he had been tempered by his early experience as rail for which he became the commander and dedicated to getting the british out so she could get more in so he was a wanted terrorist so there were posters and 10,000 pounds from the terrorist dead or alive. so he was in a state of hiding absolute hiding for years in that context. he had 30 years as pointed out in the political wilderness still be building up political following which in no small measure was the jews of north africa and the middle east, very important factor in his rise and strength.

he had iron will cut tempered and absolutely dedicated to the proposition that they were an inseparable part of what had once been the jewish kingdom and this was a return if you will of these important inseparable parts of what he termed israel and the same applied at least as strongly if not more so the concept of undivided indivisible united jerusalem. those were absolutely wrecked approaches on those subjects. i would like with that background to shorten and give you a strong recommendation. read if you haven't and if you have, really read the book but ministers and their you will

find eloquent descriptions because he was the notetaker and the speech editor and publisher of shakespeare if you will which but she always until his dying day wrote or dictated himself and then he would polish them up. read the book. i want to go to a particular episode eliot has eluded to among so many others in the crisis of rock and roll roller coaster relationship. it was december of 1981. he had suffered a security is of heart attacks and cardiac incident. his wife was very ill. there had been the bombing and the assassination of sadat, the

heating up of the lebanese situation whereby now this year you had innocent taken over the greatest part of lebanon in fact and the plo now gained control of the south and was launching civilian targets on the border. against such a background he learned that i was out of serious had said we will not recognize israel even if the plo does and of course at that time they had no inclination to recognize. we will not recognize them and he is foreign minister at the conference said if necessary we will wait 100 years until israel begins and we gained sufficient strength to dictate to them our

conditions. he became so agitated that he can gained a special cabinet meeting in his residence where he had one leg propped up on the chair because he'd suffered a terrible hip fracture and was in extreme pain and he convened his cabinet and got their approval, some of them reluctantly to push what became known as the law that extended the law of israel to the heights. it was taken as an active annexation or something extremely close at the time. [laughter] >> the administration was flummoxed and deeply

disappointed in agitated and instructed the ambassador to go in and told the prime minister that the terms in the implementation of the strategic memorandum of strategic cooperation with the suspended pending review as to its interpretation. he knew what sam was coming in with and initially greeted him politely. i would read and extract the remark at this stage that the two men had come to like each other very much over time, that

bacon had a deep appreciation for sam as a sophisticated experience diplomat who was so well connected and trusted that frustrated politicians of whatever political hue would occasionally burden their souls to him and to his charming wife. so, in came sam and before he could even start a presentation to the minister launched into a tirade that lasted over an hour and he said i want you first of all i want to give you a personal urgent message for the president of the united states and for an hour he blasted the administration for the way that it was handling israel and he

said what are we, a vessel, are we a banana republic? are we a 14-year-old boy to have his knuckles rapped and so forth and he really lets them have it. he said you're talking about rescinding an agreement. he said reese and is a term that came out of the spanish inquisition and that's the way the conversation which was a one-way conversation -- >> [inaudible] a jew meals only to god is the way he put it. it's calling for a review and he would have none of it and sam waited until the very end and finally said there's much i

would like to say but i will leave you with this message that we should not surprise each other and with that he got into his limo, turned on the radio only to hear the cabinet secretary at the time -- who was the cabinet secretary? anyway, whoever it was was reading that hour-long tirade to the israeli and whoever else public and sam was upset. a few days later after he had seen the senator he said to the prime minister the fact that you authorized the release of that message almost immediately after i left was to put it mildly a violation of every diplomatic norms and practice and the way you did it made me feel like i

was being treated like an idiot. he said there was nothing meant personal in this whatsoever. it was due to the fact there were that there were such sharp differences between the two governments that he felt compelled to fully briefed the people of our stand and make the claim that we also have red lines and then he paused and said i apologize if i have embarrassed you personally. forgive me, please. can anyone in this room imagine such an exchange between the israeli prime minister or any prime minister in an american ambassador to his country is a stark testament to all the work that sam had done and the confidence and respect and

admiration that he had inculcated in his eight long wonderful years as ambassador x. we miss you. sally, bless you. [applause] you just heard two very different but interesting presentations. he gave you the kind of historic overview of the years in which sam was the ambassador and the basic not just the highest and lows that the strategic developments that took place and bill gave you a sense of what was the real relationship sam had during this perco. i want to make one comment and then i'm going to show a video and introduce it.

this particular exchange took place and in fact i had played a central role in helping to draft what became the strategic memorandum of others understanding, and i was committed to seeing this because i thought it was one of these transforming events. what you didn't mention is in that hour-long tirade they said they've lived without a memorandum of understanding so he can continue to live without a twitch is to be a crushing blow. it was incredibly cultureless time that was described. there were period of time that msnbc were getting at in it in terms of the reagan administration that the first

two years people forget were the only times that in fact you actually had arms deliveries suspended three times within the first year. and sam was someone who commanded respect on one hand and that's what you were reflecting and he had a strategic perspective of the relationship should be and he was determined to manage it and he did. and in a way that i suspect nobody else could have done. sam also has a relationship in the very founding. he was on the board of advisers and was the most influential person in terms of helping to shape how this organization got off the ground in its organization and what we want to do at this point to end of this

session. i want to show you a video sam offers his view about the key issues that we have been talking about. so cue the video. ♪ i think if you have to distill one piece of advice or would-be peacemakers from my experience it's don't give up your not going to succeed totally but you keep pressing forward and looking for the opportunities you can achieve a lot more than

you think you can. ♪ it's important to keep the peace negotiating process because if you drop it and if you say it can't go so let's do something else but please nobody with an excuse not to turn to violence.

♪ the challenge is for the israelis and americans to attend this unique and enduring alliance to cultivate it and don't allow it to be poisoned or atrophy. ♪ i don't think washington without the washington institute would be a place that could handle u.s. relations with the middle east in the next century very

successfully. i think this institution is now an essential part of the broader policy process in the city, and if it suddenly disappeared the city would be a lock -- a lot poorer. >> i couldn't be happier to be back in government because all of all the things i've done in life the most satisfying is to bring back the israel peace treaty and i think i'm going to have another chance. [applause]

[inaudible conversations] >> taking a break at the washington institute. we will be back for the next panel that's going to be on the art and science of middle east policy planning. we will hear from the middle east envoy dennis ross in for defense secretary paul wolfowitz. the last panel of the day after lunch dennis ross will deliver the key addressing the people here from deputy secretary of state, william burns. we will have more live coverage as soon as the next session starts but while we wait a look at the recent speech from the president of iraq before the un general assembly.

in the name of the merciful, your excellency for the general assembly come your excellency the secretary-general in the united secretary-general of the united nations, wheaties and gentlemen -- ladies and gentlemen i salute you on behalf of iraq and congratulate the president of the 69th general assembly. we wish his excellency and the secretary-general of the united nations also during the session i would like to think the

secretary-general for the vital role that he played in the past year in supporting the march of my country, something that we take pride in in iraq. ladies and gentlemen, 14 years ago as the the state and government committed to the realization development focusing on issues that remain vital foremost upon which our social and economic development, the protection of international peace and security come, the end to the disarmament description whose very name puts fear in everyone fighting terrorism and organized crime guaranteeing human rights and the

coordination of humanitarian assistance efforts and the justice and international law. in this context we would like to remind you of our memory and experience and in the kurdish city with chemical weapons in 1988 at the hands of its regime. this occasion -- next year we will be celebrating their 70th anniversary or the founding of the united nations as an organization that represents the legitimacy. this expresses the value of this organization and the tasks that it's already achieved and it's a

vocation to make more initiatives and to promote the human rights freedoms. we will also be celebrating the 40th anniversary that was a turning point in seeking to promote the rights of women and the violence through which women are exposed. we need to protect our planet and seek to create a sound environment to fight the problems of poverty and illiteracy. ladies and gentlemen, the success of the political parties in iraq and establishing the government of national unity that represents every stripe is extremely important. it is a government that everyone seems represents them.

