before being tackled by a guard. a d.c. grand jury indicted 42-year-old army veteran omar gonzalez on a federal charge of unlawfully entering a restricted building while carrying a deadly or dangerous weapon. he also faces local charges for possessing a weapon and ammunition. the house oversight committee today looked into the incident which was the first time the

fence jumper into the white house. members question julia pierson about the breach and what's being done to improve white house security. this is three and a half hours. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> the committee will come to order. the oversight committee access to secure fundamental principles. first americans have a right to know money washington takes from them is well spent and second americans deserve an efficient and effective government that works for them.

our duty on the oversight and government reform committee is to protect these rights. our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers. it is our job to work tirelessly in partnership with citizen watchdogs to bring genuine reform to the federal bureaucracy. this is our mission and today's hearing follows one of the most important parts of that mission. with 1.5 billion dollars spent by the secret service nearly a billion of that spent on protection of the first family, the second family, former presidents and presidential candidates, the united states secret service was always considered to be elite law enforcement agency made up of men and women who were highly-regarded, highly respected and highly trusted.

the country has placed great faith and trust in me is secret service. they agents of the division their officers in the secret service agents have a monumental task. that of protecting the nation's president, past present and future. they do so honorably and not without considerable personal sacrifice. they ensure the safety of the first and second family and the safety of foreign dignitaries throughout washington and at times around the world. they ensure the safety of every man and woman who enters the white house and accompanying buildings. a history of misbehavior, security failures have clearly blemished that record. on september 19, omar gonzalez

jumped the north fence, ran across the white house lawn of the steps of the north portico into the front door of the white house. he was armed with a three-inch serrated knife. he entered to an unlocked door, past the staircase to the presidential residence and into the east room of the white hou house. ladies and gentlemen that was the part of my opening statement that changed last night when the early false reports that in fact he had been apprehended just inside the front door were turned upside down by a revelation that in fact he penetrated much further into the white house. secret service officers only subdued him after he was clearly well inside the white white house. an intruder walked in the front door of the white house and that is unacceptable. common sense tells us that there

were a series of security failures, not an instance of praiseworthy restraint. omar gonzalez reached at least five breaches of security on september 9. the white house is supposed to be one of america's most secure facilities in fact one of the world's most secure facilities. so how on earth did happen? this has tested the trust of the american people of the secret service, a trust we clearly depend on to protect the president. after allowing a paparazzi crazed reality tv star to crash at a state dinner, after engaging prostitutes and cartagena after excessive drinking at an agent falling

asleep outside of the room in the netherlands and yes after the mishandling of the 11/11/11 event of gunmen sprayed bullets across the white house and its reported cost over $100,000 in damage that was not properly reported in real time. it is understandable that the morality of the agency appears to be in decline according to reports. in light of the recent break-in and we have to ask whether the culture of the secret service and possibly declining morale have an impact on the operation and those are some of our questions today. the appointment of director pierson brought new hope to the agency to reclaim its noble image. recent events have so troubled us that in fact we have called the director here to face tough questions.

how could mr. gonzalez have scaled the fence? that we understand because it happens up and that why didn't agents immediately apprehend him? how was he able to sprint 70 guards almost the entire length of a football field without being intercepted by guards inside the fence? whited and security dogs stop him in his tracks? what about the swat team and sniper rifles? why was there no guard station at the front door of the white house and yes how much would it cost to lock the front door at the white house? the secret service must show us how there was a clear path to a lesson public trust. today we will hear from experts

on both the agencies protocol foreign and domestic but most importantly we will hear from the secret service director herself on her plans to improve the agency's performance. americans face real danger as they we serve interests abroad especially those stationed in our embassies. it is a time of great peril. we are engaged in a battle against isil as we speak. but that is not limited to foreign soil. americans know that the next attempt to take the white house may not be by a crazed solo knife wielding veteran with ptsd. it could well be a planned attack from a terrorist organization. the fact is the system broke down on september 19.

as it did win the salahis crashed the state dinner in 2009, as it did when ortega hernando's successfully shot the white house on november 11, 2011, sedating cartagena when agents paid for prostitutes and compromise security as it did in the netherlands in 2014. we cannot further allow this but more importantly as i said to the director before today's hearing, speakers service relies on two important skills or facts. their skill, their capability to protect the president must be at the highest level because they cannot seek 99% because 1% billiar is not an option but they also rely on a good belief by most people that they shouldn't even try and this is

the hardest target on earth. we need to make sure that second hardest target on earth is true again in reality and in the minds of anyone who might take on the secret service to get the person or his family and i recognize the ranking member for statement. >> thank you mr. chairman. we begin today's hearing with obvious -- no individual should be allowed to scale the fence of the white house, sprint across the north lawn and burst into the residence of the first family with a weapon. no one. our goal today is also clear, to determine how this happened and make sure it never happens again. this is our watch. this recent incident unfortunately caused many people

to ask whether there is a much broader problem with the secret service. last night the "washington post" reported that omar gonzalez with his way -- made his way into the east room much further than the secret service previously disclosed. another report was exposed about a shooting incident in 2011 races even more questions about the competency and culture of this elite agency. what concerns me the most about this report is that agents said they were hesitant. agents in this agency said they were hesitant to raise security concerns with their supervisors. ladies and gentlemen something is awfully wrong with that picture. the secret service is supposed to be the most elite protective force in the world, yet four

days went by before they discovered that the white house had been shot seven times. then in 2012 there was the prostitution scandal and columbia. although it had little to do with technical protection issues, it's it seriously damaged the agency's credibility. the secret service must not only carry out its duties with the highest degree of excellence and effectiveness, but it also must maintain a reputation which matches that performance. as the chairman has said much of what deters people from trying to pierce the protective veil is reputation and that reputation must be one of excellence and effectiveness. today's witness ms. julia

pierson was appointed as director of the secret service last year to help restore the agency standing. she has had a distinguished 30-year career with the agency. to her credit she immediately ordered an internal review and agree to testify. with respect to the most recent incident i have key questions for the director that i know are shared by many people across the country. did the secret service have specific protocols by handling this time of permits or breach? if so, were those protocols followed in this case and if they were followed do they need to be changed in light of what happened? if the protocols were not followed why were they not followed and how can we have confidence that they will be followed in the future? i also want to understand what happened prior to the incident. gonzalez was arrested in

virginia two months earlier on july 19. mr. chairman i would like to enter into the record eight -- provided to us by the virginia state police. it lists the contents of his car which included an arsenal of 11 firearms including sniper rifles and assad off shotgun. >> without objection the entire report will be entered into the record. >> also included the contents of the car which included a small arsenal of 11 firearms including a sniper rifle and assad off shotgun. also included a map of washington d.c. within a quote a line drawn to the white house.

virginia state police the bureau of alcohol tobacco and firearms and explosives concluded there was no information in gonzalez history that prohibited him from owning these firearms. yet he was severely mentally ill and a military psychiatrist reportedly treated him for post-traumatic stress disorder and paranoid schizophrenia. mr. chairman i hate to even imagine what could have happened if gonzalez would have been carrying a gun instead of a knife when he burst inside the white house. that possibility is extremely unsettling. today our work faces two challenges. first i understand the director will provide us with a status update with the final results are not yet in. second some of the information is classified so we cannot discuss it in public.

the very last thing we want to do is give people like gonzalez a roadmap for how to attack the president or other officials by the secret service. this does not mean we cannot obtain information the information. the director sent a letter on friday offering not only to testify here today in a public hearing but also to provide all of us with a classified briefing. mr. chairman agree to hold this classified hearing directly after this hearing concludes. let me conclude by making this final point. this ladies and gentlemen is not a democratic issue. this is not a republican issue. this is an american issue. this is also an issue of national security. the vast majority of men and women who served in the secret service are dedicated experienced public servants who are willing to lay down their lives for their country.

