still have a problem of radicalization of youth. could you address that? >> i mean, tunisia, what is happening in tunisia does not suggest that they are a perfect ideal fully functioning democracy. these are the real problems and will continue to have real problems for a while. ..

never even showed up in the results. what is that telling you? people want results. and if people, you know, do not see results, they are not going to cast their vote blindly just because of some islamist party or just because it's the party -- and who is the party that is one? a new party, not mrs. or progressive led by an 86 you old man formed only two years after the revolution, right? and it was able to succeed the largest islamist organized party in the country which has been operating since 1981. the message is clear. from now on performance is going to trump ideology. this is a war of values i think that need to be fought in the arab world. it's not being fought. other than tunisia we have very few countries, if any, that

understand that the real battle is a battle for pluralism and for inclusion, not a battle between secular and religious elements. >> thank you. we will open out to questions from the audience. please put up your hand and wait for the microphone picked a list of who you are before you ask a question. >> following up on marwan's answer, there's been a crackdown on a lot of perhaps legitimate political islam, whether it's the brotherhood in egypt or islamic groups elsewhere as part of this whole crackdown on ice is, the brotherhood is, hamas is, all these other kind of groups. so i was wondering, especially if you could tell us more where d.c. these legitimate political

islamic groups going during this time? marwan was talk about how in tunisia they've had this test and now they're perhaps failing in certain aspects of it but they haven't able to test them anywhere else in the arab world. where d.c. that going? .. >> it would probably be by isis. they're the most powerful other force in the country. >> one more, right here.

lady with the -- right here, yes. thank you. >> thank you, marwan, for bringing up nonmilitary solutions because i thought that it was really vital and don't get to hear a lot of that. my question is about another plan that you briefly mentioned about how some youth look at this war as america's war, and maybe that is one of the reasons why the coalition and the fact that it has to be successful is very imperative. but given the historic tensions between saudi arabia and iran and how different sake -- stakeholders are looking at different can end games in the region, is there any common ground for the coalition to function on? thank you. >> okay. let's, then let's start with the first question. let's start with you on the question on political islamists, particularly the brotherhood,

and then the other speakers may like to comment on this as well. >> nice to see you today. she does a great job reporting, the one who received the news in arabic in our part of the world see mullah every day on screen. [laughter] political islam, are we witnessing the end of it? i'm not so sure. i think there is great interest in countries, of course, and should we treat them equal? i'm not so sure. the key issue is those who use violence as a means to achieve political gain, this is what we should be against. but that was a different example. muslim brotherhood are participating in tunis, in yemen they were part of the equation, but i think egypt was the biggest concern because egypt, at least there a gulf

perspective point of view and majority of the gulf countries, so that to have a big country like egypt with its resources -- can military, power, regional importance -- to fall into a certain group very idealistic, using ideology as a means and yuling the run, that was a -- ruling and country, that was a big threat being perceived from our part of the world. should we treat everyone equal? i think i'll go back to the question if anybody use violence as a means, we should fight it. we should not allow extremist group, you know, any sort of belief you have, it's your own right to believe. again, this has led, of course, to the big deviation in the gulf region between qatar, saudi arabia, bahrain and uae. this is the key issue. the way how qatar basically decided that political islam is winning, they're going to be in power, let me bank on those.

they exist, this operation, in 72 countries. they have 100 years' history. is a right bet or wrong bet? i think they can judge themselves on that one. but somehow today the reason we don't have ambassador from east saudi arabia, uae back into doha is still the firm qatar position in support of the muslim brotherhood and the way how they see it and the way how they approach it closely between them and turkey in support of those groups. again, from our perspective it's been fused differently. includes this that list hezbollah in saudi arabia, but not hezbollah in lebanon. to include al-nusra, to include muslim brotherhood, of course, you know, group. but i think we differentiate between those who it is just a matter of belief or a political

means. so i think it is different today in that one. but i can say one thing, of course, we're not going to see the end of political islam. it will revive, it will have a different shape. it's like what i mentioned before. they change names and they change identity sometime but not necessarily change the belief and the approach. >> [inaudible] >> yeah. just one thing. but the thing is, the important thing, i suppose, is that it remain political islam because what we're seeing is actually negation of all politics. >> [inaudible] >> and so on the assad issue, i really think it was wrong on the part of the turkish government not to let, to have really done away with all the reservations between itself and the assad regime prior to 2011. and i think it is not morally wrong, but i think it is unrealistic for it to demand

that this be a priority for everyone else. on the other hand, based on what the other panel and to the extent that i follow the american debate, nobody can really stomach letting him stay in place either. but nobody knows how to move him out without creating a state collapse, and god knows we have enough collapsed states, we really don't need another one. and it is also, in my judgment, the turkish government would have preferred from basically focused 2011 onwards, but even before then perhaps, to have a muslim brotherhood-type to replace barr shark al assad. i just don't know if there are any, quote-unquote, moderates to pull that together in that country. >> marwan? >> let's agree first that political islam is not monolithic. isis, al-qaeda on the extreme

are different from hamas and hezbollah in the middle maybe of political islam. and then are different from the muslim brotherhood. and within the muslim brotherhood, you know, different from -- egyptian muslim brotherhood is different from the more rock con miss -- moroccan muslim brotherhood. second, those who use violencing lose their right -- violence lose their right to be participants in the political process. but then we have to complete the sentence. those that don't have the right, and it's interesting that in the arab world the big now sort of campaign is against those who don't use violence. is against the muslim brotherhood in egypt, is against -- those who do use violence and have used violence in the past, we haven't seen such a campaign in the past in the same vigor that we have seen

it here. my point is once you accept the principle of excluding others from the political process because you don't agree with their views, you in the same breath allow them to exclude you when they come to power. so selective democracy is no democracy. that's my main point regardless of whether you agree or disagree with political islam. again, we go back to tunisia. what due nights have done yesterday -- due -- tunisians have done yesterday is historic. one important was is that it was the first time in the arab world, probably in the world, i don't want to make that -- but probably in the world where an islamic party wins and loses an election by the ballot box and cedes defeat by the ballot box. so those who have argued in the

arab world that the nature of islamic parties is such that when they come to power they will never leave, that argument today is undermined by the fact that you do have an islamic party which did come to power and which ceded, you know, power according to the ballot box. again, people will argue tunisia is different. maybe. but if an islamist party can do it in tunisia, there is no reason why they cannot do it elsewhere in the arab world. on the issue of saudi arabia and iran, i don't see why the saudis and the iranians cannot, cannot cooperate on isis, for example. that does not mean that they're going to see eye to eye on all issues, and certainly they won't, and certainly there's a lot of differences over iran, over sunni/shiite issue, over nuclear issue, over security, etc. but we've seen stranger

bedfellows before when it came to certain issues, and i don't see why -- i'm not saying they will, but i'm not -- but i don't see why they won't cooperate on a limited matter. >> why iran was not included despite the uni havation of the secretary -- the invitation of the state department, i think it's very simple. iran refused to consider to see syria -- [inaudible] and second, they do not have an air force capability, can join the psalm coalition. what they have is old equipment, old air force, cannot join with such thing. can they participate in the ground support, i think they are part of the problem and not part of the solution. it's iran who really -- iran number one, and u.s. number two. if iran did not -- [inaudible]

in such a way so they cannot really, you know, they can help, they can maybe provide manager, but at the same time today in iran -- [inaudible] have gave the muslim shia a better perspective than the sunni network. >> the next panel is going to focus on iran in a lot more detail, but would you also say, though, that iran having withdrawn support from maliki was crucial in terms of moving the political process forward inside of iraq? >> maliki visited washington three times, he was supported twice by the -- [inaudible] to win the election. iran supported that fully. if -- [inaudible] and the fall of muslim, maliki would have -- [inaudible] and today to protect them they give him higher political position to be immune from any legal case. he holds vice president position there, so in reality everybody

protected maliki, did not really -- if it wasn't -- [inaudible] really made that strong movement, huh? maliki would still be -- [inaudible] >> okay. we can take some more questions. there's one in the mid here. -- in the middle here. any questions in the back of the room that i'm not seeing? okay, first question here, then we'll take questions further in the back. >> yes. i have just heard, i don't remember, i think it's from one of the panelists, american policy is -- >> i'm sorry, could you also identify yourself? >> oh, yes. >> thank you. >> i'm from argentina national defense expert, former ndu student. my question is, i heard that american policy's not clear and consistent, so when the united states began the war, the united states was immersed in a kind of

