number of arad asham prisoners. we're not in that exact fight in the groups that we have helped areód not in that fight but the are other people also fighting the islamic state. i don't look at it as only 5,000. >> knowing what you know about the way things are on the ground, is what's being laid out something that will evolve into an effective ground strategy or are there additional components that you, knowing the country the way you are, are necessary if we really want to destroy and defeat isil are necessary to make that happen? >> i would think we're goingx t get into a long-term relationship with any of these groups that i mentioned, it has to be really carefully coordinated with other countries in the region that have been funneling in help. and it's got and it's got to be centralized

senator. there is too much stuff going into too many disparate groups and it actually has made the job of the armed opposition more tough. we have to be tough with for some of our regional allies. on the ground senator, as isil has pushed out of places it will be really important to try to get help into the civil administrations. the syrian government won't go into those places and again these are in a sense the political side of the opposition linked to the moderate armed opposition. so the state department has worked with the dedication and resources and program money as i was pushed out of place. so there is clean water several hours a day.

maybe the schools can reopen in some places and that kind of thing. >> just one more question and my time is short. we have got a lot of stock in edwards and many of us got to know him and yet we didn't support him. trucks that were supposed to be delivered were delivered months late. i mean it was almost like, i don't even want to use the word because it's just such a negative connotation towards the activities that we undertook. have there have been -- has there have been a controlling command established for the moderate opposition that is workable in a sense again undermined by not really doing the things we said we would do. do we have someone they are, an organization there that has the

ability to deal with command and control? >> i think this is a question that you will want to be asking as you go forward. you are right he was never empowered not only by a senator but other regional states that were funneling assistance and so he was in a very difficult position. i think going forward, if we want the moderate armed opposition to be successful we are going to have to figure out away to get a more centralized command structure and aid those through that structure and all countries must support that structure and not help friendly group over here or friendly group over there. >> senator rubio. >> thank you both for being here and i think you ambassador. a couple of points. i want to go back in time simply for purposes of pointing fingers and saying he was right in who is wrong but it's important to learn lessons from this. it was my impression early in the conflict that when mr. rosen

by the way it's important to remind everyone that this is not a u.s. investigated. syrians wanted to get rid of assad and in the initial stages the rebellion was from syrians but the lack of the decision not to go in and empower them early created a vacuum that attracted foreign fighters from all over the world to kind world to kind of pour in and take advantage of that situation. in your opinion had we been more forceful earlier and we could go back to a half years earlier knowing what we know now and empower those groups early on to be more capable do you think it's possible that space that was left there for iselin they never had a more forceful group on the ground in the syrian military defectors early on would have closed off the opening for some of these more radical foreign fighters to be able to come in and take advantage of the chaos on the ground? >> senator i do think that. i have said that publicly before and in particular three things,

cash, ammunition and food and had more of the moderate groups on talking about were not seeking to impose an islamic state by force, had they had these things, cash, mo, food in greater supplies in saved the second half of 2012 it would have been very hard for al-nusra to gain recruits. i have heard that repeatedly from members of the syrian opposition including the free syrian army that they couldn't pay salaries. the other code. you have got to understand that the fighters have families. they have got kids. they have parents that they have to take care of. so yeah at there have been more back then i think the problem today would be smaller but i am encouraged at least that now there's an understanding of that end of this program goes forward i think that will actually help reduce the recruiting of isil

and al-nusra. >> the second question i want to ask touches on a theme that senator mccain has explored so these groups are on the ground that we want to work with and to work within as you said in your testimony the biggest threat that they face people who are targeting them the most although they will fight isil but the group doing the most damage to the militarily is assad. it seems from here to a pier to be that assad is undertaking a very deliberate strategy of trying to wipe out what we would call moderate forces so that the world is left to the very simple choice of we want to defeat isil in syria you have to align yourself with assad. he's the only alternative to them if we can wipe these moderate groups out. over the last few hours days and weeks is ramped up the effort to wipe them out to that strategy. do you agree that the compilation he has made and if so how could any effort to equip and empower and capacity these groups, how could any effort to do that be successful if we

don't protect them from the assault that's being undertaken against them? as i asked the secretary when he was here two hours ago now when i asked him questions, there may not be anyone left for us to armed or trained if assad continues to have free reign to target them and tried to eviscerate them. >> i do think that's a solid strategy. i think it's evident to look at what he is doing day by day. it's clear. i do think the moderate armed opposition has staying power and if the administration's proposals are adopted and go forward i think that will help bolster them and they will be in the field. but, but absolutely they are going to fight and bashar al-assad. the idea that they would somehow turn away from that site, the original fight in focus solely on isil is simply not realistic.

>> we can't ignore the fact that they are being attacked. >> precisely and in and i talked talked about the bad blood between isil and the armed moderate opposition but there is plenty of bad blood between them and the assad regime too not to mention the airstrikes you are talking about. i do take heart senator rubio that the armed moderate opposition have gotten more supplies lately. i'm not sure where from but they have been making some gains on the ground and in particular against the syrian regime and in particular in the area between damascus and aleppo up there. there's a lot of heavy fighting and also along the lebanese border in a place called kalamun where the armed opposition suffered a big defeat in may and june of 2013 and they have

retaken a lot of those places. i think part of it is hezbollah had too redeployed to other places and this just goes back to the manpower shortage. >> as we go to the american people and we make the argument that we need to do this and i'm in favor of doing this. i have actually called for this for quite a while and was part of those on the committee devoted to do that a while back, the american people just understand when they face or name but ran out of generic term moderate rebels that we don't know who they are. in the absence of pointing to who they are it leaves open all sorts of misinformation that i have seen in the press including members of congress who have made claims that frankly are not only inaccurate but outrages with regards to comments -- who some of these groups are. could you help us navigate some of the organization's? there are groups that we have heard the steadfastness movement is one, arauca ba'ashem. who are some of the groups that

you think that the bill? >> just very quickly i will name a few and they are in my written testimony and i'm happy to provide members of your staff with more information later. the movement which operates mainly in northern syria but also has fighters in the south, they are one of the groups. they actually are kind of more or less fighting the nusra fight as well as the islamic state and the regime. so they are in up to their eyeballs. there are two units of the moderate opposition that are mainly officered by recently defected syrian army officers. one is called the 101st division although i don't think it has anywhere near a division worth of manhood i think it's in the range of three or 4000. the 101st, kind of ironic senator and then the 13th division as well.

again led primarily by recently defecting army officers. you might remember senator rubio there was a syrian air force pilot who flew his plane to jordan a couple of years ago. that pilot is the commander of the 13th division now but it's not a division in terms of 14 or 15,000. it's a couple thousand. >> senator johnson. >> thank you mr. chairman. ambassador ford you mentioned a word that really i really want to be the crux of my questioning his credibility. i want to explore the credibility of our commitment and our credibility of our strategy. so first of all, in my questioning to secretary kerry i quoted the president when he said our safety and security depends on our willingness to do whatever it takes to defend this nation and of course by taking off a number of options off the

table, i am certainly concerned about the credibility of our commitment. what is your view in terms of our potential coalition partners? do they feel there's any credibility to our commitment to the defeat of physis? >> i think the meeting in riyadh was really interesting. i was really struck that the saudi's brought the iraqi foreign minister there and that was something when i was working in iraq five years during the war we could never get the saudi's to do that. never could get the saudi's to do that. i think that is changed and is significant. it's symbolic but it's a start. i think ultimately senator johnson our credibility by countries in that region in saudi emirates and qatar and turkey will be judged by what we do ourselves in the next few weeks and months.

