but it is not the case. see it as a priority, but isis is a priority as well. even initially, we don't know even exactly. expecting. can you give us a better sense in terms of the relationship between u.s. and turkey? >> sure. think you very much. turkey is an absolutely essential and a critical part of this coalition. it is already playing a significant role. it is offered to host a training site for the syrian moderate opposition. that is a critical contribution. it is plain a critical role in trying to deal with the flow of foreign fighters, many of them transit across the turkish border, and we are in very close collaboration of that. the same thing with the foreign financing.

the turks have taken a significant role in trying to crack down on that, and we are an ongoing conversations about other things that might be done as part of the coalition, but as we speak right now, there are kurdish forces and free syrian army forces moving. thanks to a land bridge established by the turks, again, bringing pressure murder from the iraqi kurdish region and britney in free syrian force is going to turkey. i think that is up premise, there is some conflict. they have played a lead role in making this happen. as a result, the real forces detonated to help of fall lawn are coming into place. so, again, turkey is a close, close ally and the critical part of the coalition. >> michele.

>> michele done from the carnegie endowment. some of the arab members of the coalition against isil also have different definitions of tourism, and some of them have either passed or are in the process in el a passing new counter-terrorism laws. there are some positive aspects to stop foreign fighters, but there are other aspects in which they would be criminalizing or in some cases even counting as terrorism things that the united states would normally consider to be free expression, peaceful expression of dissent, peaceful demonstration, things like that. are you concerned that this could lead to radicalization in the country, support either for isil or other extremist groups? is this an issue that the united states is raising with coalition partners? >> the short answer is, it is a short -- a constant

part of our dialogue. many face significant terrorism challenges, and it is important in answering those charges to avoid actually taking the segments of society that are not engaged in terrorism but may simply be critical of the government and actually incentivizing them to use violence as a means of passing their agenda. so this is something that comes up on a regular basis, this has been something that has been a part of the landscape for many years and is a fairly regular part of our dialogue with a number of countries. as i said earlier, i think what is very positive is that for all of the differences and definition and approach that we see an interest, the common interest of dealing with isil has been a very strong route that has put this coalition together, but as we go forward there will be differences of approach, differences of of assessed. the one you alluded to is something that is there and we talk about.

>> here to the back. the gentleman right there. go ahead. all right. >> go for it. >> i spent some time in iraq my question to you, with the national guard, is it like awakening, or is it criteria compass archives of different communities? second, on syria, are you doing the same thing basically because you and your allies are funding, a quivering, and training and arming another opposition while, perhaps you ought to reconsider working with the people that are fighting kitchen, which is the syrian army. in reality to buy you talk about it all you want, but if you want to defeat them on the ground, you have to

have ground forces commander ground forces that are doing the work of the syrians. >> radiologist take a one. go ahead. >> you spoke about how the u.s. administration uses its power to promote inclusive government in iraq. see you have anything delivered of a gulf countries to go for close and? as you know, there are a major source for funding, fighters, and extremism. what can you leverage? the crack down on human-rights activists and political parties, what can you leverage on these issues? >> thank you. let me take the last question first, and never come back to the second one. the last question harkens back to one that we heard

earlier. look, i think we have seen a pattern repeated seven different places over and over again. it is a challenge to break out of, and that is that, as countries that are facing very legitimate threats from extremist groups, action that is, in effect, much broader engaged and the threat. and as a potentially, and taking action to of action, disenfranchise large segments of their own population from basic rights , their risk, in effect, precipitating exactly what they're trying to prevent torch's more extremists. and so, as i said earlier, we are in a constant dialogue with many partners in the region and of dealing with the real threats that they face the trying to do it in a smart way that does not wind up alienating significant segments of the population who may find that they then have no choice but

to turn to violence. and that is exactly what we want to avoid. again, this is something that is a constant in a dialogue with a number of our friends and partners. with regard to the first question, the national guard , i think it can actually be an improvement in that, if the iraqis get it right, it is clearly tethered to the state in a sustained way, and that creates a relationship between baghdad and the national guard forces where they're starting, and a farce, if they get it right it will be a powerful thing that can actually be more effective and sustainable than the look and improved to be. finally, with regard to -- look, the problem that we face is it assad has been a magnet for the extremism

that we are fighting. we think he has lost its legitimacy. on the other hand, it is critical that whatever happens to syria going forward that its basic institutions be preserved, including finding ways to preserve the basic military structures, the institutions of the state. we know what happens from our experience in iraq over the last decade. it creates a vacuum, and it is usually filled by bad things police so going forward in syria one of the things that will be critical is giving to a political transition that preserves the institutions of the state and makes it clear to our of the different actors in syria that their equity can be protected.

