president george her better -- e herbert walker bush on a glorious sun-filled day on the white house lawn attended by more people than had ever attended a bill signing in the history of our country, were there and president bush signed into law the americans with disabilities act, a bill broadly supported by democrats and republicans here in the senate and in the house. it was a momentous occasion. you see, most people thought of civil rights as pertaining to people of color, religion, national origin, sex, that type of thing, but up until july 26 of 1990, people with disabilities had that civil

rights. and i remember when president bush signed that law, he uttered these words. he said, "let the shameful walls of discrimination come tumbling down." a wonderful day. and looking back over those 24 years, can anyone deny that our country has made great progress in expanding our concepts of the rights of people with disabilities, the right to be educated and well-educated, the right of people with disabilities to have independent living, to live on their own, not to be institutionalized, the right of people with disabilities to associate freely with others, the right of people with disabilities, children with disabilities, to go to school with other kids who are not disabled, the right of people

with disabilities to travel freely with barriers broken do down, ramps, not stairs, buses that are fully accessible now, trains, everything accessible, every building designed in america -- think about that -- every building designinged and built in america today is fully accessible. and we have gone a great ways in making older buildings, even some of our national monuments, totally bein accessible to peope with disabilities. and people with disabilities are finding more and more employment. they're working, not at some minimum-wage job, but working alongside others, showing that they, too, can contribute to our society. and be fully functioning members of our society. that's what the americans with

disabilities act did for our country. in 1991, the united nations decided that what we had done in america could be an example for the world, and so a commission was established to draw up a convention, a treaty, on the rights of persons with disabilities. i might point out, it was negotiated under the george w. bush administration, and it took several years, but it was hammered out with the concurrence -- get this, with the concurrence and the approval of the george w. bush administration. that u.n. treaty has been sent out for nations to be ratified.

over 150 nations have now ratified it. think about that. of 196 members of the united nations, 150 have already ratified it. one country is singularly absent: the united states, from whence it all started. and if you look at the treaty, if you just read it, it just echos with the americans with disabilities act and the language of what it does. and so i'll have more to say about this later, but i just want to give that background. and weigh brought i we brought s ago for a vote. under our constitution, a treaty requires two-thirds vote. two-thirds of those present and voting. and it was brought up two years ago in december of 2012, and we

didn't have two-thirds vote. so it failed. well, that congress ended. a new congress started so the president had to resubmit it, had to go back to the committee, now under the leadership of senator menendez, had more hearings on it, which was requested. the committee has reported the bill out again with new reservations, understandings, and declarations, and so now it's incumbent upon the senate to debate and vote again on this treaty. i am hopeful that we would have the votes this time, after due consideration over the last couple of years, that we would have the votes necessary. now, the -- the unanimous consent request that i am about to proffer is the mirror image of the same one two years ago. i want everyone to understand that, that this unanimous

consent request was not denied two years ago. we went ahead and we debated and we had a vote. and that's what this unanimous consent request would do, provide us with, again, two hours of debate evenly divided in the usual form and then an up-or-down vote. and we have the time to do it. i mean, you know, what are we doing around here? one quorum call after another. people want to leave here tomorrow night, two hours of debate, a vote. that's nothing. to pass this momentous piece of legislation. so, mr. president, i ask unanimous consent -- mr. president, i ask unanimous consent that at a time to be determined by the majority leader, in consultation with the republican leader, the senate

proceed to executive session to consider calendar number 12, the disabilities treaty document 112-7 [disability] that the treaty be advanced through the parliamentary stages, up to and include the resolution of ratification, that any committee declarations be agreed to, as applicable, that there be no amendments in order to the treaty or the resolution of ratification, that there be two hours for debate equally divided in the usual form, that upon the use or yielding back of time, the senate proceed to vote on the resolution. that any statements be printed in the record as if read. that if the resolution of ratification is adopted, the motion to reconsider be considered made and laid upon the table, that the president be immediately notified of the senate's action that. if the resolution is not

adopted, the treaty be returned to the calendar and that there be no motions or points of order in order other than a motion to reconsider and the senate then resume legislative session. the presiding officer: is there objection? mr. lee: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from utah. mr. lee: mr. president, reserving the right to object. i'd like to note that this is a treaty that has attracted a fair amount of controversy. it's a treaty that was voted on in 2012, failed to receive the requisite two-thirds supermajority vote in order to be ratified by this body. this treaty received additional consideration earlier this year in the senate foreign relations committee on july 22, received a 12-6 vote. there are a number of our colleagues both on and off the committee who have concerns with this treaty who would like to -- the opportunity to propose amendments along with our consideration of this document. roder theus consent, we would not be allowed to propose any amendments and

we'd be given two hours, only two hours to debate it. given the significance of treaties and the fact that they carry the effect of law of the land, once ratified, i think this body deserves more certainly than the opportunity to debate it for only two hours. and to not have the ability, to be precluded here from the opportunity to present any amendments would not be an appropriate thing for us to do. and on that basis, mr. president, i object. the presiding officer: the objection is heard. mr. hark harkin: mr. president? the presiding officer: the senator from iowa. mr. harkin: mr. president, another sad, irresponsible day in the united states senate. i say to my friend from utah, my friend from utah was here two years ago when we proposed the same exact unanimous consent and the senator did not object.

it also did not allow for any amendments. that's usual when we have treaties up that comes through the committee. and so why is the senator from utah objecting today to even doing what we did two years ago? maybe he has the votes to defeat it. i don't know. i don't know. we won't know until we vote on it. but two years ago the senator from utah did not object to the very same unanimous consent. he says there's been a lot of controversy about it. well, that's not so. the only controversy's been raised by the tea party. and some who i call the black helicopter crowd, people that just don't like the united nations. well, i don't care if you like the united nations or not. that's up to you. but it seems to me that we at least ought to bring it up again and debate it and see if

anybody's changed their minds. we've got new people here that were not here two years ago, new senators that have not had the opportunity to express themselves on this treaty. so i -- i disagree with my friend from utah. there's no controversy over this basically. controversy? controversy? huh. here's a treaty supported by former president george h.w. bush, former president george w. bush, former president carter, former president clinton -- all support it. every -- all the veterans' groups support it. american legion, v.f.w., iraqi-afghanistan war veterans, vietnam war veterans -- all strongly support our ratification of this treaty.

the united states chamber of commerce has supported it strongly -- and i don't mean just leaning back. tom donahue, the head of the chamber of commerce, has written, has called people how important this is to the business community that we ratify it. governor engler -- former governor john engler, who is now the head of the business roundtable, brought this up to the business roundtable and they unanimously supported our ratification of this treaty. i -- i just spoke to the business roundtable group just last evening and they were all, at least the ones i talked to individually, couldn't understand why we would block this treaty. because it's good for business. and they understand it. it's supported by the

information technology industry council. that's at&t. and i just spoke with the c.e.o. of at&t last evening. strongly supports it. sprint, adobe, microsoft, all the high-tech people because they understand that we need strong, accessible standards for their products and their software across the globe. all disability groups, every single disability group in america supports this. faith-based groups across the spectrum support it. senator bob dole has worked his heart out on getting votes to rarat my treaty. he has been on the phone -- ratify this treaty. he's been on the phone. he's made appearanced. and we have -- he's made appearances. and we have republicans on it. senator mccain. senator mccain has been strong for this from the very

beginning. senator kirk, senator mark kirk. you know, he's a veteran himse himself. we had a -- we had a press conference with all the veterans' groups here not too long ago and i thought senator kirk said something very poignant. he said, you know, a lot of disabled american veterans fought in places around the world to secure our freedom. they should have the right to travel freely in other parts of the world even though they have a disability. think about that. senator barrasso, strong supporter. senator murkowski, senator collins, senator ayotte have all worked hard on this. but for a couple of people who