awe symmetric war. now again they are trying to defeat this group through unmanned devices. my question is, do you think this kind of asymmetric strategy will lead to solution, or do you think it's very far to obtain -- [inaudible] with military force. >> thank you. we'll take some more questions. i see one at the very back of the room. >> my name is nadila, i was a new york times correspondent in iran. i don't want to disagree with all the elements that were stated on this panel and the previous panel. my question is about drought in the region. no one has referred to it as one of the reasons that is contributing to the growth of the sort of underclass that was mentioned. is this factor being ignored by the countries in the region, in

jordan? marwan, i'm curious to know -- [inaudible] is becoming smaller, people are becoming economically unhappy. is there anything that the governments can do and they're not doing it? in iran i know that the government doesn't pay attention, people don't can pay attention until lakes and rivers completely disappear, and then it turns into a crisis. >> okay, yes, on water, drought. there was one more at the very back of the room. >> yes, i had a question, i work for the department of defense, i'm here as a personal interest. my question was about abdullah -- [inaudible] you spoke about army, i believe you were referencing the free syrian army and not the assad regime. assuming we did go and train them, arm them, strengthen them, they suppress isis and overthrow the assad regime. what guarantee do we have that they're not going to form their own government that's going to go along with that policy of exclusion that marwan was

speaking about? >> okay. marwan, perhaps let's begin with you this time to address the water issue, the drought issue and whether this is a significant contributing factor to the disillusionment and disenfranchisement. >> i mean, i haven't thought of it in terms of this kind of linking, but it certainly is a major issue in the region in general and in jordan in particular. just to give you some statistics, the per capita hair of water -- share of water, if it drops below 400 cubic liters, i think, a year -- something like this -- then a country will be considered poor in terms of water resources. jordan, jordan's share is 100, okay? so it is way below what is considered poor. and that is without the syrian

refugee issue. with the syrian refugees, you have an additional, you know, whatever, 1.4 -- whatever number of refugees. so you can understand the extent of the problem. i'm not going to link it to isis because that's a bit of a stretch, but it is one of the main problems that face the region with no solution. for a country like jordan, the only solution is going to be basically -- well, two solutions. the country has to make a decision about whether to keeping keeping ature activity -- keep agriculture activity or not, and if not, what does that mean to few hundred thousand people who are living off this? but the other problem is, the long-term problem is desalination. in jordan's case, it required a

lot of energy, and, of course, financial resources that jordan simply does not have. so, basically, people are waiting for the technology to be such that the cost would be lower. but until that happens, the country and the region will have to face some very, very serious decision, decisions on this. >> okay. let me turn to these other questions about the, whether the military approach will work and what about let's say what ifs free syrian army or were able to overthrow bashar? what would happen? >> oh, that's a possibility. >> we're hypothetical. [laughter] >> the first question was, can an asymmetric war be won. i think everybody in the previous panel in here basically

said you can contain the islamic states, perhaps you can give them great damage, you can damage them, but you cannot really totally root them out which is precisely my understanding of what the american policy was; that is, they would bomb and everybody else would fight. and the only ones who are actually willing to fight because they're defending themselves are the kurds in syria. and because the free syrian army, i think, is a shell without much of a content, i think, and i guess in iraq that's the iraqi army, the peshmerga and the pkk, and that complicates matters further. now, if you forgive me, if the iranians were not invited, i'm sure it had other reasons than them not having good planes. [laughter] and honest to god, and i want to relate -- >> part of the problem. [laughter] >> and i want to relate this to the issue of drug because, i mean, we didn't mention drug because that was not, the debate was not about why we had this

civil war. but, of course, the drought issue is going to become everywhere in the world a major national security issue. and these are really huge problems. and in other words to deal -- in order to deal with those things, you really need to have functioning governments. we don't have functioning governments, and before the geopolitical contest is settled, we will not have functioning governments. i will want, if you wish, some other long-term and unsolvable problem if we go along this path. what do we to with those millions of refugees? i don't think for a second that two million refugees who are in turkey, a big bulk of them are ever going to return. so what do we do with these people? do you leave them like that so that they are the next generation of desperadoes, especially when the climate conditions worsen, governance

problems worsen and stuff? that really requires a degree of international cooperation that we have not seen. why? because the essential power struggles have not yet been settled. the longer we continue with that unsettled political balance in the region, the more difficult it's going to be to actually tackle these problems. and that requires regional lineup and international leadership. unfortunately, i fail to see their existence. >> well, just to comment on that, of course, i think having these millions of refugee country like lebanon today they're fighting war by proxy, you know? having millions of syrians in lebanon put huge pressure on the ability of a country like, small country like lebanon to manage the issue there. also jordan, turkey. i mean, it's a big problem. but again, don't forget, two million iraqi move from mosul

and the north part kurdistan. so within iraq we have a refugee moving from south to north. so this is a real serious problem that needs to be addressed, and there are huge future consequences of that. only god knows. i think i'll go back to the question in syria. two years ago i wrote an article saying is a military transitional salvation -- [inaudible] is an answer to the syrian problem. in other words, what i'm saying, the one who supports bashar to survive is his military establishment, plus iran, plus russia. iran and russia have already stated we will not die for assad. give us an alternative, we'll look at that one. but if we had that military council, could that be a solution? could that be, well, this council could consist of both the free syrian army, bus the existing -- plus the existing one. what will they do?

they will be acceptable to sort of maintain law and order in the country, they still can do a two years' job to bring a little bit stability to encourage people to come back to gradually reconstruct and build issues x. then bashar can change between the danube in austria, a beautiful place where he keeps most of his money, or if they try to take him to a criminal court, it's up to them. but always my concern was those people whom they fought and protected assad never received an assurance that they will not be taken to a court or they will not be treated or, you know, they will not be taken to a criminal court. and cause long as they don't receive that, do they have the interest? because their survival is -- [inaudible] what we need is a much more responsible conclusion. you know, they really can for

the freedom. in no way, i mean, in no way he will gain. if he stays, he cannot rule a country more than the way he's doing today in part of damascus, the larger damascus he's controlling. at the same time, somebody will argue why do we need to interfere? let syria be a killing platform for everybody, for hezbollah to interfere, and then try to get rid of them there, for the nusra, for everybody, for the syrian army, let it be a killing platform. somebody argue that, i disagree totally. i think from a humanitarian point of view we should really work in a political solution where we can try to see, increase the pressure. assad doesn't feel any pressure today. he feels, well, fine, let nurs and -- [inaudible] -- nusra fight between them -- [inaudible] >> we have time for just a couple of more questions. there's one gentleman in the

last row who's been trying for a long time to get his question in. >> hi, my name is -- [inaudible] this question i'm directing to michelle or others. you mentioned terrorism under quota, but we never defined what it means, and i have to quote my mentor, howard zinn, who said we're fighting terrorism. war is terrorism. what are we fighting? war is terrorism. so those who fight. and it was mentioned during discussion by mr. abdullah -- [inaudible] and also those who fight are the bad guys. they should not be included. so the united states is always in the forefront of fighting war. so given that, aren't we also,

as united states, the superterrorists? >> there's -- this gentleman right here, i believe, had a question. thank you. >> [inaudible] retired army. question to the the add merrill, maybe -- admiral, if you could talk to saudi arabia's, if you could put it in one role, fighting isis, what more could saudi do, if anything, to try to balance those two sides? on the one hand, fight on its ideology while on the other hand spend millions of dollars to support schools world wild, etc. >> okay. and a last question right here. >> [inaudible] from turkish press. i have very quick question for -- [inaudible] is there any way you can tell us how the relationship between riyadh and ankara these days,

how the relationship including president erdogan is perceived by -- [inaudible] thank you. >> okay, great. so, i mean, i'll start by addressing the question of the gentleman in the back. you know, i think there are, you know, there is a lot of controversy over the definition of terrorism, and it was in quotes here partly because in the title of this panel because of the differences in definition between the -- among the united states and its coalition partners and between some of them. and i think we've already gotten to those issues a little bit about whether -- everyone knows there's something broader going on here than isis, right? but the question is, so there's this fear of radicalization, and people -- you know, basically, the definition of terrorism is normally people using violence and usually using violence against civilians or

noncombatants for political reasons. and so, you know, we've discussed a little bit though that, i mean, sully was saying in the beginning that turkey wants the pkk to be treated as a terrorist group and pyd as well, perhaps. the muslim brotherhood has been declared by not only egypt, but also saudi arabia and i believe the emirates as a terrorist group. so there's this issue of whether all groups who political islamists should somehow be considered part of the same problem or not. you know, what's interesting is i ask the question at the beginning of the panel, is this going to be a big problem? is it going to be something that's going to impede cooperation between the united states and its allies or even among the allies, and i think what i've heard today is not so much, that actually there are even bigger issues than the

definitional issue although the larger problem of radicalization and how that will be stemmed remains very much unresolved. so let me give each of the speakers just sort of one minute to address the last couple of questions. i think we'll start with you -- [inaudible] since there was a specific question for you about saudi arabia. >> well, precisely what comes to the issue of, you know, on the saudi/turkish -- [inaudible] i think i will start. i myself am in full support between having great tradition between both sides. however, we agree on many issues, and we disagree on some issues. we agree turkey presence in iraq can offset sphere of influence of iran in iraq. we agree that turkey's extremely important to the syrian issue. turkey is extremely important on that issue within the region. fighting terrorism, of course, it's a very common thing. so we have plenty of issues that we are in agreement, great economic relation.

