activities. we try to cover a wide variety of situations that could occur. predicting the future and exactly what your actions are going to be is very difficult. i think the purpose of trip wires is to indicate that wait, something has just happened. this could be significant. we need to consider whether or not we need to take action in this case. >> okay. it was normally a post activity. now once wire is tripped it is watched. >> would you consider a hole being blown in the perimeter wall of the temporary committee, would you say that? >> i would say that's a good indicator. >> and that event would have probably -- should have caused some action or discussion,

correct? >> yes. >> would an attack on another diplomat coming into benghazi that caused the country to pull o out. >> i'm assuming you're referring to the attack on the british ambassador. >> i am. >> i certainly thing think it's indication of instability. >> so those are two trip wires that you would consider insignificant, would you not? >> yes, sir. >> and what was done with the security after those two trip wires were tripped? >> sir, as i said, i was not here at that time. >> well, you've read reports. >> i'm aware that the rsos were increasing physical security.

they were engaged with training in the facility. they had run drills with the annex. i think from what i read they were doing the types of things an rso would do when he sees the situation beginning to deteriorate. >> well, thank you for your testimony. thank you all for being here. and let's hope we can get some results out of this tragic event. >> the chairman now recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. shift. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank you for conducting the hearing today and for the way you have worked with us to bring together wnszs and follow up on arb recommendations. i greatly appreciate it. i want to ask you gentlemen something in a bit of a different direction than the question you've had so far. i think serve on the appropriations sub committee. and i have the opportunity to meet with a lot of foreign

service officers, both here and washington and around the world. many have described to me what they consider the benghazi effect. on their jobs. and by that, they refer to such a heightened concern about security that many of them feel they cannot fulfill their mission anymore. that they are confined to pa bunker or not allowed to undertake things they think are necessary to job responsibilities, and i think this sentiment was best expressed in june by vice president of the american foreign services association who wrote, does our collective response to benghazi threaten to make the foreign service less knowledgeable about the world and less influential with a host country and the u.s. government itself? that's a question that ambassador stevens might have asked. and i wonder if you can share your thoughts on it, as we implement the recommendations of

the arb and of your panel. how do we make sure we're not preventing people from doing their job? we all acknowledge this is a dangerous thing. as many i colleague pointed out, our facilities have been attacked literally hundredses of times over the last couple of decades. it's happened in the past. it's going to happen again. we want to protect our people as best we can. but we want them to be effective. that's why they're there. if you could each share briefly your thoughts on are we striking the right balance, or has the benghazi effect meant we are undermining the able of our people to do their work? >> congressman, you are going to the heart of the question of risk management and how do we implement risk management? over many years we've made great strides in building safer and secured facilities so that an attack on a facility that could

hurt everybody in one attack, we've done great things in terms of protecting that. and i think if you look at the number of attacks against our facilities and how few have been successful, most have been driven off with casualties by our security personnel or others only. we made great strides in. we can't lock people inside embassies. the whole point of diplomacy is to get out. and in many cases it will be the most restrictive for the foreign service personnel. but we have to get them outside of the wall as well. and that means protective security details and armored vehicles and working the host country security services. every single day we run

motorcades outside of our embassy in kabul or iraq or tripoli, we were taking risks. but every single day we were judging what that risk was versus the need to get out and making sure that we could balance those risks and we were not getting our people out for not very good reasons. they had to be very important reasons. in lower threat level posts we're operating almost normally around the world. we have physical security around the post, but our people get out every single day. that's the work of diplomacy. talking to people, understanding the country, representing the united states, and bringing information back, and you don't do that without talking to people. so i think all the efforts we've made in terms of recognizing what are the highest threat, highest risk posts, doing risk management and making sure we're getting the people out when we can, but understanding if too many people get injured or it's too dangerous, we can't operate.

and if we're not taking the threat seriously enough, we won't be there either if we get too many people killed or injured or the threat is too high, those are the types of things we need to weigh every single day. and we do. i can understand the] of foreign service officers. no, sir, they cannot live out in the open economy. they cannot just go to a coffee shop. but we are still getting them to the meetings they need to get to. >> i don't think that's the issue for them. as much as they would like to be accompanied by spouses and go to a local coffee shop, what they've expressed to me is not that which they understand, but they can't undertake the meetings they want and the places they need to go to have the meetings and the contacts they need to gather information for the government, to convey the u.s. position to people, they condition do their job because they're confined by a

hyper conservative point of view perspective back in washington. and you get that feedback, and are there any situations where you feel the pressure has been such top be so risk avoidant that we're not allowing people to do the job. >> i think in the immediate aftermath after benghazi. i think there's a deep appreciation of that attack. an the pendulum may have swung the other way for a while. i think today with the systems we have put in place. with the risk management we're doing every day. the additional resources that you're giving us, i would not agree with that same, sir. i think we need to take precautions, and we do. i talked with ambassador deb jones when we were in tripoli. i talked with the ambassador

about whether or not we're getting out enough and doing the things we're doing and they say yes, we are. and let me ask you another question because i have limited time. one of the problems with benghazi is the overreliance on the loyalty of the local militias to provide security. are there any places around the world today where you feel were continuing to place an overreliance on local militias for security of our facilities? >> that was something we talked a lot about. when you go into a situation like that, and no matter where you go in the world you're going to have to come up with that evaluation. if you don't have that capability, no amount of money you're going to pay in the contract is going to rock that. it goes back to risk management. if you don't have the

capabilities locally, you have to go and bring them in yourself. i can't speak to who has them and who doesn't. but i really think when you look at the reaction of that guard force, leading up to that, those trip wires that were spotted there, i mean, that was a real concern. and again, i just go back to there might have been the will, but there was just not the capability. >> on either question? >> i think first of all, sir, one of our recommendations, i'll start with as mr. sullivan pointed out in his opening statement, when we first started with our panel we thought we would look at these tactical issuesover building bunkers and higher walls. we quickly realized that wasn't the answer because that doesn't facilitate diplomacy and we moved to thexpda=ímqiq% and looked at the department and overseas post and risk management. we asked ambassadors, deputy