raise an objection, we can't bring it up. the senator from utah just objected to bringing it up. two hours of debate and an up-or-down vote? i say, look around the chamber, there's no one here. there won't be anybody here all afternoon. huh. we could have a little debate on this, two hours, they could make their case, we could make our case, a vote, what, 15 minutes? and yet the senator from utah will not let it be brought up. even though he let it be brought up two years ago. he said, well, we can't offer amendments. well, that was the same two years ago. but they didn't object to bringing it up. so when you see all of the support that this has. and i might address an issue, mr. president, that has come up

and it seems to have its genesis in the tea party. and they've raised objections on the basis that somehow by ratifying this treaty we give up our sovereignty as a nation. it erodes our sovereignty. now, that's based upon the fact that there is a commission under this treaty, there's a commission, a u.n. commission set up, 16-member commission, of experts. a commission of experts to draft standards, advise countries on what they need to do to meet their obligations. now, again, if we are a signatory to the treaty, i have no doubt that we would get a seat on that commission. and the high-tech industry

council and the business groups know that, and that's where we have our input to making sure that accessibility standards, software standards, other things are adaptable for us. our business community, our software, our hardware. so the tea party, some of these people have objected to this commission, saying that the commission can issue findings and stuff that take away our sovereignty. mr. president, we have operated at least for the last 20 years under two other treaties that have the same kind of commission of experts and it hasn't eroded our sovereignty. do you know why? because it's only advisory. that commission has no authority to assess penalties or anything else on the united states or any other country. all they can say is, well, you should do this or you should do

that but it's only advisory. how does that erode our sovereignty? and yet, mr. president, the very same people who make the argument that somehow this erodes our sofn sovereignty, wh, they'll rush to the front to vote on a trade agreement, a trade agreement like nafta or other trade agreements that we have, which do erode our sovereignty because it turns over to the world trade organization the ability to fine america, to tell us what we have to do in order to make trade right. they have the ability to tell america what to do, and yet my friends that are objecting to this probably support those trade agreements. yet when it comes to people with disabilities, why is it that

they are so adamant that we cannot join 150 other nations of the world to advance the rights of people with disabilities globally? why is it just people with disabilities that they've focused on? they didn't focus on torture. they didn't focus on -- on the worst forms of child labor. they haven't focused on any of our -- of our trade agreements. but why people with disabilities? it makes you wonder. is this just another blatant form of discrimination against people with disabilities? now maybe, maybe some in that tea party would like to undo the americans with disabilities act. i don't know.

but you can't say honestly, you can't say that, yes, the americans with disabilities act is good. it's done a lot of good for our country, for our business community, for people with disabilities. you can't say that and say, but we don't want to be involved in helping other countries advance the cause of people with disabilities, so people with disabilities in other countries have the same kind of rights, accessibilities, standards that we enjoy in this country for people with disabilities. some people say, well, we're the best in the world on disability law and policy. that's true, we are. so why don't we shine our light around the world? president reagan always referred to america as a shining city on a hill. if you're a shining city on the

hill and no one can get there and you're not willing to help other countries, what does it mean to be a shining city on a hill? is that some kind of, some kind of an idea that only us, only we can have? we are a shining city on a hill when it comes to disability rights, and we ought to be involved in spreading it globally. globally. this is our opportunity to do so. some people say, well, you know, we can work with other countries. if they want our advice, we can go to other countries and help them with disability policy. well, think about that for a second. we don't have the personnel, the wherewithal to go to 150 separate different countries to help them in terms of changing

policy. it takes kind of a collective action where we can join with other countries that have done pretty darned well. there are a lot of other countries that have done very well in disability policy, to join with them much better, much stronger that way than us just going to another country. when i was in china earlier this summer meeting with people about this treaty, which china has adopted, they've signed on, and we talked about the u.s. working with china not only in china, but with other countries to help advance the rights of people with disabilities. china is doing some interesting things. they're starting to move ahead. but this one person said to me, what's so important about america being a part of the

treaty is that when we speak to one another, we speak in a common language of the convention on the rights of people with disabilities. if you're not -- he said to me if the united states is not a part of that and you come to speak to us, you speak to us in a different manner. it's, united states, here's what we do. here's what you ought to do. that doesn't get you very far in diplomacy. but if we work with the chinese and other countries to say here's what we ought to do, here's what other countries have done. here's the standards that we ought to abide by, much more force and effect than if we try to go it alone. i assume that there are military analogies to this. think about the present situation. should we go it alone simply because we are the most powerful, we have the biggest

military, the best weapons and everything else? should we just go it alone because we're the best militarily in the world? i don't think the american people would want that. but we have to join with other countries, and sometimes ask other countries to take the lead. and we provide that strong backdrop. that's as i see it, as disabilities treaty. we have to join with other countries. how can we give up the moral leadership that we have had on this issue both here and abroad, the moral leadership that we've had on advancing the rights of people with disabilities? how can we abdicate that? because a handful of people are afraid of our giving up our sovereignty, which is a bogus

argument. bogus, because as i said, that committee is advisory only. it makes recommendations, but it has no enforcement authority whatsoever. by not ratifying this treaty, we're left behind. think about that. we, the united states, are left behind in a field in which we have carved out leadership. and we're just going to give it up. no, we don't want to lead the world. why wouldn't we want to lead the world in disability policy? to not join 150 other countries, to not provide the leadership, to not provide the expertise that we have developed over 24 years or more relinquishes our responsibility to people with

disabilities both here in america and around the world. why on earth would we want to do that? in ghana, a grad young advocate named emanuel usuva oboa. a man born with no leg but wanted to play soccer, turned his obsession to play into an advocate for helping people with disabilities. in malawi a 21-african nation met on this issue of changing their policies, advancing the rights of people with disabilities. i was asked to go and meet with him, i couldn't because we were here in session in the senate. but that's what they're reaching

out to. they want us to be involved with them to help move this issue forward. in nepal, parents of children with autism banded together to start their own school to educate their children. they want their kids with disabilities to be fully included in society, have opportunities for work and for life. they want us to be joined together with them. it is conspicuous. i was privileged to join senator cardin earlier this summer in b baku, azerbaijan, in a meeting for the committee for security and economic development in europe, and i offered an amendment putting all the nations of europe that are in

that oecd, the organization for economic cooperation and development, that we supported ratification of this treaty. it was adopted unanimously. they want the united states to be a partner in this effort. talk to a disabled veteran who would like to travel overseas maybe with his or her spouse, their children. i recently talked to a mother whose family emigrated here from italy, wanted to go over for a big family reunion but she has a child with a disabilities, and where they were going, no accessibility.

she could have gone and left her son at home, but she couldn't do that. so she missed that big family reunion because of a lack of accessibility in italy. so, mr. president, it is a sad day that one individual on the senate floor would object to bringing this up. when it has such broad support. when it has such broad support. and, you know, i just want to say this one last thing about this issue of sovereignty. i have heard a couple of senators on the republican side talk about the fact that this

commission, we give up our sovereignty, which i've said is a bogus argument. now, let me ask this question of my friends on the other side, the few who have objected to this on the grounds that we would lose our sovereignty. let me ask this question. former president george h.w. bush supports this treaty wholeheartedly. does he not understand about sovereignty? or does he not care about our sovereignty? former president george w. bush, under whose administration this treaty was hammered out, supports it. does former president george w. bush, does he not understand this or does he just not care about our sovereignty?