if their proposal to help the syrian armed opposition doesn't move forward out of washington this week and gets bogged down i think our credibility for not only with the syrian opposition but it will suffer with countries in the region. >> let me quick ask, is it true that the saudis are willing to pay for that training effort? >> i haven't received any classified briefings since i left government senator johnson but it seems everything i've seen in both arabic language as well as english language. >> if that's the case let's face it, the moderate vetted syrian rebels will be armed and train trained. so would it make sense that being the case wouldn't it be better for the u.s. to be involved in that training? >> totally. >> again i think that's a political argument for voting for that authorization. >> i'm assuming and again i

haven't received any classified briefings and you will know more than i do but there will be classified personnel working with saudi's and other coalitions. >> i understand our colleagues concerned about who we are training but they will be trained anyway i'd rather be involved in the process to reduce the chance that the wrong individuals would be trained by whoever. >> we will be much safer from isil in the future if we lead this effort rather than handed off to someone else. >> mr. connable you have been sitting here. i actually do want to utilize you in the testimony here. i want to really talk about the credibility of the strategy. from my standpoint there are two major steps to the offense. first of all it's to drive the isis out of iraq and secure iraq and of course you have the whole mess in terms of cereal. let's go back in history. i think both of you gentlemen were in iraq during the surge. we had him testify before us and

i was try to put this in context using some numbers. we had 68,000 al qaeda in iraq at that point in time where the estimates and we had 130 surged over 160,000 u.s. troops to defeat al qaeda in iraq. now we have 31,000 isis. we have 1500 noncombat troops on the ground. we have got an iraqi security force and the kurdish peshmerga. how credible is it that we are going to be able to first of all just get isis out of iraq without forced? >> i would start by saying i don't put a lot of credence in the numbers we have either in the first iraq war that we have now. i don't believe we have any degree of accuracy they are so assuming we are within some sort of order of magnitude there. i don't think the key to this in 2006, 2007 in 2008 was the surge. the announcement of the surge

strength and allies on the ground. really i believe it was a sunni population targeting against al qaeda in iraq and i think that's going to be the key now. whether there are 10,000 ias in iraq or 30,000 i think over time that becomes less relevant when you look at how much territory they have to control. if that's hostile territory than they have a real hard time doing that. just bombing them and trying to drive them out with the iraqi army i think their chances are much lower. >> which gets to your point that the key here is reconciliation between sunni and shia in iraq and i want to ask either one of you or both of you trying to think of the exact term we use. the grievance resolution measures, is this shia government threatened enough to actually do what you think is necessary to surpass those grievance resolution measures to bring the sunnis back into the government collects. >> frankly i think the chances of reconciliation are low. i think it's the best strategy and is probably the one that's

going to lead to long-term success but he has the iranians providing direct support. they have no enthusiasm for reconciliation with iraq and sunnis. he has other fragmented elements of the shia that he has to deal with. they just voted down a couple of his nominations for key posts in his cabinet so i don't hold that a great deal of hope but i do think that is where we will -- [inaudible] >> go ahead ambassador ford. >> i totally agree with what he said. the key to success in iraq of that. of 2007, 2008 and sub nine. the most important impact the key part was to get the buy-in from the local populations. just one little thing on your question about are the shia today in 2014, are they sobered?

brian is absolutely right that the nominees for defense and interior ministry are in such sensitive positions that were disapproved by the iraqi parliament yesterday. not a good sign. however i have also seen prime minister al abbadi say they will not send the iraqi army deep into sunni regions again. and that they are going to try to build a national regard. i think now what they're arguing about if i understand it is who do they trust enough from the shia and the sunni to do that mission? so, the proof will be in the pudding. having spent five years in iraq i have learned to trust nothing. but i at least was encouraged that abbadi said we will not send the iraqi army deep into the provinces and we will use the national guard. >> i have a lot more questions but i'm out of time so thank

you. >> senator mccain. >> i think the witnesses and i think mr. connable and ambassador ford thank you for your outstanding service. mr. connable if i got you right the iranians are in a position of significant influence in baghdad right now. is that correct? >> i believe that to be true. >> that can't be good for our interest over time. >> i agree with you. >> and another legacy of total withdrawal. >> i think that would have happened anyway. it was exasperated by the fact that the western and northern parts of iraq collapsed. i can't attributed to directly to that. >> ambassador ford is there any doubt about the viability if given the proper training and equipment and my understanding is isis has given us much as $2000 a month because they have

had plenty of money that there is no doubt in your mind if we do it right, and the fsa is viable? >> with much less support than what we have been giving they actually have held ground and advanced in a few places. >> i share that view in the thing that's frustrating to me sometimes as all of the stuff that people except they had made a deal with isis and they can't fight and having known them as you have known better than i do they will fight and they need our support in order to do that successfully but they are not about to become part of isis or even al-nusra it from time to time they have to have the cooperation because of their circumstances. >> it's absolutely true that they are in a tough situation. a two-front war is never fun but i'm very impressed that they

have held up as well as they have despite the difficult circumstances. >> so in my view and i conclude that it's an excuse that people use frankly do not have us involved and i don't expect you to comment on that. but here we are and again i want to sort of pursue what i was pursuing, the line that i was with secretary kerry. we are going to train them and we are going to equip them but we are not going to protect them from these airstrikes that are so devastating to their capability. the barrel bombs, the helicopters, the fixed-wing, which by the way included as you know the main way for bashar assad to move his people and matériel around iraq. so we are asking them to fight. we are asking them to risk their lives and yet we won't give them the protection from the air

attacks which would be a major source of casualties for them. make sense of that for me. >> well, i think we both know that there are concerns that if we provide surface to air missiles that they will be somehow transferred to the newsroom front or isil or something like that. one encouraging sign i take from the recent fighting senator mccain up in a city between damascus and aleppo the regime has an important airbase and using standoff weapons, mortars and such things that free syrian army was able to bring most of the air traffic to the military airport. >> i'm impressed with what they do but if i am a syrian and i'm being armed and trained and asked to go into battle and i see that we are not keep given the capabilities much less the

united states taking out that airpower, it's not great for my morale. >> our refusal to provide surface to air missiles has been made gigantic irritant not only to the armed opposition fighters but to the population in gener general. >> did you see, i am sure you saw the quote i gave from secretary gates in his comment today that we really can't succeed without boots on the ground was basically what he was saying. >> i didn't see secretary gates' remarks. >> i guess i can read it to you again but do you think that in your estimate the 5000 being trained and not taking out bashar al-assad's air assets, telling everybody that it's isil first is if we can't address to adversaries at the same time,

that the chances of success without much more significant involvement on the ground doesn't mean combat units but for air comptroller special forces etc.. we are going to have to basically secretary you are saying we are going to have to do that over time. >> i think several times -- several things senator mccain. i think there's going to be more than 5000. i think already the elements of the armed opposition excluding al-nusra and isil, 80,000 plus. the 5000 might be one of the better parts and it might be the part we would have more influence with but frankly we will have more influence if we provide more weapons and cash anyway. the second with respect to isil first, i just think realistically of course the

armed opposition is going to fight aside even as they fight the islamic state. we would be foolish to think otherwise. >> my question is do we help them do that and neutralize the air? >> we have not neutralize the air assets obviously. we have been providing other help. we suffered credibility problems doing that. we have been providing other help which they use against the regime. i would actually argue that the help we have provided has actually enabled them to make advances in places like southern syria and northern syria. the aid has actually been affected that way. >> there's no doubt in your mind that we are not going to join forces with any extremist organizations? >> as i mentioned and i'm glad you asked that question.