but at the same time, i think egypt is where we have the problem on that end. turkey does not wish to accept the reality that -- [inaudible] military are in position. they don't wish to see that defeated. i mean, i could understand president erdogan's position, he does not wish to see a strong military, he call it coup d'etat -- [inaudible] in egypt to be defeated in a country like turkey. i think my feeling that turkey in all reality will settle down or, you know, the americans say it will sink down. so we're going to see that reality in the relation between both sides will take, you know, place much sooner than later. emir of qatar brought up the issue of strengthening relations between turkey and and saudi

arabia. they wish to see less tension between turkey and egypt. egypt is an important allies for us in the region. i think having a triangle, saudi arabia, egypt, you are the can key, can do great things in many of the reek -- of the region and great security. your question, sir, i think was with regard to saudi, you know, how do you fight both? yes, we are -- [inaudible] we are the arabian peninsula, we are -- [inaudible] so 1.5 billion muslims looking towards saudi arabia. we have to maintain, you know, being the leader of islam, but at the same time we have accepted the -- [inaudible] of islam in the big conference in mecca. so more than islam in saudi arabia, it exists. we are not a fanatic. and by the way, monarch is more about liberalism and not conservativism. they wish to see power transformed to their kids and sons and family, so -- [inaudible] because we can do it much

quicker because they would like to stay in power. and at the same time, we understand extremism, and we have to fight extremism. i think saudi arabia has proven to be a very strong defender. when we came up with the initiative of a global center and fighting terrorism, and saudi donated hundreds of millions of dollars under the united nation, it was -- [inaudible] to have a global cooperation in fighting terrorism, extremism. this is something we suffer from. we have been fighting, and we will continue to fight it. >> i'll defer to what you just said, and that is the definition of terrorism, of course, itself is a very political thing. that's why you have all these problems of not agreeing on definitions because there are political differences. i'd like to conclude with turkish-american relations which i think are turkey's paramount relations. and those relations, in my view, have been shaken somewhat in the last few months partially because there are ideological

divergences, especially vis-a-vis our topic, that is what is to do with is and what the best course to follow is. and i think it is worth the while of both countries to actually try to figure out how exactly they should redefine their lines of communication because a lot is at stake there if those relations go bad, in my view. >> thank you, sully. marwan has ceded his final comments in favor of letting you get to lunch which -- [laughter] is a buffet that is served outside here. so, please, following this session just get your lunch and come back in and have a seat. we'll be beginning the next session in 30 minutes. but before we do that, please join me in thanking our panel. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> more now from the carnegie endowment for international

peace. up next, a conversation about iran, its relationship with the rest of the middle east and the west. we'll hear from white house deputy national security adviser tony blinken. this is 50 minutes. >> so let me welcome you again for our fourth session of the day. it's been a terrific day, but we saved the best for last. and we're honored to have tony blinken, deputy national security adviser to president obama, with us. those of you who have been with us all day -- and i think that's most of you -- know that we have covered the region pretty well and pretty deeply, but we're now going to focus on the administration's kind of inside view of where we stand in this effort against isis and to bring a greater degree of order to the region. i think everybody knows mr. blinken's distinguished resumé.

he was vice president biden's national security adviser before being the president's deputy. and before that the staff director, the democratic staff director of the senate foreign relations committee. we're really honored to have you and looking forward to hearing there you. he has a tight schedule, it won't surprise anybody to know, but we will try after hearing from him to get some good questions in from all of you. thank you for joining us. >> thanks very much. good afternoon. it's wonderful to be here, and it's especially wonderful to be here on an extraordinary day for carnegie. >> yes. >> and let me just start by saying and, presumably echoing what others have said, which is, first of all, jessica, your leadership of this institution for, i believe, 18 years has been extraordinary. you've turned carnegie into a global institution. >> thank you. >> and at the very forfront of all of the -- forefront of all of the think tanks in washington and, indeed, around the world.

it's also hard to imagine finding someone to succeediest ca, but i think carnegie's pulled off a brilliant coup to get bill burns. those of you who know bill know him to be an absolutely extraordinary leader, someone who brings incredible intellect, wisdom and decency to everything he does, and i can only say that carnegie will be transitioning into very, very good hands. i welcome this opportunity to spend a little bit of time walking you through the elements of our comprehensive strategy to degrade and ultimately defeat the islamic state of iraq and levant or isil. i want to start, though, by trying to put isil in context and, indeed, i think it has to be understood in part at least as the product of a number of powerful regional trends, some of which i believe you discussed earlier today. first, the challenge to domestic order within states, the questioning of the status quo, the rise of constituencies, the

empowerment of new voices. that in many ways, of course, has been a welcome development, but it's produced a violent counterfrom the the old order as, for example, in syria with its long death spiral of violence. and it has a dark side; the erosion of state thoft, the proliferation of weapons and technology, the surfacing of sectarianism. the second big trend is the challenge to the regional order among states, the growth of sectarian rivalries, the intensity case of the faceoff between saudi arabia and iran, the spread of dangerous proxy wars. third, i think we've seen an intra-sunni struggle between violent extremists and the vast majority of moderate muslims and a contest for leadership between establishment powers and political islam often represented by the muslim brotherhood. fourth and finally, recent history, the recent history of rack. the -- of iraq. the lid has been lifted from decades of dictatorship, war and

foreign dominion allowing many of these forces to collide head on with the fragile beginnings of a more inclusive and representative governance. one of the most poisonous products of all of this churn has been the alienation from their respective governments of large segments of the sunni population, some 20 million of whom live between baghdad and damascus. this is the vast sea in which isil swims. and it must inform the combination of determination, patience and humility we bring to the task of defeating it. so how did we get here? much has been written, much has been spoken about the relationship between our military departure from iraq and the rise of isil. so permit me to spend a few minutes on a historic detour. as all of you know, in negotiating the 2008 status of forces agreement, president bush committed our forces to leave iraq at the end of 2011.

that commitment was premised on a simple, powerful idea that we were returning to iraq its sovereignty. we shared that commitment. wal sought to leave -- we also sought to leave behind a counterterrorism presence to help iraqis target aqi, the predecessors to isil, and an f-16 squadron to protect iraq's air space. as all of you know, the council of representatives would not give our troops the legal immunities that we sought. this was not as a result of a failure to negotiate, it's something we worked very hard. but what it is, and it needs to be understood this way, is really a leading indicator or a proxy for a much larger issue. simply put, at that point in its history after a ten-year quote-unquote occupation, the iraqi body politic did not want us to stay in iraq. that's what happened. we were also to some extent the victims of success. at that point in time the isf,

the iraqi security forces were more numerous and capable, iraqi leaders were more confident, and violence overall was down significantly from its peak in 2007-2008. at every step along the way of our very, very methodical disengagement militarily from iraq, iraqis did not believe we would actually leave and follow through. they didn't think we would withdraw from the cities, we did. they didn't think we would end our combat mission, we did. they didn't think we would leave altogether, we did. in effect, we had to leave in order to find a way back on the security side and gradually build up our engagement. it's a fair question to ask whether this modest force would have made a difference. and i think a fair answer that is in some ways yes and some ways no. first, it would not have had a combat mission, so it would hardly have been in a place to

repel isil. indeed, it might have been caught in the middle of everything that was going on. iraqis would have placed restrictions on its movement, and in any event are, sur ya became a huge and unanticipated accelerate rant. second, it's also clear that departure of our forces decreased violence in the near term. shiite militia stood down, attacks against the embassy ceased. vir chu chully on -- virtually on every trip prior to that point, you would have the great privilege of getting a mortar or rocket attack. that ceased, and violation went down from about 1600 a week from the end of 2007 to early 2008 to 100 a week at that point. but it's also fair to say that had we been able to keep that small residual presence, that probably would have allowed us to better enable the iraqis to deal with aqi and, ultimately, isil, and maybe helped us better