bob dole, he knows this treaty backwards and forwards. a world war ii hero, presidential candidate, republican leader of the senate, disabled american veteran. are those few people over there that say that this would erode our sovereignty, are they saying that they know more than senator dole? or are they saying senator dole just doesn't care about our sovereignty? which is it? which is it? or those few that raise the issue of sovereignty, u.s. chamber of commerce doesn't care about our sovereignty? i don't think you'd like to say that to tom dunning or john engler at the business round

table. of course they care. tell that to the american legion. tell the american legion they don't care about our sovereignty or they don't understand this, or they're just too stupid to understand. is that what they're saying? or are they saying they are the arbiters? they, that few, they are the arbiters of what is and is not our sovereignty. they rise above all former presidents. they rise above republican leaders, they rise above john mccain, a war hero. believe me, i think john mccain understands about our sovereignty. he knows. he supports it wholeheartedly. are those few that raise this issue saying john mccain doesn't get it or he doesn't care about our sovereignty? which is it? which is it? in fact, john mccain does care about our sovereignty. he does get it and he knows that

this doesn't erode our sovereignty one single iota. but i want to make that point because those few -- they keep raising this issue of sovereignty as though they are the guardians. they alone know what distinguishes our sovereignty and what erodes it. not former presidents, former republican leaders. in fact, every former republican leader of this senate still alive today supports this treaty. every single one of them. my, how far we have gotten off track since the adoption of the americans with disabilities act. that was bipartisan, strongly bipartisan. and the americans with disabilities act amendments that we put through in 2008 strongly

supported by both sides. and i dare say we have strong republican support for this treaty, but for a few on the republican side who just want to adhere to that tea party nostrum that somehow this erodes our sovereignty, and we can't join with them. i will kind of close where i started, mr. president. the unanimous consent that i offer today and that was objected to by the senator from utah is the same as what we had two years ago and no one objected to it. the senator from utah was here. he didn't object two years ago. same unanimous consent; did not object. so it goes back on the calendar, goes back on the executive calendar, and it will be there.

so i guess, mr. president, i would say that the action by a few on the republican side blocking ratification on the convention on the rights of people with disabilities will not be the end. i may be retiring from the senate, but i'm not retiring from this fight. i will never retire. the fight for justice and fairness and equality for people with disabilities both here and around the world. i will never retire from the fight to refute those absolutely unfounded and bogus objections to this crucial treaty. i will continue to work with former senator bob dole, with former veterans, with business leaders, with republicans on the other side who support this treaty, with the international disability community, with our disability community.

i will continue to work with them to advance this and to get it over the hurdle. the false claims, the false claims of those who object to this treaty will be overcome. we will succeed in ratifying this treaty. we will restore america's stature as the world leader on disability rights. and we will continue to fight for justice and a fair shake for people with disabilities, not just here in america but around the world. a sad day. another sad and irresponsible day in the history of the united states senate. mr. president, i --es.

chair will recognize himself and ranking member for purposes of making opening statement. without objection the opening statement of any other member of

the committee who wishes to provide one will be included in the record. a little over two years ago, four americans serving our country in benghazi, libya, were killed. two of them were killed when a facility emblematic of our country was set on fire. and two of them were killed when they dared to fight back and defend themselves. and others. sean smith, chris stevens, ty woods and glen doherty represented us. they represented our country, and our values. we ask them to go. we sent them, and they were killed because some people hold a deep-seated animus toward us simply because we are us. so to the family and the friends, and the loved ones of those killed, we can never adequately express our condolences and our gratitude. as you have to the families you

have helped each of us understand these four were not just pictures on a television screen. they were sons and husbands, and fathers and brothers and friends. and fellow americans. i remain hopeful that there are some things left in our country that can rise above politics. and i remain convinced there are fellow citizens entitled to all of the facts about what happened before, during and after the attacks in benghazi. and they deserve an investigative process that is worthy of the memory of the four who were killed, and worthy of the respect of our fellow americans. some question the need for this committee, and i respect their right to dissent. but the mark of a professional, indeed the mark of character, is to do a good job with a task, even if you don't think the task

should have been assigned in the first place. and given the gravity of the issues at hand, i would rather run the risk of answering a question stwies than run the risk of not answering it once. i am willing to reconsider previously held beliefs in light of new facts and evidence, and i would encourage my colleagues and others to do the same, because we know that all the documents have not yet been produced, and we know that there are still witnesses left to be examined. and we also know that there are witnesses who have been examined in the past, but for whom additional questions may be wanting. so i would ask each of my colleagues, given their vast and varied and exceptional backgrounds, to put those talents to good use on behalf of our fellow citizens. the house of representatives constituted this committee. and they did so for us to find all of the facts. and i intend to do that and i

intend to do it in a manner worthy of the respect of our fellow citizens. our fellow citizens have certain legitimate expectations. they expect us to protect and defend those that we send to represent us. they expect us to move heaven and earth when those who are representing us come under attack. they expect government to tell us the truth in the aftermath of a tragedy always, and they expect that we will not continue to make the same mistakes over and over and over again. which brings us to this hearing. benghazi was not the first time one of our facilities or our people have been attacked. beirut, kenya, tanzania, are three that come to mind among others. and after these attacks, groups come together, and make recommendations on how to prevent future attacks.

that seems to be the process that is followed. a tragedy or an attack comes, we commission a panel, a board, a blue ribbon commission to study the attack and make sure that we make recommendations to ensure that it never happens again. but yet it does happen again. and so to hose who believe it is time to move on, to those who believe that there is nothing left to discover, that all the questions have been asked and answered and that we've learned all the lessons that there are to be learned, we have heard all of that before. and it was wrong then. it is stunning to see the similarities between the recommendations made decades ago, and the recommendations made by the benghazi arb. if you doubt that, i want you to compare the recommendations of those made 25, a quarter of a century ago, 25 years ago, with the recommendations made by the benghazi arb. we do not suffer from a lack of recommendations.

we do suffer from a lack of implementing and enacting those recommendations. that has to end. and so it is appropriate to review the recommendations in the most recent arb and i commend our colleague in california, mr. schiff, for suggesting that we do so. and it is also fair to ask why we have not done a better job of implementing recommendations made in some instances decades ago. . in other words why does it take an attack on our people or our facilities for us to make a recommendation? why not evaluate the threat before the attack? why not anticipate, rather than react? in conclusion the people that we work for yearn to see the right thing done for the right reasons, and in the right way. and they want to know that something can rise above the din

of partisan politics. they want to trust the institution's of government. so to fulfill the duties owed to those we serve and in honor of those who were killed, maybe, just maybe, we can be what those four brave men were, neither republican nor democrat. just americans. and pursue the facts. and justice. no matter where that journey takes us. with that i would recognize the ranking member from maryland. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. and i thank you for holding this hearing today. i know every member of this panel is dedicated to ensuring that our work honors the memories of the four americans who were killed in benghazi. their names must be etched in our memory banks. ambassador chris stevens. sean smith.

tyrone woods. and glen doherty. i want to thank our colleague representative schiff for proposing the topic for today's hearing, and mr. chairman, i want to thank you for accepting that topic, and so that we can see what has become of the arb recommendations. too often over the past two years, the congressional investigation into what happened in benghazi has evolved into unseemly partisanship. we're better than that. today we have an opportunity to focus on reform. how can we learn from the past to make things better in the future? mr. chairman, i agree with you, that over the years,

recommendation after recommendations have been made. the question is, as you said, what became of them? i do believe that in life there are transformational moments. that is, something happens, it causes you to stop and pause, and try to figure out how to remedy the situation and make it better. and the problem is is when those moments come, and they come to all of us. the question is, is whether we pause make things better, because usually if we don't, we repeat the the errors and usually things get worse. and this is one such transformational moment. the kind of oversight that can

be product iive, it can be critical. it can sometimes even be tedious. but it can also save lives. that's what we're talking about. and that's why i want to thank every member of this panel for agreeing to do this. for we are about the business of trying to save lives. that's a very serious mission. i sincerely hope the select committee will stay on course of constructive reform and keep this goal as our north star. it would be a disservice to everyone involved to be lured off this path by partisan politics. today we will review the recommendations of the accountability review board. which was chaired by ambassador thomas pickering and admiral michael mullen, the former chairmen of the joint chiefs of

staff. during our previous investigation house oversight committee and chairman gaudy and i heard directly from both men about how seriously they took their roles. ambassador pickering called it, and i quote, a debt of honor. their report was independent, it was adopted unanimously by all board members, and it was a blistering examination of what went wrong at the state department. they made 29 recommendations and secretary clinton accepted all of them. after they issued their report, the state department inspector general issued his own report finding that, and i quote, the department wasted no time addressing the recommendations, end of quote. the department has been working on implementing those recommendations for the past year and a half. and congress should ensure that it finishes the job.

