particularly is on his winning. they will be in power. the operation, 7-2, 100 years. i think they can judge that to. somehow until today there reason why we don't have an ambassador from this is because still the for unpopular position in support of the muslim brotherhood and away have a seat in the way how policy between them and turkey in support of those groups. come again from our perspective, as i said to me it is being viewed differently. ..

>>

>> let's agree first that it cannot be used that islam is not militaristic that isis and with tomas and with the muslim brotherhood with the egyptian in muslim of brotherhood and the jordanian moslem brotherhood. so that is the point that i want to make that those views violence -- who use violence we have to complete but those who don't have the right to be included in the political process. in the arab world the big

campaign is against those who don't use of violence against the muslim brotherhood in egypt but those you do we have not seen such a campaign that we have seen here. but my point is once you except the principle of excluding from the political process because you do not agree with their views in the same breath allow them to exclude you. so selective democracy is not a democracy. but it again we go back to tunisia. it is historic in more than one way but one important way it is the first time probably in the world where

the islamic party wins and loses an election by the ballot box and defeat by the ballot box. so those who have argued in the arab world the nature is such that when they come to power they will never leave the, that is from today's mind that the party did come to power according to the ballot box. but if the islamist party can do it in tunisian there is no reason why they cannot otherwise. with saudi arabia and iran i don't see why the saudis and iran cannot cooperate with isis for example, they will

not see eye-to-eye and all issues certainly there is a lot of distance over the shiite issue but we have seen stranger bedfellows before and i don't see why. so the manner it will not extend to other issues. >> but at the day's and second to conjoin the same coalition and they're part

of the solution. but did is iran number one benefit did nothing to that extent to have created these issues in such a way maybe to the provide something maybe to have mobile ability or the muslim she at a better perspective. >> the next panel will focus on iran with more detail but would you say having which draws support from maliki was crucial inside of iraq? >> supported twice and iran supported that a fully with

the fall of '86 and today with protection a higher political position to be immune from any legal case and in reality he is protected from the strong movement. >> host: we can take some more questions. >> i have just heard american policy is not clear. i am from the national defence experts and also a student. my question is that i hurt

american policy is not clear or consistent. so with the united states began the war it was in asymmetric word now day try to look to a coalition to you think this strategy will lead to solutions or will subside with military force? >> we will take some more questions. >> i was a correspondent in tehran. i don't want to disagree with all of the elements from the previous panel but my question is about droughts in the region.

it is one of the reasons countries with the underclass that was mentioned. is this factor being ignored by the countries in the region? i am curious to know transforming is it becoming smaller people are becoming economically unhappy. is there anything the governments can do is that they are not doing it and iran? with the lakes and rivers complete the disappear and it turns into a crisis. >> there was another question at the back of the room. >> at work for the farmington of defense and it is personal interest. talk about you were referencing the army last june. assuming we did hour and train and strengthen them

with the assad regime what means that they will not form their own government with that policy of exclusion that we were speaking about? >> let's begin with you this time to address the water and the drought issue it is a significant contributing factor. >> i have not thought of it this way but if it is a major issue in the region in general. but just to give you an idea, the capital share if it drops below 400 cubic meters per year, something like this, then it is

considered for in terms of water resources. jordan's share is 100 so it is way below what is considered for. that is without the syrian refugee issue now it is 1.four? so you can understand the problem the will not link to isis because that is a bit of a stretch but that is one of the main problems and with no solution. when it comes to jordan the only solution will be to solutions whether to keep the activity or not end with

a few hundred thousand but the other problem is long term but in jordan's case it requires a lot of energy and financial resources that the country does not have. so basically people are waiting for the technology that the cost will be lower. but until that happens the country and the region will have to face some very, very serious decisions on this. >> now we will address the other questions of the military approach will work and what is the three syrian army? what would happen? >> it is a possibility.

>> is a hypothetical. [laughter] >> the first question could the asymmetric war me one? i think everyone in the previous panel said you can contain the islamic state perhaps you can damage them which is precisely my understanding they were wrong and everybody else would fight and whoever was left was defending themselves with the kurds and syria because the three syrian army to show that much content anti-iraq i guess that is the iraqi army forgive me if the iranians were not invited there are other reasons.

[laughter] and honest to god. [laughter] and i want to relate this because we did not mention the debate was not about why we have the civil war but the issue will become every ready and though role the major national security issue and these are huge problems. in order to deal with those things you need a functioning government if we don't have a functioning government then before the political contest is settled we will not have functional governments. with some other very long term and unsolvable problems if we go along this path what do we do with those millions of refugees? i don't think for one second the 2 million refugees in turkey a big block of them

will ever return. what do we do with these people? to leave them like that so there the next generation of desperadoes especially when the climate conditions worsen, the governance problems worsened? and with the degree of international cooperation we have not seen because they have not been settled. the longer we continue with that unsettled political balance in the region the more difficult it will be to tackle these problems. that requires regional leadership and international leadership unfortunately i fail to see the existence. >> just a comment with that of course, they're fighting

a war by proxy in by lebanon to manage that also with jordan it is a big problem. but to a million iraqi moved from the north part to kurdistan and within iraq we have refugees moving from south to north. it is a problem to address with the huge consequences of that only god knows. cough go back to the question of syria. two years ago the question was is the military transitional a salvation to the problem? the one that is supported by sharp from the establishment of iran and russia was the bashar asset.

said to have that position of council could that be a solution? with that this could consist of the army. what would they do? if they still have bases in locations they could do a job to bring stability to encourage people to come back. then hit they can choose where he keeps his money or taken to a criminal court is up to them. but those people have the unprotected assets never received an assurance they would not be taken to court. do they have the interest?

so it is much more comprehensive solution the part of the regime that has kept him alive. but if he stays it is the damascus that is controlling at the same time somebody will argue it is the platform for everybody from hezbollah for the syrian army somebody argue that from that point to view the to say he does not have any pressure today.