their response to their aspirations and hope to move with their states to another era of stability and progress. as of the government seeks to build good neighborly relationships built on understanding the given key to peace in the region and the distance among the member states on the basis of good neighbors. the establishment of the government was a fair response to any danger. this infamous group used the international terror action by attacking innocent civilians it takes us to the new level.

isis was able to occupy areas and establish the state. the committed crimes against humanity killed, displaced, committed genocide, ethnic cleansing and all of the suffering of the iraqi people by horrific crimes. it kidnaps women's and sells them as enslaved captives and religious houses of worship as well as the culture and historic monuments. the components of the ethnic identity and targeted religious minorities including christians

we would like to thank the people of the world that rejected these as well as the solidarity with the victims and provided assistance. this terrorist organization and enjoys the ethic by declaring the so-called islamic caliphate. isis became a hotbed of two distract extremists of the world and they declare allegiance to this regime. they started working under its command and under the most dangerous phenomena of the information is the emergence of the new generation of terrorists who have american and european citizenship. the iraqi armed forces committee

to to stop the organization of new areas and feels feels that he did as he did in liberating the cities that have been occupied by the terrorists of this organization. we also were able to break the siege on the city's with the huge humanitarian and military support that is seen from an organization with the states of the european union and other friendly states that played a vital role in assisting us in facing up to this to radical group. the support that we shall never support shows our people that we

are not fighting terror alone. here i would like to express the appreciation and gratitude of people the people in iraq and all of their stripes and we appreciate its government to all those that stood by us in our war against enemies of humanity. we would also like to thank those who made efforts to bring to the success the conference is and we would also like to thank those that made every effort to adopt a security council resolution guaranteeing solidarity and partnership in facing terrorism and the challenges it poses to everyone. as we meet here, hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees looked to us those who were forced to leave their homes without even taking with them some of the most simple

possessions. millions of defensive civilians who have been forced to live under the tierney of isis terrorists also look to us. there is deception come into their relief is our sensibility. we call on the international committees to stand by our side in this war and to support our efforts and and of the law the law of international organizations and friendly countries in alleviating the suffering of refugees who still look forward to the return to their homeland and get rid of isis. this organization is transnational and intercontinental and we come confirm that this can only be achieved by forming a unified global fund to take measures to

fight the approach to its financial and military sources. i would like to thank you all for coming to this event. if he believes memorial symposium. as my colleague dennis ross explained at the start of the symposium, we have two panels one of which was looking backward and one of which was looking forward. now we are going to be looking forward to coming and we said as a tidal wave moving target of the art and science of middle east policy planning and it couldn't be a better moment for discussion on that issue as we hear from important sources that the president of the united states the difficulty of formulating a strategy for the middle east. and to discuss those issues,

we've assembled i think a stellar panel of the first speaker -- you have their bio in your little brochure and i'm sure you know them anyway but the first speaker, paul wolfowitz for the past speaker of the bank and also the director of policy planning for the state department in the early 1980s. after paul b. of jessica mathews the president of the carnegie endowment for international peace and for murder after the council of foreign relations washington office and she was the deputy under secretary of state for global affairs and the director of global director of global issues from the national security council staff. finally commenting on those remarks of the mike hawley dennis ross was the distinguished fellow here at the washington institute and he served more than 25 years of high-level in government with white house into bush, clinton

and obama administrations and also was the director of policy planning in the bush white house. so with that let me ask paul to begin with a few remarks. >> i wouldn't have been foolish enough to talk about the middle east at this point in history if it were not for effect for sam and missing him and wishing we had his wisdom for us now. he's a great man and he did great work. i was the head of the policy planning staff from 1981 to 1982 and during that time as dennis does it seemed as though 80 to 90% of our time is spent on middle east issues. i had a fantastic staff by academics working for me who

later became the deputy national security adviser before he died much too young of cancer. at the end of 1982 i moved to become the assistant secretary of state for east asia so you could say i did my own pivot to east asia and was like moving from darkness into light. [laughter] where they could create a once rare for the last 20 years or so they simply begun to solve them and it was so refreshing. so i can understand understand very well the administration's desire to pivot. but i think we can see no matter how much we may try to live the middle east the middle east will not leave us unfortunately. and in the role that is critical for american security and critical for energy security and the in the entire world no matter how much natural gas the

united states produces we've are still dependent on the world economy that is critically dependent on present goal. one of those sad facts of life. one of the few pleasures of dealing with the middle east as the head of policy planning with the regular visits i got from ms that are of israel in wonderful man named sam lewis who i got to know during that time. sam was always a voice of calm and balance in the area where so many of the issues were loaded with tension that was kind of an understatement. not just in the middle east but in washington as well. but he was always open to discussion which wasn't that easy in the foreign service establishment that was not very friendly to israel to be able to express views on what the outlook was. he was always the ambassador to israel and he never made the fatal mistake which i hope i

didn't do when i was in indonesia but it is a occupational hazard of an ambassador and sam never succumbed to it as i think bill's account of his confronting the knock -- all too well. i believe at that time we gave one of the hardest tasks maybe not hard as bill described in 1982 as israel was deceiving to get the plo out of beirut he assembled a group of luminaries including henry kissinger in the late number of others to help develop a peace proposal that could be launched at the time they left a beirut pitches thinking beyond the crisis of what comes next.

as soon as the crisis was over everyone would be besieging us with our own versions of peace plan and he wanted to have his own so the next eight weeks or so was spent very vigorous internal debate with schultz and sam intervening to develop it was an innocent age where people could actually talk about resurrecting the plan. you all know what the plan is. you are dating yourself if you are nodding yes. it seemed seems like a plausible idea at the time but it became a difficult job for sam because in this case he was outraged we haven't consulted with him before telling anyone else on the principle that we did consult with him before telling anyone else, everyone else would know before they were supposed to. and sam took it well and handled

relatedly. -- brilliantly. we're here to talk about the challenges in the middle east but i'm here to talk about challenges of policy planning which are considerable. it's a great position in theory you have enormous flexibility bringing in the best people from the foreign service and from outside. i've already mentioned dennis and steve, charles burbank and a number of other really outstanding people. and theory, you have the license to weigh in on the important issues facing the department, but that's part of the problem. anywhere you weigh in as someone else's turf and if you've never worked in a bureaucracy if you think people will come in troopers on their turf the last thing. it's particularly hard when shultz asked me what to do for him on how to restore the policy planning staff to the position of influence under george kennan and the great legendary head of policy planning. so have you read the history

with an eye on this particular question which i haven't thought too much about before. one of the first things that struck me the hardest was to realize that george kennan had quit in frustration at the same kind of frustration that we were feeling too much in the hague year and a half, but it felt like years. ..

research was dean acheson describing being invited to the white house to meet with truman who told acheson what was then the single biggest secret in washington, probably in the world. the fact the united states to develop a hydrogen bomb. he told acheson i need you to develop a strategy for me for how we build a policy after this. and acheson says in his memoirs, i went back to the state department and met with the policy planning staff, not the director of policy planning, the entire staff which i think of the time was only seven people but the idea the secretary of state would bring a group of seven people into his confidence

in that way was a long, long time ago. i took one lesson from that comment can usually when i was in the pentagon when we were looking at the prospect of liberating kuwait and the military plan at the time was what brent scowcroft declared, it was going to go right across the kuwaiti border, one of the most formal events iraqi. some people on the staff came up with the idea that it's possible to go around kuwait and come around from the western side. i said that's a good idea, let's try to develop it. but you have to swear in blood you don't talk to anyone outside of our policy unit because as soon as the joint staff learns a bunch of civilians came up with this idea, they will just, you know, all over it. in the we took the idea to dick cheney who liked it and energize the joint staff basically to

come back with he their own version. i felt enormous satisfaction. a couple years later what happened on an airplane to be sit next to tom kelly, that you have been in charge of planning for that period. and he said without realizing that our planning staff had anything to do with it, he said, cheney had these kind of crazy ideas and where to keep putting salt on his tail. that was the phrase. but it produced a much better result in the end. felt very good about that. also a few very good looking back on it at what i guess is sort of an example in this case not going around the bureaucracy but actually accidentally going around the second of state. maybe not so accidentally, but i recall when reagan came into office, there was enormous dislike for the bureau of human rights which was created under jimmy carter and was run for years by pat neary and who i think was unfairly blamed by