are think that we now have a new u.n. envoy who is focused on the diplomacy and starting to make their rounds of the critical regional states. we are anxious to work with them and see if some of the diplomacy can be energized. as people look aren't as serious a law were part of this, i think all sides concede that ultimately this is going to result in the most terrific humanitarian consequences the and there is no military victory for anyone in the civil war. and the patrons, various parties are spending millions and billions of dollars to sustain their proxies, that is a real cost i think that there should be a growing incentive to find a way forward. but part of that is the moderate opposition, building in upper, making a

counterweight and, and affect our further of restoring a factor the assad regime -- assad region cannot win this militarily. >> seven -- time for one last question. >> i am advisory. earl was reading, and it was really very interesting, what he said about syria. a general of the united states, the responsibility in the very beginning of the war really to strengthen the moderate opposition. either at assad is staying in power and be more cruel to his people horse seymour extremas of opposition. and then another, i take no

-- the arab world is 70 percent muslim. they're persecuted and syria. and iraq, with the beginning of the war, with the support of the army come up your shia army, a trend but iran. so isil is a reflection of frustration, which is terrible. so how you see things. >> well, you know -- [laughter] one of the things that is so important to do, limits and put this into a larger context. the of some of my remarks i was trying to put this into part of that larger context. a big piece of that is the re-emergence of sectarian division and violence, complicated and a place like

iraq that it has not been held in check for decades as a result of dictatorship, war, for an intervention. and in a miraculous kind of way iraq actually had and has representative institutions that you could argue function as well if not better than certain neighboring countries, but the challenge of trying to build something like that, and so we are very cognizant of that which is why i said we are approaching all of this with determination, patients, but also humility. it is a huge challenge, a long struggle. they're absolutely convinced that we will prevail, but it is going to take time. >> i know you are on a tight schedule. you have been candid and

informative and gracious. we thank. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> this weekend on the c-span network's, tonight starting at eight iraqis turn on c-span our campaign 2014 debate coverage continues in prime-time. saturday night at 8:00 the funeral for former "washington post" editor ben

bradlee and the sunday evening

>> throughout the campaign 2014 c-span has brought you more than 130 candidates from across the country in races that will determine control of the next congress . this tuesday night watch c-span live election night coverage to see who wins, loses, and which party will control the house and senate coverage at 8:00 p.m. eastern with results and analysis. candid victory and concession speeches and some of the most closely watched races across the country throughout the night and into the morning. we want to hear from you with calls to our comments, and tweets. campaign 2014 election night coverage on c-span.

>> earlier today the brookings institution has the international atomic energy agency director to discuss the role of the iaea in monitoring the iranian nuclear program and its compliance with the -- plus one entrant agreement. made up of the u.s., u.k., france, china, russia, germany. this program is one hour and 15 minutes. >> good morning. my name is bob einhorn. i would like to welcome you to a brookings and today's event, which is part of the airline and chain

international leader forum series. our speaker today is director-general of the international atomic energy agency, the iaea. years ago when i spoke to groups or eire briefed reporters i would simply use the initials iaea. then i would catch myself and remember to sound out, you know, the full name of the agency. today you do not have to do that anymore. the iaea has practically become a household word. it is an indispensable effort. it is an indispensable player in international efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. as a safeguard system, it is

a sophisticated monetary system that is an essential element for providing assurance about nuclear programs and for detecting possible violations of non-proliferation obligations. the agency has been at the center of compliance controversies with north korea, iraq, libya, and syria, and now it is heavily involved in the iranian nuclear issue. the agency has monitored the implementation by iran of the nuclear elements of the november 2013 interim accord between the the -- plus one countries and iran, the so-called joint plan of

action. and since december of 2011, it has sought iranian cooperation in resolving serious concerns that, at least in the past iran carried out research, experiments, and procurement activities related to the development of new terror weapons. but so far, iran has largely stalled the -- investigation and if an agreement is reached between the -- plus one countries and iran on a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue, the responsibility will fall to the iaea to monitor iran compliance. elected, director-general of the iaea and 2009, and he is now serving his second term of office before becoming

