within iran. from the folks who have to sign off on a deal hasn't inspired a lot of confidence. i will also say since 1979 to the present there has been tremendous continuity in iran's regional behavior. there was a eight year reformist government and we didn't see any change in iran and support for hezbollah or iran's support for the aside regimes so the hope that nuclear deal is going to alter iranian behavior, the historic record between 1979, and 2002 there was no nuclear conflict, it didn't really exist and we had tremendous regional rivalry. i will end by saying as long as the current supreme leader is alive and supreme leader, we

will continue to see episodes of tactical convergence between the united states and iran and cooperation but for his personal interests we will continue to see this strategic enmity between the united states and iran not because it is in the interests of either country or something pushed by the u.s. government but the parochial interests of the supreme leader to maintain this strategic enmity. >> thank you for that pessimistic but realistic appraisal of where things are headed. we will turn to questions in the interests of time, three questions at a time. please identify yourself and your affiliation and keep it to a question and very brief.

>> my question to anyone who would ask, in february of 2014 u.s. treasury issued -- in which they sanction companies including a couple of cooperative, treasury stated these operatives bringing fighters from afghanistan to syria to al qaeda. it doesn't make sense. al qaeda related groups

including isis. can you shed some light and turn this? with knowledge of tehran with al qaeda and groups in syria. thank you. >> i'm a visiting researcher at georgetown university and my question is do you think there is a measure of control and balance in the revolution in regards to clarify how much power do you think the revolution gained before somebody stuffed them inside iran? is there a threat after the revolutionary guard being so much more powerful than they can shake the fundamental governance of iran and the supreme leader

or not? just free to do whatever is they want? >> if it is suggested the saudis have a hands or an interest in keeping with the price of oil down and certainly something on the iranians, the iraqis and russians what do you think would be the iranian response? secondly if there is no deal on the 24th what should we expect? >> why don't we take that first question on the alleged iranian support to extremists or al qaeda?

>> i can't speak to the specific alleged support to sunni groups such as in syria but what i can speak to is during the time the we were in iraq in 2012, there were clear signs occasionally of iranian regime, out reach, coordination with, sometimes support of sunni extremists groups inside iraq. even including al qaeda in iraq. including groups like anti islam. one of the clearest men at the stations was al qaeda and iraq members and larger al qaeda members, al qaeda members based in pakistan were able to cross iran to go back and forth from iraq and pakistan to exchange messages and so on from the

leaders of al qaeda in iraq which was the role -- until he became the ill-fated no. 3 in al qaeda, the guy who always gets killed, he was the head of the al qaeda support network inside iran that was sending fighters and money and so on into iraq mainly through iraqi kurdistan so there is precedent for the iranians reaching out to groups that would not appear they would have an interest in promoting, to unleashed them against a common enemy. i can only speculate that if they did that in syria it was in order to unleash the more

unsavory islamist radical elements against what in d.c. we term the moderate syrian opposition or free syrian army. >> this issue of the domestic power of the revolutionary guards. >> my view on that has always been that iran has not been transformed, about prussia every country, the army is upcountry. there is subordination to clerical authority and it works for both sides. the guards require ideological visualization of clerical leadership and clerical leadership requires most particular power but they share common ideological influence toward each other it.

overs the time the role of the guards have grown particularly in economic power, that is not unusual in developing countries for the military to be part of the commerce and you saw that in china because they bring certain skills and attributes particularly in the iran/iraq war, physical reconstruction of the country that guards the engineering corps and so on and instrumental in that and the economic power has grown but i still believe there is a subordination to clerical authority at this point. something more meaningful on the table the public is likely to make whether it is domestic power or foreign relations have to take into account that cause predilections and if you look at the god's publications they tend to refer to khamenei as elevated to the point of substantial

authority. there is a sort of code dependencies there. in terms -- i touched briefly on the saudi. the central bank officials estimate for the budgetary balance and budgets to function network effectively following $70 a barrel. who knows about their statistics and so on. i do think if it is true that the saudis are manipulating petroleum markets to the detriment of competitors that is a dangerous game and in the 1980s when saudis were alleged to of done that, it certainly distorted the soviet economy even more but it is a dangerous game to play and i am not sure that is happening. there are reasons oil prices will decline in the united states, the leading gas in the oil producer complexion of the energy markets are changing, the

future for iran in terms of its actual economy is not very good. market share the losses result of sanctions aren't likely to be retrieved, the export product that it has is unlikely to command substantial attention millions of barrels of iranian oil are off the market when you secure that much. and khamenei has talked about his vision of resistance economy which is less dependent on foreign commerce and oil so he is already signaling from his perspective, don't know how much he knows about macroeconomics that national poverty is a direction the country should go as opposed to global integration so they may have to be able to live with that sort of entrenched economic situation for some time to come. >> a couple quick points. on iranian support for new radical groups i would say it is

a misperception about iran away iran wields power in the region meaning iran, i don't see as the sectarian power. it is an ideological power and if you share it doesn't care if you are sunni. you can be hamas, you can be christian, you can be hugo chavez. joel has mentioned incidents in the past where they have seen fit to support radicals, and groups as a way of protecting against provoking the united co.

on the question about severe economic heart chip read the uncompromising and lastly whatever the implications for the nuclear deal? i see three potential outcomes. outcome number one which everyone is hoping for is resolution. i don't see that being great.

i would say simply that i don't think they're great between now and nov. 24th, escalation returns, very few people want that in tehran. it doesn't mean they will not come free. managed resolution, we reach an agreement but there is recognition in both capitals, washington and tehran to go back to the escalation, 2 models through. >> thank you. the brookings institution, can panelists touch on the iran kurdish balancing act in regards to battling isis whether it is syrian, turkish or iranian

kurds? >> this is a question for all the panelists. it is easy to point to iran's policy, sectarian policies as a reason for the spread of isis, but why isn't there more focus how to combat the ideological cause of jihadists? that is the foundation on which isis relies on. what we see in syria and iraq are mere symptoms of this disease. how can the u.s. played a role in putting pressure on gulf allies especially saudi to stop funding the very islamic extremism that made them in to terrorism in the form of al

qaeda or isis? >> if we take the third scenario, and internally, in iran, the power struggle for bose and by a expansion if you project that under this scene we are backing this morning or today, what to expect in iraq, syria and potentially lebanon in terms of iranian policy, would it mean the line will go further or will it be more of crisis management in syria and iraq?

>> the iran/kurdish balancing act. >> as we have seen kurds have been incredibly grateful, to protect them against isis, kurdish officials in recent months and argue against the dangers of u.s. partnering with iran to fight isis, the concern that it could issue sunni radicalism to fight ended is too late for that. this is an existential issue, tremendously grateful for iranian support but at the moment there is a tactical convergence as kurdish aspirations for greater independence grow, you will

start to see those old tensions come to be given iran's own population and growing sentiment, growing independent sentiment. with regard to what happens to ronny if there isn't a nuclear deal, rohani is like a gambler that has gone to las vegas and put every chip in his hand on one number which is the nuclear deal. he was elected for a variety of reasons, to improve human rights record, to be more tolerant with civil society, improve people's economic law by delivering the nuclear deal but all the focus has been on the nuclear issue and if the nuclear deal isn't reached you have the worst of both worlds because he spent all his chips on an issue that he

hasn't resolved and simultaneously he won't have delivered on any of his promises to a civil society and the cause of human rights. one thing i always thought, he is a brilliant machiavellian. he is the second longest serving autocrat in the middle east, and there is a reason for that and his modus operandi is to wield power without accountability and he needs accountability without power. that is precisely what rohani will become. he will have accountability. people will say what have you done? we came out in droves to let you and you didn't deliver a nuclear deal, so popular blame goes to rohani. he didn't have the power to deliver the nuclear deal and

lastly on the question about the nefarious and orthodox ideology to create a isis, that is a very valid point. you can point to a lot of factors, some of it has been asset brutality, iranian complicity in both ventures but certainly also the ideological basis, the u.s. invasion of iraq was a factor in the creation of isis but the panel is about iran so we focused on iran's role in isis. but the critical role of education, helping to counters this type of radical in tolerance sunni ideology is so