many people in our administration for having helped to destabilize so-called friendly governments, which one was of course a shah of iran who, as bad as he was, made what came after and made him look like a golden egg in a way. there was an eagerness to have that office. perhaps for that reason haig nominate one of the first assistant secretary starr i know that was turned down by the senate. i won't name him. it's unkind, but you can go look it up. as soon as that nomination was rejected, haig decided okay, this is a good time to abolish the office of human rights. one of the great people and mentioned, charles fairbanks said this is a crazy idea. if we're going to have any kind of support for the helsinki process, any kind of opposition to soviet union on political grounds, we can't abandon the support for democracy. he said there's a better way to

do it and going around harassing individual governments, and that is to work on system change. we produced a memo and gave it to the deputy secretary judge clark, a very enigmatic man if he ever had to deal with them. it. never said much that he took it, he must have taken it to his best friend president of the united states, came back a couple weeks later saying we want to keep the bureau. help me figure out some people who can run it. and i think the rest is history. i think was a good institution that was important to save. when george marshall became secretary of state a both created the policy planning staff as we've been long range strategic plan and he created i think something that tends to neutralize the policy planning staff, which for those of your veterans, forgive me for saying this. it's state secretariat. basic as the job to protect the secular from uncoordinated

recommendations, hence the idea of private advice to the sector becomes almost impossible. they see it as their job to restrict documents, the difficulty of getting access to know this information when you're in that job. as we entered into what i think has to be called a three sided war, although i guess it's an issue of whether the world war of lies, with the islamic state and within the assad regime, the war that may last for a long time, i think policy playmates two critical things. they need the best intelligence possible, although even our best intelligence on prices seems be fairly limited. you have to have access to the very best stuff. and they need access to the views of our friends and partners in the region as reflected in high level diplomatic conversation. if i had one suggestion to make in this context, as opposed to specific policy were a few myself liking both categories of

information i would say the secretary of state should form a very high level, very, very qualified policy advisory group. maybe they should be run by the head of policy planning but it has to be small like acheson's was. to really dig into these issues in a very open-minded, very fundamental way. and able to talk to him without anything going outside to the press briefing going outside to the bureaucracy. i think that's a critical need at this point because i think anyone would have to admit that we really aren't all clear where we were going. i think we are in need of a paradigm shift in the middle east. we need to try to figure out who our friends are. do we really have friends? can we find genuine moderates in the middle east? are limited to the victim that some people think might apply to the 19, although i think it's shocking to do the. the enemy of my enemy is my

friend. if they want to do that they should remember the qualifier that the great middle east historian applied to that. he said politics in the middle east comes down to the enemy of my enemy is, my friends, he said at a little more colorfully. but what you have to remember, he said the store current australian ambassador in the united states when he was a rhodes scholar, which have to remember, mr. beazley, is the principal in at 9:00 the morning is never the same as the principal enemy at 5:00 in the evening. to which these elite replied well, how can you do politics on that basis? exactly, mr. beazley, exactly. we have to ask how do we deal with friends like saudi arabia could do so much to fund the worst brand of extremist islamist ideology which is at the root of so much of our problem today. i mentioned the word islamist ideology. i the even the terminology is one that we need perhaps to have a better handle on.

in the bad old days of the soviet union and the cold war we could distinguish at least semantically between communism and democratic socialism. not all socialists were bad. not all muslims are bad. but if the extremists i think improperly be characterized as islamist which to me means someone who believes that islam should be imposed on others and not just islam but their version of islam should be imposed on others, including another muslims. but, unfortunately, as i'm not sure that word works. i got lectured once by pakistani that i was being an anti-muslim because i talk about the threat from islamist ideology. i think it is a threat. i think we need to understand it. it's a threat, a country with the largest most -- that's indonesia. where if you go to a muslim 40 school and they're quite simple

institutions, usually very basic, you find one with a three-story dormitory at a fancy gymnasium. teaching wahhabi ideology. for many years it seems to me we followed a policy of the lesser evil. that seems to be terrorist, particularly in catholic saudi arabia and egypt ever seen to be creatures of u.s. policy. but with all its failings we would be much worse off if saudi arabia fell into their own hands. i think it was, it was obviously premature to refer to the arab spring as a brand-new season. but i think it's also premature now to refer to an arab winter. i think we can't afford, there's an appeal in the arab world and we need to influence it, find ways to influence it. what other people did and she was the willingness of arabs to brave incredible danger as they do in syria now, to be free from

pirates. but that's not the same as being ready to embrace the responsibility of democracy. i think we lost an opportunity in libya. after the fall of moammar gadhafi there've been two elections, both which returned pro-western and moderate parties with a resounding defeat for the islamists and particularly for the southeast. but those are the people who have the guns, guns they came from qatar and principe from qatar and the persian gulf. and it's now the law of the gun, not the law of the. i think perhaps libya would still be salvageable, sort it would've been south of kabul is more have been done at the beginning. to help create effective security forces. tunisia i think is the most hopeful of all those arab spring countries. it's reflected i think from sensible reaction from the electorate and it deserves much support as we and the europeans

can give. the european service should step up to the plate on this issue. but syria will take generations to recover from the divisions created by so much violence and bloodshed. it might've been different to the conflict had come to an end sooner. in that respect i think the real danger that we walked into, into syria was not a mistake that was so feared that we would somehow repeat the bad experience of iraq. instead we repeated the bad experience of boston where for three years we love the bloodshed to continue while the weaker side lacked for weapons. and the end result was 200,000 more people dead in a country that was shattered and is now partitioned in all but name. so i will leave it to my wives or panelists to see if there's a way to pick up on this. i just have to say if we're looking for allies in the middle east, certainly in absolute critical ways israel is the only reliable ally.

in certain critical ways but it's also important that because of our closest israel we ended being held responsible for almost everything israel does. and i don't think that everything is you does on things like -- are all that constructive, is their way to get to a better understanding and more restraint. i would offer one example which came during the gulf war. when i remember, if we are thinking ahead to the possibility of war, it was assumed, it was an affidavit if israel were attacked by iraq israel would respond militarily. it was also felt this would not be an american interest but it was a sort of fatalism, there's no way you can prevent it. the fact is israel was attacked pretty much continuously for i guess 54 days and did not respond. the reason it didn't respond was because we convinced them that we would do everything necessary

to take care of israel's security. and even at moments when it seemed as though maybe we were doing quite as much as we should have, that bargain held. i have never forgotten being with larry eagleburger we met with its occurring there, shamir, and she was single treating us like a relative with a social disease. that was afraid to even the egyptians say that if we're attacked we have a right to retaliate and you're asking us to give up a right of self-defense. and we pointed out, you know, you need to understand first of all we don't send our patriot missile batteries to defend relatives with his social disease. we are not treating israel like an outcast. if you want to know why mubarak said what he said about israel has the right to retaliate is because we ask them to do so. is divided don't think it will be much left to retaliate against after the americans are finished. thank you very much. thank you, sally.

