security officer. . . >> it is critical. your first 30 days on the ground, you are just trying to figure out where you are, how things are operating, where the threats are. we absolutely concur with that recommendation of taking steps to ensure that the personnel we put on the ground are there for longer periods of time. >> and has the department been able to achieve those requirements in its practice? >> yes, it has. the fact is we don't actually have any temporary facilities at the moment. i request give you an example, though, when we just entered bengi, we have mobile security agents onhe we just reentered the bank.

we have mobile security teams and agents on the ground with u.s. marines that are there. those agents are going to stay for much longer period of time, probably up to 90 days until we are sure that we have a proper security that we can then start replacing them with a permanent personnel that we are going to have on the ground. the 30-day rotations as the arb pointed out were not conducive to security operations. >> are there any incentives that the department can provide or can think to provide for personnel to undertake those longer assignments? >> i don't think it's a question of necessary or additional incentives. i think it's a question that we needed to understand that we are constantly rotating like that was not in our best interests. i think my agents clearly understand that. and i think it really isn't

about additional incentives. it's about just knowing that is not the proper procedure and we need to change it. >> not a great practice. thank you for your forthright answers and i yield back to the chairman. >> the chernow would recognize the gentlelady from the state of alabama ms. roby. >> thank you mr. chairman. returning to the question of mr. jordan about the waiver process briefly. mr. starr the embassy security policy board sets the physical security standards that must. >> and it's also my understanding that they are either temporary interim or permanent, correct? >> yes. >> overseas diplomatic facilities can be further classified as residential office or other categories as well. >> yes. >> okay and how is benghazi classified in 2012? >> my understanding from the

port -- reports is it was a the temporary mission facility. >> okay and what was that classification found in the standards? >> no. >> are there any standards for temporary office facility? there is not, right? >> our outlook? >> our outlook i'm at is that whether it's temporary or interim or permanent that we should be applying the same security standards that the ospp has put in place and that if we can't than we need to look closely at what risks we run. >> sorry to interrupt you but the office and the residential do not require a higher level of security if they are in that category. >> there are higher levels. when we build offices and build facilities does have higher than facilities do. >> the benghazi facility was being used correct?

so in the dual case where it's being used as a residential and office office what standard supplied? to higher standards correct? >> correct. >> so those of ospp standard should have applied to benghazi. >> that is the way that i would apply them now. i wasn't here but if we had a similar situation we would be applying the higher standards. >> i was wondering because it's very clear your policy is that anytime a facility is being used for more than one purpose whatever type of facility has the higher or the highest level of physical security standards, though standard should be applied. >> that is correct. >> but that didn't happen in benghazi. >> i would have to say i can answer that question. >> looking ahead, when you talk about in this era of

expeditionary diplomacy is it possible for the state department to open a temporary residential facility? >> we don't have any at the moment. i can imagine that we would or i would approve it. >> okay. let's turn to the marine security guard detachment. were marine detachment employed to the benghazi compound? >> no. >> the benghazi compound we have already established multiple questions here was a temporary facility and marine security guard detachment are never deployed to temporary facilities, correct? >> not in my experience. >> okay so the increase in marine security guard detachment as a result of the arb recommendation therefore would not have helped in benghazi, correct? i mean if it's a temporary

facility and it can be deployed that won't help. >> i just want to make the point. i'm not saying additional personnel on the ground would not have helped, but yes you are correct that in my experience we would not have put a security guard detachment to a temporary facility. >> we also want to establish you today that there are currently 30 posts considered high-risk, high threat. how many have benefited of those 30 from the marine security board personnel? >> i would have to get back to him exact number number but i think about 20. we have opened for marine detachment sent benghazi at her high threat high-risk posts. there are still some that do not have marine security guard detachment. there are a variety of reasons why they do not. >> is it your intent to get to a place where you have these

marine security detachment at all of the high threat locations posts? >> i would like to have marine security guard detachment and everyone of her high-risk high threat posed. there are impediments that in some cases cannot be overcome. >> the ones i currently do not have the marine security detachment how exactly does the department plan to augment security at these high-risk, high threat without highly trained marine security guards? >> in some cases we have made up by using diplomatic security agents. in some cases it's a mixture of diplomatic security agents and other security elements that we have within diplomatic security. in some cases we have made risk management decisions where we have taken personnel out and lowered our presence.

in some cases their families are not there or we have lowered the number of employees to minimum numbers. in many cases we make representations of the host government and now we analyze whether not the host government has both the capability and the will to provide the necessary level of protections. if we find that we don't have those types of protections or we think that the risks are too high then we won't be there. >> okay. if an ambassador and in a high-risk high threat posed picks up the phone and calls the seventh for the state department today asking for additional security, physical or personnel, who ultimately makes the decision to grant or deny that request? mr. starr? >> the last person in the chain would be me. the request probably would not go to the 74. it would probably go to me on the sixth floor or the rso two or personnel but i can tell you that today i have available mobile security teams to deploy.

we work very closely. >> ultimately i'm asking who makes that decision? >> it can be approved at lower levels. >> was the lowest level it can be improved? >> the lowest level would be the regional director of diplomatic security. >> if an ambassador sent a cable would it be the same rather than picking up the phone it would be the exact same? >> exactly the same. >> and with the decision-making process change if it was not a high-risk, high threat posts? >> no it would not. >> was benghazi considered a high-risk high threat? >> i actually don't know what the rating was that in benghazi. we did not have the 30 high-risk high threat posed the risk -- posted at that point.

>> who was the person that denied that? >> i will have to refer you back to the results of the arb. i came back five months after the attack. >> what i'm trying to get at is the same person responsible for ensuring the physical security in benghazi, is that the same person that was vested with that responsibility today? >> i think the board pointed out that there were lapses in judgment on the part of the director and several others including the director for international programs. peer. >> if the ds as write to headquarters requesting additional upgrades are increased personnel performing security duties who is responsible for making the decision to deny or grant that request from a dhs agent? >> the first thing that would happen is for discussion would go on. is this an individual request and has been vetted through the action committee of the post? is this a post request?

>> okay and is it affected by whether you categorize this is a high-risk, high threat? >> would the more attention to our high threat high-risk posts on a daily basis but i would tell you that in a request for additional security resources for any of our posts overseas is going to be met with immediate action. we would make decisions on how we can best fulfill those requirements. >> so to get to the point even if a post is not high-risk, high threat we know in some parts of the world things are very volatile and can unravel in a moments time. despite threat assessment or not than what i'm getting at is, is the department now today in light of what happened in benghazi prepared to pay better attention when the folks on the ground are saying we need help

which was not what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the attack in benghazi. >> my answer to you is unequivocally yes. that is what i've been spending my time since february 1, 2013 on making sure we have the resources, the programs, the knowledge, the capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to any cry for help. moreover not just respond to help but to place ourselves before this command to make sure we are ready for these things. >> thank you. mr. chairman i yield back. >> i thank the gentlewoman from alabama. the chair recognizes gentlelady from alabama. >> is a member of the oversight and armed services committee i spend a great deal of time working on all, working my way through all the reports on the attacks in benghazi. as the committee begins our work

here today i think the most appropriate way we can honor the brave americans who lost their lives in benghazi is to make sure we learn from us past mistakes and never ever make them again. i heard that from family members as well. let's never let them down the way we let their family members down. i want to go back to the discussion on the security and interagency cooperation but first i was there the day that admiral mullen testified and i have to disagree with you. you may question his professional integrity but when admiral mullen served in vietnam 43 years of military service defending this great nation comes before committee and swears an oath of office and testifies he was fiercely independent in the arb i would tend to believe him. in fact the arb was incredibly scathing of the state department's report. i want to go to that report. mr. starr i want want to follow-up on what my colleague

the gentlelady from alabama her line of questioning about the security guard details. so if you don't have come if you have a post that does not have a detail because they are not at a temporary facility for example can you talk about other details that can be there? are there other military options that can be assigned to those temporary posts because you talk about mobile security teams marine augmentation units. are there other options if the marines can't actually be assigned their full-time? >> yes, there are other options. we currently are trying to expand 35 more detachments but it should be noted that at the moment we have 273, more than 275 diplomatic facilities counting the embassies consulates and consulate generals. we only have 173 security detachments.

