protecting the va officials responsible for the scandal just reinforces the long-standing culture of circling the wagons to let the claim story or patient died of the veterans community has had to suffer with four years. ..

this house committee on the benghazi attack hearing about to get under way. while we have a second we're going to take a chance and give yo

[no audio] friends, and the loved ones of those killed, we can never adequately express our condolences and our gratitude. [no audio]

[no audio] [no audio] >> we are experiencing technical problems with the audio. we are working to fix that. the house panel looked at the 2012 attack in benghazi. gregory starr testified about changes made to security at diplomatic post. the chairman is tray gowdy.

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>> again we apologize we are experiencing audio problems with this recording of today's benghazi hearing. we are going to start it over from another tape we have from the top. again the house panel today looking at the 2012 u.s. con consulate attack in benghazi. welcome. the chair will recognize himself and the ranking member for opening statements. without objection the opening

statement of any other member of the committee who wishes to provide one will be included in the record. a little over two years ago four americans serving in benghazi were killed. two of them were killed who they dared to fight back and defend themselves. the four soldiers represented us. they represented our country and our values. we ask them to go. we sent them. and they were killed because some people hold a deep seated animus toward us simply because we are us. so to the family and friends and loves ones of those killed week never adequately express our

gratitude as you have to the family and helped us each understand they were not just pictures on a television screen. they were sons and husbands and fathers and brother and friends and fellow americans. i remain hopefully there are some things left in our country that can rise above politics and i remain convinced our fellow citizens are entitled to all of the facts about what happened before, during and after the attacks in benghazi and they deserve an investigative process that is worthy of the memory of the four who were killed and worthy of the respect of our fellow americans. some question the need for this committee and i respect their right to decent. but the markup of character is to do a good job with a task

even if you don't think the task should have been assigned in the first place. and given the gravity of the issues at hand, i would rather run the risk of answering a question twice than run the risk of not answering it once. we know there are witnesses who have been examined in the past but for whom additional questions maybe warranted. i would ask each of my colleagues given their exceptional backgrounds to put their talent to use. the house of representatives formed this committee to find

all of the fact and i intend to do that and i will do it in a manner worthy of respect of our fellow citizens. they have expectations of us like protecting and defending those why send to represent us and expect us to move heaven and earth when those representing us come under attack. they expect government to tell us the truth in the aftermath of a tragedy always and expect we will not continue to make the same mistakes over and over and over again which brings us to this hearing. benghazi wasn't the first time our facility was attacked. after these attacks, groups come together and make recommendations on how to

prevent future attacks. that is the process that is followed. a tragedy or an attack comes. we commission a panel; a board, a blue ribbon commission to study the attack and make sure we make recommendations to ensure it never happens again but it does happen again. so to those who believe it is time to move on and there is nothing left to discover and that all of the questions have been asked and answers and we have learned of the lessons we need to learn we have heard that before. it is stunning to see the similarities between the recommendati recommendations made decades ago and the ones made by the arb. if you doubt that, i want you to compare those to the ones made a quarter century ago with the recommendation buys the benghazi

arb. we don't suffer from lack of recommendations. we do suffer from a lack of implementing and enacting those recommendations. that has to end. so it is appropriate to review the recommendations of the most recent arb and i commend our colleague in california for suggesting we do so. it is also fair to ask why we haven't done a better job of impleme implementing recommendations made a decade ago in some instances. why does it take an attack on the people or facilities to make a recommendation? why not evaluate the threat before the attack? why not anticipate rather than react? in conclusion the people we work for yearn to see the right thing done for the right reasons and in a right way. and they want to know that something can rise above the den

of partisan politics. they want to trust the institutions of government. to fulfill those who served and honor those who were killed maybe we can be what those four brave men were. neither republican or democrat. just americans in pursuit of the facts and justice no matter where that journey takes us. with that i recognize the ranking member from maryland. >> thank you, mr. chairman and i thank you for holding this hearing today. i know every member of the panel is dedicated to ensuring we honor the four americans killed in benghazi. their names must be etched in our memory banks.

chris stevens. sean smith. tyrone woods and glen dougherty. i want to thank our representative for proposing the topic of the hearing and mr. chairman i want to thank you for accepting that topic so that we can see what has become the of recommendations. today we have an opportunity to focus on reform. how can we learn from the past to make things better in the future? mr. chairman, i agree with you

that over the years recommendation after recommendations have been made. the question is what became of them as you said. i do believe in life there are transformational moments. that is something happens, it causes you to stop and pause, and try to figure out how to remedy the situation and make it better. and the problem is when those moments come, and they come to all of us, the question is is whether we pause, make things better, because usually if we don't, we repeat the errors and usually things get worse. and this is one such transformational moment. the kind of oversight that can be productive can be critical

and it can sometimes be tedious but it can also save lives. that is what we are talking about. that is why i want to thank every member of this panel for agreeing to do this. for we are about the business of trying to save lives. i hope we stay on the course of constructive reform and keep this goal as our north star. it will be a disservice to be loured off the path by partisan politics. today we will we review the recommendations of the accou accountability review board. the was chaired by the former

chairman of the joint chief of staff. the house oversight committee, chairman gowdy and i heard directly from both men about how seriously they took their roles. ambassador pickering called and and i quote "a dead of honor" their report was independent, it was a adopted by all board membs and a blistering examine of what went wrong at the state department. the state department issued his own report finding the department wasted no time and has been working on implementing recommendation for the past year and a half and congress can

ensure they finish the job. today i would like our witnesses to provide an update on the status of several of the board's recommendations. first the board found the department's response to the situation in benghazi was i quote inadequate and it was inadequate at the point in benghazi, at the embassy in tripoli and in washington. ambassador pickering states the post didn't take action despite several trip wires that should have caused them to review security and develop a stronger response. the board recommended the department change their procedure to make sure security breaches are reviewed immediately. today the department reports it created a new process that

requires post to report trip wires as soon as they are crossed so security officials review them immediately and take action if necessary. i want to know if this process is now fully operational. if so, how it has been working so far? the board also found we shouldn't have relied so heavy on the militia groups to protect our post. they call this misplace and found the security forces were "poorly skilled" the board recommended beyond traditional alliance of the force.

