, taken the approach they can't actually predict very well what u.s. weighing into the debate will even do in terms of public opinion. and so it is best to stay out of it. i think that is reinforced by the sentiment that was already mentioned that, scots are somewhat averse being told what to do. they're probably particularly averse to being told what to do by americans. but, i think despite that absence of opinion we can still make a fairly educated guess

what the u.s. government thinks. the united states is a status quo power. i think that ising is we often forget as we talk about crises and u.s. action. but in fact as the sort of leader of the world, there is a strong bias towards stability in u.s. foreign policy and a strong bias against secession of any sort. really, secession is for status quo power nearly a complete collapse of policy. here again the united states is not entirely consistent in this regard. kosovo comes quickly to mind and there are a few other examples but in each of those examples i think if you look at u.s. policy you will see they very strongly sought to avoid any idea that there was a precedent set towards secession. or there was any right of secession by by provinces. i think that view is reinforced in this particular case because the u.s. essentially sees this

as two of its best friend, divorcing. and that is a, never a joyful experience. i think even beyond that sort of general principle of a status quo power there are some real issues for the united states. some of them have been alluded to already but i will sort of go over them more directly from a u.s. perspective. i think probably the critical one is the idea of weakening of a key u.s. ally, the u.k. the u.k. is clearly, from the u.s. perspective, a very active, very effective ally and there are precious few of those these days. there is a general view that, in the sort tumult that has been described after a yes vote the u.k. or what remains of it would turn inward as it nexts the exit of scotland. it would be more likely to get out of the european union in the

punitive referendum in 2017, which would further shrink british influence and british activism in the world. there is also a view that scottish exit would put yet greater pressure on the brittish defense budget and the british armed forces. overall, might mean that the u.k. would no longer be able to play the kind of lead role in nato it traditionally has. related to this i think that there is a fear of a weakening of nato and of the e.u. the e.u. would turn inward yet again as it had to negotiate the question of secession in general and scootish entry, specifically. and it would, because it would make an exit more likely, a british exit from the european union, that is the term of art for that, very long conference

about that. this gets at what the u.s. said when it took against brit iish exit from european union. looking for a strong britain within the european union. it is very clear that scottish exit weakenses that strong britain and the britain exit from the european union would weaken that strong european union. temporary to a little bit what has been said, this is less about the nuclear deterrent then about demonstrating weakness and disunity at a critical point in, in nato's history and in the face of a sort of newly resurgent threat from russia. if you look at the nato summit last week and the president's trip to estonia, you see a very strong urge to assure, to assert nato unity, to assert nato

strength in the face of the russian threat. and the whole idea of one of its members, one of its key members breaking up. and then the type of government that, that was described taking over in scotland and all of the difficult negotiations over nato doesn't really appeal to the united states tikrit call moment in dealing with russia. i think that, well, i will get to that a little bit later but, i think that the, the third reason that the u.s. would be against this is the question of precedent. as fiona mentioned, the leader of crimea has already mentioned scottish independence as a precedent for what he would like to do. and we've also heard expressions of this just this morning on npr. i heard a resident of donetsk

asking the question, if scotland can do it, why can't we? and that is going to be an increasingly hard question to answer. and this of course spreads also across the e.u. and so spain and other key u.s. allies could well face this question. fiona and i have a piece about this which i think we distributed out front which talks about, about the precedent this sets and the difficulty that might cause for the european union. so what will the u.s. do in the case of a yes vote? it is always a fair bet in the face of dramatic international developments that the united states will urge calm. so, i think that will be the first reaction. but what that really means is that will broadly accept the outcome. and be urging, in order to sort

of make the best of a bad situation, a fast resolution of a, of a negotiated, agreeable, divorce. specifically to create a reassures and minimize the disruption that talked about that they fear. so they will i think quietly and to some extent from behind the scenes push for e e.u. nato membership for scotland on reasonably fair terms. there will be as jeff implied, very, very hard negotiations on the nuclear deterrent but i do think that they are ultimately looking for a owe solution. they would certainly prefer a weak member of nato to a a non-member. there are, as was mentioned, plenty of nato members which