i actually have raced with them when i was working with the state department the problem al-nusra poses for us and i get a very consistent answer. i got a very consistent answer which is we don't like al qaeda. these are defected army officers or people who were civilians that were in the syrian military before they went to civilian life and became leaders in the free syrian army is that we don't like them either but you can't ask us to not deal with them when you are over on the next neighborhood and we are pushing against the regime and they are pushing and not coordinate with them. they said that's not reasonable because we don't have enough stuff to do this by ourselves. and they were very relevant. you give us more stuff and we won't have to deal with them. >> mr. connable do you have a

comment on that aspect? >> in regards to syrian airpower would be interesting to see if we put launchers on the ground in syria and what effect that would have on the decision on whether or not to attack or provide higher levels advice there. i think they would be reluctant to attack those forces. >> thank you senator. one last question mr. connable. you made a very oriented effort to make the case that it was the sunni awakening that was the critical element to the success. yes, the surge and guess the elements but that without the sunni awakening, we might not have the success that we ultimately achieve there. so what steps must in your view

the iraqi government take to facilitate a reconciliation with the alienated sunni tribes in anbar province and other sunni majority areas in order to reduce political support for isil and to get them to have a second awakening? >> as i have stated mr. chairman that's the fundamental question. now, there is one major problem and i think one major opportunity. a major problem is the sunni leadership are so badly fragmented that there is really no hope for some kind of negotiated settlement at the top level or even with regional leaders. there simply is not enough credibility there in the sunni leadership to allow that to happen. however the real opportunity is that the sunni and a very kind of dispersed way have clearly enumerated a lot of the grievances that they think are the most critical to them and it's almost like a laundry list. i have listed a few of them in my written testimony but i think

the good news here is that prime minister al abbadi also has another laundry list of these with the assumed office and put his government together and that was a very positive steps of esrd announced the things that need to be done. the trick is executing them. i think about 50% of the things he identified a need to probably add in another small group of things that are critical, he could probably do it with the stroke of a pen. those would require deliberation with government paid a think he should do whatever he can under his own authority immediately and together. if he's able to do that the sunni that i have spoken to would react quite favorably to that. it's a first step but it's an important one. >> even though sunni leadership as he described it is fragmented there are some universal issues that they have raised that is addressed as part of reconciliation would be

crosscutting. >> i think prime minister al abbadi is speaking to the sunni people and not the sunni leaders and they are crosscutting, yes. >> this has been very helpful. you have the thanks of the committee for your insights. this record will remain open to the close of business on friday and without this hearing is adjourned. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] more on the threat from isis live this afternoon with an event hosted by the strategic and international studies.

>> is truly all of the above. we have worked with law enforcement agencies who have busted down doors and drag people out of their basements literally. we have also participated in fairly large-scale arrests of

multiple individuals that are very highly connected together, very well organized. they each have individual specialities and roles. malicious software and know how to wash the money and these things just like physical organized crime. then there are others that definitely are working on behalf of the government. they have an office. there are pictures of it and there are recon photos and all of that kind of thing. they go to that building. that's their job is to hack into companies and steal their information on behalf of the government. i have seen some photos of some eastern european towns for instance that were just an insane number of people driving lamborghinis and things like this. a lot of that is the spam, the fake pharmaceuticals, the financial fraud, tax fraud, medicare fraud and all of these

things. it's a staggering amount of money that are at some point along the chain trace back to data that was stolen, stored at a corporation or government. >> the house select committee on the nazi held its first public hearing last week the state department diplomatic security official gregory starr about the changes made to improve security

at foreign posts. he noted that risks can be reduced but not eliminated. the committee also heard from a former homeland security department official who criticize the state department for its risk management process. this is about three hours. >> the committee will come to order. the chair notes a quorum for purposes of taking testimony pursuant to house rules to the chair will recognize himself in ranking member for the purpose of making opening statement. without objection the opening statement of any other member of the committee who wishes to provide one will be included in the record. a little over two years ago for americans serving our country in benghazi libya were killed. two of them were killed when a facility emblematic of our country was set on fire and two of them were killed when they dared to fight back and defend themselves and others. sean smith, chris stevens, ty

woods and glenn dougherty represented us. they represented our country and our values. we asked them to go. we sent them and they were killed because some people hold a deep-seated animus toward us simply because we are us so to the family and the friends and the loved ones of those killed, we can never adequately express our condolences and our gratitude. as you have to the families who have helped each of us understand these four were not just pictures on the television screen. they were sons and husbands and fathers and brothers and friends and fellow americans. i remain hopeful that there are some things left in our country that can rise above politics and i remain convinced that our fellow citizens are entitled to all of the facts about what

happened before, during and after the attacks in benghazi. they deserve an investigative process that is worthy of the memory of the four who were killed and worthy of the respect of our fellow americans. some questioned the need for this committee and i respect their right to dissent but the mark of a professional and indeed the mark of character is to do a good job with the task even if you don't think the task should have been assigned in the first place. given the gravity of the issues at hand i would rather run the risk of answering the question twice then run the risk of not answering it once. i am willing to reconsider previously held beliefs in light of new facts and evidence and i would encourage my colleagues and others to do the same because we know that all the documents have not yet been produced and we know that there

are still witnesses left to be examined and we also know that there are witnesses who have been examined in the past but for whom additional questions may be warranted. so i would ask each of my colleagues, given they are vast and varied and exceptional backgrounds to put those talents to good use on the half of our fellow citizens. the house of representatives constituted this committee and they did so for us to find all of the facts and i intend to do that and i intend to do it in a manner worthy of their respect of our fellow citizens. our fellow citizens have certain legitimate expectations. they expect us to protect and defend those that we send to represent us. they expect us to move heaven and earth when those who are representing us, under attack. they expect government to tell us the truth of the aftermath of a tragedy always and they expect

that we will not continue to make the same mistakes over and over and over again. which brings us to this hearing. the benghazi was not the first time one of our facilities are one of our people have been attacked. beirut, kenya and tanzania are three that come to mind among others. after these attacks groups come together and they make recommendations on how to prevent future attacks. that seems to be the process that has followed. a tragedy or an attack comes. we commissioned a panel, a board, a blue ribbon commission to study the attack and make sure that we make recommendations to ensure that it never happens again but yet it does happen again. and so to those who believe it's time to move on, to those who believe that there's nothing left to discover they are all

the questions i've been asked and answered and we have learned before and we have heard all of that before. it was wrong then. it was stunning to see the similarities between the recommendations made decades ago in the recommendations made by the benghazi arv. i want you to compare the recommendations of those made a quarter-century ago, 25 years ago with the recommendations made by the benghazi arv. we do not suffer from a lack of recommendations. we do suffer from a lack of implementing and enacting those recommendations. that has to end so it is appropriate to review the recommendations of the most recent arb and i commend our colleague from california mr. shift to kids -- to continue to do so. why we have not implemented suggestions made some -- why

does it take an attack on our people are facilities for us to make a recommendation? why not evaluate the threat before the attack? why not anticipate rather than react? in conclusion the people that we work for year and to see the right thing done for the right reasons and in the right way and they want to know that something can rise above the din of partisan politics. they want to trust the institutions of government so to fulfill the duties owed to those who serve and in honor of those who were killed, maybe just maybe we can be what those four brave men were, not a republican nor democrat, just americans in pursuit of the facts. and justice to matter where that journey takes us. with that i would recognize the ranking member from maryland.

