maybe their families are already living there. and then at that time they talked about bassan should have stood by them but they were thankful. and, yes, there was a lot of manipulation as well. so, afghan taliban owed a lot to pakistani forces that helped them before 9/11. in operations against northern alliance. so this control -- some were still sympathetic to pakistan but that fight also, wherever pakistan needed afghan taliban, the old guard, had to go off to pakistani taliban. so they responded to that old reach by not coming out against pakistani taliban. so your question is very valid. the other question -- and i'll takemont, but that a very profound idea you have, and i'm absolutely not making a

suggestion that from the -- from outside as a tool to -- i am interested because sunni and shia, but one thing is in common, these are the points in punjab, or whether these are shabaab -- i start my book there. they had some common ideas which were -- which was complete nonviolence, which was always honoring the poor and giving them hope and was also nonenforcement. you'd be surprised go to sharif, a shrine, and you would be amazed at times more hindus than muslims there. why?

becausecpa they never forced ane to convert. and those who -- i don't want more investment, more political support for them bump their tradition provide a bridge to different muslim sects and not only tolerate each other -- if you tolerate others that a success. i think it respect for the other, which is -- and all the sufi teachings, about human being as a human being. that's why in terms of ideals, i support that sufi cause. but if anyone try to choreograph it, negative reaction. totally unprecedented in the history of south asia, never before there was an attack on a sufi shrine.

that happened because of two reasons, one, because of the biggest -- bigoted people, and big bigotry, and those people know well that the challenge to their orthodoxy and conservativism and narrow minedness is imbedded in the talk. they're fearful that what if that talk would get support, political or international. so we have to be very, very careful, and thank you for raising that point. >> thank you very much. i asked you to -- i'd like to apologize to all those who didn't get a chance to ask a question. i like to thank -- i'd like to also invite all of you and to

attend the session this coming monday with -- to all of you, thank you very much. your presence, and please bring -- [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> a firmer member of the al qaeda who became a cia agent,

in "agent storm" and the author of the taliban revival describes our the tally began regrouped after the 2001 invasion of afghanistan.

>> danish author morten storm was once a radical islamist who joined al qaeda inch this book, agent storm" he writes about his disillusionment with the group and this work as an undercia agent. this is from the international spy museum in washington, dc. >> i will be brief. but as you know, as we follow the media even in these days, the rising concern about young men going to the middle east, in search of jihad or in search of adventure, and fining themselves caught up in extremism and

violence, in many cases converting either to extremist causes or becoming disillusioned and returning. in either case perhaps resulting in their becoming a problem in the west when they return to the west. there was a book during the cold war, my war, which was a 1949 book called "to the god that failed." there was people who embraced communism. they were true believers and they lost though faith. they realized that was not the holy grail. and tonight's story is very much a story of conversion, of an epiphany, conversion, and eventual loss of faith, and i think you will find it absolutely fascinating. the story is one that was developed initially by our

then-historian, dr. mark stout, and i will introduce him shortly and he will introduce our speakers. and mark developed this story, having encounters the individual of interest in, of all things -- pay attention, you older people, on facebook. so anything can come out of facebook, whether it's academic research or discoveries from the spy museum. it will involve, as you will see, very complicated case, a very involved case,;k -- to give mark and his associates their lead. let them develop the case and let the case take them where it may and that is what mark and his success your have done.

and so tonight's case will be presented -- mark will introduce the speakers and i believe also -- handle the q & a. he had 15 years in the federal government as an analyst. with degrees from stanford, harvard, and coauthored three books and published a number of articles. so, please help me welcome our guest introducer this evening, mark stout. [applause] >> thank you very much. i'll be brief. i'm really honored to be here this evening to introduce paul

crookshank, tim lister, and most importantly motorren storm, for this book launch of "agent storm" which is just coming out in the united states. a remarkable book. if you look on the back you'll find my -- a few words about the authors. in -- starting with tim, tim joined the bbc just out of college and worked for quite a number of years in the middle east, and thenir in 1996, movedo cnn. spent quite a number of years with cnn international. he has specialized particularly, though not exclusively in terrorism, and the odds are fairly good you saw in of reportage if at no other time in 2001 when he was at an obscure village in afghan known as tora bora, and yesterday at this time he was in eastern ukraine.

paul crookshank is a cnn investigateoff reporter. he is based out of new york city but does every bit of roaming the world as tim does. he has degrees from cambridge and the school of advanced international studies at johns hopkins university, and i should add that not only is he great r great scholarly work on al-qaeda. i just sent off a book chapter that draws in part in his work. it is a real pleasure to be with him this evening. and last and certainly not least is morten storm who you will be seeing on this screen. morten is coming from an undisclosed location in the uk. morten, you can come out. i won't say too much about -- there we are. thank you. i won't say too much about motorren's story because that's the substance of what we're here

for tomorrow. i will simply say he did some extraordinary things to contribute to our mutual, our joint struggle, against violent jihaddism and the al quited inwork and i'm delighted to call him my friend. very briefly, i've been studying in verious ways violent jihaddism for 20 years now, since the russians invaded chechneya at the end of 1994. i will say i'm aware of only two other cases that are even slightly dish emphasize that word slightly -- like morten storm's at all. the first is al collins, an american who converted to the islam, become radialized and went to chechneya to fight alongside the mujahadeen. he deradicallized when he heard about people who he thought shared his understanding of the islamic faith who were in egypt blowing up women and children, and he said that's not what i'm in this for and eventually

became an informant for the fbi. he wrote a book called "my jihad." the other slightly comparable is omar nassiri, a moroccan, who got involved with algerian jihaddist extremists in brussels, decided to embezzle money from them and then realize he had done something very dangerous and needed protection and went to the french government, ended up was a source for the french service, who sent him back to afghanistan where he reported from inside the camps and later worked for the british service. in the late 1990s he fell out with his handlers and wrote a book in 2006, called "inside the jihad: my life with al qaeda. a spy's are so." both individuals did their work in the 1990s. morten storm's story is much more recent, and also much more important. both collinsç.y9d nassi were

frankly by and large at the margins of a story which in the 1990s when hey were active, was not tremendous lay big deal to most western governments. but motorren storm was right at ther to of the most al qaeda affiliate, al qaeda on the arabian peninsula, and his work we're told was of direct interest to the president of the united states and he played an[ important role, the precise nature is disputed. but important role in the killing of anwar al walky as well. we hoped to have motorren -- mort enphysically with us here this evening. there were visa issues that prevented that from happening sew is joining us on video link from the united kingdom. the audio is in sync. the video may come in and out of sync just a little bit, so please don't let that disconcert you. without further adieu, ladies and gentlemen, paul crookshank,

tim lister, and morten storm. [applause] >> while they're taking their seats let me mention one thing. those who want to delve into more detail on the think that went through motorren storm's morten storm's mind, there was a terrific pod cast. i refer you to that pod cast. should it should be on the air within two or three days at the most. an in-depth interview on their experience with morten storm. en in. >> thank you very much everybody. it's an absolute pleasure to be here. thank you so much. we're actually delighted to be here, delighted that morten can be here as well in this undisclosed location. the palm tree is not necessarily real behind him.

