territory. in the mutations architecture is such from the atlantic ocean to europe. and i think there's a pretty expensive proposition and i don't think that many countries can do that. and i think the great threat is to us in america with some small unmanned aircraft is some nefarious group wanted to put some sort of explosives on it. but that would be a terror weapon. that would not be one of any military significance. i hope i answered your question even though i rambled a bit.

[inaudible question] >> could you comment about aviation involved and how is that an what would that look like and how does that change things two [inaudible] >> there is a general at the federal aviation administration that would love the answer to that question because that is something, as i'm sure you know -- one of the big issues and hurdles for people is safety. and so there are lots of

companies, the defense department, working on technologies to provide the uav and i think it's a real question as to how expensive that technology tends to be. and without it there a definite limits for what we will be able to do with this technology because you can't describe how this will relate to other aircraft as it causes damage to buildings or whatever. so safety is a major hurdle. and having looked at this thoroughly and the book tells the story of how they came up with these observations

involving a major problem that arose, i think that i am very hesitant to try to protect future because i don't think anyone would've predicted the you control this on the other side from the united states. and in fact all of the other experts are saying this can't be done. but i am reminded also of what i wrote this book and i loved the book about the 1930s and the dream that inspired this aircraft and we are still waiting for flying cars. the dream of flying cars. and i don't know how air-traffic controllers would work if all of a sudden the ability to decide,

well, i'm sick of this, i'm going to buy over to the grocery store, there are some problems that may be. >> yes, sir? [inaudible question] >> as you know we were able to talk about this. so how does this work with the way that they were chronic? >> well, i think that it was

interesting to me when they held this because from time to time there were these drones. one of the things about it was they had a flag or something draped across the front. and i had talked to people who knew more about these things than i would say it is unlikely that it was intact and it looked like a strange beast. actually when they showed it at the news conference. but i don't know the answer to that question.

i mean, it it was a classified aircraft. and i think it makes more sense to me than anything i'll bet rather than taking it over odd. >> i think i've answered every question. >> any additional comments and questions enact anyone who would like to chime in? >> you have written your previous book about this. which i think is more of a characteristic program and its more incremental which is, as you say, a tremendous revolution

and a great story as well. and especially on the horizon that could approximate something of this magnitude in terms of this. >> i think if i knew the answer to that -- i would be able to answer them more easily. [laughter] >> thank you very much. [applause] >> you very much, thank you all for being here. for those who have not received the book, smith on the next

"washington journal", doctor ron waldman. on fighting the spread of the ebola virus in africa. and bloomberg government on the recent decline of gas and oil prices and its effect on the politics of the middle east and russia. "washington journal" is live at 7:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. .. hour.

>> it's been said that no one can lay claim to the policy over the past 50 years than the secretary henry kissinger. a vital presence in international and national politics since the 1950s and named one of the foreign-policy magazine top 100 global thinkers. doctor kissinger served as the secretary of state under president nixon and ford and was the national security adviser for six years. during that time the policy of détente with the soviet union orchestrated that relations with china and negotiated the paris

peace accord which accomplished to withdraw of the forces from vietnam through which he won the nobel peace prize in 1973 and parenthetically the gratitude of this young lieutenant in the united states army. thank you mistress. other honors include the presidential medal of freedom, the middle of liberty and the national book award for history for the first volume of his memoirs in the white house years. his new book world order is a comprehensive analysis of the challenges of building international order in the world of differing perspectives, violent conflict, urgent technology and ideological extremism. you learn about the westphalian peace and be led on a fascinating exploration of european balance of power from charlemagne to the present time.

islam in the middle east, the u.s. and iran, the multiplicity of asia and the continuing development of u.s. policy. they are often more important than the answers and secretary kissinger has some brilliant one such as what do we seek to prevent no matter how it happens and even if we have to do it alone what do we seek to achieve even if not supported by anyone what should we not engage in anything if urged by a multilateral group and i think most importantly what does the nature of the values that we seek to advance. you will be intrigued and challenged by this book. i can't finish without mentioning probably one of secretary kissinger's least

known but as a transplanted native new yorker i think the most wonderful honor. he was made at the first honorary the first honorary member of the harlem globetrotters. [laughter] doctor kissinger will be interviewed at this evening by jeff greenfield in the acclaimed acclaimed acclaimed apollo debate television commentator in his own right to lecture here last year about his book if kennedy lived. it's an honor and a privilege to have them with us and i'm sorry i wasn't able to arrange the playing of sweet georgia brown. please join me in welcoming henry kissinger and jeff greenfield. [applause]

when henry kissinger was named secretary of state, the press asked him what should we call you, professor kissinger, doctor kissinger, secretary kissinger he replied your excellency will do. this isn't my plan for tonight. this covers 400 years of diplomatic military history and four or five continents. we have a little less than an hour. when we finish dealing with the book we will talk about the tax policy. but what i want to do is take doctor kissinger what you have written and see its application today.

