[laughter] [applause] >> thank you very much. you have been a great audience. thank you very much. [applause] >> i listened to the debate campaign 2014. there was between demaio and representative scott peters and it's just politics as usual. what we really need is for the politicians to quit making decisions based on power, money and votes and start working together at a higher level seeking the best decisions for the american people. i am to the point that when there is any type of political event, both republicans and democrats and any other party that wants to get involved should organize it, should start

from the get-go learning to work together and this -- at this event show their constituents and the american people that they can literally work together, recent together at a higher level on all the issues that americans are concerned about and get the best decisions by reasoning together instead of it being based on power, money and votes. we win and you lose. >> i'm calling to say thank you for the debates. i just watched the vermont governor's debate and i'm embarrassed to admit that when i first saw there were seven candidates on the stage i thought it was going to be a circus but i'm glad i got over that and i watched. i was really impressed with some of the ideas, the suggestions

that they made particularly the gentleman who said that an educated workforce is to the benefit of our country so we should be paying students to go to school, not charging them and putting them in debt for going to school. and i really liked the woman candidate who reminded us that senator jeffords would refuse to debate, to attend any debates that didn't include everybody that was on the ballot. it's time that americans realize we don't have to choose between them. there are more than 100 political parties in this country and it's time we started looking at some of the others. thanks again for c-span for airing the debates.

>> next from tennessee's 2014 southern festival of books pulitzer prize-winning historian james mcpherson pay talks about "embattled rebel" has recently public -- published biography of jefferson davis. this is 55 minutes. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> i am glad all the flights connected or whatever you needed. i am dan pomeroy the chief curator interactive collections at the tennessee museum and it's my distinct honor to be up here and share the platform with this distinguished historian. he really needs no introduction. i'm sure you all know all about him and his work. james mcpherson got his ph.d. from johns hopkins university. he is currently professor emeritus of history at princeton university. he is the former president of the american historical association. he is a recipient of the 2007 pritzker military library literature award. he is a former jefferson lecture at the national endowment for

the humanities. he is very active in efforts to preserve civil war battlefields and i'm sure he is aware of what's been going on right now in franklin. he is the author of numerous works on civil war history including that'll cry of freedom which received the pulitzer prize. lincoln as commander in chief which received the lincoln prize and -- also receive the lincoln prize. he's going to talk to us today about his newest work, "embattled rebel" jefferson davis as commander in chief. i will turn it over to you. >> i apologize for keeping you waiting or perhaps i should require the gentleman who sabotage the air traffic control mechanics in chicago about 10 days ago because everything

is -- and i've been in chicago as part of a book tour for this book. just about everybody who knows something about the civil war is familiar with the problems that president abraham lincoln had with general george b. mcclellan and who he described as the general who would not fight. less familiar except maybe here in the south and i'm sure about about that is the story of similar tensions between confederate general jefferson davis and -- johnson never ran for president the way mcclellan did against lincoln but the hostility between johnston and davis became more intense, lasted longer and perhaps had a more adverse impact on the confederate war effort than did the lincoln mcclellan conflict on the union war effort. dave is from mississippi and

johnson from virginia were fellow cadets at west point in 1820s. they graduated one year apart. they knew each other they are but they were not close. the rumor later circulated that they had a fight over a girl but that story is almost certainly apocryphal. be that as it may when the war began and virginia seceded johnson resigned from united states army and davis appointed him as general commanding one of the two largest field armies in virginia. beauregard commanded the other. those to armies combined to win the first battle in what became eventually the first battle of manassas on july 21, 1861. in the two months before that battle many people in the south had expected jefferson davis to take personal command of the main confederate army. after all davis graduated from west point. he had served as a regular army officer for seven years.

he commanded the mississippi volunteer regiment very well in the mexican war for which he emerged as a wounded were here io -- hero. he had served as a fine secretary of war in the franklin pierce of administration in the middle 18 50's. in february 1861 when the confederate government was formed davis hoped to be appointed as general in chief of the army. instead he was elected president which of course made him commander-in-chief, civilian position but one that gave him authority over his army commanders. davis at first actually intimated that he might take command of troops in the field in virginia. joseph johnson himself urged davis in june 1861 as johnson put it to appear in a position general washington appeared