today the department reports it has 17 new marine security guard detachments and another unit to enhance security in changing threat environments. in addition, the state department is now using new funding from congress to hire a 151 new personal in the bureau of diplomatic security or ds. i want to hear from the witnesses about rather the actions are sufficient or we need to do more. the board found a deputy assistant second with ds who denied repeated request for additional security in benghazi. at the time this official oversaw the security of all 275 diplomatic post around the world. to address this problem the department created a new position to focus exclusively on the security needs of roughly 30

folks experiencing highest threats. the board praises this action stating that it can be and i quote a positive first step i o integrat integrated. today i want to hear from the state department specifically about how this new position is working and whether they believe we should make additional changes. everyone understands that dipl m diplomacy by its nature requires dangerous situation and diplomats work in high threat environments. we cannot eliminate every risk but must do everything we can to keep americans as safe as possible when they are serving overseas. with that i want to conclude by recognizing the sacrifices that are made every single day around the world by diplomatic core,

the intelligence community and our military service members on behalf of the american people. and i remind our colleagues this is our watch. this is bigger than us. the things we do today and over the next few months will have lasting effects even when we go on to heaven. that is how we have to look at this. we prepare for the present and the future and generations unborn. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, gentlemen from maryland. the committee will recognize and receive testimony from the panel. the first is greg starr. the assistant deputy of secretary of state. todd keil is the second and the third is mark sullivan the chair of the independent panel on best

practices. i am pleased to report that we have made tremendous progress on the 29 independent benghazi accountability review board recommendations.

to date, we have closed 22 would you >> would you pull the mike a little.

>> we are required to operate in dangerous places we identify the risks and take the proper steps to mitigate them. the department has made important strides in that regard. i would like to highlight a few examples of how we are implementing the recommendations including giving the resources they need. with this progress, it is still essential for us to acknowledge that while we can do everything we can to reduce the risk, we can never eliminate it fully. high threat, high risk post require special attention to con firm our national interest and require us to operate there and provide the right resources to do that. we have instituted a new process called the vital validation process. vp2 is the shorthand were the

program. we returned from the central african republic and the department suspended operations there in december of 2010. using the vp2 process and a support cell process the plans for how we go into the these operations, the department engaged in an analysis we can and we should go back. we worked at the department of defense to assess the security situation on the ground and develop a plan for our return. i am proud to report we deployed state department just last yick and the embassy is now open. we must monitor conditions on the ground but the return to the area shows our enhanced procedures are working. another example of the enhanced risk management is how we have improved training. chief of mission personal, including security professionals

and all foreign service personal are now better prepared for operating in high threat environments. we have increased the expanded training for the special agents who receive high threat training and we expanded what we call the counter threat course for foreign service colleagues that are going to all of the high threat post. and we are working toward making this training universal for foreign service personal and employees for all of our post overseas. further to combat fire we partnered with the new york city fire department and warfare department to enhance our training in smoke and fire as a terrorist weapon. with your help we added to the resources and expanded the number of diplomatic personal

and we did just that and are on the way to finishing off and hitting our targets. it recommended we augment the marine security guard program which we have done as well. these are just a few examples of the department's efforts post-benghazi they highlight some of the key progress we made. i will not outline everything but i am pleased to report we have made what i consider to be progress on the arb recomme recommendati recommendations and even are in progress or nearing completion. we are better prepared, better protected and informed to manage the risk. we look forward to working with congress and you onent eenti en sure there are platforms that are safe to carry out the

interest. i want to thank congress your support to improve and sustain this diplomatic pratform. ranking member cummings and distinguished members of the select committee for inviting me to testify today about our independent panel report on best practices in the aftermath of the tragic attack on the us mission in benghazi, libya, and our insight regarding the implementation of our recommendations and related issues relevant to our report. our panel was committed to identifying best practices from throughout the u.s. government, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and international partners which can which can finally establish an effective risk management process in the department of state, improve the security of u.s. diplomatic facilities abroad and enhance the safety of department of state and foreign affairs agencies'

personnel not only in high-risk areas, but globally. we identified 40 recommendations to achieve this goal. we continue to stand behind our report in the strongest possible terms, and believe that each of the 40 recommendations and the supporting narratives, which were derived from well-known and established best practices, provide a clear roadmap for security management enhancements throughout the department of state. mr. chairman and distinguished members, i spent a career of almost 23 years as a special agent with the bureau of diplomatic security in the department of state. as a result of my years of

service, i am uniquely familiar with the history and, most importantly, the operating culture both within the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. as our panel interviewed hundreds of people in the us and abroad, and gained valuable ground truth from our travel to 10 countries during our work, including numerous high threat locations, i couldn't have been more personally and professionally proud and heartened, and my fellow panel members were equally impressed, by hearing and witnessing the dedicated and admirable work of the men and women of the diplomatic security service. every day around the world, the ds team faces extreme challenges and unpredictable risks to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of u.s. foreign policy, and they do so with distinction. the men and women of the bureau of diplomatic security are truly dedicated public servants and are owed the gratitude of the american people for their service to our great nation. as we state repeatedly throughout our report, best practices will not save lives unless they are resourced, implemented and followed. almost 14 years ago, a number of very similar

recommendations were made after the east african embassy bombings and little has been accomplished by the department since then to improve its approach to risk management. while we are pleased our report has finally been officially released by the state department, along withan implementation fact sheet, we are disappointed with the decision not to implement recommendations 1 and 13. in meeting earlier this year with deputy secretary higginbottom and assistant secretary starr, we were encouraged by their candor and support for our recommendations and their stated intent to adhere to the recommendations in our report. in light of the long history of such reports and recommendations to the department of state, and with a continuing sense of responsibility, we voiced our concerns in a recent letter to deputy secretary higginbottom, both for those recommendations not implemented and those that apparently rely on pre-benghazi processes and procedures to demonstrate or achieve implementation. clear the smoke and remove the