but then to still fight. >> host: we have time for just a couple of more questions one gentleman is in the last row. >>. >> this question i'm a directed to michelle or others. you mention in terrorism but we never defined what it means. but war is terrorism water refining? so those who fight it was

mentioned in the discussion that those who fights are the bad guys. it is others from the four french and as the united states super terrorist? >> maybe top two's sarah arabia's role with the growth of ideology and what more could they do to balance the two sides to fight the ideology also spending millions of dollars through schools, etc.? >> host: the last question

>> i have the quick question. is there any way to tell us their relationship is in riyadh these days of the current administration? thank you. >> will start by addressing the question of the gentleman in back. there is a lot of controversy over the definition of terrorism and it was included here partly in the title of this panel because of the differences of definition among the united states and the coalition partners everyone knows there is something broader going on here than

isis but there is a fear of radicalization and the definition of terrorism is people using violence and usually against civilians or non, patents for political reasons. we have discussed that turkey once the pkk to be treated as a terrorist group the muslim brotherhood is declared by not only egypt but saudi arabia and the emirate's so there is the issue of political islamist should be considered part of the same problem or not. by ast is this going to be a big problem between the

united states and its allies what i heard today that there are bigger issues than the definitional issue with radicalization and how that is unresolved i will give the speakers one minute to address the last couple of questions. >> i myself am in full support however we agree with many issues that business in iraq than offset by rand.

we did agree on the issue so we are an agreement turkey did not push to except the reality with the military position so choosy a strong military for a country like turkey bet in reality we will see that politian between bulls sides and to

have the friend of mine through saudi arabia they have nothing against having a good relation with turkey but they wish to receive the relation with egypt as an important ally in the region to have seven arabia and egypt is important. that your question with regard to saudi's having to fight, at the arabian peninsula we have 1.5 billion muslims and we have to maintain to be the leader of this lawn at the same time we have expected the big office so we're not

fanatic and with enough conservatism so they could do as much good as they would like to stay in power but at the same time so to come up with that initiative with hundreds of millions of dollars to of a global cooperation something that we suffer from the we will continue to fight. >> but the definition of terrorism is political that is why you have balthazar problems. i would like to conclude

with a turkish american relations those relations in my view have been shaken someone in the last few months partially because the divergence of what to do with isis and the best course of action is is for both countries to figure out how that redefines the lines of communication and makes them go bad in my view. >> host: now we have the final comments and letting you get to clenches of the day that it is served outside here's though get your lunch and come back and have a seat. we will begin the next session in 30 minutes but please join me to think our

guest. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

[inaudible conversations] good afternoon and welcome back from lunch. i am the senior associate for the middle east program at the carnegie endowment it is my pleasure to moderate this panel on the every and

factory and regional calculations we're focusing this session on a country of enormous consequence for the campaign against the islamic state to. >> around the entire campaign which revolves are few believe certain iran meet -- iranian merits of the islamic republic of iran regardless of where you stand of the anti-ices struggle upon number of levels of military operations iran yields enormous capabilities with their relationship with shechem militia -- with damascus with those factions and especially at the level of broader geopolitics alignment with united states against isis is a broader

convergence the regional realities that is obviously the nuclear talks in to a delicate balancing act and with those islamic republic in light of the revolutionary guard with those issues highlighting the view of the islamic state with its interest the policies that were pursuing and of course, what it means to the region in the united states. now all panelist those that are present they all bring

enormous and expertise i am delighted to welcome them to. to my right from the council of foreign relations a longtime scholar of the islamic republic published numerous publications and has served as a senior adviser of iran and joining us this senior research fellow historian by training them brings the enormous wealth of on the ground experience as an adviser to general petraeus and then working on some of the issues of course, to my left my colleague with the senior associate from carnegie. ray, i'll start with you talking about a broader

discussion of the islamic state and their regional policies. >> i will say a couple of things. first of all, looking at the middle east today it is a very different middle east and the one we grew up in. one of the things that was said about the middle east prior to the arab spring but they're often corrupt economically mismanaged the command of the territory. that is no longer the case and is not the case of libya

or iraq syria and to it would be the fragmentation along sectarian villages is has opportunities for mischievous actors. because as the state power decomposes with various into two groups that the same time what has taken place in the region is in the 1960's it was called the era of cold war that pitted radical republics against the monarchy like jordan and saudi arabia and this time hitting a the islamic republic of iran against

saudi arabia. certainly in lebanon and iraq and elsewhere in the gulf that the saudi claims of mischief in the gulf are exaggerated but perhaps without evidence. so you begin to see in my view isil is not a new phenomenon but in the future we will see many isil. history has isil before in the early 20th century there was a sunni radical group galloping across the heartland be heading people in the name of its activities that was the house assoluta originally. so you see those things like

that but when the state is no longer in control of the territory and looking for protection to see manifestation of many groups that that could happen and now iran as a contradictory policy to iraq an inconsistent policy to syria so with that unitary state at the same time it is a weakened state that was dominated by political actors but made accommodation is cosmetic or whatever for the sunni minority and you could see the tension that has been involved of the problems of iraq that they have created with the sectarian

polarization taken place in the region so they are suffering from the problems that helped to create themselves. right now learning the lessons of the of maliki regime in a different direction with a greater degree of inclusion. is not a significant but i don't think it would be material they tend to exaggerate the level of support that they give federal claim that they are secretly funded but nevertheless they have that capacity. but the policy to syria has maintained that they did not think history would end or

define itself. unlike the russian federation and a think they're beholden but nevertheless some measure of influence but when you listen to those iranians states they find themselves very comfortable in the middle east. that is paradoxical their claim is they have a history on the other sides in of afghanistan better then the united states there has been a lot of talk to cooperate

with iran arresting the search of isil sunni to be skeptical -- skeptical with ethnic groups and military groups with a great deal of tactical conversions but that does not result in an commonality i don't think they should be mistaken for another those a different from the united states they were responsible for reform by his occupation and principally transporting munitions to train malicious to lacerate the forces in that particular country and they have pay -- played a mischievous and helpful role with the syrians civil conflict.