>> thank you very much mr. chairman and i thank you for holding this hearing today. i know every member of this panel is dedicated to ensuring that our work honors the memories of the four americans who were killed in benghazi. the names must be etched in our memory banks. ambassador chris stevens, sean smith, tyrone woods and glenn dougherty. i want to thank our colleague representative schiff and mr. chairman i want to thank you for accepting that topic so that we can see what has become of the arb recommendations. too often over the past two

years the congressional investigation into what happened in benghazi has evolved into unseemly party partisanship. we are better than that. today we have an opportunity to focus on reform. how can we learn from the past to make things better in the future? mr. chairman i agree with you that over the years recommendations after recommendation had been made. the question is, as you said what became of them? i do believe in life there are transformational moments. that is, something happens that causes you to stop and pause and try to figure out how to remedy the situation and make it bett

better. and the problem is when those moments come and they come to all of us, the question is whether we pause, and make things better because usually if we don't, we repeat the errors and usually things get worse. and this is one such transformational moment. the kind of oversight that can be productive can be critical. it can sometimes even be tedious but it can also save lives. that's what we are talking about in that is why want to thank every member of this panel for agreeing to do this. for we are about the business of trying to save the lives. that's a very serious mission. i sincerely hope this committee will stay on course on

constructive reform and keep this goal as our northstar. it would be a disservice to everyone involved -- today we will review the recommendations of the accountability review boards. which was chaired by ambassador thomas pickering and admiral michael mullen, the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. during our previous investigation are oversight committee chairman gowdy and i heard directly from both men about how seriously they took their roles. ambassador pickering called it and i quote a debt of honor. their report was independent. it was adopted unanimously by all board members and it was a blistering examination of what went wrong at the state department.

they made 29 recommendations and secretary clinton accepted all of them. after they issued their report, the state department and general issued their own reporting reporting findings and i quote the department wasted no time in addressing the recommendations end of quote. the department has been working on implementing those recommendations for the past year and a half. congress should ensure that it finishes the job. today i would like her witnesses to provide an update on the status of several of the board's recommendations. first, the board found the department's response to the deteriorating security situation than ghazi was and i quote inadequate and it was inadequate at the point in benghazi at the embassy in tripoli and here in washington.

ambassador pickering explained that the post did not take action despite crossing several tripwires for officials to review security more closely and develop a stronger response. the board recommended the department changed its procedures to make sure the security breaches are reviewed immediately today the department reports it has created a new process that requires post to report tripwires as soon as they are cross so security officials can review them immediately and take action if necessary. i want to know if this process is now fully operational and if so, how it has been working so far? the board also found that we should not have relied so heavily on local militia groups like february 17 militia to

protect our hosts. i call quote misplace end of quote and found the security forces were poorly skilled end of quote. the department strengthen security and i quote beyond the conditional reliance on host government security supporting high-risk high threat posed end of quote. today the department reports it has added 17 new marine security guard attachments and another new marine unit to enhance security in high threat environments. in addition the state department is now using new funding from congress to arm 151 new personnel and diplomatic security. i want to hear from our witnesses about whether these actions are sufficient or

whether we need to do more. the board also found fault with a deputy assistant secretary who denied repeated requests for additional security in benghazi. at the time this official oversight security involved 275 diplomatic posts around the world. to address this problem and department created a new position to focus exclusively on the security needs of roughly 30 posts addressing the highest threats. stating it could be and i quote a positive first step integrating into a sound strategy for ds suburbanization. today i want to hear from the state department specifically about how this new position is working and whether they believe we should make additional changes. everyone understands that diplomacy by its nature

sometimes requires to be in very dangerous places. our diplomats work in high threat environments create we cannot eliminate every risk that we must do everything we can to keep americans safe as possible when they are serving overseas. with that i want to conclude by recognizing the tremendous sacrifices that are made every single day around the world by the diplomatic corps, the intelligence community and their military servicemembers on behalf of the american people. and i remind my colleagues that this is our watch. i said to the chairman before we started this is bigger than us. the things that we do today and over the next few months will have lasting effects even when we are gone and that is how we have to look at this.

so we prepare not only for the present but we prepare for the future and generations unborn. thank you mr. chairman. >> thank you gentlemen for maryland. the committee will now recognize and receive testimony from today's witness panel. the first witness will be the honorable greg starr the secured -- the second witness will be todd keil and the third witness will be marc sullivan the chair of independent panel on best practices. welcome to each of you. we will recognize each of you for your five-minute opening statement. there is a series of wise and i'm sure you will stay with the lighting system. because this is an investigative hearing i will need to administer the oath to the witnesses before taking their testimony. so if the witnesses would please rise and lift their right hands. do you solemnly swear the testimony will give will be the

truth whole truth and nothing but the truth? let the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. secretary starr you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement. >> chairman gowdy, ranking member comings and distinguished committee members good morning. i thank you for your invitation to appear today to discuss the department of state implementation of a 29 recommendations made by the independent benghazi accountability board also known as the arb. >> mr. secretary i don't want to interrupt you. would you pull the mic a little. some of us have had birthdays recently and are hard of hearing. >> we look forward to working with you as you examine the issues relating to the 2012 terrorist attack in benghazi. the attacks in benghazi were tragic. today we honor those that we lost by internalizing the

lessons from that night to protect their people in the field as they carry out our country's foreign policy work every single day. over the past two years, with secretary kerry's leadership that commitment is being honored. like you, we want to keep our people safe. the heart of the accountability recommendations was to enhance the department's approach to risk management ensuring that when our national interests require us to operate in dangerous places, that we identify the risks and take the proper steps to mitigate them. the department has made important strides in that regard. i would like to highlight just a few examples of how we are implementing the arb recommendations including how we are getting high threat posed the attention and resources that they need. however, even with this progress it is essential for us to acknowledge that while we can do everything we can to reduce the

risk we can never eliminate it fully. high threat high-risk posts require special attention to confirm our national interest require us to operate there and to provide the right resources to do that. we have instituted a new process called the vital presence of validation process, shorthand vp2 to do just that. one example is our recent return to bangui. the department suspended operations there in december of 2012. this year using the process and a support cell process that plans for how we go into these operations the department engaged in an analysis that determined that we should and could go back. we worked with our colleagues at the department of defense to assess the security situation on the ground and develop a conference a plan for our

return. i'm proud to report that we deployed the state department personnel just last week. the embassy is now open. while we must closely monitor conditions on the ground are returned to bangui demonstrates our risk management procedures are working. another example of our enhanced risk management postures and benghazi is how we have improved the training. chief of personnel -- chief of mission personnel including both security professionals and all foreign service personnel are now better prepared for operating in high threat environments. we have increased the expanded training for ds special agents to receive high threat training specifically and then we have also expanded what we call our foreign affairs counter threats force for foreign colleagues going to oliver high threat posed and we are working towards making this threat training universal for foreign service

personnel and employees for all of our posts overseas. further to combat fires a weapon we have partnered with the city of new york for department and the army's asymmetric warfare group to enhance their training curriculum and implement countermeasures in response to fire and smoke as a terrorist weapon. finally, with your help we have added to our security resources. the arb recommended that we expand the number of diplomatic security personnel and we have done just that. we are well on her way to finishing that often hitting all of our targets. it also recommended that we have met the marine security guard program which we have done as well. while these are just a few examples of the department's efforts post-benghazi i believe they highlight some of the key progress we have made. i will not outline all of this, all the things we have done in the interest of time but i'm pleased to report that we have made what i consider to be tremendous progress on the 29

arb recommendations. today we have close 22 recommendations and seven are in progress and nearing completion. today we are better prepared, better protected and informed to manage the risks. we look forward to working with congress and you on assuring that for -- our foreign affairs committee has safe platforms for carrying out her national interests. i want to thank congress for the additional resources that you provided over the past two years to improve and sustain this diplomatic platform and i will be glad to answer any questions that you have. thank you. >> thank you mr. starr. mr. keil. >> thank you chairman gowdy ranking member comings and members of the select committee for inviting me to testify today about her independent panel report on best practices in the aftermath of the tragic attack in the u.s. mission in benghazi libya and to provide our insight regarding the implementation of our recommendations and related issues relevant to our report.