mirrors, now is the time for the department of state to finally institutionalize some real, meaningful and progressive change. words and cursory actions by the department of state ring hollow absent transparency, and verifiable and sustainable actions to fully put into practice the letter and the intent of our recommendations, which will facilitate diplomacy and safeguard the selfless americans who carry out our national security priorities around the world. the department of state owes it to those people who have given their lives in service to our country and to those employees who continue to serve our country in some very dangerous locations around the world to continue to identify and implement risk management best practices. finally, we urge the department to institutionalize the process of outside and independent counsel on risk management best

practices sooner than 2016. the accountability review board recommended that this be an annual process, and we concur that this remains a critical need of the department and should begin as soon as possible. in our view, this is a decisively important step the department must take to demonstrate transparency and insure a continuing dialogue on security best practices with and input from outside, independent experts regarding operating in high threat and challenging international locations. thank you very much, mr. chairman. i will like to introduce another person in the audience, mr. ray. he is the example of a distinguished american. >> mr. sullivan you are

recognized for fibmns. >> good morning chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and distinguished committee members. thank you for your invitation to appear here today to discuss the department of state's implementation of the recommendations made by the independent benghazi accountability review board (arb), as well our panel with and -- our panel and staff have a combined appearance of 75 years of law enforcement expertise. during our careers, each panel member as gained an understanding of the importance of having clear lines of leadership in an organiizational structure. we learn things don't go as planned and when they don't it

is vital to implement instructions so it doesn't happen again. the panel report reflects the news of the panel based on our professional judgment, experience and analysis of the best practices informed boy interviews, travel and extensive research. it was a pleasure to serve with the dedicated group and i app c appreciate the professionalism and hard work. i would like to acknowledge and thank all of those interviewed in the course of drafting the report from the u.s. government, private sector, international organizations and foreign governments. the best practice panel was the result of the accountability review board for benghazi that recommended the department of state establish a panel of outside experts in appearance --

experiences -- of high risk behaviors to identify threats in high-risk, high-threat post. our report provided 40 recommendations in 12 areas. they are organization and management, accountability, risk management, program criticality and acceptable risk, planning and logistics, lessons learned, training and human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and security assessment, program resource and technology, post nations and guard force capability enhancement, regular evaluation and change management leadership and communication and training. it was the opinion of the panel,

all 40 recommendations would further stregthen the department's ability to protect its personal and work on a global platform to achieve american policy goals and objectives. the goals were realistic, achievable and measurable. the panel delivered its final report to the department of state and of the 40 recommend eg eggs -- recommendations we offered, 38 were accepted. 30 were implemented and the other two are going. the ones not taken were the department should have a strategy for diplomater of

security and waivers for standards should only be pride provided to mitigate measures. advised by the department of state and as informed boy the department risk management model. the best practice panel looks across the wide spectrum of private and non-government organizations to identify and enhance and provide safe environment for employers and programs. the panel found men institutions, including government, refer to the department of state and bureau of security as the gold standard of security and seeks to model their service after the model of dip all lomatic security. the panel continues to advocate the way forward will provide

framework that enhances the departibili department's department department's aability to meet the needs. one certainty we share is the effort that is needed to ensure the safety and security of all-american lives. we must honor and protect the citizens were were lost as a result of violent attacks with dig nity and respect. i would like to thank the department of state and the bureau and the support they provided to their panel. i would like to thank chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings and members of the select

committee for inviting us here in the continued effort to keep america safe. >> the chair recognizes ms. brooks for her questionings. >> i would like to start out by thanking each panel member to being here. you dedicated your careers whether it is protecting the president or those at homeland security and i would like to thank you for that work. in preparing for today i looked at the department of state's website and learned there are reports and i am certain you are aware since the 1970's there have been over 500 attacks on our diplomatic facilities abroad in over 92 countries. from 1998 to december of 2013,

there were 366 attacks against personal and facilities. these include things like rocket attacks, fire bombings, attempted murder, arson, take p overs and vandalism. in 1970 the state started accountability review boards and there have been 19 arb's since that time. as i understand it is the mission of the arb's to review only the most significant attacks against our diplomatic personal and review specifically security and intelligence and whether or not government employees breach their duties. as the chairman and the ranking member brought up, in the east african bombings in 1998. 12 americans were killed and the rest were africans and an arb

was convened and they made several recommendations there. this followed a panel 14 years before the east african arb and many of those findings were found in east africa in their arb. at the time the then secretary of state accepted all of the recommendations and now here we're 14 years later and the same recommendations have been repeat bide the benghazi arb. we seem to have a state department with repeat recommendations but i think there is a significant difference between recommendation and implementation and i would like to talk about how that happens and has happened. in fact, the board in east africa urged the second of state to quote take a personal and active role in carrying about

the safety of the personal abroad. it was essential to convey to the department that security was one of the highest priorities. secretary starr, are you familiar with the east african recommendations? >> not every specific recommendation but with the report. >> do you agree with the report? >> yes. >> are you aware that after the benghazi arb was put in the hands of the deputy secretary. are you familiar with that? >> yes, i am. that was in fact to her letter to john kerry at the time. she indicated the deputy

secretary would be overseeing the arb implementation? are you familiar with that? and when secretary kerry became secretary of state he kept it at the deputy level. is that correct? could you speak to the mike? thank you. >>ia yes, ma'am. >> overall responsibility for implementation of the recommendations is with an office known as management policy right sizing innovation. is that correct? one of 11 separate offices that report to the under secretary of management. >> mpri is tracking. they are not responsible for implementing but they are doing the job of tracking the impleme implementation. it is their job >> i would like to point out for those not familiar and you too are an assistant secretary

reporting to the under secretary of management. is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> you say they are tracking the implementation but that office is going in and trying to ensure that all of those recommendations are being followed. is that correct? >> one office, yes. >> and so at this point the arb recommendations, which are not at the secretary of state level, it is not at the deputy secretary of state level -- the secretary level, it isn't with an undersecretary but the tracking is happening at the 4th tier. the tracking and making sure day in and day out is on 4th tier. >> i can give you further information about how it is being looked at by the deputy secretary herself. >> and the deputy secretary -- are you familiar with the inspector general's report, sir?