have, sort of romantic anti-american notions about particularly about the nuclear deterrent. this fits into a wider, into a wider debate. the united states won't welcome a new one but i think it will prefer it to a nonmember, to sort of irish solution. the key point is it has to be a negotiated solution and a transition. i think, very clearly, the united states will push back against the idea that this referendum represents a precedent for places like crimea, donetsk or even catalonia and the way they will do that is by emphasizing the mutual decision nature that this was agreed by both side. and that was the critical feature, which allows this type of referendum and this type of separation. it must be agreed both by the

region that is holding the referendum, and i about the state in which the region belongs. and they will say this is totally different from ukraine or the breakaway provinces of georgia which this is under dispute. i think, also and somewhat more speculatively, if the scotts vote yes, the u.s. will reevaluate its decision to play a fairly hand's off role in, in the british exit question for the european union. they will still have the problem that i mentioned, that, it is not clear how weighing in will really help, but have the precedent not having not weighed in, not helped and typically the united states, you know, doesn't make the same mistake twice. it make as new mistake. and so i think i will see them

play a more active role. the argument that they will use, is that, that because they have a stake in british membership in the european union, just as for example, a country like britain would have a stake in the united states membership in nato, they have a every right to weigh in. and i think they will be willing in the run up to that referendum to make their opinion much more known if cot land votes yes. >> well thank you, jeremy. obviously we've got a lot of issues here and only have half an hour left i would like to bring in you the audience. i see a lot of questions. i recognize quite a few people in the audience have a stake in this issue. so i will take maybe three questions right away. we have microphones which will come out, if you just wait a second. then i will come back to our panel to ask them to comment on whichever the questions you like. two questions immediately here and opposite side of the i'll

we'll take. i also, please at the back wave and let me know about your questions too. please identify yourself for the audience. >> thank you. my speaks for myself as british expat englishman, conscious englishman's words at this point potentially not helpful. but i do just want to take up something mr. dyer said if i may, english don't care for that matter. i would hate for that impression to be left with this audience and more i had widely. if you look at twitter more generally you do see today plans for a day of national unity from outside the borders. from outside of scotland coming next wednesday. you also see, i recommend it very strongly, forgive me for getting slightly emotional on this matter, the spectator magazine launching a campaign for people outside of scotland, writing in very personal words why it is that would want and

scottish people to vote and it is their vote to stay in the united kingdom. that is probably all i got to say apart from my question obeying rules of this seminar which is, has been suggested that perhaps no would be less urgent, you know the situation in terms of what would happen afterwards. could i ask the panel if the referendum is not shown in the campaign amongst it there is a wide feeling of disenfranchisement both in scotland and in england and wales, and therefore if it is in fact urgent, that there is some sort of constitutional settlement not just in scotland but more widely in the event of a no vote. thank you. >> thank you very much. and, across the aisle and then peter. >> gerald chandler. independent. could you relate everything you said in this situation to ireland, first of all, could there be a ireland, northern ireland type of situation where some area of scotland voted 2/3 to stay in the u.k. and it would

stay with the u.k.? and, would ireland and scotland have better relations because they might end up using the euro or could there even be a closer drawing of ireland to the u.k. because it is now kind of a club, that it is relatively bigger. >> thank you. across the aisle thank you. >> i'm from the nation. i thank the panel for this marvlously instructive survey of current matters. wish to regret the absence in the panel of the eloquent governor of texas, the honorable rick perry. who has some views on secession as well. but everybody knows -- >> speak a little closer to the mic. i'm not sure the cameras are picking this up. >> better? okay. just regretted the absence of

rick perry from the panel. everybody knows that in england that is metropolitan england scotts play an enormously disproportionate role in the leadership of institutions, cultural, academic, economic and of course politics and one wonders about the composition of the, the social come significance, age composition also of the two, maybe even religious composition of the two parties, yes and no blocs in scotland? is there a class gradient ever some kind? appeared so from some of the discussions. also on television. but it would be good to know something simply about the social composition of the opposing parties. thanks very much. >> thank you very much. for all of these questions. we'll come back again. this last question, i would like to amplify a little bit because in many of the meetings that we've had at brookings we've had