director general he had a distinguished career in the japanese diplomatic service. his last post as a japanese diplomat was as japan's ambassador to the cave far from 2005-2009. mendez japan's representative to the iaea he served as chairman of the agency's board of governors in the 2005-2006 timeframe. in that capacity he accepted the nobel prize on behalf of the agency for its work in iraq. during his ten years he has done much to enhance the iaea reputation for professionalism, integrity, objectivity. his predecessor, in my view,

sometimes strayed into highly political matters, providing his personal advice of policies that iaea member states ought to pursue. he has kept the agency focused on its original technical mandate, the area -- its area of special competence, and it has been extraordinarily capable as an instrument of nonproliferation policy. end of this emphasis on the agency's technical mandate has restored, and i think a increase the agency's credibility. and credibility is the iaea number one has said. the director general has made some tough calls on issues of the syrian nuclear

reactor and the possible military dimensions of eros and clear progress. he calls them the way he saw them, as warranted by the information collected and analyzed by his very capable, professional staff. now, it is predictable that the governments that were identified by the agency as having violated, likely violated the obligations its director general accusing them of bias and of being a tool of countries like the united states. but this man has made clear that he will not be deterred or intimidated by such tactics. he will continue to follow the evidence wherever it leads.

he has been a staunch supporter of the agency's strengthened safeguards system and a staunch defender of that system against efforts to weaken it from countries was not so hidden agendas. but he and his agency are not only focused on safeguards and nuclear nonproliferation, they boosted the agency's technical cooperation program to ensure that member states, especially those just embarking on a civil the clear programs, can fully benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. in the wake of the former sheila tragedy, the iaea has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety throughout the world, and with the worldwide terrorist threat continuing to grow and the worldwide

increase in stocks of nuclear and radiological materials, the agency has significantly expanded its role in the area of nuclear security. searle the iaea agenda is full, its role is critical, and the challenges that it faces a daunting. fortunately, we have this man at the helm. so mr. director-general, we will move forward with your remarks. [applause] >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. i am very pleased to be here today at brookings.

this institution has a well-deserved reputation for the excellence of research. for more than a century major contribution to public policy most of them the united states and internationally. it is our special pleasure, a distinguished veteran, through our haverland for many years. i have been asked to talk about the challenges of the nuclear arms, about the role of the iaea with regard to the iran nuclear program. before talking, so you where we are not. we are not a political

factor. we are not an international police force. we do not take sides. iaea is an independent organization within the un family. one of our core activities is to verify that countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful and cities to make it their weapons. we collect and analyze all relevant information and provided impartial, factual, objective reports star board of governors to facilitate his decision making. the iaea studies, the director general is under the authority of and subject to the control of the board of governors. under the statute the role of the iaea and nuclear verification is to establish and administer safeguards

designed to ensure the special materials, services, equipment facilities are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose . in addition, and and that three of the operation of nuclear, requiring all states to commit themselves to use nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes. these countries are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguard with the iaea and submit a declaration of all nuclear material to us. i expect facilities to verify the declaration made by countries are correct, and inspectors continuously follow-up. the iaea safeguards system appears to work well until

the 1996. however, the discovery of the secret nuclear weapons program in iraq after the gulf war of 1990-91 and the development of a nuclear program showed that concentrating only on facilities declared to us by countries was not enough. we needed tools that would enable us access to undeclared nuclear materials and activities in the country. in response, member states approved the model in 1997. whether countries implement an additional protocol the agency requires more tools and implements safeguards, including additional access to information, to people, and to sites in that country. the additional is the sizzle

for the iaea to be able to conclude the thought of the country's nuclear in the exclusively peaceful activities act. a number of states with additional protocol and forth now stands at 124. this is good news. ladies and gentlemen, the safeguards we implement today is very different than that of our founding fathers in 1957, as are the challenges they face. new technology and modern communications have made it easier at it ought to access knowledge, materials, and expertise that would have been much more restrictive than in 1957. that makes nuclear proliferation easier now.