we will never have enough grants to cover every single post and in many of our posts around the world if we put a marine detachment and we would have more marines than service officers and some of these places. we carefully look at where we need to use this scarce resource. we have had excellent cooperation from the marine corps in terms of augmenting the different units in getting more detachments. as i say we have opened 17 more detachments since then ghazi on her way to opening 35 which should be done by the end of next year. additionally the marines have created something called marine security augmentation units where we can send additional marines under the rubric of the marine security guard program that helps us where we have different situations but the thrust of your question was what do we do in places where we don't have marines or permission to send marines? we have different capabilities. we have diplomatic security agents that are high threat and

high-risk train. our highest level operators are mobile security operators. we have the ability to request from the department of defense and they have never let us down for things like fast teams to commend and protector embassies and consulates when we need that. we have a robust program where we have security contractors. in many cases they are americans and sometimes they are third-party national contractors that we have these contractors for many years. there are some downsides to that. there are some countries that won't allow them and we have learned some very painful lessons over the years by contractors that we have to have incredible amounts of oversight and make sure we are using them properly but it's still a tool. we have local guard forces, local protective elements that we higher directly from a country where in. i would tell you that some of these units in places around the world even unarmed have done amazing acts of heroism protecting our people. ultimately we have the host

country services which we now evaluate whether they have the capability to protect us or the will to protect us. those cases where they may not have the best capabilities or we may think they are challenges one of the additional ability that congress has given us is the ability to start a program or we can train those forces whether it be police or national guard directly around the embassies and increase their capabilities. so we have a number of different possibilities. >> you had said mr. starr that the state department sides engage in the process of risk management and is very experienced at. i have to say i was disappointed with the risk management process that was undertaken leading up to the benghazi attacks. i would hope that risk assessment and mitigation process has become more robust. i want to speak specifically to interagency cooperation between

dod and the department of state. he said the d.o.t. has never let you down. on that night the arb and various reports including armed services committee has stated that there was no way that those f-16s in those military, u.s. military forces could have made it there in time to save our americans lives. what have we done since to make sure that in the future they can be president time to save american lives? is the special days come up, these anniversaries or issue here more chatter that is going on and you think there might be the potential for greater risk what tripwires are in place, what processes are in place for you to call the dod and say hey maybe need to help us and repositioned some forces so if we do have another benghazi that those institutions can be there can be bare and time in the future so we don't lose american lives. what processes happening between the dod and the department of state at this point?

>> the department of defense has put together a program that they referred to as the new normal. we have looked closely at what capabilities dod can bring for defensive use of american embassies and consulates overseas. there has to be realization that we don't have bases everywhere in the world. in many cases while we would like to be able to say that the department of defense could respond to any one of our embassies within four hours physical distances, just the amount of distance between where our military institution and where diplomatic facilities are make it impossible. even if they could respond in a certain amount of time this idea that we are magically going to get paratroopers jumping out of the back of planes and land on the american embassy is it realistic. we have to get permission from host countries to get personnel end. we have to transport them from the airport to the embassy somehow and in the midst of a

crisis this isn't really realistic about what's going to happen. what we work with dod on is making sure that we are better prepared to predict what is going to happen, looking at instability and his dod has often said they would rather be on the ground in advance of something happening than trying to react after something happens. now it doesn't mean in certain cases that they haven't been on a very close leash with us. i can give you the example of tripoli recently where we had in many cases special forces and helicopters and marines on less than one hour notice to respond to the embassy. in critical threat situations, those are the types of things we are working with dod on to make sure that they have very close response capabilities. but i can tell you that with 275 locations around the world we can't do that often. we can't do that every place. dod is seeking increased basing options and i would highly

recommend a discussion with dod honest about where they are going in terms of basic facilities. they are working with the state department on this but ultimately we have got to do a better job of making sure we have the right preparations on the ground in advance. in those situations that are absolutely critical we will have dod close to us and they have worked tremendously with us in places like tripoli and so nod and other places. i just have to tell you i have the utmost respect for the way the department of defense and the u.s. marine corps and army and air force have responded in the navy have responded to her knees. >> in the last minute i have left can you talk about what leveled at the state department does that request have to take place clinics for example in the case of tripoli where you said they have them on a one-hour least responses that come from your kedik come from an ambassador who determines what

the diplomatic security team that's there that he has this. how far does it have to go before you can have a fast team is ready to commend? how high up through the state department bureaucracy does he have to go? >> in an emergency the investors going to call big commander of the combatant commanders may need all the time to talk to each other in the emergency situation you can pull the string immediately. in a less than emergency situation and the way we are looking at it to try to pre-position ourselves he would make a request or we may make the request and say we think you need this. we would work for the office of the executive secretary to send back and forth. i can and admit it best -- instigated in the assistant secretary of the bureau can instigated. in most cases it's a collaborative effort. we are talking with each other or having a phone conversation but in the most extreme cases

the ambassador can go directly to the combatant commander that's closest to him and request support. then he can notify us afterwards. >> thank you. i yield back mr. chairman. >> the chair would recognize the gentleman from illinois mr. roskam. >> i thank the three panels for your test wednesday. mr. keil what is a special compound? >> i would like to clarify one point. i wasn't making any subjective judgment on admiral mullen. i was simply stating the facts. the precepts of regulations the arb cannot discuss the proceedings outside of the arb admiral mullen admitted he did that. it's a statement of fact it is not a subjective judgment. >> in legal terms that collects partake communication. what is a special mission compound? >> i don't know. to be honest a i reviewed undersecretary kennedy and authorizing that made up that term in order to avoid security

standards. >> is an interesting thing is today in her office we did a nexis lexis search of special mission compound, not benghazi. there may be other ways to search and there may be ways to look out over the landscape but the result of looking for that term yielded nothing. throughout all those datafiles all across the printed plane absolutely nothing. so what does it mean if something is simply redefined? what does it mean if something is said we are just going to declare this as something other than that which is to be regulated? that means you have no regulations. isn't that right? >> correct. >> mr. sullivan you mentioned in your opening statement one of the regrets that you have is a member of the panel is that the department of state didn't adopt your recommendations that relates to waivers read what is your recommendation as it relates to waivers? >> we believe waivers are needed

and we want to see those waivers because when you have a waiver what that will do is it set in motion standards. people recognize once you have the standard you have to meet those standards. what we saw in this particular instance was there were no standards. there really were no standards and i think somebody brought up the fact before that there a lot of people coming in and some dedicated people, some very hard-working people and some extremely well-intentioned people and dedicated people however these were people that were extremely inexperienced and they were coming in for 30-day periods. they would come in for 30 days and they would identify vulnerabilities. the next person would come in and the process would continue. >> so you are saying you need an orderly process by which things are weighed and not declarations on the department of state that assault waves.