but morten's story is really quite exceptional. we have never seen a story like this, of somebody who has gone so deep inside the world of al qaeda and has come back to tell the tale north a courtroom or interrogation or guantanamo, but also somebody who has been so deeply involved with western intelligence, the tip of the spear in some of their most important counterterrorism operations, targeting operations, since 9/11. so, for tim and me, the journey we embarked on with morten 18 months ago has been rewarding. we learned so much from him. he has exceptional insights and experiences and one hell of a story to tell. >> initially worked with morten, we found out his role low desk was something else. he knew so many people who we know now from various plots over the last ten or 15 years, whether in london or birmingham

or denmark. or yemen, or lebanon. he had met all these people, been friends with them. and then there came that moment, that epiphany, where he decided he couldn't deal with it anymore. there were all sorts of reasons we can get into later. i wasn't an innocent -- instant moment. it was a process of disillusionment, and he is not alone in that. but his case study is fascinating in that aspect, as well as so many others. so, what we're going to try to do is a little bit of working through the story with some of the incredible volume of physical evidence he brought to us, whether it was recordings, whether it was e-mails, whether it was visa stamps, everything that helped substantiate his account of what happened to him. we also obviously visited denmark, talked to his -- talked to a lot of people who knew him, and built this picture and it's a complicated picture, of a guy

who was interest all sorts of bad stuff as a kid. is thathé[ not right, morten? [inaudible] >> he was a biker, a boozer, and then found islam at the age of 21 in a public library in denmark, and he was the true jihaddist for nearly ten years, before he decided in about 2006 it wasn't for him anymore because it had moved beyond where he was comfortable. by that time, his contacts were gold dust to the western intelligence agencies and the danish introduced him to the cia and so forth. that is the bare bones. now more detail. >> you see his mentor, who he met in 2006, al-aulaqi, a mentor to morten and then those connections he had with a.l. --

became extremely important to the cia. at al-aulaqi inspired young men in the west to launch attacks and also the guy behind the underwear bombing, the printer cartridge bombing attachment and more -- attempt and more after that. the heart of the book is the story about morten and anwar al-aulaqi, their friendship and what bill a necessary betrayal for all our security. morten, introduce yourself, buddy. >> hi, guys. thank you very much for coming. i want to say thank you to mark stout, paul and tim, you guys are superstars. sorry for giving you all the trouble for two years now, but i hope you forgive me. and i want to say thank you to to -- thank you for the whole team, everyone, amazing. thank you so much.

and about myself, what can i say? i never imagine to be in this position where i can sit and talk to an audience like you guys. i'm very delighted and honored, and i hope once you leave this room, you have been enriched with information that will benefit you, and maybe understanding, insight into how radical muslims or radicals like myself used to think, and a chance for everyone to -- we actually see this. thank you. >> thank you, morten. and tim, if we can just go to the -- >> can i say one more thing? >> go ahead. >> want to also -- never thought about this. my life is in danger, and people around here are taking very good

care of safety for me and my familylv/ñ. and one of the guysi want to say thank you to is gavin. he is next to me. thank you so much. >> what we're going to do here is we're going to play a video, and just to set the scene here, this is may 2005. this is grover in square in london, outside the u.s. embassy. controversy because there had been reports the in the media a koran had been desecrated in pakistan. there's a lot of anger on the streets, and morten came down with a group who were proal qaeda support group, very radical, and they all come down to protest what they see is the desecration of the koran. we'll just let you play this a bit. you'll see morten appear on screen on the right-hand side of

the video. [yelling] [shouting] [shouting] [shouting] [shouting]

[shouting] blog blog. [shouting] >> the crowd chanting as the burn the american flag. morten, how did you go so angry? >> i'm laughing at this, but at the same time i'm shaking my head in disbelief i had been so delewd -- delewded. what drove me to that was frustration and devoted muslim. leads me and these people to

hate the west and the we were views and the western democracy, and what you saw there was from my heart, and i'm just looking at these people now. at that time i used to consider it to be -- now many of them are active in syria and iraq fighting. >> many of the people on the video know fighting with isis in syria and iraq, and perhaps involved with atrocities. the mindset there carried them in that trajectory, obviously for you, your story ended up completely differently, but let's take you back in your story here. you grew up in denmark. right? and had a pretty troubled childhood, got involved in some how you discovered lahm, what happened there? >> well, i felt that i was a

young, troubled young man, with no direction in my life. i didn't have parents to guide me throughout difficult times or good times. so the only thing i felt a necessity was to belong to something, and the gangs was one of the reasons, one of the things you can belong to. i later on discovered that it wasn't really what i wanted to do with my life. and i started to question life after this, and i wanted to -- i had a lot of muslim friends so i went into the danish library in my town, where i picked up the life story of prophet mohammed. and the reason why i picked up that book is because of -- i just maybe wanted to know about their cultural religion, but that is not prophet muhammad

attracted me so much. it was appealing to me. just spoke to me. and i couldn't let it out. i couldn't let it go. and each page i read, i needed to continue another one. and i ended up staying from the morning to the time it closed in the late afternoon, and when i left i was a different person, from the time when i entered. >> soon after that you end up in damage, one of the centers 0 learn in the arab world. tell us about your experience in yemen as a muslim convert. you just converted to islam. you decided to embark, as we describe in the book, to yemen. tell us a bit about that experience and the islam you were being taught there. >> when i converted to islam, i was considering that we all

muslim, we did have differences like shia and sunni, but we are muslims. so that wasn't a big deal to me, until i went to yemen, and i went to -- i started in the most intensive institution. we had people living in the streets. disconnected from big towns. now, i was living amongst 2,000 students from all around the world, studying islam, studying the koran, getting used to islam. and that is where -- particularly that place i founded what was to become -- >> this very puritan cal fundamentalist version of the

religion, where you guys were ride in damage, the fallacies, and everyone else was wrong and then you came back to london around 2000, or just before, ane really what we're part of the -- what was then called the landistan scene, growing radical caldron in london at the time, richard reeves, the shoe bomber, zachariah, one of the bombers. what was making them go towards more of the jihadist mindset muslim? >> you see, we came to the done that they the jihadi is one of the most noble acts you can do as a muslim, if you die in fighting, you have the intention while you're doing, you die -- and so the obligation of jihad

was quite clear. it was something that must be done 'we considered the muslim countries were occupied directly or indirectly by the western regimes and oppressive rulers. so did not legislate with the islamic sharia law. these radicalize me and made me aware there was more than a theoretical part of islam, turkly when it comes to -- >> how far did events elsewhere in the late '90s, early 2001s -- 2000's inflame your parks and the people you were with, did you find there was a patent to their background, the sort of people they were? >> yes. the first question is, as her to conflict zone, at that time we

had somalia, sudan, against the christians, the jihad, jihad in chechneya, as mark stout correctly said. also still something -- just after -- there was -- just a few years ago, my friends had been to bosnia to fight as well. very real, and just happened a few years back. so jihad for them was -- those people who told them they want to be to afghanistan and those places, did i answer the question? >> the sort of people you met, richard reeves, what were they like? >> i came across interesting people some of whom have made -- some of them who are actually between yemen and afghanistan,

to meet up with the new training camp. we had -- one whenever my friends was a bodyguard, courier, and then richard reeves and i went to europe and would meet converts sun as richard reeves, and united kingdom would meet different people, and of whom are muslims. >> at that time i have to say -- at that time most radical groups were katada, and at that time they were actually running the show in -- for the jihadi societies. >> just prior to 9/11, morten returns to yemen where he meets the people with very close ties involved with al qaeda and actually in a barber shop on the day of 9/11, sees the images of the towers coming down, and then

describe the events of that day and the mosque you went to and what happened next. describe the atmosphere that day with the people that you were with. [inaudible] >> we don't have one at the moment. >> so what happened was i came back to yemen, and at that time i had the invitation about two months before 9/11 from osama bin laden so he invited me to good over there to join but i had to bring my wife, and at that time, my wife was pregnant with my first son. and so i didn't want to leave her or i didn't want to bring her. so i declined to travel to afghanistan. so i planned to stay in yemen, and a few months late are we had 9/11. i was in the barber shop with a friend of mine, and he had been

to new york, and suddenly we saw one tower on fire. he said, i've been to that place. and i say, wow,zr and then suddenly there was another hitting, obviously we knew they were terrorists, ms. wag -- something was going on. turned on the tv and america was under attack. we went to the mosque to hear what was going on, and this mosque was run by a prominent scholar. he was a very activist, a very political active man, and he -- i remember he was saying that by the grace of allah, america has been attacked, and that we consider -- we expect 50,000 people will be killed, and we should all prostrate in

gratitude to allah so the whole mosque did that. >> quite extraordinary to hear that in the united states. and you were sort of swept up in that sort of atmosphere there, and then in the weeks that followed, we see there was a plan for the united states to go into afghanistan, and george w. bush made a speech which had a particular affect on you. can you describe that? >> yes. i never saw the people jumping out the buildings. we didn't have tv. we considered the tv to be forbidden. so, i could only hear what i heard on the radio, and i remembered that osama bin laden said, i didn't do it. but i know that osama bin laden used -- permissible way of lying when you're facing your enemy. permissible in warfare to

deceive. so, now, i just didn't know that. but now i know that he was doing tha"] anyway so what happened was the jobs -- he said, this is a crusade against the evil, and he was talking about taliban and al qaeda. he said this -- you're either with us or against us -- with us or with the terrorists. so, george w. bush did not leave any space for anyone to be in between, and for muslims, devout muslims there, was no option. even though i might have disagreed, which i didn't -- but if i did disagree, could still -- so, there was no choice for me, and a all chose to be on the side and at least we morally support with al qaeda. >> just a couple of years later