.. in all areas of activities including safeguards. we have developed important new instruments such as the additional protocols as i mentioned. we also make technology such as

satellite imagery. we have dramatically improved our analytical capabilities by building new safeguards and laboratories outside of cni. safeguarding implementation continues to evolve including what we called the state-level approach. this involves considering a state's nuclear activities and related technical capabilities as a whole rather than focusing only on individual facilities. this helps us to keep the frequency and intensity of routine inspections for states to the minimum level necessary to draw credible safeguards and conclusions. if you're interested i can come back to this issue later. an important thing to remember is that the state level approach is implemented strictly within the scope of the existence safeguard agreements. i would also like to add that

the assumptions in the 1950s were that nuclear would only be developed and processed by governments. today, there are concerns about the possibility of nonstate actors developing nuclear explosive devices. we have therefore become increasingly active in important related areas such as nuclear security which involves helping to ensure that terrorists and other criminals do not obtain nuclear or other radioactive material. the iaea is now playing the center role in enhancing global nuclear security. the main safeguard issues on the agenda in recent years have concerned iran, north korea and syria. these are very different cases. what they have in common is the

fact that these countries have failed to fully implement their safeguard agreement with the iaea and other relevant delegations. this makes it very difficult for us to do our job efficiently. as far as the iaea is concerned the iran story began in august of 2002 when maggie have reported that iran was building a large underground nuclear related facility in natanz which had not been declared to the agency previously. iran's sub secretary acknowledged this and put it in iaea safeguards. let me say at this point that it is vitally important that the iaea and its director general should be impartial. that means applying the same principles to all countries.

for me the fundamental principle is that all of the safeguard agreements which we conclude with our member state should be implemented fully. relevant obligations such as resolutions of the u.n. security council. in late 2009 i applied this principle to iran. i felt that -- the issues with gravity was an essential force for resolving the problem. my report from february 2010 stated that nuclear material declared by iran was not being diverted for peaceful purposes but i also stated that iran was not providing sufficient cooperation to enable the agency to conclude that all nuclear material in iran was for

peaceful activities. i urged iran to implement the additional protocol and gratify the issues related to what have become known as possible military dimensions to its nuclear program. the next important question was how to approach the possible military dimensions. our technical experts have spent years painstakingly and objectively analyzing a huge quantity of information about the program from my wide variety of independent sources including in the agency's own efforts and from interim information provided by iran itself as well as a number of member states. after carefully reviewing the issue i decided to present the detailed report in november 20 november 2011. in that report i stated that the information assembled by the agency was overall credible.

it was consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved and timeframes. the information indicated that iran had counted out activities relevant to the development of the nuclear explosive device. the information also indicated that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured program and might still be ongoing. i would like to be very clear on this issue because there have been some misunderstandings. the iaea has not said that iran has nuclear weapons. we have not drawn conclusions from the information about a possible nuclear dimension to the iranian nuclear program. what we have set in fact iran has to criticize these issues because there is credible

information indicating that it engaged in activities of this nature. in other words, iran has a case to answer. in response to my report both the iaea board of governors in the u.n. security council adopted resolutions asking iran to cooperate to clarify their issues relating to possible military dimensions in order to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. on the basis of these resolutions the agency had talks with iran over the next two years. no progress was made. at times we were going around in circles. last year, we started to see some improvements. in november i went to tehran and signed find a framework for cooperation with iran under which it agreed to resolve all

the outstanding issues past and present. we agreed to take a step-by-step approach. initially, iran implemented -- which it agreed under the framework for cooperation very well. however since december of 2014 focus on implementing agreements have been limited. two important programs which should have been implemented two months ago have still not been implemented. the agency invited iran to propose new measures for the next step of our cooperation but it has not done so. clarifying issues relating to possible military dimensions are not an endless process. it could be done within a reasonable timeline but how far and how fast we can go depends very much on iran's cooperation. i have made it clear that the

agency will provide an assessment to our board of governors after it obtained a good understanding of the whole picture concerning our issues with the possible military dimensions. it is then up to the board to decide the future course of action. as you may know there are two types of negotiations on the iran nuclear issue. one is the iaea iran track. the other is the so-called p5+1 and the iran track in which the iaea is also involved. these six countries china, france, germany russia, britain and the united states agreed when they joined -- on a joint plan of action with iran in 2013. the aim was to achieve a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful.

all seven countries asked the iaea to undertake monitoring and verification of military measures to be implemented by iran which we are doing. the p5+1 negotiations with iran are continuing. i should mention that iran is still not implementing their protocol. this is contrary to the resolution of the board of governors and the security council. the implementation of additional protocol by iran is essential for the agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country. the current status of affairs in fact iran's nuclear material under iaea safeguard is an peaceful -- but we cannot provide assurance that all material in iran is for peaceful purposes.