today, i would like our witnesses to provide an update on the status of several of the board's recommendations. first, the board found that the department's response to the deteriorating security situation in benghazi was, i quote, inadequate, and it was inadequate at the point in benghazi, at the embassy in tripoli, and here in washington. ambassador pickering explained that the post did not take action despite crossing several trip wires that should have caused officials to review security more closely and develop a stronger response. the board recommended that the department change its procedures to make sure that security breaches are reviewed immediately. today the department reports that it has created a new process that requires posts to

report trip wires as soon as they are crossed, so security officials can review them immediately and take action if necessary. i want to know if this process is now fully operational. and if so, how it has been working so far. the board also found that we should not have relied so heavily on local militia groups like february 17th militia. to protect our post. or call this reliance, and i quote, misplaced, end of quote. and they found that the security forces were, quote, poorly skilled, end of quote. the board recommended the department strengthen security and i quote, beyond the traditional reliance on host government security, supporting high risk, high threat posts, end of quote. today the department reports

that it has 17 new marine security guard detachments, and another new marine unit to enhance security in changing threat environments. in addition, the skate department is now using new funding from congress to hire 151 new personnel in the bureau of diplomatic security or d.s. i want to hear from our witnesses about whether these actions are sufficient or whether we need to do more. the board also found fault with a deputy assistant secretary with d.s. who denied repeated requests for additional security in benghazi. at the time this official oversaw the security of all 275 diplomatic posts around the world. to address this problem the department created a new position to focus exclusively on the security needs of roughly 30

posts experiencing highest threats. the board praised this action, stating that it could be, and i quote, a positive first step integrated into a sound strategy for d.s. reorganization. today i want to hear from the state department specifically about how this new position is working, and whether they believe we should make additional changes. everyone understands that diplomacy by its nature sometimes requires to be a very dangerous places. how diplomats work in high threat environments, and although we cannot eliminate every risk, we must do everything that we can to keep americans as safe as possible when they are serving overseas. with that i want to conclude by recognizing the tremendous sacrifices that are made every single day.

around the world our diplomatic core, the intelligence community and our military service members on behalf of the american people. and i remind my colleagues that this is our watch. i said to the chairman before we started, this is bigger than us. the things that we do today, and over the next few months, will have lasting effects, even when we're gone on to heaven. and that's how we have to look at this. so we prepare not only for the present, but we prepare for the future and generations unborn. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you gentleman from maryland. the committee will now recognize and receive testimony from today's witness panel. the first witness will be the honorable greg starr the assistant secretary for diplomatic security at the department of state. second witness will be todd kyle a member of the independent panel of best practices and third witness will be mark sullivan the chair of the independent panel on best practices. welcome to each of you.

we will recognize each of you for your five minute opening statements. there are a series of lights which mean what they traditional mean in life, and i am sure that you are familiar with the lighting system, because this is an investigative hearing, i will need to administer the oath to the witnesses before taking their testimony. so if the witnesses would please rise, and lift their right hands. do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. may the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. secretary starr you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement. >> chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and distinguished committee members, good morning. and i thank you for your invitation to appear today to discuss the department of state's implementation of the 29 recommendations made by the independent benghazi accountability review board, also known as the arb.

>> mr. secretary, i don't want to interrupt you. would you pull the mic just a little. some of us have had a couple birthdays recently and we're heard of hearing. >> i, too, sir. i along with my colleagues at the state department look forward to working with you as you examine the issues relating to the 2012 terrorist attack in benghazi. the attacks in benghazi were tragic. today we honor those we lost by internalizing the lessons from that night to protect our people in the field as they carry out our country's foreign policy work every single day. over the past two years, with secretary kerry's leadership, that commitment is being honored. like you, we want to keep our people safe. the heart of the accountability review board's recommendations was to enhance the department's approach to risk management. ensuring that when our national interests require us to operate

in dangerous places, that we identify the risks and take the proper steps to mitigate them. the department has made important strides in that regard. i'd like to highlight just a few examples of how we're implementing the arb's recommendations, including how we are giving high threat post the attention and resources that they need. however, even with this progress it is essential for us to acknowledge that while we can do everything we can to reduce the risk, we can never eliminate it fully. high threat, high risk posts require special attention to confirm our national interests require us to operate there, and to provide the right resources to do that. we have instituted a new process called the vital presence validation process, shortland vp-2 as we call it, to do just hat. one example of it in action is our recent return to bangi

central african republic. the department suspended operations there in december of 2012. process and a support cell process, that plans for how we go in to these operations, the analysis that determined that we should and could go back. we worked with our colleagues at the department of defense to assess the security situation on the ground, and develop a comprehensive plan for our return. i'm proud to report that we deployed dod and state department personnel just last we week. the embassy is now open. while we must closely monitor conditions on the ground our return to bengi demonstrates our procedures are working. another example of our enhanced posture since benghazi is how we've improved at training. chief of personnel drgs chief admission personnel including both security professionals and

all foreign service personnel are now better prepared for operating if high threat environments. we've increased the expanded training for our ds special agents, who receive high threat training specifically and then we've also expanded what we call our foreign affairs counterthreat course for foreign service colleagues that are going to all of our high threat posts. and we're working towards making this foreign affairs counter threat training universal for foreign service personnel and employees for all of our posts overseas. further, to combat fire as a weapon we partnered with the city of new york fire department and the army's asymmetric warfare group to enhance our training curriculum and implement countermeasures in response to fire and smoke as a terrorist weapon. finally, with your help, we have added to our security resources. the arb recommended that we expand the number of diplomatic security personnel, and we have done just that. we are well on our way to just

finishing that off and hitting all of our targets. it also recommended that we augment the marine security -- marine security guard program which we have done, as well. while these are just a few examples of the department's efforts post-benghazi i believe they highlight some of the key progress we have made. i will not outline all of the things we've done in the interest of time but i'm pleased to report that we have made what i consider to be tremendous progress on the 29 benghazi arb recommendations. to date we've closed 22 recommendations, and 7 are in progress or nearing completion. today we're better prepared, better protected and informed to manage the risk. we look forward to working with congress, and you, on ensuring that foreign affairs, our foreign affairs community has safe platforms for carrying out our national interests. i want to thank congress for the additional resources that you provided over the past two years to improve and sustain this diplomatic platform.

and i'll be glad to answer any questions that you have. thank you. >> thank you. mr. kyle? >> thank you, chairman gaudy, ranking member cummings and distinguished members of the select mitty for inviting me to testify about our independent panel report on best practices. in the aftermath of the tragic attack on the u.s. mission in benghazi, libya, and to provide our insight regarding the (urjjp'd related issues relevant to our report. our panel was committed to identifying best practices from the u.s. government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners which can finally establish an effective risk management process in the department of state. improve the security of u.s. diplomatic facilities abroad, and enhance the safety of department of state and foreign affairs agencies, personnel, not only in high risk areas, but globally. we identified 40 crucial

recommendations to achieve this goal. we continue to stand behind our report in the strongest possible terms. and believe that the 40 recommendations and the supporting narratives which were derived from well-known and established best practices provide a clear road map for an absolutely necessary organizational paradigm change throughout the department of state to support the current direction of expeditionary diplomacy and the application of proven enterprise risk management enhancements. mr. chairman, and distinguished members, i spent a career of almost 23 years as a special agent with the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. as a result of my years of service, i am uniquely familiar with the history and most importantly the operating culture both within the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. as our panel interviewed hundreds of people in the u.s. and abroad and gained valuable ground truth from our travel to

ten countries during our work, including numerous high threat locations, i couldn't have been more personally and professionally proud and heartened, along with my fellow panel members, by hearing and witnessing the dedicated and admirable work of the men and women of the diplomatic security service. each day around the world the ds team faces extreme challenges and unpredictable risks to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of u.s. foreign policy, and they do so with distinction. the men and women of the bureau of diplomatic security are truly dedicated public servants, and are owed the gratitude of the american people for their service to this great nation. as we stated repeatedly throughout our report, best practices will not save lives. unless they are resourced, implemented and followed. almost 14 now, actually almost 15 years ago as was mentioned in the chairman's opening