>> yes, i am. >> and the inspector general who issued the report in 2014 also believed at the highest level of the department, those are the individuals who must be personal responsible for ovseeing the recommendations. isn't that correct? >> yes, it is. >> and indicated in the report that is how culture change would happen is if implementation was at the highest levels of the department. i would like to ask mr. keli, where a security function is placed in a department is a statement of how that organization values security and personal. do you recall that finding? >> yes, ma'am, very well. >> can you please explain with respect to recommendation number

one, which hasn't been implemented by the department, can you at least talk about the importance of that recommendation of elevating the importance of mr. starr's position to a higher level. can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation and why you understand the department isn't elevating the department. >> the culture at the department of the state is burpimportant a the placement of that position

was important. mr. starr was at the united nations and in charge of that department safety and security and he was an undersecretary there. the united nations recognized that diplomatic world where you see things really matters. ma'am, if you would look at recommendation number 40, we recommended that the secretary should establish a comprehensive change strategy throughout the department that is led by the deputy secretary of management. those things come together. >> in your view, the best practice, when looking at the organization, it was your view that overall security was too low on the chart. is that right? >> from a visual and operational standpoint. mr. sullivan was trying to find

the diplomatic of security and i had to point him further down the chart until it was identified. >> and it might not just be where it is placed on the chart v v visually it has to do with command and control? >> yes and informed decision making >> that requires you to move up within the organization to get approval for things you would like to do. is that correct? >> yes, of course. >> i would like to wrap up briefly with mr. sullivan. you have led a large federal agency, the secret service, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> you understand the span of control. so with respect for the need to leave lasting cultural change in an organization which is what i believe the panel is going to try to lead and do, where does that need to start?

>> it needs to start at the top, i think. >> that would be the secretary of state so if you want to emphasis the importance of security, the deputy secretary or the undersecretary, which are considered principles in the department and that is the highest levels. is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> do you have other comments you would plulike to make in response to mr. keli's statement? >> there are important and critical functions going on and it is personal and budget procurement. i believe there maybe 21 assi assistsent secretary reporting. and this wasn't about an upgrade

in title. i don't care what the title is. i just think there needs to be a direct report up to my former position and i maybe bias but i reported directly to the secretary. we had the deputy secretary of the fbi on our panel and the fbi reported to the attorney general. we believe that is the way this should be structured. internally and externally it tells people where security is thought to be and the importance of security. but again this wasn't about an upgrade in title. it was about clarity of who was in charge of security. >> thank you. chairman now recognizes the gentlemen from washington. mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. we talked about process and who is in charge and obviously the first recommendations go and we can review who was in charning

and moving around who was and should be responsible. but i want to focus on what should be done regardless of who it is and who is in charge of it. the challenge i see as i travelled around to world to different post i am awed and amazed of the risks the people in the state department take every day. i went to an embassy in pakistan and hearing the person talking about going back and forth to work and the security involved. we are in a lot of dangerous places throughout the world and most of the people in the state department i talk to take a certain amount of pride. it is their job to go into tough places and make sure american interest are protected and watched over. but the question is how do you protect this? what have we learned about what you can specifically do,

forgeting for the moment of who is in charge of doing it, to enhance security at high-risk post? how do you identify the high-risk post and once you identify one what do you do? how do you then try to enhance security and make sure people are protected and if you could tie that back into what played out in benghazi -- i don't think there was any question people view that as a high-risk post, what should have happened as a result of the identification but didn't? and how to you approach them now versus in the past? >> we have always rank ordered our post according to threat. the threat of terrorism and civil disorder. this is done with input from the

post itself, the emergency members on the post and we rank order them and give them rating for terrorism and civil disorder and things like crime and counter intelligence and technical intelligence. >> the real key question is then what? once you identify how do you try to better protect? >> he worked with the overseas security board to craft standards and physical standards and technical security standards and procedure standards on what we can do at the post on the different threat levels. once we decide and see a post is in the highest threat or critical threat category we are going to devote more rso's and look at the size of the marine detachment. in terms of the post and the

security and it plays a huge role when we decide which ones to rebuild under the cost sharing program and prioritize replacing the most vulnerable post with newer and safer facilities we build with funding from congress and overseas office and buildings. we look at the threat and we make determinations now in the aftermath and we categorized our 30 highest risk post. we continue to look at the threat information from over post around the world. we start at 8 a.m. and look at

the threats we get. one of the critical lessons we learned from benghazi and we don't get specific threat information before an attack. if we did we would thwart the attack. congressman brooks talked about the attacks we suffered over the years. that is the document we put out to ensure people know what the environment is. we look at the threats and determine what we have to do. we have been practicing risk management. we play close the post for a concern amount of days. there are times we ask them to augment the protection on the ground. in tripoli we had nearly a hundred marines with us. we look at what is happening in the post overseas and try to make sure we are aware of

whatever intelligence is out there and try to make sure we are fully aware of the larger, instability question of what that means to us and put the right resources to the right place and take the right steps. >> as a result of the arb in this specific instance, what did you learn specifically about benghazi? what should have been done there that wasn't? >> sir, our focus wasn't to evaluate what happened in benghazi. our focus was to come up with the best practices and we became aware of things that did happen in benghazi. this maybe a way of answering your questions -- when we met with the assistant secretary and met as panel, we determined we would take the approach from a tactical approach to a more strategic approach. we recognized that they didn't

need us what kind of weapons or firearm equipment to get. we needed to approach this from a strategic perspective. i think one of the things you see in any type of situation when things go bad is communication. i think this comes down to communication. we made recommendations under planning and logistics. we made four different ones there. i believe for any type of trip, whether it be to benghazi or wherever you go, there has to be a plan, logistics and a good job of risk management. obviously there was a communication breakdown for that visit to benghazi. i think it was mentioned there were numerous trip wires. in that spring starting in march of 2012 and going up until july or august of 2012 there are numerous incidences occurring in benghazi.