chiefs and foreign services officers as we traveled overseas, tell us about the state department's risk management process. without exception, each one said there is none. and they make it up. and sadly to this day, while they may be making(syprogress, that is still a significant concern. risk management process, as you indicated, sir. the foreign service is a dangerous business. we have to be out there. we have to do these things that are national security priorities. but we have to do it under a risk management process that's effective and sustainable andzú transparent. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >>en thank you, the chair will now recognize the gentleman in ohio. >> mr. kyle, how many years experience do you have in the security field? >> approximately 30, sir. >> and how many years did you serve the state department in the the area sf. >> almost 23. >> did you get good evaluations in high reviews, strong reviews? >> yes, sir. >> so good that you were put on the security detail to protect

the secretary of state. is that accurate? >> yes, sir. sectarian warren christopher and madeline albright. >> and the most recent service in the public sector was assistant secretary of homeland security. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and that's from the obama administration? >> yes, sir. >> you trust the agents in the field, mr. kyle? >> i trust them. they know the ground truth. they know what's going on. they're the guys on the ground putting their lives on the line just like you did. when they make a recommendation to the state department, you take that seriously? >> yes, i would. >> are you aware the guys on the ground in benghazi repeatedly asked for additional security and were repeatedly denied? >> yes, sir. from what we saw. they said this thing is out of control. we need more good guys here. and it was worse than that, wasn't it, mr. kyle? >> probably, yes, sir.

>> because they said not only we need more. but what they had was reduced. is that accurate? >> yes. we heard testimony he was on the ground in benghazi. he said we couldn't keep what we had. we're the united states of america. we have facilities all over the globe. my guess is the security people will say we can use a few more folks. but wasn't the situation in libya and benghazi unique? >> when you look at the intelligence and the numerous incidents, yeah, i would prioritize benghazi. >> we had assassination attacks on the british ambassador. this is as bad as it gets. the state department says you're not going to get that. if you were an agent on the ground, would you be boblying

for more help? >> i would be extremely frustrated and try to push every button i could possibly push. >> you get the request from these guys on the grounds for more help. would you have fought to make that request happen? >> my last position, i was a regional director for the bureau vetting those requests from the field. i would have put a significant amount of priority on benghazi. >> so you had that job? >> yes. >> before benghazi you had the job? >> yes. >> and you would have went to bat for them? >> i would have. >> what's the overseas security policy board? >> it's an inner agency board that is a genesis from the beirut embassy bombings. the kbhigs that maded the security services. the standards. it's an inner agency board that creates physical security, technical security. procedural security. >> so these were standards developed interagency. so state department standards,

is that correct? >> state department leads. >> and the resulted from the embassy bombing in beirut where 64 people were killed. 17 americans. >> yes, sir. >> and were the standards followed at if benghazi facility? in talking with people and based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the standards. >> so the standards weren't followeded? >> no. >> so my understanding is there's a waiver process you have to follow if you're going to deviate. was that followed? >> that was one of our recommendations, sir, and when you're not following the standards, you don't have to following the waiver process. >> so they didn't follow standards or the waiver? >> correct. >> what's your overaum impression of the arb report? >> mr. sullivan and i testified before the house and oversight government reform committee.

the ambassador referred to the arb as being fiercely independent. in the same hearing, admiral u mullen admitted to oversight and government reform that he was reporting on arb proceedings through the senior staff of the safety department outside of the requirements of being a member of the arb, i don't think that fits anyone's definition of being fiercely independent. >> you don't think it was independent at all? frankly, i share your belief. when secretary clinton gets to a point, when sheryl mils calls them up and asks them to serve. when neither are interviewed. when they get a draft report before it goes public, in essence they get to edit it before the rest of the world sees it. when admiral mullen told the committee, told the committee, now think about this. he's been on the job a few days as the cochair of the supposedly independent arb.

be on the job a few days. he discovers that she's going to two days later come in front of the oversight committee. he realizes she's not going to be a good witness. what does he do? just what you referenced, mr. kyle. he gets on the phone and calls the chief of staff to the secretary of state and says charlene lamb is not going to be a good witness. she's not going to reflect well on the state department. he gives a heads up to the very person he's supposed to investigate. of course this wasn't independent. we asked mr. mullen, why do you care if she's a good or bad witness? your job is to get to the truth of the american people. not to get to the heads of the

>> it's recommendation number one. most of the others hinge on the implementation of that recommendation. >> yes, sir. it's designed to give accountability to one particular person at the state department, is that correct? >> to identify those who are -- >> yeah, something miss brooks talked about in her opening questions. >> yes, sir. >> designed to give accountability and responsibility to someone at the state department. and is this the first time this recommendation has been put forward, mr. kyle? >> no, sir, our panel was a bit surprised to uncover a memo from now 15 years ago that secretary of state madeline albright

signed ordering the creation of an underdsecretary deputy of security. >> that wasn't followed. we have a recommendation from madeline albright, the lady you protected,that say wes need to create an undersecretary after americans were kill nld the east african embassy bombings. >> yes, sir. >> and that wasn't followed. has the state department said they're going to implement this at all? >> they said it's one of the recommendations they're not going to implement. >> they're not going to implement. my question is simple, mr. chairman. what is it going to take? what is it going to take for the state department to put in place the practices to save american lives? they didn't listen to the guys on the ground. the pros that know what they're doing. they didn't listen to the guys on the ground that put their lives on the line. they didn't follow their own standards that were developed in

1983 after the bay rue embassy bombing. they didn't follow the waiver process to deviate from the standards and now they're not following the panel ee's numbere recommendation. what's it going to take? the ranking member in the opening remarks said this is a transformational moment. somebody better tell the state department that. think of this track record. i hope it's right. i hope they get it. if they're not going to listen to two guys with the experience that mr. kyle and mr. sullivan have and say the one mange thing we need is person of accountability. the one ming thing that everything else hinges on. talk about the arrogance of the state department. hopefully one of the things this committee can do is convince them to follow these guys. at least convince them of that. thank you for your service. amazing work for your country.