statement, a number of very similar recommendations were made after the east african embassy bombings and little has been accomplished by the department of state since then to improve its approach to risk management. while we're pleased our report has been finally officially released by the state department, along with the implementation fact sheet, we are disappointed with the decision not to implement recommendations, number one. the most important one. and recommendation number 13. in a meeting earlier this year with deputy secretary higenbottom and assistant secretary starr we were encouraged by their candor and support for our report, and their intent to adhere to the recommendations in our report. in light of the long history of such report, and recommendations to the department of state, and with a continuing sense of responsibility, we voiced our concerns in a recent letter to deputy secretary higen bottom both for those recommendations not implemented, and those that are apparently relying on pre-benghazi processes and

procedures to demonstrate or achieve implementation. now is the time clear the smoke. remove the mirrors, now is the time for the department of state to finally institutionalize some real, meaningful and progressive change. and as the ranking member said this is a transformational moment. they can't lose this moment. words and cursory actions by the department of state ring hollow absent transparency, and verifiable and sustainable actions to fully put into practice the letter and the intent of our recommendations. which will facilitate diplomacy and safeguard the selfless americans who carry out our national security priorities around the world. the department of state owes it to those people who have given their lives in service to our country and to those employees who continue to serve our country in some very dangerous locations around the world, to continue to identify and implement risk management best practices. additionally, we urge the department to institutionalize the process of outside and

independent counsel and guidance on risk management best practices, sooner than 2016. the accountability review board recommended that this be an annual process and we concur that this remains a critical need for the department and should begin as soon as possible. in our view, this is a decisively important step the department must take to demonstrate transparency, and ensure a continuing dialogue on security best practices, with and input from outside independent experts regarding operations in high threat and challenging international locations. finally, mr. chairman, i'd like to take just a quick moment to introduce another member of our panel sitting in the audience, mr. ray vislack. his multiple careers in public service include more than 25 years as an fbi agent, five years as director of security at the cia. ray exemplifies the definition of a great american. thank you, mr. cheryl. >> thank you mr. keil and welcome to your guest. mr. sullivan you're recognized for five minutes. >> good morning, chairman gowdy,

ranking member cummings and distinguished members of the committee. thank you for asking todd keil and i to appear before you today. mr. chairman, i consider it an honor to have served on the best practice panel with outstanding and dedicated individuals. our team of todd keil, richard manlove, raymond mislock jr. timothy murphy and staff, erica lickleiter and stephanie murdoch have a combined experience of 175 years of experience in law enforcement expertise. during our careers, each panel member has gained an appreciation in understanding of the importance of having clear lines of leadership and organizational structure concerning security matters. we as a panel also understand that things don't always go as planned. and when they don't, it is vital to implement lessons learned in an effort to prevent them from happening again.

the panel report reflects the independent views of the panel based upon our best professional judgment. experience, and analysis of the best practices. informed by interviews, travel, and extensive research. it was a pleasure to serve with this dedicated group, and i appreciate their professionalism, and hard work. i would also like to acknowledge and thank all of those interviewed in the course of drafting this report from the u.s. government, private sector, international organizations, and foreign governments. the best practice panel was the result of the accountability review board for benghazi. which recommended that the department of state establish a panel of outside independent experts with experience in high risk, high threat areas, to support the bureau of diplomatic security.

identify best practices, and recommendations from other agencies and countries. and evaluate united states security platforms in high risk, high threat posts. our report provided 40 recommendations, in 12 different areas. those 12 areas are organization and management, accountability, risk management, program acceptable risk, planning and logistics, lessons learned, training and human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and security assessment, program resource and technology, host nations and guard force capability enhancement, regular evaluation and change management, leadership, and communication and training. it was the opinion of the panel,

all 40 recommendations, with further strengthen the department's ability to protect its personnel and work more safely on a global platform to achieve american foreign policy goals and objectives. the panel's view was that its recommendations were realistic, achievable, and measurable. on august 29th, 2013, the panel delivered its final report to the department of state. of the 40 recommendations we offered, the department accepted 38. of the 38 accepted recommendations, the department of state has reported that 30 have been implemented, and in addition, the implementation process for the remaining eight is ongoing. the two recommendations not accepted are the department should, as a matter of urgency, establish an undersecretary for diplomatic security, and number 13, waivers to establish security standards should only

be provided subsequent to the implementation of mitigating measures as agreed by regional bureau or other program managers. advised by department of state, and as informed by the department risk management model. the best practice panel looked across a wide spectrum of private and nongovernmental organizations to identify effective measures to enhance the department's ability to ensure a safe and secure environment for employees and programs. not surprisingly, the panel found that many institutions, including governments, referred to the department of state, bureau of diplomatic security, as the gold standard for security and seek to model their service after the bureau of diplomatic security. nevertheless, any organization must continuously evolve and improve to adjust with a fluid and dynamic environment. the panel continues to advocate that the way forward should be characterized by cooperative

efforts that will provide a framework which will enhance the department's ability to protect americans. in order to be effective, we must be innovative so that we ensure institutions adapt and evolve to meet the ever-changing security requirements needs. many environments of uncertainty permeates one certainty we share is the necessary collaborative effort that is needed in our country to ensure the safety and security of all american lives. it is also a necessary certainty that we honor and protect the memories of those citizens who have been lost as a result of violent attacks with dignity and respect. i would like to take this opportunity to thank the department of state, the overseas post that hosted our panel's visit, and the bureau of diplomatic security for the outstanding support they provided to our panel during our endeavor. i would also like to chang chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and members of the select committee for inviting us

here today and your continued efforts to make america safe. i look forward to any questions you may have. thank you. thank you. >> thank you, mr. sullivaqrpl?"2 t18xtñ

these include things like rocket attacks, firebombing, attempted murder, arson, takeovers, vandalism. it wasn't until 1987 that the state department started what are called accountability review boards and there in 19 arb's since that time. and there have been 19 arbs since that time. they've reviewed only -- and as i understand, it's the mission of the arbs to review only the most significant attacks against our diplomatic personnel, and to review specifically security, and intelligence, and whether or not government employees reach -- as the chairman and ranking member have brought up, in the 1998 east african bombings, 300 lives were lost. 12 americans, the rest were africans, and an arb was convened then, and as we've

already heard they made several findings and recommendations then. this follows what was called the inman panel which was 14 years before the east african arb. and again many of those findings and recommendations were found in east africa, in their arb. at the time the then-secretary of state accepted all of the recommendations in the east africa arb. and now here we are, 14 years later and some of those same recommendations have been repeated by the benghazi arb. and so we seem to have a state department that has a long history of repeat recommendations. but i think there's a significant difference between recommendations, and implementation. and i'd like to talk about how that happens. and how that has happened. in fact, the board in east africa urged the secretary of state to, quote, take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring

the security of u.s. diplomatic personnel abroad. and it was essential to convey to the entire department that security is one of its highest priorities. assistant secretary starr, are you familiar with the east africa recommendations? >> not every specific recommendations, but with the report, yes, ma'am. >> and do you agree with the report? >> yes. >> are you aware that after the benghazi arb, then-secretary gave her personal assurances, as well, that she put overall responsibility for implementing all of the arb recommendations in the hands of the deputy secretary. are you familiar with that? >> yes, i am. >> and that was, in fact, in her letter to -- in december of '12 to at the time the honorable john kerry, chairman of foreign relations. she indicated that the deputy secretary would be overseeing the implementation of the arb.