important. >> i will touch on the last one, the implications of the nuclear deal or absence of it on the domestic balance of power. if you look at the history of iranian presidency, three presidencies of loose power as their presidency progresses because all of the coming with promises, with a promise of economic rejuvenation which he did not deliver and the promise of political liberalization and economic justice. all of them had unfulfilled promises so you see erosion of their popularity and balance of power shifts to the office of the supreme leader which is not subject to an electoral challenge. you see a similar thing happening and in case of rohani because he had made a promises he has not kept, and my view

never had an intention of keeping and civil liberties and political emancipation and as i said i don't disagree with the prospects of the nuclear agreement and percentages he alluded to. but i do think perhaps there is a greater sort of understanding between the main and rohani on parameters of the nuclear agreement. is more a consensus government and there has been in the past. a greater degree of agreement on what they want to. to suggests rohani is looking at substantial dismantlement of structure, there is no public record of that. they seem to have been very lockstep. from his experiences as a nuclear negotiator between 2003 to 2005, rohani invokes the

authority of the supreme leader and the agreement between the system. too often when we looked at the iranian system we have seen personalities that exist. when iranians talk about the system, i think it is less than a was in the past. there is more consensus in the system than there has been in the past. if you look at the reformist period, it challenged the institution of supreme leader and notions of unaccountable power. that was the essence of reform. the president tried essentially to usurp the authority to -- that he did not have and move forward. rohani has not touched those headlines. he is a technician of the state. looking at the soviet model, he is not shaking things up. as i said in an absence of an

agreement, both sides have an interest in preservation of negotiations with the negotiating table has been in existence for 12 years since 2003. everybody has some utility for the table to continue. neither power was suggested, want to go to mutual escalation. i will say at some point if there is an interim agreement that is prolong the iranians will walk away from it away they walk away from the e.u. 3 agreement between 2003-2005. and they walk away from it when they introduce new technologies. high-speed centrifuges or whatever. the restriction from the interim agreement, collides with a technological capabilities, you will see them walk away from it.

>> the question of the balancing act between the kurds is an interesting one. most recently you saw the combined militants to lift the siege, mainly she at kirkman town and what happened, the next thing that happened after it was broken, in that town, the shia militants got into gunbattle such. they were doing that in at least one other town. it is not a perfect marriage between the shia military and the kurds but this is something you could have predicted several years because you could see the

tension is not just between sunni and shia along the green line in iraq -- sunni and kurds, not just an arab kurd green line in iraq but you could see whether it was maliki pushing the kurds from the green line or whether it was iraqi military, she a military officers, all felt very strong interest in trying to contain the kurds territory elise speaking so i think moving forward you will see the iranians having to manage core seeing it in their interest to manage -- managed a shi'a parish green line, and it looks to me like the iranians will see it in their interests to have shi'ah arab militant presence along the green line to try to him the kurds in.

turning to the question about the ideological rifts and why more isn't being done i agree with a lot to say on that subject but in a panel on iran, the focus need not be on the gulf and ideological influence. i would say baghdady was made in baghdad. kirkmany was made in iraq. so these leaders of the iraqi presence in iraq, these are iraqi productions, home grown iraqi militant leaders and their revenues need not come from the

golf. i am sure it benefits them but it was a multi-year period in iraq when we were fighting there, a great many outside at revenues came from being able to siphon off of the northern oil sector to the tune of millions a week to extort northern iraqi businesses and to tax the local population and now the they will those territories out right there able to draw a great deal of resources and sustain themselves from that. is the gulf many went to zero overnight they would still be able to fund their militant operations inside iraq based on local revenue streams and being able to exploit local political agreements. >> i had a quick question, you

mentioned the option of the negotiation process, the agreement on disagreement thing. how long both sides can keep doing this process? that would be a parliamentary election in 2015 and as a result of this election, a new one will be elected, a new supreme leader as far as i know. what is the role of the negotiation and what should we expect from this one year period until the parliamentary election process. >> my question is about the impact on iran at support for its third proxy in the region,

syria and everywhere. everytime you ask about the issues on the table they say it is only a nuclear negotiation and later on it would be discussed. what leverage with their be on iran? thank you. >> yes, right there. >> thank you. i had a question about how earlier you had mentioned even in the regime not a lot changed in terms of prosecution but the other part of it, made public overtures in the united states for dialogue as he called it. my question, do you think that

was a missed opportunity to change the trajectory of u.s./iran relationship, if not why would the supreme legal allow him to send such a message? >> why don't we do this? i will ask you the impact of the nuclear deal on iran at support. >> it is suggested that iran's support for these regional groups predates the nuclear controversy and nuclear discussions. ..

and i think the relationship between iran and hezbollah is an organic one, sort of an intimacy there. that you don't seem terms of hamas and others. but iran and saudi arabia and others are trying to fight it out for influence in the contested region and, therefore, use the resources and allies at your disposal. and those are going to be with some degree of tactics. i don't see him pass on iran. as a matter of fact, you can make a case, and perhaps a

speculative one iran's support for those groups will increase because they will try to insist that irrespective of nuclear agreement that will sustain their ideological values and ideological alignments. one way to do that is to increase level of support for allies. conversely, i think you're going to sit as a result of a nuclear deal a more substantial american support for the gulf countries as a means of suggesting the nuclear deal does not affect america's alliances. so paradoxically the nuclear agreement could lead to further polarization. said something to keep in mind that nuclear deal maybe good for iran and make good you national committee but not miserably get the original polarization. in terms of whether we missed -- i think in history of the islamic republic, the most interesting and important, and i think the president has not

always been given the credit he deserves. whether he was successful or not he thought to transform the islamic republic into a system of government that is representative and still religiously and culturally authentic. it would prove an impossible task, but i think his enterprising effects should not come his legacy think is larger than many contemporary historians otherwise suggest. the movement i think was real and his aspirations to transform iran, and transform iran's place in the international community were real but ultimately the forces of reaction at home prevail. and at that time, and the islamic republic is a very different state than it was them. today, to be simplistic about it there was always the last, the left, the reform said in the right. there is no left anymore. it's been excised from power. it's been excised from presence

and influence. that is never happened in the history of the islamic republic. i think at the center and right and have come to an agreement. and his wife he continues to languish in prison. >> the question was how long can this what i described as manage the revolution, how long can that sustain itself both in u.s. political context and iran political context? i would say in u.s., political context as extension of the deal. perhaps sustain itself until january 20, 2017. at least that's what president obama would ideally like to appear i've always thought its objectives with iran but he wants to avert an iranian bomb and he wants to avert bombing iran. some a show some forward progress but certainly much better, the best is revolution but he can get of revolution

come extending a deal is better than a family of video. the iranian political context, i think we oftentimes get too much credit to iranian elections as if we are talking about norway. ayatollah khamenei come as long as he is healthy, i think there is no signs of any threat whatsoever to his position as supreme leader. so in the assembly of experts, i see them getting unanimous support almost. and as ray was talking about earlier, you know, it's dividing the spoils. it's not that is going to be a parliament which comes in and really calls for sweeping change in iran. i was just a couple of sentences about the prospects, if there is

a nuclear deal, what happens to iran's regional policies. the optimistic perspective is that the pragmatists are embroiled in iran and we see more pragmatic iranian regional behavior which means curtailing of support for hezbollah, islamic jihad and osha also. the more pessimistic point of view is that iran is not going to be freed up financially, right? -- bashar al-assad. far more financial resources to continue to support these groups. as i said i think we always have to warn against complacent our hopes. the last 35 years shows the pessimistic point of view has usually prevailed and putting ideological interest of our national interest. and then finally on the question of whether there was a missed opportunity with iran. aaron david miller who covers the israeli-palestinian conflict said something i really like which said the anniversary conflict is not a morality tale

between evil and good. and likewise the u.s.-iran conflict, there's been certain times when the u.s. has made mistakes and what iran has made mistakes, but the current administration desperately wants to engage. bill clinton himself has boarded a deal with iran. i think the hardliners in tehran were then ready with the united states and i would argue the hardliners don't are not ready. if i were an adviser to the hardliners in tehran i would advise them against it. because whether you're fidel castro in cuba or kim jong-un in north korea, i think he's hardline groups are sure to appreciate that can preserve the power and a closed environment but when you open up the system to the forces of globalization to market forces, they could well be swept aside with the tide. i think there's a personal

parochial interest for the hardliners to maintain their embassy with the united states. >> to add my 2 cents on iran's for porch regional proxies in the wake of some deal, so i guess to think that a nuclear deal will lead naturally to a retraction of rain support for militant proxies means that you think that those militant proxies -- proxies our cars to trade away. the iranian regime reviews those as in favor of pursuit of a nuclear deal. i personally don't think that that's true. i think their commitment to what they call the axis of resistance which they themselves built is deep and enduring, and is not entirely associate with its relationship with the united states, although it plays a central role.