we appreciate your work as well. 42 seconds, i would yield. >> wli don't you answer the question of the state department? >> you can is ask him that question. the way this works -- >> reclaiming my time. that's -- you're welcome to do it, mr. chairman. i think you spent a lot of time on mr. starr. i chose to focus on mr. kyle who has 30 years of experience, appointed by the obama administration, 23 years in the state department, viewed so highly he was actually on the protective detail for secretary of state to warren christopher, secretary of state madeline albright. i chose to use my ten minutes on mr. kyle. minority can use their ten minutes on whatever witness they called. this is a hearing they called. >> thank the chairman from ohio. now recognize the gentle lady from california, miss sanchez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to all the witnesses for joining us for what i hope will be a productive and forward looking hearing on what can be done and what is being currently done and what we

have yet to do in terms of trying to prevent a tragedy from benghazi from happening again or at the very least minimizing the potential for something like that to happen again. i am going to begin my questions on the same realm of where the questioning left off. talking about the security accountability framework within the department of state. the best practices panel, led by mr. sullivan, determined, quote, clearly defined accountability and security at every level is fundamental for effective security management within an organization. and the panel recommended the development of an accountability framework. is that correct, mr. sullivan? >> yes, ma'am. >> in response to that recommendation the department created a security accountability framework that the department explained clearly defines key actors, their roles

and responsibilities, and governing you. can you please describe the responsibilities at each of the various leadership levels? >> i think the first leadership level starts with the secretary of state. the secretary acknowledges that he is ultimately responsible for the security of our personnel overseas. beneath that in the accountability framework, the next person that has the direct responsibility for security is me. assistant secretary for diplomatic security. and i would have to say that we looked long and hard at the recommendation of whether it needed to an under-secretary position or assistant secretary position. it was a rental by the panel. the department looked at this very seriously. ultimately, weighed all the points behind it and made a decision what was probably more important is whether or not i, in my position, had the direct access to the secretary that was necessary.

and under accountability framework and f.a.m., i'm directly responsible to security threat information and security threats against our people. i still do report to under-secretary for management. we think that's key because isolated and alone diplomatic security would not have some of the capabilities we have with buildings operations, imn and others. i want to put that back on the record. one of the things the accountability framework talks about is that all of us in department of state are responsible for security. specifically designs the roles of the department secretaries and what they do. it defines roles the under-secretary for political affairs and under-secretary for management has. the most important thing it does is define roles for other assistant secretaries, the people i work side by side with

every single day, who run the regional bureaus, the wha, era bureau. and it assigns security responsibilities to them. in fact, their job descriptions have been changed to reflect the security responsibilities. >> let me -- let me -- >> all of this is contained in the accountability framework. one final thing, which i think is critical, we can't do the security we need to do unless every individual foreign service officer understands that they have a role in their own security as well. and it goes to defining that. >> so, those expectations have been communicated, then, on down the security framework, is that correct? >> yes. >> and state department employees have a clear understanding of what the chain of command, so to speak, is for security decisions and security decision making? >> overseas it was always clear. it ran from rso and chief of

mission. it was always clear overseas. it was a little less clear within the department who had the responsibilities. this document goes a long way, taking information that was already in the f.a.m. and putting it together into a clearer framework, yes. >> if i can go back for just a second to the number one recommendation about creating a different position that would be in charge of security explain some of the thought-making process that went into the ultimate decision not to accept that recommendation and essentially make you responsible for security. >> well, first and foremost, i think it has to be acknowledged that i am responsible, whether i'm the assistant secretary or whether it be changed to deputy -- i'm sorry, an under-secretary position. the department looked at this and and had to weigh different things. under-secretary has different responsibilities rather than one focus on things. if you look at other under-secretaries and the range of things they do, it's -- one

of the things the department made sure of is this position, my position, a, we are access to secretary and other leadership. second, that i wasn't being diverted from the just pure security role by other duties. under-secretary position would carry other duties. my predecessor was the assistant secretary for diplomatic security and the chief of overseas foreign missions. the office of overseas foreign missions. one of the things we did in the aftermath of benghazi was to separate those two functions. now there's an ambassador in charge of overseas missions. i'm not distracted by that role. i focus exclusively on security. >> i have two other questions i would like to ask. mr. sullivan, do you think the new framework that the department of state has clearly defines accountability and responsibility for security?

>> congresswoman, we haven't been fully briefed on that. what i heard just now, i think that's a great start, but clearly there has to be accountability. people have to know who's in charge of security. also the point that was made earlier, how all the employees feel around the world. i think that that leadership is important to let them know they're valued, that they're supported and that those people making decisions are going to be made accountable -- every employee will be made accountable for those decisions they're making. >> thank you. i want to hit on the issue very quickly. i have very limited time about temporary staffing. several investigations into the attacks in benghazi found the temporary staffing of security officers was what contributed to poor security at the benghazi facility. the bipartisan senate homeland and governmental reform committee found, for example,

dsa agents were remaining for relatively short periods, often no longer than a month. the independent accountability review board concluded that the utilization of temporarily assigned agents in benghazi was problematic. i'm quoting from their findings. the short-term transitory nature of benghazi staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in benghazi. staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering the post security posture, considering the high risk, high threat environment. the end result was a lack of institutional knowledge and mission capacity which could not

>> it is critical. your first 30 days on the ground, you are just trying to figure out where you are, how things are operating, where the threats are. we absolutely concur with that recommendation of taking steps to ensure that the personnel we put on the ground are there for longer periods of time. >> and has the department been able to achieve those requirements in its practice? >> yes, it has. the fact is we don't actually have any temporary facilities at the moment. i request give you an example, though, when we just entered bengi, we have mobile security agents on the ground with u.s. marines that are there. those agents are going to stay for a much longer period of time. probably up to 90 days until

we're sure we have the proper security that we can then start replacing them with permanent personnel we're going to have on the ground. the 30-day rotations as the arb pointed out were not conducive to the security operation. >> are there any other incentives that the department can provide or think to provide for personnel to undertake those longer assignments? >> i don't think it's a question of necessary or additional incentives. i think it's a question we needed to understand that constantly rotating like that was not in our best interest. i think my agents clearly understand that. and i think it really isn't about additional incentives. it's about knowing that's not the proper procedure and we needed to change it. >> built a great practice. thank you for your forthright answers and i yield back to the

chairman. >> the chair would recognize the gentle lady from the state of california, mrs. robey. >> thank you, mr. chairman. returning to the questioning of mr. jordan about the waiver process briefly. mr. starr, oversea security policy sets the physical security standards that must be met. it's also my understanding that they're either temporary, interim or permanent, correct? >> yes. >> and overseas diplomatic facilities can be further classified as residential office or other categories as well? >> yes. >> okay. >> and how was benghazi classified in 2012? my understanding from the reports is that it was the temporary mission facility. >> and was that classification found in the ospb's standards? >> no.