are you familiar with her letter? and then are you familiar with the fact that when secretary kerry became the secretary of state, he initially kept it at the deputy secretary level, is that correct? and could you please speak into the mic, thank you. >> yes, ma'am. >> today, however, overall responsibility for oversight and implementation of all of the recommendations is with an office known as management policy right-sizing innovation. is that correct? one of eleven separate offices that reports to the undersecretary of management. >> mpri is tracking. they are not necessarily responsible for implementing, but they are doing the job of tracking the implementation, yes. >> and it is their job. and so i'd like to just point out, for those who might not be familiar, and you, too, are an assistant secretary reporting to the undersecretary of

management, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> and so, with respect -- and you say that they are tracking the implementation. however, that is the office that is day in and day out going in and trying to ensure that all of those recommendations are being followed. is that correct? >> one office, yes. >> and so at this point, the arb recommendations, it's really not at the secretary of state level, it's not at the deputy secretary of state level, the second level, it's not with an undersecretary, but the tracking is happening at the fourth tier. is that correct? the tracking and making sure that day in and day out is at the fourth tier. >> the tracking is going on at mpri. but i can also give you further information about how it is, in fact, being closely looked at by the deputy secretary herself. >> and the deputy secretary, are you familiar with the inspector general's report, sir? >> yes, i am. >> and the inspector general,

who issued the report in 2014, also believed that at the highest levels in the department, those are the individuals that must be personally responsible for overseeing those recommendations. isn't that correct? >> yes, it is. >> and, in fact, indicated in the i.g. report that that's how lasting change and cultural change would happen. is if implementation were at the highest levels of the department. >> yes. that is true. >> i'd like to ask mr. keil, if you might, your best practices panel indicated that where a security function is placed in a department is a statement of how that organization values security in its personnel. do you recall that finding? >> yes, ma'am, very well. >> and can you please explain with respect to recommendation

number one, which has not been implemented by the department, can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation of elevating the importance, actually, of mr. starr's position, to a higher level? can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation, and what you understand as to why the department is not elevating the importance of security within the organization at the current time? >> as we looked at other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, it became very clear that the placement of the chief security officer with responsibility for the safety of the programs, and the people, clearly depends on where it's placed within the organization. especially at the department of state where visuals, because of the culture of the department of state are so crucially important. the placement of that position, it was crucially important. mr. starr previously served up

at the united nations in charge of their department of safety and security. in that organization, he was an undersecretary. that position was an undersecretary. the united nations recognized that important and that diplomatic world where you see things really matters. and, ma'am, if you'd actually look at our recommendation number 40, we recommended that the secretary should establish a comprehensive change management strategy throughout the department that is led by the deputy secretary for management resources. so those two things clearly come together and are crucially important. >> and in your view, the best practices panel, when they looked at the organization of the department, it was clearly your view that overall responsibility for security from a visual standpoint, which is important in large organizations, was too low on your chart? >> from a visual standpoint and also from an operational standpoint. i remember on the first day when we brought out the chart as part of our panel mr. sullivan was trying to find the bureau of

diplomatic security and i had to keep pointing him further and further down the chart until he identified it. >> and while it might not just be where it's placed on the chart visually, it has to do with command and control, does it not? >> exact. command and control and informed decision making. >> and, in fact, when you are a lower level on an organization chart that requires you to then move up within the organization to get approval for things that you'd like to do, is that correct? >> yes, of course. >> i'd like to just briefly wrap up with mr. sullivan. and with respect to -- you've led a large federal agency, the secret service. is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> and you understand the span of control, and so with respect to the need to lead lasting cultural change in an organization, which is what i believe this panel is going to try to lead and to do, where does that need to start?

>> i think it needs to start at the top. >> and when you start at the top, which would be the secretary of state, if you want to emphasize within your entire organization the importance, and in this place of security, the deputy secretary or the undersecretary, which are considered principles in a department, is that correct? and that's the highest levels? >> yes, ma'am. >> and with respect, do you have any other comments you'd like to make with respect to mr. keil's assessment? >> when we look at management, that is a very large and very complex directorate. it has important functions going on there but its personnel, budget procurement i believe there may be about 20 or 21 assist avt secretaries or deputy assistant secretaries reporting up to that undersecretary. and for us, quite frankly, this was not about an upgrade in title. quite frankly, from my perspective, i don't really care

what the title is. i just think there needs to be a direct report up to the, you know, in my former position, and i may be biased, you know, i reported directly to the secretary. we had the deputy secretary of the fbi was on our panel, and the fbi directory put it to the attorney general. we just believe that it's a -- that that's the way that this should be structured. we think internally and externally, it tells people, you know, where security is thought to be, and the importance of security. but again this was not about an upgrade in title. this was just about clarity of who's in charge of security. >> thank you. and i yield back. >> the gentle lady from indiana yields back. the chair will recognize the gentleman from washington mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. talked a lot about process. who is in charge. how can we -- i always think one of the first recommendations when everything goes wrong, going to go back and review who was in charge, how we can change the process, how can we sort of move around, who was -- who was

and who should be responsible? but what i really want to focus on is what should be done. regardless of who it is, who is in charge of it, the challenge i see, and i've, you know, as i've traveled around the world to various different posts, i'm just, you know, awed and amazed at the risks that people who serve in the state department take every day. i went to a consulate we have in peshawar in pakistan, and just listened in to the personnel there talk about going back and forth to work every day, all the security that's involved. we are in a lot of dangerous places throughout the world. and most of the people in state department that i talk to, you know, take a certain amount of pride in that. it's their job, they're going to tough places to make sure that american interests are respected and watched over. but the question becomes, how do you protect them? so, you know, we've got the recommendations, these recommendations, what have we learned about what you can

specifically do forgetting for the moment of who is in charge of doing it to enhance security at high risk posts. security atk posts? i guess it will be two piece. how do you identify the high-risk posts, first of all? and second of all, once you identify one, what do you do? how do you then try to enhance security and make sure that people are protected? and if you can tyie that back into what played out in benghazi, what should have happened as a result of that identification that didn't. and then the broader question about high-risk posts and how you approach them now and befor before. >> thank you. we have always rank ordered our posts according to threat. we look at the threat of terrorism. we look at the threat of civil disorder. this is done in a process every single year with a tremendous amount of input from the post

itself, from the emergency action committee on the post, which has members from all the different agencies that are represented. we rank order these posts and give them ratings for terrorism, for civil disorder. for things like crime, counterintelligence, human intelligence, technical intelligence. >> and then the question, the real key question there is then what? once you identify them, how do you try to better protect them? >> we look at these posts and for years we have worked through the overseas security policy board to craft security policies and standards. physical security standards. technical security standards. procedural security standards on what we can do at these posts, at these different threat levels. once we decide and we see that a post is in our highest threat. so let's say a critical threat category, we're going to devote more rsos. we're going to look at what is the size of the marine detachment? does it need to be larger? in terms of the posts, that

plays a huge role in when we decide which posts we want to rebuild after the capital skurlt cost sharing program. and we prioritize, replacing the most vulnerable posts with more, with newer, much more robust, much safer facilities that we build with funding from congress and offiverseas office and buildings. we look at threat and make determinations now in the aftermath of benghazi. w our highest risk 30 posts. we sent out teams specifically to those posts, and in addition to making sure that they meet the security standards, are there things that we need to do in addition to the security standards that make sense? these were multiagency teams that we sent out. we continued to look at the threat information from every post around the world that we get every single morning. we start at 8:00 a.m. every morning looking at the threat information that we get. but one of the critical lessons

we learned from benghazi is there are many times, andny we know this from times past, that we don't get specific threat information before an attack. if we did, we would thwart the attack. and congresswoman brooks talked about how many attacks we have suffered over the years. that's our document that we put out to ensure that people know what the environment is. or we may evacuate the post. there are times we go to the the u.s. military and ask the department of defense to augment our protection on the ground. in tripoli we had nearly 100 marines with us, so on a daily basis we look at exactly what's happening on our post overseas.