and on behalf of of a grateful congress and a grateful nation i think everyone of them. they have an extremely difficult job. like others in similar positions they are required to make instant life or death conditions in extremely stressful situations. last year for example the capitol police shot and killed an unarmed woman with a 1-year-old girl in the backseat of her car. some criticized the quick response and others criticize the -- but another deranged individual burst through the doors and killed two capitol police officers. the secret service has a high-profile job but it's critically important that it requires accountability so the spotlight is brightly in action

today. mr. chairman i look forward to testimony and they thank you for bringing us back to this hearing and i look forward to the questions that i have already raised with others. but that i yield back. >> thank you mr. cummings. i now recognize the gentleman from utah mr. chaffetz the subcommittee chairman on national security for his opening statement. >> i think the chairman and i think the ranking member mr. cummings and he's absolutely right. it's not a republican issue or democratic issue periods in american issue. i don't want to make a political football that we in the united states of america are critical on issues we do hold ourselves accountable so i appreciate you sharing. we have wonderful men and women who serve the nation and put their lives on line. the walkway from family and spouses and they don't know what the day is going to bring them. they do so in a very honorable way. we thank them for their service

and dedication. i have serious concerns about the current leadership. i've concerns about training and i'm concerned about protocol. that's what i want to get out today. since the current director has taken on this role is important to note that she was the chief of staff in 2008. in the last couple of years she was the chief of staff in 2008. i'm concerned about her leadership in the mixed messages send to those who serve in the secret service. after the fence jumping incident the secret service was quick to put out a statement that honors that honored they agents for their quote tremendous restraint. tremendous restraint is not what we are looking for. tremendous restraint -- restraint is not the objective. the message should be overwhelming force. if one person can hop a fence and run into an open door in the white house don't praise them

for tremendous restraint. that's not the goal. that's not what we are looking for. if there were alarms inside the door that were muted or silent i want to know why that is. who makes that decision? that to me is a leadership decision. i think at some point we need to review the 2013th specter general's report that action is so there's not a problem here but has over 1000 indications of security concerns. in the opening statements they say we have to be 100% right of a time and every one agrees without yet the inspector general's record is pretty damning when it looks at what they agents are feeling what happened within the agency itself. concerned about the 2011 incident. as best i can tell from the spot report as well as the article in the "washington post" the event

in 2011 working shots were fired at the white house you have no less than five secret service agents report that they heard they hurt -- thought they heard shots fired and you had someone on twitter that they saw someone should at the white house. there were to two people and shuttled fans who reported they saw someone firing a weapon at the white house. blocks away moments later somebody crashes the vehicle and an assault rifle as the mayor of and the secret service is on the scene and nobody ties those two together. i don't understand that. later they are lincoln county police actually detained this person. he had been positively identified based on the vehicle there but nobody put it into the system to put him on a watchlist. consequently when the arlington county police pulled him over they and they take his picture and they let him go. it was only the pennsylvania police for five days later actually find a person. now he's serving 25 years in

jail but he could've done a lot more damage. if the director is truly going to take full responsibility think your opening statement on the goals you have should also talk about leadership. since i talked to the whistleblowers in secret service and others it's a concern about leadership. i'm also concerned about training. as i look at the 2015 budget request from the white house, on page 39 there's a basic class total and i want to run through these numbers. this is important on the training aspect. under special agent basic class there were eight classes than 12,000 tenebrae classes in 2011 there were five classes in 2012 there were no classes. in 2013 there was one class. the basic class in 2009 and 2010 there were 11 classes. in 2011 there were six classes and in 2012 there was one class. 2013, one class and if you look

at the budget line appropriations for this it didn't go down. it maintained basically the same. why did that -- and finally mr. chairman i worry about protocol. again i mentioned tremendous restraint is what the secret service touted. that's not the objective. we want to see overwhelming force but when the intruder cannot be intercepted by a person perhaps more lethal force is necessary and i want the secret service agents and officers to know at least this member of congress has their back. when somebody gets close to the president, don't let somebody get close to family. don't let them get into the white house ever and if they have to take action i will have their backs. in this day and age of isil and terrorists and 30 bombs we don't know what's going on underneath a person's clothing. they want to penetrate they need to know that they are going to

perhaps be killed. that's the message we should be sending every single time and that's the kind of secret service but i expect. i thank them again for their service and dedication. we love them and we care for them but we need better leadership. i yield back. >> i think the gentleman and i recognize the gentlelady from the district of columbia for her opening statement. >> thank you mr. chairman think he was hearing. my respect for the secret service goes back to when i was growing up as a child to this very day. today we must ask recent events call for, recent unprecedented events call for an unprecedented response. first an increasing number of white house jumpers including

the most recent one who is able to get into the interior the white house. before that in 2011 multiple shots into living quarters of the first family discovered only four days later not by secret service investigations but by white house staff. beyond these failures and the core mission of the secret service to protect the white house and the first family is an unsettling failure to disclose, perhaps even understand what has occurred or to properly investigate. together this combination of failures suggest strongly that the time is right for a 21st century makeover of the secret service. i do not regard this matter as a mere question of personnel.

i believe it goes far deeper than that. moreover the stunning events have occurred during it. back when the united states and by definition the white house and even the president are being targeted by international terrorists. according to threat assessment this president has had three times as many threats as his predecessors. just as troubling indications of unwarranted secrecy in the secret service. the secret service is not a secret society. if there is an avoidance of needed transparency, that in itself poses a danger to the white house. for example noises heard that some believe could be gunfire at the white house, others believed

was an automobile backfiring and others believed it was gang gun fire. isn't it up to the secret service to presume, to presume such a sound is gunfire until an immediate investigation shows it was not? when line officers close to the sound have to become whistleblowers, have active suppression of information because get -- become yet another threat to the white house. worse, do such failures show that some in the secret service are in denial of dangers, perhaps posing the greatest risk to the white house? particularly troubling in light

of such unanswered questions would be the rush to quick fixes such as depression of public assets to the area around the white house without a thorough investigation, the white house in lafayette park just like the congress are first in the area and the public must be allowed to express their grievances as they always have been. in light of the seriousness of recent breaches, the investigation by the department of homeland security should go well beyond the details of these events. they are merely the most recent raw data for a top to bottom investigation of secret service operations at the white house.

this is not a mere question of personnel. changing people at the top or in between will not solve the iss issue. we must learn whether today's secret service as structured, for example could stop five or six fence jumpers, jumping at the same time intent on harm to the white house and the president. not just a demented words that you even alone might have succeeded. no scenario should be off the table. we need a 21st century study of secret service operations in the age of terrorism. .. gone debate.

the white house and intruder was brought down by an agent. presidentte house and have been sprung into a new era of danger. the secret service should welcome an outside investigation to assure the necessary resources and the expert backup and structure for the 21st century is necessary to do its job. >> enqueue. >> members may have seven days to submit opening statements for the record. i now ask for unanimous consent that are calling, the gentlelady from texas comments jackson lee

be allowed to participate in the hearing. additionally, unanimous consent that our calling, the gentleman for mr.'s -- missouri be allowed to participate. we now welcome our panel of witnesses, the honorable julia pearson is the director of the united states secret service. director is the former director of the united states secret service, and currently up partner at command consulting group. is theorable todd keele former assistant secretary for infrastructure protection at the united states department of homeland security and currently a senior advisor to touchtone page, pursuant to the committee rules i when asked that you please all rise and raise your right hand to take the oath. do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you are about to

get will be the truth, whole truth and nothing but the truth? please be seated. but the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. in order to allow a sufficient time for discussions and questions, please limit your testimony to five minutes. the entire opening statement will be made a permanent part of the record. with that, directo >> good morning, chairman issa, ranking member cummings, distinguished members of the committee. i'm here today to address the concern that we all share, following the incident of september 19th at the white house. it's clear that our security plan was not properly executed. this is unacceptable, and i take full responsibility and i will make sure that it does not happen again. as director, my primary concern is ensuring the operational readiness of my workforce. i have been aggressive in addressing our human capital challenges, ensuring professionalism and developing leaders. through active engagement with the agency's supervisors and employees, i have made it clear

my expectations for professionalism and personal accountability. much of what we do to protect the president and the white house involves information that is highly sensitive or classified, so i'll be limited in what i can say in a public hearing. on september 19th, a man scaled the north fence of the white house, crossed the lawn, while ignoring verbal commands from uniform division officers, entered through the front door and was subsequently arrested on the state floor. immediately that night, i ordered enhancements around the complex, and in consultation with the secretary, initiated a comprehensive review of the incident and protective measures to ensure it will not happen again. the review ben with a physical assessment of the site and personnel interviews. all decisions made that evening are being evaluated, including those on tactics and use of force in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting those officers. i am committed to the following, a complete and thorough investigations of the facts of this incident, a complete and thorough review of all policies, procedures, protocols in place that govern the security of the

white house complex and a response to this incident. and based on the results of that review, a coordinated, informed effort to make any and all adjustments to training and personnel actions that are necessary to properly ensure the safety and security of the president and the first family and the white house. the white house emergency action plans are multifaceted and tailored to each threat. the secret service has apprehended 16 individuals who have jumped the fence over the last five years, including six this year alone. in fact, on september 11, 2014, a week prior to the events that are the subject of today's hearing, officers apprehended an individual seconds after he scaled the fence and ran onto the grounds. in addition to fence-jumpers, over the last five years, hundreds of individuals have approached the white house perimeter, verbalizing threats to our protectees or acting in a suspicious manner. officers and agents routinely leverage their experience and training to make decisions to either arrest or transfer these individuals to appropriate facilities for mental health evaluations.