and to be on its way out one thing that is never discussed the iranians have rejected cooperation as the beginning point and it ought to be the end point. one of the things you can say is he is a person of integrity he is not corrupt or veracity but tells you what he needs. his views on the united states international history you can reject those to say he does not mean it but he elaborates regret may. i am not sure if there is a significant degree of cooperation with scare it

but -- with those assumptions there will be a tactical cooperation plan not sure if that would result in a larger hard running as relationship. in my view was strategic adversary but the weakness should be appreciated it is a weaker power as in the negotiation smith the strategic barriers of protection better likely to remain what they are and have been for a long time but don't that nobody could be a hegemonic power in the united stock -- in the middle east not even the united states and great britain was not.

so i do not see it as the great threat that could dominate the news surges cannot be contained. >> building on that turning that over to discuss iran and iraq? >> a pleasure to hear that my a remarks and i should state up front i am here to give my own views and i do not purport to speak for national defense university nor anyone else in the government. and i don't purport to be an

expert on the inner workings of the iranian regime of what i have observed of the behavior but based on what i saw you cannot escape the fact that they waged a war against united states that it had broad military campaign as well as those of our allies ever-present in iraq. obliged to meet prime own argument with two different aspects to talk about the nature of the iranian

military campaign in iraq and what i think it meant as the intention is to us. and what that means in iraq now that we are gone or since we left at the end of 2011. getting technical, the way that we know the iranian regime we're waging a war in the military says you can follow several signature weapons the iranians produced in which curiously were never proliferated beyond groups that were affiliated with the iranian regime. that they were able to control their distribution

once they were inside iraq. they're only use by shia militant groups trained, funded, arms otherwise sponsored by the regime other than a handful of occasions fell into their hands. the first was a roadside bomb which is a very sophisticated armor weapons and with then maybe a call that the u.s. military had in its arsenal that did a great deal of damage to us over six years. but 240 - - 240 mm rockets showing up on the battlefield and bring members and only used by the

militant groups associate with the iranian regime and the improvised rocket which is essentially like a propane tank packed full of explosives and shrapnel put on top of a rocket then shot usually over the walls of the base intended to cause mass casualties there were numerous times during the war when iranian sponsored militia is tried to fire this against our base to ament areas where the troops were sleeping or dining or were they could kill a lot of people all at once. it is like the marine barracks bombing in beirut but was intended of the mass

casualty event but they never succeeded those contractors but they came close on a handful of locations and can you imagine, the problem is it is not very accurate weapons you cannot get it accurately but had they been able to pull that off they could have killed 100 or 200 of our troops. between 2005 and 2008 there were over 1,100 esp detonations against us and other coalition members inside iraq. during that time there were more than 500 founded defused before they went off so over the four year period there were more than 1,700 attacks were intended attacks against us inside iraq.

but if you narrow it down 2007 and 2008 surge period it was even greater just under 900efp detonations with more than 400 found defused before they went off meaning just an average under two attacks per day during the surge they had the last quarter 2006 which was a very violent period the esop tax accounted one out of five coalition troop deaths in iraq in the month of july 2007 alone the multinational corps was tracking there was 89 and though one month alone and during that month they killed 23 of our troops and wounded 89 so it is not insignificant so that a

revolutionary guard began sending not only their own people to coordinate military operations a number of no more captured and eventually repatriated but began using lebanese hezbollah operatives to coordinate to plan the troops for those that was captured in early 2007 after having a hand to carry out of it attack winding up with the execution of our soldiers that was captain of our custody and then after awhile they repatriated them and ended up back in syria

at that point there is a spike against the troops in june and july 2011 when esops and killed 18 of our soldiers and a six week period. during the time when the iranians mysia to carry out attacks to create the perception that was their attack to force us to withdraw from iraq. that is part of the claim in the israeli withdrawal from lebanon. with the status of forces agreement something to have the effect in doing.

and to have some broader lessons of the technical details what this meant was the iranians were willing to destabilize iraq during the time we were there to force us out militaria. that shows that the iranians had a shared interest in a stable and non-violent direct. but the facts show they were willing to have a lebanon invasion of iraq in three of the serious influences you could broaden this and stems from with the particular

views with iraq. it is intended to defeat for the islamic republic. the first iraqi military should never again be allowed to pose a threat in the islamic republic does it pose in the iran-iraq war it is important for the iranians use their influence to defeat our effort with said iraqi nationalist army and air force. so far they have succeeded. more recently we see them try to replace that institution with a militia with day apparatus the live site the i rgc with the

iranians are trying to do is rise up the alternate military structure so they can be sure there will not be another military to invade iran but at the same token it was important to suppress iraqi national identity that the shia community not arab first and threw their proxy they have gone a long way to accomplish that. they viewed it as important that iraq should not be a platform for either iranian opposition groups were other adversaries. next it is important that the movement not be allowed to develop as a competitor to the atomic republic which is why as a sponsor those

militant groups it is important to do that within the movement so they could co-op that sadr movement to corrupted by money to comment too much but it is important to keep that influence so it could not be a threat to use of legitimacy which is why it is important to have a community to be a challenge. i will be that at that. we can expand later. and follow up. >> we will close with you with those broader conclusions what it means for the u.s. and iranian leadership. >> first things i work here

and never take anything for granted. >> the institution with social media conscience -- conscious so they to start with some oral tweets. but pointing to iran and the west's the first point endophytes against rises iran is the arsonists and the fire brigade had not been for iran's support or regime and the maliki government it would not be as strong as it is now.

because isis plays the incredibly important role as we have seen and fighting against isis. but with regards that say mentioned they have rejected that cooperation but iran can be effective to simultaneously killed soon the radicals -- sunni radicals and also fuel the radicalism of. often times it is very effective with the palestinian militants using the radicals will just fuel the radicalism.