i think one of them moved out benghazi. the british moved out and that needed to be discussed. ... of benghazi. that needed to be communicated. that needed to be discussed. they needed to talk about what were the mitigating measures they were going to take to protect our people at that mission? and again, i think that unfortunately, four people paid the price. because that communication didn't occur and that planning and logistics quite frankly didn't happen the way we were recommending it should occur. and which i have ever confidence that assistant secretary starr and his staff are working on right now. >> do you want to add something on that? >> i think, congressman, the first question is it's not about how many people you send, how many walls you build. and the first question has to be, and that's where we change from a tactical approach to a strategic approach. the first question has to be, do

we need to be there? do we need to be in benghazi? and the department lacks a risk management process to make those informed decisions. do we need to be in those places? do the risks -- are the risks less than the national security priorities or the policy gains? the department does not have the process to determine do we need to be there and do we need to stay? that's the center and the heart of our report. the department needs that process. not just give them more people. not just give them more guns. if the national security priorities outweigh the risks, fine. then go. there's nothing wrong with that. we're not saying don't go. but you need a risk management process, which the department lacks to make those determinations. >> congressman, my good friend todd kyle here. could i just say, perhaps it should be past tense. lacked as opposed to lacks. this is one of the things that we've concentrated on most over the past two years.

it is the heart of the vital presence validation process. >> and talk about that. the chairman talked at the outset of the necessity of this panel. but we've done that with a >> >> the department's acceptance, not just acceptance but embracing the concept first and foremost, that was just alluded to, we need to ask the question why are we in the most dangerous place? and 30 places we identified the highest risk, that is exactly what you're doing going through those 30 with the validation process. what is our national interest for being there?

why should we have that high risk posed? if the answer comes out the risk does not it show we should be there as a national interest than we make decisions for additional security. >> in the last year we have pulled out of post as a result of that process correct? >> not as a result of that process that is a long-term strategic process but there risk management and of principles exactly. we have pulled out or close to post. >> the chair will now recognize the gentleman from kansas. >> you said recently there was no immediate tactical warning about the incident before benghazi? correct? >> said that is might in their standing. >> it is often your experience there is the immediate tactical warning?

mcfadyen is true. >> so your opening statement did not talk about findings 21 or 22? so if you don't have that threat analysis right if you don't, the right intelligence would you agree with that? >> yes. but i would say eight you have to look at the entire situation in the country. and there is the incredibly the deteriorating situation around benghazi? >> that situation was deteriorating. finding number 21 said careful attention should be paid and and it has is

addressed the recommendation. what is the you have done to address the recommendation? >> i can discuss part of that in open session but as i alluded to earlier we start every morning 8:00 a.m. looking at intelligence and the threats that come in from a wide variety of sources. beyond that we bring in personnel from the regional bureaus that are with us not just to locate at the threat intelligence in many cases we don't pick up the threat. >> i don't want to do in a raft but is this different pre-or post? benefices different. we are looking at the political reporting in

addition to the intelligence reporting and looking as sources from private companies from ngos but the entire question of instability what is that overall flat profile? in a much better job of looking at the threat situation as opposed to whether or not we know if there is a specific threat to. >> after all incidents you were not doing that before september 11, 2012 or before those findings? >> i think we're doing it better than we were before. >> if any of these changes would make an impact? were we doing those before that date? >> it is hard for me to say i was that united nations at that time. at the u.n. as under

secretary general we were aware of the deteriorating situation. of the date of the attack september 11, 2012 i still had u.n. personnel in benghazi as well. >> changing topics. with the findings of the best practices panel that the state department had not interviewed of the special mission. is that still the case? >> the agents were interviewed by the fbi and diplomatic security. >> was the panel and director word did you conduct these the interviews afterwards? >> there were done prior to best practices panel. we had discussed tactics but we had not fully debrief them with the incident

because we have the fbi three o touche. >> it is important to know what they saw the crowd that night and those also the brother that night but the department of state at that point. >> a hesitate to say all the people that we thought those that were relevant. >> where they conducted individually or in groups or were they group in declined interviews? to begin the bitterly. >> because they did conduct group interviews i have seen them in business before where the boss sits around they're not as candid as they might be if they were in the situation independently so free try to see what is sufficient is

important to know the basis so they conducted those individually? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. >> the references to the inspector general's report it indicated to secretaries of state have asked the question if it was as efficient process is a capable to handle investigations. do you think it is sufficient to make this transition for good policy going forward? >> there are limitations with the law that establishes the arm especially with a complex catastrophic incident with significant limitations but it clearly impacts their effectiveness.

>> in finding 23 goes to a the capacity to recommend disciplinary action of the unsatisfactory leadership that you are prepared to help us so they can do that? are you prepared to you testified that it does have the ability to make sure the leaders are held accountable for any errors they have made? >> yes, sir. we have been looking at this to working with congress since january 2013. man also say that while the arb to much get everything but that we recommended consider to put together a best practices panel to delve into the specifics proves the arb can go beyond what they can do that is a good example of the fact

while it may not have that exact expertise recommendations can be made. >> i appreciate that sees saying it is important that arb can have action against senior leaders? >> it already has the ability if they find their breach of duty but now we're looking for a lack of leadership. >> i know mr. starr you were not on that i want to make sure real understand precisely the you know, if the arb could interview caa contractors who might know something about the security that evening? >> a do not know the answer. >> have they had a chance about the security situation on the ground? >> i will not go through the

rest i think is important but do you have a chance to review any of the intelligence gathered from the capture if you too could incorporate that into your it is? >> we are aware of these debriefings of the material that is relevant to take the proper steps based on what we find. >> i yield back. >> the chair will recognize the gentleman from maryland. >> mr. starr i want to pick up where ms. brooks left off how does the department track its compliance with the benghazi arb recommendations?