protecting the white house complex is a challenge in any threat environment. in addition to being a national icon, the complex consists of public spaces, executive offices, where our nation's highest leaders congregate and the private residence of the president and first family. ensuring the safety of all who live and work in the white house, while preserving access to the millions of visitors each year, requires a unique balance. in this environment we are never satisfied by the status quo and we're constantly reviewing our security protocols. with the help of congress, we have enhanced our protective countermeasures and security features at the white house. in the past five years the secret service has upgraded perimeter cameras, officer booths, vehicle gates, and command and control systems along with enhancements to highly classified programs that have made the president and the complex more secure. we have generated many of these new security enhancements in direct response to intelligence information on known and emerging terrorist tactics. i thank the congress for their support in this time of constrained resources. beyond technology, approximately 75% of our annual budget is

dedicated to payroll costs which support our most valuable asset, our people. the agency relies heavily on experience, training and judgment of our men and women to make critical split-second decisions. with respect to the many questions that have been raised and the opinions proffered in the wake of the september 19th incident, i do not want to get ahead of the investigation that is under way. the secret service has had its share of challenges in recent years, and some during my tenure. i intend to lead the secret service through these challenges and restore our agency's reputation to the level of excellence that the american public expects. as director, i'm proud of the secret service's workforce who serve each day with honor and distinction. last week our employees successfully implemented security operations in conjunction with the 69th united nations general assembly in new york city, where they protected the president and more than 140 world leaders. over the last 12 months, they have completed over 5,600 successful protective missions. it is my responsibility to

ensure that these men and women have the resources and training that they need to succeed. as director, i have worked with the department of homeland security, secretary johnson, the administration and congress, to include members of this committee, to develop a comprehensive forward-leaning strategy to further enhance the secret service's workforce and operational capabilities. we remain dedicated and committed to protecting the president, the first family and the sanctity of the white house. i thank the committee today for the opportunity to appear and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you. mr. basham? >> mr. chairman, ranking member cummings -- >> could you turn the mic on and pull it a little closer, please? try that. >> mr. chairman -- thank you -- ranking member cummings, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my perspective today on the recent events at the white house and more broadly, on the state of

the agency i care a great deal about, the united states secret service. let me say at the outset that i look forward to discussing how the recent incident highlights some of the challenges the secret service has long faced at the white house complex and balancing desired levels of security, along with the functional needs of those who work and live and work in that complex, the practical realities of the thriving city it resides in -- within and the historic symbolism and imagery of the people's house. the incident exposes certain steps the secret service got right and those they got wrong, and will identify corrective measures and additional resources that can be considered. however, it also poses some difficult questions for all of us on issues, like the use of lethal force and our tolerance for additional fortifications around the white house complex. those questions do not have easy answers, and the long-term potential consequences must be thought through.

let us also be mindful that while our analysis of actions and shortcomings as benefit of days of hindsight in consideration, anyone to assert our protective detail knows the decision-making to a natural event with life-and-death consequences is measured in milliseconds. those who were on duty during this incident had a much harder job in trying to get it right than we do here today. my perspective is one dish a biker of over 30 years in the secret service, but also from my experiences at the head of three other operational components within the department of homeland security. and now for five years and the private sector where i remain deeply involved in the homeland security issues and the obligation of international best practices as it relates to the protection of individuals and high-value assets. i had the honor of joining the secret service in 1971 and i enjoyed it challenging and very interesting career, including being on protective detail of

henry kissinger, vice president bush, quayle, core, and countless for heads of state and foreign dignitaries. later president clinton appointed as director of the federal law enforcement training center and eventually i returned to washington after the september 11 attacks to help start of the transportation security administration. i rejoined the secret service in 2003 when i was appointed director where i was honored to serve over three years. i was appointed by president bush to service the commission of the united states customs and border protection of the largest law enforcement agency in the united states. i remained in a position in the obama administration at the request of secretary napolitano. upon retiring from the government in 2009 i helped found a security coming to work for private sector and government clients. therefore the viewpoint that i was sure on the subject before the committee did it is informed largely by my experience with the secret service but with the benefit of having worked for and with many other elite security

organizations around the world for almost 40 years. let me commend the members of this committee for the time and interest you're showing on this subject, especially at this juncture when there are so many pressing security concerns to which our government must pay attention. it goes without saying that the recent incident with the individual jumping the white house fence, running across the north lawn and making it inside the white house is unprecedented and unacceptable. this is not just my view but as the director stated it is her view and other senior management of the agency as well as the rank-and-file. again perspective is critically important in this entity. we could easily be sitting here discussing why an iraq veteran possibly suffering through post-traumatic stress disorder, armed with only a pocket knife was shot dead on the north lawn and the president and first family were not on the property. the secret service some split-second decisions made

during this latest incident will be examined, procedures will be debated, training will be altered and in the end the secret service will learn valuable lessons that they have been doing throughout their history of protecting the president and his family. this is an agency which has never been reluctant to read teen incidents, those of my consequences and those of less importance. to find opportunities for improvement in the way it conducts business, the way it trains its people and the tools it uses to accomplish its incredibly important mission. i conducted that my confidence remains extremely high that this aspect of the service culture remains as strong today as it has ever been. i know the agency will learn valuable lessons that you can apply immediately to improve security at the white house and in other settings. i would urge the committee to keep in mind that when examined any incidents that the broader context in which the secret service operates is not one which is valued on security

alone. the service us to ensure that the president and other protectees at facilities in which they work and live our safe and secure, but they do so in the context of important american values like freedom and openness. and in close coordination and cooperation and almost always in negotiation with the myriad of other stakeholders and decision-makers who have diverse priorities, responsibilities and viewpoints. in this dynamic, this dynamic is, in fact, more true when it comes to the areas surrounding the white house complex than in any other. as much as i may have wished it when i was the director, the secret service absolutely cannot unilaterally when it comes to almost any security feature in com in and around the white house. stakeholders with a voice including the government of the district of columbia, as ms. norton would recognize, the national park service, white house strokes aside, gsa and others all provide input into an

architectural changes and improvements, new infrastructure or changes in appearance. a prime example of this is the closure of pennsylvania at length in front of the white house to vehicular traffic. a security imperative for the service, from the services perspective for many years. that was politically impossible until oklahoma city bombing in 1995 may the impact of, made the impact to a vehicle borne explosion could have on a government building. no less, a 200 year old sandstone mansion made it very vivid and undeniable. even then it was not until 2041 as director that we're able to complete the project to promote converting the course of the road into a pedestrian mall. i might add to this day there are those who believe the avenue should be reopened in spite of the overwhelming and irrefutable evidence of the extreme risk such a move would put the first family and hundreds of employees who work there.