>> beso we talked about before risk management. in its simplest terms risk management is about identifying the threat of a the vulnerability and coming up with mitigation for that threat. >> we just did not see that formalized process. >> secretary starr question. he said earlier in answer to congressman smith that i'm benghazi they didn't get the threat information. i understand the threat information may be a term of art but to mr. westmoreland point earlier certainly a bomb blowing up on the side of that wall, the whole litany of events that took place beginning march 18, 2012 until the first time there was a communication from ambassador stevens, isn't that enough information? you are not saying nobody was aware of the nature of the threat. is the threat a term of art?

>> congressman thank you for the question. the distinction i was trying to make was that there was no specific threat information developed by the intelligence community. >> these people are coming over the hilltop at this moment. >> we don't normally get that. i think your point that there were a number of them going on people were aware of the overall instability. >> here's my point. the senate intelligence committee report they reported on june the sixth of 2012 ambassador stevens recommending the creation of teams and so forth. the team was never created in benghazi despite the ambassador's recommendation. there were other events subsequent to that and then ambassador stevens reaches out again and sent a cable to state department headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 temporary duty personnel and the state department never fulfilled his request and headquarters never responded to the request

with a cable. in a follow-up on august 16 of 2012, a month before these events. again a cable to the state headquarters stevens raised additional concerns etc. etc. etc.. now go to the arb. the arb says one thing to times about ambassador stevens and it's worth noting. they said this about him. his status as the leading u.s. government advocate on libya policy and his expertise on benghazi in particular caused washington to give unusual deference to his judgments. they said that on page six of the report. they liked it so much they put it on page 30 for the report and yet ignoring the ambassador who bye-bye their own admission is the expert in the area and ignoring his request for support. that is not giving unusual deference to his judgments is it mr. secretary?

>> a difficult question congressman. >> no it's very straightforward. >> no i don't think it is. it's a difficult question. i think mr. stevens was a tremendous ambassador. >> there's no question that he was tremendous and no question that he was a hero. the specific request of the department of the department of the arb said this person is uniquely qualified secretary and he was ignored. >> i think this is why the arb recommendations are what they are. >> this is why the arb recommendations in the panel say you can't have this kind of waiver authority. when ms. roby has to the question are there any plans for temporary facilities in the future you are pretty clever in how you responded. you said, we don't have any plans for it and i'm not likely and i'm paraphrasing now, i'm not likely to approve it. and you know what that tells me?

that tells me you can do it all again. that tells me you can take the special mission compound. you can call it something else. you can call it a temporary consular facility. you can take two adjectives and put them in front of a noun and call it some other thing and do it all again. so here's the question. if madeleine albright signed off on certain recommendations, if the best practices panel makes certain recommendations, why is it that the state department is clinging to this legacy of power that has failed to? why are you grasping on it so much? why not walk away from it and nobody hears criticizing a very tough job but the nature of the job mr. secretary means to mr. cummins point needs to be the transformational moment. why not take the transformational moment to say we are not going to choose to

read findings that we are going to revisit how we do these waivers and we are going to do everything we can in cooperation with congress to honor chris stevens legacy, to honor the legacy of those who have suffered, who you serve with and you know what why cling to this old thing that just isn't working? are you the only one that does not see at? >> congressman i think i have a distinct view having served 29 years in the state department, four years with the united nations and i am back again. they think in accepting all of the recommendations of the accountability review board, i think in accepting 38 out of 40 recommendations made by the best practices panel, i think the department has made tremendous progress and efforts in the time that i have been back. not every recommendation is gold. every recommendation needs to be

looked at from the recommendations standpoint but then from the organization as well. >> so take your argument. a couple of minutes ago you've made this point as it relates to the responsibility of a foreign service office that they have a responsibility to be mindful of their own security. i was in response to ms. sanchez. every foreign service officer must understand they have a role in their own security. i agree with that wholeheartedly and yet when ambassador stevens played a role in his own security on cable number one, table number two and cable number three that responsibility was not absorbed or reflected in the state department. you are not offering anything as it relates to fundamental change because based on what the rules are right now mr. secretary you have the authority, you have the capacity and you have got the flexibility to do the benghazi structure again. am i wrong? >> the rules have not changed.

who is responsible is clearly defined. >> who is responsible his fourth down on the food chain. >> no i would disagree with that. i'm responsible. the latest example when we are trying to open a facility in southern turkey, we had a request to put personnel in on the ground for start operations for humanitarian operations. we need a facility. we are in the process of leasing a facility. we know where it's going to be. a request came to me from the people on the ground saying can we use it in advance of the security upgrades being done and been accomplished? by answer, no. >> would the that's beautiful and in light of mr. cummings response in his admonition that we are here for a season, you're going to be there for a season ended another season summer is

going to succeed you. in that new season when someone with your judgment and deference doesn't have that level of capacity and they don't have your background they will be under tremendous pressure and they are going to say yes. i yield back. >> the chair thanks the gentleman from illinois and recognizes himself. it strikes me that there are at least two issues, two major issues. number one is the efficacy of the arb process itself, whether or not it is in our best interest to allow any entity to essentially grade its own papers. we don't do that in any other category. we don't get to sentence ourselves when we are inquiry. we don't get to great room papers in the classroom. the other aspect of the efficacy of the arb is who they interviewed and who they did not interview to whether or not they have to accept recommendations are don't have to accept recommendations. that is a separate issue to me is whether or not the arb

process works, whether or not it has shortcomings. the second issue, let's assume arguendo that they arb process works. let's just make that assumption for the sake of argument. is anyone following the recommendations of arb? mr. secretary and want to read something to you. we are disturbed at the inadequacy of resources to provide security against terrorist attacks. we are disturbed at the relative low priority accorded security concerns. we praise the ambassador for seeking security enhancements long before the attack. do you know what that comes from mr. secretary? what i just read? >> i believe it's part of the accountability review board. >> from 1999. >> nairobi, correct? >> that was the arb from 1999 and you can lay it almost perfectly over what happened in

benghazi. and buy another point the 1999 arb made it really clear. they went out of their way to make it clear they were disappointed that the recommendations that came after the bombings in beirut were not being implemented. something called the inman commission so the 99 arb criticizes existing state department employees for not following the inman condition -- commission for 14 years prior. that's a quarter century's worth of recommendations. and yet here we set. so what i want to do because honestly i commend mr. schiff. his was a wonderful idea and i think each of you for coming but given the i'm escapable interconnectivity between recommendations made after beirut and after eastern africa and now after benghazi we are going to look at some of those

past arb recommendations and i will give you one mr. secretary. for diplomatic buildings not meeting in men and inman again being beirut not meaning him and standards essential physical security upgrades should be made immediately. that was the recommendation of the 1999 arb. mr. secretary i want to read another one. this goes to mr. cummings point which i thought was a wonderful point. diplomatic petition should be made to all governments with whom we have relations to remind them of their obligation to provide security for our embassy. who in libya were we to call? mr. cummings point is a wonderful point and it's so good the 1990 arb made the recommendation. make sure the host country is aware of their obligation. who do we call in libya at?