in order to provide that assurance iran has to clarify the issues. facing a possible military dimensions and implements the additional protocol. what is needed now is concrete actions on the part of iran to resolve all outstanding issues. i recommended working with iran to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. let me repeat this is not a never-ending process. it is very important that iran fully implements cooperation sooner rather than later. the iaea can make a unique contribution to resolving the iran negotiations but we cannot do this on our own. the sustained efforts of the intelligence committee are needed as is iran's fault cooperation to resolve all outstanding issues. i would now be happy to take your questions. thank you very much. [applause]

>> director general thank you very much for your presentation. i have a few questions to pose to you. i am sure our audience has many that it would like to pose to you. i know a iran is going to be a big focus of attention, so therefore i will start off talking about the agency and its role. and i particularly want to raise the concern that i and many others have about the growing politicization surrounding the

board of governors in its discussions about the agency's role. i remember when i used to attend the board of governors meetings, general conferences. usually there was a consensus among board members and any particular topic. it was very rare that it was voting a divided membership. now it's almost the norm on lots of issues for them to be voting differences. you mentioned the state level concept the state level approach. i think this is a very innovative approach to safeguarding. i think it would enhance the agency's role, but yet you and the secretariat have received criticism or may number of questions and i can name them. russia, argentina brazil and some others have raised

questions about this innovative approach to safeguarding. could you talk a little bit about what i have described is the growing politicization of this surrounding the agency? >> i firmly believe that the iaea is a technical organization and its state so that the rarity of that everything we deal with this very political. verification of nonproliferation is very political. we have a mandate on nuclear power. the use of nuclear power is a very political issue in any country. and so i think the iaea is a particular organization which is operating on a very political environment. this is the irony. in order to make ourselves stay

nonpolitical, technical and impartial, we should have objective standards and that is why i mentioned the use of a standard of the full implementation of the safeguard agreement and regulations. if we stick to this principle we can be very impartial, mutual and credible. it does not mean 100%. we are living in the real world. in the real world there is no 100%. credible assurances the concept of hours. the countries have to implement

the safeguard is fully as possible. they should be as transparent as possible. and sticking to the universal standards we can avoid the politicization. it is true that nowadays a lot of issues are -- compared to the past. if i compare the environment in vienna or geneva or new york we are not in bad shape. the important thing for the iaea is we look for concrete results not only in the nonproliferation area but in nuclear security, use of nuclear power, application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and elsewhere.

we have difficulties. we are living and operating in a very -- environment but i think there are ways to make ourselves impartial, nonpolitical and deliver concrete results. >> let me just press you a little bit on this. if the iaea is to meet the tremendous challenges that are in front of you is going to have to be pretty aggressive, independent, strong but there are those who seem to be challenging the agency in a number of ways. you reached the conclusion i think on the basis of evidence that your staff had compiled that the syrians very likely have a nuclear reactor. now that finding was challenged and it is challenged to this day and there are those who really don't want you or your

secretariat to have a strong independent voice. and i see this is a real problem for the future of nuclear nonproliferation. are you concerned by the challenges you have been receiving? >> when i succeeded my predecessor there were three nations iran and north korea and syria. north korea is no longer a member so we keep following this issue but the main issue was iran and syria. on syria, we had a visit to the site, twice. we have had quite good knowledge from the facilities. the option for me was to

postpone the drawing of the conclusion or to conclude, provide a conclusion based on the findings that we have on our own. and i thought that if i can do it, it's better to do it. syria did not agree to give access to me and to the agency after it became the investigator general. we did not have as much information as we wanted. still we had sufficient information to draw a conclusion. that is why i drew the conclusion on syria and i do not regret it. refusing cooperation is not the best way even under such a situation. if we have enough information

and facts on our own we should be able to draw a conclusion. >> let me turn to iran. you mentioned a few moments ago how important the additional protocol is to providing confidence that a state is not engaged in undeclared activities inconsistent with its safeguards and obligations. the iranians have agreed with the p5+1 that if it's a comprehensive solution, they will adhere to the additional protocols assuming their parliament agrees to it. but it seems to me that for many of the measures that will be, that will have to be monitored by your agency, it will be necessary to go well beyond the additional protocol, something the iranians have expressed

reluctance to do. now obviously we don't have an agreement. you don't know the provisions but if you could speculate whether the agency is going to have to go well beyond the additional protocol, do you expect that you are going to be asked to do that and are you prepared to do that? >> we do not yet know the content of the comprehensive solution, if there is any, but we had from time to time from various sources in the negotiations concerning additional protocol. it is foreseeable that implementation would be given to us. we need to see the content of

the agreement once it is agreed, but very important first step is that they need to be endorsed, adopted by the board of governors. we are operating under the authority and control of the board of governors to take up the case of a plan of action. it it was agreed in the p5+1 in iran and the iaea was asked to monitor and implement the agreement. i convened a special board of governors and they agreed that the agency implements these measures. i appealed to the member states to continue this and they responded very positively.