i had a lebanese shia and i was once told me, you should think of lebanese hezbollah as forward deployed regiment of the irgc. and then you'll think, then you'll understand their role in iran strategy worked with the i agree with that but it also think that groups like hezbollah are also iran's cubans. so the way the soviets used the cubans in order to be able to project proxy power into central america, and cole and ethiopia, for example, that's the way they're able to use lebanese hezbollah to project into whether it's iraq or bahrain or syria. and it's not something they're going to give up. i think it will continue to see that they'll have vital interests, that they wanted militant proxies to pursue for them in lieu of taking iranian casualties. out to the iran-iraq war, the iranian regime is very casually a first. they're not going to set

iranian's out to do the job that arab shia are willing to do for them, or can be organized to do for them. that's not going to stop after any sort of nuclear deal. lastly, i think you are also not going to see them reduce any of this sponsorship so long as they remain in a cold war, which is a hot proxy war with the saudis. as long as that conflict remains, then they're going to see a vital interest in keeping these militant proxies, you know, empowered. >> we've got a question from the overflow room via twitter. to you, karim, about the role just congress if there is no nuclear agreement. your reaction and where we're going with that. >> in the view of congress it was there sanctions and economic coercion which forced iran to come to the negotiating table in a meaningful way. and i think many members now

would argue that if we don't reach an agreement by november 24, the no slouch course of action is to increase the pressure against iran to force them to do a deal. i would say that additional sanctions against iran will be insufficient to force iran to capitulate but there will be sufficient to provoke iran to escalate the that's my point of view. i think on this particular issue is a cognitive difference among some members of congress in that on one hand are cognizant of the fact their constituents are not interested in another military engagement, another u.s. military adventure in the middle east. congress opposed a much more limited military strike against the assad regime in syria. the passing of additional legislations could well force us to contemplate another military

adventure in the region. and i would say that there is one way, and a colleague of mine, thinking about this a lot, as -- if congress does feel compelled to pass legislation come november 24 in the absence of deal, what he argues is the sanctions legislation should be deterrence in nature, meaning you can pass legislation which tries to hold the line where it is right now. how iran if you put your foot on the gas again and we -- reconstitute your program, it's going to trigger additional sanctions but if you essentially stay where you are, if you keep the car pulled up to the side of the it's not going to trigger additional sanctions. that's perhaps a smart way of thinking about it. >> we have time for two more very brief questions. >> hi.

thank you, guys for your comments. i was just curious at what point do you think iran cuts ties with assad, if and when that time comes? and what the kind of regional geopolitical considerations would be for that. thank you. >> okay, that makes it easy. so ray, would you like -- >> one day cut ties with trenton when he is opposed. i think that's going happen. going to happen. i don't think they are tied into assad of the person per say but nevertheless, to the constituency that they have developed in series of the and as i mentioned they seem comfortable and operating in a fragmented, messy, murky syria, balkanize syria. that's sort of a, suits their lenses. so i'm not quite sure if those ties will rupture syria is often

have suggested, so i suspect kashmir and also their profits on syria has come to fruition. name if they didn't think assad was going to collapse or go, and so they're playing a winning hand from their perspective. >> i would agree with that. you know, if you're an iranian official end to read an op-ed in "the new york times" from a decorated, an imminent u.s. diplomat like ryan crocker which says that as bad as assad is, the alternative to assad is worse, i don't think you feel like you have to prepare to abandon your critical regional ally. i think if you like the u.s. and the west is gradually a government getting itself to your position rather than vice versa. as ray said, i think if they

thought they could preserve the interest in syria and oppose the assad abutment they would've cut him loose long time ago. they are not married to the individual. but the fact that they haven't done that despite all that's happened and tremendous reputation damage to iran and the broader sunni arab world means that i think they feel absent this, they could lose all of their interest in syria. >> never. i think they will never do that. i'll make it short. >> on that note i want to thank you all for the very excellent set of presentations on this complex country. please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] spent we'll take a break and be back here at 3 p.m. thank you. [inaudible conversations]

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here's a look at the massachusetts governors debate between democrat martha coakley and republican charlie baker. transport headlines like martha coakley have been chasing you. in a state where democrats dominate congressional and state delegations, why aren't you leaving and leaving big right now? coakley: thanks for that question. because i appreciate that what matters of course is not newspapers endorsement or what any poll say. they are often been. i believe this race is pretty close right now. i think that if you follow this you also will believe that what i've been focus on since i got into this race a year ago september was on traveling around the state and listening to people about what they needed and where we could go as the economy started to turn around. and because i believe that we of the best ideas about turning the economy around for everybody for earn the six-time -- forgiving people -- sick time, making sure

that we invest in our workforce, and her kids so they can have those jobs of the future, that's what's going to win this race. it some ideas and organizing. i'm confident we're going to win on november 4. >> moderator: charlie, you've got the globe endorsement. republicans haven't had that in a long time. can you talk about what martha said just now. is this a close race are not? baker: i've been pleased and gratified by the response we've gotten from the voters across the commonwealth and i've been grateful to receive endorsement from "the boston globe" and not just "the boston globe" at every newspaper in massachusetts has made an endorsement so far industries has endorsed our campaign. i believe that's because they believe as i do state government is broken and the next governor of massachusetts needs to be a proven leader and manager with tremendous success in the public sector, and the private sector and do is also certain local government. clearly the voters as this race has gone from being 20 points

behind the even or a little ahead for us and as both papers have come up with those endorsements did make statements about who they think is most suited to lead the commonwealth at this point. >> remarks from white house deputy national security advisor tony blinken. he spoke at the carnegie endowment for international peace about isis and efforts to get former iraqi president nouri al-maliki to deal with the group. >> we welcome you again for our fourth session of the day. it's been a terrific day but we saved the best for last. we are altered to have tony blinken, deputy national security advisor to president obama, with us. those of you have been with us all day, and i think it's, as most of you know we have covered the region pretty well in pretty deeply but we are now going to focus on the administration, kind of inside you of where we

stand in this effort against isis and to bring a greater degree of order to the region. i think everybody knows mr. blinken's distinguished resume. he was vice president biden's national security advisor you for becoming president's deputy, and before that the staff director of the democratic staff director of the senate foreign relations committee. we are really honored to have you and looking forward to hearing from you. he has a tight schedule, won't surprise anybody to know, but we will try after hearing from him to get some good questions in from all of you. >> great. thanks very much. good afternoon. it's wonderful to be here and it is especially wonderful to be here on an extraordinary day for carnegie. let me just start by saying that i presume that the what of an essay, first of all jessica, your leadership of this institution for 18 years has

been exported to give turned carnegie into the global institution and at the very forefront of all of the think tanks in washington and, indeed, around the world. and it's also hard to imagine finding someone to succeed jesse in this job i think our guest pulled it off with getting bill burns, the former deputy secretary state to succeed jessica. those of you know bill, that's probably most people in the audience and beyond, know him to be an absent extraordinary leader. someone who brings incredible intellect, wisdom and decency to everything does. i can only say that carnegie will be transitioning into very, very good hands. i welcome this opportunity to spend all the time walking you through the element of our comprehensive strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the islamic state of iraq and levant, or isa. i want to start i putting myself in context -- isil. i think that's the understood in part at least as a product of a

number of powerful regional trends, some which i believe you discussed earlier today. first the challenge to domestic order within states, question for the status quo, the rise of new constituencies, the incumbent of new voices. that inning was of course is in a welcome development but it is produced a violent counterreaction the old order as example in syria with his long death spiral of violence. it has a dark flipside the erosion of state authority, the emergence of uncovered spaces, new weapons and technology, the surfacing of sectarianism. the second turn as a juncture the regional order among states, the growth of sectarian rivalries, the intensification to face off against data rate and the rent, the spread of dangerous proxy wars. third, i think you've seen sunni struggle between violent extremists and the vast majority of moderate muslims. and a contest for leadership between established powers and

political islam, also represented by the muslim brotherhood. for the finally the recent history of iraq, the way has been lifted from decades of dictatorship, war and foreign dominion allowing many of these forces to collide head-on with the fragile beginnings of the more inclusive and representative governance. one of the most poisonous products of all of this has been the alienation from their respective government of large segments of the sunni population, some 20 million of them live between baghdad and damascus. this is a vast sea in which isil swims. and it must inform the combination of determination, patience and humility would bring to the task of defeating. so how did we get here? much has been written, much has been spoken about the relationship between our military departure from iraq and the rise of isil.