our panel was committed to identifying best practices from throughout the u.s. government or private sector, nongovernmental organizations and international partners which can finally establish an effective risk management process and the department of state, improve the security of u.s. diplomatic facilities abroad and enhance the safety of the department of foreign affairs agencies personnel not only in high-risk areas but globally. we identified 40 crucial recommendations to achieve this goal. we continue to stand behind our report in the strongest possible terms and believe that the 40 recommendations and the supporting narratives which were derived from well-known and established best practices provide a clear roadmap for an absolutely best -- necessary organizational paradigm change throughout the department of state to support the current

direction of the expeditionary diplomacy the application of proven enterprise risk management enhancements. mr. chairman and distinguished members i spent a career of almost 23 years as a special agent with the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. as a result of my years of service i am uniquely familiar with the history and most importantly the operating culture focused on the bureau of diplomatic security in the department of state. as her panel has interviewed hundreds of people in the u.s. and abroad and gain valuable ground troops from our travel to 10 countries during our work including numerous high threat locations i couldn't have been more personally and professionally proud and hardened along with my fellow panel members by hearing and witnessing the dedicated and admirable work of the men and women of the diplomatic security service. each day around the world the ds team makes extreme challenges and unpredictable risks to provide a safe and secure marmot for the conduct of u.s. foreign

policy and they do so with distinction. the men and women of the bureau of diplomatic security are truly dedicated public servants that are owed the gratitude of the american people for their service to this great nation. as we stated repeatedly throughout our reports best practices will not save lives unless they are resourced, implemented and followed. almost, almost 15 years ago as was mentioned in the chairman's opening statement and number of very similar recommendations were made after the east african embassy bombings and little has been accomplished by the department of state since then to improve its approach to risk management. while we are pleased to report is then finally officially released by the state department along with the implementation fact sheet we are disappointed with the decision not to implement recommendations number one and the most important one and recommendation number 13. in a meeting earlier this year with deputy secretary

higginbotham and secretary starr we were encouraged by their candor and support for her report and their intent to adhere to the recommendations in our report. in light of a long history of such report and recommendations in the department of state and the continued sense of responsibility we voiced our concern in a recent letter to deputy secretary higginbotham for those recommendations implemented than those that are apparently relying on free benghazi processes and procedures to demonstrate or achieve implementation. ..

to institutionalize the process of outside and independent counsel and guidance on the risk management best practices sooner than 2016. the accountability review board recommended the speed manual process that this remains a critical need for the department and should again as soon as possible. there's a decisively important step the department must take to demonstrate transparency and ensure continuing dialogue and best practices with an input from outside independent experts regarding operations and high

threat challenging international occasions. finally i would like to take a quick moment to introduce a member of the -- another member of the audience who included within 25 years as an fbi agent, five years as the director of security at the cia and exemplifies the definition of a great american. thank you mr. chairman. >> welcome to the guests. mr. sullivan, you are recognized for five minutes. thank you for asking us to appear before you today. mr. chairman, i consider it an honor to have served on the best practice panel without dedicated individuals. our team have taught kyle, richard, raymond junior, timothy murphy and staff erica and stephanie murdoch have a combined experience of 175 years of security and law-enforcement

expertise. during our career each panel member has gained an appreciation and understanding of the importance of having clear lines of leadership and organizational structure concerning security matters. we as a panel also understand that things don't always go as planned. and when they don't come it is vital to implement lessons learned in an effort to prevent them from happening again. the report reflects the independent views of the panel based upon our best professional judgment, experience and an analysis of the best practices performed by interviews, travel and extensive research. it was a pleasure to serve with this dedicated group and i appreciated the professionalism and hard work. i would also like to acknowledge and thank all of those interviewed in the course of drafting this report from the

u.s. government, private sector, international organizations and foreign governments. the best practice panel was the result of the accountability review board for benghazi. they have experience in high risk high threat areas to support the bureau of diplomatic security, identify best practices and recommendations from other agencies and countries and evaluate the united states security platforms and high risk posts. our report provided 40 recommendations in 12 different areas. coastal areas over organization and management, accountability, risk management, program criticality and acceptable risk in the planning and logistics, lessons learned, training and

human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and security assessment, program resource and technology, host nations and capability and hands meant, regular evaluation and change management, leadership and communication and training. it was the opinion of the panel of 40 recommendations would further strengthen the department's ability to protect its personnel and work more safely on a global platform to achieve american foreign-policy goals and objectives. the panel's view was that its recommendations were realistic, achievable. august 29, 2013 the panel delivered its final report to the department of state of the 40 recommendations we offered, the department accepted 38.

of the 38 accepted recommendations come at the department of state has reported that 30 have been implemented, and that in addition the implementation process for the remaining eight is ongoing. of the recommendations not accepted our department showed as a matter of urgency establishing undersecretary for diplomatic security and number 13, wavers to establish security standards should only be provided subsequent to the implementation of mitigating measures as agreed by the regional bureau or other program managers. advised by the department of state and informed by the department of risk management model. the best practice panel lived across a spectrum of nongovernmental organizations to identify effective measures to enhance the department's ability to ensure safe and secure environment from employers and programs. not surprisingly, the panel found that many institutions

including the department of state, bureau of diplomatic security as the gold standard for security and seek to model their service at the bureau of diplomatic security. nevertheless, any organization must continuously evolve and adjust with the fluid and dynamic environment. the panel continues to advocate that the way forward should be characterized by cooperative efforts that will provide a framework that will enhance the department's ability to protect americans. in order to be fixed if we must be innovative so that we ensure institutions adapt and evil to meet the ever-changing security requirements needs. many environments for uncertainty permeates one certainty that we share is the necessary collaborative effort that is needed in our country to ensure the safety and security of all american lives. it is also a necessary certainty that we honor and protect

memories of those citizens that have been lost as a result of violent attacks with dignity and respect. i would like to take this opportunity to thank the department of state of the overseas post on the overseas poster that hosted the panel does it and the bureau of diplomatic security for the outstanding support they provided to the panel during our endeavor. i would also like to thank the chairman, the ranking member cummings and members of the select committee for inviting us here today. and your continued efforts to make america safe. i look forward to any questions that you have. thank you. >> the chair now recognizes the gentleman from indiana for questioning. >> thank you mr. chairman and i would like to start by thanking each of the panel members for being here. you've dedicated your career whether protecting the president or foreign service officers and those in homeland security and we would like to thank you for that work. i looked at the department of

state's website and learned there are reports that show and i am certain that you've are aware since the 1970s there have been over 500 attacks on our diplomatic facilities abroad and over 92 different countries. from 1998 through december of 2013, there were actually 336 attacks against u.s. person know and facilities. these include things like rocket attacks, firebombing, attempted murder, arson, takeovers, vandalism. it wasn't until 1987 that the state department started what is called accountability review boards and there've 1980 r. --

19 arb's. and to review the security and intelligence into whether and whether the government employees reach their duty. as the chairman and ranking member brought up in 1998 east african bombings, 300 lives were lost, 12 americans, the rest were africans and the arb was convened then and they made several findings and recommendations than. this is what was called the panel that was 14 years before the east african arb. and again many of those findings and recommendations were found in east africa in their arb. at the time the then secretary of state accepted all of the recommendations in the east africa arb, and now here we are 14 years later in some of the same recommendations that have

been repeated by the benghazi arb. we seem to have a state department that has a long history of repeat recommendations but i think that there's a significant difference between recommendations and implementations and i would like to talk about how that happens and how that has happened. in fact the board in east africa urged the secretary to take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of the u.s. diplomatic personnel abroad and it was essential to convey to the department of security is one of its highest priorities. assistant secretary are you familiar with the east africa recommendations? >> not every specific recommendation that with the report, yes ma'am. >> and do you agree with the bug report? >> yes. >> are you aware that after the benghazi arb, the then secretary

gave her personal assurances as well that she put overall responsibility for implementing all of the arb recommendations in the hands of the deputy secretary? are you familiar with that? >> yes i am. >> and that was in fact in her letter in december of 2012 to the honorable john kerry the chairman of foreign relations. he she indicated the deputy the deputy secretary would be overseeing the information of the arb. are you familiar with her letter? and are you familiar with the fact that when secretary secretary john kerry became the secretary of state he initially kept at the the deputy secretary level; is that correct? and could you please speak into the microphone clicks thank you. >> yes ma'am. >> today overall overall response body for oversight implementation of all of the recommendations is with an office known as management policy right size innovation; is

that correct? one of 11 separate offices that reports to the undersecretary of management. >> they are not responsible for implementing that they are doing the job of tracking the implementation, yes. >> and it is their job. so i would like to point out for those who might not be familiar, and you are and in assistant secretary reporting to the management is that correct? >> yes ma'am. >> and you say they are tracking the implementation however that is the opposite of day in and day out going to ensure all of the recommendations are being followed is that correct? >> one office, yes. >> at this point the recommendations come it's really not at the secretary of state level. it's not at the deputy secretary of state level come it's not

within the undersecretary tracking that's happening at the fourth year is that correct. it's making sure that day in and day out is in the fourth tier. >> that i can also give you further information about how it is being closely looked at by the deputy secretary herself. >> and the deputy secretary, are you familiar with the inspector general's report? >> yes i am. >> the inspector general that issued the report in 2015 also belief that at the highest levels in the department, those are the individuals that must be personally responsible for overseeing the recommendations isn't that correct? >> yes it is. >> and in fact indicated in the report that that's how lasting change and cultural change would happen is if implementation were at the highest levels of the department.