>> questions her? >> i am waiting for each answer but i will make it more clear in the future. >> i think this is the heart of the question. there are times when for the national interest of the united states we are going to have to have diplomats, humanitarian programs and rule of law programs and other things in places where the host country does not have a government. in those cases we must take the lessons from this arb. >> was there a government in libya for us to contact? >> not at that time. >> let's move to one that perhaps we were able to do. this was also recommendation from the 1999 arb and again they arb is presented to us as a panacea. that's the evolution of what happens. there's an attack in a blue ribbon panel. we are going to make recommendations and this is never going to happen again so back to 1999.

the secretary of state should personally review the security situation of diplomatic facilities closing those which are highly vulnerable and threatening. why do you think the 1999 arb one out of its way to use the word personally? >> no comment, sir. >> is the answer privilege? that's a recommendation. the 1999 arb. the secretary of state should personally review and i'm asking you with all due respect, we are not going to get to the word review. we have to get past the word that modifies review personally. why did they think was important the secretary of state himself or herself personally review? >> i think ultimately the secretary bears the responsibility for the security. has to be brought to the information necessary for him to

make decisions. that would be my job. i have gone to the secretary of state on different occasions and we have talk specifically about the security of different places. tripoli was one of them in particular supply since i've been back but we have also looked at kabul. we talked about the other locations as well. where i have concerns about the safety and security of our personnel, if i believe we are not doing the things that we need to do it's my responsibility to bring it to the secretary. >> i appreciate that mr. secretary. was it done on september the tenth of 2012? this recommendation has existed for more than 10 years. >> i was not here at that time. i'm sorry, i cannot tell you. >> your answer mirrors what the 1999 arb further said which is first and foremost the secretary of state should take a personal

and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of u.s. diplomatic personnel. is that being done now and was it being done prior to your ten-year? >> in the time that i was here previously and i have served as multiple secretaries of state i have heard every secretary talk about the importance of security. i have heard every secretary of state in personnel of the department of security is their function. that goes from madeleine albright. that goes through secretary clinton, secretary rice and secretary kerry has also made those statements and has made statements that the safety and security of our personnel is absolutely one of our highest priorities. >> i appreciate that mr. secretary but i think words have consequences and most people use words intentionally. in 1999 arb intentionally used the words personally and active.

that to me does not mean talking about something. a personal review is not simply talking about it. is the personal review is that arb recommendations still accepted i guess is my question. does the state department still accept these recommendations from the 1999 arb and is it being done? >> yes. i think the best and clearest example i can give you today is the new process we put into place. the vital presence validation process where we again look at what are our vital interests in why should we be in these high threat locations quickly put this process up and it goes all the way to the secretary. >> that is a great point which leads to the next point i was going to make her ask you about. what is it about that recommendation that is so charismatic that it couldn't

have been made prior to the attack and benghazi? >> i think the department of state has practiced risk management. >> risk management we are going to weigh the risk with the benefits. we know the risk of being in benghazi. can you tell us what our policy was in libya that overcame those risks lacks in other words why were read there? >> these questions i think have been fundamental to the department for over 30 years. if there's a reason why many places we have evacuated are shut down operations and we have taken our families out or we have gone down to essential personnel only are we have asked for marines to come in and support us while we are there. >> my point being none of that was done and benghazi. we know the risk of benghazi. my colleagues in you and others have done a wonderful job highlighting some of the trip tripwires is a diplomatic term. what policy were we pursuing in

libya that was so great that it overcame all of the tripwires and all of the risks? >> not being here at the time sir i can't answer that question for you. i do believe personally from my time at the united nations that many of us understood that if we lost the eastern half of libya, that if we lost the confidence of people after they revolution in libya that we would pay a terrible price. i don't want to put words into chris stevens mouth. i think he was an immensely talented diplomat and i was not here at that time. but i think it was clear in chris' mind why he needed to go to benghazi and what he was trying to accomplish. i think today we have more formalized processes to make sure those decisions are documented. the process makes us go through a process that i don't think was there prior to that gauzy.

the results and accountability for best practices panel and the recommendations we have accepted insurer as we go forward we get a clearer or precise more mandated process for risk management. but i will tell you sir that every single day for the years i was with the department of state we were weighing the safety and security of our personnel versus our national security priorities and i think that's a fundamental tenet they will find everybody in the department uses. >> i appreciate bringing the hearing back to chris stevens and the other four loss lives that mr. stevens was equally clear that he needed help. he was equally clear that the situation is getting worse and benghazi. he was equally clear in asking the people who sent him there to represent us to provide adequate security and none was forthcoming.

with that i would recognize the ranking member for closing remarks. >> i want to thank you all for being here today. i think -- i thank all of you. what i want to remind all of us is we are americans. everybody is trying to do the best they can to protect our people. when we look at what happens in benghazi, there are a lot of lessons to be learned. the question is not only have we learned them, but then how do we address some? and you know, what do they call

it, monday morning quarterbacking? i think when you look back on things a lot of times you realize the things you could have done differently. that probably would have made things better. but, you know, you cannot bring back -- but i think we can make a difference right now. it's clear that our diplomats are in some very dangerous situations. i think we all agree on that. and so, now we have got to figure out how we go about protecting them even better than we have been. that is why secretary starr i ask you about coming back to us

and letting us know exactly what you are working on, those things that you still have to do and reporting back. it is so important because when all the dust settles the question is, what did we accomplish? i have been here 17 years and i have seen a lot of arguments back and forth. but i think we must concentrate on being effective in getting something done. the arguments and the frustration you hear from both sides trying to figure out what happened and i believe that everybody is acting with great

intentions but we want you to understand that we does want to find out what happened so we figure out what went wrong does not happen again and that's what it's all about. mr. chairman again i want to thank you and i want to ask you to do something for me. i want to bring mr. starr back in either december or january. he has told us in 45 days or less he can tell us about what he is working on and a timetable but i want him to come back and tell us what has been achieved. and that is very very important for me. and for the whole committee. mr. chairman if you will that is your goal.

i think it would be unfortunate if one owl at this ends that we have not addressed these recommendations and address them in a way that would please the families of the deceased. and that brings me back to the four great americans who lost their lives. and i think we all made a commitment in one way or another to them that we would do everything in our power to find out what happened and at the same time to make sure we did the best we could to protect our folks overseas, to tighten up security and we have got to do that.

with that mr. chairman i want to thank you. >> i want to thank the gentleman from maryland for all of his help and the cooperative nature for which he has always worked with me. i think it's an excellent idea. we will work with the secretary and i want to pick a date in the schedule. december suits me better than january because i'd rather do it sooner rather than later. i will work with the secretary and work on you whether that would be hearing with all of her colleagues was just you and me, we will work on that. he will be done in december if it suits his schedule and also i want to just say this. we were given to different tasks and i say we, the house voted for us to be in existence. find out everything that happened before during and after the attack in benghazi and do everything. the speaker has been very clear in my conversations with him

about this, to do everything we can to make sure it never happens again. part of that is taking recommendations that have been made in the past and asking whether or not they have been implemented. frankly it's anticipating things that might possibly happen. we do not have to wait on the tragedy to make recommendations. i noted mr. cummings during the secretary's opening statement, i'm not minimizing this at all. if this comes across as me minimizing it i am not that they mention they were partnering with the new york fire department. and that's a great idea but it does necessarily leave some of us to conclude why could that not have been done previously? i mean fire has been around for a long time it's been a weapon for a long time. why now? that's not fair of me to ask him which is why he didn't ask him but the notion that we have to wait on something bad to happen before we can act to do

something then all 12 of us agree ultimately so i thank all of you my colleagues and i want to thank mr. schiff again for giving us this idea. i will hope he will share theirs with me in again as we adjourn i want to adjourn in the memory of chris stevens, sean smith tie woods and clyde dougherty and pledge a process that is worthy of their memory and one that our fellow citizens can respect regardless of their political ideations and with that we are adjourned.