several sessions of this. that is one of the issues confused a lot of people from the outside. because scotland's referendum is framed in terms of civic nationalism, a lot of people are trying to grasp, who are the people on either side in terms of identifying themselves. issues of identity have not really been put on the table but they have come up in many other issues. geoff and i talked about this. i think this panel also reflects it. i myself from northern england but my family moved around the border area of scotland and england for years. charlie was originally from england and living in scotland. juliet is from u.s. and living in scotland. and geoff is living in scotland and larger u.k. entity. that is history of the united kingdom one of constant migration. obviously the previous efforts to national self-determination of scotland, had really founded on the fact that there wasn't enough people who identified

themselves ethnically and culturally as scots to really kind of carry the day. the snp platform has been very much based on this idea, it is residents of scotland, no matter who they may be, no matter how they might identify themselves but they're residents of the polit why of scotland. this is obviously very important and playing out as geoff was trying to suggest here in england and, as our questioner hugo rosemont said, people in england care about this but puts identity of great britain on the map and many people in england having backlash about the idea of cot land wanting to leave but there is also a larger issue i would like to put out as you think about responding to this, about the identity of british and bret tisch identity. the united kingdom is kind of a rather description of the country not great britain. britain is the not official name

of the united kingdom. this question is raised about the united kingdom of scotland, wales and ireland, england and northern ireland. that this becomes quite complicated because of course the united kingdom is country of immigration and many people have come from outside of the british isles will wonder how they identify themselves on september 19th, depending what happened as well because there are all kind of identities there. if you're from romania or bulgaria or recent immigration or you're, like many of the members of british parliament were, you come from somewhere else. we have many prominent members from germany or portugal and many other places. how do they identify themselves or south asian community in great britain. . .

and i've done quite a bit of survey work in england, and i can endorse your comment in a sense the english do care. when we asked in april we found 19% of people in england any very large survey who thought something -- scotland should be an independent country. very, very big majority who do not think that. however, in all a bit more in line with what geoff was saying, if scotland does the yes what we know from that survey is that able in england would be quite strongly in support of a tough line in negotiations towards scotland. so one thing going to say but if scotland decides to go, then perhaps a little bit of a

backlash. went i said the urgency, that wasn't my note urgency. i think it would be a great danger of the uk level political system thinking. we've done that one now. we will move on and start thinking about europe. i think if we vote no, a more stable set of constitutional arrangements for all parts of the uk would be a strong priority. who's voting yes and no rx there are some clear patterns which are quite interesting. men more likely to vote yes than women. younger people, except the very youngest, younger people generally more like to vote yes than older people, people from disadvantaged communities clearly more likely to vote yes and people from our affluent communities. been a national identity

question. one of the best predictors we have a voting intention is around those people who feel primarily british in scotland. doesn't work quite so well on the other side, those people who feel primarily scottish. this doesn't lead directly or so directed to supporting a yes vote. there was a territorial dimension to that, a poll was released from the scottish borders this morning which showed two-thirds in favor of remaining in the uk. so there would be territorial differences between different parts of scotland. i don't think that's going to lead to a kind of the irish partition situation. i think given that level of likely level of turnout, the formal rules which say 50% plus one either way wins, i think will have sufficient legitimacy.

>> thank you. juliet. >> i'll just answer a couple of questions quickly so we can get more questions from the audience. on issuon the issue of identityi guess partly being an outsider i've been struck at how the identity, nationalism, ethnic identity has not been part of the debate as much. it's been a very functional political debate, about policy preferences on foreign policy and health care and spending issues. and so i think the way the electorate has been defined in terms of residency has taken away some of that. although some of us can't vote even though we are residents there, the extent to americans. on the question of ireland, it is interesting. ireland has kind of looked towards the uk in this debate

than it looks towards supporting scotland and independence. scotland hasn't reached out to think about cultivating scottish irish connections. scotland is more looking towards the nordic countries in thinking about the connections there, the arctic circle and the north sea, those countries have largely stayed on the sidelines in this debate, probably not just after the referendum but after come in the case of a yes vote after negotiations. they will wait to take up the offer of scotland to be partners and alliances and that. >> geoff? >> this question is interesting because it's not formally part of the debate at all. it's really not on the table but it is absolutely the underlying fabric of the debate i think which is the sense that scottish identity issued in the last couple of decades.