so let me spend a few minutes on a historic detour. as all of you know in negotiating the 2008 agreement, present which committed our forces to leave iraq at the end of 2011. that commitment was premised on a simple, powerful idea that we were returning to iraq its sovereignty. we sure that commitment. we also sought to leave behind a small residual force, encounters and present the iraqis develop intelligence, target aqi, the predecessor to isil, an f-16 squadron to protect their airspace. as all of you know, the council representatives would not give us the protection for our troops from legal immunity that we sought. this is not as result of that go to negotiate. it's something we worked very hard. of what it is and understood this way is really a leading indicator or proxy for a much larger issue.

simply put, at that point in its history after a tenure quote-unquote occupation, the iraqi body politic did not want to stay in iraq. that's what happened. we were also to some extent the victims of success. at that point in time the i is f. were more numerous and capable. iraqi leaders will were more confident and violence over all was down significantly from its peak in 2007-2008. at every step along the way of our very, very methodical disengagement militarily from iraq, iraqi simply we would actually leave and follow through. they didn't think we would withdraw from the city's. we did. they didn't think we would enter combat mission. we did. they didn't think we would leave altogether with our military. we did. we have to demonstrate to them we meant it. in effect we have to leave inward to find a way back on the security side and gradually build up our engagement. it's a fair question to ask whether this modest residual force would've made a

difference, and i think if your answer is in some ways yes in some ways no. first they would not have had a combat mission. so it would hardly have been in a place to repel isil. it might've been caught in the middle of everything that was going on. iraqis would've placed restrictions ending in the series became a huge in some and to spread accelerant to isil's rise. second is also clear that the departure of our forces significantly decreased violence in the near term. shiite militia stood down, attacks against the u.s. embassy seized. some of you i know our veterans of trips to the embassy in virtually on every trip prior to that point you would have the great privilege of getting a mortar attack or a rocket attack. that has ceased and into the violence in iraq went down from about 1600 a week at the end of 2007, our 2008, to 100 a week at that point. but it's also fair to say had we

been able to keep that small residual presence, that probably would've allowed us to better enable the iraqis to do with aqi and ultimately isil and maybe help us better shape iraqis security policy. that's exactly why we sought to leave a residual force and effect applied immediately upon the withdrawal of our combat forces, we tried to get our foot back in the door. the iraqis in early $2012 they were confident they could handle the problem. we said you were wrong. if you don't constantly and proactively collect aqi, they will rise up again. i had these conversations with my iraqi interlocutors, and so did many of our senior officials including vice president biden. you need to keep aqi on its use and off it's a toasted in early 2012, along with david petraeus was then the head of the cia, several of us thought an agreement to constitute with iraqis and effective joint

fusion cell in iraq to help them target aqi. it's too soon, they said. eventually we will get there, but you need to prove that you're not actually returned in force. then the arab league summit camera in march 2012. we thought why not provide the iraqis with drones, intelligence drones, isr, to safeguard the summit was they thought i was a great idea but they had arab leaders coming in from around the region. it represent a real sick of each other which and they welcomed this possibility. we thought this was a good way to get a foot back in the door and help develop more intelligence against aqi. unfortunately, the story leaked to the press and to begin a political hot potato and ultimate the iraqis said no. so there was an exercise in frustration throughout 2012 as we sought to work her way back in. all of that began to change in 2013. aqi became isil, fueled by the conflict in syria.

in iraq, in early 2012 at the time we left there were about five suicide bombers a month. by early 2013 it was up to 50 a month and this was the homework of aqi and then isil which by the way was not initially to dominate an indigenous force anorectic it was mostly at that point a foreign force. iraqis so they became much more open to and, indeed, desirous of aid but quietly. in the spring of 2013 we begin a systematic effort to ramp up our counterterrorism assistance to the iraqis. we use the foreign military sales program to try to get to the more apaches, f-16, missiles, small arms and munitions. ithis should hard-working with our congress and there was a certain amount of reluctance which is not hard to understand because the the concerned by the leadership of prime minister maliki. we resumed in very small numbers isr flights in late 2013. we stood up a targeting so in

2013. and that helped the iraqis captured about 200 isil fighters. and would put in a small number of our embassy, a small number of special offers and trainers. throughout the year, and then well into 2013 and then the beginning of 2014, the committee that i chair, the deputy committee met more than a dozen times on the question of increasing support to iraq to deal with aqi and then isil. the principals committee to the national city council met multiple times on the same issue. it was something with which we were deeply engaged. when president obama met with prime minister maliki in november 2013, isil was at the top of the agenda. the president told the prime minister, you need a conference approach to this problem. there's a military peace. we're working hard but it has to cover its. and in particular you have to pursue political reforms to address the legitimate grievances of iraqis otherwise

might see isil as a savior. two months later, isil streamed into ramadi and fallujah with the isf laying siege. in short, we were focused and acting on isil and the threat that i opposed more than a year before the fall of the mosul. but the problem began to out run the solution. fueled by the, in syria, iraqi reluctance and a renewed sectarianism in iraq with politicians on all sides playing to the basis. that brings us to almost the present, to this summer with the fall of mosul and the erasure of the border between iraq and syria. when that happened, the president acted decisively as well as deliberately. our immediate focus was on protecting americans. we rapidly deployed military personnel to further secure our embassy and the international airport. we put in more isr to develop a clear picture of what was happening on the ground and we sit in small military teams to

assess the viability of iraqi security forces, and the status of the threat. then as all of you know we initiated limited military action to protect u.s. personnel, protect strategic sites come and prevent large-scale humanitarian catastrophes. those initial airstrikes stop the isil advance on irbil. and allow the iraqis to control a mosul dam, airpower help provide relief to thousands of iraqis trapped. these actions also have the benefit of blunting isil's momentum, buying time and space to put in place the pillars of a comprehensive strategy to roll back the isil. the first pillar is a new inclusive iraqi government. we put particular emphasis on its formation and, indeed, we leveraged the promise of greater u.s. assistance accordingly because we could not expect iraqi kurds or sunnis or the

various neighboring states to join forces to counter i saw with an iraqi government pursuant completely sectarian agenda. indeed, we resisted more expensive relative efforts until change was well in, lest we perceived as air force of the outgoing minister maliki, alienating sunnis in the racks and the region. instead we focus our initial diplomacy on creating conditions for maliki to step aside and completing government formation in record time. now we have a government committed to reforming the military, giving us more effective iraqi part at addressing grievances of the sunnis and to dilute their support or acquiescence for isil but i'll come back to that at the end. the second pillar that the president wanted to have in place before embarking fully on a comprehensive strategy was a broad, regional and international coalition. we were delivered in building

that coalition before taking sustained action. we could not make it look like a united states was acting against isil or islam or the christian west was supposed to the muslim middle east to that's just a isil would've wanted but instead we get the focus on the global challenge in which regional states which have the most immediate at stake played leading roles. now more than 60 countries around the world have signed onto this coalition. when we took our first airstrikes in syria, saudi arabia, the uae, jordan, bahrain and qatar flew with us. with these pillars and partners coming into place we begin to implement the comprehensive strategy to go from one thing isil's advances to starting to roll back. the objective and the president has been clear about it, is to disrupt, degrade and ultimate defeat isil. so that it no longer poses a threat to iraq or syria, to our people, partners are interest in the region, or ultimately to the united states itself.