shape iraqi security policy. that's exactly why we sought to leave the limited residual force and it's exactly why immediately upon the withdrawal of our combat forces we tried to get our foot back in the door. the iraqis in early 2012 told us they were confident they could handle the problem. we said, your wrong. if you -- you're wrong. if you don't constantly and proactively go at aqi, they will rise up again. you need to keep aqi on its heels and off its toes. in early 2012, along with david petraeus who was then the head of the cia, several of us sought an agreement to constitute with the iraqis, in effect, a joint fusion cell in iraq to help them target aqi. it's too soon, they said. eventually, we'll get there. but you need to prove you're not actually returning in force. then the arab league summit came

around in march of 2012. we thought why not provide the iraqis with drones, intelligence drones, isr, to safeguard the summit? they thought that was a great idea. they had arab leaders coming in from around the region, it represented a real security challenge, and they welcomed the, this possibility. and we thought this is a good way to get our foot back in the door and to help develop more intelligence against aqi. unfortunately, the story leaked to the press, and it became a political hot potato and, ultimately, the iraqis said no. so there was an exercise in frustration throughout 2012 as we sought to work our way back in. all of that began to change in 2013. aqi became isil, fueled by the conflict in syria. in iraq in early 2012 at the time that we left, there were about five suicide bombers a month. by early 2013 it was up to 50 a month, and this was the hallmark of aqi and then isil which, by the way, was not initially

predominantly an indigenous force in iraq, it was mostly at that point a foreign force. iraqis suddenly became much more open to, and indeed, desirous of aid but quietly. in the spring of 2013, we began a systematic effort to ramp up our counterterrorism assistance to the iraqis. we used the foreign military sales program to try to get to them more apaches, f-16s, missiles, small arms and ammunition. this, of course, required working with our congress, and there was a certain amount of reluctance, which is not hard to understand, because of the concerns about the leadership of prime minister maliki. we resumed in very small numbers isr flights in late 2013. we stood up a targeting cell in 2013, and that helped the iraqis capture about 200 isil fighters. and we put in a small number at our embassy, a small number of special operators and ct trainers. throughout the year and then

well into 2013 and then at the gunning of 2014 -- beginning of 2014, the committee i chair, the deputies committee, met more than a dozen times on the question of increasing support to iraq to deal with aqi and then isil. the principals committee, the national security council met multiple times on the psalm issue. it was something with which we were deeply engaged. when president obama met with prime minister maliki in 2013, the president told the prime minister you need a comprehensive approach to this problem. a military piece to it, we're working hard to help you with it, but it has to be comprehensive. and in particular, you have to pursue political reforms to address the legitimate grievances of iraqis who otherwise might see isil as a savior. two months later isil streamed into ramadi and fallujah with the isf laying siege. in short, we were focused in acting on isil and the threat that it posed more than a year

before the fall of mosul. but the problem began to outrun the solution. fueled by the conflict in syria, iraqi reluctance and a renewed sectarianism in iraq in advance of its elections with politicians on all sides playing to their bases. that brings us to almost the present, to this her with the -- to this summer with the fall of mosul and the erasure of the border between iraq and syria. when that happened, the president acted decisively as well as deliberately. our immediate focus was on protecting americans. we rapidly deployed military personnel to further secure our embassy and the international airport. we put in more isr to develop a clearer or picture of what was happening on the ground. and we sent in small military teams to assess the viability of the iraqi security forces and the status of the threat. then, as all of you know, we initiated limited military action to protect u.s. personnel, protect strategic

sites and prevent large scale humanitarian catastrophes. those initial airstrikes stopped the isil advance on irbil, it allowed the iraqis to control the dams, air power provided relief to thousands of iraqis trapped on mount sinjar and the broke the isil siege of both places. these actions bought time and space to put in place pillars of a comprehensive strategy to roll back isil. the first pillar is a new, inclusive iraqi government. we put particular emphasis on its formation and, indeed, we leveraged the promise of greater u.s. assistance accordingly because we could not expect iraqi kurds or sunnis or the various neighboring states to join forces to counter isil with an iraqi government pursuing a blatantly sectarian agenda. indeed, we resisted a more expansive military effort until

change was well entrained, lest we be perceived as the air force of mr. maliki, alienating sunnis in iraq and in the region. instead we focused our initial diplomacy on creating conditions for maliki to step aside and completing government formation in record time. now we have a government committed to reforming the military, giving us a more effective iraqi partner and addressing the legitimate grievances of the sunnis and so dilute their support for or acquiescence to isil, and i'll come back to that at the end. the second pillar that the president wanted to have in place before embarking fully on the comprehensive strategy was a broad regional and international coalition. we were very deliberate in building that coalition before taking sustained action. we could not make it look like the united states was acting against isil or islam or the christian west was opposed to the muslim middle east. that's just what isil would have wanted. instead, we kept the focus on a

global challenge in which regional states would have the most immediately at stake played leading roles. now more than 60 countries around the world have signed on to this coalition, and when we took our first airstrikes in syria, saudi arabia, the uae, jordan, bahrain and qatar flew with us. with these pillars and partners coming into place, we began to implement the comprehensive strategy to go from blunting isil's advances to starting to roll it back. the objective and the president's been very clear about it is to disrupt, degrade and ultimately defeat isil so that it no long arer poses a threat to iraq or syria, to our people, partners or interests in the region or, ultimately, to the united states itself. the defeat of isil will not happen easy, it will not happen quickly, it will not happen through exclusively military means or by u.s. efforts alone. to the contrary, our strategy had to be come prehencive,

broad-based, and it must be sustained. so in concert with our coalition partners, we are leveraging all elements of our national power in four basic ways. first, we're working to destroy -- starting with degrading it and ultimately destroying -- isil's war fighting capacity; its command and control, its leadership, its supply lines, its logistics, its ability to overrun local populations. and is we're doing that through a combination of military and counterterrorism means. second, we're working to uproot its central nervous system, the financing, the foreign fighters, the religious legitimacy and the recruitment that are its lifeblood. and we're doing that by bringing to bear intelligence platforms and sharing national and international laws, cooperation among enforcement officials, counterlegitimacy campaigns, increased efforts to counterviolent extremism within partner countries and, indeed, here in the united states. third, we're working to dilute

local support or accommodation to isil through tribal engagement, pressing for the resolution of legitimate grievances, shifting momentum against isil on the ground and squeezing the space within which it operates. and finally, we're working to build partner capacity so that local forces can take the fight to isil and retake the ground that's been lost through trained advise and assist programs, through the provision of weapons, ammunition and equipment, and through direct military action to enable partner success. the people we are helping will do the fighting on the ground to retake their countries. the strategy recognizes that the situation we face in syria is more complex even than the one we face in iraq. unlike in baghdad where we have a viable local partner and ground forces to leverage, assad remains in damascus a magnet for the extremism we seek to defeat. for more than two years, we've made some gains in making it more effective and trying to position it as a counterweight

to assad. now we're intensifying that support, including through an overt train and equip program under so-called title x which the saudis and turks have offered to host. this will give the moderate opposition more effective tools to help them and us counter isil, to protect its own communities and over time to demonstrate to assad and his patrons that he will not prevail militarily, creating the conditions for a negotiated set almost. this -- settlement. this is not a silver bullet with. it's going to take time to train recruits and produce results. the forces arrayed against the moderate opposition are powerful. the syrian army, backed by hezbollah and iran and russia on one happened, isil, nusra, and other battle-hardened extremist groups on the other, but the program's critical to eventual success. the coalition can do real damage to isil through the air, but without forces on the ground,

the whole territory, we will not be able to shrink and eventually eliminate the safe haven. meanwhile, we are taking action every day to degrade isil's capacity to project power into iraq, to resource and sustain its forces. we're going at its command and control, its headquarters, its armies depots, its oil refineries, and we're seeing significant results. take, for example, the oil refineries, storage tanks, pump stations. the international energy agency reported just this past week that it's clearly affecting isil's ability to fuel its vehicles and derive revenue from the sale of gasoline. let me conclude with this. i spent about a week in iraq a couple of weeks ago, and i wanted to give you a report card on what i found because i think it's illustrate i of both the challenges we face, but also some of the promise that's before us in terms of success. first, if you look at the political situation, iraqis are

dealing now with a legacy of mistrust, of suspicion, of grievance. and they also face an incredibly difficult economic situation. oil prices are down, war and expenditures on internally-displaced persons are up, investment is on the fence. this makes for a very complicated situation. but i was struck in meeting with virtually the entire senior iraqi leadership across parties and ethnic groups in baghdad and then up in irbil that there was a clear commitment and desire to work together across sectarian lines, a clear willingness to give the other the benefit of the doubt for now. and the reason was simple: virtually every group in iraq has been looking into the abyss, and they're seen what is before it if they don't manage to work together to take on isil. we've already seen the prime minister awe wadty -- abadly say and do can significant things in

terms of reaching out to other communities. e do the he disbanded the infamous commander in chief which was an office prime minister maliki had established. he removed some of the more difficult and challenging generals. he pushed through at some political expense a sunni defense minister, a post that had been vacant for four years, and he is now pressing for the creation of a national guard that offers the best prospect of bringing sunnis into the fight, and i'll come back to that at the very end. and he's leaning forward on engaging the kurds for oil revenues and back pay for the peshmerga, and together, the iraqi leadership is trying to advance a program that is address the interests, desires and grievances of all the communities. so there's promise there. they're off to a good start, but it's against the backdrop of significant challenge. then there's the military piece, and the iraqis face two very significant deficits.