try to make sure we're aware of whatever intelligence is out there. try to make sure we're fully aware of the larger instability question and what does that mean to us and put the right resources in the right place and take the proper steps. >> so as a result of the arrb on this specific instance, what do you think you learned specifically about benghazi? what should have been done there that wasn't? and actually let me ask mr. sullivan that question. >> our focus was not to evaluate what happened in benghazi. our focus was to come up with best practices. during the course of that, we did become aware of certain things that did happen in ben gau benghazi. when we met with tp assistant secretary, and we met as a panel, we quickly determined that we were going to take our approach from a tactical approach to more strategic approach. we recognized that, you know,

they didn't need us to tell them what type of weapons to get, what type of fire equipment to get. that we needed to approach this from a strategic perspective. i think one of the things you see in any type of situation where things go bad is communication. i think this comes down to communication. and you know, we made recommendations under planning and logistics. we made four different recommendations there. and i believe for any type of a trip, whether it be to benghazi or wherever you go, there has to be a cohesive plan. there has to be logistics. you have to do a very good job of risk management. obviously, there was a communication breakdown for that visit to benghazi. i think it was mentioned earlier that there were numerous trip wires. i think in that spring, starting in march of 2012 and going up until july or august of 2012, there are numerous incidents that were occurring in benghazi.

i think one embassy moved out, the british moved out of benghazi. that needed to be communicated. that needed to be discussed. they needed to talk about what were the mitigating measures they were going to take to protect our people at that mission? and again, i think that unfortunately, four people paid the price. because that communication didn't occur and that planning and logistics quite frankly didn't happen the way we were recommending it should occur. and which i have ever confidence that assistant secretary starr and his staff are working on right now. >> do you want to add something on that? >> i think, congressman, the first question is it's not about how many people you send, how many walls you build. and the first question has to be, and that's where we change from a tactical approach to a strategic approach. the first question has to be, do we need to be there? do we need to be in benghazi? and the department lacks a risk

management process to make those informed decisions. do we need to be in those places? do the risks -- are the risks less than the national security priorities or the policy gains? the department does not have the process to determine do we need to be there and do we need to stay? that's the center and the heart of our report. the department needs that process. not just give them more people. not just give them more guns. if the national security priorities outweigh the risks, fine. then go. there's nothing wrong with that. we're not saying don't go. but you need a risk management process, which the department lacks to make those determinations. >> congressman, my good friend todd kyle here. could i just say, perhaps it should be past tense. lacked as opposed to lacks. this is one of the things that we've concentrated on most over the past two years. it is the heart of the vital presence validation process. >> and talk about that.

the chairman talked at the outset of the necessity of this panel. but we've done that with a number of different reports. and as you point out, we made this change now. so what is different about that communications level as a result of the arb and some of the other studies that we've done? >> sir, the biggest single change that i would really like to point out is the department's acceptance. not just acceptance, but embracing this concept that first and foremost, as todd just alluded to, we need to ask the question, why are we in the most dangerous places? and the 30 places that we identified as the highest risks, that's exactly what we're doing. going through every single one of those 30 and doing this vital presence validation process. the first step is, what is our national interest for being there? why should we run these high risks that we've already

identified as a high threat, high risk post. and if the answer comes out that the risks don't outweigh why we should be there, the national interests, then we're going to make decisions that either we have to put additional security in, or we're going to have to wait. >> and we've actually in the last year pulled out of posts in the result of that process, correct? >> not as a result of that process. that's the longer strategic process. the risk management process and the principles of it, yes, exactly so. we have pulled or closed post because of that thing. >> thank you, gentleman. >> the chair would now recognize the gentleman from kansas. >> you said in you recent testimony there was no immediate tactical warning. that's the saying arb had found before, is that correct? >> that's my understanding, yes. >> and it is also the case that in your experience that it's often not the case that there's an immediate tactical warning. >> that is very true, sir. >> and so i want to talk about

that intelligence. you in your opening statement didn't mention anything related to findings 21 and 22. in fact, in unof these matters. if you don't have the threat analysis right, all the various things you talked about is meaningless if you don't have the threat analysis correct. if you don't have the right intelligence and have it in the right place. would you agree with that? >> yes, sir. but i would just add it's not just the intelligence. you also have to look at the entire situation in the country. it's analysis and intelligence. >> i would agree with that as well. there were some 20 incidents referred to in and around from march 2012 up until the death of the four americans where there was an incredibly deteriorating situation in and around benghazi. would you agree with that as well? >> the situation was deteriorating. >> and in fact, number 21 said careful attention should be paid to that kind of thing. and your only response to that

particular finding was the department has addressed this recommendation. can yo u the u tell me what tha? what it is you've done to address that recommendation? >> i can discuss part of it in open session, sir. literally we start every morning at 8:00 a.m., looking at every bit of threat intelligence and threats that come in from a wide variety of sources, not just the intelligence community, be u from our posts in the reporting. beyond that, we bring in personnel from the regional bureaus, the political officers and others that are with us that we're not just just looking at the threat intelligence. as you pointed out and we well know, in many cases we don't pick up the threat. >> is this different from pre-benghazi to post-benghazi. >> this is different, sir. we are incorporating the regional bureaus with us. we are looking at the political reporting in addition to the intelligence reporting.

we are looking at the sources that we get from private companies, from ngos in the area, the entire question of instability. what is the overall threat profile, and, i would say that a much better job of looking at the entirety of the threat situation as opposed to just whether or not we know -- whether there's a specific threat against us. >> and after all the the incidents in the previous years that were accounted so elegantly this morning. you weren't doing that before the incidents of september 11th, 2012 or before the arb's findings. is that right? the state department wasn't do that, is that what i understand from your testimony? >> i think we're doing it better than we were before. >> and can you tell me if any of the changes would have made an impact on the lives of those four americans in benghazi? had we been doing those before that date? >> hard for me to say, sir. i was at the united nations at that time. i can tell you that at the u.n.

when i was the undersecretary general, we were aware of the deteriorating security situation in benghazi. on the date of the attack, september 11th, 2012, i still had u.s. personnel in benghazi as well. >> let me change topics a little bit. one of the findings of the best practices panel that now dates over a year ago was the state department had not interviewed the ds agents who survived the attack at benghazi special mission, as of that date. is that still the case? >> the agents were interviewed by the fbi. the agents were interviewed by diplomatic security. >> so the state department now -- was the the panel incorrect, or did you conduct the interviews after the panel's report, the independent panel's report? >> they were done prior to the best practices panel. we had discussed tactics tw the agents, but we had not fully debriefed them on the incident

because we had the fbi 302s. >> it would be pont to know what the folks on the ground saw, right? it would be very important to know what those people saw. >> yes, sir. >> the same for the folks there that night. but there previously as the department of state interviewed all of those persons at this point? >> i hesitate to say all. we have interviewed a number of them. >> were they conducted vinlly or in groups? when the interviews were conducted by the department of state, were they conducted individually, or were they group interviews? >> individually. >> i ask that question because you know the arb conducted group interviews. i've seen that dynamic. i was in business 16 years before this when the boss is sitting around, the underling isn't quite as candid as they would be. if you look at the findings and evaluate they're sufficient for

you to do what you need to do, that's important to know the the basis for what the arb did as well sochlt the interviews were conducted by the department of state individually? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. mr. kyle, mr. cummings' reference to state department general's inspector report, it indicated at least two secretaries of state have asked the question about whether the arb was a sufficient process. that is is it capable of handling investigations of the complexity that we see here. do you think that the arb itself is sufficient to make the transition from facts known about incident to conducting good security policy moving forward? >> i think there are limitations. they have significant limitations in what they can and can't do. it clearlymd impacts their

effectiveness. >> and back to you. finding 23 goes to some of those limitations. it goes to the authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory resources. are you prepared to testify today you'll help us continue to make sure that the arb does, in make surhe ability to make , in sure that the leaders of organizations are held accountable for any errors that they may have made. >> yes, sir. and it's my understanding that we have been looking at this and working with congress since december of -- sorry. january of 2013 on this. may i also just say that one of the points that i think is important to make is while the arb in several cases may not have the expertise to look at everything, the fact that the arb recommended that we consider putting together a best practices panel that could then delve further into the specifics, i think proves that the arb can make recommendations that can go beyond what they can do and look even further. i think that's a very good example of the fact that while

the arb might not have the exact expertise that you're talking about, recommendations can be made to bring in other experts to do these things. >> i appreciate that. so you think it's important that the arb have the capacity -- at least recommend some type of disciplinary action against senior leaders. >> the arb already has the ability to recommend disciplinary action if they find a breach of duty. think think we're looking at whether they find a lack of leadership. i would support that as well. >> that's exactly what i was asking. mr. starr, i know you weren't on that. none of you were. i want to make sure we understand precisely what is there. people who might know something about intelligence and is a good situation on the ground that night a? >> i do not know the answer to that. >> there's a handful more questions about what i think the scope of arb, i think they're important. i also wonder if you all have had a chance to review any of

the intelligence that has been gathered as a result of the capture -- whether you want a chance to incorporate that in your ideas that implementing the arb? >> we are aware of the debriefings. we are looking at some of the debris for material that is relevant to us and we are taking the proper steps based on what we find. >> great, thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. great, thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you very much. mr. star, i want to pick up where miss brooks left off. how is the department tracking compliance with the benghazi arb recommendations? can you tell me briefly?