enduring the revolution. davis discovered as president he could not postpone or ignore civil affairs in order to take the field as commander in chief. still, he itched to do so. even though he was required to stay in richmond to address the confederate congress when it met there for the first time on july 201861. after addressing the congress though on the hot morning of july 21 he could stand the suspense no longer. he knew that the combined army of beauregard and johnson were confronting the enemy near the railroad junction at of manassas. he commandeered a special train and davis went northward arriving at manassas junction in midafternoon. he borrowed a horse and rode toward the sound of guns. he was dismayed by what he first encountered stragglers and wounded men, discarded weapons,

damaged equipment, the usual in the prayer of the battlefield. davis tried to rally the stragglers. i am president davis he shouted. follow me back to the field. some of them did it by the time davis reached johnson's headquarters where he found the general sending reinforcements to the front it was clear the confederates had won the battle. davis addressed the soldiers who cheered into the echo. that evening davis met with johnson and beauregard at their headquarters. davis wanted to organize the pursuit of the enemy and suggests a one of the generals order such a movement. they remain silent because as commander in chief davis was now in charge. he began to dictate in order but on reflection further information about the disorganized nature of the confederate army than more

consultation they concluded in the darkness and effective pursuit was impossible. heavy rain and confederate troops brought recognizance to a hault. even though it was davis who was most eager to follow up his victory impressively and oppression grew up in the south that it was he who had discouraged pursuit. beauregard gave an ambiguous passage in his belt report and back stairs, two congressman. this was the beginning of a growing rift between beauregard and davis said he came second only to the eventual schism between johnson and davis. in the summer of 1861 davis and johnson remained on pretty good terms. that cordiality belt became seriously strained in september over the question of johnson's ranking on the list of confederate generals.

back in may 1861 the confederate congress had authorized the appointment of five full generals equivalent of the u.s. army of four-star generals. the law specified it would be equivalent to their relative grade in the united states army and the same branch of the service before they had resigned to go south. thus davis gave the top-ranking to samuel cooper whom i expect not many of you have heard of. his adjutant inspector general the same staff position he held in the old army and now of course at this job in richmond. davis named his longtime friend albert sidney johnston who was on his way from california but had not yet commanded confederate troops to the second position followed by robert e. lee who at this time was commanding a small army trying unsuccessfully to push union troops out of the western part of virginia that subsequently

became west virginia. davis rounded out the list of five full generals with joseph johnson is number four in blower guard is number five. when joe johnson learned in september of this number four ranking he exploded in anger. all along he assumed he was number one based on his position as quartermaster general in the prewar u.s. army with the rank of leader general 12 the three ranked above them had been colonels. johnson sat down and wrote a blistering letter to davis venting his outrage. the presidents actions johnson told him closely studied indignity that tarnish my fair name as a soldier and a man. it was a blow aimed at me only especially when he was commander in the great victory of damascus and those had not struck a blow to the confederacy as he put it. this angry missive reach davis while he was suffering one of

his frequent bouts of illness. this time a recurrence of his old malarial fever which no doubt sharpened the asperity of his reply. he acknowledged receiving johnson's letter and added, his language is as you say unusual. his arguments and statements utterly one-sided and his insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming. that was it. no response to johnson's arguments. no explanation of the ranking. such an explanation would have pointed out that johnson's grade as a line officer in the old army was lieutenant colonel while the three men that davis ranked above them had been full colonels. johnson brigadier generalship in the old army within a staff position while this branch of service in the confederate army was as a line officers under the terms of the law his fourth grade was below that of the

others. even if davis had bothered to explain all this complicated business to johnston the general would not have been satisfied. the insult to his honor as he considered it, rankled him for the rest of his life. he dropped the matter for now though and neither he nor davis mentioned it to each other again. but given the large and brittle egos of both men there remained a festering issue in the recesses of both of their minds. they had a war to fight go against a different enemy, the yankees hands over the next six months they cooperated as commander in chief's and top kill generals to conduct the enemy threat. beauregard was transferred to the theater in tennessee and lee went to south carolina to organize the south atlantic coastal incentives. johnson organized and trained his growing army occupying the

centreville manassas line in northern virginia where it faced a larger union army. it was subject to increasing pressure from lincoln and from congress to do something with that army. concerned that mcclelland might in fact do something davis, and johnson to a strategy meeting in richmond in february of 1862. they discussed the vulnerability of johnson's army and centreville to a flanking movement by mcclelland via the rappahannock river. they agreed that johnson should pull back to more defensible position south of the rappahannock but the wretched conditions of the roads caused by winter rains sent the chaotic state of the overworked railroads made a quick withdrawal impossible. davis ordered johnston to send his large guns and huge stockpiles of meat and other supplies south as transportation

became available and to prepare to retreat with the army itself when he received orders to do so. but in early march in 1862 johnson became a precipitate withdrawal went they detect a federal activity that he thought was the beginning of mcclellan's anticipated flanking. without informing richmond he feared a week later. johnson fell back so quickly that he was compelled to leave behind or destroy us have begun ammunition amounts of supplies including 750 tons of meat and other foodstuffs food stuffs that big confederacy could ill afford to lose. in richmond davis heard rumors of this retreat but as he later told johnston, i was at a loss to believe it. the distress that the disruption of supplies was acute.