you're here in london, you're protesting. when you turned up to that demonstration, you thought the plan was going to be to storm the u.s. embassy, right? but obviously there was some frustration with some of these leaders, they were just blow hards and talking the talk you wanted to walk the walk so you in 2006 traveled to yemen, where you met with anwar awlaki. tell us about the american cleric you met who had been interviewed by the fbi in the united states, mentioned in the 9/11 reports, and was now living and teaching back in yemen's capital. tell us about meeting him and what he was like. >> with my son with the sense of making immigration to the muslim land. by that time as you can see on the radio, going to the west was

very deepyé and i understood tht there was no way i could live in the west. so for me the only option was to migrate to the land where the muslims were, and they were obviously in yemen. so i was introduced suddenly one by some australian muslims, invited to go up to the house and eat lunch, and then al wall can i was awlaki was there. i was not much aware of him because i -- however, once he start talking and -- he5¥ñ had s scholarly way, this very noble way of talking. he was very calm. he was -- he considered things before he say them. when he say something, he

reference to the koran,=l and everything he said made sense. it was like, wow, he is actually quite good. then i was quite surprised. we then suggested all of us, we should do study circles, and where he obviously had to deliver the lectures. as i emerge from the meeting. >> so you had these study circle. in fact many study circle sessions wereíí4bñ in your housd some of our most famous or infamous youtube hits and videotapes actually were first given in your house, a small study circle of a dozen or so westerners, many who actually later on gravitated towards leadership roles in al qaeda affiliates around the world. so you had this sort of front-row seat. you became close to him and he became almost like a mentor figure to you.

and tell us about that. >> yes. al wall can -- an extraordinary nature. unfortunately, widely spread in internet and amongst the western muslims around the world. actually even in indonesia and africa, that's how far he reached from that place. amongst the4(2 students were vey -- named -- an american convert who is now on the fbi'sc most wanted list, and he is in somalia, one of the leaders of shabaab now. so we're having -- in that group we mad many prominent figures. we have a danish convert who

went to somalia and cut the head off somali prisoner, and we had an assassin who was killed in syria. so the he was sincere. >> what most -- what was the attraction of al-aulaqi to all of you. what made his message resonate. what was it about him that drew this following in yemen and obviously around the world? >> i think the western muslim sawz-38 him as the english speg osama bin laden. that's the way the country decided to -- they could see he wasn't a showoff. he didn't need for drama like -- so he was much more devout, didn't have a really bad

reputation in other sects. so, he couldn't do that like all -- >> just after 9/11, al wall can i gave a speech where he repudiated philadelphia in a church close to here. what changed him over the followingxñ years? was it's personal animosity towards the united states? philosophical, inevitably given the learning and the circumstances and the invasion of iraq? what changed him so much in such a short time? >> it was both of them. number one, personally he had a certain -- score to settle with the american government. he believed he was wrongly accused of being tricked into this with the prostitutes, so for that obviously he took -- hated the americans and the american government.

secondly, which was something that was supposed to happen anyway. because of religious -- he became more religious, became more devout and engaged. he was focused on the goal. for him the establishment of the islamic armies in the south of yemen, there would be an army of 10,000 soldiers, start from the south of yemen, and that islamic army will take over the world and control everything with sharia. so he believed what he was engaged in at that very moment now, at that time, was a divine cause that was -- >> the next thing that you did more than after this is you want to go and fight in somalia, to

go and participate in some way in the jihad in somalia. you go back to denmark. you want to raise some money to do this you. see many friends in yemen, who part of the study circle, migrating to the jihad in somalia and other places. you want to do the same thing. talk a bit about that and then talk about what happened next. >> so, at that time in 2006, the islamic union were taking over somalia)rapidly. the somali president, the war lord, kicked out tribal lead evers and started to rule somalia with sharia law, and for the first time in 19 years, ever, there was some kind of system in somalia. and that is a huge sign, and the new islamic state.

so, for every muslim who believed that we should live amongst the muslims and we'll be simple, believing or disbelievers, this was obligatory. so we -- so, we -- many of my friends traveled directly, one was -- actually got the permission from the american embassy to travel from yemen to somalia. he left over there. i stored his furniture. i -- i didn't have money enough to buy a house in somalia, so i went to -- companies owned by muslims. >> you bought your ticket, you're going to -- one-way ticket to fight in somalia, an official invite, which we have record of. you're about to go and then got

0 phone call. tell us about the phone call and the implications of the phone paul for the rest of your life. >> by that time, i was so excited about going to somalia, for me it was now the4l key to paradise. i could -- i didn't go with intention of dying but i went with the intention of fighting. whatever happens in that cause, that way, -- that wasn't supposed to happen i would accept it. i said goodbye to my children, my family, my friends. i went to this big army store in copenhagen to buy the clothes from my friends on the phone. and by the way, just before this, phone call from this muslim, and he said, everything is really cold here. i just cut the head off one guy. so everyone was so excited about it. and this was so engaged and excited.

so i came out of the shop. on my way back to any flat, and then i had the second phone call, and that was from -- told me, you cannot come. we just lot of the airport. don't travel. stay where you are. you'll get arrested. and i just couldn't believe. i was in disbelief. i couldn't believe there was no way for me to reach the land of jihad. it was a blow. i felt i was let down. >> you felt let down but you were about to go and participate in jihad, which had been something you had been working towards for many years, and all of a sudden, the ethopians have taken the airport in mogadishu. very late 2006, and you're completely deflated. you go home with all the equipment you wanted to bring

and give the islamic group, which later became al-shabaab. threw it in the bedroom and then went to the computer. what did you do on the compute center. >> well, i was -- i did something -- i came into my things and i guess i must have had a -- i must have had some issues before. when i'm looking back i can see what actually triggc÷ that. anyway, i thought why is it alaw would -- what would he prevent pre to do something he ordered and command us to do in the koran. why does he not like me? everything i can to please him. i am doing everything. and i just couldn't figure out. so i -- and one of the things i had used as a tool to spread islam in europe, particularly united kingdom, in speaker's

corner, on oxford street, would be a debate with the christians. i used contradictions in the bible. so this time -- contradictionss in the bible. and just received -- i was trying to -- for that i suddenly discover thousands of -- loads of contradictions, and the biggest surprise because allah, if there was any contradiction here in this book, it would not be from me. so the koran -- and i researched the contradictions, and to my discovery, i found out they were generated and i decided, -- for that very reason i suddenly looked at the whole world differently. >> you can give up your faith and maybe your friends, but why

would you necessarily then have to go approach

this very moment when i decided not be a muslim anymore, realized how deluded i was. i could see the very same reason these people were promoting democracy and promoting freedom of speech, i now have trouble -- i had chosen for my basic human rights to not be muslim. for that very reason i had to be killed. for that same reason i needed to be killed. and then i realized how evil it is and how much different i can do if i -- if i don't say anything and continue to fight them. so i was also -- i had kids and i would no longer see them. so for me -- i come to the

danish intelligence. >> this meeting -- >> take a glass of water, morten. i'll set up the meeting. it was in early 2007, in -- at a hotel there, and they couldn't believe ita when you called up, right? morten storm? one of the toll targets of danish intelligence, one of the people on their radar screen, somebody who had been in yemen with suspected of associating with al qaeda types over there, all of a sudden he is calling them up and he wants a meeting. this was a very exciting for danish intelligence, wasn't it? describe the scene in the hotel room when you have these two guys, these two handlers who are going to come in and basically try to recruit you. describe it. >> so we have -- this is -- most

of the people know about how to flatter a potential agent or -- one of the tricks is to be very kind and to show understanding and tolerance. so these two danish intelligence officers, met me at the he -- at rad disson hotel in the swing suite. on the top floor, and they were trying to flatter me. came with the menu -- just to make me even more happy. would you like some more fish or this italian food? i looked at him. i go, no. i want something with pork, something with bacon in and it i want tooe have a beer.

so, he was just realizing, and i told them, do you hear guys? i want something with bacon and a beer. i'm not muslim anymore. so, i told them i want to join up, i want to fight -- i want to join you guys to fight, and -- i could tell you, they were still not -- still were not convinced until the food arrived and when they saw me eating that bacon, and the -- then they knew i was on their side. >> this is the beginning of your career as a double-agent, something on the -- al quite side, secretly working for a western government.