the second point i would like to make that in the past and in the previous decade to be able to project power increasingly using their power to project ideology. what does that mean? ten years ago or 15 years ago there was popular support in the arab world for iran in 2006 when arabs were told which leaders or which countries are most admired given that opposition to israel to have that popular soft power in the area but now it is really dominating. syria and iraq and lebanon

and yemen but increasingly dominating it is a position to be much prefer to have the soft power throughout the region rather than having to rebuild military power to be perceived as a sectarian power. . .

it appears they are increasingly dominating the region but this is a position that they are very comfortable with. now let me move on to u.s. iran relations and you know what isis means for u.s. iran relations. i would say one of important outlines before the pragmatists and the hardliners in tehran is that the pragmatists and i'm talking about people like president rabbani -- they have in the past on themselves willing to work with america against sunni radicals where is the hardliners have shown

themselves willing to work with sunni radicals against the united states. going back to 1979 was a lot of instances of the u.s. iran convergence. u.s. and iran both have a common enemy in the soviet union and president reagan tried to work with the soviet union and he was rebuffed. in the very early months of the revolution the carter government tried to warn iran about saddam hussein's invasion, pending invasion. then the iranian government didn't take the threat seriously and they prefer to be the united states as -- an adversary. there certainly was a convergence of interests between the united states and iran vis-à-vis the taliban in afghanistan and was a missed opportunity by the united states and now we have isis and as a mutual adversary.

what has been pretty consistent has been whatever iran has been faced with a mutual adversary of the united states rather than siding with america against that adversary they have stayed out of the fights or worked with the adversary which is the united states. in the case of isis what has been quite remarkable over the last few days i have been meeting a lot of the statements from the senior revolutionary guard individuals and media government military who are hand-picked by the supreme leader and their line has been incredibly consistent which is isis is a creation of the united states. isis is a creation of the u.k., the united states and the zionists. again i go back to what i said earlier that the pragmatists are willing to work, they said this

openly, they are willing to work with united states to get isis and when foreign minister came to new york during the assembly in a speech at the council on foreign relations and he remarked that isis was created by america. they dismissed him as a conspiracy theorist but two weeks later the supreme leader came out consistently and said that isis was created by the united states. the reason why i say this is because i think there has been a tendency as of late to conflate our hopes about iran and our analyses. we all hope that we will see a government in iran which starts to prioritize national interest ahead of ideological interest. the government of iran that opens up to the world iran is good for america and good for the region. i think we oftentimes delude ourselves into thinking that the folks that come and say these things and the united states

have real power and influence over these types of major decisions. when you look at the individuals that do have authority in the revolutionary guard and the office of the supreme leader they are very consistent about who their adversary is. and let me grapple with the final point and it's related to this point about the nuclear deal and prospects for a nuclear detente and whether a nuclear detente between the united states and iran would alter iran's regional behavior and bring about more cooperation between the united states and iran. on the one hand if you look at it from the perspective of iran's national and economic interests there's a tremendous argument to be made for them doing the deal. i want to say they are burning the candle at two ends but they are actually burning the candle at 3m's which doesn't make any sense but let me explain what i mean by that.

there emerging hundreds of millions of dollars per month keeping the regime in power in israel. simultaneously they lost tremendous oil production and exports. this is a country which was at one point exporting 2.5 billion barrels a day and now it has been cut in half so they have been losing a tremendous amount financially. when i say 3m's the price of oil has dropped fairly dramatically over the last four weeks in the trendline looks to continue. so from a purely economic perspective there's a strong impetus for iran to do this nuclear deal. but i would argue that the worldview of the supreme leader and the revolutionary guards is the nuclear deal strengthens the hands of a more pragmatic moderate forces in iran. i can see it being amenable to

their parochial issues with on iran and certainly the statements from the folks who have to sign off on the deal haven't inspired a lot of confidence. i would also say that since 1979 to the present there has been tremendous continuity in iran's regional behavior. remember there was an eight year government up a reformist government and we didn't really see any change in iran's support for hezbollah in opposition to israel's existence. iran supports the assad regime so i think the hope that a nuclear deal is going to really alter the iranian behavior is not really buttressed by the historic record and between 1979 in 2003 there was no nuclear conflict between the united states and the administration that exists and we still haven't tremendous regional rivalry. i would just end by saying i think as long as this current

supreme leader is alive and is the supreme leader i think we will continue to seed episodes of tactical convergence between the united states and iran a tactical cooperation between the united states and iran but for personal issues we are continuing to see the strategic enmity between the united states and iran. not because in the interest of either country or something which is being pushed by the u.s. but i think it's in the parochial interests of the supreme leader to maintain a strategic entity. >> thank you karim for that somewhat pessimistic that realistic appraisal of where things are headed. we are going to turn now to questions in the interest of time. we are going to take three questions at a time. please do identify yourself and your affiliation and keep it to a question please and very brief.

>> thank you. i am a journalist. my question is to anyone who would like to answer. in february 2014 the u.s. treasury issued a new statement in which attention to the companies including a couple of corporatists who live in tehran, the treasury states that these operatives who have been bringing fighters from the gulf from afghanistan to syria to al qaeda. it doesn't make sense for iran to help al qaeda with groups in syria most likely included bassist created groups.

i was wondering if any of the panelists could shed some light on this role between the knowledge of tehran to have al qaeda groups in syria. thank you. >> okay. >> i'm a visiting researcher from georgetown university. my question is about do you think there is a measure of control and balance with the irgc revolutionary guard. how much power do you think they will gain before somebody stops them inside iran and is there a threat if the revolutionary guard being so powerful that they can actually shape the

fundamental governance of iran and the supreme leader himself or his age free to do anything that they want? >> if as you suggested the saudis have a hand or at least have an interest in keeping the price of oil down and thereby -- the iranians and the iraqis and the russians, what do you think would be the u.n. response and secondly, if there is none what should we expect? >> wide-awake take that first question on the alleged iranian support for extremists or