and this book came at a time of other confederate defeats in the western tennessee and elsewhere in the west and in north carolina. these were verses and davis's waning confidence caused the present to recall robert e. lee and install him as his top military adviser assorted general in chief in richmond. one of these first activities in that capacity was to instruct general thomas j. jackson, that is stonewall jackson, to carry out the virgin mary attacks in the shenandoah valley which of course jackson did with famous success. nevertheless mcclellan increased the pressure with the buildup a large army at the tip of the virginia peninsula 75 miles down the keynes river. ..

>> he had his own army of about 60,000 men. instead of attacking, he brought up his big guns and methodically

prepared to polarize the defenses with heavy artillery. now, despite having been overruled by davis, he still intended to evacuate the yorktown lines without a fight. he delay that until mcclellan was ready to open with this artillery. he favored to keep them informed at the last minute on may 1 when he told the president that he must allow the next night and davis was shot and it would mean the loss of folk and the ironclad virginia and other ships under construction there. and johnson agreed to wait. for one more day. and on the ninth of may 3 and 4th, his armies left the yorktown line and begin and retreat towards richmond. they thought a battle with pursuing federals at williamsburg and continued to in

line behind the river about 20 miles from richmond. more folk did fall to the yankees and the crew had to blow it up because it was too great to get the james river. davis was dismayed by the development. he allowed this to lament the tubing cause of our country. and he told johnson that johnson recognized this rebuke for what was this includes the conduct of the campaign. and he received this for someone

who can be part of personal accountability and he would've charged them to a duel. and with davis yet again it was repeated. and he defended the line and even to launch counterattacks along that sluggish stream. but without informing davis, johnston have decided to withdraw to a new position only about 4 miles east of richmond. when the president rode out on horseback, as he frequently did when the armies were in the vicinity of richmond, he rode out on may 18 visit him and he was taken back when he encountered the army before he was gone more than a few miles. davis confronted him and asked why he had pulled back so close to the city.

and that includes the low lands on a super supply of water. and so he told johnson according to one of his aides who was present that he would appoint someone to the command would and he asked johnson to attend the meeting the following day and that afternoon he wrote to his wife. and he had taken this as part of the danger.

i have been waiting for johnston wanted to communicate his plans and we are uncertain of everything except the battle must be near at hand. i'm still johnson never did show up at davis went ahead with the meeting where we expressed anxiety about the fate of richmond. and it shall not be given up, he said. and he said tears ran down his cheeks. i have seen him on many occasions when the fate of the confederacy hung in the balance, but i never saw him show equally deep emotions. the next day davis assured an anxious delegation from the virginia legislature that richmond would indeed be defended. and johnson finally seem to get the message and mcclellan had crossed the chicken hominy leaving the other park

northeast. he told davis that he planned to attack that and he said he had discussed just such a plan of the attack yet approved of the plan. and he rode over the bluff to see this action commands, as he wrote to his wife. and it turned out that scouts have learned that the enemy was strongly behind beaver dam creek and so the attack had been avoided. davis was depressed. thus ended the program, he wrote his wife from which we expected much and which i was hopeful. and almost the same thing happened again one week later. once more he plan to attack the right flank north of the chickahominy and he called off her davis, who had again ridden

out to watch the battle. at this time he decided instead to attack the one nearest to richmond. he explained later that he did not tell davis of this change. but he said to do so would transfer this to his shoulders. and so johnson decided the peculiar notion meant that he first learned of this general's plan of attack when he heard artillery firing on the afternoon of may 31. he quickly left his office and mounted his horse and rode towards the sound of the done. when he arrived near the village of seven pines, just a few miles

from richmond, which gave its name to the battle, he saw johnston writing way to the front and davis' aides were convinced that the general had left in order to avoid davis and the battle was not going well for the confederates. as dusk approached it was clear that the attack had failed. at moment stretcher barriers carried a seriously worried johnson to the rear. all animosity forgotten, davis rushed to his side and spoke to him with genuine concern. it was clear that while his wounds were not mortal, he was out of action for several months. as davis and lee rode together back to richmond that night. the president told lee that he was now the commander of a lee would designate as the army of northern virginia. the new era would don on his new