defense secretary hagel -. >> here or via the comments we recently received from our viewers. >> i enjoy c-span everyday and especially i enjoy watching c-span3, to watch real america every sunday afternoon at 1:00 pacific time. i love real america.

i have never missed one episode. please keep real america on the c-span schedule. i say what every american says, thank god for c-span. >> c-span has gone downhill, it really has. they have these neocons on, aei, heritage foundation funded by time warner and you can't say anything to criticize israel or they will cut you off and they cut you off with your question. also i want to make a comment at the national summit c-span3 which nobody watches and some people don't even get it. you had steven smith toske about the israeli relations. they were telling the truth and they aired it. and you shouldn't have that on c-span1 i think. >> i've been watching "washington journal" for many

years and i have seen many shows that have inspired me that this show this morning is the absolute best. it's just over the moon. this in my opinion, the format of the show and the way it has moved forward this morning to me is the answer to all of our problems. because what it does is it allows all of us to see an in-depth look or have an in-depth look at a specific problem or a specific topic that's important to all of us, to everyone of us, not just to the republicans or to the democrats but to all of us. these conferences will bring good to our society. thank you so much.

my hope is that we have many many more of these kinds of shows. thank you.

.. at some point in the future it becomes appropriate to begin normalizing policy. let me underscore that our release of this information is not meant to convey any change in his stance of policy. as you know, the fomc views on

policy are conveyed in up policy statement, which i will now discuss before coming back to our normalization plans. as indicated in our policy statement, the fmoc decided to make another reduction and that pace of the asset purchases. the committee also maintained its full board guidance regarding the federal funds rate project and reaffirmed its view that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy remains appropriate. let me discuss the economic conditions that underpinned these actions. the economy is continuing to make progress toward the fmoc objective of maximum sustainable employment. in the labor market conditions have improved further in recent months. although the pace of job growth has slowed somewhat recently to my job gains have averaged more

than 200,000 per month of the past two months. the unemployment rate was just over 6 percent in august, two tenths lower than that data available at the time of that june fmoc meeting. floridian majors of the labour market utilization such as the use six measure have shown similar improvement, and the labor force participation rate has find out. these developments continue to trend gradual progress toward our planet objectives. but the labor market has yet to fully recover. there are still too many people that want jobs but cannot find them, too many who are working part-time but would prefer full-time work, and to many who are not searching for a job but would be. as noted in the fmoc statement,

a range of labor market indicators suggest that there remains significant underutilization of labor resources. the committee continues to see sufficient underlying strength in the economy to support ongoing improvement in the labour market. although real gdp rose at an annual rate of only about 1% in the first half of the year, that modest gain reflected, in part, transitory factors, including a dip in net exports. spending grew about twice as fast as gdp. indicators of spending and production for the third quarter suggest that economic activity is expanding at a moderate pace , and the committee continues to expect a moderate pace of growth going forward.

inflation has been running below the committee's 2% objective, but with longer-term inflation expectations the economic pickup -- recovery continuing, the committee expects inflation to move gradually back toward its objective. moreover, inflation has firmed some sense earlier in the year, and the committee believes that the likelihood of inflation running persistently below 2% has diminished. as is always the case, the committee will continue to assess incoming data carefully to ensure that policy is consistent with attaining the fmoc and logger goals of maximum employment and inflation of 2%. this outlook is reflected in the individual economic projections submitted in conjunction with this meeting by the fo -- fmoc

participants which for the first time go through 2017. as always, its participants projections are conditioned on his or her own view of appropriate monitor of policy. if the central tendency of the unemployment rate projections is slightly lower than the june projections and now stands around 6% at the end of this year panera. community participants generally see the unemployment rate declining to a lower than normal level of the course of 2016 and edging a bit below that level in toward 17. the central tendency of the projections for real gdp growth is around 2% for 2014, down slightly from the june projections. over the next three years,

the projections for real gdp growth run somewhat above the estimates of longer run normal growth. finally, fmoc participants continue to see inflation moving gradually back toward 2%. the central tendency is one-and-a-half percent in 2014, widened to almost 2% in 2017. as i noted earlier, the committee decided today to make another reflection in the pace of asset purchases. two years ago when the fmoc began this purchase program the unemployment rate stood at just over 8 percent in progress in lowering it was expected to be much slower than desired without additional policy accommodations. the intent of the program was to achieve a substantial

improvement in the outlook for a labor market and to ensure that inflation was moving back toward the committee's long run goal of 2%. in light of the cumulative progress toward maximum employment and the improvement in the outlook for labor market conditions since the inception of the program and with the likelihood of inflation running persistently below 2%, having diminished somewhat, we have reduced our pace of asset purchases again at this meeting. starting next month we will be purchasing $15 billion of securities per month, down 10 billion per month from our current rate. this incoming information broadly supports the committee's expectation of ongoing improvement in the labour market and inflation moving back overtime toward its 2 percent long run objectives. the committee will end this program and our next meeting

. the committee will continue the policy of reinvesting proceeds from insuring treasury securities and principal payments of holding agency debt. the committee's sizable holdings of longer term securities should help maintain accommodative financial conditions and to promote further progress toward our objectives of maximal employment and inflation of 2%. regarding interest rates the committee reaffirmed its floridian guidance and likely will be appropriate to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends. especially if projected inflation continues to run below the committee's 2% blogger riegle and longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. this judgment is based on

the committee's assessment of realized and expected progress toward its objective of maximum employment and 2 percent inflation. an assessment that is based on a wide range of including measures of labor market conditions, indicators of inflation and inflation expectations and moving some financial development. once we began to remove policy accommodations it is the craze current assessment that even after employment and inflation and new mandate consists of levels economic conditions may for some time warrant keeping that target federal funds rate below levels that community feels is normal long run. this guidance is consistent with the path for a proper policy as reported in the participants' projections.

as i will whisper in a moment, the fmoc now will continue to establish a target range rather than a single point for the federal funds rate or normalization against. and in the downside is treated airshow for each participant the target range over the central tendency of the unemployment rate in late 2016 it is slightly below the estimated long run value. it's close of a 2% objective . at the end of 2016. at just under 3% it's nearly a percentage point below long run value of three and three-quarters percent projected by most participants.