very strongly held view of almost most scotland. scotland is a very distinct place based on different education system, different church, legal system from all these profound and deep rooted aspects of scotland may get a different place. the other idea is the one country in the world and share with the most a single. there's this tension between the two in these last two decades has really become much stronger. the things that binds the uk together, the reasons have declined. the uk was really founded on the empire in a sense that it's one of the things that kept scott's interest in uk for a long time. the members of the second world war, fighting together in fascism, trade union movement was a another very powerful thing that blinded scotland and uk together.

margaret thatcher had really broken up some of the checks and balances in the way the uk, a political grammar of the way the uk work. all these things are played out over the last couple decades to give scotland a much stronger sense of identity. even though that's not what officially on the platform it's very much one of the driving forces behind the way we've got to this stage. we have globalization and individualism create an apartment where people will have more tribal identities. to go to wedding in scotland these days, all the men of my father's generation in the '60s and '70s overinvested. album in 50 years under are wearing kilts. that's something that's -- a way to explain the shift that is happening. so identity is not on the manifesto but the ski-doo understand what's going on. as i quickly respond to the

hugo, all i would say is personally i couldn't hope you are right, thing about england opinion trying to make the case. i would say you perhaps have been leaving it a little bit late. spent i don't think he means you though personally. [laughter] >> jeremy, do you have anything to say? >> just bring the. i will mention that on your point about general disenfranchisement i think that's sort of an important point, fiona, and i referred to in the piece i referred to. with scotland is expressing is it's often phrased as sort of anti-english but it's more if you think about it and i london. -- anti-london. it expresses frustration i think a lot of the hinterlands of 19 them, northern england and wales and a lot of other areas of the european, action all of the aries of the kingdom outside the

metropolitan london area and the south feel about the english government that the uk government, the disenfranchisement they feel from the city, the cultural distance that is being created by the different evolutions of london and the rest of the united kingdom. what the identity of scotland gives them is a language, a vocabulary, and institutional platform to express that disenfranchisement that the rest of the united kingdom doesn't really have to. and so that's why we see this disenfranchisement coming forward most clearly and most strongly in scotland. but i think it is a general problem in the united kingdom and i think it is something yes or no that the united kingdom roux should deal with. and i guess urgently but i would share some of the pessimism that was expressed that they really

well. >> and i think, geoff, the fda many other british newspapers have also pointed out that those divides within a kingdom, with in london itself, maybe a sense of disenfranchisement, london itself is also a divided policy. one of the features of the thatcher era and was the abolition of the greater london council, which was always leaning very much to the left of government. one of the great battles was margaret thatcher fighting with her leader, the leader of the london council. for a certain amount of self-determination so think this issue is going to take on some very interesting dimensions as we move forward and i'm sure the ft and others would don't a lot about the. i would like to get questions about because there's a lot of people been waiting feverishly.

and please identify yourselves. [inaudible] >> what is the impact on businesses like pensions and banks the scottish people vote yes? what is the impact on the economy, considering many scottish people are dependent on uk for social welfare, social security, and other benefits? thank you. >> my question is, do you think that people should have the right to decide their own fate? as a general matter we have 2 million people demonstrating in barcelona yesterday put us all, as you all know the spanish government does not allow the capital vote to go ahead. as a general matter do you think

that any people should have the right to decide the own fate? thank you. >> thanks. there's a question from a gentleman standing right behind you. >> i work for the eurasia group i would want anyone to think the accent reflects any bias. i have a purely mythological question for the panel. it seems most of the organizations have published the portion of don't knows, quite often the press has recalculated the polls reflect it as an absolute confrontation between yes and no. i saw the brookings site, to this tentatively and show the yes no. as far as i know they don't knows quite a bit proportion of the polls. surprisingly big for a poll, for a referendum that takes 20% approximately. so i was wondering if you could comment on this and perhaps give some indication as to whether they think these hesitant voters will vote yes or no?

