one faculty but they were all crazy genius and didn't want to work together. there were fist fights and they would hackle each other during surgeries. and jefferson had enough ration fired the faculty and brought back ones that followed their initiati initiative. and he was selected to head up the surgery committee as the youngest member and the oldest member was charles. they had clashed before and there was much more clashing to come. >> you can watch this and other programs online at booktv.org. mr. kissenger book is up next.

substitute ... which accomplished the

withdrawal of american forces from vietnam for which he won the nobel peace prize in 1973, and parenthetically the gratitude of this he and lieutenant in the united states army. thank you, mr. secretary. this includes the presidential medal of freedom, the medal of liberty and the national book award for history for the first volume of his memoirs, the white house years. his new book, world order, is a shrewd and comprehensive analysis of the challenges of building international order in a world of differing perspectives, violent conflict, burgeoning technology and ideological extremism. in it you will learn about the west philly in peace and be led on at cascading exploration of european balance of power from charlemagne to the present time. islam in the middle east, the

u.s. and iran, multiplicity of asia and continuing development of u.s. policy. in my business the questions are often more important than the answers and henry kissinger has some brilliant one such as what do we seek to prevent? no matter how it happens and even if we have to do it alone. what do we seek to achieve even if not supported by anyone? what should we not engage in even if urged by a multilateral group, and most importantly, what is the nature of the values we seek to advance. you will be intrigued and challenged by this book. i cannot finish without mentioning one of henry kissinger's least none but as a

transplanted native new yorker, he was made the first honorary measure of the harlem globetrotters. henry kissinger will be interviewed this evening by jeff greenfield, an acclaimed television commentator and author in his own right who lectured here last year about his book if kennedy lived. it is an honor and privilege to have both of them here with us and i am only sorry i wasn't dirksen senate office building 3 to arrange the playing of sweet georgia brown but please join me in welcoming henry kissinger and harvey rishikof. [applause]

>> when henry kissinger was named secretary of state, the president as what should we call you? professor kissinger, dr. kissinger, secretary kissinger, he said your excellency will do. this is not my plan for tonight. this book, "world order," covers roughly 400 years of diplomatic geopolitical and military history and four five continents. we have less than an hour. when we finish dealing with the whole book we will talk about tax policy, but what i want to do is to take dr. kissinger, what you have written and see its application today. i think anybody looking at the headlines would will get your book and say, what world order?

the west salient piece you talk about where states respect each other's territorial integrity, balance each other out, don't interfere, and isis crosses national boundaries, to talk about it, which helps protect syrian dictator we went out, you have afghanistan which you described less as the country that a group of tribes whose central low -- power is resentment and vengeance. can you look at the world today and say yes something like a world border -- world order is possible or is that an old concept that is not applicable today? >> first of all, i say to you is that there is no world order today. and perhaps if i tell you what

induced me to write the book, i was having dinner with a friend, a professor at yale, and i was discussing various ideas i had for writing a book. most of which had to do with historical episodes and personalities, and he said you have written a lot of history. why don't you write something about what concerns you most at the moment? what concerns me most at the moment is the absence of world order. the fact that for the first time in history, different regions of

the world's are interacting with each other. in the classical period, the roman empire and the chinese empire existed without any significant knowledge. without inference to the world order. so the reality of the present period is that different societies with different answers are now parts of a global system because what they don't have and the great concept of world order, so i began with this piece for two reasons. because that is the only formal

system of world order that has been devised and because it was the dominant system in europe and because lower europeans, as part of the imperialism brought around the world as a concept, there was a unique aspect to the european experience. in every other part of the world, what ever quarter existed was part of an empire. in china and the ideas that states balance each other didn't exist. in the islamic world it didn't exist in that sense. the sovereignty of states and the balance of their actions with each other was believed to

produce in the national order and international order. that is why i started to attempt to of fly to the contemporary circumstances. this is not a cook book you can read to the international order will be, it is an attempt to tell you, this is what we are up against now. and ways of looking at it. it does not say that i don't know what the end results of these conflicts and these ambiguities that you described will be. >> what i am getting at is that the westphalean piece which was 1648 after the 30 years' war,

those who like to believe history repeats itself, remember the fight over the shape of the paris peace corps table, 1648, and an endless number of doors so everyone could enter by the same import door and i believe you described they had to walk -- >> this same moment. >> some things don't change but the more relevant part is, is it falling to look at 360-year-old set of conferences involving one small part of the globe and think that it somehow has applicability to what we need in the 21st century where you have an islamist power that believes it is destined to rule the world, you may not have a chinese empire but you have a china that is reaching across the globe for resources, and international banking system that knows no national borders.

in this question for me is that even a model worth thinking about. >> the reason i started is this. europe for 30 years more, very similar to what is going on in the middle east. and every faction fighting every other and some of them using them for geopolitical purposes. the end of the period, and a population of central europe, with conventional weapons. it was the massive effort.