commander. and johnson's recovery took almost six months. during that time he moved into the richmond home of louis windfall of texas. a fire eating secessionists that would engage in this. and it became the most tenacious critic in congress. and that includes increasing hostility. and then that face the duty and

that includes the army of virginia and there was no chance of that. all other confederate armies also had commanders and davis decided to make johnston a sort of theater commander and that includes the appalachian mountains in the mississippi river, including several armies, principally braxton bragg's army and john pemberton's army of mississippi. confederate prospects had recently improved after devastating losses earlier in the year. but pemberton's hold on vicksburg in the lower mississippi was still threatened and his position in middle tennessee was still threatened and was precarious after his retreat in october from the invasion of kentucky. and giving him authority over

this, and he thought he was conferring with prestige in rank and ambition. but johnson thought otherwise. seeing it as an effort as johnson put it, to put it on the shelf by giving johnson a position with no real authority. that was not davis' purpose at all though he gave some substance to that suspicion by requiring them to continue reporting to richmond. still it could've made much more of the command if he had chosen to do so but he preferred to complain about lack of authority and express his desire for a real army command. when davis give him that opportunity in early 1863, johnson declined it. dissension in the army had grown worse after its second retreat

following the battle of murphy's burrow. a cabal of core division commanders in the army blame him for inept leadership. davis instructed johnson in his capacity as theater commander to investigate this imbroglio and take command of the army itself as he found the complaints justified. but johnson gave him eight clean bill of health, telling them that the army's operations included the interest of the service that requires that he should not be removed. nevertheless, the infighting amongst the high-ranking officers in the army of tennessee only grew worse. in march of 1862 davis ordered johnson to take field command of the army and to descend him to richmond for the assignment. and however johnson once again managed to avoid obedience to

the commander-in-chief's wishes. when he arrived at the headquarters in tennessee, johnston learned that his wife was seriously ill so the general could not be sent away. and then he himself fell sick as well. on april 10 he reported that he was not now able to serve in the field and by the time he had recovered a few weeks later from his honest, the scene of concern have shifted to mississippi where ulysses grant had launched his campaign against vicksburg. and the loss of that bastion would be a staggering blow to the confederacy. on may 9, davis ordered johnson to mississippi to take personal command of the troops there. johnston arrived at jackson, the state capital, on may 13 to find that the army was about to capture that city and was appearing to turn west towards vicksburg itself. johnston wired richmond that i

am too late. and his pessimism set the tone for johnston's efforts or the lack thereof during the next seven weeks. he ordered pemberton to evacuate expert and can bind his army with johnson's small force to defeat grant. pemberton was reluctant to do that because davis had telegraphed him a week earlier to hold vicksburg and hudson as necessary. many southerners were already skeptical because he had been born in the north. and pemberton feared dead if he abandoned vicksburg he would be accused in the south of treason. in any event, grants victories

at champion phil in the big black river on the 17th, back into's vicksburg defenses. the failure of two union attacks against these formidable works caused grant to settle down for his siege. the discrete together reinforcements building up his force to about 25,000 men covering east of vicksburg. they attacked to break through to reinforce pemberton. but he said that he his force was too small under sherman that established to protect israel. in vicksburg the hope that johnson would rescue them bleed both soldiers and civilians who were under siege. the newspaper, now being printed on wallpaper because it had run out of newspaper, reported the

undaunted johnston is at hand, hold out a few days longer in our lives will be open, the enemy driven away and the siege raise. but johnson was daunted and he was not a hand. on june 15 he wired the secretary of war and said i consider saving vicksburg hopeless. an official reported that he was furious with johnston. the president directed said that your telegram reeves and wants us. expert must not be lost at least without a struggle. the interest and the honor of the confederacy prohibits that. i rely on you to avert the loss if the resource does not offer the attack, but johnson did not wage an attack. on the fourth of july the starving garrison surrendered.