i can also play that there've been numerous studies conducted over the years by the secret service and at the secret service is quest to address all of those and concern at the white house, complex, motivated in part by concerns about the inadequacy of the current white house fence as an outer perimeter for a complex given the ability of an individual or group of individuals to quickly scale it and be on the white house ground. while notable improvements have been made especially over the last decade to the security of the white house complex, and many a noticeable to the public there have been several priority improvements that have not been possible in light of other considerations are given the level of funding provided to the agency for such capital improvements. let me be clear. i am not in anyway trivializing importance of these other considerations as security professionals. to almost, they're almost always doing things i would like to do for security purposes but could

not given the factors and limited funding. that is always going to be the case. we must always keep in mind that the white house like the united states capital is an important symbol for the american people. it is critically important that it detects safe. at that security must be accomplished in a way that does not jeopardize the very values that we seek to protect and that these buildings themselves indeed symbolize. i ask you keep this in context when looking at this particular incident in examining how some could have, something could have happened or how it could be and should be prevented in the future. finally, i want to make sure the committee is aware of another fundamental principle of which the secret service, in fact any good security organization protected methodology is based. in the military it's called defense and death. and lawn force but it is referred to as multilayered security. when it comes to protecting the president or the white house complex there are many layers of protection to which an attacker

must travel in order to achieve their desired of justice and to post an ultimate threat to the person or thing that is the target. a breach of the fence and entry of an individual into the white house -- >> mr. basham, could you summarize? >> i apologize. having said that, thank you i am ready to take questions. >> thank you. mr. keil. inviting me toyou for testify today regarding the u.s. secret services security protocols. i believe i can offer unique perspective on protecting high visibility targeted as a ladies after spending nearly 23 years after the department of state diplomatic security service with responsibility for developing and implementing security programs for u.s. personnel, embassies, consulates and other officials around the world. i have also spent numerous years in the private sector working in and advising corporate security and management. from late 2009 until early 2000

well i was the assistant secretary for infrastructure protection at the department of homeland security. i was responsible for public/private partnerships in a regulatory program to protect critical assets of the united states. asked year i was selected and served on the benghazi accountability review board number recommended independent panel on best practices, which was established to identify best practices from across u.s. government agencies. and allied countries on management and operation and high threat/high risk locations globally. mr. chairman, the united states secret service has a proud history of protecting the most important government leaders of our country, the white house and other official facilities and conducting criminal thestigations to protect banking systems and financial communications and cyber security. and women on the from

line every day keeping our men and women safe do a tremendous job. the agents and officers of the secret service are constantly in the spotlight, especially serving at the white house, one ofthe most prominent signals our nation strength and democracy. leo them a debt of gratitude. every organization, even those with a century and a half of history must be willing to learn. those who wish to do us harm possiblynpredictable mentally unstable person to an organized terror group meant on -- bent on unleashing an attack typically have the element of surprise. our country faces a very dynamic and fluid and evolving threat environment in which the aggressors have become very patient, resilient and determined. we have to be better than they are. to counter this threat, security intelligence and law enforcement agencies like the secret service must have strategical and

tactical leadership, focus on the primary mission and provide the people with the best training and resources, and possibly most importantly be ready to act aggressively when faced with a threat. the secret service like any successful organization must be willing to continuously eat all and improved to adapt the agency ahead of the threat curve. i foundut my career government agencies and private sector organizations were at the top of the game become complacent. time tends to unknowingly you wrote and blunt the end of this year. way wely on this is the have always done it or we know how to do it best so they are unwilling or unable to change. the secret service, i believe, would benefit from new and emerging technologies to assist with protect of responsibilities . when i was at the department of homeland security the secret service partner with my office and dhs office of science and

technology to research and develop cutting-edge technology. now is the time for the department of homeland security to bring some of those technological enhancements out of the lab and expand their use in the secret service toolkit. in addition, management and leadership of an organization change, andhem a improve. deployment of personnel and resources should be understood -- under constant scrutiny and exercise based on real world scenarios. officers are some of the best this country has to offer and they deserve the strategic and tactical leadership to match. all too often after something has gone wrong the cry is for more money, more personnel and a larger physical setback. this is really the correct answer. -- rarely the correct answer. throwing more money and people at the problem will only existinge week mean --

weaknesses. post incidentss are typical in the u.s. government from agency to agency but from my experience the reviews are impacted by intentional or unintentional arsenal or professional bias and are often informed by the same agencies cultural and management gaps that may have been the contributing factor in the original incidents. the department of homeland security and the secret service now have unique opportunity and critical moment in time to obtain an unbiased, independent top to bottom review focusing on management and policies and procedures related to the incident on september 19. i strongly recommend the secretary of homeland security appoint a panel of independent experts to conduct the review in the group should be tasked with providing advice, guidance and formal recommendations to dhs and the secret service.

in fact, the faneuil -- panel i by markas chaired sullivan. throughout my career i have always been proud to work colleagues. my the united states secret service is a recognize world-class organization and i am confident will learn from the most recent incident and innovate, strengthen and improve to keep the country and leader safe. thank you. you, mr. kyle. i will recognize myself now. --hink the first question you can put up the map of the white house. first question, if you look at the firstportion, question the american people crasho know is is there a button, and had it been punished, what is locked the front door that is marked as the ?ntrance hall apc

the front door at the time did not have an automatic locking mechanism. it required an individual to lock the front door. click so we have an automated system. 800 million per year, millions of dollars more during your tenure each year at the president's request, and that door was unlocked with no one standing at it when mr. gonzales came through? is that correct? unlocked at the time of mr. gonzales's entry. that is correct. >> ok. earlier there was a report and that he was apprehended at the entrance hall. isn't it true today that we understand it was not true, he was apprehended at the green room, correct? if i may clarify my first answer, the front door consists

of two doors. which isan outer door, class almost described as a storm door, and an air door that is a historic door. the outer door was not locked. the internal wood door was in the process of being hand locked. lex bottom line, automated locking is in a capability at the white house but not of that entrance at that time. >> not at that time but has since been installed in effective today. >> the second paul, east room and arrested in the passivity of the green room? - in the vicinity of the green room?

>> according to your map-- >> i want a short answer. the federal indictment showed he was apprehended in one place. >> as mr. gonzales entered the door he knocked back the officer standing at the doorway. the officer engaged mr. gonzales. they crossed the east entrance hall to the other. they made the left turn down the cross paul, they stepped momentarily into the east room. another officer rendered aid and was placed on the ground in the carpet and handcuffed on the cross paul to us outside of the green room. , the federal complaint in the earlier reports were not accurate, correct? yes or no, please go >> i think the original complaint is accurate that he scaled the fence. lex i have very little time, and the american people want to know

, is the president safe? i want to know if we can rely on reports from your agency. going back to mr. hernandez. drain your watch as chief of staff to the director, is it reported,in fact as agents falsely assumed they were not gunshots when they were gunshots? were standdown orders to people who had aarti full shotguns out. in fact, the bullets were not discovered to have hit the white house in real-time within a 24 hour or greater. by the secret service. yes or no, please. >> you are referring to the in 2011.ooting >> yes. >> at that time, it is my understanding that there was reports of shots being fired in proximity to constitution avenue. 'am.amma -- ma

i want to be considerate to you, you have a hard job. but you have an agency whose morale has gone down. it is lower than other comical federal agencies. it has had a series of embarrassments out. we've had two cases in which the reporting is evolving. only last night to the public learn that in fact, it was far worse, or at least somewhat worse, on september 19. only recently has it been revealed, and you said you wanted to correct the record. the washington post makes it clear, from what i read, that in 11, 2011,ovember shots were fired. the assailant left. the secret service supervisor shutdown the response of people who believe rightfully very gunshots fired.

the follow-up did not discover the damage to the white house, and the actual shots in real-time. , ortegaally, mr. ortega hernandez is how i have a written, would not have been apprehended except he had a car accident. and when he did, it was not immediately linked to his criminal activity. in fact, the system at the white house did not detect the actual shots fired and begin the pursuit of somebody who had provided legal -- lethal force against the facility of the white house. is that correct? you work chief of staff at the time. allow yout, i will whatever time you need to properly explain whatever happened on november 11, 2011. so the american people can understand that september 19 is not the first time there is been considerable lapse, as i see it.