and leaders got together for a number of principles, the basic unit of international relations should be the state. that the state, countries should not -- the domestic affairs of other states. and the borders of the international affairs, by attempting to have an impact on other societies. some kind of international laws have been created. diplomats should be called into

existence, they never happened before. and so the interesting thing is none of the people, overwhelming statesman. but out of -- still a number of principles which for several hundred years governed european relations and were brought by the europeans and buy us and the world's. some of them are still of consequence. namely the basic unit of international is asian should be the state aid if you conduct foreign policy on a purely ideological basis and try to undermine the existence of the

state, then the structure of restraint that could be created disappears. now, of course, non intervention, separate principles of conduct, these were useful instruments. the dilemma of the present period is that several things are happening simultaneously. the state as a political organization is attacked in many parts of the world's, and non state actors are appearing that have powered that used to be associated with the state. secondly the economic organizations of the world and the political organizations of

the world are not comfortable anymore. political organizations based -- the economic organization of the world attempts to achieve globalization meaning there could transcend borders. there are many challenges today. i am attempting to do in the book to say here it is where is the idea of where it started. we will come to a concept of order because without it, there will be no principles to govern conduct, there will be no restraint on the exercise of power. how we get there, that is the

big challenge because for us in america, we believe that our principles are universal principles that everybody must accept. and i as an individual belief they are universal principles. but how to relate it to other societies, that is one of the great services. >> as you point out in your book, there are some forces that reject fundamentally the premise you have just outlined. the ones that you point to that would most alarm is islamism and particularly as the iranian folks in charge practice it. if i read your book correctly, the people who really run around, the theocrats, how many, believe islam is destined to rule the world, it is the only legitimate way so the idea of

saying to iran if i read your book right, you won't interfere here and we won't intervene there, that is that a basic level not islamic. doesn't that pose a difficult challenge? >> that is a big internal debate which is going on inside iran. the point i am making iran at this moment has three historic models before it in its own history, the experience of being a nation state, pursuing normal or traditional nation states actions which is more or less what they did for 100 years.

second model they have is of an empire. for great part of its history, iran was a great empire extending from the borders of what is today india and even into india will in to what today what we call the middle east and extending to africa. and it is the experience -- would you correctly described as enriching its view of the present theocracy which is that the islamic faith governing guide should be the governing guide of iranian poverty and

therefore the united states, is implemented and the view i expressed here is iran has to make the choice. doesn't have to announce a choice that has to make a perceptible choice which of these three models it will follow. let's remember one other thing about iran. of all the countries accounted by islam, iran is the only one that condition the middle east anyway -- the only one that does not give up its language or culture and that it maintains the iranian culture and language and adopt arabic.

so always is a feeling of something about iran so at the end of november, we are going to be confronting, we as a country, the end of the culmination of the negotiations about nuclear-weapons. end they will have to be touched by one assessment about the ultimate purpose of the iranian government through this. >> host: here is an argument i have heard about the optimistic way to look at iran, that over time meters and countries that once seemed, nestle threatened, you mention in your book a forgotten part of history, 1957,

mao tse tung goes to moscow and makes a speech in which he says this fear about nuclear war, we could lose 700 million people, we are big country and if we end of the communist world so be it. i gather the soviet union was not impressed by this argument. they took notice of this. 14 years later in beijing things change. the question is when you hear the iranians talk as they do, is it useful to point to an example like the evolution of china, the fact that longtime enemies now are at peace with each other? even in northern ireland, 800 years of violence has eased. should we take those examples and say all right, let's see what happens in iran, maybe they will leave golf out of their current reason and come to a more westphalean view of the

world? >> westphalean section was warmly to describe how an international custom came into being. no serious person thinks you can apply exactly the same principles. what you can apply is to ask a question of the basic units in touch with each other and by what method are they involved with each other and how do they communicate with each other and what is it they should try to achieve together? now, it is of course possible that this evolution occurs. but it is not possible that as an american leader, because

everything evolves. whether we sit back and let it evolve, we will see what happens. with respect to some issues that are permissible, in the case of china, the transformation of the conduct of china which started out to be built as a model of revolution for the rest of the world, this continues -- this continued until there was a consultation, ideological consultation, practical and ideological with the soviet

union, caused the soviet union to 42 divisions to the chinese border and then now look at this has attracted 0 problem, how do i protect my state against this? and the united states was the only available parter. i don't know if i put this in the book or not. the persistent of traditional ways of thinking, by shown by this episode. nixon and i, the first day in office have concluded that an attempt must be made to bring china into the international system. >> as i recall he wrote a piece for foreign affairs before he was elected. nixon wrote a piece in foreign