the defeat of isil will not happen easily. it will not happen quickly. it will not happen through exclusively military means or by u.s. efforts alone. to the contrary to succeed our strategy has to cover its of, broad-based, and it must be sustained. so in concert with our coalition partners we are leveraging all elements of our national power in four basic ways. first, we are working to destroy, starting with degrading it and ultimate destroying isil's war fighting capacity. its command and control, its leadership, its supply funds, logistics, ability to mass force and overrun local population. we are doing that through a combination military and counterterrorism means. second, we are working to operate its central nervous system but the financing, foreign fighters, the religious legitimacy and the recruitment that are its lifeblood and we're doing that to bring to bear intelligence platform ensuring national and international laws,

cooperation among enforcement officials, sanctions, counter legitimate campaigns, enhanced transportation, within partner countries and, indeed, here in the united states. third, we are working to dilute local support or a combination the isil pressing for the resolution of legitimate grievances can regional diplomacy, shifting momentum against isil on the ground and squeezing the space within which it operates. finally, we're working to build partner capacity so that local forces can take the fight to isil and retake the ground that's been lost to train and advise and assist programs, for the provision of weapons condemnations and equipment at the detroit motor action to enable partner success. the people we are helping will do the fighting on the ground to retake their countries. the strategy recognizes the situation we faced in syria is more complex even than when we face in iraq. unlike in baghdad for we have a viable local partner and ground

forces to leverage, assad remains in damascus, a magnet for the extremism we seek to defeat. for more than two years working with and supporting the moderate opposition, we have made some gains in making it more effective and trying to position it as a counterweight to a socket now we are intensifying that support including to it over train and equip program under so-called title x which the saudis and turks of offered to host. this will get the moderate opposition more effective tools to help them and us counter isil, to protect its own communities and, over time, to demonstrate to assad and his patrons that he will not prevail militarily, creating the conditions for a negotiated settlement. this program is not a silver bullet. it's going to take time to train recruits and produce results. the forces are powerful. the syrian army backed by hezbollah and iran and russia on the one hand, isil, nusra and other extremist groups on the

other. at the programs critical to eventual success. the coalition can do real damage to isil through the air without forces on the ground to hold territory from which isil has been removed we will not be able to shrink and eventually eliminate the safe haven. meanwhile, we are taking action every day to degrade isil's capacity to project power into iraq, to recess and sustain its forces. we're going at its command and control, its headquarters, its training centers, its arm depots, its oil refineries. and to cite one example is seen significant results. take for example, the oil refineries. storagetek's, stations. the international agency for just this past week that is affecting isil's ability to fuel its vehicles and to derive revenue from the sale of diesel and gasoline. let me conclude with this. i spent about a week in iraq the couple of ago and i wanted to give a report card on what

account because i think it is a luster to a both the challenges we face but also some of the promised that is before us in terms of success. first if you look at the political situation, iraqis are dealing now with a legacy of mistrust, suspicion, of grievance. and they also faced a tough economic situation the oil prices are down. or and expended on internally displaced persons are up. investment is on the fence but this makes for a very complicated situation. i was struck in be with virtually the entire senior iraqi leadership across parties and ethnic groups in baghdad ended up in for bill -- burble that there was a clear commitment and desire to work together across sectarian lines, a clear willingness to give the other the benefit of the doubt for now and the reason was simple. virtually every group in iraq has been looking into the abyss and they have seen what is

before. if they don't manage to work together to take on isil. we've always seen the prime minister abadi say and do significant things in terms of reaching out to other communities. he did -- he removed some of the more difficult and challenging generals. he pushed through at some political expense a sunni defense minister, a post had been vacant for four years and is now pressing with pretty much the entire body politic for the creation of the national guard that offers the best prospect of bringing sunnis into the fight to welcome back to the at the very end. he's leaning toward an engaging the kurds on oil revenues and back pay for the peshmerga. and together they back it looked leadership strike events a national program that can address the interests, desires and grievances of all its committees. so there is promise.

they're off to a good start but it's against the backdrop of significant challenge. then there's the military peace. and the iraqis face two very significant deficits first, the previous prime minister had in effect hollowed out big chunks of the iraqi military. keep the professional is it moving out some of the competent leadership, moving in people wanted him but didn't necessarily know what they were doing. the cut the normal chain of command and major as it mentioned a moment ago to some of the senior leadership reported directly to his office, but that's not anyway to run to work and, of course, the force itself became more sectarian in nature. and so when you have the iraqi military deployed in a bar, a predominantly shia force deployed into a sunni region, despite the fact it was their to help with the committees protect itself against isil, it was working in the community that didn't trust it and asked itself what he was doing there. and then it ended up being cut

off the supply line, isolated without effective leadership to that's been going on since january of this year. and that's the very difficult situation we inherited in and bar. but we've also seen something very positive. when the efforts of iraqi secret forces are planned and coordinated with the coalition backing them they can be very effective but in the same thing for the kurdish peshmerga. we send as i noted before that the mosul dam. we saw it outside of irbil. we summer resort of the border crossing. and as we speak we see it in the north where the peshmerga have retaken the town and we're seeing it as we speak elsewhere when iraqi secret forces are moving to take the area around the oil refinery that iraqi forces have helped very valiantly since june. so what this means is this.

this is our approach. we are working with the iraqis to establish a campaign plan that is planned, coordinated and methodical to begin over the next months to take back site by site, town by town territory that has been lost to isil. at the same time, and this is where you have to do some building in a plan at 60,000 feet, we did an assessment of iraqi secret a force and we found half we were able to inspect in effect or not competent. now the class has full version of that is half the force works. the coalition in the weeks and months ahead will begin to take part in that effort. as i mentioned order is the national guard the iraqis have bought into this concept. it's a way to bring local forces in to protect their own

community that have been tethered to the state which provided the equipment and the salaries. this is a very significant developer. the challenge of course is it will take time to stand up to what we are working on a with iraqis is an effective bridge to get to that national guard so we can take advantage now of the increasing significant number of tribes who want to get in on the fight against isil the recognizes that future is better off with iraq than with isil but you need help, aid supplies come equipment, support. as the iraqis and the peshmerga in the north go on the offensive, as they move from their heels to their toes, this has very beneficial impact. first, the changes to the it changes the dynamics. it damaged his isil is not 10 feet tall, that it's not invincible. one of the reasons why somebody foreign fighters are flooded to iraq and the city is precisely

because of this perception, the isil has momentum. it's the place to be. it's the winnipeg as you start to go on the offensive and put them on defensive, that dynamic changes. second, isil has changed some of its tactics since our initial military strikes. in many places it is not massing its forces but it's moving around in smaller groups. it's taking refuge in cities and in buildings. it's even taken that it's black flags will be less visible but as the campaign begins and as the iraqis start piece by piece to go at them, isil will have to make a choice. it will have to stand and fight, and so be very visible to the coalition and our air power, it will have to flee, or it will hunker down and instead of the iraqis being seized by isil, isil be under siege from the iraqis. as we are doing is we're at working the lines of effort i mentioned before, internationally around the world to stem the flow of foreign fighters come to the financing, to undermine the legitimacy and to deal with the humanitarian challenge.

so having reviewed with the strategy is let me conclude with a brief word about what it is not. it is not iraq or afghanistan redux. it will not involve deploying tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of american troops. it will not involve the expenditure of trillions of american dollars. it will not require the united states to go into virtually alone. the iraqis don't need and, indeed, they don't want foreign forces in combat in iraq. as the prime minister z. on national television just last by, that would be divisive, destructive the nation and, indeed, it would also probably endanger our own forces. and more to the point, we will not fall into the trap that isil would want to set of dryness in in large numbers, bogging us down and bleeding us. that's exactly what they want and that's exactly what we will not do. for these reasons, too, we believe the strategy that we have while difficult, challenging, time-consuming is

sustainable and ultimately will be successful. thank you. [applause] >> would you prefer to sit? >> no. unhappy -- >> if i may, let me start with the first question which has to do with administration has managed to put together as you mentioned and extraordinarily broad coalition, more than 60 countries, but that encompasses a number of different, even conflicting agendas. what do you see as the biggest, the biggest challenge for maintaining the integrity and the coherence of the coalition? you know, in the months immediately ahead. and how are you going to manage to keep it together?