we have received a mandate to implement the measures agreed in a joint plan of action and we have given the means to implement it so we are now implementing it. this would be a good reference where we consider the implementation of measures to be agreed under the comprehensive solution. >> mr. director general iq discuss the agency's efforts to gain clarification on these military dimensions in iran's nuclear program and i think it's clear from your remarks and what's been reported in the press that so far at least iran has not provided much cooperation with your investigation. so what happens if iran continues to stonewall in this regard? you don't get the clarifications you need, what do you do in that

circumstance? do you simply report to the board that you haven't gotten the cooperation that you seek, or do you draw some conclusions as you did in this area case on the basis of the information available to you? now you know iran continues to argue that its so-called evidence, it's always so called evidence is based on fabricated material, falsified documents and so forth, that i think on the basis of your analysis i think you called the information credible, indications of these associations with a military nuclear program. so what do you do? do you simply report that we didn't get cooperation or do you make an assessment based on information available to you? >> first, regarding the measures

with possible military dimensions, we have agreed in november 2013 with iran on all the outstanding issues, issues past and present should be resolved through cooperation. we understand that unresolved issues past and present include issues with possible military dimensions. a step-by-step approach and we have agreed to take up the issue with possible military dimension mainly explosive -- and we have received some information from iran and we are now analyzing it. at least one measure was addressed. we agreed to take up to additional measures.

agreement was made on the 20th of may. we started the accreditation of installations with iran but progress is limited. we are encouraging iran to come up with a proposal on new measures to be taken but so far we have not yet received a concrete proposal from them. a very important negotiation is ongoing. we have iran iaea so we need to do everything to clarify the issues past and present. the question is in the syrian case is relevant to the iranian case. as i said in my statement the

iranian case in the syrian case are very different. they are nonproliferation issues that each case is different. the majority of the issues are different. complexity of the issues are very different so as far as the possible military dimension issues of iran i think the best way is to continue with iran. we have already the basic understanding of the clarity that was included in my first report in 2010 and i repeat i provide the same assessment in my military report. we know where we stand now. in 2011 i provided a report in which i identified 12 areas to clarify. so the questions to be answered are cleared now. we have now the framework for

cooperation. the best way is to implement it. >> thank you. we will open it up and when you have a question please identify yourself and ask a concise question. david did you -. >> if you do get cooperation in the list that you provided in 2011 on these issues, is it important that the iaea make public the history of iran's work on possible military dimensions and what you determined or not there seems to be some reluctance on the part of the iranians to have a public accounting. we have had so heard some

medications that they might be more willing to be cooperative that they thought their answers to the questions would remain confidential within the system and some people say that is why they have been less cooperative with you even while they continue to negotiate with the p5+1. so i'm just wondering what your stance is about the need to make public the answers to each of the 11 or 12 issues that you raise? >> all the safeguards are confidential information and should be kept between the country and that iaea. when i find it is needed i share the information with the member states. with respect to the possible military dimension i included some relatively detailed information in 2011.

that is in the confidential report and if it is agreed among the members of the board to make it public, they can do so. that report of 2011 was made public and the quarterly reports of the iaea are made public by the decision of the board of governors. so in the future if i provide an assessment of the possible military dimension and if the board of governors agrees, it will be public. >> thanks. barbara slavin from the public council and manager.com. as a surprise you that iran is not providing disinformation

given that it's involved in detailed negotiations with the p5+1 on a long-term agreement and is it your feeling that a long-term agreement should somehow be contingent on progress on d&d or is that something that can be resolved over the course of a long-term agreement? >> i will go to tehran in august of this year and i had an occasion to talk to president rouhani. he repeatedly stated that iran is willing to accelerate the process of the accreditation of issues with a possible military dimension. for now but progress is limited but i sense there is an intention on the part of iran to accelerate the clarification of

the issues important to the negotiation between p5+1 and iran is now ongoing. now is not the best time but it doesn't mean there will not be progress in the future. i continue to hope that this issue with a possible military dimension will be gratified -- clarified as soon as possible. this is the intention of iran to accelerate the process. it is also the intention of the iaea to accelerate the process. this is not an endless process so with the corporation, we can clarify these issues within a