affairs magazine called asia after vietnam and there was a hinge that this -- >> and china was in the middle of a cultural revolution. it was hard to know -- to get a dialogue started. what i wanted to mention, the cia wrote periodic reports about what china might do and they published a report that is now available. and in july of 1971, when i was in china which they did note

which said, which said, which listed all the arguments i just made of why china should look to the united states but they concluded by saying this cannot happen while mao tse tung is alive so it has to wait until he is dead. today, we know that it could not have happened so fast. >> host: is reassuring that the cia hasn't changed all that much. >> guest: it was understandable. at any rate, china and the united states had to deal with each other as great powers and if -- they are all available now, read the conversations on

my trip to china, we were talking like two college professors discussing abstract concepts of international relations. we didn't go through any of the technical issues that divided us because both of us decided independently-at this point the most important quality to be achieved was can we understand what the other side is doing? so if we go into this world of three countries, china, russia, the united states, maneuvering against each other, cooperating with each other so we were building that kind of

international system, and i would say it was three years before we came to grips with the day-to-day. >> host: so many areas to cover and so little time that you raised one area. the critical step was to understand what the other person, how the other person was thinking. a point that was made during the cuban missile crisis. the points given to john kennedy were that begins the impulses of his advisers he kept trying to put himself in khrushchev's shoes. the question this raises is it seems to me that some of the united states's biggest missteps, i will use a polite word in foreign policy, have come from precisely the fact the we haven't understood the terrain or the people in which we were trying to act.

most recently -- i'm not trying to be partisan because i think think of both parties but certainly it seems to me the decision to go into iraq which from your point of view the you say nice things about bush but it seems pretty clear to me that you regard that kind of notion that we would go into iraq, build a democracy that would spread through the middle east like of ritual circle, is kind of really naive if not worse. >> the thing about. he gave me the honor of inviting me to discuss long-range international affairs with him.

so i overlooked the personal effects, i was impressed -- and concerned and there was a criticism but-my personal view of bush to other chapters but anyway, the decision to go into iraq, from a security point of view, after the united states had been attacked by terrorists based in the middle east, it was quite rational for the president of the united states to focus on the country that he genuinely

believed was building nuclear weapons. it is also wrong to say -- to believe this. and seeks prior agreement on many occasions, 35 by the united nations which might be -- might encourage and terrorist activities in the region. and in the clinton administration in 1998, the senate voted in a non-binding resolution, 98-zero, that he should be removed and if clinton signed this, this was not an

idea that bush introduced. i supported that part of it. i disagree with bush, to believe at after said dom -- saddam hussein was overthrown, that we had capacity to make a democracy out of a country during a military occupation. not only was islamic and therefore different approach to the notion, but also there was a profound division between the shiite and sunni parch and the

kurds. so i think that that is where it went wrong coin. >> with respect to does seem to me -- >> guest: explain why i think that. >> host: it seems to me with the history has shown is there was a lot of rhetorical notion that saddam hussein has to come out but the history shows the people in that administration were determined to go into iraq and help shape the evidence, the notion they were involved with 9/11 was never close to be accurate and to your point, your point they were at best victims of illusions about what they could do. so pressed for time, there are 25 things i would like to talk to you about. >> guest: the point is a governmental -- the president

cannot misunderstand the situation. the point is what the larger purpose is of the united states in the construction of the region. there are some things we are able to do and that we cannot do. >> i have to make this observation. george bush, george w. bush, second inaugural address proclaimed that it will be the policy of the united states to spread freedom and end tyranny everywhere in the world and i actually thought of you when i heard that because i thought you were watching at home you were throwing something at the television because it is so exemplifies what you think is a dangerous misapprehensions of how the world works. >> guest: the united states has

to have three levels of understanding. one, objectives or definitions of security that are so vital to us that we try to achieve them if necessary. the second is the objectives and security concerns which are important to us but which we will try to achieve only with allies. and objectives and particular concerns which we should not do because they are beyond the capabilities or values.

this is the sort of discussion we need to have. >> host: if you have a question of will get the mike to you and i am sure you will remember we have to come to a common understanding of what a question is. very important and i will be exceedingly undiplomatic like henry kissinger in making sure that we have questions. so to people with their hands raised. back to you. >> thank you for an in lightning evening. henry kissinger, if you were national security adviser, what would you advise president obama to do with regard to sending troops to the middle east?