>> i would like to ask your best practices panel indicated that where a security function is placed in a department is a statement of how that organization values security and its personnel. do you recall that finding? >> yes, very well. >> can you explain with respect to recommendation number one, which has not been implemented by the department, can you talk about the importance of the recommendation that recommendation of elevating the importance and actually of mr. starr's position to a higher level so can you talk about the importance of that recommendation and what you understand as to why the department isn't elevating the importance of security within the organization at the correct time. >> as we looked at other

government agencies, nongovernmental organizations as the private sector and the private sector it became very clear that the placement of the chief security officer with responsibility for the safety of the programs and the people it clearly depends where it is placed in the organization and especially at the department of state where the officials cause of the culture of the department or so crucially important come of the placement of that position was crucially important. mr. starr tv as we served in the united nations in terms of the security in that organization he was in undersecretary. that position was in undersecretary and the united nations recognized that and that's diplomatic world where you see things really matters. and if you actually look at the recommendation number 40, we recommended that the secretary should establish a comprehensive change management strategy throughout the department that has been led by the deputy deputy secretary for management resources. so those things come together in

our crucially important. >> and in your view of the best practices panel, when they look at the organization of the department, it was clearly your view that overall responsibility for securities from the visual standpoint which is imported in large organizations was too low on the chart is that right? >> from the visual standpoint and an operational standpoint when the thought of as a part of our panel, mr. sullivan was trying to find the bureau of diplomatic security and i had to keep pointing him further and further until he identified it. >> it might not just to be placed be placed on the chart visually it has to do with coming into control does it not? >> command and control and informed decision-making. >> and when you are a lower level in an organizational chart that requires you to then move up with the organization to get approval.

i would like to wrap up with mr. sullivan. with respect you have led a large federal agency in the service is that correct? and you understand the span of control so with respect to the need to be the feed the lasting cultural change in the organization with which is what i believe in the panel is going to trick to lead and to do where does that need to start? >> i think it needs to start at the top. >> the deputy secretary or the undersecretary which are considered principles and the department is that correct and that's the highest level. >> yes ma'am. >> with respect, do you have any other comments you would like to make with respect to mr. kyle

assessment? spinet it is a very large and complex directorate and it has very important and critical functions going on but its personnel is budget procurement. i believe there may be 20 or 21 assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretary is reporting to the undersecretary. and for us quite frankly this was not about an upgrade. from my perspective, i don't really care what the title is i just think there needs to be a direct report and i may be biased as reported directly to the secretary we have deputy secretary on the panel and the fbi director reported to the attorney general the just believe that it is a -- that's the way that this should be structured. we think internally and externally it tells people where security is thought to be in the

importance of security but again this wasn't about an upgrade entitled this was about parody and who is in charge of security. >> the gentle lady yields back and recognize the gentleman from washington mr. smith. >> thank you mr. chairman. you talked about about the process of who's in charge. you go back and review who's in charge and how can we sort of move around who was and who should be responsible but what i really want to focus on is what should be done regardless of who is and who is in charge of it. as i've traveled around the world i am amazed at the risks taken every day. just listening to the personnel talk about going back and forth to work everyday every day and the security that's involved.

we are in a lot of dangerous places throughout the world. and most of the people in the state department that i talked to take a certain amount of pride in it. it's their job and they go to these places to make sure that american interests are inspected and watched over. what have we learned about what you can specifically be forgetting for the moment who is in charge of giving it to enhance security at the high risk posed. how do you identify the high-risk post first of all and second, once you identify one, what do you do, how do you then try to enhance security to make sure people are protected and if you can tie that back into what played out in benghazi i don't think there's any question people view that as a high-risk post. what should have happened as a result of that.

thank you mr. congressman. we have always ranked the post according to threat. we look at the sort of terrorism and the threat of civil disorder. this is done in the process every single year with a tremendous amount of input from the post itself, from the emergency action committee on the post that has members from all the different agencies that are represented. we rank order these posts and give them ratings for terrorism for civil disorder. for things like cryan, counterintelligence, human intelligence, technical intelligence. >> the key question is then watch once you've identified and how do you try to better protect them? >> we look at the post and we have looked at security policy board to craft policies, security policies and standards

for physical security standards, technical, procedural security standards what we can do at the post it the post at the different threat levels. when we see that it's in the highest threat category, we are going to be d. vote for. we look at what is the size of the marine detachment and does it need to be lurcher. in the security that plays a huge role when we decide which post we want to rebuild over the capitol security cost sharing program and we prioritize replacing the most vulnerable post with more, with much more robust and much safer facilities that we build with funding from congress and overseas office and buildings. we make determinations now in the aftermath and we've categorized our 30 highest threat risk posts.

in addition to just making sure that the meet the security standards, are there things that we need to do in addition to the standards that make sense? these are multi-agency teams that we sent out and we continue to look at the threat information from every post around the world that we get every single morning we start at 8 a.m. every morning looking at the threat information that we get that one of but one of the critical lessons we learned from benghazi and we learned this in the past that we don't get specific threat information before an attack. if we did we would thwart the attack. the congresswoman talked about how many attacks we have suffered over the years. that is our document that we put out to make sure the people know what the environment is. we look at the threats and then we determine what do we have to do. we have been practicing risk management for years. we take our dependence out of

the post where we need to downside of the post were the critical places we may actually close the post a certain amount of days or evacuate. we go to the military and ask the department of defense to augment the protection on the ground. in tripoli we had 100 marines with us. so on a daily basis, we look at exactly what's happening on the post over c., try to make sure that we are aware of whatever intelligence is out there, try to make sure that we are fully aware of the larger instability question of what does that mean to us and put the right resources in the right place and take the proper steps. >> as a result on this specific instance what are you feeling specifically about benghazi and what should have been done that wasn't? and let me ask mr. sullivan that question. >> our focus was not to evaluate what happened.

it was to come up with best practices and during the course of that we did become aware of certain things that did happen in benghazi. this may be a way of answering your question. when we met with the assistant secretary we determined we are going to take our approach from a tactical approach to the more strategic approach. what type of fire equipment to get that we needed need to approach this from the strategic perspective. this comes down to communication and we made recommendations. we've made for different recommendations there. there has to be a cozy sigplan or logistics and you have to do

a very good job of risk management. it was mentioned there were numerous tripwires. there are numerous incidences that were occurring in benghazi and the one embassy moved out, the british moved out of benghazi. they need to protect people at admission and again i think that unfortunately people paid the price because the communication did not occur and the planning and logistics quite frankly didn't happen. and i have every confidence that

the assistant secretary and his staff are working on right now. >> congressman, the first question is into about how many people use and in how many balls you build. the first question has to be a strategic approach of the penalty for the first has to be do we need to be there, do we need to be in benghazi and that the department lacked the risk management process to make those informed decisions do we need to be in those places. are the risks less and the other national security priorities or the policy gains. the department doesn't have that process to determine to be need to be there and do we need to stay and that is the center and the heart of our report. the department needs the process not just to give them were people and more guns but do we need to be there and if the national security priorities outweigh the risks, fine then go there's nothing wrong with that.