reasonable timeframe. >> let me just jump in on this issue. there are experts who say that it's going to be very difficult to get iran to provide a full concession of past activities especially activities that were directly related to the nuclear weapons program. and so it should be sufficient simply to have confidence that those activities are not continuing today and that we have monitoring measures in place that would enable us to determine whether they have resumed in the future. what do you think about that approach? >> it is a reasonable timeframe. a reasonable timeline, you can

do some simple -- we have identified certain areas. if we address the three steps, the three measures how long does it take? it is easy to perceive. it will not be one month but it will be a reasonable timeline. you can do your arithmetic at home. your question is about. >> whether it's necessary to get iran to confess all activities even providing incriminating information to those activities were directed to a nuclear

weapons program and sufficient to have confidence that those activities have stopped and that we have monitoring measures sufficient to know that they will resume. is that sufficient in your view or do we need to really get clarity in what they actually did do in the past? >> first the iaea is committed to doing its best to clarify the issue. we also expect iran to be as transparent as possible. i very much value the mating among experts. when they talk to their counterparts they can have a good understanding of the activities. we would like to have access to people, the site and to information. i have full confidence in the

experts of the agency. they have been doing a good job and they will continue to do a good job. but then our next step will be to report on the assessment after having a good understanding, to the board of governors. and how to move from that point is a decision by the member states. we are guided by the board of governors. >> thank you. how important for the future to make sure that it is a peaceful program, that your people from the agency or any other agreement with p5+1 would include searches, unannounced visits to military sites?

>> military sites. >> i believe you mentioned earlier that you would look at the company as a whole and i was wondering if it's necessary to conduct unannounced visits and search his? >> i would like to give you an example of additional protocol. in the case of additional protocol, if we have a good reason to believe that some activity is undertaken at the military site we can request access to that military site. the country can refuse that request but then that country has to give a good reason or why they can't. we also offer when we have

access to the military site in order not to compromise on their military interests. this is a concept of managed access to the military site is already existing in the existing safeguards. it is not the absolute reason to refuse access. in certain cases we want to have access and they need to give that to us. >> thank you very much. west asia council. mr. amano i would like to think in terms of the dialectic between nonproliferation on the

one-handed nuclear safety on the other because recently a number of iran's neighbors in the persian gulf region have been talking about the very scary prospect of an earthquake or some kind of a nuclear meltdown in busheir which is not an active nuclear proliferation per se but equally dangerous to the future of stability in that region. i'm wondering if in your work you are also focusing on that side of this debate? thank you. >> yes, we do. we are aware that many countries in particular the neighboring countries have an interest in the safety of iranian nuclear opportunities. we have sent our mission to review that regularly, the framework of iran and we have given some recommendations. that will help at the highest

level of safety and iran. this case of an earthquake was also raised by some member states. we are ready to send expert missions to review that seismic aspect and safety and security is the responsibility of each countries state and the role of the iaea is to provide assistance upon request. therefore if we ever request from iran to access and review and give advice for enhancing the safety we are prepared to do so. >> back there. >> what do you think the u.s. would do it tomorrow iran declared its atomic bomb? thank you.

>> it's too difficult a question for me to answer. >> back persian news network, voice of america. yesterday you had a meeting with the secretary of state john kerry. would you say he left the meeting happier and more confident because it's such a comprehensive agreement that everybody has in mind is not going to be released in november but generally do you think he left happier and more confident? >> i think they are happy to exchange views on matters of common interest.

>> i would like to ask you about the so-called studies. has the agency independently verified the advancements and my second question what was exactly the reason behind not making these documents fully available to the iranians? thank you. >> sharing the document was discussed in the negotiation between iran and iaea. the structured approach is the name of the negotiation that we are engaged and the board of

governors resolution in november 2011. we have discussed the modality of sharing information and negotiations

authenticity was not discussed after he came to the agency. we are asking questions to clarify these issues and we elaborate to our questions in writing and we have explained the background of the questions and so i think our counterpart understands the question well.

the issue is to clarify the activities in iran. this is not to verify the authenticity. >> i am from embassy of ukraine and i have a slightly different question. your excellency you were talking about the nonstate actors and acquired the nuclear material for nuclear weapons and i would like to know your opinion, how should it work when this is actually detected? will it be the government who will be held accountable for the charges? thanks.