don't interfere. look at isis which crosses the national boundaries and if you look at the united states on them in serious. it's less than a country as a group of tribes whose central out of power is resentment and vengeance. can you look at the world today and actually say something like a world order is possible or is that an old concept that is simply not applicable today? >> first of all i agree with you that it is no world order today.

and perhaps if i tell you what induced me to write the book i was having dinner with a friend, professor at yale and i was discussing various ideas i had for writing a book most of which had to do with the personalities and he said you've written a lot of literacy. why don't you write about something that concerns you most what concerns me most at the moment is the absence.

the different regions of the world interacting with each other. the roman empire and the chinese empire existed without any significant knowledge and acted without any difference. so the reality of the present period is different societies with different histories are now integrate concept of the world order so i began for two reasons

because that was the only system of world order that has ever been devised and because of the dominance in europe and because the europeans were part of the problem around the world as a concept and in every part of the world whatever order existed as part of an entire. in the islamic world that doesn't exist. europe is the only society where the sovereignty of states and the balance of their actions with each other was believed to

produce international order so that's why it started with that and then attempted to apply to many circumstances. but this wasn't a book you could read to see what the order will be. it's to tell you this is what we are up against now. this is the challenge we have but it does not say that i know what the end result of all these conflicts and ambiguities some of which you describe will be. >> i'm getting the westphalian

peace which is 1648 after a 30 year war. either way you like to be the district repeats itself. remember the fight over the paris peace accord table. 1648, the sensibility of the various diplomats headed up the number of doors so that everybody could enter by the same importance and i believe you describe they had to walk -- >> the same moment. >> somethings don't change but i think the more relevant part is is it folly to look at a 360-year-old set of conferences involving one small part of the globe and it somehow has applicability to what we need in the 21st century where you have an islamist power to believe that is destined to rule the world and you may not have a chinese empire did you have a china that is reaching across the globe from resources and you

have an international banking system that knows no national borders. in this age the question for me is that even a model for thinking about as relevant? >> the reason i started this system is a "third year war very similar to now what is going on in the middle east of every faction fighting every other and some of them using their religious convictions for the geopolitical purposes. and at the end of the period which may be a third maybe a third of the population of central europe with conventional weapons they got together on a

number of principles which was the basic unit of international relations should be the state. the state that countries shouldn't intervene in the domestic affairs of other states and that the borders of the international affairs began by attempting to have an impact on and that some kind of international law should be created and that diplomats

should be called into acceptance into the never happened before. and so the interesting thing is none of these people were overwhelming statesmen, but out of the suffering they still have a number of principles which then put several hundred years covered european relations and were brought by the europeans and by us throughout the world. now some of them still of great consequence mainly the basic unit of international relations should be the state and that if you conduct foreign policy on the purely ideological basis and try to undermine the state that

it could be created disappears. now, of course non- intervention , the set of principles of conduct, these were useful instruments. the dilemma of the present period is that several things are happening simultaneously. it is attacked in many parts of the world and the nonstate or as are appearing that have covered used to be associated with the state.

and in the political organization of the world of the economic organization of the world attempts to achieve which means it transcends. i am attempting to do in the book is to say here is where this idea of the order started. sooner or later we will come to the concept of order because without it there will be no principles to govern and there will be no restraint on the exercise of power. how we get there is the big

challenge because for us in america, we believe that our principles are the universal principles that everybody must accept. and i as an individual believed in the universal principles. but how do we relate to other societies, that is one of the great challenges we face. >> but as you point out in the book there are some forces that reject fundamentally the premise that you outlined. the one that viewpoint to which most alarm is particularly as the folks in charge practice that. if i read your book correctly, the people who've who really run around, the theocrat how many believe that it's the only

legitimate ways to the idea of saying if i read your book right you won't interfere here and we won't dare. at a basic level that is on islamic. doesn't that pose a rather difficult challenge? speck that is the internal debate that is now going on. and the point i'm making is at this moment there are three stories models in its own history. the experience of being a nationstate and pursuing normal or traditional nationstates which is more or less what they

did. the second model they have is that of an empire. iran was a great empire extending from the borders today and well into what we cover the middle east extending to the end of africa and you have correctly described which is the view of the present which is that of the islamic face and it should be the governing guide and

therefore it is permanent and the view i expressed here is that iran has to make a choice. it doesn't have to announce the choice but it has to make a perceptible choice which of these three models it follows. one other thing iran is the only one that is in the middle east nor its culture and that it maintains the culture and

language so it's always a distinct feeling of something special about iran so at the end of november we are going to be confronting the end of the culmination of the negotiations about the nuclear weapons. and they have to be judged by the settlement and about what the alternate purpose of the air indian government. >> here's an argument that i've heard. they seem to change they've seen the change in you mention in your book forgotten part of