[applause] >> jessica. [inaudible] just before i begin i would like to say that sam lewis was to meet demand of deep wisdom -- a man of deep wisdom, overflowing commonsense, and great, good humor. and i think that's both a rare combination and one could be admired. and if we can, in a late. and so i don't really field deserving to be here, but i feel privileged to be. our assignment was to think about policy planning in the context, or the middle east and the context of policy planning which to me means what are the big questions, what are the ones that underlie day-to-day

policymaking? so let me offer a few thoughts. i should add, before i begin, listening to paul talk about the difficulties and the downsides of working in policy planning, i remember a time when i was torn between accepting an offer to take that job and what was my courage of, and paul is one of the people asked advice of. and i do remember any of the negative stuff that he just shared, none. [laughter] so first question would be for me, would be how it engaged is the american public prepared to be now in the middle east? the common wisdom is that, is war weariness. but i've looked hard at the polls, and i don't see any evidence that that's actually what this country is suffering

from. i think what we are suffering from is weariness of interventions that don't succeed. and that's a very different thing. and i think what you've seen this summer after the beheadings and this massive shift in public opinion so quickly is some evidence for this view on suggesting that there is a willingness to stay engaged if there is clarity, convincing clarity about what it is we are setting off to do. remember that afghanistan is not only our longest war, but we have spent in real dollars more money in afghanistan than we spent on the marshall plan. and americans may not know that figure, but they have a feeling for how much, they have at least a general feeling for how much

we spent and how much there is to show for it on the ground. so my sense is the willingness to be engaged is there, if our president and the secretary of state can capture it. a second question, or a need, is i think we are very short now on dictation in the middle east. paul referred to this but i put a lot of the blame in this case on the word arab spring come on the phrase arab spring. phrases as we saw with the pivot can do enormous damage, concrete damage to policy, as the pivot is ongoing in china. it's amazing to me how a word that has little content can have so much outcome on the ground. but arab spring did leave people with a sense that things are going to change for the better

fast, and in a linear kind of fashion. and undoing that is going to take a lot of doing, some director of policy planning needs to think hard about. third, we're going to need, i think we badly need more diplomatic energy. and i think probably most people here have found, and i discovered to my surprise it's one of those factoids is actually true, that we have more people in military bands that we do career diplomats. that's been a trend now in both republican and democratic administrations for at least three decades, and it's something we have to work to unwind. that said, i think that how we behave abroad, what we do, what we attempted to has everything

to do us how we think of ourselves at home. and when we can make positive change at home, we are more inclined to think we can do so abroad, and vice versa. it has been a very long time since we have very much to celebrate in terms of how constructive we can be on our own domestic policies. and, obviously, no director of policy planning, no secretary of state can undo that. but i think were i in office right now making policy, it would be very much on my mind, what, how far we can stretch ourselves given our record at home. fifth, we need a better listening ear worldwide. it's been a loss since the end of the cold war, but in

particular we need it in the middle east. we have far too few people whose expertise is the arab-israeli conflict as opposed to the arab world. and we need people whose principal expertise is that. there's an awful lot of history happening, and it's going to happen in the coming years of our difficult history that we need to be better prepared than we are now. and, finally, we have, the president has shown in the last few weeks that with the right threat, it is possible to build quite fast and extraordinary ad hoc coalition, and we have seen it before. but it's also true that ad hoc coalitions are your third choice in international coordination cooperation. your first choice is

institution, and it has to be said that it's one of the disappointing features of the last 50 years has been a steady decline of what we had hoped for from the u.n., in the '90s. and your second choice is established partnerships. so your third choice is ad hoc coalition. and ad hoc coalitions now are pretty much the best we can do outside of the u.s.-israeli relationship. i am very conscious of the time so let me, let me just say a word about that relationship. i do think we need to get a more realistic relationship with israel. we've gotten unable politically to distinguish u.s. interests from israeli interests, and to prioritize those interests.

and i think too often or too long our policy has protecting israel from the consequences of its own choices, and that's a formula that doesn't have a happy ending, in my view. let me if i can say just a word about syria, which i think is clearly the biggest immediate challenge for this region. the achilles' heel of the presidency new policy is obvious, and that's the lack of boots on the ground in syria. you can see three source of boots on the ground in iraq, the iraqi army, the kurds, the peshmerga, and the sunni tribes. but you don't see a serious set of boots on the ground in syria. the syrian opposition that we're talking about training, the time

scale is, according to the pentagon, a year and a half, three to five months, a year to train. so what happens in the interim? i think that there is a piece of good news, potential good news, if we can discard the guiding assumptions that have directed our policy for the last three years, which is that we need the outline of a political settlement before we can take steps to cease-fire and then agreement. i think isis, extraordinary accomplishments in the last several months, has shifted reality so deeply that it is now possible to imagine two parallel

cease-fires, separate parallel cease-fires by the assad regime and by the moderate opposition, both of which are stretched badly, over stretched badly in badly, and both of which would enormously profit from such a truce, vis-à-vis each other, so they can both focus on the common threat. what makes me think this is conceivable is that that same change in priorities now holds true for saudi arabia and iran. who fear each other and distrust each other, but recognize that they face now a common existential threat. that they would like to do with before it gets to their borders. so i think that there is an opening now. i know just sort of dropped this scandalizing undeveloped thought, but that is there. and so just as at last comment i

will say that the other thing that would be very much on my mind were i in this chair right now, with our relationship with iran, if we lose the opportunity of this deal, we lose so much more than that. and i think the deal is there. a deal is in the room. it may not be on capitol hill. it may not be in tehran, but it's in the room, doable, a good deal, acceptable deal. and if we can get it, a lot else, particularly in syria. >> and now dennis.

>> well, thank you. i think paul and jessica's comments were interesting and created a kind of broad conceptual framework. i think jessica also raised i think what our provocative thoughts again and maybe we'll get into some of that. i want to do it a little bit differently, just because i want to do it more in the way that would reflect the sand were here, what would be the questions sam would ask. and i feel like i can do that in part because i used to spent a lot of time with sam, and sam used to ask a lot of hard questions, typically when i was our negotiator and i would see him, you know, he wouldn't, he would have to offer his judgment because you asked the kind of questions that would make me question my own assumptions. and that was really sam. of all the people i work with over the years, i don't know that i ever, i ever dealt with

anybody who more consistently would ask us to question our own assumptions. and i suspect at a time like we're in right now in the middle east, i can think of a better time to be questioning our own assumptions. there are a lot of assumptions about this region that if taken on a life of their own and if there was ever a point at which they seem to be in doubt, this is it. so if sam were here, the first thing he would say is, as a policy planning person, he would say let's be sure that the decisions you're going to make in the coming days will be decisions that will move you where you want to go over time. don't make the decision that seems comfortable because this is the easiest path or the path of least resistance, or the one that imposes the least price right now. because maybe six months from now or a year from now you will regret the fact that you did it. that's the essence of policy planning. how to be sure your day-to-day decisions are consistent with

where h you would like to be ovr time and that requires you to define your own objectives clearly, it requires you as you define those objectives to again ask questions about your assumptions. so if we take a step back, and i want to do what sort of, i will do it on two things. because we didn't talk about the arab-israeli issue, actually for good reasons because the region today reflecting i think the reality is challenging what has been an assumption which was one that was embedded in i was in a national secret establishment for a long time. it's true. i finished a draft of a new book on u.s. and israel, and every administration from truman through obama had a constituency that had an assumption that guide it about the middle east, which was if you solve the arab-israeli issue, you say the arab -- arab palestinian issue, you change the region.

that assumption applies today because by the way, if you solve it today, it wouldn't stop one barrel bomb from being dropped in syria. it wouldn't have, you know, isis wouldn't change its approach. you can go through country by country, iraq come its problems today are not a dysfunction of this, and so forth but it's important to realize that but that can't be in document for not dealing with the issue. and by the way, look at the video, sam's preoccupation with this issue was driven by how we defined american interest compounded by the region but also how we defined israel's interests. and so i do want to deal with the issue at the end because we haven't really dealt with it. but let me sort of deal with too broad sort of questions in effect and i won't belabor too long so that we'll have some time for questions. in the first case how do we look

at the region? i think sam would say, what do we learn from looking at the landscape of the region right now? he would probably say, dennis, did you pay attention to what went on in gaza? you know, i noticed that there were demonstrations against israel and europe but i didn't see demonstrations in the middle east. what does that tell us about the landscape right now? and i would say, well, it tells us that the gulf states and egypt and probably morocco and algeria view the muslim brotherhood as the first threat. now, that doesn't mean that the saudis don't view iran as a threat, because they do. and in effect what it says is that you have, and paul used this term, islamists. he didn't say -- what you have is a spectrum.