when the news reached richmond, davis was bitter against johnston according to the ordinance chief. when gorgon said that vicksburg fell because a want of provisions, he replied that it guess, from want of provisions inside and the general outside who would not fight. johnston retreated to the state capital at jackson and sherman pursued and began to surround the city hoping to salvage something from what he called the disasters determination of the siege of vicksburg, he urged johnston to hold the state responsible. he said he will not fail to employ all available means to ensure success. the johnston beard does and so he evacuated it on july 16. he left so hastily that he failed to secure some 400 rural

cars and davis relieved him of his theater commander making them independent and leaving johnston and control. he also wrote a 15 page letter in his own hands charging johnson with what amounted to dereliction of duty. he fired back denying the charge with pemberton. this inaugurated with his biographer described as a paper war between the partisans of davis and johnston. in increasingly poison the body politic of the confederacy. three months after the fall of expert, mary chestnut road and her husband, james, a member of the staff told the president after an inspection trip that every honest man that he saw out

west thought well of joe johnson and those of the president suggest this for all the trouble he has given him. and that included amounting to a religion. and this mutual hostility obviously had an important impact on competitor at operations, confederate operations. but he wanted to know what to do about braxton bragg and the army about tennessee. contact dissension between him and his senior general continued to plague the army and even after victory in september, it seems to bear the strategic results because the defeated enemy remained in control of chattanooga. both of the subordinates blame him for this state of affairs and he blamed some of them.

dave is twice tried to persuade robert lee to go south and take command of the army but we convinced the president that was more important for him to remain in virginia. in october davis himself made the long trip to sort out the problems between him and his subordinates. and one reason for that controversial decision was with a logical alternative which was johnston. and davis had tried to get him to take command back in the spring but that had worked not and now he davis was so angry that a renewed offer seemed impossible. but after his disastrous defeat in november, the pressure on davis from all quarters, most quarters at least, to a point

johnston became overwhelming. davis first tried and he did actually name hearty to the post , but he didn't feel up to the task of leading that afflicted organization. and sony on davis billy had nowhere else to go then johnston, who became the army of tennessee's new commander in december of 1863. he set to work to reorganize the army and prepare it for the spring offensive by sherman that everyone knew was coming. and davis hope that he could steal the march on sherman and launch a preemptive winter offensive that might set the federal people back on their heels. became a steady stream describing the deficiencies of the army that made any kind of offensive impossible. the army has not entirely

recovered its confidence, he informed davis. the arc and trent artillery is deficient and the horses are not in good condition. troops have not subsistence or build transportation and the enemy outnumbers me almost two to one. lincoln had received unless messages of the same nature back in 1862. they were closer to the truth in johnson's case to be sure. but davis knew that the same problems existed in the army of lee in northern virginia. in the spring of 1863 just before it's spectacular victory at chancellorsville, it became eminently clear to davis that he could expect nothing like chancellorsville. he did hope that johnson might stop the offensive or at least make him pay heavily for it as

lee was making grant pay and virginia. but in georgia sherman flanked his defensive positions and forced him back so i stopped, 70 miles to the outskirts of atlanta. by the first week of july. johnson kept his army intact in these retreats, but he yielded valuable territory and raise doubts about whether he intended to defend atlanta. which was not only an important railroad and manufacturing unter, but have become a symbol of confederate resistance second only to richmond and self. davis agreed with the secretary of war appraisal of johnston strategy and said that his theory awards seem to be never to fight unless strong enough to overwhelm the enemy and merely to continue to looting. davis might also have agreed with a modern has very of this

campaign, richard mcmurray, who is not being entirely facetious when he said that if johnson had remained in command he would have fought the crucial battle of the campaign at key west. and by the fourth of july he had pulled back to the chattahoochee river just north of atlanta. and he assured the senator that he could hold that line against sherman for at least 50 days. he went to richmond and conveyed this assurance to davis with a wry smile and davis showed him a telegram that he had just received announcing that sherman had crossed the river today's earlier and johnson had retreated into the atlanta fortification. davis decided that he had to go. the cabinet agreed unanimously. the secretary of state voice their conviction. he was determined not to fight.

it is of no use to reinforcing and he is not going to fight. and davis knew that her leaving him would be an enormously controversial act. and he wasn't sure who would replace him. he decided to give johnston one last chance. he said in a telegraph i wish to hear your plan of operations. and he replied that my plan of operations must depend upon that of the enemy. it is mainly to watch for an opportunity to fight for the advantage and we are trying to put a banana in a condition to be held for a day or two by the georgia militia at the army movements may be freer and wider. the georgia militia? a day or two? and to davis this reply meant that johnston was ready to yield atlanta to the enemy just as he

failed to rescue expert. davis replaced him with john bell hood, the bellicose transfer from the army of northern virginia. and he did manage to hold off for six weeks and later invaded tennessee. but at the cost of virtually destroying the army of tennessee here at the battle of nashville. this caused many contemporaries and later historians to condemn davis' removal as his greatest mistake as commander-in-chief. many of the contemporaries and good many historians have also taken his side and his ongoing differences with davis. i leave it to each of you to decide where you stand on this

matter. and with that, i'm glad to answer questions for the time that we have remaining. [applause] >> a notice that there are microphones on the other side of the room that are available to you. [inaudible] >> as far as i know they were forest, although it was laughingstock to a lot of people come and they say they be rounded them up and told them despite that he seemed to be the best that davis ever considered him. >> davis did actually utilize him behind union lines.