>> thanks, jessica. i think what's extraordinary in the first instance is the fact that country that can do this with incredibly disparate agendas often in conflict with one another actually came together to join this coalition and to work against. that's evident of the factor all of the churches among the coalition countries, their minds are concentrated by the wolf at the door, and that's isil. so there's a clue that is keeping this together and it's a common interest integrating a totally defeating isil. just about your rights are differences among the coalition members. in syria number of coalition members would like to see the focus placed more on removing assad. there are tensions that can arise in terms of the composition of coalition members were taking military action and what sensitivities that may touch in different countries. but i have to tell you, by and large what we are seeing now is rather extraordinary cohesion but what we've done is put in

place a structure in a model that puts a tremendous emphasis on keeping the coalition together and strengthening as we go forward as i think virtually everyone knows, the president asked retired general john allen to lead the effort, to work day in day out on building and sustaining a coalition. and, of course, against the different lines of efforts military, financing, forethought, legitimacy, et cetera. we have lead agencies in the government working with their counterparts to do the same thing. and john allen, his deputy was one of our most experienced hands in iraq, or on the road virtually full-time making sure that they're working to keep us together of course the president has played a lead role in this as well. he convene extraordinary summit at the united nations of leaders from dozens and dozens of countries to get credit commitments to do with the problem of foreign fighters. we've seen real success and progress there. is burning up the phon phone lis

and would as is the vice president. so the bob litt is at least until now there's been -- the bottom line, the we tensions will afford us different countries have put a different emphasis on different parts of the agenda. but again my sense is that the common denominator of wanting and needing to do with the isil problem will keep us together. >> thank you. >> michael gordon, "new york times." 20, u.s. has used air power to protect the kurdish population in kobani and to protect kurds and the yazidis from the islamic state. that the united states has not used air power to protect sunni arab opponents of the assad regime against barrel bombs and other attacks. as you know this is a distinction that has not gone unnoticed by the moderate syrian

opposition. how does the united states hope to recruit and maintain the support, sustained the morale of the moderate syrian opposition and eventually use it as a ground element in the effort to contain the islamic state? as you noted in your speech, while at the same time taking the stance that it's not prepared to protect them against airstrikes, unlike these other groups. and under what circumstances would the u.s. be prepared used air power to protect them? all you really going to take the better part of the year, $500 million to train and equip moderate syrian opposition and then put it in syria where it will be vulnerable to the regimes in airstrikes? thank you. >> thanks, michael. first, i think actually we have been using air power in ways that advance clearly the interests and agenda of the sunni population as well as other populations. for example, we've taken action in anbar around the mosul dam,

strategic sites but also protecting sunnis who live there. we have worked hard as well too, as i said, start to build out two things. first, this national guard which will be a way to bring sunnis into the fight, to have been engaged with the state, and that will benefit as well from the full support of the coalition. we are working on building a bridge for the guard as it develops. and in syria we have focused initially on working to degrade isil's capacity to project power, including and in particular into iraq. so we have tried to focus on making sure that we were looking at the strategic aspects that it had, command-and-control, headquarters, a refined, arms depots, training centers, et cetera and we've been very deliberate about that.

we've also tried when we have seen significant humanitarian catastrophes in the making to take action to we did that. but here's the challenge, and i think this is important. as i said there is a very methodical campaign plan that is in the element and, indeed, we're starting to roll out on. and we have to stick to the plan. unfortunately, every day there's going to be in some part of iraq or some part of syria a community that is under siege, under attack, and is looking for help. we can't be everyplace every time. we have to stick to methodical plan to start to roll back isil in a very deliberate way. that's what we're doing. if we get moved off of that plan i something popping up in one place or another, we are not going to succeed. so we're trying to be disciplined about this. we are trying to help the iraqis be disciplined. but the bottom line is this.

isil represents a threat first and foremost actually to the sunni community in iraq as well as in syria. we have seen the conditions under which sunnis are living in towns that have been taken over by isil. we get the reports. we know what the living conditions are like. and for the vast majority of people, this is not the future they want. the iraqi government has to demonstrate to them that they are better off with iraq than with isil. we are making good progress on that. and we also have to support the more, especially the tribes come in terms of allowing them to get more fully into the fight with training, equipment, salaries, et cetera. all of that is happening. again, the coalition is, what, five or six weeks old. so we have to have a look at a e strategic patience as we build this strategy. >> thank you very much. if i could follow up on this national guard plan. some have scaled it as a second

awakening but there's a lot of details that remain unclear. what do you see are the risks of this plan to iraqi cohesion? this tab you mention, how strong is that? what are the mechanisms in place to strengthen that tether? i guess the broader question is how do we strike the question, empowering communities and not encouraging fragmentation warlordism and militia will? >> it's a great question and it's a challenge but i think what we're looking at is a few things. first, empowering local committees -- communities to defend themselves as a part powerful potential mechanism. the national guard come its members would be drawn from local communities. it would be tethered to local leadership and to the governor of a province to it would probably act at a conventional level -- provincial level.

but unlike the awakening, it would actually be directly tethered to the iraqi state as well which wil would provide fos salaries, its equipment, it's basic sustainment. that did you think the best of both worlds but it creates an entity that answers to and is supported by the state, but its membership is drawn from local committees and people will feel a lot better about having their own protection. closer in your likely of local police forces. think of this innocents in terms of a circle. the local police force closest in at the local level, at the talent level, at the city level. the guard at the provincial level and then the iraqi security forces, the national army at the national level to like any national guard this guard could be federalized in an emergency situation. i think there's tremendous promise. you are right there are complications. one is what you do with the

shiite militia? will they be folded and then those to the guard? will they be folded into iraqi city forces? we saw early on these militias were probably critical to helping the iraqi security forces hold on in the early days when they're under tremendous strain. but they also represent a real challenge because to understate things they're not exactly popular. so those militia have to be either drawn back and disbanded, or their members need to be integrated into officials could force. and, finally, the peshmerga. they will have no doubt in interest and certainly desire to remain as independent as possible. how does that fold into a guard concept? all of these things we are working on. again, standing it up is going to take some time. is that the top of the agenda of the government that has to be legislated. that's going to take a look at a time to in the meantime what we're trying to do as i said before is how the iraqis take

fish of the fact we're already seeing tribes starting to move from being either with isil or on the fence to be with the government but they need assistance now. and so bridging to the point where we get to a guard is what we are working on. >> the gentleman right here. >> thank you very much. i had a quick question as a follow-up with you or your question.