first, the previous prime minister had, in effect, hollowed out big chunks of the iraqi military. he deprofessionallized it, moving in people loyal to him who didn't necessarily know what they were doing. he cut the normal chain of command and made sure, as i mentioned a moment ago, that some of the senior leadership reported directly to his office. but that nose another any way -- that's not any way to run a war. and the force became moretarian in nature. so when you had a predominately shia force deployed into a sunni region, despite the fact it was there to help the communities protect itself, it was working in a community that didn't trust it, and it asked itself what it was doing there. and then it ended up being cut off, isolated without effective leadership. and that's been going on since january of this year, and that's the very difficult situation we inherited in anbar. but we've also seen something

very positive. when the efforts of the iraqi security forces are planned and coordinated with the coalition backing them, they can be very effective, and the same thing for the kurdish peshmerga. we've seen that, as i noted before, at the mosul and haditha dams. we've seen it more recently add the border -- at the border crossing. and as we speak, we're seeing it in zumar in the north where the peshmerga have retaken the town, and we're seeing it as we speak where the iraqi security forces are moving to take the area around the oil refinery that iraqi forces have held very valiantly since june. so what means is this, and this is our approach: we are working with the iraqis to establish a campaign plan that is planned, coordinated and methodical to

begin over the next months to take back, site by site, town by town, territory that has been lost to isil. at the same time, and this is where you have to do some building of the plane at 60,000 feet, we didn't assess -- we did assess the iraq security forces, and we found about half of them we were able to effect were not competent. the glass half full, there's about half the forces that are. the coalition in the weeks and months ahead, we'll begin to take part in that effort. and then as i mc

a isil will have to make a choice. we will have to stand and fight and be very visible to the coalition air power. it will have two hunkered down instead of the iraqis besieged by iso, isil be under siege from the iraqis. we're doing this we are working the other lines of effort i mentioned before. internationally around the world to stem the flow of foreign fighters, to financing, undermine legitimacy and to do with the humanitarian challenge. so having reviewed what the strategy is let me conclude with a brief word about what it is not. it is not iraq or afghanistan redux. it will not involve deploying tens of thousands or hundreds of

thousands of american troops. it will not involve the expenditure of trillions of american dollars. it will not require united states to go it virtually alone. the iraqis don't need and, indeed, they don't want foreign forces in combat in iraq. as the prime minister said on national television just last night, that would be divisive, distract from the nation and probably endanger our own forces. and more to the point, we will not fall into the trap that isil would want to set of drawing us in in large numbers, bogging us down and bleeding us. that's exactly what they want and that's exactly what we will not do. for these reasons we believe the strategy that we have, while difficult, challenging, time-consuming is sustainable and ultimately will be successful. thank you. [applause] >> would you prefer to sit speak

was no, i'm happy to -- >> if i may, let me just been start with the first question which has to do with, the administration has managed to put together as you mention an extraordinarily broad coalition, more than 60 countries, but that encompasses a number of different, even conflicting agendas. what do you see as the biggest, the biggest challenge for maintaining the integrity and the coherence of the coalition? you know, in the months immediately ahead. and how are you going to manage to keep it together? >> thanks, jessica. i think what's extraordinary in the first instance is the fact that countries that came to this with incredibly disparate agendas often in conflict one another actually came together to join this coalition and to

work against as many lines of efforts. that is evident of the fact that for all of the differences among the coalition countries their minds are concentrated by the wilwolf at the door, and that i. it is a glue keeping us together and it's a common interest in degrading and multiply defeating eyes. there's no doubt you are right, you are differences among the coalition members. in syria a number of coalition members would like to see the focus placed more on removing assad. there are tensions that can arise in terms of the composition of coalition members who are taking military action and what sensitivity that may catch in different countries. but i have to tell you, by and d large what we are seeing now is rather extraordinary cohesion here at what we've done is put in place a structure and a model that puts a tremendous emphasis on keeping the coalition together and strengthening as we go forward as i think virtually everyone knows, the president

asked retired general john allen to lead the effort, to work day in and day out on building and sustaining the coalition. and, of course, against the different lines of effort, military, financing, foreign fighter, legitimacy, et cetera. we have lead agencies in the government working with their counterparts to do the same thing. and john allen, his deputy brett mcgurk, was one of our most experienced hands in iraq are on the road virtually full time making sure that they're working to kee give us to get the of coe the president has played a lead role in this as well. he convened an extraordinary summit at the united nations of leaders from dozens and dozens of countries to get greater commitment to do with the problem of foreign fighters. we have seen real success and progress there. is burning up the phone lines everyday as is the vice president. so the bottom line is at least until now there's been remarkable cohesion. there will be tensions going

forward as different countries have put a different emphasis on different parts of the agenda. but again my sense is that the common denominator of wanting and needing to do with the isil problem is togetherness. >> michael gordon, "new york times." tony, u.s. has used air power to protect the kurdish population in kobani and to protect kurds and the yazidis from the islamic state. but the united states has not used air power to protect sunni arab opponents of the assad regime, against barrel bombs and other attacks. as you note this is a decision that has not gone unnoticed by the moderate syrian opposition. how does the united states hope to recruit and maintain the support, and sustained a morale of the moderate syrian opposition and eventual use it

as aground on in the effort to contain the islamic state? islamic state? as you noted in your speech, while at the same time taking the stance that is not prepared to protect them against airstrikes, unlike these other groups. and under what circumstances would the u.s. be prepared to use air power to protect them? all you really going to take the better part of a year, $500 million to train and equip moderate syrian opposition and then put it in syria where it would be vulnerable to the regime's airstrikes? thank you. >> first, i think actually we have been using air power in ways that advance clearly the interests and agenda of the sunni population as well as other populations. for example, we've taken action in anwr around the mosul and haditha dam which are strategic sites to the iraqi government but protecting sunnis who live there. we have worked hard as well to

come as i said, start to build out two things. first, this national guard which will be a way to bring sunnis into the fight, to have them engaged with the state, and that will benefit as well from the full support of the coalition. we are working on building a bridge for that card as it develops. and in syria, we have focused initially on working to degrade isil's capacity to project power, including and in particular into iraq. so we try to focus on making sure that we were looking at the strategic aspects that it had comp committee control, headquarters, oil refiners to arms depots, training centers, et cetera and we've been delivered about that. we've also tried when we have seen significant mention catastrophes in the making to take action. we did that.

here's the challenge. and i think this is important. as i said earlier there is a very methodical campaign plan that is in development indeed we are starting to roll out on. we have to stick to the plan. unfortunately, every day there's going to be in some part of iraq are some part of syria a community that is under siege, under attack, and is looking for help. we can't be every place every time. we have to stick to the methodical plan to start a rollback isil in a very deliberate way. that's what we're doing. if we get moved off of that plan by something popping up in one place or another, we are not going to succeed. we are trying to be disciplined, trying to help the iraqis be disciplined. but the bottom line is this. isil represents a threat first and foremost actually to seek unity in iraq as well as in syria. we've seen the conditions under which sunnis are living in towns

had been taken over i isil. we get the reports. we know what the living conditions are like. and for the vast majority of people, this is not the future they want. the iraqi government has to demonstrate to them that they're better off with iraq than with isil. we are making good progress on that. and we also have to support them more, especially the tribes come in terms of allowing them to get more fully into the fight with training, equipment, salaries, et cetera. all of that is happening. again, the coalition is, what, five or six weeks old. so we have to have a look at a strategic this strategy. >> thank you very much. if i could follow-up on this national guard plan. some have hailed it as a second awakening but there's a lot of details that remain unclear. what do you see as the risks of this plan to iraqi cohesion? this tether you mentioned how