plots involved a friendship with this guy in the red hat, the master mind of the westgate mall attacks other. missions and operations which we lay out in the book. going from yemen to kenya to snowedda, all around the world -- indonesia, all around the world for debriefing, helter skelter life for both cia and also mi-6, danish intelligence doing one for another agency, and we laid it all out in the book. from the americans' point of view, over time, one of their top targets became anwar al-aulaqi, cropping up in all these terrorism investigations in the west, the london bombings, other plots and attempts. they saul seemed to be inspired by this guy. so in the bottom of this slide here we have you driving in

october 2008, in yemen, and you're delivering supplies to anwar al-aulaqi. and the interaction you had in 2008 with him. >> was going to deliver a night-vision camera, laptops and -- even sandals and some money. at that time the cia was start to getting -- i don't remember the -- it was -- >> 2008. the supplies -- >> that's right. yes. so, here we -- at that very moment, or that year,6ncz cia wo interested in -- became more intense in the years, in his --

i was obviously one of the actors. they had other people around anwar at that time but i was one of the important ones to deliver for him. >> you also delivered $5,000 from the cia, which you were told to give to him. how did he respond to that? >> i mean, with bad intent. this is not -- 2008, it was even that intense that i remember before traveling to that region, the british government gave me a laptop when i arrived to copenhagen. the are they took away that laptop and gave me an american laptop. they want me to lead that mission, and what i can say is that the money was obviously something that he -- al-aulaqi would have the checked on

muslims in europe. when i paid him the money, i was -- that was the only chest ever had done to me, and he was -- we were sitting in a restaurant -- do you want to say something? >> go ahead. >> so, delivering this equipment to him, to reach that place, took me 15 hours, 15 hours driving. and it's not because it is long distance. it's because we have to go toyúñ checkpointspointspointspoints an declarations to the police, going to see family member. ... kinds of obstacles. when i reached him, i saw him as a changed person because he could no longer meet up in any

of the areas before. this time he was wearing a military jacket and was more looking like bin laden. and he had a body guard. when i saw him with the guns i was a bit worried because we had to go to sit under a tree in the desert so i could show him how to use the satellite and laptop and i was a bit worried because i didn't know, maybe it was over there. >> what led you to think this is a guy that needs to be killed and taken out? what changed your view from someone that needs to be detained to someone that

deserved to be killed even though he is an american citizen. >> there is no difference in american national or danish or arab national. if they are terrorist, they are terrorist. it doesn't matter their nati nationality. so the my conformation he had to be taken out and not having to reach the court and justice of cour courts, happened when they first came under attack and before that i was hoping that somehow he could get arrested. but it was naive to think so. >> we just put up on the screen pictures of very attractive blond lady. he was she involved? >> yes, so after my last meeting

in 2009, during that meeting, he hendered and told me he liked to get married to a western convert if i knew anyone. i said i would try to see if i can find anyone. i never imagined i would find anyone. but when i returned from the meeting, after the attempt where they learned he was behind the operation, and i understood that he was troubled. he was getting there. >> one thing led to another and

you managed to get her to yeman and she had this suit case. but al-qaeda was smarter than that. she had to take everything out and there was a detection device and that scheme didn't work. but you got paid for your efforts. the briefcase in the middle is real money morten received. a total of $250,000 and that was the high water mark. you did come back later on and work for them again. what went wrong? >> what went wrong was it joe didn't happen. he took the suitcase and passed

through the passport control in yemen and there was an agreement between the danish government and cia that if she does pass, she must pay the $250,000 and that was the deal that the americans unearthed and later she left her passport even where she was staying. the americans cut off communication with me after six months. she asked me if i wanted to join her and track her down. i went to yemen and by the way during the meeting the danish government told me americans will pay you $5 million if you

are the reason to track them down. you get $5 million. >> you went back to yemen in the spring of 2011 and you established a mode of communication with him and every time you would meet a courier you would let the cia know where the meeting was going to take place so they could start tracking this thing. the was a sequence of meeting with couriers picking up supplies from you and eventually there is a final pickup and just a few weeks later he is killed in a drone strike. originally you didn't thing it was your operation -- think -- because you didn't hear anything back to confirm that. but reports in the western media and officials briefing a courier who was very much the same as the person you met in terms of

their description in terms of how young and their look was the key person that led the drone there. so you then, you know, all of a sudden thought my goodness and this is my operation. there was a moment a week after he was killed in a hotel on the danish riveria where you confront your cia handler. we will play a little bit from the tape if we can.

>> the cia have just launched their counter propaganda operation by disabling the power here. imm imm immaculet timing. >> i will going to the post and you can call me when you are ready. anyone have any questions about the accounts of it is rare you hear a cia officer talking to a source and informant and it come out in public.

... >> the. >>d/ #ç

[laughter] [inaudible]

[inaudible] [inaudible] >> we are just going to wrap up this part of the presentation here. obviously you don't feel that you have received that gratitude yet. >> no, i do not. otherwise i would have done my best. and i feel that i want to leave behind -- if i could bury this and move on, it is so difficult. and there's a lot of things going on with me in my life and my family. >> we also have to say that

morten storm carried on working or western intelligence for a whole year. he managed to meet the leader of al qaeda in yemen. and by the way, he was given a significant opportunity through those contacts that he established. including the bomb maker that they are concerned about. we can talk a little bit about that in the question and answer. but we would like to open it up a little bit for questioning to the you can ask morten storm anything that you would like about his career as a double agent. thank you very much. [inaudible question] >> thank you very much. >> first of all, can we have a quick round of applause for morten storm. [applause] >> we have run a little long that we have time for questions.

i'm going to ask the first one. there's a lot more to this toy then we have had time to get into area but i did want to ask you and maybe paul can handle this. it's a fairly remarkable story even in the short version that you came here. and dave. aside from morton's words, what you have to say? >> there is a remarkable amount of ore raiders. gigabytes of e-mails between morten storm and his terror contacts recordings with the cia and danish intelligence handlers and money transfer records from some companies set up by western intelligence and the list goes on and on. and it also continues on with the narratives. >> that gave us great confidence

and let's give you an example. we have this terror leader on the left and i will just describe a little about this. [inaudible] >> that is a video, if you will believe, from where he is proposing to this girl [inaudible]

[inaudible] [inaudible] >> so that is his marriage proposal from anwar al-awlaki to this blonde, croatian, so how on earth did morten storm have that in his possession? and it's never come out before. so things like that that really do corps operate his story. how we have that on his computer, how he had the replies so it was just an absolute wealth of corroborating in detail. and what we try to do in the book is laid out as much as

possible. and there's also going to be a documentary next week where you can see a lot of this play out as well. so that gave us a lot of confidence. >> we have a microphone coming for you. >> so what does the cia think about this book reign. >> is there anyone from the cia to comment? and now is the time, folks. >> the cia has not commented on this at this time. >> when you described the reason you didn't go to afghanistan, you said it was because your wife is pregnant and he did not want to travel and you did not want to leave area but then he went to somalia and you left your family. i'm curious about what role your wife and your kids played in either preventing you from going or maybe prevented you from

leaving. >> my wife at the time, she was without her family and said she wouldn't leave them and nor would i want her to go to afghanistan. because some people do get arrested over there. and so at the time it was a choice and we considered it to be a duty. and it was even what appear as part of the it islamic state. and so you can do everything you can do with that.

>> you also got up an important thought, your son that was six or seven, he said he thought highly of you. because you have gone and done your religious duty. >> yes, you have your family, and you expect them and you are guaranteed paradise, you can take family members with you to paradise. so that is something very huge. >> are there other questions? >> over here in the front row. >> thank you so much.

i thought it was interesting. we all got a laugh about how you talk about when you wanted to have bacon and you said you're not a muslim anymore. i'm just wondering that now that you seem to be living a different lifestyle, i'm wondering what you chalk up those experiences to in your quest for jihad. do you think of it as a phase? and how do you think about these things now? i'm wondering when we look towards the westerners that are going to iraq and syria and joining she thought, what lesson should we take from the ability to re-indoctrinate people and maybe this is a phase they are going through in the international community and maybe we can stop that. because you certainly don't espouse that type of ideology now.