>> but it's not the case for u.s., for example, or sees as a priority but isis is a priority can you give us a better sense in terms of u.s. and turkey? >> sure. thank you very much. turkey's an absolutely critical and essential part of this coalition. it's already playing a significant role. as i alieu lewded too -- alluded to earlier, a critical contribution. it is playing a critical role in trying to deal with the frau of foreign -- the flow of foreign fighters, many of whom transit across the turkish border, and we are in very close

collaboration on that. same thing to the financing that it is actually pa versing borders. the turks have taken a significant role in that. and ongoing conversations about other things they might do as part of the coalition. but as we speak, right now, thanks to turkey there are kurdish peshmerga forces and free syrian army forces moving into kobani thanks to land bridge established by the turks, again, bringing peshmerga from the iraqi kurdish region and bringing in free syrian forces going through turkey into kobani. that, i think, certainly rebuts the premise that there's some conflict over the question of kobani. the turks have played a lead role in making this happen x as a result, the reinforcements that are needed to help kobani hold on are coming into praise. so, again -- into place. so, again, turkey's a close, close ally and a critical part of the coalition, and we see it

every day. >> michelle? >> michele dunne from the carnegie endowment. some of the arab members of the coalition against isil also have different definitions of terrorism, and some of them have either passed or now passing new counterterrorism laws. there are some positive aspects to stop foreign fighters from going to iraq and syria, but then there are other aspects in which this would be criminalizing or in some cases even counting oz terrorism things that the -- as terrorism, things that the united states would normally consider peaceful expression of dissent, peaceful demonstration, things like that. are you concerned that this can lead to radicalization in those countries, support either for isil or for other extremist groups? and is this an issue that the united states is raising with the coalition partners? >> the short answer is it's a constant part of our dialogue

with a number of countries. many face significant terrorism challenges, and it's important in answering those challenges to avoid actually taking segments of society that are not engaged in terrorism, but may simply be critical of the government and incentivizing them to use violence as a means of advancing their agendas. so this is something that comes up on a regular basis, something that's a been part of the landscape for many years, and it's a fairly regular part of our dialogue with a number of countries. as i said earlier in addressing jessica's question, i think what's very positive is that for all of the differences in definition and approach that we see and interests, the common interest of dealing with isil has been a very strong glue that has put this coalition together. but as we go forward, there will be differences of approach, differences of emphasis. the one you alluded to is

certainly something that's there and that we talk about on a regular basis. >> relate me be fair -- let me be fair to the back. [laughter] the gentleman right there, go ahead. >> all right, go for it. >> go. >> thank you. my name's -- [inaudible] i'm a palestinian journalist in talk town, and i spent some time in iraq, so i got to know it a little bit. with the national guard, is it like awakening 201, or is it going to encompass all kinds of communities -- >> i think we -- >> international. and second, on syria aren't you doing the same thing, basically? because you and your allies are funding, equipping and training and arming another syrian opposition while perhaps you ought to reconsider working with the people that are fighting isil which is the syrian army. perhaps you can do some coordination in reality. we can talk about -- [inaudible] all we want, but if you want to

defeat them on the ground, you have got to have ground forces, and the ground forces doing the work are the syrians. >> okay, let me -- maybe i'll just take one -- go ahead. >> [inaudible] you spoke about how the assad administration leveraged its power to promote an inclusive government in iraq. do you have anything to leverage on the gulf countries to go for pluralism as you know that the gulf countries are a major source for funding, for fighters and for extremism? my question specifically about what can you leverage, and if i'll go specifically about bahrain, as you see the growing crackdown on human rights activists and political parties, what can you leverage on these issues? >> thank you. let me, let me take the last question first, then i'll come back to the second one, and i think the last question hearkens

back to a question we heard earlier. look, i think we've seen a pattern repeat itself in different places over and over again, and it's a challenge to break out of it. and that is that as countries that are facing very legitimate threats from extremist groups take action that is, in effect, much broader gauged than the threat and as they potentially, in taking action, disenfranchise large segments of their own population from basic rights, they risk, in effect, precipitating exactly what they're trying to prevent which is more extremism. and so as i said earlier, we're in a constant dialogue with many of our partners in the region about dealing with the real threats that they face, but also trying to do it in a smart way that doesn't wind up alienating significant segments of the

population who may find they then have no choice but to turn to violence. and that's exactly what we want to avoid. so, again, this is something that's a constant in our dialogue with a number of our friends and partners. with regard to the first question, first, is the national guard the awakening 2.0. as i said, i think it actually can be an improvement in the awakening in that if the iraqis get it right, it's clearly tethered to the state in a sustained way. and that creates a relationship between baghdad and the national guard forces where there is, in effect, both need each other and want to sustain the relationship. so if they get it right, i think it'll be a powerful thing that can actual be more effective and more sustainable than the awakening proved to be. and finally, with regard to syria, look, the problem that we face is that assad has been a

magnet for the very extremism we're fighting. that is what has attracted into syria isil and various other extremist groups. we've long said that he's lost his legitimacy and it's hard to see how syria can be stable while he is syria's leader. on the other hand, it's very critical that whatever happens in syria going forward, that its basic institutions be preserved including finding ways to preserve the basic military structures, the institutions of the state, etc. we know what happens from our experience in iraq over the last decade when you disband those institutions. it creates a vacuum, and that's usually filled by bad things. so going forward in syria i think one of the things that's going to be critical is getting to a political transition that preserves the institutions of the state and makes it clear to all of the different actors in syria that their equities can

actually be protected in a syrian state. that's, obviously, a big challenge. i think we now have a new u.n. envoy who is focused on the diplomacy, and he's starting to make the rounds of the critical regional states. and we're very anxious to work with him to see if some of thediplomacy can be energized. because as people look out at the syrian civil war part of this, i think all sides can see that, ultimately, this is going to exhaust them. it's already had the most horrific humanitarian consequences. and there's no military victory for anyone in the civil war. and the patrons of various parties who are spending millions and billions of dollars to scene their proxies, that's a real cost too. so i think there should be a growing incentive to find a way forward with energy jietzed diplomacy to deal with the civil war. but part of that is the moderate

opposition, building it up, making it a counterweight and, in effect, further underscoring the fact that the assad regime cannot win this militarily. >> we have time just for one last create p question. >> [inaudible] i'm adviser of -- [inaudible] i was reading the book of the dean of fletcher who was -- >> yes. >> -- [inaudible] >> yes. >> and it was really very interesting what he said about syria, that i don't know if united states up to the responsibility at the very beginning of the war either really to strengthen the moderate opposition because we face two situation; either bashar assad are stay in power and will be more cruel to his people, or we'll see more extremism -- [inaudible] and then another -- >> no, be crisp.

>> [inaudible] the arab world 70% muslim world, and they are persecuted in syria since 50 years. in iraq with the beginning of the war, they were, you know, with the dissolve of the army, maliki he built pure shiite army trained by rapp. so they say -- by iran. so they say sometimes isis is a reflection of us frustration, oe which is terrible for the muslim world. >> okay. >> so how you see things? [laughter] >> well, you know, one of the things that's so important to do is exactly what you've done, which is try and put this into a larger context. and, indeed, at the outset of my remarks i was trying to put the rise of isil into at least part of that larger context. a big piece of that is the reemergence of sectarian division and violence

complicated in a place like iraq by the fact that that had been held in check for decades as a result of duck today to haveship -- dictatorship, as a result of war, as a result of foreign intervention the lid was taken off. and in a miraculous kind of way, iraq actually had and has representative institutions that you could argue function as well, if not better, than in certain neighboring countries. but the challenge of trying to build something like that, one, the lid's been taken off, and when you have all of these other trends in the region that i've described is immense. so we're very cognizant of that which is why i said we're approaching all of this with determination, patience but also humility. it's a huge challenging. it's a long strug -- it's a huge challenge. it's a strong -- long struggle. i'm actually convinced we'll prevail, but it's going to take

time. >> tony, you've been candid and informative and gracious, and we thank you so much for join us. >> thank you. thank you very much. [applause] thank you. [inaudible conversations] >> c-span's 2014 campaign coverage continues today with debates from illinois, new york and new hampshire. at 8 p.m. eastern, the illinois governor's debate between incumbent democrat path quinn

and rauner. at 9 p.m., the new york governor's debate between andrew cuomo, bob it's reno and independents howie hawkins and michael mcdermott. later at 10 p.m., the new hampshire senate debate between incumbent senate debate between jean shaheen and former massachusetts senator scott brown. >> the c-span cities tour takes booktv and american history tv on the road traveling to u.s. cities to learn about their history and literary life. this weekend we've partnered with comcast for a visit to colorado springs, colorado. >> in 1806, zebulon pike was sent into the american southwest to explore the region very similar to lewis and clark who were sent to the northwestern part of the newly-acquired louisiana territory. pike was sent to the southwest part of the territory, and from