and he was a good calorie commander and a good battlefield commander. and most would agree that he didn't have the capacity to be a large army commander. and i think that is how davis perceived the information that is how we in johnston and beauregard and others perceive the situation. so they used him for what he was really good at. and i don't think the davis ever considered appointing him to replace brack. he just didn't have the experience for commanding a large army of mixed artillery and infantry and maybe some calgary. he didn't have the experience and the politicians to manage

the logistics for a large army. so he was really good at what he did and probably would not have been very good in a larger capacity. >> we also raise the seniority as well. and it's often a sensitive issue. >> hello, i'm tim johnson, you will be speaking at the 15th of next month, we look forward to that. i have a question, this includes his relationship with bragg, why he would've kept bragg in command as long as he did.

and also do you have an opinion about who davis might have turned through to command the army of tennessee of beauregard or someone else? >> first on the bragg question, when i began the research for this book, i began the negative consensus about bragg about him as a commander. the more i got into the material and research, the more i began to doubt that stereotype and he was not a likable guy and there's no question about that. he was a stern disciplinarian and unpopular with his men and part of the problem with his relationships with his generals was the nature of his personality. which tended to be fairly quarrelsome. on the other hand he was a superb organizer of troops and he was impressed early in the war when he took troops with the

craft division that fought at shiloh, when he wanted to decide to pull back at the end of the first day. when he went awol after the battle of shiloh, he seemed a natural choice to command that army. because he seemed to be the most to commander within the army. i think that his experience, simon buckner and others, some of the others that were treated against him were involving more than just his duty. they did not give him the kind of a cooperation and support

that subordinate generals and division commanders not to do for the general. that diminished the effectiveness of the army of tennessee. part of it is a fault of bragg, no question about that. more than anything else due to his personality. and he goes with personalities and ambitions of some of those subordinates. so i have changed my mind on that question and i'm sort of in the same camp considering him to be with all of his faults, probably the most logical person to command that army. but it was clear after the fiasco in november 1863 that he had to go in the other part of this question is who should have replaced him.

and he was the other possibility, beauregard was the other possibility. and he was in davis' eyes almost potentially as that of a choice as johnston himself. davis really felt that he was forced to choose the lesser of two evils. most of the pressure was on behalf of johnston and he was holding his nose and he did appoint johnston. yes, go ahead. >> it's your turn. >> thank you. it's commonly known that so many of these northern and southern generals all knew each other at west point. but i'm wondering if there was an open or common analysis among the confederate generals as well as davis.

in looking at mcclellan's performance and estimating what he probably would not do when he was facing johnston. why did no one else except lincoln see that he had a case of the flows? >> i think other people did. i think especially lee. once he became the commander, he reputedly took advantage of what he knew would be his sluggishness and caution. as well as defensive mindedness. that is why he launched his attack and repeatedly attacked. that is why we invaded maryland in the fall of 1862. so it wasn't only lincoln that saw that he had the slowest. the confederates realized this and i think that they took advantage of it.

>> i felt that you made a compelling case for the position of davis. is this just upon the material based on the earlier validations or is this your religionist technologist? >> well, i suppose it is the latter. but to some degree it is partly based upon new material. there has been a major project going on for the last dozen years or maybe even 15 years at rice university. to publish all of the papers of jefferson davis. and they have only recently gotten all of the wartime papers completed and published. so being able to use that, some of it had not previously been available. and it's one of the things that help to persuade me of some of

the points that i have been making here in this analysis of the davis and johnson relationship. it is also i have written about the relationship between the lincoln and mcclellan. the davis and johnston relationship is based on viewing some ways. basically joe johnston was the mcclellan of jefferson davis. the frustrations that lincoln experienced with him are almost replicated step-by-step. and so it became increasingly clear as i went through this material but that was the case. >> it's about 3:00 o'clock but we might take one more question.