>> that's -- that's very important. because the whole world is facing, at the moment, not only in china, it's not just us or them but it's also in the east. and so what we can do, it was a matter of faith. and i lost my faith. i found out that what i was was whole. and so for that it was easy for me to do this. and other people have to be theoretical eyes and there are programs that might be created

for them. but what i think they should do [inaudible] and these people are facing justice and becoming an example to all people out there so that they will not preach their hatred. so if we can prevent that by doing so and reaching out and giving them some kind of hope, it could also help those that are in the in iraq and syria and then prevent them from coming through these countries. and ultimately prevent a crime from occurring in these

countries. >> the left side of the room, go ahead with your question. >> thank you for your presentation and your work, of course. i'm curious. you said the were welcoming going undercover in silence because that way you wouldn't lose your wife and children. what happened? eventually they must have found out a map. >> we don't want to get into the family stuff because it's obvious security stuff. so i think that they don't want to get into that very much. >> okay, can you talk about the cost of walking away from your family? for some people it is walking away from their family. >> i'm sorry, can you repeat that again. >> when you talk about disengaging from a terrorist group, if it involves walking away from your family --

>> the question is when you disengage from a terrorist group, is impossible to also walk away from your family and that becomes a part of the bargain? >> well, to walk away from these people was easy because i realize how evil they were. and that is my basic right to live in a free world and so i -- for me it was very easy to work against these people, but it was very difficult to know if my children, if i would be able to see them.

and there were many lovely people in the muslim world that i had met, friends, actors, examples that we could all learn up. and i knew that they were still upset. so i lost everything there. and i would not change. if you have the choice to change, i would not. i'm happy for what i have done. >> it's sort of a double life tape upon you, it took six years or more, when you had to leave not only your family, but you had to play a role wherever you went, which was just not you. that become incredibly tough for you mentally and emotionally? >> yes, to the extent that it

was hard to figure out who you were. one minute you are this who is working with the jihadis and then the next minute you were over here in bakke is and you have to be a husband. and it was actually so difficult that it was easy for me to interlace the rolls. and it was actually difficult to find it individually. and so for me it was very personal and, you know, it did affect me, absolutely. >> the gentleman in the middle here in the aisle. two quick questions, then the

gentleman on the isle. >> you mentioned after 9/11 -- and i'm assuming this means because of the u.s. occupation of afghanistan. but now that the islamic state has declared that is, what is your read on the obligation to wage jihad in this case? >> this is almost very different. and what you had for 9/11 was not obligate tory. and you could choose to fight against the christians and in indonesia and so on.

but the invasion of iraq and afghanistan and it became upsetting and it was defensive. and it was a call to sharia and all they had financially, by encouraging other people and other muslims to reach theirs. and once you see today was very upsetting and it is something

that was occurring in something that by any means necessary you have to keep it down. and so the centerpiece in yemen, those who study intensively, they were not even from the aqap. these people have declared their allegiance thing that you must make allegiance to them and i've never seen anything like that before. in all 16 years, i have never seen anything like this defeat

of isis. >> okay, gentlemen on the aisle here. >> i have a question to you relative to your discussions mainly in regards to anwar al-awlaki. he had various interfaces with three of the hijackers involved in 9/11. did he ever make any mention of his knowledge before 9/11 or what he might have known after 9/11? >> no, sir. he never mentioned that. he never mentioned that. but i remember in syria, in lebanon and jordan.

and so why would that be again in syria? and you couldn't even mention this in secrecy. and so it is something that these people are religiously motivated with. >> thank you. i am in the uk where you are. and just to give a sense as we close out here. to give a sense of the cost that he has had to bear, all of this work he was doing on the cutting edge of counterterrorism,

targeting the various leaders of al qaeda. and what you are about to see was in august 2013 in syria and its part of isis and this is the message that they have for morten storm. [inaudible] [inaudible] ♪ ♪

♪ ♪ >> so i will give the last word to you. [inaudible] >> i don't think so. [laughter] >> okay, thank you so much, morton, we really appreciated and thank you so much to everybody that came here today this evening. thank you for coming along and we hope that you will enjoy this

>> we are going to have a reception downstairs and we will be able to look at quite a few of the highlights from his world in this story and the espionage world. we didn't get to it a video shown on anwar al-awlaki and his wife responding to the proposal. however, we did have equipment problem appeared at the bookstore downstairs is open immediately adjacent to the lobby. and so those who want to get it down there, it's possible to get a least two of the three authors to sign it. and morten storm, his arm is an outlaw, he's a big guy. but with that, thank you so much for coming to the book launch. >> thank you.

>> house campaign 2014 debate coverage continues at 9:00 a.m. eastern between state senator democrat wendy davis and attorney general greg abbott and live on thursday night, joe dorman and the incumbent mary fallin on c-span2. watch the nebraska governors debate between these two candidates in 2014. more than 100 debates for the control of congress. >> c-span2 provides live coverage of the senate or proceedings in key public policy events. every book weekend, booktv. the only television network devoted to nonfiction books and authors. got you as a public service by

your local cable satellite provider. like us on facebook and follow us on twitter. >> daniel green and william mullen our veterans who fought against insurgents in 2007. they write about it in their book, "fallujah redux." this is one hour. [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon. i am part of politics and prose and on behalf of the entire staff, welcome and thank you for

coming out on this lovely afternoon. a couple of quick administrative notes and now is a good time to turn off your cell phones or anything that might be during the presentation. and because we are being filmed, we would appreciate if you find your way to the microphone so the table pickup your question. and at the end, we asked the audience to hold up their chair, but you don't have to do that because we have another event this evening. on this anniversary of 9/11, it is quite fitting that we should be gathering here for a book that involves the military and they look back at an important part of the long-term fight in which the u.s. armed forces have been engaged. the iraq war wasn't necessitated

by the september 11 attacks and that war was more one of choice. but it was follow the purpose of helping to keep america safe.kep and there are lessons that we have about force and diplomacy and relying on forces. onese lessons remain veryrelyin relevant today, especially as in this country we prepare to reengage in iraq and go after yet another enemy in the form of the group that called itself the islamic state. dan green and bill mullen both served in iraq, overlapping this in the western part of the an country and the book that theye co-authored, anwar al-awlaki, be the book that they co-authored,

"fallujah redux", talks about the end of our awakening. when they try to join the battle against al qaeda affiliated forces. and both of these are vague bony guys. and dan is a reserve officer in the u.s. navy and served as a political engagement officer for a special warfare unit. in falluja in 2007. he has also done duty inujah afghanistan, both as a military officer and as a civilian withtn the state department. his first book three years ago, entitled the valley's edge, was about a year in south-central

afghanistan.- also, he is now a research fellow at the washington institute for middle east policy , focusing on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operation. i might add as well that he is a regular here at politics and prose bookstore in we are very grateful for that. and bill has been amery and 27 or 20 years, 20 years now. and he is currently with the combat development command andet he spent two years in falluja, first as the operations officer for a marine regimental combat team in 2005 and 2006. ben is a battalion commander in charge of the city for most of 2007. falluja has particular significance in the history of the iraq war and it became a center of insurgent activity and

was the scene of one of the u.se military's biggest setbacks in the first year of the iraq war. forces eventually retook the city in late 2004 in groups inntinue to operate in and around falluja. then in 2006 and 2007 as they decided to search u.s. troops ii iraq, delocal tribes also movedo reject acadia affiliated providers and the united states was able to coordinate these efforts by local tribes with thl campaign of the u.s. and iraqi security forces. that coordination, of course, has since come undone in thei wake of the u.s. with all and done sectarian misrule by the government. falluja is now occupied by thesw islamic state fighters. while much has beed n written

about whatte happened, then it will offer the perspective for those that actually have serveda their. in their book, they hold it up in tn example of what can be achieved by the right combination of leadership and perseverance. the story is not really the story of the major military battle in 2004, but of a more complex diplomatic move three years later it did for a time during greater peace to the thai war-torn area. so ladies and gentlemen, and i want to make one other note the bill asked me to make. all the remarks here are personal. they do not represent the views of the u.s. marine corps or the

u.s. armed forces. please join me in welcoming daniel green and brigadier general william mullen. >> thank you very much. [laughter] >> i thought that i would begin with why we wanted to write this book. a lot of how we remember war is so important and there are so many books about this and appropriately so. when it comes to the city of iconuja, it has an iconic status. the victory wasn't a thunderclap. partly for that reason it wasn't covered much by the media and it there hadn't been any books written about it. but it's also more important ho. you initiate a war rather than how you started it. one ofre the primary reasons weu wanted to collaborate is to tell what we felt at the time was a

final chapter of falluja and how eventually the u.s. learned a lot about stability operations and counterinsurgency and it was a process of learning within the military that eventually we had an understanding of what was ton tired and providing lessons ford the future against al qaeda and other groups around the world. so we both had a chance towe experience the fair for sixmomet months and we felt like maybe oumeday future units, you're w going to read probably a memoir and that's how a lot of people get their understanding from books. and that's partly why we wanted to collaborate on us. we also wanted to showcase that. success is possible in this success process.