participants provide a number of explanations for the federal funds rate running below the longer run normal level at that time. many cite the residual effects of the financial crisis which will fully diminish restraint household spending and depressing expectations for future growth in output and incomes . most expect the federal fund rate to move closer than its blogger run normal level. that committee's expectations of a pass of the federal funds rate are contingent on the economic outlook. if the economy proves to be stronger than anticipated by the committee resulting in the more rapid convergence

of employment and inflation sent the fmoc objectives then increases in the federal funds rate are likely to occur sooner and to be more rapidly than currently envisioned. conversely if economic performance supports increases are likely to take place later and to be more gradual. policy normalization principles and plans. a statement is intended to provide information to the public about the eventual normalization project. it does not signal a change in the current or future stance of monetary policy as is always the case in setting policy, the fmoc will determine the timing and case of policy normalization so as to promote a statutory mandate

of maximum employment and price stability. since the crisis the federal reserve has been providing extraordinary accommodation using non-traditional tools of monetary policy. the fmoc intention has always been to return to a more traditional approach. and throughout this time the committee has been preparing for the normalization process. in june 2011 the committee sat out broad principles and to some more specific tactics for how it envisioned the normalization process to take place. in june 2013 we noted that conditions had changed significantly in ways that anticipated in june of 2011 including the size and composition of defense balance sheet and revision of earlier plans would be appropriate.

the document released today reflects our updated plans which readers would no have been under discussion for the last few fmoc meetings. a new approach retains many broad objectives and principles from the original but also has new elements. as was the case before the crisis, the committee intends to adjust the stance of monetary policy for normalization, primarily through actions that influence the level of the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates, not through active management of the balance sheet. the federal funds rate will serve as a key way to communicate his stance of policy. to begin normalization the committee will raise its target range of the federal funds rate. the committee expects that the effective federal fund

rate may vary within the target range and could even move outside of that range of occasion. but such a move which should have no material effect on financial conditions or the broader economy. the primary tool for moving the federal funds rate into the target range will be the rate of interest paid on excess reserves or i l e r. the committee expects that the federal fund rate will create below the ire rate while reserves are so plentiful as is the case at present. the committee also intends to use an overnight reverse repurchase agreement facility which by transacting with a broad set of counterparties will help insure that the federal funds rate remains in the target range. the would like to emphasize the overnight rrp facility will be used to the extent

necessary and will be phased out would no longer needed to control the federal funds rate. the committee will adjust the particular settings of these tools as needed and could deploy other supplementary tools as well to insure that we achieve our desired stance policy. turning now to our plans regarding that balance sheet, the committee intends to reduce securities holdings in a gradual and predictable manner, primarily by ceasing to reinvest the repayment of principal on securities held in the system open market account. regarding the timing for ceasing reinvestment the committee now expect this to occur after the initial increase in the target range for the federal fund rate. the committee currently does

not anticipate selling agency mortgage-backed securities as part of the normalization progress. although limited sales might be warranted in a longer run to reduce or eliminate residual holdings. the timing and pace would be communicated to the public in advance for. it is the committee's intention that the federal reserve will and along run oboe more securities than necessary to implement monetary policy efficiently and effectively and that the securities will primarily consist of treasury securities. as i stated earlier, today's release of the committee's updated mobilization plans is in no way intended to signal a change in the stance of monetary policy. rather, it is meant simply to provide information about how the committee invasions' the normalization process in

light of the changes in economic and financial circumstances that have occurred since we put forth our original plans more than three years ago. that said, conditions could change further, and we will learn about our tools during mobilization. the committee has agreed that it is prepared to make it just -- additional adjustments to his mobilization plans if warranted by economic and financial developments. thank you. let me stop there. i will be happy to take your questions. >> thank you. it there is some debate about the phrase considerable time. want to know if you could tell me a couple things about it. was it debated at the c-span.org? am sure we have been over this before, but what does

it mean time wise to back is the statement to a form of forward guidance? finally, how do you square this idea of talk continuously said that you are dated dependent to the point where if the data were to turn would it not necessarily be a time? >> of course the committee discussed its forward guidance today and discusses what the appropriate for guidance says. this is part of our assessment of economic conditions in the appropriate stance of monetary policy the committee decided that based upon the assessment of economic conditions that characterization remains a

corporate and it was comfortable with it. i think if you look, for example, and the projections of individual participants that are revealed, the view of each participant. again, i would emphasize not a committee to make in the collective view. there is relatively no change in the assessment of the outlook by participants between this meeting in the assessment in june. the outlook is little changed apostolate declined in the anticipated unemployment rate and a very slight uptick in the inflation projection but really quite minimal. so the outlook has not changed that much from june, and the committee felt comfortable with this characterization.

well, you said isn't this calendar based patten's? i want to emphasize that there is no mechanical interpretation of what the term considerable time means , and as i have said repeatedly, the decisions that the committee makes about what is the appropriate time to begin to raise its target for the federal funds rate will be dated dependent. and in my opening comments just now i again emphasize something i said previously which is that if the pace of progress in achieving our goals were to quicken or accelerate, it is likely that the committee would begin raising its target for the federal funds rate sooner than anticipated and mike then raise the federal funds rate at a faster pace.

in the opposite is also true if the projection work to change. so, there is no fix mechanical interpretation of the time. i think it would not be accurate to describe the committee's guidance about the timing of the federal funds rating to when it will move above zero as being calendar based. the committee has started with the broad general statement of what determines how long it will keep the federal funds rate target at zero. it has said that it will be looking at the actual and projected to the projected pace at which the gaps between employment and inflation and our goals for those variables closed. and then what the committee does at each meeting is

after saying that the assessment will take into account many different indicators and take into account inflation pressures and other things, it goes on to provide at that meeting its assessment of the implications of its view of that data at that time. and that assessment really has not changed over the last several meetings. the committee, based on this assessment at each meeting, has felt comfortable saying that based on its assessment of those factors it considers that it will be like the appropriate to maintain the current target range for a considerable time after the asset purchase program ends, especially if inflation remains below the 2% objective. i would not describe that as a considerable time. it is highly conditional.

>> thank you. having kept their guidance the same, having referred to significant underutilization of labor, having actually pushed gdp projection the rate path gets steeper and seems to be consolidating higher. if it is stated dependent what accounts for the faster projection? >> well, to "the projections for 2014, they are down a little bit. but the unemployment path is also largely lower. of the projected path of the labour market, an unpleasant , and other measures of the labour market of course is always partly dependent on the court outlook punitive it is

not totally dependent. and the committee assesses the labour market continuing to improve. and you see a small reduction in the path of the unemployment this year and over the rest of the projection. so if you ask me -- you asked me why is the project should to a projected path moved up? each participant does the reason that they wrote down what they did. as a guess i would hazard, for star would say it is relatively little upward movement. i would view it as broadly in line with what one would expect, a very small town or a reduction in the path for unemployment in a very slight upward change in the projection for inflation.

most participants in deciding upon the path i think look at, as our guide is says, how large is the gatt between performance at the labour market and that associated with our maximum a plan objective to how large the gap is between inflation and our objective, how fast they change. and you see in the projections modest reductions in the size of those gaps. and in modest, very small change of a slightly faster pace at which those caps would change. i would describe the change in the projections both for the economy and the path of rights has quite modest. but the fact that they move does illustrate today dependent principles which i think is so important for

market participants to keep in mind that what we do will depend upon how the data unfolds. there is uncertainty about that, and, as expectations and the actual performance of the economy changed you should expect to see movements. i think it is also notable that the further that you go out in the projection of a wider range. and that reflects in part different forecasts by different members of the committee about how rapid progress will be. what he did not see it is also the uncertainty that each individual, each participant seas around their own projection. so things will depend upon how the economy falls

there's a good deal of uncertainty. >> thank you, madam chair. the economy has been growing for five years. some believe the expansion will last another five years why in your view is economic growth not creating more inflation in wages and pc e? is this all about the labour market or are there other forces at play? >> to my mind the very slow pace of wage increases does reflect slack in the labour market. we had a very deep recession as it is, perhaps, to be expected in the aftermath of a very significant financial crisis.