and on the spectrum give sunnis and shia, defined as islamists, defining them as extremists. they are those who don't much respect the idea of civil authority. they don't really respect the idea of individual states. they don't believe in effect in the very concept of wasn't because they reject the very idea of tolerance. they don't reject anybody else's interpretation et cetera but that's to whether they are sunni or shia. and that might be an interesting starting point for us to think about how we decide who we want to be working with. the problem is, sam would be the first to come back and say this, you know, that's an interesting way of thinking about the region. in fact, it probably conceptually a very important place to start from here but if we approach it that way we are

still going to be faced with the dilemma is because if you say those who aren't the extremist are those who are the islamists, we are still going to have those countries were leaderships who might respect individual states who are authoritarian in character and they challenge our values. so how are you going to reconcile the fact that on the one hand we have those who fundamentally threaten our values under interest, and we have those who may be with us right now but still challenge our values, how are you going to reconcile that? and i would say, well, that's a tough one, sam. i don't have an easy answer for that one. but i guess if we hope for pluralism over time, we first have to deal with those who will never accept it, under any circumstances. we first have to establish that security and order are a based on because there's no pluralism without it. and that might mean that yes, i would work with egyptians and others who i think at this point

they challenge us on some of our values, but at least maybe lining up with us in terms of who threatens the basic principle of pluralism over time. i don't think, i know we can't surrender our voice. i know we have to be honest with them. and sam, i mean, he was the embodiment as an ambassador, who would lay out what was important to us even as he was working with those who were our friends. and so i think one of the challenges may be how on the one hand to establish a clear priority that we are going to deal with order executed first, and that's in effect what the president is doing right now, even while we recognize we will have partners in this coalition who we have differences with, but it's the kind of first things first approach. and that's going to be the basis on which we will approach them.

i think, and i think on the issue of syria, which jessica, i think you put your finger on it, it is true that today you can see the strategy and iran. and by the way, it's kind of consistent with what i was just outlined to in syria it becomes much more complicated, because yes, you have to deal with isis. because they are the first things first. the idea that we can't in any way partner with assad i think is beyond the pale. because of what he's done. is a war criminal, that's just a fact. this is not a case they challenge our values but it's a case that he's gone beyond anything that's acceptable. the question is, can you follow the path, is the fatigue and a sense of threat from isis, is it enough to create some kind of convergence there? i don't know. the short answer is i don't know the answer.

i'm a big believer, this also goes back to one of the points sam used to also raise, if there's one thing that guided him more than anything else, it was he said, don't fall in love with your own ideas, and if you think you're right, that's fine, but why don't you tester i just? what do you lose by testing them? the short answer is you don't lose a lot. so i'd be quite open to testing certain things but they also know that if it looks like, you know, we shouldn't assume necessarily that having the sunnis with us is a given if it looks like we are drawing to close to the iranians, which has currently been a sensitivity for the obama administration. if we want sunni tribes by the way not just iraq but in syria because yes, you have a syrian opposition that is completely fractured, but it's still largely based on sunni tribes to the extent to which they're

going to be part of this. but also to be integrated into this. if they are prepared to accept, and i would test, if they're prepared to accept some kind of cease-fire that would be one thing. at this point i would note one thing about assad. assad seems to be using our going after isis to go after the syrian opposition that is not isis. he continues to do that. throughout this conflict has been much more willing to drop barrel bombs on those who are not isis and those who are. he was willing to buy oil from those who are isis. so while we think about this idea, i think we have to do it very clear eyed, and that's begin the point. whatever your idea is, be clear eyed about it but also have a hedge don't think it if you test this idea that you have, you better have a hedge and think about the consequences of, if it's going to moves in the wrong direction as opposed to the right.

that gets back to the idea of policy planning at the essence of good policy plan is as you make a decision don't just think about the first order of consequence, the second or the third order. think about where it's going to leave you over time. all right, let me say something about, it's now a quarter till. let me say something about the israeli-palestinian issue. and here i would say something else that would've guided sam. i can actually envision him saying this very clearly. when you have, when you look at your options, don't create two polar opposites. you know, don't put yourself in a position where you're going to solve the problem or you're going to do nothing. because if you're going to solve the problem, if you can't solve the problem you be left with doing nothing but and if you do nothing in this part of the world the one thing we've seen is that you have vacuums and the vacuums in variably get filtered we know who fills the vacuums. they're all the worst forces.

that applies also think in terms of israeli-palestinian diplomacy. the choice we have cannot be that if we can't solve the whole conflict right now, well, there's nothing to be done and we wash our hands. the one thing we know that that will produce is a much worse situation which later on if we try to do something about it, the challenge to us, the tests, the problem will be dramatically worse. in some ways i would say that's what happened in syria. we applied the principle of, you know, we're not going to put boots on the ground so there isn't much to be done come and we've seen what's happened. i would say and diplomacy between israelis and palestinians you can see very much the same kind of implication when you do nothing, the vacuum gets filled. so where are we today? well, i would say that it would be really desirable to be able to solve the conflict. i see the prospect of solving the conflict right now to be

ready close to nil. i don't see, you know, i would say even before what happened in gaza, i was actually in the region the end of june and i was struck very much by two different realities. you know, you can be between jerusalem and ramallah you're talking less than 10 miles. it might have been come might as well been from here to the moon, at least psychologically. i was there right after the kidnapping of three israeli teenagers, turned out to be the murder of the three israeli teenagers. i was there before the murder of what was the palestinian teenager, but what i saw in israel is a country that was under a sense of national trauma because of the kidnappings. and so basically in ramallah or three fingers being held up to celebrate the idea. reflecting a kind of world apart, a gap, a golf that was

profound and i was a psychologically from the time when i was our negotiator, as bad as things might get a certain points but was never close to where we are today. the gulf is wider than i've seen it. i can't recall a time where i think the gulf was as wide as it is, though there's a sense of irony when i say that, because on the one hand if you look at, his approach towards hamas these days seems to reflect, shall we say, a very high degree of skepticism. he's not real keen on embracing them at this point. obviously, the israelis have the same view, but the idea that the israelis at this point are prepared to take a big leap, given what they see around them, the idea this point that he is in a position where he can make what amounts to fundamental

concessions, given what i think the mode of palestinians is and how he sees, particularly given the anger level of policy towards israelis, i think it just doesn't pass the test of being realistic. if there's one thing that guided sam, it was don't tell me about what you would like to do. tell me about what you can do. if you listen to that video, he focused very clearly on the idea, well, you don't give a. that gets back to if you cannot solve the whole thing, you don't give up and wash your hands of it. so the question becomes now, what can you do. and i we focus very heavily on what i have for a long time called coordinated unilateralism, which is to say to stand pat, let's focus on those things that could actually begin to make a difference, practically, meaningfully. yes, on the israeli side i would like to see to make their settlement policy consistent with their two state approach. did you say you believe in two

states, then don't build on what you think is going to be the palestinian state. it undercuts your credibility on the issue of believing in two states and there's no inherent logic to it, not to mention the fact it does a great deal to foster the delegitimization of israel internationally. and if you're serious about two states, then what about opening up area c which is 50% of the west bank and which would be if it was over and over economic activity if you're a palestinian, but actually have a dramatic effect. i was struck by the fact that he didn't you can go back to a poll that was taken to the whole middle east at 18-24-year-olds, taken in june. it's a stunning poll worth looking at. it doesn't matter where you are, this included by the way, include the west bank and gaza but it took 18-24-year-olds from north africa, and the gulf, and the one thing they're all focused on was not the idea of political transformation which is where they were a couple

years ago. this poll has been over the last several years. they are focus on having a job. what was their economic future. the country the most wanted to live in? anywhere in the world, was actually the emirates. because they saw an economic future there. so you can actually have an effect i think among 18-24-year-olds, among palestinians if they thought there was an economic future. but that's not going to be an economic future if you don't open up area c, if you don't these some of the restrictions. getting the israelis to do those two things just on their own, i could sit here and say look, it's in your strategic interest to do this, but the israeli psychology will be, e.g. give something for nothing all it does is foster the idea that you're constantly giving angel never get. so here's a role for the united states. a role for the united states is let's see what you can broke a between the two. if you can get the israelis focus on these two kinds of steps, and i have some of the

ideas that will be coming out, but then what did you get the palestinians to do? because these are the things that would be measurable. today if you look at the polling, standing among palestinians isn't so great. in his to deliver something. going to the u.n. is symbolically good and practically nonproductive the when he went to the u.n. before and got the u.n. general a simile to vote for the palestinians as a non-observer state that the u.n. he was celebrate when he returned and the weekly people are saying okay, so what changed? so the point is do something where people will see that there's a change and i don't just mean economic bu but a chae the began to signal that something can get significantly better for the future. that's the kind of approach that sam would emphasize because he would say, don't do something that makes you feel good for a day. do something put you on a path to get your chance to change things over time. it's only good policy planning, it's good advice, and when i