but you need to have risk management processes the department lacks to make those determinations. >> congressman by good friend here could i say perhaps it should be past tense, lack. this is one of the things we have concentrated the most on the past two years. it is the heart of the validation process. >> talk about that because the chairman talked in the outset about the necessity of this panel. there is no question of the necessity to learn from it what we've done that with a number of reports and as you point out, we have made thishange. so what is different about the communication level as a result of the arb and the other studies that we have done? >> the biggest single change i would like to point out is the department's acceptance, not just acceptance, but embracing

the concept that first and foremost as todd e. looted to -- eluted to we have to ask why are we in the most dangerous places and in those that we identified as the highest risk, that is exactly what we are doing going through every single one of those and during the vital presence validation process. the first step is what is the national interest for being there and why should we run these high risks that we've already identified as the high-risk post? if the answer comes out the risks don't outweigh, then we are going to make decisions either we have to put additional security in or we have to withdraw our presence. >> we actually last year pulled out of the post as a result of the process, correct? >> not of that process. that's the larger strategic process but the risk management process, yes exactly so. we have pulled out because of

these things. >> thank the gentleman from washington. >> you said in a recent testimony there was no tactical warning. that's the same that they found about the incident before is that correct? that's my understanding yes. >> is also the case that in your experience your experience as an immediate tactical warning? >> in your opening statement you didn't mention anything to find a number 21 and 22. if you don't have the threat analyst us right over things you talked about are meaningless if you don't have the thread and ... but if you don't have the right intelligence in the right place would you agree with that? >> yes sir but i would add that add is that only the intelligence. you have to look at the entire situation in the country.

it's its mlss and intelligence. >> i would agree with that. there were 20 incidences referred to in and around march of 2012 of the death of the americans where there was the deteriorating situation around the benghazi. >> finding number 21 said attention should be paid to that the point of situation deteriorates and in your fact sheet your only response to that finding is that the department has addressed the recommendation. can you tell me what it is done to address the recommendation? >> i can discuss part of it in open session. as i alluded to we start every morning at 8 a.m. looking at every bit of threat intelligence that comes in from a wide variety of sources not just the intelligence community that the post in their reporting. beyond that, we bring personnel

from the regional bureau, the political officers and others that are with us but were not just looking at the threat intelligence because as you pointed out, as we know in many cases we don't pick up the thread before the attack. >> if this is different as opposed to post-benghazi i would appreciate that. >> this is different. we are incorporating the regional bureau with us and looking at the political reporting in addition to the intelligence reporting. we are looking at sources that we get from private companies and ngos in the area. what is the overall threat profile. it looks at the entirety as proposed to whether or not we know if there is a specific threat against us. >> after all of the incidences that were accounted for you are not doing that before the incidence of september 11, 2012 before the findings is that

right state department wasn't doing that is that what i understand? >> we are doing it better than we were before. >> can you tell me if if peace changes would have made an impact on the lives of those americans? had we been doing that before the date? >> it's hard for me to say. i was at the united nations at that time. i can tell you that after the un when i was the undersecretary general we were aware of the security situation in benghazi. on the date of the attack, september 11, 2012 i still had un personnel. >> if we change topics a little bit one of the findings of the best practices panel that was a bit over a year ago is that the state department had not interviewed the agents who survived the attack in the special mission as of that date is that still the case?

>> of the agents were interviewed by the fbi and diplomatic security. >> so with the state department -- was the panel correct or did you conduct then after the panel reads you? >> the fbi interviews were done prior to the best practices panel. we had discussed tactics with the agents but we had not debriefed them on the incident because we had the fbi 302. >> it's important to know what the folks on the ground assault that makes to implement the consideration it would be important to know what they saw and the same for those folks that were not there but then previously the department of state interviewed all of those persons at this point? >> i would hesitate to say all. we interviewed a number of people that we solve relevant to the attack. they make when they were conducted with a conducted individually or in groups?

>> when the interviews were conducted by the department of state department of state where they conducted individually or grouped interviews? >> individually. i was in business for 16 years before this when the boss is sitting around often as candid as they might be in the situation when they were there and independently so as we look at the findings and to try to evaluate if it is sufficient to do what you need to do it is important to know the basis. so they were conduct at individually. >> in the inspector general's report that indicated at least two secretaries asked if it was a sufficient process that is is is capable of the complexity of the one that we see here? do you think that it is

sufficient to make the transition from the fact done about the incident to conducting good security policy moving forward? there are limitations in the law that establishes especially when you're talking about a complex catastrophic incident they have significant limitations of what they can and can't do so it impacts the effectiveness. >> and that goes to some of the limitations and capacity in its authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of the unsatisfactory leadership and indicate that you are prepared to help us change the statutory authority so that they can do that. are you prepared to testify that you will make sure that it is in fact have the ability to make sure that the leaders of the organizations are held accountable for any errors that they may have made? >> yes and it's my understanding we have been looking at this with the congress since january

of 2013. may i also say one of the things important to make is that while the arb not have the expertise to look at everything the fact that the arb recommended that we consider putting together best practices panel that could then delve further into the specifics proves that the arb can make recommendations that can go beyond what they can do" even further. that is a good example that while the arb may not have the expertise you are talking about, they can bring in other experts to do these things. so they can at least recommend some kind of disciplinary action against senior leaders and agencies that they are reviewing? >> they already have the ability if they find a breach of duty i think what we are looking at now is whether they find a lack of leadership and i would support that as well. >> a handful of questions i know you were not on data but we want to make sure we understand

precisely what they are. did they have the opportunity to interview the contracts that were on the ground that night who might know something about the security as well as the other facilities. >> did they have the opportunity to interview the people that might have known something about the intelligence and security situation on the ground that might? >> i'm sorry i do not know the answer to that. >> what i think the scope of the information is there are important and i also wonder if you have had a chance to review the intelligence that had been gathered as a result of the capture who would know what was going on that night on the ground as also i'm interested if you had the chance to incorporate that into your ideas about implementing the arb. >> we are aware of the debriefings and looking at the material that is relevant to us and we are taking the proper steps based on what we find. >> i yield back.

>> the chair will now recognize the gentleman from maryland mr. cummings. >> mr. starr, i'm going to i am going to pick up where ms. brooks left off. how is the department's tracking its compliance with the benghazi arb recommendations can you tell me briefly? they are the ones doing the tracking as we go through these. but i can tell you that i have had many meetings with the deputy secretary, myself, anyone that has anything to do with the response of a particular answer or best practices panel answer or the management panel where we have sat with the deputy secretary and literally have gone through every single one of the recommendations where are

we, how have we inserted about what is the response, how far along in the implementation are we? we have these meetings about every other month. but literally she has been on top of the of the santa tracking it since the beginning. >> and so, you said that there were seven arb recommendations that haven't been completed is that right? >> we are still in progress were nearing the completion that they are not totally fulfilled. >> do you have a timeline on those? >> they are what i would refer to as evergreen recommendations and i will give you an example. one of the wreck of the patients was for better language for the diplomatic security agents. since that time, we worked to specifically put together some courses in arabic, urdu and

french. we we called an alert alert course is that a much shorter and they are specific to training the agents and the type of language capability that they need in a short period of time. we have the courses in place but the reality is that it is going to take me a long time as the agent to get ready to rotate overseas and put them in the training so that is the type of recommendation that is going to be open for a long time. >> all of them are like that? >> many of them are evergreen recommendations. some of them will be closed in 2015. >> you understand where i'm going with this? i seen over and over again in my 17 years in congress that the department will come in. the new congress comes in and

the next thing you know, it hasn't been done. we want to be effective and efficient. this is the moment that we have to take advantage of. so can you of the seven. are these things that can be done in an indefinite amount of time? can you give us a timetable on those so that at least while we are a committee we can hold the department accountable? is that a reasonable request? >> i think that is a reasonable request. we can supply the information on where we are on those recommendations. i would say there is no doubt in my mind that we are going to implement every one of these recommendations.