history the 1957 mount saint goes to moscow and the fear of a nuclear war would lose several hundred million people and if we end up with the communist a communist world, so be it. i gather that it was unimpressed by this argument. 14 years later during the regime the question is when you hear them talk as they do is it useful to point to an example like the evolution of china. it's now at peace with each other that even in northern ireland 800 years of violence is in the east. should we take those examples and say all right. maybe they will evolve out of their current series theories and come to a more salient view

of the world. >> this section was only to describe what came to be boasted of things you cannot play exactly. you can apply the database and what message should there be in touch with each other and how do they communicate with each other and how do they try to achieve together? >> perhaps this evolution occurs but it is not possible that as

an american leader you say because everything revolves. why don't we just sit back and let it evolve and we will see what happens. with respect to some issues, in the case of china the transformation that started out to be built as a model of resolution for the rest of the world that hasn't continued until it was the conflict with

caused the soviet union to move 42 divisions to the chinese border, and then mao looked at this as a practical problem of states, how do i protect my state against this? and the united states was the only available partner. i don't know whether i put this in the book or not. the persistence of traditional ways of thinking is shown by this episode. nixon and to some extent i, from the first day in office, had concluded that an attempt must be made to bring china into the international system. >> is a recall he wrote a peace for posterior foreign affairs" that behind end ibeg you're

pardon. >> nixon wrote a piece called "asia after vietnam" and it was a hint this was on his mind. >> absolutely. and thousand was in the middle of a cultural revolution, so it was very hard to know at what door to knock, even to get a -- to get a dialogue started, but the incident i want to mention, the cia wrote periodic reports about what china might do. and they published a report in early july, 1971, while i was on my way to china, and they didn't

know, which said -- which listed all the arguments that was made of why china should look to the united states but the concluded with saying, this cannot happen while mao is alive. so, one has to wait until mao is dead. today we know it could not have happened so fast unless he was alive. >> that's re-assuring the cia has not changed all that much. [laughter] >> well, it was understandable. at any rate, then china and united states had to deal with each other as great powers, and if you read -- they're all available now -- these

conversations on my trip to china, chou en-lai and i were talking like two college professors, discussing abstract concepts of international relations. we didn't go through any of the technical issues of -- that divided us. why? because both of us decided independently that at this point, the most important quality to be achieved was, can we understand what the other side is doing? so as we go into this world of three countries, china, russia, and the united states, cooperating with each other, so

we were building a kind of international system, and i would say it was about three years before we really got to discuss the day-to-day. >> so many areas to cover and so little time-out. raise one of the areas i want to -- the critical step was to understand what the other person was -- how the other person was thinking. a point that was made, i know, during the cuban missile crisis, the opinions given to john kennedy were that, against the impulses of some of his advisers, he kept trying to put himself in khrushchev's shoes. so the question this raises is, it seems to me that some of the united states' biggest missteps -- i'll use a plight word -- polite word -- comes from the fact we have not a understood the terrain and people in which we were trying

to act. most recently -- i'm not trying to be partisan because i can think of both parties but seems to me the decision to go into iraq, which from your point of view, you say nice things about bush you did serve republican presidents but seems clear to me you regard that notion that we would go into iraq, build a democracy, it would spread through the middle east like a virtuous circle as kind of really naive, if not worse. >> bush did me the honor of inviting me to discuss long-range international affairs with him, without any -- fairly regularly. in the second -- and so i

developed a personal affection for him and i was impressed by his concerns. and there was some criticism that i recorded my personal view of bush and normally did not do in the other chapters. anyway, now, about the decision to go into iraq. from a security point of view, after the united states had been attacked from -- by terrorists based in the middle east, it was quite rational for the president of the united states to focus on a country that he genuinely

believed was building nuclear weapons. it turned out to be wrong, but it is also wrong to say that this was -- he generally believed this -- had violated a cease fire agreement without -- on many occasions certified by the united nations, and which might be a base for which might encourage a terrorist activities in the region. and when asked -- i have to remember that in the clinton administration, in 1998, the senate voted in a nonbinding resolution, 98-0, that saddam should be removed and did clinton sign it? this was not enough of idea that

bush introduced, and i supported that part of it. where i disagreed with bush was, in the belief was in the belief that after saddam had been overthrown, that we had the capacity to make a democracy out of a country during military occupation, that not only was islamic and, therefore, of a different approach to the notion of pluralists but also in which the -- there was a profound division between the shia and the sunni part, and a profound division between the kurds and