strong is that? one of the mechanisms in place to strengthen that tether? i guess a broader question is how do we strike the question, empowering communities and not encouraging fragmentation, warlordism and militia rule? >> it's a great question and to challenge but i think that were looking is a few things. first, empowering local communities to in effect defend themselves is i think a very powerful potential mechanism. and the national guard, its members would be drawn from local communities. it would be tethered to local leadership and to the governor of a province. it would probably at at a provincial level. but unlike the awakening, it would actually directly tethered to iraqi state as well which would provide for its sellers, its equipment, its basic sustainment. data gives you i think the best

of both worlds. it creates an entity that answers to and is supported by the state, but its membership is drawn from local communities. people will feel a lot better about having their own protection. closer in, you are likely of local police forces. think of this in a sense in terms of a circle. a local police force is closest in at the local level, at the talent level, at the city level. the guard at the provincial level, and then the iraqi secret forces, the national army at the national level. but like any national guard this card could be federalized in an emergency situation. i think there's tremendous promise. you are right, there are complications. one is what do you do with the shiite militia? will they be folded in to the guard? will be folded into the iraqi security forces? we saw early on these militia were probably critical to helping the iraqi security forces hold on in the early days

when they're under tremendous strain. but they also represent a real challenge because to understate things, they're not exactly popular. so those militia have to be either drawn back and disbanded, or their members need to be integrated into officials pretty forces. and, finally, the peshmerga. they will have, no doubt, and interest and certainly desire to remain as independent as possible. how does that folding to the guard concept? all of these things we are working on. again, standing it up is going to take some time. it's at the top of the agenda of the government that it has to be legislated. that's going to take on the bit of time. in the meantime what we're trying to do is work with the iraqis, take advantage of the fact we're already seeing tribes starting to move from being either with isil or on the fence to be with the governments but they need assistance now. and so bridging to the point

where we get to regard is what we are working on. >> thank you very much. i had a quick question as a follow-up to the earlier question. in terms of the coalition building, different priorities. and especially the role of turkey. i knew when an american official business about the role of turkey, turkey has a role in the coalition in a different way. but when you look at the ground, there are major differences, even between two nato allies. after airdrops especially, chris i just government very harshly in terms of this uid -- pyd.

or they see a site as a priority but isis is a party for u.s. eventually present or the one said we don't know exactly what washington is expecting from us. can you give us a better sense in terms of the relation between u.s. and turkey and so forth? >> sure. thank you very much. turkey isn't a fully critical and essential part of this coalition. it's already playing a very significant role. as i alluded to earlier it is offered to host a training site for the series moderate opposition that will benefit from this train and equip program. that's a critical contribution. it is playing a critical role in trying to deal with the flow of foreign fighters, many of them transit across the turkish border, and we are in very close collaboration on the. same thing with foreign financing to the extent it is traversing borders. the turks have taken a significant role in trying to crack down on the.

we are an ongoing conversation about other things they might do us part of the coalition. but as we speak right now, thanks to turkey there are kurdish peshmerga forces and free syrian army forces living into kobani. thanks to a land bridge established by the turks. again, bringing peshmerga from the iraqi kurdish region and bringing in free syrian forces going through turkey into kobani. that i think certainly reduce -- rebuts the premise that there is some conflict over the question of kobani. the turks have played the lead role in making this happen. and as a result the reinforcements that are needed to help kobani hold on are coming into place. so again, turkey is a close, close ally and a critical part of the coalition, and we see it every day.

>> michele dunne from the carnegie endowment. some coalition members also different definitions of terrorism. and some of them have either passed or on the process now has a new counterterrorism laws. there are some positive aspects to stop foreign fighters from going to iraq and syria, but then there other aspects in which they would be criminalizing or in some cases even counting as terrorism things that the united states would normally consider to be free expression, peaceful expression of dissent, peaceful demonstrations, things like that. are you concerned that this could lead to radicalization in those countries, support either for isil or for other extremist groups? and is this an issue the united states is racing with the coalition partners at? >> the short answer is it's a constant part of our dialogue with a number of countries. many face significant challenges, and it's important in answering those challenges to

avoid actually taking segments of society are not not engaged in terrorism but may simply be critical of the government and actually incentivizing them to use violence as a means of advancing their agendas. so this is something that comes up on a regular basis but it's something that's been part of the landscape for many years, and it's a fairly regular part of our dialogue with a number of countries. as i said earlier in addressing just this question, with very positive is that for all the differences in definition and approach that we see, and interests, the common interest of dealing with isil has been a very strong glue that is put the coalition together. but as we go forward, there will be differences of approaches, differences of emphasis to the one you alluded to something that is there in something we talk about on a regular basis. >> let me be fair to the back. the gentleman right there. go ahead.

>> thank you. i'm a palestinian journalist in town and i spent some time in iraq i got to know a little bit. my question to you on the rack, with national guard companies alike awakening 201, or is it going to encompass all kind of committees and different committees -- >> i think we -- >> and second, on syria aren't you doing the same thing basically, because you and your allies are funding, equipping and training and arming another syrian opposition, while perhaps you ought to reconsider working with the people that are fighting isil, which is the syrian army. perhaps you can just import nation. in reality, we can talk about all we want i can really enjoy to defeat them on the ground you have to put ground and the ground forces are doing the work. >> maybe i'll just take one -- go ahead.

>> you spoke about how the administration leveraged its power to promote an inclusive government in iraq. do you have anything to leverage on the gulf countries to go for pluralism? as you know, the gulf countries are a major source for funding, for fighters and for extremism. my question specifically about what can you leverage him and if i will go specific about bahrain. as you see there going track down on -- crackdown on political parties to what can you leverage on these issues? >> thank you. let me take the last question first and then come back to the cyclone. i think the last question harkens back to a question we heard earlier. look, i think we've seen a pattern repeat itself in different places over and over again, and it's a challenge to

break out of it. and that is that as countries that are facing very legitimate threats from extremist groups, take action that is in effect much broader gauged than the threat, and as a potentially, in taking action, disenfranchised large segments of their own population from basic rights, they risk in effect precipitating a sucker what they're trying to prevent, which is more extremism. and so as i said earlier we're in a constant dialogue with many of our partners in the region about dealing with real threats that they face but also trying to do it in a smart way that doesn't wind up alienating significant segments of the population who may find they can have no choice but to turn to violence. that's exactly what we want to avoid. so again this is something that's a constant in our

dialogue with the number of our friends and partners. with regard to the first question, first, is the national guard the waking 2.0. as i said i think it can be an improvement over the awakening if the iraqis get it right. it's clearly tethered to the state in a sustained way. and that creates a relationship between baghdad and the national guard forces where there is in effect they both need each other and want to sustai sustain the relationship. relationship. so it's a gigabyte i think it will be a powerful thing that can actually be more effective and more sustainable than the awakening proved to be. and, finally, with regard to syria, look, the problem that we face is that assad has been a magnet for the very extremism we are fighting. that is what has attracted into syria isolate and berries other extremist groups. we've long -- isil and other

extremist groups. on the other hand, it's very critical that whatever happens in syria going forward, that it's basic institutions be preserved, including finding ways to preserve the basic military structures, the institutions of the state, et cetera. we know what happens from our experience in iraq over the last decade when you disband those institutions but it creates a vacuum and that backing is usually filled by bad things. so going forward in syria i think one of the things that's going to be critical is getting to a political transition that preserves the institutions of the state and makes it clear to all of the different actors in sega that the equities can and actually be protected in a single state. that's a big challenge. i think we now have a new u.n. envoy who was focus on the

diplomacy, that's historic and is making the rounds of the critical region states. we are very anxious to work with him to see if some of the diplomacy can be energized because as people look out at the syrian civil war part of this, i think all sides can see that ultimately this is going to exhaust them. it's all we have the most horrific humanitarian consequences, and there's no military victory for anyone in the civil war. and the patrons of various parties who are spending millions and billions of dollars to sustain their proxies, that's a real cost. so i think there should be a growing incentive to find a way forward with energized diplomacy to do with the civil war. but part of that is the moderate opposition, building it up, making it a counterweight, and in effect further underscoring the fact that the assad regime cannot win this militarily.