>> she is correct the office that actually does the tracking as we go through these but i can tell you i have had many meetings with the deputy secretary of myself and anyone that has anything to do with a response of a particular answer or best practices panel we have sat with the deputy secretary and have gone through every single recommendation. where are we? how have we answered? how far into implementation are we? we have these meetings about every other month but literally she has been on top of this since the beginning. >> you said there were seven arb recommendations not

completed? >> we're still in progress toward nearing completion on seven but not totally fulfilled. >> do you have a timeline on those? >> some of those are what i would refer to as evergreen recommendations. one was for better of language training. since that time we work specifically to platitude courses together in arabic or french courses they are shorter but specific touche rating agency in the language capabilities they need in the short period of time and courses are in place but the reality is it will take a long time as agents get ready to rotate to get them trained so that is the recommendation that will be open for a long time

>> but all of them are? >> many of them are evergreen but some will be closed in 2015. >> this is where i go. i have seen over and over again that departments will come then they wait there is no checking up, a new congress comes in the next thing you know, it has not been done. we want to be effective and efficient. this is the moment we have to take a vantage of. of those seven fellows that you know, can be done in a definite amount of time, it

can you give us a timetable on those so while we are a committee can hold the department accountable? is that a reasonable request ? to make i think is. whether or not or lavabo we can provide the information on those recommendations with the implementation panel. i would say no doubt in my mind we will implement every one of the recommendations. the one question is if we have been. one exercise was to review every single recommendation made since 1988. the office that has tracked these they went through every recommendation in the past been the office will

track these in the future as well. i can understand some hesitancy if wage ragis out and i can assure you that we will make sure every single recommendation is fulfilled. >> then recommend we only are here for so long. in the place we are in for a season it could come in all kinds of ways. that is why the under our watch what i want some definite time tables so we can hold the somebody accountable. otherwise we go through this over and over again. can you were understand what i am saying?

you just gave me information alibi to add to your list. pep there are crucial thing is we have been looking at from 1988 you are working on , going back to the significant ones that you have not been able to complete so we can have a time table with that? >> the most important thing we can do coming out of this, i promised the father of tyrone would he ask one question in by the way every family that we talked to said the same thing. make it safer for somebody in the future. are you with me? >> yes, sir. i am. >> will you come back? how much time do you need for what i just asked for? >> let me work through this

i will try to give you the answers as soon as possible. >> 45 days? >> absolutely. >> we can talk about this but it may be appropriate later for us to have a hearing just on the progress that has been made. that is the chairman's decision that we need to make sure we stay on top of this arb found the tripwires touche trigger reviews and responses were too often treated as indicators of threat rather than a mechanism of serious mismanagement decisions and action. the committee on intelligence came to a similar conclusion. that there were tripwires to prompt a reduction of

personnel or suspension of operations in benghazi and although there is evidence they had been crossed but they continue with minimal change. as a result arb recommended the state department revised guidance to require key officers to perform in depth tripwires. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> in response the state department said up the tripwires committee but the purpose of this enemy is to review the tripwires to help insure that the bridge and - - regional bureaus in the environments, who is on the committee? >> representatives from bureaus in this chair that of the operations center.

of the biggest single change is then passed years the tripwires was something of the post itself would put that as the emergency action plan and determine what action they did to be made. but at this point the major change in the time it crosses a tripwire has to be reported to washington at that point it will review what tripwire was costing you look at the implications to make decisions on what should happen. there may have already made the decision but this is a new review from the washington level as well with the much greater degree on action if a tripwire is crossed. >> can you give me an example?

>> i would say they're not just security concerns but the activities of the ukraine recently. at the beginning of the zero misheard activities it was clear there was civil disorder in the city the post reported tripwires were crossed for instability and insecurity and decisions were made to remove our dependents and nonessential personnel and tell the situation had ceased and wreckage -- rectified itself with the reverse tripwires then the mayor made the decision to return after that situation and did --

and did. >> i look forward to receiving via affirmation and we requested. >> the chair recognizes the gentleman from georgia. >> mr. starr arb found systematic failure in the security of posture in benghazi. that it was inadequate for the special mission compound. three days after the attack we were told it was the temporary mission facility but now it is called the special commission and compound? is there a reason for the terminology to revolve? >> as it was neither a day embassy nor consulate or agency but some of my

adieu:the temporary remission facility? >> that is the right definition i wide gas. >> they had hired the blue mountain in to do screening of any visitors. >> my a and dash did they is the contract with the blue mountain securities company with the agreements with the 17th militia. >> given the absence of the security that is the best that they could do senate who is responsible for vetting these contractors for these facilities?

>> in terms of contract and performance? >> normally they have the zero bin competition process and it is the function given to a swiss specific requirements from congress from local and competition to can pick it began to contingency situations like we find there is probably very little. >> was this the lowest priced bitter? >> i was not there at the time. >> were you aware to contracts in tripoli were.

>> and i have read reports of that. >> in the in your distinguished career coverage you ever remember recommending a service not be used and i was familiar with it and then being hired over your protest your recommendations? >> nine in my experience. >> i you would have recommended somebody? was it your job to look at the performance they were aware of? >>'' as we have drug contracts we have a variety of ways that we can find they're not performing if they cannot perform the

contract they could be barred if it goes that far civic you had mentioned february 17 to that of martyrs brigade we were told that was whole company security. is that true? binnacle would hesitate to call that host country's security of might have had some control but this is based on what i have read from the of reports. >> is there in individual responsible for insuring the 17th brigade was responsible in dependable? >> sir, i was not there at

the time that i could probably tell you is that there were likely limited choices. and we would try to make the best of the situation that was he ended. >> with that february brigade? >> if not up to the levels he wanted, he would engage in to assist they understand the guard orders to have the capabilities. >> and they were hired there was an attack inside the compound, who would have that contact information and who is responsible to protect that brigade of murders -- marchers? >> i was not here at the

time that the of four personnel on the compound had telephone communication with their own groups that agent. >> with their own groups? >> with other personnel in the group. and there was communication on the part of the operations center making phone calls and those made from the annexes. >> with those tripwires the foreign affairs handbook says it is a handbook that set in motion and to set harm to the post the personnel the u.s. citizen in community or other u.s. national interest than to him the "booknotes" win a trip wire yvette and joker's it requires an action be

taken. are you familiar with that? >> yes, sir,. >> it is my interest than they are preplanned and preapproved measures to be taken in light of us period - - superior incident or a threat. >> true. as it emphasizes opposed to have tripwires? to make as it? yes. >> when it tripwire is breached it is the trigger to take specific action. is it not? >> add a minimum a warning that the post must review what has occurred and determine if an action needs to be taken at a minimum. >> rather than just require we sit around and reevaluate the situation? >> tripwires are written in

advance and we tried to cover a wide variety of situations that could occur. predicting a the future is very difficult the purpose is to indicate that something has just happened to this could be significant we need to consider if we need to take action. it was up post activity but now if it is stripped it is looked at by the post in various sections of washington. >> would you consider a whole blood in the perimeter wall of the temporary admission facility a tripwire? >> certainly that is a good indicator. >> that the event should have caused some action your discussion.