al qaeda. >> so, i can't speak to the specific alleged support to sunni groups in syria but what i can speak to us is during the time that we were in iraq before 2012 there were clear signs occasionally of the iranian regime outreach in ordination with some type of support of sunni extremist groups inside of iraq even including al qaeda in iraq. certainly including groups like azhar al islam. one of the clearest manifestations of that was that al qaeda and iraq members and larger al qaeda members so al qaeda members based in pakistan were able to cross iran to go back and forth between iraq and

pakistan to exchange messages and so on between zawahiri and the leaders of al qaeda in iraq which is the role that for example rock mom had for quite some time until they became the ill-fated number three in al qaeda, the guy who was killed. he was the head of the al qaeda support network inside of iran that was sending fighters and money and so on into iraq mainly through iraqi kurdistan so there is a precedent for the iranians reaching out to groups that they would not appear they would have an interest in promoting in order to unleash them against a common enemy. i can only speculate that they

did that in syria in order to unleash the more unsavory islamist radical elements against what in d.c. we term the moderate syrian opposition or the free syrian army. >> raise this issue of the domestic power of the revolutionary guards. >> my view on that has always been i run is not being transformed too precious. they used to say the country has an army and the army has a country. i think it's a relationship that works on both sides. the guards required the ideological visualization of the clerical leadership in the clerical leadership requires muscular power of the revolutionary guards but they

share a common ideological influence towards each other. over time of course the role of the guards have grown particularly in economic power. that's not particularly unusual in developing countries for the military to be part of it and we saw that with the pla because they bring certain skills and attributes particularly in the aftermath of the iran iraq war when the task was the physical reconstruction of the country and were instrumental in that in over the years that power has come but i believe there's a symbolization. they are more meaningful acts on the table and some of the decisions whether it's about domestic power or about foreign relations have to take into account for elections and also if you look at some of the guards publications they tend to redo -- review to alcohol many

so they have elevated him to the point of substantial authority. i think there is a sort of a codependency there. in terms of i touched briefly on the saudis. the iranian central bank officials whatever that's worth estimate that for the budgetary balances and budgets to function and work effectively they need oil prices to fall in the next year to $70 a barrel. who knows about their statistics and so on. i do think if it is true that the saudis are manipulating the petroleum markets to the detriment of their competitors that kind of a dangerous game. in the 1980s when saudi's have done that it distorted their own economy and it's certainly distorted the soviet economy even more. i think that's a dangerous game to play and i'm not quite sure if that's happening. there also reasons why oil prices can decline.

the complexion of the energy bottles are changing. the future for iran in terms of the economy is not very good. the market share has lost as a result of the sanctions that are unlikely to be retrieved. the export product that it has some likely to command substantial attention. 1 million barrels of iranian oil has gone off of the market and no one seems to care that much. ali khamenei to his credit has talked about his vision of the economy which is increasingly dependent on foreign commerce and less dependent on foreign oil said he is signaling from his perspective and i don't know how much he knows about macroeconomics but national poverty is the direction that the country should go as opposed to integration. so they may have to be able to live with that sword is economic situation for some time to come. >> a couple of quick points on

iranian support for sunni radical groups. it's a misperception about iran's, the way iran wields power in the region meaning iran i don't see aspiring to be sectarian power or are the logical power and if you share its ideology it doesn't care if you are sunni. you can be hamas. you can be all white and you can be christian. you can be hugo chavez will support you so i think they're been instances in the past with a benefit to support radical sunni groups as a way of protecting against provoking the united states or they see perhaps these groups with power. the case of taliban there's a concern that taliban may be coming back to the position of influence and iran want to see if they could make the taliban have some kind of cooperation.

on the question about oil prices and its implications for the nuclear deal i would cite a couple of things to what ray said. by historic standards call me and he has been ruling for 25 years. oil at $80 a barrel is still pretty high. there was a time a little more than a decade ago when prices were less than $10 a barrel. oil where it is right now is pretty high. second the economic wealth of the iranian population for the supreme leader has never been there first or even their second year priorities that he is willing to go to subject the population to severe economic hardship rather than compromise. lastly what are the implications for the nuclear deal? ic3 potential outcomes. outcome number one is what

everybody is hoping for which is a resolution. i would say simply that i don't think they are that great between now and november 24 of outcome number two coppice escalation. i think very few people want that here. few people want that in tehran. that doesn't mean that it won't happen in outcome three manage the revolution. we failed to reach an agreement. it does not behoove either side to go back to the status quo. we are able to muddle through. >> thank you. i want to know could any of the panels touched on the iran kurdish balancing act with

regards to balancing ice is whether syrian iraqi or even iranian kurdistan? [inaudible] >> this is a question to all the panelists. it's easy to point to iran and iraq policy and maliki sectarian policies is the reason for the spread of isis but why isn't there more focus on how to combat the ideological root cause of the salafi jihadists? that is the foundation on which isis relies on and what we see in syria and iraq are mere symptoms of this disease. my question is how can the u.s. play a role in putting pressure on its allies especially saudi's

to stop funding the islamic extremism that may morph into terrorism in the form of al qaeda or isis? thank you. >> thank you. if we take the third scenario that karim presented kicking the can down the road in the negotiations internally in iran what does it mean for the power struggle between rouhani and his foes and if you project that on the scene that we are attaching this morning are today what do you expect in iraq syria potentially lebanon in terms of the iranian policy? will it mean it will go further or will it be more of a crisis management in syria and iraq?