>> we have time for just one last crisp question. >> i am an advisor. i was reading the book of the dana fletcher who was the admiral. and it was really very interesting what he said about syria, that i don't know if united states didn't up the responsibly of the very beginning of the war, either really to strengthen the moderate opposition because we face two situations. either a shower outside will stay in power and will be more cruel to his people, or we will see -- a shot of assad. or we will see more opposition to in another -- >> no. be crisp. can you -- >> the other one, the arab world 70% muslim world, and they are

persecuted in syria for 50 years. in iraq with the beginning of the war they were, you, with the dissolve of the army, maliki, he built pure shiite army trained by iran. so this is sometimes isis is a reflection of frustration and one which is terrible for the muslim world. >> okay. >> so how do you see things? [laughter] >> one of the things that's so important to do is exactly what you duncan which is try to put this in a larger context. and debuted at the outset of my remarks i was was time to put the rise of isil into a least part of that larger context. a big piece of that is the reemergence of sectarian division and violence complicated in place like iraq by the fact that that had been held in check for decades. as a result of dictatorship, as a result of war, as a result of foreign intervention.

the lid was taken off, and in a miraculous kind of way, iraq actually had and has represented institutions that you could argue function as well if not better than in certain neighboring countries. but the challenge of trying to build something like that, one, the lid has been taken off, and we have all of these other trends in the region that i described is an immense. so we are very cognizant of that which is why i said we're approaching all of this with determination, patience, but also humility. it's a huge challenge. it's a long struggle. i'm absolutely convinced we will prevail in it, but it's going to take time. >> tony, i know you're on a tight schedule. you have been candid and informative and gracious. and we thank you so much for joining us. >> thank you. thank you very much.

[applause] [inaudible conversations] >> c-span to provide live coverage of the u.s. senate floor proceedings and key public policy events. and every weekend booktv, now for 15 years the only television network devoted to nonfiction books and authors. c-span2 created by the cable tv industry and brought you as a public service by your local cable or satellite providers. watch us in hd, like us on

facebook and follow us on twitter. >> here on c-span2 four days until election day. wherwere like national press clb for discussion on the midterm elections and the latino vote. expects speakers glue the president of the congressional hispanic caucus foundation, and the director of hispanic media for the public in national committee. it should get underway momentarily here at the press club. among the campaigns to become president obama taking a final swing in new england campaigning in maine history. he was campaigning in the present-day speaking in rhode island but it looks like this event is getting underway live here on c-span2. >> hello. to these cameras automatically -- can you tell can either of

you on c-span is supposed be -- this is supposed to be life. >> they are rolling. >> okay. we would like to welcome all of you to the national press club for this very important newsmaker on the latino vote. we have four very distinguished speakers. let me introduce each of them to you. mark lopez is director of hispanic research at the pew institute. he has his ph.d from princeton university. ruth guerra is the director spend me for the republican national committee who served as communications director for texas congressman sam johnson. esther aguilera, and i hope i'm pronouncing this corrected, as president and ceo of chci.

which is assisting spanish executive -- students. she holds a degree from occidental college and is a native of mexico. peggy is a correspondent on higher education magazine in washington. she holds a ph.d from university of california at santa barbara. and with that, the program can begin. >> thank you. welcome, everyone. [speaking in native tongue] one of the greatest pleasures i did in covering hispanics as i have for the past years is discovering and writing about the great diversity, diversity of backgrounds in terms of multiracial background, multinational, multi-generational and in some cases multilingual. let the nose i always say are as

diverse as america. so in this newsmakers for days before the midterm elections which is very possibly of the senate switching from a dominant democratic leadership to republicans, w we're going to focus on the hispanic let you know electric. that is in general, those of hispanic heritage who are eligible to vote because there over the age of 18 and they are citizens of the united states. but we're going to go deeper and hopefully more clearly into information about this electric than most journalists do. when most people talk about electing a vote, including most members of the press, they tend to equate the hispanic population with the electorate and with those who actually vote. mark lopez who's the director of research at the pew hispanic

center and is a recognized expert on hispanic demographics is going to parse down those numbers for us. the five parts which i think should be clearly distinguished. that is the population, the electorate, those were eligible to vote, but registration, those who register to vote, the turnout, that is those who actually vote, and i would like to go deeper into how those split by parties, and we can to the issues. and i would also like mark to talk about the percentage of hispanic voters who are, hispanic voters were spanish dominant and actually request ballots in spanish at the polls. mark will also been talked about what his research has found that some of the most important issues to the has been the electorate, particularly the issue of immigration reform.

that is the change in immigration laws. then we will hear from two directors of organizations who are heavily involved in the hispanic electorate. that is the director of the congressional hispanic caucus institute, esther aguilera editor of hispanic outreach for the national republican party, ruth guerra or they will address how the initiatives to expand the hispanic electorate and voter turnouts are being shaped and how they are developed. we also really interested in what issues they feel are important to turnout hispanic voters, hispanic heritage voters. i want to thank all the panelists are coming in for being flexible with a several day changes can and want to thank susan who helped me very much with the context for this event. i would also like to request that, while all the panel speaks spanish in that sense we don't have an official translator and

then he interest of time, that questions and interviews in spanish will be made after the event. [speaking in nativ [speaking spanish] okay, with that let's start with mark. >> thank you very much for the great introduction, peggy. i appreciate the opportunity to do. it's a real pleasure, and i want to tell you a little bit about what's been happening with the hispanic vote. so today there are more than 25 million latinos for these 18 in the u.s. its victims are people who we define as eligible to vote. but among americans who are in this age group and/or use citizens, they make, hispanics make up only about 11% of the population to compare that to their general share in u.s. population overall. they make up 17% of all

americans but only 11% of those who were eligible to vote. when you start breaking it down by registered voter and then down to voters, and recent election cycles hispanics have started to reach about eight, nine, nearly 10% of voters over all. but as you can see is what my colleagues likes to say, latinos have been punching under the weight given the presence in the general population. you might wonder why that might be. there's a couple of big reasons. the first is many latinos, about 18 million, are under the age of 18 so that they are not eligible to vote yet because they have aged into adulthood. the second big reason why you see many latinos are on eligible to vote is they may be adults, they may be in the country legally but they're not u.s. citizenship, or they may be in the country illegally and, therefore, are not u.s. citizens. these two groups make up a significant portion of the adult population and that's part of the reason why over all latinos tend to what we say punch below their weight.

a couple of other things i think that are worth noting. the hispanic vote, 25 million potential voters. they reside all around the country and hispanic population has been growing in virtually every part of the country over the last 10, 15, 20 years. but half of hispanic voters are in just two states, california and texas. if you include florida, new york, new jersey and illinois, that's almost two-thirds of the entire hispanic electorate. all of those states that i just mentioned, florida really is the only one where we have a close in this case governors race this year were latinos are likely to play an important role in shaping the outcome of that particular election. but the map for this year, particularly for the senate, is one that emphasizes states like alaska, georgia, north carolina, states like colorado where in some cases as in the case of colorado latinos make up nearly

15% if not over 15% of eligible voters in the state of colorado. that's interesting because that's a big share in colorado is one of the bigger hispanic voter states. however, in states like alaska anthey make up more like 5% of eligible voters. in a state like georgia where latinos make up a nearly 10% of the state's population, among registered voters in georgia they only make up about 2% of registered voters. same story for north carolina. it's interesting that the weight of the latino vote is not quite where you might expect it to be given its relative population size and i think that's an important point to note. who are latino voters? we just did a survey and in our survey we asked hispanic voters a number of different questions including questions about the demographics. when you take a look at latino registered voters you will find 70%, almost three quarters, are us-born. so the u.s.-born makes up the

bulk of hispanic voters, though among hispanic adults over all, only half are us-born. i think it's important distinction to note that hispanic risked voters tends to be more likely to be nativeborn, was born in the united states. a second thing to note i is that language to peggy asked them to talk about language but i do have any hard data to point to, i'll took was in spanish. my colleagues on the panel may have some data on that but if you take a look at our data you will find that they should latinos who are spanish dominant, that is the conduct most of their daily business in spanish, that sure is about 17%. about 48% are bilingual, and more than a third our english am. in other words, they conduct most of the bases in their daily lives in english. i think those are some important numbers to point to the tick because a lot of connected with what of advertisement is folks

on the hispanic committee goes, a lot of it does go to spanish me and that is poor but many spanish voters don't necessarily watch spanish media. especially those who are -- a few other things worth noting what is the vehicle in terms of its parchin she. our most recent survey shows that sheriff hispanics identify with the lean towards democratic party is split in recent years. just in 2012 it was a 70%. so 70% of hispanic registered voters in 2012 said they identified with or lean towards the democratic party. today, that number is 63%. as you might expect the republican party has made some gains. defcon from 20% back then to about 27% today. there have been some changes. in addition to take a look at the congressional vote, which is what we're interested in your today it's interesting to take a look at the congressional vote that the intentions of the spandex to vote for democratic candidate or republican candidate have changed it back

in 2010, about two-thirds of hispanic registered voters said they would support the local democratic candidate in the congressional race. today that number is at 57% or so there's been a decline in the share of hispanics who say they will support the local democratic candidate. i so want to point out that there is a wide advantage here on the part of democrats. democrats still have a very wide advantage among latinos, oath in terms of party affiliation, the intention to vote and one of the interesting thing to point out is when you ask which party has more concern for the community, half of hispanic registered voters say it's the democrats, 10% say it's the republicans, and about 38% say there's no difference between the two parties. that democratic share is down from 63% just two years ago. so even in perceptions the democratic party has lost some ground among latinas. partly because of the issues. the one big issue that people