correct? >> yes, sir,. >> would an attack on another diplomat coming into a benghazi cause in the country to pullout is that a tripwire? >> we are referring to the attack on the british ambassador? >> i am. >> i think it is an indication of security problems and instability. >> those were two you would consider significant. would you not? >> yes, sir. >> what was done with the security after those two tripwires were tripped? been the guy was not here at the time. i have read the report and i am aware they were increasing the physical security and engaged to build a safe haven inside

and in treating with the cards and has run drills and from what i read the ted siftings he would do in his situation if they would deteriorate. >> thank you for your testimony and for being here and let's hope we can get results out of this tragic event civic said chair recognizes the gentleman from california. >> thanks for working with us to put together witnesses and follow-up via recommendations. i appreciate it better and also serve from the state of foreign operations and

effectively with foreign services officers here in washington and around the world they and many have described the benghazi fact. by that they referred to said chalk clay and security that many feel they cannot fulfil of their mission and are not allowed to undertake things they think it is necessary. this sentiment is best expressed by the vice president does the collective response to written to make us less knowledgeable in less effective and less influential with u.s. government itself spee mcfadyen is a question in mr. stevens might have

passed and if you could share your feelings and the recommendations had to read make sure we don't prevent people from doing fair to in and as my colleague pointed out of our facilities have been attacked led to the hundreds of times. it will happen and that we want them to be effective. so if you treat each but is that benghazi effect undermining the people of the ability to do their work ? >> congressman you go to the heart of the question of risk-management and how to reemployment it? >> over many years with the support of congress we have made great strides to build a free and secure facilities so in an attack of a facility that could hurt

everybody with one attack, we have done great things and if you look at the number of attacks and how few have been successful most have been driven off with casualty's by security personnel leave make great strides the we cannot lock people inside indices the we have to get out money to understand that our highest threat highest risk post we have the bill security and it is the most restrictive for the foreign service personnel. we have to have the security programs in place that means protecting its security details and an end security surpluses. every day we've run

motorcade's didn't of iraq or cheerfully we would it take their risk but every single day we will judge what that was persons the need to get out to make sure we could balance those risks and not getting people out for good reasons. they have to be important. woolworth brett will post operating round of world with a school security but people get out every single day. and preening informational and back and you don't do that without talking to people. all of the efforts that we are the highest rent and highest risk posed. rich richer we're doing what we can but if it is to

dangerous and not taking it seriously enough we room that be fair or if the threat is it too high a and said we need to weigh every single day. i dissent make in the up with one of the open economy and go to a coffee shop. but still even in this highest replications. >> that is the issue as much as they relate to be accompanied by a spouse is. with they have expressed to me is they cannot take the meetings they won at the places they need to have the context to couldn't pay the u.s. position they cannot do

their job because they are confined to with the hyper conservative point of view from back in washington and did you get that feed back? and are there any situations you feel the pressure is such to be so risk avoidance we do not allow people to do their job? >> that the immediate aftermath after benghazi there is a deeper appreciation of that attack and the pendulum may have swung the other way. today with the systems we have put in place with those resources that you give us the would not agree with that statement. we need to take certain precautions but i talked with the ambassador when we read in tripoli and the

ambassador about whether pre-are doing the things we're doing and they said yes. it is the right balance. >> one of the problems in benghazi was the local militia to provide security are their of their places today where you feel we place the over reliance on local militia for security of our facilities? >> that was something we talked a lot about and the fact you go into a situation like that to look at the capability and no matter where you go you have to come up with a valuation. if you don't have that will word capability and will not resolve that. it goes back to

risk-management so you have to bring them in yourself and i cannot speak to has the man who doesn't that when you looked at the reaction but even leading up to that there were trip wires. that was the concern and i go back but i go back to that capability. >> first of all, one of the recommendations to start with refers started with the panel we thought we would look at the issues to build bunkers and higher walls and realize that is not the answer to facilitate diplomacy to look at the overseas post and risk management.

we asked ambassadors to tell us about the state department risk management process in without exception they said there is none and they make it up. so the inmate -- they might make progress is a concern as you indicated foreign service is a dangerous business we have to do these priorities but under a risk management process that is transparent. >> now the gentleman from ohio. >> 70 years experience no's the security field? >> approximately 30. >> county in the state department? >> almost 23. >> did you get good reviews? >> yes, sir. >> so good in fact, you were

put on security detail to protect the secretary of state? >> yes madeleine albright. >> so two of them and also assist the secretary of homeland security? that is the appointment from the obama administration? bin the kisser. >> you trustor agents? >> implicitly they have the best perspective they know what is going on with their instincts they put their lives on the line just like you did. when they make a recommendation you take that seriously. >> yes i once been a pretty familiar with the guys on the ground repeatedly asked for additional security and were repeatedly denied? >> yes, sir, from what we saw. >> routinely denied this is out of control. we need more good guys and repeated the denied and it was worse than that?

because they said we need more about what they had was reduced. accurate? >> yes. >> we heard from the colonel on the ground who said we were fighting a losing battle we cannot even keep lovely had. >> we're the united states of america and i guess is every facility the security people would say we can use of a few more folks but wasn't that situation somewhat unique? >> looking at that intelligence reporting and the numerous incidents, yap i would prioritize it. >> are pg attacks on the british ambassador this is as bad as it gets the state department said no. we will reduce what you have if you were an agent would you have lobbied for more

help to come to benghazi? >> would be frustrating pushing every button. >> looked around you get the request from the skies on the ground would you have fought to make that happen? >> actually my position for their regional bureau betting those requests from the field that would put the certificate amount of parity >> if you had that job. >> you would have went to bat for them. >> yes, sir,. >> mr. keil what is the overseas security policy board? >> is us genesis for the beirut embassy bombings the interagency bore that creates physical security and technical security and procedural security. >> user standards developed