in march 2007, there were approximately 750 incidents, including explosive devices and you name it. with by applying a counterinsurgencyu approach in the city, which bill led, and in partnering with those around the state, we were able to push them out of the al area and then we had other security incidents taking places in the city. so we wanted to chronicle this and we wanted to put it on paper so that future generations have a chance to read it. put and also we want to write a book that showcases sacrifice. we want to make sure that the two of us got it right. i we benefited from thes sacrifict of countless others prior to our osrival as well as socialed froh

movements taking place that we were able to give image of that. so we wanted to capture the sacrifices of the people to show that their sacrifices were not for not and we did eventually achieve success and other things took apart later on. would too isught i turn it over to bill and talk about what falluja was like ando then he will share his perspective on how each started to change this. >> how is everyone doing today? >> we are going to double team you'll like he said so we are going to do that. so i think what is going on in the military right now, there are a lot of folks who think that enforce no matter what happens is the only answer tohet solving problems.

it's one of the reasons that i wrote this book and in many cases it's just putting aanswer blanket over something that kind of settles everything down and we need to say that we can do something different. so the argument still goes on and there are many within the military who believe the only reason we should go to war is le because of this and we don'tgla have that option. whatever we are told to do, we are told to do to the best of our abilities. and so using these weapons is not the best approach. my experience started when i was on the joint staff before i joined the division. that has been the first battle that happened in april.

the marines went back into this less than the month before the battle happened and before these contractors were hung from the bridge. and they kind of went in there pretty cocky. we also went in there with the attitude that we are going to go in there and smile and we are not going to live up to the reputation we normally have. unfortunately, it forced a lot of people's hands and the marine commanders themselves, saying that we shouldn't be retribution with the city they were told to go in anyway. and they were told to stop when things got ugly and that's when it wasan turned over to an experiment that didn't work. and that is when they said we tn made sort this thing out.rt

i was in the summer 2004 and we0 knew that we can inherit the entire area. so when the battle was over, it was our job to clean things up and get the city reestablished and keep the insurgents out. up but the hardest part about that is we can sort them out, we can sort out who is here. really the only thing we did talk about is how this has been established by the government at this time. so that makes things particularly difficult. time. now that we are trying to keep people out there we can identify, we are trying to establish lists and thankfully they've been reestablished very quickly and stood up very quickly.y are so we had our work cut out for

us. it's a difficult process. trying to keep things calm, trying to keep things quiet. over the course of the year we thought we had things fairly camped down. but when we left and returned home, we were still keeping ae close eye on it because i knew i would be coming back and i had j sense that things could get worse. throughout the courseah of 2006, we had the drumbeat saying that we kind of lost this outlook ane we even had a marine intelligence officer write a hae report saying that falluja is lost and we will never be able to take it back and we just have to deal with the poor as long as possible and then coleave. det thankfully that was kind of hard to deal with, especially when you're training young marines getting ready to go out there, and they're looking at you like this. members of congress, other folks, on the tv news all the time. it was really difficult to do.>e

so don't worry about what others are doing. that's not your job. we got back to the city and things were a bit worse, pretty much playing a game of whack a mole in going after folks. relaxing that we have to dospecl something different and that is what we did, something radicallo different.kerent. >> one of the key lessons that we learned was that we will always win against the enemy an we can clear any valley. but what is the whole strategy and who will eventually prevent the insurgency from turning baco or not by 2007 you had a cadre

of people that had done have done repeated tours in iraq and afghanistan and cleared numerous villages and valleys that they knew the area well and it was pretty incredible. so the key dynamic was listing the population and getting them off the fence and part of that was the awakening which i can talk about later, but also organizing neighborhood watches so that the community was and is stuck between insurgents on one hand and u.s. forces on the other but part of a solution and people know where the bad guys are and they want to be part of the solution and that makes it much easier for an outsider to figure out local partners you can work with. so bill can talk about this, it's what we call a population

centric approach that really haven't been tried previously. >> one of the things that is necessary is you have people looking in the area and they have to get off the fence in one way or another. and it's a very dangerous thing to do. if they join us too early, it's a problem. if they even seem like they're joining the side, they get thrown into prison. so it's a very difficult problem for them to deal with. one thing that the marines were frustrated about is that people never seemed to help them and you can ask people, hey, can you help us come and you can see the wheels turning in their heads. and it's like, it's your problem, not mine. we had the weapons and they didn't. and it's a pretty stark

contrast. one of the other things we did was spend a lot of time explaining to the marines that this is what were going to do and this is what we're how we are going to do it. for the iraqi people are just caught in the middle. they live there. this is a rest of their life kind of issue. and so for many if you take the time to explain that, you see the lightbulb coming on, understanding why we're doing it. and that eases a lot of frustration. because many of them had an expectation of what might be happening when they get there. one wasn't happening that way, they were pretty frustrated about it. so when they are frustrated, they do dumb things. you can do one thing wrong and that is what everyone remembers.

and so it was an attempt to work with the iraqi army and to set up a neighborhood watch to be involved in providing their own security. to kind of keep these suicide bombers from driving into their neighborhood. what they actually appreciated and i didn't think that they would. the response to a questions was these bombs are not going off. but most importantly was the neighborhood watch.is they sohth and so we hired 100% of eyeballs watching us all the time. living in that neighborhood and reporting. living t and there were insurgents they couldn't deal with it. we thought that there would be a reaction to this book there wasn't. the majority left and wentder tg

somewhere else and we had evidence of that in other areast and so a lot of this was a product of being in the right place at the right time and having the right attitude. there were a lot of different things that came together that really helped us during that in 2007. for instance, and we talked about this, the former police chief was terrified and wouldn't te outside the police station headquarters and wouldn't go oue on patrol but i don't think he even left the building. the iraqi army brigade commander was in charge of the iraqi forces and was a member of the militia and was going weapons.

and the guy previous to me engineered his removal. and so when i went the second time, the mayor was terrified. there's a level of corruption that was acceptable in the culture and he was above that. and somehow or another, dan and i figured it out, that he was engineered and somebody else took over. we don't know quite how that happened. but the new police chief and the mayor, the combination of the three of them was crazy. and all of them arrived right at a time is you are coming into the bay. >> thing that people don't always appreciate for a long time as>> you had the al qaeda

branch inlo the national -- nationalist insurgents who frequently worked withch saddam hussein, which made people know that they have a lot of experience with weapons, they knew how to fight. it developed over time and rocky mount love to smoke and drink and they like the girls go to school and they like these things and they had a different vision. the brutality of al qaeda and they would earn the warehouses of cigarette and they start to cut into the corruption of different tribes, which is about money. so eventually this split developed where they said, you may be number two or three as an enemy now.hey and so we actually found theyum had a local partner tobe work wh and we would use them to crush

al qaeda essentially. and so we knew that they had prs been involved and probably hads blood on her hands and vice versa. so was sort of like, let's set this aside, focus on the threat, and the threat is multifaceted. i'm al qaeda also has a political program that is tactically proficient. and those are individual in the city. and he's head of a tribal council. if you're from iowa, that sounds legitimate from my perspective. he's wearing robes, he has a leg beard, he must the illegitimatep shape. but once you start to kill that back and start noticing this, no one would continue their conversations and bill has this

that you might've picked up on. and so you don't notice these little things. so i can talk a little bit about this, when he enters the room, you know that because the security detail is ari there. which are not sure what to dos e with that.ew were but when they talk, people tha listen.ople lis and there is a serenity that comes with power that you pick up on. that so we had one individual who isd head of a tribe on the banks of the euphrates. there were several members of this tribe and yet control of aa areand like this. a mixture of farmland and he could control that area. that's a lot of these werehe cod

working with these tribes andini from america's perspective, some of them are seen as antitheticaa and it took a while for us totir understand how vitally important as social institution was and how family ties trump us. t so we had ahe very robust tribal engagement program. and helping them recruit men from their villages to be part of a local protective force.to o including raising local police forces as well. ... >> with regards to classification of the insurgents and the more islamic history next --

extremist insurgents i bring that up is important what is currently happening with isis. don't take their cigarettes a way. bad is bad but your daughter is now my wife. the locals have no say. they were killing people. the people of fallujah and the national insurgents' thought we know the u.s. military is leaving very professional buddies al qaeda people have to go we cannot live with them. so we may see a similar type of thank they have definitely over reached that

we don't do that. that is pretty bad. so at some point the people will turn on them with the government that they could actually trust now that the prime minister stood down the in the city westering the iraqi military when there is nobody there anymore to be a force prime minister maliki took direct steps to push the sunii of the military that is why they did not trust them.