i think one of your questions is whether or not we have been implementing the recommendations one was to review every single recommendation that has been made since 1988. the office that is tracking these we sat down and went through every recommendation in the past to make sure that we were doing our best to fulfill those in our office is going to track them in the future as well i can understand understand some hesitancy about if we drag the south we are not going to get done. i can assure you that while i am bare or secretary kerry is that we are going to make sure that every single one of these recommendations is fulfilled. as i get older i realize that we are not going to be here for so long. in the places that we are in for a season and it may come to an end in all kind of ways.

that's why i want you under our watch. i want some definite timetables so that we can hold somebody accountable. other than that, we are going to be going through this over and over again. do you understand what we are saying? you gave me more information i would like to add on to your list. if there are crucial things we have been looking at making recommendations from 1988 that you are working on. going back to ms. brooks. the father of tyrone was i

looked him in the eye and he asked one question and by the way, every family that we talked to said the same thing make it safer for somebody in the future. argue with me? >> yes i am. >> well you come back -- how much time do you need? to give us what i asked for? >> let me take this back to the department and work through this and and get to the answer as fast as possible. we can talk about this but it may be appropriate later on for us to have a hearing just on the progress that has been made. i know that is the chairman's decision, but i think we need to make sure that we stay on top of this. the independent arb found that the tripwires the trip wires that are security incidents is that are supposed to trigger the

reviews and responses were, and i quote him a too often treated as indicators of threat rather than a central mechanisms of serious risk management decisions of actions. the senate select committee on intelligence came to a similar conclusion and its bipartisan report is said and i quote there were tripwires designed to prompt the reduction and personnel or the suspension of operations. although there is evidence that some of them had been crossed, operations continue with minimal change can end of quote. it revises guidance in all key offices to perform in-depth status tripwires. in response to this recommendation, does the state department setup the tripwires committee in washington wax when

they are triggered to help ensure that the relevant regional bureau to the deteriorating environment. >> in the operations center the biggest single change is in the past years the tripwires were usually something about the post itself would look at as part of the emergency action plan and if they cross the tripwires it would determine what action needed to be made and report what decisions he were going to have. at this point the major changes that anytime they cross the tripwires it has to be reported to washington. at that point, cms and gathers a group of people and we review what tripwire was crossed and

they look at the implementations and we make decisions on what should happen. they may have already made the decision that this is a new review that goes on in the washington level as well. >> i will try to concentrate on the security concern. the actions recently at the gaining of those activities when we had a civil disorder quite a few tripwires had been crossed for for him stability or insecurity. decisions were made at that

point we moved them out until the situation had ceased and had rectified itself. we look up at what we called reverse tripwires and was the situation really changed and then we made a decision to return the families in about two weeks after the situation in the middle of town that could have affected the representative was resolved. >> i look forward to receiving the information that we requested. thank you mr. chairman. >> we now recognize the gentleman from georgia. >> thank you. mr. starr. >> the arb found a systematic failure in the security posture in benghazi and it was inadequate for the special mission compound and a little side note. we had been called at the embassy and we were told that it

was a temporary mission facility and now it's being called a special mission compound. is there any reason for terminology continuing to evolve into something? >> it was neither an embassy or consulate in the agency there was just some do you call it a temporary mission facility? >> they had hired the blue mountain to do the screening of any visitors and the perimeter protection. >> my understanding from other reports is that it was a contract with a blue mountain security company for the libyan individuals and agreements with

the 17th militia. >> that is the host country as the 17th brigade. >> in the absence of the practical and real host security nation that was the best that they could do. >> but it was unarmed is that correct? >> that's correct. >> who is responsible for some of these facilities? >> in terms of contract performance? normally we have an open competition process. how we contract is a function that has been given to us with very specific requirements. it's open competition and whoever can bid on it and meet the requirements does it. i think in the contingency situations we were finding in

benghazi it was probably very little competition. >> so was this the lowest price better? >> i can't really tell you. >> are you aware that the two contracts these people had were counseled and that at the temporary mission facility they had recommended that they not be used? >> i've read reports of deaths or -- read reports of that sir. >> in your distinguished career do you ever remember recommending that a service not be used? that you were familiar with anywhere and then being hired over your protest or recommendation? >> not in my experience.

>> but you would have at some point recommended to somebody or maybe not recommended anybody. was it your job to look at the performance of these people that you are aware of? >> when we have contracts if we find the contractor is not performing we have a variety of ways you can deduct money ultimately find they are not performing and if they are found to be lacking and cannot perform the contract that they can be terminated, they can be barred if it goes that far. >> you mentioned february 17 the martyrs brigade is what it was called. we were told that it was the host company security. is that true or not? >> i would hesitate to call that the host country. it had some control in that area of the city that this is based

on what i've read in the reports. report. >> is there an individual that would be at the post that would be responsible for ensuring that the 17th brigade was responsible and dependable? >> i wasn't there at the time. i can tell you you there were likely limited choices and one of the things they would do at that point if faced with limited choices is try to train them the best they could to make the best of whatever situation he was handed. >> you would have to train the federal brigade? >> if he found that they were not up to the level that he wanted, he would engage in assisting the training and making sure they understood about workers and making sure they had the capabilities that were necessary.

let's say they were hired in case there was an attack inside the compound, who would have had to contact information and the information and who would have been responsible on the post for contacting this projected brigade of martyrs? >> as i read read the reports and again i wasn't here at the time there were personnel on the compound. they have telephone communication with their own groups. other personnel in the group. and there was communication on the part of the operation center making phone calls and there were phone calls that were being made from the annex. >> let's go to the tripwires.

the tripwire activated, initiate or set in motion plans to prevent harm to the post as the personnel and that u.s. citizen community or other national interest. the book also knows that when a tripwire occurs, it requires that an action be taken. are you familiar with that? >> it's my understanding that they are preapproved measures that should be taken in light of security related incident or threat is that true? at the state department emphasized the purpose of having tripwires? >> when the tripwire is breached meaning something bad is

happening that is the trigger to take specific action is it not? >> at a minimum, it is a warning that the post must review what has occurred and determine what action should be taken. >> take action rather than just requiring that they sit around and reevaluate the situation. >> while, sir, they are in advance of the activities. we try to cover a wider variety of situations that could occur. predicting the future in exactly what your actions are going to be is very difficult. i think the purpose of tripwires is to indicate something has just happened. this could be significant. we need to consider whether or not we need to take action in this case. as i said previously, it was neither a post-activity now wants the tripwire is tripped it is looked at both by the post

and by the various sections in washington. >> would you consider a whole that being blowing in the perimeter wall of the temporary mission facility would you consider that a tripwire? >> i would certainly say that is a good indicator across the tripwire. >> and bad events would have probably -- it should have caused some action or discussion; correct? >> yes, sir. >> was an attack on another diplomat coming into benghazi that caused that country to to pullout would that have been a tripwire? >> i assume that you are referring to the attack of the british ambassador. that is another tripwire, yes. that is an indication of security problems and instability. >> so those were tripwires you would consider significant would you not?

>> yes, sir >> what was done with the security after those tripwires were tricked? >> i was not here. i read that report and i'm aware that they were increasing physical security. they were engaged in building safe havens inside the facility. they had engaged in training with the guards. they had run drills with the annex. from what i've read, they were doing the type of things that a rso would do when he sees a situation beginning to deteriorate. ..