interagency. >> the state department these days. >> as a result from the embassy bombing in beirut? >> yes, sir,. >> where the standards followed at the benghazi facility? >> we sought of love that authorize the opening of the mission have referred to as the special mission compound as it was a purposeful standards. >> but there is a waiver process you have to follow. was it? >> that was a recommendation when you don't follow the standards the new don't have that either. >> what is your overall impression of the arb report? >> mr. sullivan and i testified before a the oversight committee and

ambassador pickering said arb is fiercely independent that admiral moment it committed to reform he was reporting on proceedings to the senior staff of the state to permit outside of the precept to be a number of the arb. that is no one's definition of being fiercely independent. >> win the secretary clinton and they called and asked to serve and they're interviewed or when they get a draft report before it goes public a could edit before the rest of the world sees it and when admiral lynch told the committee think about this coming he is on the job a few jay is -- days the co-chair of the

independent arb he interviews charlene and discovers two days later she is on the oversight committee that she will not be a good witness. so he gets on the phone to call the chief of staff to say charlene will not be a good witness she will not reflect well on the state department saying give us the heads up to the person he was supposed to be investigating of course, it was the independent we asked mr. baldwin why do you care if it is a better bad witness it is sure job to get to the truth not to give a headset to the state department sell anything but independent. one good thing came out of it in my judgment they created the best practices panel that you sat on andy made recommendations.

40 of them summer more important than others? connected creation for a diplomatic security is the most important and in our summary reset one clear overarching recommendation that is sustainable of all of them is the creation of the under secretary. >> is that the first one? >> number one most of the other is hidden john that recommendations been making a service break to give accountability and responsibility to one person at the state department? >> to identify those to give accountability and responsibility. is this the first and nine this has been put forward? >> no. our panel was a bit surprised from 15 months ago

that was signed after the bombings to order the creation of another for a diplomatic security. >> it was created after americans for killed in beirut that was not followed. recommendation from madeleine albright, the lady that you protected that we need an undersecretary after the african bombings and the sea that was not followed. the state department will implement this at all? >> they will not. >> they will not? my question is simple what will it take? what will it take for the state department to put in place to save american lives? they didn't listen to those on the ground in this situation if anybody looks we need more americans. they did not follow their own best interests in did

not deviate and now they're not following the best practices panel number one recommendation. what will it take? the ranking members said this is a transformational moment because somebody better tell the state department because i hope they get it that the one thing is but everything else hinges on talk about the arrogance of the state department so hopefully one of the things this committee can do is convince them of that. thank you for your service we appreciate your work on

the best practices spaniel -- panel said in a castle's questions to the state department. >> you can ask them that question. >> requesting my time you are welcome to do that mr. chairman i thank you spent a lot of time on mr. starr bet those who have 30 years of experience appointed by the obama administration but he is on the protective detail for albright and christopher d. kiddy sure 10 minutes a liver witness you want you can handle that this is your hearing. i yield back. >> now we recognize mr. sanchez. >> thank you to all the witnesses for joining us for what i hope me a forward looking hearing on what can be done and what is

currently done and what we have yet to do to prevent a tragedy of thank gauzy happening again or to minimize the potential and i will begin my questions in the same realm. talk about the framework within the department of state the best practices panel determine accountability at every level to be fundamental for security management within an organization. the panel recommended the development of the framework. is that correct? >> yes man. >> in response to that recommendation and the department created a security accountability framework that was explained clearly defines the key

actors and government mechanisms. kim you please describe their responsibilities at each leadership level? >> the first leadership level starts with secretary of state the secretary of acknowledges he is ultimately responsible for personnel over sees. but the person who does the next framework is me and i would have to say we looked long and hard at the recommendation whether they're needed to be undersecretary or assistant secretary. was a recommendation by the panel and the department looked at this very seriously in and raid the points to make the decision was probably a more important if i had direct

access to the secretary that was necessary. under the accountability framework we have modified to lie and reportable to the secretary for security threat information but i do still report to undersecretary of management. that is key because isolated and alone diplomatic security would not have the capabilities with the management bureau but i just want to put that on the record it talks about all of us are responsible for security but it designs levels of the deputy secretary and political affairs in the most important things that run

the regionals perot in to lew assign responsibilities to reflect the security responsibilities this is all within the accountability framework and one critical thing we cannot do the security of us every officer understand say have of rule in their own security as well. >> so that was communicated down the framework? >> yes. >> the state department employees have a clear understanding of the chain of command for security decisions? >> it is always clear running for of the dippy achieve emissions so it was

always clear over sees with this document goes a long way it puts it into a clear framework. >> going back to the number one recommendation about creating a different position been explained that thought making process. to make you responsible for security spinnakers than four rasta i am responsible whether the assistant secretary on saree undersecretary position. of the department looked at this to a different sayings the under secretary has additional responsibilities over one focus on the range

of things that they do one thing fe made sure that this position had the access they need and that i was not diverted from the security role by a other duties. my predecessor was the assistant secretary for a diplomatic security and chief of overseas foreign missions. what we did in the aftermath of benghazi was to separate those functions now there is an ambassador i am not distracted by that rule i focus exclusively on securities. >> i appreciate that answer. do you think the new framework clearly defines

accountability and responsibility for security? >> we have not been fully briefed but from what i have heard it is the great star but clearly people do have to know what is in charge and how the employees feel from around the world to let them know they're valued and supported in the people making decisions are accountable to those decisions they are making. >> to talk about temporary staffing the security officers contributed to pour security at this facility. the reform committee found

for example, their role is on temporary duty assignments but there for short periods the review board concluded the utilization a temporary assigned agents was problematic and their short-term transitory nature of benghazi staffing was another driver from the inadequacy it security platform it was insufficient considering the high risk in high-tech environment it was knowledge in reaching capacity which could not be overcome by talent and hard work alone although the board found ample evidence. that is the of recommendation and 120 days for a temporary duty assignments. but mr. starr you have held

the number of positions including a regional security officer. . . >> it is critical. your first 30 days on the ground, you are just trying to figure out where you are, how things are operating, where the threats are. we absolutely concur with that recommendation of taking steps to ensure that the personnel we put on the ground are there for longer periods of time. >> and has the department been able to achieve those requirements in its practice? >> yes, it has. the fact is we don't actually have any temporary facilities at the moment. i request give you an example, though, when we just entered bengi, we have mobile security agents onhe