that is the interesting dynamic. >> one of the reasons fallujah switched you have the tribesmen so they have the firepower. the police have the presence they have the manpower but not the fire power so one would bolster the other so that resiliency was crucial but in the political side it was important so to understand the shadow government to use that placement to understand that margins due generally support of mayor. he had no budget whatsoever.

so one of the things that i try to do was provide temporary money to provide funds and the even had my parents mailboxes of school supplies. but in return a crucial missing piece of legitimacy. he was very proactive. one thing that was very useful is we had an attack that killed a prominent leader at a funeral procession the next day. that car bomb changed things so the mayor imposed a vehicle p.m. so over nine of the vehicles were allowed in

the city the whole city was fenced off for the marine corps you could only enter addis small number of the entry points every some person in the city had the identification card. every house had a number on the map there was control. it was very important but to impose that vehicle and then to set up a series of buses you could imaginepx people would revolt but the iraqis surrendered they knew that was part of the strategy. >> the amazing part was the heat was just unbelievable in the summer it gets 130 degrees. so they told us with that car bombing it was horrific. of lots of people were

killed because with their practices they take them into the house as fast as possible. it was horrific. the mayor saidãhe would impose the vehicle began -- day and, i good luck with that i did not see it working. but it did. their radio from stopping people of driving that did not get the word was to shoot at them there was a lot of shooting going on to get them to stop driving around but they did it. and from the time this was in place they were walking in at 130-degree heat. . .

then you have a police captain move out there with 20 or 30 iraqi police to set up a new precinct. then you add to that a neighborhood watch. for example of funny stories we have neighborhood watch. it would be one man from every household and work a letter commanding people to do this. they have special shirts and hats made up for them. one of the shirts in the neighborhood watch in arabic were three-inch letters which somehow he mistranslated. it went from three-inch tall letters to three-inch wide letters. it was just little things like that but essentially what you are doing is employment so all these militaries are getting a job there is an honor wearing the uniform because the the insurgency has so overreach that it's no longer considered cool to be with the insurgency. it's now considered to be better with the police force. we do one neighborhood at a time

and eventually had to squeeze out cut out of the city so they started working in rural areas. >> one of the key aspects of getting the police to go out there is we had marines and we have the police and as long as we were there we could prevent the iraqi army and police from fighting which was a consistent problem and we could give them the confidence that if somebody tried to blow up that precinct or attack the precinct we were there to help defend it. that gave them a lot of confidence in many cases the only reason they would stay there is because we were there with them. he was getting off with a forward operating bases and getting in a mixing them at these people. a lot more foot patrol instead of vehicle patrol. the barriers we have put around weren't -- he could walk through them which was fine. you just could not drive a car through them. we set up these precincts with two checkpoints that people had to stop. they were manned with the police supervising them so they could check to see was coming into the

neighborhood. this gave them a sense of ownership and they really liked it. again all of these things you think about in the american context i can imagine doing that in america. i can't begin to imagine that. >> the thing i also wanted to add is why did it take so long to do this? why is the resting place of our military institutions in combat and conventional warfare. across the spectrum not just the marines but the army in the state department and usaid they were all generally designed to fight nationstates and work with capitals and national governance. the problem said of al qaeda's insurgencies has aspects of that but it's predominantly outside the capitol. it's frequently tribal not formal institutions. it's often a very dangerous area so force protection concerns of u.s. personnel frequently trumps accomplishing a mission sometimes. the problem is the exact opposite frequently and how we

are organized for success. part of this is to capture in book form that there's a differ way of doing this and it's not always about killing people and breaking things. it's about their own defense and empowering them at the local level. these aren't things you typically hear from earnings were naval officers. it's very different from a career path. we wanted to capture that at least at one point. again the bison publishing is towards combat. there are plenty of books written by junior officers directing -- directly involved with the combat. that's not how you win wars at the end of the day. as part of the solution but not the fundamental insurance. >> going back to my comments at the beginning there are a lot of folks in the military that think of you can do the high-end type or you can do anything else. you can adjust and one of my favorite quotes is if only two of you know how to use a hammer it's amazing what can look like nails. frankly i think that's why it took us as long as it did because there were a lot of

units over there. the only tool they wanted to use was a hammer because everything else was too slow and too frustrating. it wasn't real combat but how do you win? you don't when by depopulating the area. that's not peace. you win by getting people to decide okay we have had enough of this. we are going to get involved. we are going to take her neighbors back and calm everyone down. we are going to get the military out of the neighbors. one of the problems we had when i got there was the iraqi army had given space in the city that they were in charge of. it just happened a month before we arrived. how do you tell them now we have a plan to get you out of the city and we will put the police in your place? they didn't trust the police at all. that was and what they wanted to hear. the way explained it to them was like look the role of the iraqi military is to defend iraq. it's not to keep control of the cities. the final result in the city was police in charge of the city and

false -- enforcing the rule of law in that city. that's it. we don't vote along here in the iraqi military doesn't belong here. we have to give them the confidence that they can take control. as dan brought up earlier to place his outgunned. they were terrified to go in the city. we were worried every time they win out because they would shoot at anything and everything and many times at us, not purposely but if they get hit by an ied or someone shot an rpg at them or someone shot at them we call it the death blossom. it's murphy's rule of conduct when in doubt empty the magazine. the biggest piece is how do you get to be more professional and get them more focused on the job which is to protect and serve, which is not a concept they believe in. >> i will talk a little bit about isis and what the possible strategy might look like going forward. the president gave remarks last

evening. there were a lot of things we try to learn from our experience in anbar province and the volusia pacification. one of the key elements is you have to have the army for police and tribes working together in concert. that's only the service of their broader political strategy which is to say how do you convince the sunni-arab who really doesn't like isis but is in an alliance of convenience now to turn against isis and work with the government that has not been made up of people from his religious background or his part of the country. you have to have a compelling political strategy. when you're fighting an insurgency it's not just about military arms, it's famously 20% of the solution. 80% is having a political strategy and political rationale that defeat the insurgency's political program and that involves a listing the community not only in its own governance but its own defense. i like to use hillary clinton's -- clinton's quote it takes a village.

you will be relentlessl clearing and trying to hold all the time and you will lose people unnecessarily for strategy then and won't succeed. >> the best thing to do would be to open up for questions for any questions you may have. [applause] >> thank you. could you use the microphone please? >> how prevalent are the views you are talking about today and how prevalent is dealing with insurgencies in the military right now. what is the status of fallujah right now? >> the status of fallujah right now is that is under isis control but we have control in the majority of the people are like well they don't trust the government, the previous government i guess you could say now so how much control do they

really have i'm not sure. i suspect things i'm seeing and reading at a certain point as soon as you say okay you guys are out of here and they will make it happen like they did before but they will need someone to help them. as far as the prevalence of abuse in the military it's very much a mix. you have a lot of people argui arguing. the counterinsurgency stuff is not real, we don't do that. we are going to focus on training with our weapons. we are going to focus on the good war. haven't seen any of those breakout anytime recently. if you watch the news, i talked to the other marines and the younger marines, that's what they join for. they want to go do something a lot of them are frustrated because iraq and afghanistan, the piece isn't exactly breaking out. may not be the big war that you saw on tv or in the movies but when you look at the course of history especially the united states the majority of the things we have done have been these types of operations.