>> guest: you know, it is very hard -- let me tackles the question in another way. i have now lived so long that i have witnessed and participated in five wars. some as an active participant and as an observer who knew the key players. if you look at the five wars that the united states conducted since 1945, we achieved the stated objective in only one. which is the first gulf war.

it was sort of a draw and that we withdrew from. each of them started like this one now with great enthusiasm, great public support, and at some point, the only key debate was how do you get out of its? and it was the only strategy accepted as a general consensus. what i would say to the president and security adviser, what i would say to you is tell me how it is going to end, and tell me -- let's get a plan. i think it was correct, in --

americans are murdered on television with improvement of intimidating regions and ourselves, i think it is right for us. we also need a strategy of how it will end and what we're trying to achieve and i would tell him that it does not risk public speeches here, should be the most important thing that he can do. >> could you stand up? you will project better. >> back in the 60s, the u.s. supported the removal of lack of

american governments and establishment of governments in the region, dictatorships that we would consider barbarian by all means, when you look back, the right policy for the u.s. to support the establishment of democratic governments. >> i can't answer that question until i know what government you are talking about and where there would you consider the american establishing with a correct description of it. >> she lachile, argentina, braz

bad. these ideas were first debated -- is out of the vietnam war, it has become axiomatic that the united states was conducting immoral foreign policies, and need not consider what serious people conducted serious policies might do. the new chile thing many books have been written on this. there is no possible way we can

come to a conclusion about it. and one in contributor affect is the revolution that overthrew -- every democratic party in chile supported it and every democratic party welcomed it. then we did not even know him, when this established an autocratic regime, the democratic party in chile, and the practical problem for any

american president faced with this situation is can you get involved in trying to overthrow any government that does not follow american preferences? what are the consequences for the united states? >> not as if we haven't done that in the past. in iran, guatemala we tried to overthrow fidel castro. nighters if the united states have whatever system you want, when it got to be tricky for the seizing of american companies, seemed to me -- very happy to try. >> i don't know about guatemala. that was before my time. >> it was before my time. >> it is very easy, very easy to

-- after the un. people in high office generally are there because they think there is nothing more important they can do with their lives except to improve security and values of our country. they can then come to the wrong conclusions, this idea that the united states faces a practical problem, and the experience i know about. in 1973, egypt was showing signs of wanting to move out of the

soviet orbit into a relationship with the united states, and from the point of view of stability in the middle east, and peace in the region we strongly encourage it. we knew saddam hussein was also basically an autocratic ruler, but i thought of him -- as a great man who contributed tremendously to the peace process in the region and i wish we had another anwar sadat who could deal with it. he was succeeded -- i was not in august at that time so this is not a defense of any particular

position but the american president -- a finite number of problems that it is possible to deal with and when you don't know what the outcome will be, when the outcome may be democratic, at tahrir square which we did support. this is a question to reflect upon, every decision was correct, but simultaneously say the united states would not be involved everywhere and to say however they should overthrow the democratic and anti-democratic government. i understand what you would say. i am not saying america has

always acted consistently. i have laid out what i think the critical thing should be but i have seen enough of it to know that the operation of the security of the united states, some allowance for the contingent and circumstance. >> yes, sir? i do regret that after 30 years in television, i thought we would have all this time the we are down to our last question or two. >> the separation of church and state is a fundamental principle of western democracies and one can argue about their success. and most troubled regions of the world it seems to me a heresy punishable by death in some cases. do you think this is a

fundamental problem that is a long-term barrier to true global world order? >> it is if it is -- first of all, i agree with you. the definition of the american fundamental principles. in the islamic religion is not possible to separate church and state because they are considered to be part of the same overriding philosophy. even in turkey, to create a secular state.

coming back to islamic concept. isn't so much the case in relations with china because china has no concept, no national concept. it also has no national concept. and to any order in the religion and the state emerged. >> that me see if we can get somebody all the way back. >> $500 for derek jeter's last game by the way. >> i think his excellency for

all of those wonderful things he had to say over his career on the importance of statesmanship. and statesmanship is not mentioned tonight. where can we learn to be better statesman, where is statesmanship being taught in a place, as fulfilling that role when developing your own mind and your own writing over the years and particularly reflected in this book. >> it is a very important question. statesmanship, and helping lead

to society from where it is to where it hasn't been. so it needs a combination of courage and character and above all, a sense for the trends of the period. if you look at the great statesman they have generally -- in our society, it is extremely pragmatic. and considered problem-solving rather than a reflection of historical evolution. as its principal objective.

contractually. and other obstacles, two other problems we face. the electoral process is getting so complicated and so expensive that the leaders have to spend some much time on a process and raising money and answering questions on television shows. there's not time to reflect about direction. if you look at prison in the nineteenth century, they have succession of prime minister, and sells very for almost a century. all of whom whatever differences

they have, basic conventions about the role of prison, and what prison should take. the reason for it, they lived in an environment comment and taken for granted. and provided a basis for creative -- i am very worried about the impact of the way history is taught and received and to develop these. >> you know what occurred to me? if you try to go to pakistan and

through to china with today's technology somebody would have taken an iphone picture of u.s. tweeted out and the secret would have been blown before you ever got to beijing. think about that. it is a different world. we have time for a couple more questions. we are done? okay. i am sorry, folks. can we think henry kissinger? [applause] >> thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >>. tv is on facebook. like us to get publishing