and in fact, during a long theod of time we have had kinds of things we should be concerned about for protecting the president. please tell us, in whatever time you need, about november 11, 2011. whether the washington post is right or wrong. this is your chance. >> thank you. as chief of staff -- >> in the might close. >> my primary responsibilities at that time were business transformation. and i.t. transformation for the organization. my focus was on the business operations of the organization. to my knowledge, and based on the briefings i have received of this three-year-old investigation that occurred in november of 2011, that appeared in the washington post on sunday, i had been aware that a

apresentative had asked with data inquiry, and we responded to the committee on september 12. we responded him detailed responses. shots were reported by the united states secret service officers in the area of constitution avenue and 15th. there were witness accounts of a black vehicle that had fired shots. there was confusion at the time on the part of the witnesses as to what they had witnessed, and what they had saw. witnesses putse out twitter accounts of what they had witnessed. they were subsequently located, interviewed, and recanted those statements. the actual shots that were fired come in proximity to constitution avenue and 16th, the vehicle sped away. it went westbound on constitution, erratically driving, and struck a light post.

mr. tager then fled the vehicle. ortega then fled the vehicle. the vehicle was left with an ak-47 in the front seat. had us possibility over the traffic accident. >> i will give you all the time you need. but where are the inconsistencies with what we now know from the washington post? you said they got the story wrong, they were misstating it, they were mischaracterizing it. i would like to hear the inconsistencies. so far you are corroborating that in fact, the understanding of the series of failures in real-time to protect the white house are in fact correct, according to the washington post. please tell us where they are not correct. >> throughout the course, there was a command post established down on constitution avenue and 23rd street, metropolitan police department, the u.s. park

police, the secret service whether attempting to resolve or understand from the witness accounts what had happened along constitution avenue. back at the white house individuals had heard what they believe to be shots. the secret service according to the records that i've been able tto locate on his three year-old investigation did respond properly. the projected response teams and other officers did a protective sweep of the air to make sure that we didn't have any interest, to make sure there were no injuries and obvious signs of anything have been damaged. further investigation with the park police, they were unable to resolve at that time as to whether not these are shots being fired at other vehicles or shots being fired at the white house. that took some time to understand. it wasn't until the ushers office was preparing for the return of the president and first family, or th the presidet and the first lady that they identified damage on the truman balcony. that led to further investigation and that led to us

contacting the fbi to initiate their full investigation. >> think you. mr. cummings, i want to thank you for your understanding and just relate to something that i discussed yesterday if i may. in washington, d.c. and around the country there are a number of systems that we all know baltimore has it come to, that there are basically microphones that hear gunshots, can identify the direction and quickly without human intervention figure out whether or not a real shot has been fired, confirm it and often get a very accurate direction. that type of technology isn't so odd we don't see it in our city, and i think that's the reason i would bounce along with this question. ms. norton i know knows this. the district does have a sophisticated system and i think the committee will want to make sure that not only does the white house have a higher level of awareness of the system, but

that the district system enhanced if necessary to make sure that something like this never happens again. and i thank the gentleman for his patients. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. director pierson, i had thought about all of this long and hard, and i think my major concern goes to the culture. it is very disturbing to know that secret service agents in the most elite protective agency in the world feel more comfortable, apparently from what i'm hearing, coming to members of this committee and telling things and coming to you and members in the agency. that, that i'm telling you, when

i boil all of this down, that to me is dangerous. it has to go against morel. i don't even see -- morel. i don't see how good decision can be made it your own people don't feel a level of comfort that, or they feel fear that they are going to be able to be able to talk about the things that concerned them. i just want to go through these questions and want to give you a chance to address that. because to me when all the dust settles, that's a problem. so going back to this november 11, 20 to 11 incident i know know you're not director. i understand that. a lot of people talk about the culture problem with the secret service and the press reports,

all the press reports, the ones that concern is that back then on 2011, quote one of the officers, not the gunfire probably hit the house that night were largely ignored. and some were afraid to dispute their bosses conclusion. did you see that report and are you aware of this issue? >> ranking member cummings i.t. read a newspaper article and was troubled by those accounts. i asked my officers professional responsibility to retrieve the file and those records. what we know and when we do it if these young officer had made such a statement. i did find a statement of this young officer alleges that reluctant report to the supervisor to be criticized, i

believe was a statement. that troubles me as well. >> and that's a major problem. >> i'm going to ask my office for special responsibly to reenter the that officer. they remain on the job today, to determine whether not that officer would be more competent today or what were some of the problems that night that she felt she could not say that. that's extremely -- that extremely troubles me. it it said she heard shots, i quote, chart shots at what she thought was debris falling overhead. she drew her handgun and to cover, then heard a radio call reporting possible shots fired near the south ground. she then called the secret service joint operation center to report that she was breaking into the gun box near her post, pulling out a shotgun. according to this article, and i quote, she replaced the buckshot inside with a more powerful plug in case she needed to engage an

attacker. but then the call came over the radio to stand down. the next day the officer, and i quote, listened during roll call before her shift saturday afternoon as supervisors explained that the gunshots were from people into cars shooting at each other. the report said that she, and i quote, had told several senior officers friday night that she thought the house had been hit. but on saturday she did not challenge her supervisors for fear of being criticized. she later told investigators. now, director pierson, as a former field agent and as the head of the agency, that has to concern you tremendously, is

that right? >> yes, sir, it does. is unacceptable. >> does it trouble you that some of your own agents out there we do not feel comfortable raising security concerns? and this is just one person, and there are others who, again, would rather be whistleblowers, and again i have no problem with whistleblowers. as a medevac we do everything in our power to protect them, but this agency, they would rather be a whistleblower then to bring their concerns? see, you started off by saying that you are going to make sure this never happens again. let me tell you what the problem is here. if you are heading in agency where the folks are not providing you with the information to do the right

thing, to make the changes, how do you even know what the problems are? do you follow me? help me with this. >> yes, sir, if i may. anytime any organization you start to make significant changes, some people will have resistance. some will push back. however, i will continue to lead and transform the secret service to ensure that we are prepared for our mission, and it sure that we can restore our reputation to the american public. what i will tell you over the last 18 months i have been serving as director, and over the last six months i've met personally with over 1500 of our supervisors and employees. i've had a number of engagements and spent over an hour with each of them expecting him advising them of what my expectations are, what their performance requirements are, what personal

accountability is, how to manage this workforce, how to ensure that we are performing at the highest levels in everything that we do, at we are operationally ready, that we are training, that we are evaluating each other and that constantly looking at our mission to make sure we are being effective in everything we do. i can't speak for what is happening in the past, but i can tell you as we are moving forward into the future and while i am as director, i will not tolerate personnel missteps where people either fail to act or do not support the workforce, or do not work in unison. but i would say that i suspect that many people that are still pushing back, and i'm going to continue to lead forward. >> you know, the problem today, that officer, she was right. and that was the morning after the shooting, yet it took four days for the housekeepers to discover the bullets struck the building, isn't that right?

>> in other words, the officer was right. >> yes. ultimately, the officer was right. >> the "washington post" story said that this agency declared reported her concerns to investigators. was there an after action report about the 2011 shooting? did include recommendations relating to agents reporting their concerns without fear of being criticized? do you know? >> i don't know but i would say that the officers of statement, the in it is that concern secret service employees are different from the officer statements to the fbi investigators conducting the investigation, and that is why i've asked my office special responsibly to go back and have a conversation with that employee to ensure that she feels supported, knows that we want her to come forward with any information, and that we

understand what some of the impediments may be with the management team were we feel like we can make improvements to ensure that never happens again. >> let me say this and then i will close. former director sullivan invited me, a few years ago, you may of been there, to speak before your top agents after the colombia situation with the prostitutes. and one of things that i said to then -- to them back then, i expressed my tremendous appreciation but i also told them that i don't want anyone to imagine, imagine, imagine that -- of the secret service. because i firmly believe that the reputation is so very, very,

very important. and, you know, i just, again, that coulter thing is an issue. i'm sure others will question you about that, but i just thank you for your testimony. i yield back. >> thank you and i will now recognize myself. follow up on ranking member cummings. i sent you a letter, director, specifically asking for details about the situation on 2011. i would ask an instance into an into the records all members can see it, the unclassified spot report on the incidence in november of 2011. carry no objection so ordered. director, why is it come what is it that when i look at this report there isn't even a mention of officer carrie johnson? and get the "washington post" reports details about her calling into the secret service headquarters? why isn't her name even mention in the spot report?