oftentimes associate with the latino community is immigration. our survey shows many hispanics when immigration reform, the once and. more say this now than was the case just a year ago. we also find the issue of immigration is important to many latinos. three quarters tell us it is extremely or very important issue to them personally. but the issues of economy and jobs, education and health care are seen by many latinos as just as important or sometimes even more important than issue of immigration. so immigration looms large and it's an important issue for latino voters but other issues as well such as education, economy and jobs resonate within. and on these issues it's interesting from our survey you will find latinas to say that democrats are generally the better part of her day with the economy, for example, working with immigration. despite some of the recent lack of progress on immigration reform from democrats and republicans. that's a lot of data. that's a lot of information but

i hope that's been informative. but i do want to close by saying one other thing. so when we talk about the latino vote in 2010, particularly in some of the states where there are close races, let's take colorado. about 144,000 hispanics voted in 2010. that's about 35% turnout rate in the state for that year. and in the state of florida, some 858,000 latinos voted in 2010. that's a turnout rate of about 45%. how does it compare to the general public in those states? in colorado there was about a 10 percentage point gap. non-hispanics book at a high rate in 2010, but in florida hispanics were voting at a rate very similar to their white and black counterparts in the governor's race in 2010. we will see what happens the issue but it remains to be seen how things will turn out but i think if there's an awful lot of

interesting patterns, trends and potential impacts of the latino vote that we will see on tuesday. so with that i'm going to close. thank you very much. >> we will have time for questions for these speakers. i'm sure there will be plenty of time. >> minus ruth guerra and i'm with republican national committee. i am the communications construct for hispanic media and what i wanted to share with you today is back in 2012 after republicans lost the white house we realize we need to make some changes. as any of you have heard, the project cannot. under the leadership of chairman grains previous we made significant efforts to engage

hispanic committee's across the u.s. -- reince priebus. we are in 11 different states, senate and house races. this is never that hasn't been done before and we are building on these efforts, year-round presence that we have any hispanic community. as chairman often says, you get overrepresented the american people and the you engage and to build relationships with the hispanic community. so our efforts are now going to be year-round. we are involved in the governor's race in colorado, and other races which are important. these efforts will continue, as well as mark pointed out, republicans have seen progress in their numbers with the hispanic community. anything has to do a lot with our year-round presence in these

communities. not only are we working with state parties can we are working with republican candidates as well taking into these communities in order to communicate our message and share our story because we know that if we ended doing that, we know the opposing party is going to mischaracterize exactly who republicans are and what they stand for. and basically come and what we have is let me talk a little bit about what the phase that we and 20, the first phase is identification is going to the hispanic community in meeting with business leaders come to mean delete, with pastors and identifying what the events are in the committee and getting the candidates to go to those events on a daily basis but it's having all this data and identification process in one place, either as republican national committee and state parties as well. once we have all of that data and information, then we are engaging.

we are meeting with these passes, having the candidates go and tee mccabe. now was i yesterday that kaufman had a spanish debate with the governor in colorado history. that's the first spanish debate that has taken place but we are seeing all these extorting efforts and i think that's why you see republicans making inroads in the hispanic community. you also have the third phase that is persuasion to get out the vote effort. we have a strong presence but however we are not using our power. so we are engaging them and getting them out to vote and making hispanic language website in order for them to have their information in a language that they prefer. and so we feel confident we are not taking anything for granted but we are saying that we are making inroads and our message is resting with the hispanic community.

>> thank you to national press club, and good morning. i am esther aguilera, president ceo of the congressional hispanic caucus institute. we're a nonprofit organization. we were established by the two members of congress to educate, empower and connect. we work with latino youth through providing paid internships, scholarships and union people ready for college. but our vision, the organization vision is aesthetically engaged and population contributing to all sectors of society. so clearly civic engagement is very important, and all elections are very important. the stats that we had a market

out these -- by mark paint a large population where half are eligible to vote, and a turnout as we so in 2012 was 46%. so civic engagement and the importance of participating, participating to impact the welfare of her family, community and the nation are the types of work and things that we push for in do. in this election we know that over all, the latino population and the voter is more of a swing voter. you can't clearly, it leans democratic but there is a significant portion that is up for grabs so it's not a population that can be taken for granted. some of the statistics we heard was about 38% don't see either

party as, that they are favoring. so that again speaks to, it's about the issues. it's about what is going to make the latino family strong and prepared for the future. we also know that the latino population is more optimistic than the general population. when you asked the question about how do you see the next generation, opportunities for the next generation, and the american dream, the latino population is there and it has higher rates of optimism for, not only where the country is, but by the next generation has to go. so in terms of what is important for the community, we know that immigration is one of those entry points to the heart, and to speak to the values of the community. but we also know that the

hispanic community cares about jobs, about well being, about safety and health. and so things like health and health insurance are very important. y. guillotine is need to participate, to speak. so health insurance is important because the hispanic population before the health care act was 30% uninsured. more percentage of hispanics were uninsured in the population by ration of one to three. so the latino population stands to gain the most by fixing our health insurance system. and so, and we've seen the numbers of hispanics who are insured go out. so it is a good trend. the other thing that is important, and these are issues, you know, that resume, the

latino population is very, very hard-working. it's considered a working poor population, tends -- we are very diverse. we have a growing entrepreneurial and business and executive ranks, but the majority are still working hard in multiple jobs, and 43% of latino workers earn poverty level wages, although they work. and so clearly anything that helps with their wage levels is going to be important. and any party or candidate that speaks again to the welfare and jobs on their pay, on health insurance, on education and children are going to be what is going to resonate with the community. again, it's a population that swings democrat, but their significant amount, it is about the issues that matter to the

population and the community. the other thing i wanted to mention is that overall, i think in the mainstream there is a huge misrepresentation of latinas and who they are. they are depicted as primarily illegal immigrants refusing to learn english or embracing the american values when, in fact, the opposite is true. as i mentioned, it's a growing and diverse population that is hard-working, that is building business objectives contribute to the economy through jobs in the small business sector, and in executive position. and it is a population that is contributing at every level. and very much we have higher rates of latinos serving in the armed forces, very patriotic and

often times the real story of the commuted is not understood the so it's misunderstood and that spoken to with what issues the king and he cares about, that's where again these elections matter. and the issue and the well being of families matter. the last thing i'm going to mention is that, you know, this is also about the growing insulins of the latino committee. we know that it's 54% -- 54 million in the population today, 17% of the population, but it's also already 25% of americans under 18 are latino. and actually i referred to some of marx statistics. the growing number of percentage of hispanics growing our nativeborn, and if you look at

the demographic of us-born hispanics, 18, the median age of us-born hispanics is 18 years old. this is a very young demographic. and so we are seeing impact in the elections but that's only going to grow. there's much more potential to turn out the vote, to speak on issues the community cares about, and the growing numbers in the future. as was mentioned in this particular election, there is going to be just a handful of races where the population will have a significant impact, as was mentioned, on the senate. colorado with 15.4% eligible, voters been hispanic. on the governor's races, arizona

has 22% hispanic eligible electorates. florida is important, and colorado. thank you for having me and welcome any questions. >> i will call on members of the press. thank you. >> so again, i think it's important to distinguish between the population and the electric. and been that way for this election, the electorate in the states. so you mentioned arizona, and i'm wondering if you have statistics for arizona, the senate race is important as far as turning, flipping the senate, but the governor race is interesting. and i think also interesting, governor susan latinas in new mexico. that is also a high hispanic

state. so could you talk about the hispanics in new mexico, colorado, and in terms of the party affiliation? and again, talking about the electorate. >> both color and new mexico i think a really interesting state. first let's talk about new mexico. in new mexico which is by the way the ninth largest hispanic state, hispanics their make up about 40% of all eligible voters but it's actually the highest hispanic voter% make sure of any one of them of any state. so very interesting that this is also a state that's got hispanics who have a long tied to the state. so families have been there for many generations, which means they're us-born, their parents are us-born. their grandparents are us-born and they traced the roots back to spain in many cases. so when you take a look at new mexico, new mexico's hispanics

have tended to vote democratic, but i think it's important to note that susana martinez who is the current governor and two as you mentioned is running for reelection this year, she is republican. we don't have an exit poll from 2010. i know there were some other polls that were done prior to the election by deliver the exact figures for them, but susana martinez, i don't think she one significant share of hispanic vote, at least not compared to some of the candidates, but you might have a better sense of that than i do. ..