>> it's correct that the npri office is the one actually doing the tracking as we go through these. but i can tell you that i've had many meetings with the deputy secretary, myself, anyone that has anything to do with a response of a particular arb answer or best practices panel answer or the management panel answer where we have sat with a deputy secretary and literally gone through every single one of the recommendations. where are we? how have we answered it? what is the response? how far along in implementation are we? we have these meetings about every other month. she's out at the the moment. but literally she has been on top of this and tracking it since the beginning. >> and so, you said that there were seven arb recommendations that have not been completed.

is that right? is that what you're saying? >> we are still in progress or nearing completion on seven of them. but they're not totally fulfilled. >> and do you have a time line on those? >> some of those, sir, are what i would refer to as evergreen recommendations. and i'll give you an example. one of the recommendations was for better language if r the security agents. since that time, we worked with fsi and specifically put together some courses in arabic and french. we call them alert courses. they're much shorter. they're specific to training d.s. agents and the types of language capabilities that they need in a short period of time. we have the courses in place. but the reality is it's going to take me a long time, you know, as agents get ready to rotate overseas and put them into the training and then get them trained. so that's the type of recommendation that's going to be actually open for a long too many. >> so but all of mine aren't

like that, are they? some of them will be closed in 2015. >> let me show you where i'm going with this. they will come in, say they're going to do things. and then they wait. there's no checking up on this em. a new congress comes in and the next thing you know it hasn't been done. we want to be effective and efficient. this is a moment we have to take advantage of. so can you of those seven, the things that you know can be done in a definite amount of time, can you give us a timetable on

those so that we can at least while we are a committee can hold the department accountable. is that a reasonable request? >> i think it's a reasonable request. we can supply you with the information where we are on those recommendations in panel. i would say, sir, that there is no doubt in my mind that we are going to implement every one of these recommendations. # i think one of your questions is whether or not we have been implementing arb recommendations. one of the exercises we went through last year was to review every single arb recommendation that has been made sinceggx 198. the office of npri. that aus that is tracking these. we sat down with them and went through every recommendation in the past to make sure we were doing our best to fulfill those and that office is going to track these in the future as well.

i think -- i can understand some hesitancy about if we drag these out they're not going to get done. >> i can assure you, sir, while i am there, while secretary kerry is there, we are going to make sure every single one of these recommendations is fulfilled. >> as i get older, i realize that we're not going to be here for so long. we are in the places that we're in for a season. and it may come to an end in any and all kinds of ways. that's why i want you to, as i said in the opening under my watch. i want some definite timetables. so that we can hold somebody accountable. other than that, he said it best. we'll be going through this over and over and over again. can you understand what i'm saying? but you just gave me more

information that i would like to add onto your list. if there are crucial things that we've been looking at, recommendations from 1988 that you are working on, would you add those -- the significant ones, going back to miss brooks now, that you haven't been able to complete that you're working on so we can have a timetable in that? i think the most important thing that we can do coming out of this, and i promise the father of tyron wood, and i looked him in the eye and he asked us one question. every family said the same thing. make it safer for somebody in the future. so are you with me? i just want to make sure you're with me. >> yes, sir, i am. >> all right. so will you come back to us, how much time you need? give us what i just asked for. >> let me take this back to the department. let me work through this.

i will try to get you these answers as fast as possible. >> 45 days? >> absolutely. >> very well. mr. chairman, we can talk about this. it may be appropriate later on for us to have a hearing just on the progress that has been made. and i would -- i know that's the chairman's decision. but i think we need to mike sure that we stay on top of this. the independent arb found that the trip wise, security incidents that are supposed to trigger reviews and responses were, and i quote, too often treated as indicators of threat rather than essential trigger mechanisms for serious risk management decisions and actions. the senate select committee on intelligence came to a similar conclusion in the bipartisan report. it said, and i quote, there were trip wires designed to prompt a

reduction in personnel or the suspension of operations at the mission in benghazi. and although there is evidence that some of them have been -- operations continue with minimal change. as a result the arb recommended that the state department revised the guidance to post and require key offices to perform in depth trip wires. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and in response to this recommendation, the state department set up a committee in washington. as i understand it, the purpose of this is to review trip wires when they were triggered to help ensure that relevant and regional bureaus respond quickly to deteriorating environments. miss star, who is on that community? >> regional bureaus. representatives from regional bureaus. thest chaired out of the crisis management group. i think the biggest single

change, sir is that in past years the trip wires were usually something that the post itself would look at. it's part of their emergency action plan. if they crossed a trip wire, they would determine what action needed to be made and report to us what decisions they were going to have. at this point the major change is any time a post crosses a trip wire it has to be reported to washington. at that point cms gathers a group that reviews what trip wire was cost. they look at the implications and we make decisions based on what should happen in. now in many cases the post may have always made the recommendation. but this is a much greater degree of oversight and much greater emphasis on action if a trip wire is crossed. >> can you give us an example of what happened with regard to that? >> i would say that trip wires

are not just security concerns, but i'll try to concentrate on security concerns. the activities the kiev and ukraine recently. at the beginning of those activities. when it was clearly unsure what was happening and we had civil disorder in the city, the post reported quite a few trip wires were crossed for inspablt and security. decisions were made at that point. we made the decision to move them out of kiev. we moved them out until the situation had ceased and rectified itself. we looked at reverse trip wires. was the situation really changed and what had changed? then we made the dogs to return the families after the situation ended in the middle of town was

resolved. >> i look forward to sreceiving the information that we requested. >> thank you, mr. starr? the arb found that systematic failure in the security of posture in benghazi. and it was inadequate for t three days after the attack we had been calling the embassy. we were told that it was a temporary mission facility. and now it's being called a special mission compound. was there any reason for the terminology continuing to evolve into something? >> i think as it was neither an embassy nor a consulate nor a consular agency, it was just some -- >> do you call it a temporary mission facility? >> i think temporary mission facility is probably the right definition. >> all right.

anyway, they had hired blue mountain i believe, is that correct, to do the screening of any visitors and the perimeter protection? >> my understanding from the arb and other reports were that it was a contract with a blue mountain security company for libyan individuals and agreements with, i think it was the 17th militia. >> that was the host country security was the 17th brigade. >> well, in the absence of a practical and real host country security, i think that was the best that they could do. >> but the blue mountain was unarmed, is that correct? >> correct. >> who is responsible for betting these contractors, like blue mountain that's going to be used at some of these facility? >> in terms of betting, in terms of contract and performance of

those types of things? >> yeah. >> normally, sir, we have an open competition process. how we contract for card services is a function that's been given to us with very specific requirements from congress. it's open competition, and whoever can bid on it and meet the requirements does it. i think in contingency like situations like we were finding in benghazi, there was probably very little competition. ..competition. >> so are -- was the lowest price? >> tags right. are you aware the two contracts were counciled and that the rso at the facile -- at the temporary mission facility had