>> spent the spot report with your flex active investigation and i don't know what information that you ability of two officers johnson and reporting. >> you gave us this report that i asked you for all the details and information. is his minute by minute, 2052, 2053, minute by minute what happened in this situation. are you telling me the "washington post" is wrong, that she did go into the headquarters? did she not do that? >> i'm confused by your statement about call into headquarters. >> according to the "washington post" recalled in a reported the said she heard shots fired. she reported that she was opening a box getting out of shotgun, all those details. >> that's the confusion that i have with the "washington post" article. typically when there is an emergency happening around the white house, alerts are made much like the shots being fired on november 11, i would expect

officers to act according to their security protocol. >> she says in the "washington post," it says that she called into the headquarters. there's no mention of the. other officers are mentioned but she is not. we will follow-up on the. it's unacceptable to not even mention the actions she took. let's go back to the fence jumping situation. basically the fence jumper. state police detained a person, had a map in the car, all the weapons that congressman cummings talked about, suspicious behavior. my understanding is that actually three officers that spot in that day and not reported in the not reported it. i wanted to if that's true as we go along. offense failed, officers that chased him didn't catch them, sniper was a position, no shots were fired. dogs are out there, weren't released. countersurveillance is understaffed. there was, nobody said anything, nobody that was intercepted. the doors were unlocked and

officer was overwhelmed. the crash box was evidently suspect the secret service puts out a statement that said they offered a quote tremendous restraint and discipline, and quote. my question to you is, do those officers have your authority to use lethal force to prevent somebody from entering the white house? >> those officers do have the authority to use independent judgment to leverage lethal force when appropriate spent is that true in some is trying to get at the president's? >> that is always true. they are law enforcement officers. >> so it's always true in some you try to penetrate the white house that they can use lethal force? >> as appropriate within the compounds of the law. >> explained the details of that. if somebody is approaching the white house, has penetrate the security and making a run for the white house, no apparent

weapon, can they take that person down? >> the law requires that law-enforcement officers ensure that they are in imminent danger or others are in imminent danger before they can leverage lethal force. >> if the person is running at the white house but no other weapon, they can or cannot use lethal force? >> those are going to be independent decisions made by the officer based on the totality of the circumstances. >> how does officer know if they have an end to the new devices boast a device or dirty bomb? how do they know that? shouldn't assume this person has ill intentions? >> law enforcement officers are trained in observation skills, and i would've says they were constantly looking at people for ill intentions. >> i think it's confusing. this is part of what they had to do with. they have to make a split-second

decision. i wanted to be crystal clear. you make a run and a dash to the white house, we're going to take you down. i want overwhelming force. would you disagree with the? >> i do want our officers and agents to execute appropriate force for anyone addicted to challenge or breach the white house. >> we've got to explore this further. the secret service put out a statement according, or talk to the associate press i should say. they reported on september 20 at 1:24 a.m. eastern time donovan, the spokesperson, donovan said the man appeared to be unarmed to officers who spotted him climbing the fence, and in search of the subject turned up no weapon. why would he say that there's no weapon? >> i will have to have, have to ask mr. donovan of the question. >> you haven't done that since the incident happened?

>> i know that when mr. gonzalez was placed into custody he was found to have a folded not in his right front pants pocket. >> do you consider that a weapon? >> that is a weapon. >> why would the secret service put out a statement to "the associated press" digit correct "the associated press"? called them back and say you got that wrong? >> i have no knowledge of that. spent so you just let it linger after that there was no weapon. that was wrong but it was inaccurate. correct? >> i do know that there has been a lot of information in this case and that's why we are doing a robust review. i can't speak for conversations that i was not a part of on the presses interest in this speedy did you read the press release before when that? >> i have read the press release before it went out. >> do you agree that the officer chose tremendous restraint and discipline? do you agree with that, and? >> i do think based on the

totality of the circumstances, and from mr. gonzález's arrest that these officers did use restraint in making a very difficult decision as to whether to deploy lethal force or subdue and arrest him. >> do you think they responded a probably? >> i do not think the security plans was properly executed, and that is why i'm conducting a robust investigation to ensure that we have a comprehensive review of what people have the facts, all of the facts i can make an assessment of what the decisions were on that night. >> thank you. icon will pass my time. i will not recognize the gentlewoman from the district of columbia. >> pardon me. we would recognize mr. horsford. is he your? we will go -- you're recognized for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and i want to thank director

pierson for 30 years of service in the secret service, rising through the ranks to become the first woman, director the antiwar of what she has inherited, and of her many accomplishments. director pierson, i want to ask you about the rumors that it in after a with the secret service may do. win pennsylvania avenue was closed down after oklahoma city, there was an example of how public access can remain. i was heartbroken. both sides of the white house or close down. i've worked with the clinton administration to open the backside of the white house. that not only for its vista because it's a major thoroughfare and it has affected the entire region. that was summarily closed down. but as mr. basham testified, in

front of the white house though cars can no longer go there, people can go there. and essentially it was made a part, a walkway. and none of my constituents, no one says it should be reopened because that would mean cars, not people. so my concern is whether or not people will continue to have access around the white house. i want to the white house yesterday. i was pleased to find not only tourists but protesters as usual better. i ask you, notice, i followed your testimony and you testified 16 jumpers in only five years. so there's been an increase in fence jumpers. so i want to know whether you

have considered before today simply asking that a higher fence be built, one that, for example, could curb, that rod iron fence that would curb going outward so maybe you damage one of your body parts if you tried to get over it. or even, and here off the top of my head, loki layered glass behind the fence that could resist blasts from guns or bombs. since there have been 16 in five years, at least i think many more over the years, have you considered such commonsense devices as that so that the public would still have access

by the president of the united states and his family would be protected? have you ever recommended that? >> we do want to work in partnership to ensure that the people have access and proximity to the white house in a historic nature and national significance of the lafayette park in pennsylvania avenue and the white house. and so i do look forward to continue to work with you and the administration and the department to look at what additional security features can be put in place, not only for white house fence jumpers, but for the other challenges that face us in securing public areas. >> i recognized that most of the senses are harmless. i am worried about multiple fence jumpers and whether you have the resources and the staff, that five or six of them

come across the fence. by my calculation, you are down almost 300, more than 250 agents in the uniformed services in the last year or two. due to this request and the cats. is that the case? >> yes. the secret service has had a reduction in its staffing as a result of sequestration and other fiscal constraints. we are close to 550 employees below are optimal level. >> i understand that stuff has had to be brought in from other units who may not have been as familiar with the white house because of the shortage of staff, is that the case? >> earlier this summer and based upon the work requirement that the secret service was faced with in the month of september

in order to support the united nations general assembly i made the decision to bring in special agents from around the country to support some of the uniform division post assignment. that's provide summer before uniform division to be will take some annual leave. >> mr. chairman, i realized my time is gone, but if you think that congress had to take some responsibility t sequester when across the board including police agencies like the secret service. thank you, mrthank you, mr. cha. >> we when iraq is the gentleman from south carolina for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. director of a big fan of law enforcement and i don't take any delight in asking questions i'm going to ask you, a law-enforcement i given unique powers o on our society and with their unique powers continued responsibilities and i get to give any responsibility greater than guarding the safety and security of our president and his family. so as i understand it, several agents believe that shots were fired and a supervisor concluded that was a vehicle backfiring.

even if that were true, given a very small investment of resources, why not invest in a shots fired? representative, i think that is where some of the confusion starts to come out of the story is in the washington post. >> i'm not asking you about a washington post or, i'm asking you about why a housekeeper, who doesn't spend 14 weeks in training, who doesn't have 18 weeks of training thereafter, found glass, and your agents did not. they didn't come from the washington post. is that true? did a housekeeper find evidence of the shooting, and your agents did not? >> the housekeeper was able to on th fragments of glass truman bny, whicot >> the housekeeper was able toby locate fragments who was frequented. i asked you -- there was a

spontaneous conclusion that shots were fired. there were officers who believed they smelled gunpowder. theirfficers drew weapons. that is how seriously they took it. i'm not interested in cursory searches. when did your agency find evidence of the shooting? the 15theve it was on or 14th of november. >> hominy days after the shooting? -- how many days after the shooting?\ >> three to four days later. >> you have officers taking cover because they believe shot were fired. you have officers at the white house drawing their weapons because they believe shots were fired. give me all the evidence to support a vehicle backfiring. sure youentative, i'm are familiar with law enforcement in downtown areas.