>> are there any ospb standards for a temporary office facility? there's not, right? >> our outlook on that is whether it's temporary or interim or permanent, that we should be applying the same security standards that the ospb has put in place. and that if we can't, then we need to look closely at what risks we run -- >> so that -- sorry to interrupt you. the office in the residential don't require a higher level of security if they're in that category? >> there are higher levels -- when we build offices, when we build facilities, they have higher level. >> the benghazi facility was used at both, correct? >> yeah, i'd say that's an accurate portrayal. >> in the dual case where it's being used as a residential and an office, what standards apply? the higher standards, correct? >> correct.

and so those ospb standards should have applied to the benghazi facility? >> that is the way that i would apply them now. i wasn't here, but if we had a similar situation, we would be applying the higher standards. >> i just want to make sure this is very clear. your policy is that any time a facility is being used for any purpose, whatever type of facility has the higher -- the highest level of physical security standards, those standards should be applied? >> that is correct. >> but that didn't happen in benghazi? >> i would have to say i can't answer that question. >> looking ahead, when you talk about in this era of expa dishary diplomacy, is it possible for the facility to other a temporary facility? >> we don't have any at the

moment. i can't imagine we would or that i would approve it. >>. >> okay. let's turn to marine security guard detachments. were marine security guard detachments ever deployed to the benghazi compound? >> no. >> the benghazi compound we already established by multiple questions here, it was a temporary facility. and marine security guard det h detachments are never deployed to temporary facilities, correct? >> not in my experience. >> the increase in marine security guard detachments as a result of the arb recommendation 11, therefore, would not have actually helped in benghazi, correct? >> i mean, if it's a temporary facility and they can't be deployed, then it can't help? >> i just want to make the point, i'm not saying that additional personnel on the ground would not have helped,

but, yes, you're correct, we would not -- in my experience, we would not have put a marine security guard detachment into a temporary facility. >> we've also already established here today there's currently 30 posts that are considered high risk, high threat. how many have benefitted, of those 30, of the marine security guard personnel? >> i'd have to get back to you with the exact number. i think about 20. we have opened four marine detachments in benghazi at our high-risk posts. there are still some that don't have marine detachments. there's a variety of reasons why. >> is it your goal to get to marine security detachments at all the high risk, high threat posts? >> i would like to have marine

security guard detachments at all of our high risk posts. some impediments cannot be overcome. >> at the ones that don't have the marine security detachment, how exactly does the -- without highly trained marine security guards? >> in some places we have made up by using diplomatic security agents. in some cases we have made risk managed decisions where we have taken personnel out and lowered our presence. some cases our families are not there. or we lowered the number of employees to minimum numbers. in many cases we make representation with the host governments and we analyze

whether the host government has both the capability and the will to provide the necessary level of protections. and if we find that we don't have those types of protections or we think the risks are too high, then we won't be there. >> okay. if an ambassador at a high risk, high threat post picks up the phone and calls the seventh floor of the state department today, asking for additional security, physical or personnel, who ultimately makes the decision to grant or deny that request? mr. starr? >> the last person in the chain would be me. the request would probably not go to the seventh floor. it would probably go to me on the sixth floor or the rso to our personnel. i can tell you that today i have available mobile security teams to deploy. we work very closely -- >> ultimately i'm asking who makes that decision? >> it can be approved at lower

levels. >> what's the lowest level it can be approved? >> i think the lowest level would be the regional director of the -- of diplomatic security. >> if an ambassador sends a cable, would it be the same, rather than picking up the phone, it would be the -- >> exactly the same. >> and would it -- would the decision-making process change if it were not a high risk, high threat post? >> no, it would not. >> okay. >> and was benghazi considered high risk, high threat or critical threat? >> pardon me. i actually don't know what the rating was of benghazi. we did not have the 30 identified high threat, high risk posts listed at that point. >> who denied the additional diplomatic security personnel requested in benghazi by those who were working and living there and in tripoli? who was the person that denied that? >> i have to refer you to the results of the arb. i came back five months after the attack. >> what i'm trying to get at, is

that same person who was also responsible for ensuring the physical security in benghazi, is that the same person that's vested with that responsibility today? >> i think the board pointed out that there were lapses in judgment on the part of the director and several others, including the director for international programs. >> if a ds agent at the post writes back to headquarters requesting additional security upgrades or increased personnel performing security duties, who is responsible for making the decision to deny or grant that request from a ds agent? >> i think the first thing that would happen is the discussion would go on, is this an individual request from ds? has it been vetted through the emergency action committee at the post? is this a post request? >> okay. and is it affected by whether you categorized this as high risk, high threat?