we faced head of lanes in the economy recovering. so the recovery has been slow. growth has been positive, and it has lasted for five years. it is low relative to past recoveries that have not been associated with financial crises. and while unemployment has come way down from the slightly over 10 percent level that it reached, it remains significantly above the levels that most fmoc participants would regard as consistent with normal in the longer run. so there is significant underutilization of labor resources we continue to discuss whether or not the unemployment rate itself is

-- an inadequate measure of how much utilization of labour resources there really are. in no went into detail. there are no other ways in which we see underutilization, high levels and have come down marginally as part-time and point for economic or involuntary part-time employe tha, perhaps some remaining shortfall of labor force participation as a result of technical factors. and so i think there still is -- and the statement says it -- a significant underutilization of labor sources. in a very modest pace of wage increases that point to a very little essentially a reflection of that. ..

i also want to ask you about a san francisco fed paper that came out with suggested market expectations have been running below the fed's own projections so i wanted to ask you if you see that as well and whether it's troubling that market expectations may not be aligned with what the fed put out today?

>> so with respect to identifying myself, the committee has had discussions during the years that we have been providing these forecasts of the participants to the public as to whether or not it's desirable from the standpoint of a committee functioning to identify who's who in these pictures. thus far, occasionally an individual will indicate in a speech what their personal views are. we have not yet decided what would be the desirable thing from the point of view from our decision-making process to identify individuals. we have a subcommittee on communications that is now chaired by vice chair fisher and they will be considering the sep

and whether or not the changes are appropriate but until and unless there is some change in the committee's stance on this i don't want to identify myself. you asked second about the san francisco fed paper that did point to a notable convergence between market views and the views of the committee. i would say there have been any number of different analyses of this topic. are there many different surveys and interpretations of what the market thanks and i don't frankly think it's completely clear that there is a gap. there are different views on whether or not such a gap exists. to the extent that there is a gap, one reason or it could be

markets and participants have different views on the evolution of economic conditions. for example i think i would note that when the committee participants write down their forecasts for the federal funds rate, they are showing the funds rate path that they consider most likely. they are economic forecasts are of the conditions that they think are the most likely ones. you don't see a full range of possibilities they are and the path to the funds rate is the path that each individual thinks is most likely. market participants, understanding that there are range of possible outcomes with upside and downside possibilities are doing something slightly different i

think when they are determining market prices. they are taking into account the possibility that there can be different economic outcomes, including even if they are not very likely ones in which outcomes would be characterized by low inflation or low growth and the appropriate path of rates will be low. so differences in probabilities and different outcomes to explain part of that. we want to learn. market participants may have different views on the economy than the committee does and that's something we want to try to infer and learn market views in part from information of this type. what i can say is that it is important for market participants to understand what

our likely response or reaction function is to the data and our job is to try to communicate as clearly as we can do way in which our split policy stance will depend on the data and i promise to try to do that. >> hi. my question is about the new exit principles. you guys say that you don't plan to end reinvestment until after the first to rate hike. can you give us a little bit of a sense of what are the conditions you are going to be looking for when you eventually begin to end the reinvestment? it sounds like tapering the reinvestment is also on the table. what is your decision on whether or not to end them together or whether or not to taper them and do you have a general timeline for how long you think it will take to shrink the balance sheet once you actually start? >> all good questions. so i think the committee will be

focused on we intend to use the path to short-term interest rates as their key tool of policy and of course market participants will be very focused as we are on what is the appropriate timing and pace of interest rate increases when that time comes. and i think the committee would like to feel that it is successfully beginning the normalization process and we are successfully communicating with markets about how that process will be playing out over time. and i think when the committee is comfortable with that process is established is working well and we are comfortable with the outlook, that they will begin the process of seizing or possibly tapering that eventually ceasing for investments.

so we say that it will depend on economic and financial conditions that we want to make sure normalization is successfully underway. if we were only two shrink our balance sheet by seizing reinvestment it would probably take, to get back to levels of reserve balances that we had before the crisis. i'm not sure we will go that low but we have said that we will try to shrink our balance sheet to the lowest levels consistent with the efficient and effective implementation of policy. it could take until the end of the decade to achieve those levels. >> you said a few moments ago that there is perhaps a sharp fall in labor forces as a result

of factors. this seems consistent with a recent paper by your staff. is that the house view that it consists of unemployment plus part-time workers who want full-time work and labor force participation is out of the equation and the second question you said the committee will act as soon as economic conditions warrant. they have been an idea in circulation that at some point it might stay lower for longer as a means of compensating for some the damage done during a recession. is this an indication of the debate has been settled and the ideas off the table? >> just remind me what was the first question? >> the first question was as the labor force participation then removes? >> the recent brookings paper by the fed economists clearly indicates and i said this in jackson hole that there are structural reasons particularly

demographics but not only demographics, why labor force participation should be expected to decline over time and i agree with that. i believe that most of my colleagues would endorse that as well. however, they did indicate in the paper that they see some remaining cyclical shortfall by one technique that they use. they place the estimate at a quarter% but by another technique that they used to could be a believe they said as large as 1%. and so my own personal view is that there is some cyclical shortfall and something certainly probably within that range but nevertheless it's a meaningful cyclical shortfall. it's not completely, and giving my own personal view not a committee assessment, that i

see, given the underlying downward trend in labor force participation we might interpret the flattening out of labor force participation over the last year as showing that cyclical component has diminished somewhat. i think there is something that remains but eventually i would certainly agree with the authors, we should expect to see labor force participation declining. and then what was the second piece? [inaudible] >> well, we stayed low for a very long time. we have been at zero for a very long time and below the levels that some common policy rules would now be suggesting given the level of unemployment and inflation. so the recovery has been very

slow. we have also been doing unconventional policies, of course buying assets and in a general sense i think we have been lower for longer than if you complete that sentence, than many standard policy rules would suggest. in a sense that is a policy that we have had and once we decide it's appropriate to begin to normalize policy and to raise the level of our target for short-term interest rates, it would still take some time for rates to get back to levels. you can see in our projection that by the end of 2017, the participants are on average protecting that rates will reach the levels they considered normal in the longer-run and similarly we could make a similar statement with respect

to where the funds rate will stand relative to the recommendations of rules. so that would take some time to return to those kinds of levels. >> marty and then greg and then robin. >> thank you. barty crutsinger with the "associated press." madam chair there were two dissents from today's decision. i would kind of like to get your thinking on how you treat dissent. i think in chairman bernanke's eight years of the largest number of dissents was three. do you see two dissents as a yellow warning flashing light at the policy may need to be moderated down the road and how should market participants read the dissent's? >> well i think it's very natural that the committee should have a range of opinion about a decision as crucial as

what is the right time to begin to normalize policy. we do have a range of views in the committee. i don't consider two dissents to be an abnormally large number. president plus our and fisher have been quite clear in all of their speeches recently in stating that they think the time has come to begin normalizing policy. i think they perhaps have some concerns that if we don't begin to do so soon that inflation will pick up above levels that they would consider desirable or that they have some financial stability concerns. but the committee adopted today's statement by an overwhelming majority and i don't consider it the level of

dissent to be surprising or very abnormal. >> another downgrading your near-term growth forecast as it appeared the potential is much lower than you thought and slack is closing more quickly than you thought? in nearly how can advance in europe and the recent decline in expectations differ? >> so there has been a little bit of downgrading. i think even this time in the longer-run, normal growth rates that committee participants have written down. you are certainly right in saying that over a number of years now, there has been a pattern of forecast errors in which either we have been on

track with respect to unemployment or unemployment has come down in some cases faster than we anticipated and yet growth has pretty persistently been surprising the committee to the downside and that is a statement about productivity growth which has been pretty disappointing. we have had downward revisions in the level of potential output and to some extent at least for a time and a projected pace of growth, so that his been there. there are range of views about long-run growth. a lot of people are writing about this topic. i think the committee's longer-run estimates are the most pessimistic or the most optimistic.