the sunnies and the shia. so, i think that that is where it went wrong. >> with respect -- it does seem to p me -- >> i explain why i think that. >> it does seem to me that what the history has shown is that -- yes there was a lot of rhetorical notion that saddam has to come out. the history shows that the people in that administration were determined to go to iraq, help shape the evidence to the notion they were involved with 9/11, was never close to being accurate, and to take your point, that they would -- your point that -- throughout the book -- they were at best victims of delusions about what they could do. but we're so pressed for time, there are 25 other things i'd like to talk to you about -- >> the point is not that which government of the president

cannot misunderstand the situation. the point is what the larger purposes of the united states in the construction of the region would be. >> yes. >> and there are some things we are able to do and there are other things we cannot do. >> i have to make this observation. it's nowhere in your book, george w. bush's second inaugural address proclaiming it would be the policy of the united states to fight tyranny and spread flee dom everywhere in the world and i thought if you were watching that, you were throwing something at the television set because it so exemplifies what you think is a dangerous misapprehension of how the world works. >> the united states has to have

three levels of understanding of the world. one objective or definitions of security that are so vital to us that we will defend them or try to achieve them even alone, if necessary. the second is, objectives and security concerns which are important to us, but which we will try to achieve only with allies. and the third is, objectives and security concerns which we should not do because they're beyond our either capabilities or value, frankly.

so this is the sort of discussion we need to have. >> your turn. if you have a question, raise your hand. we'll get a mic to you, and please, as i said a year ago, we have to come to a common understanding of what a question is. [laughter] >> very important, and i will be exceedingly undiplomatic, like dr. kissinger, in making sure we have questions. so mics to people with hand raised -- i get to call. i'm sorry. let's start in the front row because i can see that. i'll get back to you. >> thank you both for an enlightening evening. dr. kissinger, if you were national security adviser, what would you advise president obama to do with regard to sending troops to the middle east?

>> you know, it's very hard to give tactical advice. let me tackle the question in another way. i've now lived so long that i have witnessed and in a way participated in five wars. some as an active participant, some as an observer who knew the key players. if you look at the five wars that the united states conducted since 1945, we have achieved our stated objective in only one.

the first gulf war. the korean war was sort of a draw. and the other three war's we withdrew from. but each of them started like this one now is, with great enthusiasm, great public support, and then at some point the only key debate was, how do you get out of it? and withdrawal became the only strategy accepted as a general consensus. so, what i would say to the president, as security adviser, and what i would say to him, would say to you, is tell me how it's going to end? and tell me how -- get a plan -- i think it was correct that when americans are murdered on

television, for the purpose of intimidating regions and ourselves, i think it is right for us to respond. but we also need a strategy of how it will end and what we're trying to achieve. and i would tell him, internally, not with the public speech here -- should be the most important thing that he can do. >> halfway back. yes. >> could you stand up? project better. >> back in the '60s, the u.s. supported the removal of some of the latin american governments,

and establishment of nondemocratic governments in the region, and in some countries, dictatorships that we consider barbarian but all means nowdays. when you look back today, you think it was the right policy for the u.s. to support establishment of those party government? >> i can't answer the question until i know what government you're talking about. and whether what you consider the american establishing of them, whether that's a correct description of it. >> chile, argentina, brazil, uruguay.

>> settled this debate is that -- when these ideas were first debated, partly as a result of the vietnam war, it had become alcsow -- axiomatic that the united states was conducting foreign policies and one need not consider what serious people conducting serious policies might do. the chile thing, many books have been written on this, and there's no possible way to come to a conclusion.

but bun irrefutable fact is that when the revolution that overthrew allende occurred, every democratic party in chile supported it, and every democratic party welcomed it. then pinochet, who we did not put -- we didn't even know him -- when pinochet established a autocratic regime, that's when the democratic parties in chile, and then the practical problem for any american patriot in this

situation is, can you get involved in trying to overthrow any government which does not follow american preferences and what were the consequences of the united states. >> it wasn't as if we hadn't done that in the past in iran in guatemala, we tried to overthrow castro. it's not as though the united states said, have whatever system you want, when it got to be tricky for the seizing of american companies seemed to me that america was happy to try. >> i don't know about guatemala because that was -- >> okay. >> that was before my time. [laughter] >> okay. it was before my time, too. >> it's very easy to sit in

judgment after the event. if you start from the concept that people in high office are generally there because they think there's nothing more important they can do with their lives except to improve the security and the values of our country, they can then still come to wrong conclusions, but this idea that the united states likes -- it places a practical problem. let me see if you experience i know about. in 1973, egypt was showing signs of wanting to mover out of the soviet orbit, into a

relationship with the united states. and from the point of view of stability in the middle east, and peace in the region, we strongly encouraged this. of course we knew that sadat was also basically autocratic ruler, but i thought of him -- i grew to think of him as a great man who contributed tremendously to the peace process in the region. and i wish we had another sadat with whom one could deal as one dealt with him. then he was succeeded by mow