>> we pay more attention to our high risk, high threat bases on a daily basis, but i would tell you any additional request for additional security resources for any of our posts overseas is going to be met with immediate action. we would make decisions on how we can best fulfill those requirements. >> so, to get to the point, even if a post is not high-risk, high threat, we know in certain parts of the world things are very volatile and can unravel in a moment's time. despite threat assessment or not. what i'm getting at is, is the department now today, in light of what happened in benghazi, prepared to pay better attention when the folks on the ground are saying, we need help? which is not what happened in the days and weeks leading up to the attack in benghazi. >> my answer to you is unequivocally, yes. that's what i've been spending

my time since february 1, 2013 on, making sure that we have the resources, the programs, the knowledge, the capabilities, to respond quickly and effectively to any cry for help. more ever not just respond to the cries for help, but to try to better place ourselves before those come in and make sure that we're ready for these things. >> thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman woman from alabama. we recognize the gentle woman from alabama, mrs. duckworth. >> as member of the oversight and government reform committee and armed services committee, i've spent a great deal of time working on all of the -- working through the reports on the attacks in benghazi. and as the committee begins our work here today, i think the most appropriate way we can honor the brave americans who lost their lives in benghazi is to make sure we learn from those past mistakes and never make them again. i heard that from the family

members again. let's never let their buddies down the way we let their family members down. and so i want to go back to t s this -- the discussion on the security and interagency cooperation. i was there the day admiral mullen testified. i have to disagree with you. you may question his professional integrity, but when admiral mullen, a man that served in vietnam, 43 years of military service, againing this great nation, comes before this committee and swears an oath of office and then testifies he was fiercely independent in the arb, i would tend to believe him inspect in fact, the arb was incredibly scathing of the state department in its report. and i want to go to that report. mr. starr, i want to follow up on what my gentle lady from alabama, her line of questioning about the marine security guard details. so, if you don't have -- if you have a post that does not have a

detail because they're not at a temporary facility, for example, can you talk about other details that can be there? are there other military options that can be assigned to those temporary details? you talk about the mobile security teams, marine augmentation units. are there other options if there are -- if the marines can't actually be assigned there full time? >> yes, there are other options. we currently are trying to expand 35 more detachments. it should be noted that at the moment we have 270 -- more than 275 diplomatic facilities counting the embassies, consulates and consulate generals. we have only 173 marine security guard detachments. we have never had enough marines, nor we will to cover every single post. many of our posts around the world f we put a marine security ky2k1éñ have ent w more marines than foreign

security officers. so we carefully look at where we need to use this scarce resource. we have had excellent cooperation from the marine corps in terms of augmenting different units and getting more detachments. as i say, we have opened 17 more detachments since benghazi on our way to opening 35 totally. we should be done by the end of next year. additionally marines have made marine augmentation units where we can send additional marines under the ruberick where we have different situations. but your question, what do we do where we don't have marines or don't have permission to send marines. we have different capabilities. we have diplomatic security agents that are high risk, high threat, highest trained, mobile security officers. we have the ability to request from the department of defense, and they have never let us down,

for things like fast teams to come in and protect our embassies and consulates when we need that. >> we have a robust program where we have security contractors. many times they're americans, sometimes third country national contractors but we have used contractors for many years. there are some downsides to that and some countries won't allow them and we've learned some very painful lessons over the years about contractors, that we have to have incredible amounts of oversight and make sure we're using them properly. but it is still a tool. we have local guard forces and local elements we hire directly from the country we're in. and i would tell you some of these units in some places around the world have done amazing acts of heroism protecting our people. ultimately we have host country services which we evaluate whether they have the capability

to protect us. additional funding congress has given us is the ability to start a program where we can train host country forces, whether it be police or national guard directly around the embassies and increase their capabilities. so, we have a number of different possibilities.)63j4pzi >>. >> you had said the state department. i have to say i was disappointed with the risk management process that was undertaken leading up to the benghazi attacks. assessment and mitigation process has become morrow bust. i want to speak specifically to enter agency cooperation, between d.o.d. and state. you said the d.o.d. has never let you down. on that night, the arb in various reports, including armed services committee has stated

there was no way those f-16s, those u.s. military forces could have made it there in time to save our americans lives. what have we done to make sure in the future they can be present in time to save american lives? as these special dates come up, september 11th, these anniversaries or as you hear more chatter going on and you think there might be the potential for greater risk, what trip wires are in place? what processes are in place for you to call the d.o.d. and say, hey, maybe you need to help us and reposition some forces so that if we do have another benghazi, we can call -- and that those f-16s can be there in time in the future so we don't lose american lives? what process is happening between d.o.d. and the department of state at this point? >> the department of defense has put together a program they refer to as the new normal. we have looked closely at what capabilities d.o.d. can bring for defensive use of american embassies and consulates

overseas. there has to be realization that we don't have bayh bases everywhere in the world. in many cases while we would like to say the department of defense could respond to any one of our embassies within four hours, physical distances, just the amount of distance between where our diplomatic stations are make it impossible. even if they could respond in a certain amount of time, this idea that we're magically going to get paratroopers out of the back of the plane and land on the embassy isn't realistic. we still have to go through airports, go through host countries to get personnel in, transport them from the airport to the embassy somehow. in the midst of a crisis, this isn't realistic about what's going to happen. what we've worked with d.o.d. on is making sure that we're better prepared to predict what's going

to happen. looking at instability. as d.o.d. said, we would rather be on the ground in advance of something happening then trying to react after something happens. now, it doesn't mean in certain cases that they haven't been on a very close leash with us. i can give you the example of tripoli recently, where we had in many cases special forces and helicopters and marines on less than one hour notice to respond to the embassy. and a high, high threat, critical threat situations, those are the types of things we're working with d.o.d. on, to make sure they have very close at hand respond capabilities. i can tell you with 275 locations around the world, we can't do that ofsh. we can't do that every place. d.o.d. is seeking increased base options. i would highly recommend a discussion with d.o.d. on this about where they're going in terms of basing closer and more closely to u.s. embassies and facilities. they have excellent plans. working closely with the state department on this.

ultimately, we've got to do a better job of making sure we have the right preparation on the ground in advance. in those situations that are absolutely critical, we'll have d.o.d. very close to us. they've worked tremendously with us in places like tripoli and sana and other places. i have to tell you i have the utmost respect for the way the department of defense, u.s. marine corps, army and air force -- and navy have responded to our needs. >> in the last minute i have left, can you talk about at what level at the state department does that request for d.o.d. have to take place? for example, in the case of tripoli recently where you said that they had them on a one-hour leash to respond. does that come from you or can it come from lower? if an ambassador determines that through his risk analysis assessment with his diplomatic security team that's there, that he needs this, how far does he have to go before you can have something like a fast team, that's ready to come in or

something along those lines. how far up the state of bureaucracy does he have to go? >> the commander will call the nearest combatant command. they meet awe the time, talk with each other. in an emergency situation, he can pull the string immediately. in a less than emergency situation, in the way we're looking tat to pry to preposition ourselves, he would state something or make a request or we may make the request and say, we think you need this. we work through the office of executive secretaries. we send an exec sec back and forth. i can instigate it, assistant secretary of the regional bureau can instigate it. in the most extreme cases, the ambassador can go directly to the combatant commander closest to him and request support and then even notify us afterwards. >> thank you.