oh about europe. i mean certainly we have discussed the outlook for europe. the very low level of inflation that they have seen recently and the decline that they saw in inflationary expectations and the slow pace of growth. it is one of a number of risks to the global economy and we certainly hope that they will be successful in seeing the pace of growth and inflation pickup. i think i would be good for the global economy in the united states. >> robin harding from the financial times. let's come back to the forward guidance. a large part of the committee

has recently criticized guidances being -- but if i understood your comments earlier that's not correct. how should people understand and if it doesn't have a defined meaning what purpose is it actually serving and do you expect to have -- in the future? thank you. >> we are constantly discussing forward guidance and thinking about whether it's appropriate and how to revise it. we did do a major overhaul of our forward guidance in march. i think the committee participants who have spoken out on this topic recently want to make sure that we have the flexibility that the committee has the flexibility to respond to unfolding developments. they want to make sure that if progress really does turn out to be faster than we would expect,

that the committee would be in a position to start sooner tightening monetary policy. they do not want to be locked into something that the markets see as calendar-based and firm commitment. so they want to emphasize data dependence of our policy and make sure we have appropriate flexibility. but i agree with that and as i said earlier, i think we do not have any mechanical interpretation that applies to this. it of course gives an impression about what we think will be appropriate but there is no mechanical interpretation and i have said repeatedly and i want to say again that if events surprise us and we are moving more quickly toward our

objectives and the committee sees a need to move sooner or later, depending on what the data is, that we do, i do feel we have the flexibility to move. it is important for markets to understand that there is uncertainty and the statement is not some sort of firm promise about a particular amount of time. >> good afternoon. getting back to one aspect of the forward guidance is the statement which you have reiterated about the funds rate probably needing to stay below normal for some time after achieving a mandate consistent level on unemployment and inflation and so forth. the assessments of appropriate

funds rate levels show the funds rate getting up to that 3.75% normal level in the end of 2017. if you look at the set projections of unemployment, inflation and so forth they seem to get back to those mandate consistent levels by the end of 2016 if not much sooner. what is the justification for waiting that much longer to get back to normal particularly when you have such a large balance sheet that you intend to reduce only gradually? is there a danger of getting behind the curve and secondly can i just ask, you envision a time when reduced reserve pressures you may have to resort to asset sales if you don't anticipate doing it now? >> so on the first question of some time before rates return to normal levels, as i mentioned

you can see in the scp that by the end of 2017, many participants are anticipating that rates will return to what they think are normal longer-run levels but the economy in your view will have probably gotten back to normal levels of unemployment and near normal levels of inflation sometime in 2016. so that looks like a year or more in which we would be below normal levels. we asked participants why they hold the views that they do about appropriate policy and there are a number of different explanations that participants give, but a common view on this is that there have been a variety of headwinds resulting from the crisis that have slowed

growth, led to a sluggish recovery from a crisis and that these headwinds will dissipate only slowly, that they are dissipating. an example would be the fact that mortgage credit really is at this point available really to those with pristine credit. credit conditions there are abnormally tight. another thing that we see is that households, expectations about their likely income paths remain quite depressed relative to precrisis levels. that's something that may be holding back consumer spending. so it could be those forces will dissipate over time but only gradually. we have had slow productivity growth and a slow pace of

potential output likely depresses the pace of investment spending. so those are some of the things that participants mention is why it will take some time to get back. it's not that the fed is behind the curve in failing to return the funds rate to normal levels when the economy has recovered. it is rather that in order to achieve such a recovery in 2016 or by the end, it's necessary and appropriate to have a somewhat more accommodative policy then would be normal in the absence of those headwinds. >> i would like to follow up on the question because tomorrow scotland is going to be voting on independence from great britain and there is some

concern that if it does vote to break from great britain that this could cause some turmoil in global financial markets in the global economy. are you concerned about that and do you see any impact if scotland does vote for independence on the european economy and potentially on the american economy and if so is the fed doing anything in per perp -- preparation of the possibility? >> studies show voters about to go to the polls tomorrow and they have had a good debate about this topic and in light of that i don't want to weigh in on this today. >> thank you. pedro to koska with dow jones newswire. my question is that your particular views about whether a graduate -- it's better than a more aggressive and less predictable one. it was some discussion about internally and externally about

whether it was the fed's predictability in the 2004 period that created the conditions of complacency that led to the housing bubble. i wonder if you would be more inclined to be gradualist in your approach and more transparent and outlining future moves or whether you think keeping the market guessing, there are some value to that? thinks. >> this is something the committee is going to have to discuss when the time comes to normalize policy. looking back on the period, the run-up to the financial crisis, i don't think by any means the very predictable pace of 25 basis points per meeting explains why we had a financial crisis but it may be diminished followed utility and has been a small contributing factor. the committee will have to think

about how to do this. i think many people in the aftermath think that someone less of a mechanical pace would perhaps be better but this is a matter that we will in due time have to discuss. [inaudible conversations]

>> st. paul in the 1930s, i wouldn't call at las vegas but it was a very lively city. the gangsters brought their gun bolts. during prohibition to have the biggest jazz artists of the decades here in st. paul. it was a very lively place partially because the gangsters were welcomed here. virtually every major gangster kidnapper and bank robber in america lived and worked within a three block radius of where we are standing today. john dillinger, baby face nelson, alvon creepy carpets all were here. people don't know that. there's no statues of these gangsters but this was the epicenter of 1930s crime in the era of john dillinger. the fbi, the federal hero of

investigation with jaeger hoover had this building as their head quarters. this is also the building for all of those bootleggers and bank robbers were tried and sent to opera tries, leavenworth prison and other prisons across america. it's where it began and where it ended. >> we are standing at historic fort snelling and we are looking over the junction of the minnesota in the mississippi rivers. st. paul is located up the mississippi river from fort snelling. the ford was here before the city was but city was at the fort is intimately connected in the creation of st. paul. in the 1830s there were groups of settlers that were living on the military's property. finally the army had enough of competing with them for resources and they felt that they should be removed officially from military property. the settlers moved across the river to the other side and they formed what became the nucleus of the city of st. paul. when you think about the story and the history of this region

and you think beyond the walls of fort snelling. that is what we try to do here is to push people to think more about what does it mean when all these cultures came together? what perspectives do they have on these historic events? >> nexa government investigation looks at veterans medical care in the phoenix arizona va system. it doctor expose some of the problems at the troubled phoenix hospital testifies and we would hear from robert mcdonald and acting inspector general richard griffin. this house veterans affairs committee is chaired by congressman jeff miller.