said i ask myself questions about how we should be proceeding with in be proceeding with inabilities or gender or on this issue, i ask myself what questions would sam be asking? [applause] >> spirit now it's our chance to ask questions and i get to go first, setting up your. so two interrelated questions for painless. first come this weekend president obama said that the united states had underestimated the strength of isil and underestimated the weaknesses of the iraqi army. and that's how we got into the current one tree. so talk to me a bit about how you do planning for strategic, how do you sniff out what surprises might be on the horizon that you ought to be pushing for? and to what extent should our policies the base and hedging against the possibility of -- and second and related question

is jessica mathews mentioned that and iran deal might not happen. how do you do planning for plan b without making it look like we've already given up on plan a? how do you make it look like you are thinking about the possibilities if your plan a doesn't work out without the same time undermining plan a? not obvious this administration has got a planning process underway for what happens if the iran negotiations don't work out, and it's not obvious that all those months that secretary kerry was putting effort into the israeli-palestinian talks that he had a plan for what to do if it didn't work out. so how realistic is it to think that you can do some policy planning about a plan b? >> all three of you. >> just very quickly on the iran deal. i don't think that's so obscure, or is so difficult.

i think, i mean, everything will depend if it does fail on how it fails and why it failed. but if it does, i don't believe we will go back to the status quo. i believe there will be some kind of a muddling through framework and that something is possible to be thinking about and working on right now. and i would guess it is being thought on, thought about. >> i think plan b is the sort of thing you need to work on with some degree of privacy and confidentiality, which is maybe extraneous hoping for peace in the middle east and washington but it's a reason to have that kind of private channel to people who are working on plan a. and the, i'm sorry, your first

question? [inaudible] >> it seems to me this should not have been such a surprise. there was so much evidence that extremists were growing in strength among the syrian opposition. one of your sister think tanks tracks what is happening there. may be better than the company sometimes you need to read products that are not just on the intelligence community, but i don't think that really should've been such a surprise to and the weakness of iraqi army was something people been jumping up and up with her hair on fire now for a couple of years. because, i mean, practically every colonel who serves with petraeus has been watching the firing of capable generals because they were in the wrong confessional persuasion. i thought it was a striking use of the third person when the president said the united states underestimated.

i'm not sure the united states, i'm not sure who underestimated but maybe the white house did. i think this is something we could've seen coming. that doesn't entirely answer question of how to prepare for surprise, and that's in a way like having plan b, plan b, and it goes to one of the questions dennis was raising. usually if you bring up the idea of a surprise, people say, well, that's not likely to happen. [laughter] of course that so israel got surprise in suez and 73 and that's how we got surprise in pearl harbor, it happens over and over again. surprises almost historical something that didn't seem possible at the time for some reason. and i think what dennis is described sam's approach of, what are you assuming when you say egyptians couldn't hope to cross the canal, or what are you assuming when you're assuming the japanese couldn't attack the

u.s. fleet? what of those assumptions of how reliable are they tracks sometimes, i mean, some very deep secrets in japanese military planning that we could not have penetrated, but we should have at least been thinking given the pressure reporting on japan at the time thinking worst case, and i don't think we did. >> i think paul's answer picks up where i would answer. one of the things you have to do is be asking yourself, you know, where it could things go wrong come and if they go wrong what could they look like? and, you know, when i was head of policy planning with baker, i had the advantage of also being part of a very closely knit group with him where he would ask, among others, bob and i to sit down with them every 90 days and go over where are the

opportunities that are out there that we haven't talked about? and where are the dangers that are out there that no one is talking about or thinking about? that doesn't prevent you from surprise because the message was surprised when saddam hussein went into iraq. one of the reasons was because the topic message was so consumed with german unification and nato that no one else, anyone who is sort of charged with doing policy was focused on that and not on the other question. so even if you sort of try to institutionalize this you also to ensure when it's institutionalized it gets to the heart of which are raising, those are raising these questions have a pipeline into the leadership. so the leadership gets consumed because there is, use the appropriate term, there's a limit on the bandwidth. somehow there has to be accessed for those are asking hard questions. and they can't be discounted i recall after 731 of the lessons the israelis learned was they

needed to great its equivalent of what we call a red sea. when you cause that kind of a group, the minute they walk in with something everybody discounted as well, we know that's what you're charging to his. so sociologically have a problem doing this. no one can ever guarantee against surprises, but i think the more you try to stretch your trying to anticipate where good, where good things go wrong, so that your position for that and also, by the way, where did things go right. because the benefit of doing things where you actually produce, the payoff there is disproportionate. one last just note on this, and i agree with jessica said i think on the issue of iran. ..

>> i don't buy those to who say, yu know, if there's no deal, immediately the iranians are going to go all out. i don't think they're going to do that. i think the iranian default strategy is to say, you know, we're going to continue with some of the transparency, we're going to show you how reasonable we are, and they're going to use that as a strategy to get the rest of the world to drop the sanctions without an agreement. >> well, now let's turn to the audience for your questions, please. so let's start over here. >> hi. thanks for the panel. dan from cbs. let's keep it with policy

planning. i'm wondering about the independence of state department policy planning, because it's not a university symposium, and it's not a think tank. you work for the current administration. can you really, if you're doing that job, think outside the box, things that the president wouldn't each want to hear? -- even want to hear? >> let me start. the answer is yes and no. [laughter] the answer is, yes, you can. and a lot depends upon relationships. if the, you know, if the relationship that the secretary of state has with the president, if those around the secretary of state, you know, have been given a kind of charter, if those on the national security council staff have been given kind of a charter, you can come in there and raise ideas. i say the no because if you do that too many times, then the odds of you being able to pursue

the things you most want to pursue goes down precipitously. but the fact is, you know, you're not excluded from doing that, and, you know, and i think to be fair, you know, i have been a political appointee for four presidents and had access to three of them. i would say of the three that i worked for, there was, there was no, there was never a kind of prohibition on raising new ideas. in fact, i frequently found an openness, a readiness to that. if you overdo it, you might not find the openness there on a continuing basis. >> i remember something that acheson says in his memoirs which paraphrased basically says if you want to have new ideas received by the president, you need to understand how he thinks, and you need to speak in language that speaks to him. if you tell him this is what we

experts know, you have to trust us, the state department will becomer relevant as it has as -- become irrelevant as it has frequent times. >> the only thing i would add is we all three have tacked about the importance of -- talked about the importance of being able to re-examine core assumptions. and i just want to underline how incredibly hard that is to do whether you're in the government or outside it. core assumptions, it is just by definition, psychologically, it is really hard to re-examine them. and it often tends to be the step that gives you insight. it's just rare. >> ed -- [inaudible] >> keep it short, ed, and wait for the microphone. [laughter] >> fair enough. >> i did not hear your phrase, of course. [laughter] sam lewis did say to many,

including myself on several occasions, that one should start by questioning one's assumptions. the united states is now embarked in a war against the islamic state. the islamic state's enemy are the shia. the shia who rule in mesopotamia for the first time in history and the iran shia. so united states is now for the third time in a row deploying its forces, summoning its allies to fight an enemy of iran. we did that in iraq by removing saddam, we then did afghanistan in more excusable circumstances, now we're doing it for the third time. now, on the iran side, on the other hand, their war against the united states is relentless. in fact, when the yazidis entered yemen, first thing they did, they came out saying we have to become anti-american here in yemen. that was their statement, okay?