>> the iran kurdish balancing act. >> as we have seen the kurds have been incredibly graced -- grateful about iranian support to protect them against vices. there are officials that are visiting in recent months and they would argue what i said earlier about the dangers of u.s. partnering with iran to fight isis saying that was the concern that it could actually fuel sunni radicalism that we are trying to fight. it's too late for that. this is really an existential issue right now and they are tremendously grateful for iranian support. at the moment there is a tactical convergence as kurdish aspirations for greater

independence grows. i think you'll start to see those old tensions calm to being in iran's own kurdish population and perhaps a growing sentiment independence sentiments amongst them. with regard to what happens to rouhani if there isn't a nuclear deal, you know rouhani is like a gambler gambler that has gone to las vegas and put every single chip he has in his hand on one number which is the nuclear de deal. he was elected for a variety of reasons. he was going to improve human rights records. he was going to be more tolerant towards civil society. he was going to improve people's economics lives but all the attention has been on the nuclear issue and that the nuclear deal isn't reached you will have the worst of both worlds because he will have

spent all of his chips on an issue in which he has not resolved and simultaneously he won't have delivered on any of his promises to be helpful towards civil society and the cause of human rights. one thing i have always thought about the supreme leader ali rouhani he's a brilliant of alien. he is the longest-serving autocrats in the middle east and there's a reason for that. his modus operandi is to wield power without accountability and in order to do that he needs accountability without power. that is precisely what rouhani will become. you will have accountability and people will say what it be done rouhani? we came out in droves to elect you and you haven't delivered on the nuclear deal or elsewhere so popular blame goes to rouhani.

accountability goes to rouhani who has the power to deliver this nuclear deal. lastly on the question of why did we talk about the next various orthodox sunni ideology which has helped to create isis. i think that's a very valid point. you can point to a lot of different factors. some of it has been brutality. maliki had a hand in this. certainly also the ideological basis for this as ray discussed is the u.s. invasion of iraq with the immigration of isis. our panel is about iran so we will focus on iran's role in isis. i think earlier about the critical role of education helping to counter this type of radical intolerance sunni

ideology is so important. >> i will touch on the last one and implications of the nuclear domestic balance of power. if you look at the history of the iranian presidency since the end of the iran-iraq war that's three presidencies of rafsanjani and ahmadinejad all of them using power as her presidency progresses. all of them come in with promises that they are unlikely to deliver. president rafsanjani came with it promise of rejuvenation which he did not deliver and president of ahmadinejad with the promise of economic justice. you begin to see erosion of their popularity and the balance of power shifts to the office of the supreme leader which is not subject to an electoral challenge. you are likely to see a similar thing happened in the case of

rouhani because he has made promises that he is not kept her in my view had never had the intention of keeping regarding civil liberties or emancipation. as i said i don't disagree with the prospects of a nuclear agreement and the advantages that he alluded to but i do think there perhaps is a greater understanding between khamenei and rouhani on the nuclear agreement. i think this is more of a consensus government than there has been in the past. they have a greater degree of agreement on what they want. to suggest that rouhani is looking for an agreement that requires substantial dismantlement of the iranian nuclear structure, there is no public record of that. they seem to have been very lockstep and from his experiences as a nuclear negotiator between 2003 and 2005

rouhani persistently focused the authority of the supreme leader on how this is a consultation and an agreement within the system. too often i think in the past when we have looked at the iranian system we have seen personalities and i think they exist but when iranians talk about their system i think it's a less factionalized today than i it was in the past. there's a morbid consensus within the system than there has been in the past. when you look at the reformists period the institution of the supreme leader and the notions of unaccountable power. i was the essence of the reform. president ahmadinejad try to essentially usurp authority that he did not have and move forward. rouhani has not -- he is kind of the technician of the state so if you are looking at the soviet model he's not shaking things

up. but as i said in the absence of a nuclear agreement both sides i think have suggested having an interest in the preservation of the negotiations. the negotiating table has been in existence for 12 years since 2003. the reason why it's been negotiated as everybody has utility for it to continue. neither power as people suggest want to go back to mutual escalation but i would say at some point if there is an interim agreement and its prolonged at some point iranians will walk away from it they way they walked away from the agreement between 2003 and 2005. they will walk away from it when they are ready to introduce new technologies, high-speed centrifuges what have you. when that happens the restriction of the interim agreement and the restrictions of the interim agreement collide with their technological capabilities i think you'll see

them walk away from it. >> i think the question about the balancing act, the iranian balancing act between the kurds is an interesting one. most recently he saw the combined peshmerga and shia militant led assault to the siege. she had turkoman town kirkuk and the next thing that happened after -- was broken in the vicinity of that town was the peshmerga and the shia militants got into gun battles. they began clashing and they did that in at least one other town so it's not a perfect marriage between iran's shia militant proxies in iraq and the kurds. this is something you could have

predicted for several years because you could see the tensions not just between sunni and shia along the green line in iraq or i'm sorry sunni and kurds, it's not just an arab-kurd greenline in iraq but you could see whether words nouri al-maliki and his very shia dominated government trying to push the kurds back from the greenline or whether it was iraqi military, shia military officers with the sadr movement all felt the strong interest in trying to contain the kurds territorially speaking. so i think that moving forward you are going to see the iranians having to manage or sing it in their interest to manage shia kurdish greenline in iraq around her cook and so on and it looks to me like the iranians will see it in their interest to have a shia militants, i shia arab militant

presence along the greenline to hem hem the kurds in. turning quickly to the question about the ideological risk of -- and why more isn't being done. i agree with there's a lot to say on the subject. the focus need not be on the gulf and its ideological influence. in addition to that i would say al-baghdadi was not made. he was made in samarra and baghdad. altered money was made in the turkmen territories of iraq. al zawahiri was made in -- so these leaders of at least -- is present in iraq are iraqi productions. these are homegrown, iraqi militant leaders and their

revenues need not come from the gulf. i am sure it benefits them but there was a multiyear period in iraq where we were fighting there where there were a great many al qaeda iraq revenues came from being able to siphon off of the northern oil sector into the millions of week to extort northern iraqi businesses and to tax the local population. now that they hold those territories outright they are able to draw a great deal of their resources to sustain themselves on that. i'm willing to bet that gold money went to zero overnight that they would still be able to fund their militant operations. the local revenue stream and being able to exploit local political groups. >> hello.