yield back. >> . >> i would like to clarify two points miss duckworth said. you cannot discuss the proceedings outside of the arb. admiral mullen admitted he did that. it's fact. >> in law that's called exparte communications. >> sorry. i didn't go to law school. from our review under-secretary kennedy in authorizing that made up that term in order to avoid the ospb security standards. >> it's an interesting thing. yesterday in our office we did a ne nexus lexus search of special

compound, not benghazi. there may be different ways to look, ways to look ought over the landscape. the result of looking for that term yielded nothing. throughout all those data files, all across the fruited plain, absolutely nothing. so what does it mean if simply is redefined? if they declare this as something other than that which is to be regulated. that means have you no regulations, right? >> correct, sir. >> mr. sullivan, you mentioned in your opening statement one of the regrets you have as a member of the panel that the department of state didn't adopt your recommendations as it relates to waivers. what is your recommendation as it relates to waivers? >> we think -- we believe waivers are needed. we want to see those waivers. because when you have a waiver, what that will do and set in motion standards and people recognize once have you those standards, have you to meet

those standards. what we saw in this particular instance, since there was no standards, was no waiver, there were really no standards set, and i think somebody brought up the fact before that there were a lot of people coming in tdy, and some very dedicated people, some very hard working people, and some extremely well-intentioned people and dedicated people. however, these were people that were extremely inexperienced and they were coming in for 30-day periods. and they would come in for 30 days. they would identify vulnerabilities, take care of that vulnerability. the next person would come in and that process would continue. >> so, you're saying you need an orderly process by which things are waived, not declarations on the part of the department of state, that it's all waived, is that right? >> right. it goes back to what we talked about before, risk management. risk management is all about identifying the threat, identifying the vulnerability and then coming up with the

mitigation for that threat. we did not see that formalized process ongoing. >> secretary starr, question, you said earlier in an answer to congressman smith, on benghazi they didn't get the threat information. now, i understand that threat information may be a term of art, but to mr. west moreland's testimony earlier, certainly a bomb blowing up on the side of a wall. the whole litany of events that took place beginning march 18, 2012 until the first time there was a communication from ambassador stevens, those -- isn't that enough information? you're not saying, nobody was aware of the nature of the threat. is the threat a term of art? >> congressman, thank you for the question. i think the distinction is -- that i was trying to make is that there was no specific threat information that had been developed by the intelligence

community. >> in other words, these people are coming over the hill top at this moment in time? >>y correct. >> we don't normally get that. i think your point that there were a number of different thins going on. i think people were aware of the overall level of instability? >> here's my point. the senate intelligence committee report, they reported on june 6th of 2012 ambassador stevens recommended the creation of teams and so forth. the team was never created in benghazi despite the ambassador's recommendation. there were other events subsequent to that. then ambassador stevens reaches out again, sends a cable to the state department headquarters requesting a minimum of 13 temporary duty personnel and the state department never fulfilled his request and headquarters never responded to the request with a capable. then they follow up on august 16th of 2012, a month before these events 37 again, a cable to the state headquarters. stevens raised additional concerns, et cetera, et cetera,

et cetera. now, go to the arb. the arb says one thing two times about ambassador stevens. and it's worth noting. they said this about him. his status as the leading u.s. government advocate on libya policy and his expertise on benghazi in particular caused washington to give unusual deference to his judgments. they said that on page 6 of the report. they cut and pasted -- they liked it so much, they put it on page 34 of the report. and yet ignoring the ambassador, who by their own admission is the expert in the area, and ignoring his request for support, that's not giving unusual deference to his judgments, is it, mr. secretary? >> gill question, mr. congressman. >> no, it's very straightforward. >> no, i don't think it is.

it's a difficult question. i think chris stevens was a tremendous ambassador with a tremendous -- >> look, there's no question that he was tremendous. there's no question that he was a hero. he made specific requests of the department. the department in the arb said this person is uniquely qualified, secretary, and he was ignored. >> and i think this is why the arb recommendations are what they are. >> well, this is why the arb recommendations and the panel say, you can't have this kind of waiver authority. when miss robey asked you the question, are there any plans for temporary facilities in the future, you were pretty clever in how you responded. you said, we don't have any plans for it, and i'm not likely -- i'm paraphrasing now -- i'm not likely to approve it. you know what that tells me? that tells me you can do it all again. that tells me you can take the special mission compound, you can call it something else, can facility. you can take two adjectives, put

it in front of a noun and call it some other thing. and do it all again. so, here's the question. if madeleine albright signed off on certain recommendations, if the best practices panel makes certain recommendations, why is it that the state department is clinging to this legacy of power that has failed? why are you grasping on it so much? why not walk away from it? and nobody here is criticizing a very tough job. but the nature of the job, mr. secretary, means that this, to mr. cummins point, needs to be the transformational moment. why not be the transformational moment to say, we're not going to just choose to redefine things and we're going to visit how we do these waivers and we're going to do everything we can in cooperation with congress to honor chris stevens' legacy,

to honor the legacy of those who suffered and you know, but why cling to this old thing that just isn't working? are you the only one that doesn't see it? >> congressman, i think i have a distinct view having served 29 years with the state department, four years with the united nations and i'm back again. i think that in accepting all of the recommendations of the accountability review board, i think in accepting 38 out of 40 recommendations made by the best practices panel, i think the department has made tremendous progress and efforts in the time that i have been back and -- >> but the opportunity -- you want to knock it out of the park right now. >> not every recommendation is gold. every recommendation needs to be looked at from the recommendation standpoint, but then from the organization as well. >> okay. take your argument, a couple of minutes ago you made this point as it relates to the responsibility of a foreign service officer. ha

to be mindful of their own security. that was in response to miss sanchez. every foreign service officer must understand they have a role in their own security. i agree with that wholeheartedly. yet when ambassador stevens played a role in his own security on cable number one, cable number two, and cable number three, that responsibility was not absorbed or reflected in the state department. and you're not offering anything as it relates to fundamental change. based on what the rules are right now, mr. secretary, you have the authority,ç you have e capability and you've got the flexibility to do the benghazi structure again. am i wrong? >> the rules have been changed. who is responsible is clearly defined. >> who is responsible is fourth down on the food chain. by your own -- >> no, sir, i will disagree with that. i am responsible. >> yeah, but i'm telling you --