thank you. we will start again with charlie to respond to questions. >> thank you. i'll start on that one. that's fairly standard practice when you're predicting elections to get rid of the don't knows and report figures without them. but it does raise the question of which way the don't knows are leaning. different pollsters are reporting different levels of don't knows. it extends a little bit on the polling methods. people to face-to-face polling you get more don't knows. i think people are more reluctant face-to-face to give their opinion. the picture we have had from some academic surveys research, which is using the same panel of votes at different time points which is press the most reliable evidence that we have, was that between the two time points, which were early this year and

then in the early summer, don't knows were breaking towards yes, but in a ratio of 25 to 18, so more or less 43. and that is perhaps one of the things -- for the three. beyond that it's very difficult to say. i wanted to take focus, about pretty but it wanted to come back to geoff and clarify. i am skeptical that it would be a formal currency union, and i'm sorry if you thought that that was what he thought i was say but i do think the science and the debate has become really quite polarized from the no side, had been so definitive, and some parts of the no side have gone beyond that by saying the next uk manifesto for the labour party is saying we will not have a currency union. it will be very, very hard to

move away from that position. what i'm suggesting was that there would be an interest in the stabilization process most likely around and in formal use of -- perhaps we've seen the first stages of that stabilization process in the announcements of all of the major banks with headquarters in scotland yesterday saying that in the event of a yes vote they would move their registered headquarters, if not necessarily many of their activities, the london so that there would be a lender of last resort, which is one way of managing some of those transitional issues. my broader point was that both sides, including the uk, which beat -- which would be very uncertainty around currency, bearing uncertainty about continuity of business, for many

firms headquartered in the rest of the uk, would have an interest in stabilizing, in reassuring, in saying it's all going to be okay. i'm not sure i coined the phrase or someone else wrote it and i just absorbed for myself, the idea of store limitation plus -- sterilizes asian plus appears to me to be a more likely outcome than currency union. >> let me take the catalonian question in the back and use it as a platform to come back to something that jeremy was talking about on presidents and secession. that is a strong international norm for people who have the right to decide who governs them but the principle of national self-determination is not always obeyed, not always supported by

outside groups, but it is a strong and ever-growing a normative part an international system, and that's why you see outside actors even if they're against scottish independence that worries and concerns about the implications of scottish independence, or not anything or staying on the sidelines, not making many public comments on this. i think this concern about the spillover of the scottish independence to other secessionist movements sometimes is exaggerated or i was at a really good conference about the a class the university last year. we brought in several experts on secessionist movements and how they relate to each other. most of the research shows that they really don't dominant effect, that it may be that other secessionist movements using instance as precedent to push their case, but it's not really successful and the

results of secessionist movements are determined more by local factors rather than what's happened next door or across the world. and i think secessionist movements around the world will probably use the scottish independence referendum in their movement for secession regardless of the outcome of their referendum. and i think, i think there is as jeremy was talking about, it's a clear difference. this was a case of a mutual decision by westminster government and edinburgh government to allow this to happen. and this is a fully democratic process without any real conflict, which is quite an amazing thing and quite a unique thing in international history. >> geoff? >> i'll take the economic question that fma. short-term impact and -- the

short-term impact is uncertain uncertainty. just because it will create a huge number of questions and back and have some economic impact. you could see some pension fund money being moved because of the border, things are very uncertain. you could imagine people trying to withdraw money from scottishh banks, positive they started the word about future arrangements. i think he'll be a very strong self-preservation institutional movement on both sides of the border to try and overcome that, to try to stop the uncertainty from causing corruptions in the economy but in the medium term i would look, we depend on what sort of currency arrangements independent scotland eventually ends up having. most of them would involve a new scottish government having to really enforce a period of austerity to establish credibility, maybe help preserve

come to be a witch arranged affair. the with the oil price. an independent scotland would have a much larger part of its revenue would come from oil. that could counteract the mixture of both arrangements in the oil price would define whether scotland could keep spending that amount of money in the medium-term. in the short term it's just about uncertainty and that's the big issue at the moment. >> i won't somewhat unwisely weigh in on this self-determination question. i think that the norm of national self-determination is one in which the rhetoric of states is always exceeded the practice. it's very common for states to get up and asked all the rights of -- asked all the rights of self-determination. if you look at the history of the think it is always somewhat silly limited in the sense that

people have a right to self determination but they don't have a right to determine that it's the size and the scope of the political community of which that self-determination runs. and so it's not legitimate for the brookings institution to suddenly decide that it wants to be an independent country and vote to do so and secede from the united states, although occasionally we have considered it. and, of course, this is the show which the u.s. civil war was thought, and quite clearly determined that even if there is a right to self-determination, there's not necessarily a right to secession, especially secession that is not agreed by the larger political community. that's been a fairly strong practice, although certainly the arm many exceptions. fairly strong practice even since the sort of rise of self-determination movement after world war i.