i have a quick question for karim. you mentioned the turks option on this negotiation process and the agreement on the disagreement thing. how will both sides keep doing this process. we have a parliamentary election and as a result of the election the council will be elected and the council will elect as supreme leader as far as i know. what is the role of this process in the negotiations and what should we expect from this one year period after the parliamentary elections in iran? >> thank you. >> thank you. my questions about the impact of

any nuclear deal on iran's support for the proxy in the region of hezbollah and syria everywhere. every time you ask about recent issues they say now it's only a nuclear negotiation and these issues would be discussed. what leverage do you think the united states and the west will have in iran after the negotiations? thank you. >> yes maam, right there. >> thank you. i'm with the dod and i have a question about how earlier karim you had mentioned that even during the hot sunny regime regime that not a lot has changed during iran's support of but the other part is president haqqani named overtures to the united states for dialogue.

my question is do you think that was a missed opportunity to change the trajectory of u.s. iran relationships or if not by what the premier allow him -- thank you. >> why don't we do this. ray i'm going to ask you the impact of the nuclear deal on iran's support for mutual proxies. >> karim suggested that the support for these regional group's predates the nuclear controversy and the nuclear discussions. the role of hezbollah i would say in the iranian strategic conception has changed. it was a long time suggested that hezbollah was an ally of iran but not necessarily a proxy. nasrallah would make his own decisions based upon his own political requirements and he understood the difficulties and

imbalances that would mitigate his burlington dependence on iran. the events of syria and iraq has devastated that is not the case. actually hezbollah isn't iranian auxiliary force there will be deployed in areas that benefit iran but not necessarily hezbollah so that is one thing that i think it's been obvious certain in terms of hezbollah's involvement in syria which i cannot see as being advantageous to his political aspirations. i think that relationship between iran and hezbollah is an organic one and they're sort of an intimacy there that you don't see in terms of hamas and others. but iran and saudi arabia and others are trying to fight it out for influence in the contested region and therefore use the resources and allies at your disposal. those are coming with some degree of -- so i don't see an

impact on iran. as a matter of fact you can make the case and perhaps a speculative one that iran's support for those groups will actually increase in the aftermath of the nuclear deal because ali khamenei will insist irrespective of the nuclear agreement it will sustain the ideological values and ideological alignments. the only way to do that is to increase support for allies. conversely i think as a result of the nuclear deal and a more substantial american support for the gulf countries as a means of suggesting that a nuclear deal does not affect alliances so paradoxically the agreement could cause polarization between the sunni bloc. that's something to keep in mind. the nuclear deal could be good for iran and good for the international community but not necessarily mitigate their regional polarization. in terms of whether we messed i think in the history of the islamic republic the air is the

most important and i think he was not always given the credit he deserved. whether he was successful or not he transformed the islamic republic into a system of government that is representative and religiously and culturally authentic. he proved an impossible task but i think his enterprising effects, his legacy is larger than many contemporary historians would otherwise suggest. the reform was really his aspirations to transform and transforms place -- iran's place were real but the reaction at home prevailed. at that time today islamic republic is a very different state than it was then. today to be simplistic about it there was always the last reform center and the right.

there is no left anymore. it's been excised from power. that is never happen in the history of the islamic republic. i think the center and the right have come to an agreement which is why most of the continues to languish in prison. >> the question was how long can what i'd describe as managed resolution resolution houck von cannot sustain itself in the political context in the iranian political context? in the u.s. context extension of the deal can perhaps sustain itself until january 20, 2017. president obama would really like to -- he wants to avert an iranian bomb and the first bombing iran so if you extend interim deal somehow to show

progress is certainly much better. if you can't get a resolution extending the deal is better than the failure of the deal. the iranian political context i think we oftentimes give too much credit to iranian elections as if we are talking about -- as long as he is healthy i think there are no signs of any threat whatsoever to his position as supreme leader. the assembly of experts i see him getting unanimous support almost and as ray was talking about earlier in no it's dividing the spoils between shiites and conservatives. there's not going to be a parliament parliament that comes and calls for sweeping change. i would just say a couple of

sentences about the prospect if there is a nuclear deal what happens to iran's policy. the optimistic perspective is the pragmatist are emboldened and iran nbc regional behavior which means curtailing of support for hezbollah islamic jihad. the more pessimistic point of view is that iran is now going to be freed up financially. they will have far more financial resources to continue to support these groups and as i said i think we always have to warn against conflating our hopes and our analysis. the last 35 years shows a pessimistic point of view which usually prevails and then finally on the question of whether there was a missed opportunity with iran aaron david miller who covers the arab

palestinian conflict says the arab-israeli conflict is not him morality between evil and good and likewise the u.s. iran conflict there have been certainly times when the u.s. has made mistakes in iran is made mistakes but the administration desperately wants to engage the haqqani government and bill clinton himself desperately wanted to deal with iran. i think the hardliners in tehran warned and i would argue the hardliners now are not ready for the united states. if i were to advise the hardliners i would advise them against it. whether fidel castro in cuba or kim jong un in north korea i think these hard-line groups appreciate that they can preserve their power in a closed environment but when you open up the forces of globalization to

market forces they could be swept aside with the tide. i think there's a parochial interest for the hardliners to maintain it with the united states. >> to add my 2 cents on the iran's support for its regional proxies in the wake of some de deal, i guess to think that a nuclear deal would lead naturally to a retraction of iranian support for proxies means you think those proxies or cards to be traded away. the iranian regime use views those cards to be traded away in favor in pursuit of a nuclear deal. i personally don't think that that's true. i think their commitment to what they called the axis of resistance which they themselves built indeed is enduring and is

not entirely associated with this relationship with the united states although it plays a central role. a lebanese shia analyst once told me you should think of lebanese hezbollah is forward-deployed regiments of the irgc and then you will understand their role in iranian strategy more clearly. i agree with that but i also think things like hezbollah are also iran's cubans. when the soviets used to cubans in order to be able to project proxy power into central america angola and eventually ethiopia for example that's the way they're able to use lebanese hezbollah to project into whether iraq or bahrain or syr syria. it's not something that they are going to give up. i think they will continue to see that they will have a vital interest but they will need militant proxies to pursue for them and lou of taking iranian