there is sound attenuation. often times -- >> i have never heard a car backfire 68 times. have you? >> i've heard car backfires -- 6 to 8 times. a housekeeper found the evidence of the shooting, and your agency did not. i will give you credit, it was brought up by a colleague. i have colleagues who are obsessed with sequestration. we can't have any hearing without it coming up. but you were not going to sit there and tell us that sequestration is the reason your agency did not find evidence of the shooting, are you? >> no, i am not. >> i will give you credit for that. i was stunned that one of my colleagues would try to conflate

sequestration with the fact that a law enforcement agency waited for or five days to find evidence of a shooting in the housekeeper found. give me all the evidence to back the vehicle backfiring narrative. we already know all the other evidence. give me all the evidence that major department so sure that it was a vehicle backfire that you didn't even search the white house. the secret service was actively engaged with the united states park police in an effort to determine where and in what direction shots were fired on constitution avenue. >> madame director. you reached the conclusion that it was a vehicle backfiring as opposed to shots fired. haveis the third time i asked. give me all the evidence to support that supervisors conclusion that it was not shots fired, despite all the contemporaneous claims that it was, despite all of the reaction of your agents that it was. give me all the evidence to support the theory that it was a vehicle backfire.

and then, tell me why not invest the very minimal resources required to exhaustively search the white house. representative, often times in these cases, there are a number of different people that make different statements. what i can tell you is the uniformed division officers on constitution avenue heard on fire and reported gunfire. can't speak to the specificity of the individual you are talking about the reported it -- >> can you speak to why a housekeeper found it and your department did not? >> housekeepers routinely work in the private residence of the president and first family. >> even when there is overwhelming -- was just a suspicion. we want the overwhelming evidence, that would require you to search the present -- the residence. you don't go through every inch of that residence?

i want you to imagine a prosecutor in front of a jury. this is where these cases wind up sometimes. you explain to the jury why a housekeeper found evidence of the shooting, and your agency did not. >> representative, again, this case has been prosecuted in federal court. those expirations were made in front of a federal prosecutor. evidencethe lord the was sufficient for a jury. and what you make it -- i want you to make it sufficient for commerce. >> it was difficult to see at night. officers heard the shots, officers reacted, picked up security positions, swept the area, looking for any type of injury or intruder. it was not known until days later that the shots and actually struck the upper level, the third floor level of the

white house. >> i will end, i'm out of time. why not search every inch of the white house, given the very small investment of resources? i went on your website, i saw you have training for psychology, you have training for survival skills, none of which i minimize. all of which i'm sure is important. this is just processing a crime scene. this is not high math. it is processing a crime scene. you actually don't need 18 weeks of training to be able to do that. just need to walk around. so why was it done -- why wasn't it done? >> it was my understanding that a perimeter sweep was done. was it as thorough as it needed to be black evidently not. security.gnize the >> i think all the witnesses here this morning. preventions.out

if you look back in july, several months before the incidents, when the promoter was understanding our was stopped by virginia state police. they found at least 11 weapons and a map with a line drawn directly to the white house. is that your understanding? >> it was a regional map with a line pointed to the memorial area of the mall, including the white house and the other historic monuments. >> our reports are that the virginia state police and the atf then referred that matter to the secret service, because presumably because of that line. >> that is correct. >> secret service had an interview with mr. gonzales at that time. is that correct? >> yes. the case was later referred to the secret service for an interview of mr. gonzales. >> how thorough without

interview have been, according to protocols? how deeply they have gone into their examination of mr. gonzales? >> they had a very thorough initial interview with mr. gonzales. they initiated contact with his family members, his mental health history, and the police reports. >> they determined he had a mental health history? >> key technology had a mental health history as a veteran suffering from ptsd. >> do protocols allow you to obtain his records? >> if the individual consents to the release of their medical records, we do pursue that. in this case, mr. gonzales consented the release of his military medical records. >> you had all of his medical records to review. i assume you did review them? >> they were obtained over a. of time, and they have been reviewed. >> despite all that, what happened? you didn't take any action, he

didn't have him arrested. >> representative, it is a very difficult thing for people dealing with disabilities on and people dealing with mental illness, when they don't exhibit any unusual direction of interest. mr. gonzales, at the time, denied any interest or any intent to harm anyone. he indicated that his information relative to the map at his car was given to him by another individual. who had recommended places in washington dc to sightsee. bash onded to go to camping trips. he wanted to go to the valley forge, pennsylvania area. >> was the individual ever questioned? >> not to my knowledge. >> how does that conform with protocol? >> i know investigators are as thorough as they can possibly be an investigation like this to make sure that we have a good understanding.

>> the individual wasn't available? >> i do not know the specifics. >> that would be an indication if they were as thorough as they should have been. not withstanding that, there was a second incident before the perimeter was breached by mr. gonzales, where he was found walking in front of the white house with a hatchet in his belt. is that correct? >> mr. gonzales was observed on august 25, on the south fence line. >> he was interviewed again by secret service agents? >> he was interviewed by uniformed officers of the secret service and special agents of the secret service. >> his name was run against the database? >> yes. >> the database indicated the earlier incident? >> yes. the database provided information of the original contact with mr. gonzales. >> at that time, they knew he

had been arrested in virginia, had a map pointing towards the area of the white house, ammunition in his car, watching -- walking with a hatchet, we knew had mental health problems. what happened then? >> officers and agents made contact with mr. gonzales. asked him about the hatchet he was carrying. he indicated he had been camping in the area of lake prince william county around quantico. the agents and officers had asked him for consent search of his vehicle. he agreed. he was going to return the hatchet to the vehicle. they went back, they look through the vehicle. mr. gonzales was extreme the cooperative. this build in a concerns of the officers had. he had camping gear and camping equipment in his car. he appeared to be living out of his car. so they just let him go. >> mr. gonzales had not violated any laws. he had to be released. >> did they have any follow-up?

did anyone talk to any other agencies in the washington area about observing this individual? making sure somebody knew what his behavior was after that second incident? >> the second incident was also passed into our analysis desktop , so it could be analyzed. >> what happened at the end of that evaluation? >>. not committed any violations, nothing -- he was under mental health evaluations by the military v.a.. no further action could be taken by the secret service other than to continue to monitor his behavior through his family. >> is that the only way they could monitor it through his family? there was no other agency that could monitor his activity? >> he was on bond pending charges to the state police. the incident that brought them to our attention -- there was criminal contact on the state level, and he was returning to

that area. the case was still under evaluation as to what mr. gonzales's mental history was, and whether or not he was going to come to our attention again. >> it was your understanding that you thought it was particularly appropriate that the service did nothing else and regards to making sure this individual was monitored in his behavior. it is very difficult for the secret service, when these individuals come to our attention. day,ny as 300 year, or a or being evaluated by our office of protective intelligence. have been in history twice picked up with weapons heading to the white house? >> many of them are brought to our attention by making a direct threat. many of them are mentally ill. they have a long mental health passed. some are more cooperative than others. in the specific case of mr. gonzales, he was being very cooperative.

his family had been contacted by investigators. the family members indicated that he was cooperative, that he did not have a violent past. his mental health records, to my flectstanding, did not re that any of his mental health contexts body was a danger to himself or others. >> thinks the gentle man. -- thank the gentleman. it is my understanding that people and told us there were three different officers that theseen him, recognized him day that the incident happened. the but did not report it. is that true? >> it is my understanding, based on how i have been breached, that two of the officers recognize mr. gonzales. in the area of the white house, on september 19, and observed him for some time. they remembered him from the contact they had had with him on august 5.