>> all right, the question needs to be coming pretty soon. >> the question is this: are we questioning our assumptions, or are we simply going right ahead with the notion -- what i heard from the panel is let's go right ahead. let's make the deal with iran because that is, of course, naturally let us not question the assumption that the deal itself might be a mistake. let's try to enforce, find boots on the ground to fight against isis which happens to be the enemy of iran and to do so with allies such as turkey which is still, quote, a nato ally and qatar and, of course, saudi arabia itself pumping out ideology in places like birmingham, england and 37 othe. and i think we ought to. and the united states, the american public has seen us intervene in the middle east

again and again with very scant information, less information than i gather when i choose a hotel in thailand and failing. so we're persisting in this path as far as i can see. >> as usual, provocative. [laughter] >> well, i take it more as a comment than a question. [laughter] but the question of us up here actually are prepared to question assumptions, you know? i think, look, from my standpoint, i was trying to suggest take the different view of the landscape of the region and then begin to shape your policies in light of that. and that landscape i was trying to suggest was not a sunni-shia landscape, i was suggesting quite the contrary, that you look at it from the standpoint of who are the radical islamists or the extremists -- to use paul's term -- who are on both sides of that spectrum and build your policies with an eye towards competing with them. you should be trying to

strengthen those, who in the first instance i think, help you reestablish order without losing sight of the fact that you also have to be, you have to recognize there's a tension between your interests and your values, but if you don't have some security to start with, you're not going to be able to to promote pluralism later on. >> i very much agree with that. i think we certainly shouldn't be lining up shia against sunni, and i think we too often reduce it to that. i've never forgotten being with secretary baker on his first visit to the middle east right after the, i would call it the premature ceasefire in the first gulf war. and when he met with the saudi foreign minister and the ambassador to washington, kind of a second foreign minister, the two of them spent the entire meeting saying the worst thing you could do now would be to leave saddam hussein in power. there's a shia rebellion going on, you should support the shia. we're not afraid of the shia of

iraq, for one thing. they said they're arabs, not persians, which is true, and they fought loyally for iraq for eight years through a bloody war. unfortunately, we ignored that advice, and unfortunately, when the chance came for the saudis to support a more pluralist iraq in the last ten years, what they did instead was to try to reimpose sunni domination over the country. that may be inevitable in saudi arabia, but i don't think -- i would not give up on trying to get the saudis to develop influence in baghdad that would counter the influence of iran which is, obviously, pernicious and has helped to bring us to this situation of deep secularism. the saudis, basically, walked away from iraq at just the time when they could have done some good there. that's an example, it seems to me, of what dennis is talking about, about working across that divide with people whom at least in that case share our interests, if not our values. >> and one last question right

up here in front, barbara slave. slairch. >> barbara slavin from the atlantic council. thank you for a really interesting discussion. i wanted to probe more on the divide that you perceive over iran policy with the sunnis, dennis. why does it have to be a zero sum game, especially now with the common threat of the islamic state? we've seen high level meetings now between the saudis and the iranians, we have a team in place in iran that has had reconciliation with saudis in the past. is it possible to have an iranian nuclear deal and a common fight against the islamic state? thanks. >> i would just, barbara, i would say -- i would test it, that was my point. my concern up front, i know what the instincts are, but we need to know has something changed because of the islamic state in terms of how the saudis and others look at things.

if they have, then you're in a different place. if it hasn't, you're going to have to figure out how you manage that. >> just add one thought to that. i don't think a nuclear deal with iran makes us, makes them our friends, us their friends at all. but what it certainly does do, is it gives greater domestic credibility, legitimacy to the rouhani government which, as you know, is in a very dicey position right now. they need to deliver. and their ability to interact with the saudis will be greater if they can deliver a deal and substantially less if they can't. >> and with that, i'm afraid that we're running out of time because secretary burns' schedule is quite tight, and we need to start promptly. may i is ask you, please, to grab a drink and grab a box

lunch in back, come back to your seat, and we will be starting promptly. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> and taking a quick break for lunch here at the washington institute. if you missed any of the discussions from earlier, we'll have those available at our video library, that's c-span.org. >> tonight on "the communicators," federal trade commissioner maureen ohlhausen on net neutrality, privacy and data security.

>> big data is the tool, and it can be used well, and it can be used poorly. there are many benefits that can come from big data, consumer benefits, i think there'll be great new insights in certain areas -- well, many areas, but many that are top of mind for me are in health care, in, you know, other kinds of research in reaching underserved populations and providing new insights. i think in some of our more difficult-to-solve problems that we face as a society. but are there risks from big data as well? i think that's true. i think you can take previously kind of separate pieces of information and assemble them into a profile that may give sensitive insights into a consumer. and the question for me is, you have all these benefits and you have some risks. what do you do then? >> tonight at eight eastern on that it aers on c-span2 -- on "the communicators" on c-span2. >> next, a look at some of the recent oregon governor's debate between john kitzhaber and

republican dennis richardson. here's some of the debate. >> the first state to institute minimum wage in 1913, so this has been a core value of oregon for over a century. i do believe the minimum wage should be higher. i'm not sure what. i don't think 15, but i could see it at 11 or so. simply raising the minimum wage by itself doesn't solve the problem because there's -- your income goes up and support services like daycare start to fall off. so you actually have less money in your pocket. so moving up the minimum wage is very important. no one can live on the minimum wage today, and many of those people require social services to support them. so we should raise the minimum wage, but we have to address the income cliff so work actually pays so that when you get a minimum wage increase whether under a current system or not, you actually end up with more money in your pocket. make work pay and giving the ability to take care of

themselves and their families. >> governor, thank you. representative richardson, in 2015 oregon's minimum wage will be $9.25. in your view, should it be higher or stay the same and why? >> focusing on the minimum wage, i think oregon presently is the second highest in the country, and it's indexed with inflation which is something many other states do not have. we need to to focus on the fact that minimum wage is supposed to be an entry wage. we should not just be looking at how we're going to be able to raise the minimum wage. what we need are more jobs, family wage-paying jobs in our state x. that requires us to focus on the barriers that prevent us from having good jobs in oregon. i want very much for us to expand our gross domestic product, because when there's greater demand for our products and services, that creates more desire for those products, and that creates jobs. minimum wage is an entry-level wage. we need to provide more jobs that will allow people to raise their families and pay their

mortgages and have a future here in oregon. >> governor kitzhaber, you have 30 seconds to respond to that. >> we have the second fastest growing economy in the nation the last couple years, and most of those jobs are flat out on the bottom, no way up and no way out. no one can live on the minimum wage. you try to take care of a family on $18 or $19,000 a year, and it is impossible to do. if we care about each other, if we care about the future, we will pay people in this state a wage that allows them to take care of themselves and their families. >> governor, thank you. representative richard soften, i do want to ask a quick clarification on that question. the question was in 2015 oregon's minimum wage would be $9.25 an hour, and you talked about that being an entry level wage. could you tell me if you think it should be higher or stay the same in 2015? >> i think that the minimum wage should stick with the program we have now because it is indexed, but what we need to do is not focus on minimum wage, but focus

on wages so people can get beyond minimum wage, and that takes a vibrant economy, and after three terms, we don't have that. our unemployment has been higher than the national average for 18 years. that's unacceptable. >> you can watch more from the oregon governor's debate, one of more than a hundred governors, house and senate races we've covered as part of c-span's campaign 2014 coverage all on our web site, c-span.org. and tomorrow night democrat wendy davis and republican greg abbott will meet in their second and final televised debate with live coverage on our companion network, c-span, beginning at 9 p.m. eastern time. they're running for the seat that will be empty as current republican governor of texas rick perry is not seeking re-election. we'll with be back to the middle east institute in just a few minutes, but before that, some of the conversation from today's "washington journal." >> host: and we're joined now by salamal mare yachtie, he's the president of the muslim public

affairs council, and we're going to have a discussion on islam and the american muslim community amid the backdrop of the military effort against isis and other jihadist groups. mr. al-marayati, we've had calls already from viewers concerned about radicalization of american muslims. how concerned are you about that scenario in light of isis' efforts? >> guest: well, if one person falls prey to these violent extremist recruiters, that's one too many, of course. this is a serious problem. the reality is that these people that do turn toward violent extremism are doing so outside the mosques. and so we have to have healthy conversations in the moss concludes to -- mosques to see how we can reach these unreachables. but at the same time, these are a handful of people. we are concerned about it. and at the same time, we believe that the best thing we can do is to fortify the partnership we've had with law enforcement and