casualties. after the iran-iraq war the iranian regime was casualty averse. they're not going to send iranians out to do the job that arab shia are willing to do for them. that's not going to stop after any sort of nuclear deal. lastly you're also not going to see them reduce any of the sponsorship so long as they remain in the cold war which is a hot proxy war war with the saudis. as long as that conflict remains than they are going to see a vital interest in keeping these militant proxies in power. >> we have actually got a question from the overflow room via twitter to you karim about the role of the u.s. congress if there is no nuclear agreement and your reaction to where we are going with that. >> in the view of congress it

was their sanctions and economic coercion which forced iran to come to the negotiating table in a meaningful way and i think many members now would argue that if we don't reach a nuclear deal by november 24 then the logical course of action is to increase the pressure against them to force them to do a deal. i would say additional sanctions against iran will be insufficient to force iran to capitulate but it will be sufficient to ask way. that's my point of view and i think on this particular issue there's a cognitive dissonance among some members of congress in that day on one hand are cognizant of the fact that their constituents are not interested another military venture in the middle east. we saw congress put a much more limited military strike against the assad regime in syria. in the past additional

legislation could force them to contemplate another military adventure in the region. i would say there is one way and a colleague of mine was thinking about this a lot. congress does feel compelled to pass sanctions legislation come november 20 -- what they argue is the sanctioned legislation should be determined in nature meaning it can pass legislation which tries to hold the line where it is right now and tell iran that if you put your foot on the gas again and reconstitute the program is going to trigger additional sanctions. if you essentially stay where you are keeper car and that's either the road is not going to trigger additional sanctions. i think that is perhaps a smart way of thinking about it. >> we have got time for two more very brief questions.

>> hi aaron with the american council. thank you guys for your comments and i'm just curious at what point do you think iran cuts ties with assad and when that time comes what the kind of regional geopolitical considerations would be plex thank you. >> that makes it easy. >> when they cut ties with assad i think that's what is it's going to happen. i don't think they are tied into assad as a person per se but nevertheless to a constituency that they have developed in syria. as i mentioned they seem comfortable in the operating in a messy murky stereo or a balkanize syria. that sort of suits their -- so

i'm not quite sure. it's a frontline state for them and a vice has been so. also their prophecy on syria has come to fruition thinking that assad was going to collapse so they are playing the winning hand from their perspective. >> i would agree with that. if you are an iranian official and in the reagan op-ed in "the new york times" from a decorated and eminent u.s. diplomat like ryan crocker that says it is as bad as assad is the alternative to assad is worse i don't think you feel like you have to feel like you have to prepare iq will abandon your critical ally. the u.s. and the west is

accommodating itself to your position rather than vice versa. as ray said they thought they could preserve their interests in syria and in a post-assad environment they would have cut a long time ago. the fact that they haven't done that despite the tremendous reputational damage to iran means i think they feel they could lose all of their interest in syria. >> i think they will never cut ties. >> on that note i want to thank you all for this very excellent set of presentations on this complex country. please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] we are going to take a break and we will be back here at 3:00 p.m.. thank you.

[inaudible conversations] next on c-span2, a discussion on immigration reform with former senator ken salazar. then the funeral service for former "washington post" editor ben bradlee. that's followed by a discussion on expansion of isis in the middle east.

in 1806 montgomery pike was sent to the american southwest to explore the region very similar to lewis and clark who were sent to the northwestern part of the newly-acquired louisiana territory. pike was sent to the southwest

part of the territory and from his perspective when he came out here he really walked off the map. he went to an area that was unknown. when pike first sees it he thinks he will reach the top of that in just a few days. it really takes weeks to approach. they reach what we believe is a lower mountain on pikes peak called mt. rosa. they turned around at that poi point, given the conditions, given the equipment that they had at the time, no one could have summoned pikes peak inspired the poem that became america the beautiful written by bates who came here to colorado springs to teach a summer course at colorado college in 1893. and the view down to the planes from the top of the mountain

inspired the poetry. it inspired the images that are captured in that poster of the united states. wednesday the white house president obama husted health care workers who had returned from and are heading to west africa to fight ebola. you can see his remarks in their their entirety on our web site to c-span.org. here is a look. >> now we have a responsibility to look out for our health workers as well as they look out for us. that is why on monday the cdc announced new monitoring and movement guidelines that are sensible based on science, that were crafted in consultation with the people who actually

went there to do the work and they are tailored to the unique circumstances of each health care worker. but we have to keep in mind that if we are discouraging our health care workers who are prepared to make these sacrifices, from traveling to these places in need, then we are not doing our job in terms of looking after the public's health and safety. what we need right now is these troops that are out there leading globally. we can discourage them. we have got to encourage it and applaud it. and i want america to understand, the truth is that until we stop this outbreak in west africa, we may continue to

see individual cases in america in the weeks and months ahead. because that's the nature of today's world. we can't hermetically seal ourselves off. the nature of international travel and movement means that the only way to assure that we are safe is to make sure that we have dealt with the disease where right now it is most acute. so yes we are likely to see a possible case elsewhere outside of these countries and that's true whether or not we adopt a travel ban or we adopt a quarantine. the nature of diseases as long as it will exist in the world no one can promise that there won't be any more cases than america or anyplace else.

to prevent its spread and ultimately to keep americans safe we have to go to the source while preparing for the few cases that we see here. and protecting our health care workers who are treating patients both here at home and abroad. next the former colorado senator ken salazar takes part in discussion looking at immigration from a political moral and legal perspective. fordham university hosted this one hour and 45 minute event. >> when we begin to think about who might serve as presenters and conversation partners this evening the first name that came to mind was secretary ken salazar. before his executive branch service as secretary of the interior and during his congressional service as a

member of the united states senate, secretary salazar gave evidence of his even-handed intelligence on the range of issues related to immigration. when he joined the bipartisan group of senators to construct a conference at immigration reform package, package after its passage in 2006 -- [inaudible] 10 years later the nation has yet to come to some consensus on immigration. secretary salazar will begin tonight by trying to make sense of the broad issues we as a nation are facing in the current immigration crisis and hopefully shed some light on why we remain log jammed a decade after his initial efforts at reform. ..