>> the latest example. when we're trying to open a facility, in southern turkey. we had a request to put personnel in on the ground for start operations, for humanitarian operations. they're in their tdy. we need a facility. we are in the process of leasing a facility. we know where it's going to be. a request came to me from the people on the ground saying, can we use it in advance of the security upgrades being done, being accomplished. my answer, no. >> okay. that's beautiful. and in light of mr. cummings' response, you're going to be there for a season. and in another season, someone is going to succeed you. and in that new season, when someone with your judgment and your deference doesn't have that level of capacity and they don't have your kind of stick and background, they'll be under

tremendous pressure and they're going to say yes. i yield back. >> chair thanks the gentleman from illinois and recognizes himself. it strikes me there are at least two issues at play. two major issues. one is the efficacy of the arb process itself. whether or not it is in our best interest to allow any entity to essentially grade its own papers. we don't do that in any other category of life. we don't get to sentence ourselves when we're in court. we don't get to grade our own papers in the classroom. the other aspect of the arb is who they interviewed and didn't interview. whether or not they have to accept recommendations or don't have to accept recommendations. that's a separate issue, whether the arb works, whether or not it has shortcomings. let's assume that the arb works. let's just make that assumption for the sake of argument.

is anyone following the recommendations of the arb? mr. secretary, i want to read something to you. we are disturbed at the inadequacy of resources to provide resources against terrorist attacks. we are disturbed at the relative low priority of accorded security concerns. we praise the ambassador for seeking security enhancements long before the attack. do you know what that comes from, mr. secretary, what i just read? >> i believe it's part of the accountability review board report. >> from 1999. >> nairobi, correct? >> that was the arb from 1999. and you can lay it almost perfectly over what happened in benghazi. one other point, the 1999 arb went really clear, they went out of their way to make it clear,

they were disappointed that the recommendations that came after the bombings in beirut were not being implemented. something called the inman commission. the '99 arb criticizes existing state department employees for not following the inman commission from 14 years prior. that's a quarter century's worth of recommendations. and yet, here we sit. so, what i want to do, because i -- honestly, i commend mr. schiff. this was a wonderful idea. i thank each of you for coming. but giving the inescapable, inner connective with recommendations made after beirut, eastern africa, benghazi, we're going to look past some of those arb recommendations. inman being beirut bombing.

not meeting inman standards, essential physical security upgrades should be made immediately. that was the recommendation of the 1999 arb. mr. secretary, i'm going to read you another one. this goes to mr. cummings point, which was a great point. diplomatic situations should be made to all governments with whom we have relations to remind them they have security obligations to our embassy. who in libya were we to call? who? mr. cummings' point was so good. the 1999 arb makes a great point. who did we call in libya? >> question, sir? >> when i pause, that's generally an indication i'm waiting on you to answer. but i'll make it more clear in the future. >> i think this is the heart of the question.

there are times when -- for the national interest of the united states, we are going to have to have diplomats, humanitarian programs, rule of law programs and other things in places where the host country is -- >> mr. secretary. >> -- does not have a government. we must take lessons from -- >> was there a government in libya for us to contact? >> no, not at that time. >> so that recommendation of the 1999 arb we were not able to do. let's move to one perhaps we were able to do. also a recommendation from the 1999 arb. again, the arb is presented to us as a panacea. i mean, that's the evolution of what happens, is there's an attack, there's a blue ribbon panel, we're going to study, make recommendations and this is never going to happen again. back to the 1999. the secretary of state should personally review the security situation of facilities closing

highly vulnerable or threatened. why do you think the 1999 arb went out of its way to use the word personally. >> no comment, sir. >> is the answer privileged? i mean, that's a recommendation from the 1999 arb. the secretary of state should personally review. i'm skug with all due respect -- we're not going to get to the word review. we have to get to the word that modifies the word personally. why did the secretary of state himself or herself personally review? >> i think ultimately the secretary, who bears the responsibility for the security, has to be brought the information that's necessary for him to make decisions. that is my job. >> okay. >> i have gone to the secretary of state on different occasions and we have talked specifically about the security of different places. tripoli was one of them in

particular since i have been back. but we have also looked at sana, we've talked about kabul, we talked about the other locations as well. where i have concerns about the safety of our personnel and if we're not doing the things we need to do, then it's my responsibility to bring it to the secretary. >> and i appreciate that, mr. secretary. was it done on september 10th of 2012? was it done prior to benghazi? because this recommendation has existed for more than ten years. >> i was not here at that time. i'm sorry, i cannot tell you. >> well, your answer is -- mirrors what the 1999 arb further said, which is first and foremost, the secretary of state should take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring security of u.s. diplomatic personnel. is that being done now? was it being done prior to your

tenure? >> in the time that i was here previously and i have served under multiple secretaries of state, i have heard every secretary talk about the importance of security. i have heard every secretary state to personnel of department that security is their function, their personal security has to be their function. that goes from madeleine albright, that goes through secretary clinton, secretary rice and with secretary kerry, who has also made those statements and has made statements that the safety and security of our personnel is absolutely one of our highest priorities. >> and i appreciate that, mr. secretary. again, i think words have consequences and they have meaning. most people use words intentionally. the 1999 arb intentionally used the words personally and active. that to me does not mean talking about something. a personal review is not simply talking about it. is the personal review ongoing?