they haven't been the big ones and a lot of people just don't understand that. it goes back do we have to do what we are told to do not what we think we ought to do. thank you. >> you mentioned that and correct me if i'm wrong that former leaders of the baath party were active in the insurgency at the time. do we know with the current situation with isis is similar like the group headed by former vice president -- are they active in isis? that's one question and the other one is how do you expect fallujah to be taken back the iraqi forces? is it going to be similar to what happened recently by the

americans bombing the area and the iraqi and control the city? after all you have difficulty, the american army in getting the city in 2007. how will the iraqi army be able to win fallujah again after almost nine months? >> the reason isis was so, it's so easy for isis to takeover was in part because there's an alliance taking place of convenience right now between former baptists some tribal leaders colluding with isis in part for the internal politics of pressuring the maliki government and trying to either reform or create their own separate enclave. i think that's been pretty clear. isis had a very smart ground game of political engagement. before we saw them on our radar screen militarily rest assured they were reaching out to different tribal leaders and

networks of former baptists to facilitate their return. i think that's what happened here. i think eventually likely experience in our own tours that alliance will start to fray as a reality of isis control. i don't know exactly how iraqi's will pacify these areas. i don't think he will be frankly as sophisticated and sensitive to civilian casualties as we were when they were there. >> i would like to add that i don't think it's going to be real violent either. a lot of the things we saw it looks like somebody has success they want to be on that team. when things start going south on them they melt away. i think what's going to happen is if you get the national unity government going in the center and they start the polling the military back together and bringing back the kurds into the

military like i said eyes i says they are overstaying their welcome. declaring caliphate. you don't do things like that exceed if you expect to have a long life. what i think is going to happen is the tide is going to turn and it will probably turn quickly because when you think about it they are fighting in lebanon, fighting in syria and iraq. they have a lot of people working against them and i don't think they will last very long. as soon as the tide starts to turn i think the folks putting flags down in downtown fallujah will take the flight down and leave as quickly as possible. it's just my personal view. >> there are so many dynamics. one of the huge dynamics is the military comes in and is unable to speak the language of the street and needs translators. from past experience translators really don't say the right thing

and you have alluded to some of the problems that creep up but in reality the dynamic involves poverty and good governance. it needs no screwing around with corruption and security, proper security and then there's the other problem with drugs and of course oil. the huge problem is the suicide killer and how to deal with th that. i wonder -- i know a little bit about what general pershing did in the philippines and i wondered if he would be bold enough to say what he did, how to deal with fanatic killers. >> the approach he used in the philippines? probably not acceptable. >> since we are going out to the internet pershing is sensibly -- essentially took the bodies of fanatics and have been dumped in a common grave, contaminated them with blood and dumped.

>> i wouldn't go into that level of detail but that's essentially it. >> unfortunately the media has made a mess too by taking things out of proportion. most people in the military are pretty decent but then there are some clowns who create havoc like the year nations on the bodies. in any event the big problem is proper security with the fanatic killers and their revenge killers and how you would deal with that. >> your first the interpreters versus translators. translators is something i focus hard on with the people i worked with and the folks that put people out on the streets. the translators repeat what they hear what the computer in many ways to get the context wrong. if you have an interpreter someone who understands what they're doing has been working there for a while which i have the benefit of having, you can tell when they are talking with somebody. they are trying to get the answer. they're trying to emphasize the right things. i studied arabic before i went over there so i could understand some of what they were saying in some of what they were saying

back. all of those things are keys to be of the committee with people and get your point across. that interpreter is key. if you can get a good one they are worth their weight in gold. >> to put that into perspective someone special to me was a russian woman with some kids. i greeted her by saying -- and i didn't realize that meant mother. >> that would be a problem. >> on the suicide in the west when they hear west when the hairbrush suicide bomber is incredibly jarring to her values and how we see the world that when you attack the suicide bombers are they come in many different flavors. sometimes people are suicide attackers unknowingly. there's a famous case of a saudi youth to come into iraq and was instructed that yes you will eventually be part of the operation but in the meantime you pay your dues. he was instructed to move a truck between two places as part of that dues paying a bill to the nova truck was actually a truck bomb. he survived that and it's just

an example. some people, there are things that are done to them that create such a sense of shame that they become suicide bombers. there are people with mental problems to become suicide bombers. the fanatical true believers a part of it but it's by no means all of them. >> the other aspect of dealing with them is that the thing we emphasize with armoring solid time is you have to have focus. the insurgent suicide bomber only needs one second to succeed him what they are doing. one second of not paying enough attention and that's hard. they mixed in with the crowd so how do you protect yourself because a very difficult problem we had is we do escalation of force. in many ways it was a cultural misunderstanding between the two and didn't voice is like that there were occasions when the iraqis were hurt or has

sometimes killed. when you have a marine who is afraid to protect himself and he let somebody and it's an enormous problem. >> won anything and that's why it's important to have a local ally to partner with. they know who is from the neighborhood and his from the village and who isn't and they can spot those people well beforehand. if you have the local community organizing a list that they will provide endless amounts of information to you on what's going on. people we don't know who moved into the house down the road that's been unoccupied. if it weren't for the marines in the navy would know that. since we have a semiliterate youth and he's holding in ak in his own neighborhood, that will do it. >> i worked for usaid in iraq and in the kurdistan region. i certainly approve of the approach here. one of the things that has bothered me about the surge, and

that goes with what you have been saying too is that a lot of the success relied on financing buying off in a sense local people to do good things but clearly this is not very sustainable. how did you deal with that issue? >> you are exactly correct. not a good solution but when you are faced with a number of very bad solutions you have to pick the least bad when least bad one and that was the least bad one. it's kind of the way look at it. we have a lot of unemployed youth. in many cases they would charge them, here's 50 bucks go shoot this rpg. my first appointment there was very much an emphasis on no we are not going to pay them and get them jobs. we need to get the economy going but we don't have security you don't have -- so how do you deal with back? the amount of money we were paying the neighborhood watch that were hired wasn't very mu much. it was more than they were

getting before which was nothing. the other aspect of that as we told them if you do the job and get the police to nudge to your chance of becoming a police officer are much better. your chances of joining the iraqi military are much better because you have proved yourse yourself. that kind of resonated with them also. some of them were just doing it because it was like this is what i want to do. shop started opening back up in one of the most amazing things my marines noticed is kentucky fried opened up. that's peace, right? it's that kind of, it starts snowballing and it has that effect. you have to get something started. that was the hardest part. >> were you able to work on many measures to try to get better finance to get these things to continue? >> that was his job. [laughter] >> yes actually. the key thing was getting security to a point where civil governance could take place.

when iraq in april we had a brand-new city council a brand-new head of the fallujah city council and the new mayor so the beginning of a new change. we had a new iraqi army and police chiefs all the new leadership to come in there. the problem as it had been broken up. parts of the iraqi government for meeting locally so getting it together getting a rhythm of meeting regularly and unfortunately within two weeks of my arrival ahead of the fallujah city council was assassinated. i had a meeting with the civil affairs marines there and as he walked home from that meeting he was gunned down. then we had another state council council made her who was a gym teacher and he was gunned down in his home. there was a real point they there. you can imagine the head of the city council was assassinated in a look around the room and you say who is willing to stand up and be a leader with back? there's that empty chair just

sort of sitting there at the table. it's those moments where you ask yourself what is the insurgency trying to have the due? you persist and in door and push on and that's what we did. for me what we did with the mayor was i finally found someone who seemed to be a local partner. you are always testing the relationship. we establish security around the compound at the outset. i tried to give him money as a bridge to cover his bills. we supported him publicly where we could. i was given advice on who to talk to. you really need to talk to colonel mullen. he's the man in charge of the city and you are too but he is too. frankly he didn't need much encouragement. he had standing in the city so once things started happening and the reconstruction team arrived and state representatives usaid of who partner with her bare helped him write a budget and worked with the provincial government to regularize deployment.

>> one of the amazing things was usaid was working with us throughout the deployment and we were starting projects. we would check on the projects and as things turned of the city towards august and september and into october we started seeing other projects. it would come up and we would say who's doing that one? it one? it turns out the people themselves were. you start to clean the area up and started to do things that were amazing. that was good to see. >> i have a suggestion for your next project. from fallujah to ferguson. you will even have the same equipment unfortunately. [laughter] >> we have time for one more question. >> hi. i'm a student with american university. i'm a journalism major. i want to ask from your experience what do you want for his readers to take away from an inspiring