his perspective when he came out here, he really walked off the map. he went to an area that was unknown. when pike sees the grand peak, he thinks he'll reach the top of it in a few days, but it really takes weeks to approach. they reached what we believe is a lower mountain on the flanking of pike's peak called mown rosa. at that point pike wrote in his journals that given the conditions, the equipment they had at the time, no one could have summited the peak. pike's peak inspired the poem that became "america, the beautiful," written by katherine lee bates who came here to colorado springs to teach a summer course at college in 18 1893, and the view down to the plains from the top of the mountain inspired the poetry, it

inspired the images that are captured in that poetry of the united states. finish. >> watch all of our events from colorado springs saturday at noon eastern on c-span2's booktv and sunday afternoon at two on american history tv on c-span3. >> here are a few of the comments we've received on our ebola virus coverage. >> my comment about ebola is we actually had ebola right here in this country, doctors coming back with ebola, patients in texas hospitals, nurses and so forth. and it's not hysteria, people are just reacting to a very serious disease where you have to have teams of doctors and nurses waiting on you constantly. but we had the isis fear too. they showedded the beheadings over and over on all the media channels, over and over. i suppose we should have gotten hyped up about isis coming over

to p chop off your head but not ebola that's actually here. >> i think that when the people who are in the area of the ebola should be banned from entering any other nation. and it is up to our leaders to do that. >> i would like to see c-span do a question about is this ebola virus the proof that we need a national one-payer health care system? we've just seen what happened in texas with this capitalistic health care system. and what now it's going to cost us millions and millions to clean that mess up. and that's what i was kind of curious, see what we'd get out there for remarks on that, if this is the program that we need a national -- if this the the proof that we need a national health care system. >> and continue to let us know. call us at 202-626-3400, e-mail

us at comments@c-span.org or you can send us a tweet at c-span @comments. like us on facebook, follow us on twitter. >> well, live shortly we plan to take you to more from the atlantic and aspen institutes today from washington as they co-host the washington ideas forum, day two of this event as administration leaders, business officials, entrepreneurs, science and technology experts gather to discuss concepts and solutions to some of the nation's problems. on the schedule today, michigan senator debbie stabenow, john kerry, ernest no news and dr. anthony fauci along with ceos of yelp and whole foods. live coverage will get under way in just a moment as we try to clear up some technical issues. in the meantime, here's a portion of e are marks from defense -- remarks from defense secretary chuck hagel,

announcing the news of a mandatory quarantine of all u.s. troops serving to contain ebola in west africa. [applause] >> thank you, steve. thank you, audience. thanks, especially, to secretary hagel for joining us this morning. let's start off with one bit of news. there's someit ebola order you signed today. tell us about that and what the significance is. >> what i signed this morningi i was a memorandum to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff in response to the memorandum of a recommendation i received from the chairman and the chiefs yesterday to go forward with a policy of, essentially, 21-day incubation for our men and women who would be m returning from wt africa. that policy was put in place by the chief of staff of the army e couple of days ago for general

williams and ten of his0 o associates who are now back at their base in italy. and what i said in response this morning was give me within 15 days the operational specifics of how that would work. and then i believe we should review that policy within 45 days. the fact is the military will have more americans in liberia than any other department, that's number one. number two, our people, our younger, the can cohorts are different. they are not volunteers, and this is also a policy that was discussed in great detail by thr communities. by the families of our military men and women.tary and they very much wanted a

safety valve of on this. so that's, essentially, what the directive says. >> great, thank you.e that's the news of the day. let's talk broad orer picture. steve mentioned all the parts of the world where things that are of concern to you and u.s. military are blowing up. could you give us a brief big picturbre of how dangerous youef think this time of history is? is it a chronic annoyance or actual danger, and when will the united states see some end to these wars? especially now the 13-year war in iraq and afghanistan? >> jim, i think we are living through one of these historic defining times. i think we are seeing a new record order. a new world order. post-world war ii, post-soviet union implosion being built. many questions about first or

among the american people and our leaders what's the role of america in this new world thath is evolving. should we have a role? what is appropriate? and the inventory of issues that steve mentioned coming onto the stage with you and your question gives us some snapshot into whaw we're all dealing with.ea each one of these issues one regardless of where they are affects us now, will continue to affect us into the future. i've said, chairman dempsey'su said, president obama's said,chi secretary kerry, others that what we're seeing in the middle east with isis, isil is going to require a steady, long-term effort. it's going to require coalitions of common interest which we aree forming. we have more than 60 countries now with us to deal with this. this is an ideology. this is a dynamic that in total

we've never quite seen. then you look at all the other dimensions -- the rise of chinaf russia, what russia has been doing the last six months, pandemic disease, ebola being an example, budget issues, we've got a congress that can't work together. i t hope that changes after next tuesday, i don't know. but we need, we need all of our institutions functioning including the congress to deal with these great issues because they have long-term consequences, global warming. i mean, every facet that we see out there today rolling back on us in some way. if we're not paying a price today, we will pay a big price tomorrow. price to mark. >> the secretary made interesting speeches about the role of climate change as a security issue. you mentioned the role of the congress. it's a unique phenomenon and you were an influential center -- senator and there are four

former members, president obama, joe biden, yourself in secretary kerry who are now in these positions a great executive authority at just the time when there seems be less congressional involvement in the decision-making, the accountability and the connection between defense policy and the public that historically has been the case. how should we think about this? is this a problem? >> well, in one way there is not less involvement. but the way i would say it, i think there's less partnership. and partnership is critical here because it isn't a matter of we all have to agree. that's not the issue. we need different opinions. but we've got to have a strong enough partnership, for example, with us to allow us to make the kinds of reforms internally, whether its base closing or we don't need anymore of these planes on these ships, but we do need these for the future.

we've got to have the partnership strong enough so that both sides can get to some conclusion and make a decision on how we go forward. congress is critically important here. it is article one of the constitution. i was in the congress as you noted. i was very protective of that constitutional responsibility. they control the money. they are closest to the people. so we need them, and i have tried in the time i have been secretary of defense to continue to reach out and build those partnerships. we can't do this any other way. and again, i'm hoping over the next couple of years we will see a culture of self correction. because that's probably the greatest strength america has is with difficulties and problems and issues we can self correct. and i hope that comes together. >> i go back and ask again part of my initial question i through

at the end, again it's been 13 years now that we've been involved in more or less open-ended combat in the middle east, about 1% of the population affected and the rest not. at what point, if ever, will and administration be able to say this war is over? >> i think the way we have to look at this is tyranny, terrorism, the challenges and threats to our country, the freedom for certainly the short term is going to be with us. it's a reality. now, the challenges and threats to a nation, to an individual are not new in the sense that threats are new. the history of mankind has been

about that. it's always the response and how do you do it. and we have to be smart here. we've got to the big things right. we won't get everything right. we've got to get the big things right. what i mean by that in answering your question, coalitions of common interest. we won't get it right with every country. we will agree with every country, but we've got to focus on in of common interests to build a relationship that deals with the threats to all our countries. isil, extremism, radicalism, terrorism is a threat to every state, to every society. we've got to build those platforms to work from there to get. unfortunately, i see these things continue to stay out there, jim. i think we're in for longer-term challenge here than maybe any of us would help. but that's the world that we live in and we've got to be honest about that and we've got

to be smart about it. >> the climate issue, in the senate you saw the extremely polarized discussion of climate and energy issues. now in the defense department it's been one of the leaders on awareness of these issues both the potential threat and fuel and all the rest. what is the defense department doing on climate issues, different fuels? might that change the broader national debate do you think? >> from my perspective within the portfolio that i have responsibility for, security of this country, climate change presents security issues for us. what do we mean by that? well, let's take the arctic. glaciers are melting. there can be arguments about why but let's put those arguments the site. the fact is the glaciers are melting. you are saying that part of the world opened up. if, in fact, the continued we're going to see a new waterway

right into the heart of the arctic. that means exploration for natural resources, oil and natural gas and minerals. that is going to attract, it already is, great powers. that there's a security dynamic to that. as the oceans increase, it will affect our basis. it will affect islands but it will affect security across the world. so just from my narrow perspective, what i have responsibility for, that's happening now and we have to be prepared for that. the leadership as much anything else estimate in this room knows is to prepare the institution that you serve, that you lead for what's coming. and so we have laid out a new arctic strategy.