>> thanks but i want to bring in the last set of questions. there's a gentleman standing at the very back. a gentleman over here was had his hand up forever longtime and a sergeant and one else. these individuals have had -- yes, please. >> my name is kevin and i'm intern here at the brookings. if i understood correctly, i heard that if scotland aims its independence, england will not have enough power and influence to play a prominent role in nato. what does this mean for the united nations? would in the future and if northern ireland gained its independence, would england be kicked out of the position it now enjoys in the united nations and probably be replaced by an emerging power like germany or brazil? >> the gentleman behind the

camera here. and then the lady over here. >> i am with european television. i covered the referendum campaign two decades ago in canada when québec voted by i think 50.01%, or something like that, to stay in canada. ever since this issue has totally disappeared from the political discussion in canada. so my question is if scotland both know by a similar outcome, are we going to see a next referendum next year, in two years, or will this issue fade away? thank you. >> thank you. and this lady over here. >> thank you. i am the congressional reporter for the hispanic outlook come and read a lot about immigration. so in the immigration debate and people start talking that nativism and nationalism even, there's a connotation of

xenophobic and anti-immigrant, but i'm not getting that in this conversation. and yet i want to political science conference two weeks ago, international, and european scholars told me the whole concept of multiculturalism instead that in europe. people to talk about it. so i'm wondering if this debate is more about big government versus small government, these huge multicultural governments like london, they just can't identify to them anymore. they don't feel like they keep control. again, multiculturalism, xenophobia or big government versus small government. >> thanks, those are good last questions and social we don't have a lot of time. the article and people outside the door. hopefully not demonstrating on one side or the issue. but in any case i will give the last word to all of our panelists. charlie.

>> thank you very much. québec, quebec did have very recently a government led by the pro-independence party which was hoping to secure sufficient support to move towards a further round of constitutional discussion. i think things are over in québec. if it's a no vote i don't think they would be over in scotland. the first minister alex salmond has said this is a once in a generation issue. i suspect the definition of generation could be reasonably flexible, depending on how other events go. for example, if scotland votes no, the uk than as a referendum on eu membership which has a uk wide majority to leave, but a scottish majority within the uk to stay, i think that's terrain which is a very short political generation in a way in which they could revive the debate. i believe the other questions to

the others. >> let me take something put on immigration debate. i think it hasn't been part of the scottish nationalists independence movement at all. in fact, they promise a more liberal immigration policy, an independent scotland and the uk has but it may be you are seeing the tensions within the united kingdom more broadly but jeremy spoke of, london versus the rest or divisions within london. in scotland this may be seen in the independence referendum. and the rest of the uk it may be seen in more of the rise of anti-immigrant populist parties. on the question of the u.n., just quickly, i think a smaller rest of uk after a yes vote would raise more questions about whether the uk has the right to be represented on the u.n. security council. those questions are already raised and that pandora's box is already open with no simple solutions in sight. so i don't think -- it would add

to the call but i'm not sure it would provide any more answers. >> geoff. >> yes, on the u.n. the day after a yes vote for scotland, the brazilians and in this will be a public we say this is a moment. the germans will be more polite, but probably make the same case. the logic fo for reforming the sector joseph dunford powerful for a long time and it hasn't happened. you need to organize consensus between the members and that's never been possible and it doesn't seem to be any reason why it would be more possible after a scottish referendum vote. charlie is right. even if the national side lose, absolutely made a very powerful case that there is a strong groundswell of support for independence in scotland if they lose it will probably beat, 30%, 40, 45, 48, 49%. the issue will be very much back on the agenda sooner than you

might imagine. >> thanks, geoff. jeremy, any last words? we're going to refrain from trying to tip the scales to i hope that nothing we have said here will tip the outcome one way or the other. we all know how inadvertently one can win a debate and make a mess of it and hope what this is done instead is enlightened people on some of the key issues in the debate. we are grateful again to charlie and juliet for flying in from edinburgh. obviously, just a weekend of these momentous events to tell us what's going on. and i hope that everybody who will be watching this very closely, and thank you so much participating, you in the audience, in this discussion today. a given much again, and to geoff and to jeremy also. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

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