also foster even stronger relations throughout civil society. >> host: you've written that the key to defeating isis is islam. explain what you mean by that. >> islam means life, isis means death. islam means mercy, isis means cruelty. it's very simple, and anyone that has any kind of elementary education about islam knows the difference. and if anything, what we see in isis is there may be muslims there, but it is not islam. what we feel islam has done to contribute to civilization is being tarnished by groups like isis. and we feel that on the one hand we have to set the record straight, on the other hand we know that there is a grave danger in groups like isis rising not only to the region, but in terms of the narrative throughout the world. president obama was correct, he said what groups like isis do

very effectively is they exploit grievances of people. but they lure them into thinking that fighting the way they're fighting, in such gruesome and cruel manner and barbaric really, is the way to fight evil. islam says to pond to evil with -- to respond to evil with good. so there are so many points in islam that we can actually use as an antidote to the ideology of isis. we also know and i think many military experts have said that we cannot defeat isis militarily, we have to deal with the ideas. and so it is a battle of ideas, and we feel that american muslims have that ability to help in this war on terror. >> host: you bring up president obama, talked about some of these issues last week at his speech before the united nations e' general assembly. here's a bit from that speech in which he called on muslims to speak out against extremist ideology. >> it is time for the world,

especially muslim communities, to explicitly, forcefully and consistently reject the ideology of organizations like al-qaeda and isil. it is one of the tasks of all great religions to accommodate faith with a modern, multicultural world. no children are born hating, and no children anywhere should be educated to hate other people. there should be no more tolerance of so-called clerics who call upon people to harm innocents because they're jewish or because they're christian or because they're muslim. it is time for a new compact among civilized peoples of this world to eradicate war at its most fundamental source, and

that is the corruption of young minds by violent ideology. >> host: salam al-marayati is the president of the muslim public affairs council, joining us. after that speech do you think enough muslims are speaking up against jihaddism? >> guest: well, i think we'll call this violent extremism, and one thing we have to be very clear about, we shouldn't be countering jihad, we should restore the classical meaning of jihad. jihad to the extremists means holy war, but in classic terms, it means struggle. so let us at least not use religious terminology in fighting groups like isis. it just plays into their hands. they want this to be a war on islam, a war on religion. we should be at war at criminal behavior, war against terrorism. so rather than dealing with these religious terms, i think we have to isolate them from

mainstream muslim communities. and what i think the president is talking about in terms of violet ideologies -- violent ideologies, let's face it, there are people in the region of the middle east that sponsored groups like isis. there are groups and powers in the middle east that have these ideas. and so when we are talking about a battle of ideas, we should confront those groups in the middle east. and i think american muslims have that ability to do that. we have the ability to steer the conversation in a different direction so that young minds are not corrupted, so that people's grievances are not exploited, so that we set the record clear on what islam is, and we show that american muslims are part of the solution. >> host: for folks unfamiliar with your group, what is the muslim public affairs council? >> guest: the muslim public affairs council is aimed at helping to integrate islam and

muslims within american pluralism so that we become a vibrant and effective group in helping on public policy issues such as countering violent extremism, religious freedom, human rights and democracy in the muslim world and also enhance the understanding of islam to the american public. >> host: and how many american muslims are there in this country? >> guest: there's estimated between three and six million. no one really knows. but the fact is, there are muslims in every sector of society now whether it is in the arts or the sciences, in technology. and so we see more muslims being involved in civil society, and we want that to be a positive contribution to the challenges that we're facing today in the 21st century. >> host: salam al-marayati joins us for about the next 40 minutes or so to take your questions and comments. our phone lines are open if you have questions for him. kevin is up first in stafford, virginia, on our line for

republicans. kevin, good morning. >> caller: good morning. there's a lot of dancing around the words of what this terrorism is. first of all, timothy mcveigh didn't have anything -- he didn't do that act in the name of christianity. timothy mcveigh did that act in the tradition of the government's too big, and he was against the government. had nothing to do with his religion. all of the acts of terror that we see in the world today, including the one with chopping off the girl's head just the other day, are in the name of islam. and i'm almost done here. i want to make a couple points. the jihadists, isis, isil, whatever you want to call them, i know, sir, you are a muslim, but i'll tell you, these people will kill you just as quickly as they will kill me. this is in the name of islam. and when i say dancing around the words, the point i'm trying to make is you can't hide from

that. president obama hides from it, refuses to say what it really, actually is. >> host: mr. al-marayati. >> guest: well, first of all, we understand that isis is ready to kill muslims. in fact, they've killed more muslims than anyone else. their objective is ideological cleansing. they have an ideology that, basically, declares muslims as apostates and as infidels. so we understand that problem very well, more than anyone else. number two, anyone can use labels. there are religious groups in every religion really that uses labels, but reality is when they violate the number one rule in all religions -- and that is to protect life -- then they're going against the tenets of the faith. and that's our point. in other words, rather than reacting to isis with fear and

with outrage, what we're calling for is more leadership in america to expose the forgely of isis. isis -- forgery of isis. isis is a mafia. it doesn't conduct martyrdom operations, it is conducting criminal operations. and so let's just set the record clear and straight on that issue. number two, what we're saying is by shedding light on the issue, it will help us as americans create more leadership in dealing with groups like isis more effectively. the reality is we have bombed iraq, you know, the past four administrations, and it has not helped us in terms of creating stability in the region. it has not helped us strategically. so we need to do something else besides airstrikes. and what we're saying is we need a campaign to expose the forgery of isis, and that is a campaign of ideas, that is a campaign of

raising voices of the american muslim community. anybody can do anything in the name of religion, but when that act is an act of terrorism and an act of criminality, a criminal behavior, then let us not validate that act with any religion. >> host: and is that effort that you're talking about one that should be led from the muslim community? is this a way that -- is there a way that the government can help in this effort? >> guest: absolutely. that's a great question. there are american muslims who are speaking out against us. i believe 120 scholars issued a letter last week that is basically deconstructing and exposing isis. we ourselves have had several press conferences on that issue. but it doesn't get the media attention that it needs, and so we need support from our civic and faith partners, from our government, from media so that that voice becomes the

predominant voice, and we expose isis for what it is, and that is we render it the marginalization that it deserves, really. it should not be the predominant voice for muslims. we, the american muslim community and the muslim mainstream communities throughout the world, should be that predominant voice. >> host: kathleen's up next call anything from pampa know beach, florida on our line for democrats. good morning. >> caller: good morning. i'm going to open a pandora's box, how about that? i'm an african-american. how does this sound to you? hebrew, israel! try with judah forever! >> host: we'll go on to bowie, maryland. ola, good morning. >> caller: how are you? >> >> host: good. >> caller: good, good. first of all, i'd like to thank your guest for coming on, and i'd like to thank you for appropriately identifying

democrats as democrat and not democratic. so is thanks for that. [laughter] they're democrats, part of the democratic party. i'm a republican, i grew up in a true religion household. read the quran, back and forth. and i chose to be a christian for a particular reason, but that's just a little background, i wanted to give you guest a sense of the fact that i know what it is that i speak of. when you first opened the statement, you said radicalization does not happen in the mosque. that is wrong. it does happen in certain mosques, and i have visited certain mosques although i am a christian. so we need to clarify that. the first gentleman said you were dancing around words, and you are dancing around words. the idea that all the terrorist activities that has occurred in this particular world over probably the last 20 years has been done in the name of islam. that doesn't necessarily mean that the faith of islam is bad. that doesn't necessarily mean that the face of islam

particularly is -- [inaudible] it just so happens that everyone that happens to be a major terrorist or has performed major terrorist act over the last 20 years happens to be muslims. so muslims have to confront the fact that -- [inaudible] or something that is allowing them to do people what -- do what they do. i understand social and economic impacts, but people that kill people in drove cans and then for one religion that has similarly produced most of those people to say it's not islam, there has to be a reckoning of fact that there's something within the teaching of the faith and allowing some of these clerics to come on and spread this kind of propaganda all the time -- >> host: all right, mr. al-marayati, do you want to respond? >> guest: well, i don't want to get into a debate about, you know, religion and extremism. i think that we can do bo to the -- go to the israeli