is that arb recommendation still accepted, i guess, is my question? does the state department still accept these recommendations from the 1999 arb? and is it being done? >> yes. i think the best and clearest example that i can give you today is a new process we put into place. the vital presence validation process, where we, again, look at what are our vital national interests and why should we be in these high threat locationses. we put this process up and it goes all the way to the secretary. >> and that is a great point, which leads very nicely into the next point i was going to make, or ask you about. what is it about that recommendation that is so talismatic that it couldn't have been made prior to the attack in benghazi? >> i think the department of state has practiced risk management from the day --

>> risk management we're going -- we know the risk of being in benghazi. can you tell us what our policy was in libya that overcame those risks? in other words, why were we there? >> these questions, i think, have been fundamental to the department for over 30 years. it is the reason why in many places we have evacuated or we have shut down operations or we've taken our families out. or we've gone down to essential personnel only or we've asked for marines to come in and support us while we're there. >> right. and my point being, mr. secretary, none of that was done in benghazi. so, what -- we know the risk in benghazi. my colleagues and you and others have done a wonderful job of highlighting some of the trip wires, i think is the diplomatic term. what policy were we pursuing in libya that was so great that it overcame all of the trip wires and all of the rifbs? >> not being here at the time, sir, i cannot answer that

question for you. i do believe personally, with my time at the united nations, that many of us understood that if we lost the eastern half of libya, that if we lost the confidence of the people after the revolution in libya, that we were going to pay a terrible price. and i don't want to put words into chris stevens' mouth. i think he was the -- an immensely talented diplomat. and i was not here at that time. but i think it was clear in chris's mind why he needed to go to benghazi and what he was trying to accomplish. i think today we have more normalized processes to make sure those decisions are documented, the vpvp process makes us go through a process that i don't think was there prior to benghazi. i think the results of the accountability review board and the best practices panel and the recommendations that we've forward, we've got a clearer,

more precise, more mandated process for risk management. but i would tell you, sir, that every singleag664kmsg6vñi day i was with the department of state, we were weighing the safety and security of our personnel. i think that's a fundamental tenet you will find everybodyçn the department agrees with. >> i appreciate you bringing the hearing toward its conclusion back to chris stevens and back to the other four who lost their lives. but mr. stevens was equally clear that he needed help. he was equally clear that the situation was getting worse in benghazi. he was equally clear in asking the people who sent him there to represent us, to provide adequate security. and none was forthcoming. with that i would recognize the ranking member for his closing remarks. >> i want to thank you all for being here today. i thank all of you.

one thing i want to remind all of us is that we are americans. everybody trying to do the best they can to protect our people. when we look at what happened in benghazi, there are a lot of lessons to be learned. the question is, not only have we learned them, but then how do we address them? and, you know, quarterbacking -- what do they call it, monday-morning quarterbacking, i think when you look back on it a lot of times, you realize the things you could have done differently.

that probably would have made things better. but, you know, we cannot bring back the past, but i think we can make a difference right now. it's clear that our diplomats are in some very dangerous situations. i think we all agree on that. and so now we've got to figure out how we go about protecting them even better than we have in the past. and so that's why, secretary starr, i asked you about coming back to us and letting us know exactly, you know, what you're working on, those things that you still have to do. and reporting back.

it is so important, because after -- when all the dust settles, the question is, what do we accomplish? you know, i've been here 17 years and i've seen a lot of arguments back and forth, but i think we must concentrate on being effective and efficient and getting something done. the arguments that have been made, and the frustration you hear from both sides, trying to figure out what happened. i believe everybody is acting in an honorable way, with great intentions, but i want you all to understand we're just trying to figure out what happened so that we make sure, if there were things that went wrong, that it doesn't happen again. that's what it's all about. so, mr. chairman, again i want

to thank you for this hearing. and i want to ask you to do something for me. i want to bring mr. starr back in either december or january. he's already told us that in 45 days or less he can tell us about what he's working on and give us some kind of timetable. but i want him to come back and tell us what has been achieved. and that's very, very important for me. and i'm sure for the whole committee. mr. chairman, if you will, that's your call but i think it would be unfortunate if when all of this -- this committee ends, that we have not addressed these

recommendations and addressed them in a way that would make -- that would please the families of the deceased. and that brings me back to them. four great americans who lost their lives. and i think we all made a commitment in one way or another to them, that we would do everything in our power to find out what happened. and at the same time, to make sure we did the best we could to protect our folks overseas, to tighten up security, if that's appropriate. and we've got to do that. and so with that, mr. chairman, i want to thank you. >> i want to thank the gentleman from maryland for all of his help and, frankly, getting ready for this hearing.

and the cooperative nature with which he has always worked with me. and i think it's an excellent idea. we will work with the secretary. i don't to want pick a date that's inconvenient with his schedule. december suits me better than january. i would rather do it sooner rather than later. but we will work with the secretary and i will work with you on the nature of whether or not that will be a hearing with all of our colleagues, whether or not that would be with just you and me. we'll work all that out. but i will pledge to you it will be done. and it will be done in december, if it suits his schedule. also, i just want to say this. we were given two different tasks. i say we. the house voted for us to be in existence. find out everything that happened before, during and after the attack in benghazi. and then do everything. and the speaker has been very clear in my conversations with him about this. do everything you can to make sure that it never happens again. part of that is taking recommendations that have been made in the past and asking whether or not they've been implemented.

the other part of that, frankly, frankly, is anticipating things that might possibly happen. we do not have to wait on a tragedy to make recommendations. i noted, mr. cummings, during the secretary's opening statements -- i'm not minimizing this at all. if it comes across as me minimizing it. i am not. he mentioned they were partnering with the new york fire department. that's a great idea. but it does necessarily lead some of us to conclude, why could that not have been done previously? fire's been around for a long time. it's been a weapon for a long time. why now? and it's not fair of me to ask him, which is why i didn't ask him. but the notion that we have to wait on something bad to happen before we can act to do something that all 12 of us agree ought to be done. so, again, i thank all of my colleagues. i want to thank mr. schiff again for giving me this idea. i'll hope he'll share some others with me.

again, as we adjourn, i want to adjourn in memory of chris stevens, sean smith, woods and y and pledge a process that is worthy of their memory and one that our fellow citizens can respect regardless