when he was on the south fence line. they observed him for some time, he wasn't acting inappropriately, he didn't violate any laws. >> they did not report that, and they did not approach him, correct? >> they noted that, but did not approach him. >> they did not approach -- remote -- report him? >> not to my knowledge. >> i think there are several concerns, i think one of the things i agree wholeheartedly about,e ranking member this is something that we are talking about the white house. it is a world icon. you think of america, you think of the white house. one of the concerns i have come and we have been mentioning many of the issues here recently, different events -- the issue is not the protocols that have been put in place now. it's the issues of why are there so many instances on a

foundational level. ay the doesn't seem to be willingness to report. why there doesn't seem to be a willingness to exercise -- a willingness to say this is something i have noticed. the officer said she didn't feel she could report it. if there are issues where the and otheroverseas places, there seems to be a foundational issue we have to address. not only from your perspective, but from here. you made a statement of moment 300 you said we get suspicious people a year, and 300 a day in the same sentence. which is it? >> talking to protective intelligence, as of yesterday, they were directly overseeing 300 and 27 investigations. to 27.otality, three

327.three hitter 27 -- it is very visual. there is are the been a new police line perimeter put in place. is that correct? temporary rack to provide us a standout area while this investigation is underway. >> i thank you for the long answer to guess. i have several things i want to ask. you have made several comments that we are doing an investigation, we are saying why these protocols were breached. you also said we don't want to rush, we don't want to change things. we have already started with putting a perimeter fence, or at least a barrier back from the fence currently. i'm wondering here if the problem doesn't seem to be the fence area the problem seems to be the fact that someone jumped the fence, ran 70 yards, got

into the white house with nobody's stopping them. you made a comment, my father is in law enforcement. this is hard for me to look at this. you made an analogy that i'm not sure is accurate. you talked about discretion and restraint. police officers do this all the time it. they do this on the side of the road when they have made a stop. you are talking about officers who are protecting a national icon. when they jumped the fence, there should be an immediate understanding that this person should not be here. there should be an immediate understanding that there is not a restraint factor here. this is not the nice, cuddly secret service. someone -- i'm having trouble how you correlate restraint and discretion in a traffic situation, which is way they came across. to someone actually going after the president's home. statedesentative, i have

that they did not properly execute the security protocols that were appropriate to respond -- >> you believe that was because of the information and guidance they have gotten from the top of that they were not sure what to do. told to exercise restraint in these measures? have they been told exercise protection? >> those officers have the authority to take legal law enforcement action as individuals. i'm conducting an investigation to find out the decisions that were made, what are the facts in the totality of the circumstances those officers saw. >> i want to give ms. pierson a break. this issue of putting the fence line in front, or at least a police barrier, and looking at this area -- we are trying to make ourselves appear better as we are working on it. say, this that is to president and his family deserve

to be protected. it is concerning to me they were not told about the shooting until many days later. that is just mind-boggling to me. especially when their daughter was actually in the residence that night. >> i do have a question. explain to me, is putting the fence you are the only fix? help me outcome is there a better way to go about this? my perspective, protecting u.s. embassies around the world, it is a concentric ring of security. layers of security. the fence typically is one of the last things. typically, fences are meant to keep good people out. bad people find ways over fences. you can't simply rely on the fence as a last resort. >> i think the issue that has come as we go forward here is the protection, of this world icon. in the threat environment we are in, it's very concerning. we get half-truths to start

with, more truth is leaking out. wants toa group that say what is the issue, why are we not doing it the proper way? putting of a visual, we are doing something, that is not right. the foundation has to be wrote -- has to be laid. that is the bigger issue, along with protocols not being followed. i yield. >> i just want to make sure one thing was clear. director, the failure to apprehend mr. gonzales before he got well into the white house -- the change of further setback or fence, since you successfully stopped the 16 jumpers in the , was there any reason you couldn't have stopped to 17? you are taking the american people's space with this additional fence and the proposal for a setback that would include pennsylvania and lafayette being restricted.

and yet you have made no case here today that you couldn't have had 17 out of 17 apprehensions, if not for outright human error and procedural failures for it. is that true? >> the placement of the buy crack to provide a buffer zone is to allow us time to do this analysis to make sure that personnel and procedures are going to be effective with the time constraints that individuals have to make an effective tactical response to runners or fence jumpers. >> i get it. you are not up to snuff to the level you would like to be. until you are sure you are, you want to have that exit timing. i sort of get that. that is a little concerning. >> thank you. i think the witnesses. es.i think the witness >> i want to go over the prior contacts between mr. gonzales and the secret service. noted, there was

a prior contact with mr. gonzales back in july of 2014. he had been pulled over. he had a small arsenal of weapons in the car. want to explore when does the red flag come up for the secret service. informedt service was that he had 11 weapons in the car. i want to go over that i have the evidence list from the state police that was provided to the secret service. mr. gonzales had a mossberg maverick 12 bird -- 12 gauge pump shotgun in the car. he had a winchester with the scope. he had another gun with the scope here in. he had a 12 gauge shotgun.

he had an ar-15, a pretty sophisticated weapon. with a flashlight and scope. boltd a weatherby vanguard action rifle with a scope. he had a smith & wesson 380 caliber automatic black handgun. he had a glock 45 in the car with an empty magazine, although later, we found he had 800 rounds of ammunition. revolver asnum 357 well. caliber, andr 45 he also had a map. this is the evidence list. you seem to be minimizing all this stuff. of washington dc with writing and align it drawn to the white house. have with oure introduction to mr. gonzales

here in. that, we know he has a history of mental illness. he shows up at the white house in august of 2014. he has a hatchet in his belt. no red flags, we let him go. then there is the day he jumps the fence and runs into the white house. i want to talk about that. you say he came into the front gate. he went through the front door of the portico. and was wrestled to the ground, to the carpet, wrestled down to the road new the green room. -- rug near the green room. the distance from the front of the white house to the green room is about 80 feet. the width of this room right here is 60 feet.

[inaudible] yards, 30 yards inside the house. i have been there many times. about somebody singsgressing -- transver the white house for your bash to the -- foyer, american public, that would be half of one white house tour. that isn't just getting inside, that's half of the white house tour to the american public. you keep minimizing this. i'm just wondering when to the red flags go up. you have a lot of wonderful people over there.

but this is not their best work. here.e a serious issue about protecting the president and his family. this is disgraceful. this is absolutely disgraceful. mentioneven going to the fact that it took us four days to figure out that somebody had shot seven rounds into the white house. this is beyond the pale. i have listened to your testimony very deliberately. that you protected the white house like you are protecting your reputation here today. i wish you spent that time in that effort to protect the american president and his family, like i am hearing people covering for the lapses of the secret service on the several occasions. i really do.

what are we going to do -- look. this whole thing is -- the hased states secret service one mentally challenged man. one man with mental illness, that you knew had mental illness. the secret service against one individual with mental illness. you had three chances, and he got it the green room. what happens when you have a sophisticated organization with nefarious intent and resources going up against the secret service? what happens then? time isentleman's

expired. if the gentlelady has any answers to his questions, i would appreciate hearing them. >> let me be clear. united states secret service does not take any of these incidents highly. >> with all due respect, that is my point. as a casual observer to what has happened here, i do not think the circular -- the secret service is taking their duty to protect the american president and her family at the white house -- i do not think you are taking it seriously. that is exactly my point. based on the evidence, and the series of lapses. unfortunately, that is the conclusion i arrive at, that you're not taking your job seriously. i am sorry. i hate to be critical. but we got a lot at stake here. i know people are dancing around this issue, but i got to call it like it is. inave very low confidence the secret service under your leadership. i have to say that.

that is not an easy thing for me to say. but based on the evidence, that is how we have to call it here. based on the evidence, my confidence in you protecting the american president right now at the white house, supposed to be one of the most secure buildings of the country, if not the world, a confidence in you doing that is very, very low right now. >> i thank the gentleman. the gentleman from north carolina is recognized. n. thank you, mr. chairma you were pointed in 2014, is that correct? >> yes. >> what three things have you done to improve the culture since you got in there? briefly. what three things have you done to improve the culture, because that has been brought up, that there is a culture problem? >> we have instituted an office professional integrity, a new discipline