>> ensuring the highest level of nuclear security is the responsibility of each government. controlling the trafficking, illicit trafficking is the responsibility of each government. however, the international organizations have an important role to play. for example the iaea has a database that collects the information on the illicit trafficking. we have thousands of pieces of information already and the information is very useful to analyze, understanding the facts and trends are very useful to establish a response. in order to react to a possible illicit trafficking of countries

we need to train customer -- custom officers and border agents to use the equipment. some of them are the size of the blackberry and they can be very effective. there are some facilities more complicated to have that precise information. these nuclear -- should be provided and they should be trained. we need guidance to establish. please send submissions to give recommendations to enhance nuclear safety. the short answer is that to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear material is the

responsibility of each state but there is a role to play for the international organizations including ours and the iaea is playing a central role in enhancing nuclear security. >> good morning. jay cramer. i'm a lawyer practice focused on international nuclear trade and export controls. mr. director general let me turn you from the nonproliferation pillar to the disarmament pill pillar. what has the agency learned in the last decade or so with respect to its investigations in iran that would help it to verify a general treaty on nuclear disarmament and perhaps expressed as a multiple of the

agency's current resources what level of resources would it take the agency to verify such a general treaty on nuclear disarmament? thank you. >> the iaea has expertise in the area of verification and if requested we are ready to make our expertise available to implement the agreed nuclear disarmament treaties. but the iaea is not a negotiating body for the nuclear disarmament agreement. nonetheless we do not replace the conference on disarmament in geneva. we do not replace the united nations either. the negotiations belong to other countries and once the agreements are reached and when

we are asked to provide assistance by using our expertise and verification we will consider such assistance. >> yes sir, right there. >> mr. director general greg giles. he referenced your august trip to tehran and i'm wondering if in your discussions with iranian officials, you mentioned president rouhani, did you get the sense that the civilian leadership in iran would perhaps like to be more forthcoming in clarifying the pmd issues but the military and the islamic revolutionary guard corps that stands in the way? >> i cannot generalize what i

heard from a rainy and later. they aren't willing to clarify the doubts if there are any and they would like to accelerate the process and are willing to cooperate with the iaea. so i think they are is some political will to clarify the issue. in reality the clarification is not making progress as we expect but we continue to work with iranian counterparts to clarify the issues.

>> what do you think is the biggest challenge in achieving a nuclear weapon free zone in the middle east? >> dialogue is very important. i joined the iaea in 2005 and there is a resolution of the general conference in 2001 requesting me to host a forum to learn from the experience of other nuclear-free zones. hosting the forum looks easy but in reality it's not that easy. before we could finally convene that forum, the iaea hosted the

forum and 2011 with the presence of israel and the arab state and despite the complexity of the issue and the difference in views they could have a very constructive discussion. so i believe that we need to continue that dialogue and iaea in support of the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the middle east, it is not an easy issue and we will keep on following this issue. >> would the come back to the question of the agency's investigation of a possible military dimension so iran's nuclear program. you mentioned access to individuals. you mentioned access to

locations. you know, we know individuals that we believed were engaged in some of these activities. the noaa locations where we believe believed that some of these activities took place. how would you assess the relative importance of gaining access to sites, gaining access to individuals? and how successful has the agency been? obviously the access to the facility, there were two occurrences in the password agency went there and didn't look exactly at the place that was of particular concern and it's been rebuffed constantly in recent years. but what about access to individuals? it would seem to me that one of the most effective ways of

keeping tabs on iranian nuclear activities is to have continuing access to individuals, not a one-time interview where the subject of the interview might be misleading, may not tell the truth and store both -- soar both but -- so forth but continuing to gain confidence by people who have the greatest expertise in some of the military related aspects of nuclear energy are working on civilian programs and are not applying their expertise to the military program. how do you evaluating the relative importance of these different points of access? >> the iaea is seeking access to gain information related to the issues of a possible military dimension. but these are very difficult issues. for example we have requested

access to the site from a very early stage but that access has not yet been granted. the access to people raise very sensitive issues in iran because of their experience in recent years. but we keep requesting access to the site and information to clarify the matter. >> thanks. mr. director general i wanted to ask you have had the opportunity to work with two different heads of iran's atomic energy state under the current rouhani

administration. could you touch on the difference in approaches between the two heads and your relationship with both men and? thanks. >> they are a very different type of people. it was very useful for me to have dialogue with both of them. both of them have a good understanding of the issue and i benefit from the dialogue. the difference does not bother me. i am ready to include everyone. >> hi. i have a question about, what are the measures that the iaea can take in order to prevent the

misappropriated use of dual material and what you think of the controls in this issue? >> i did not quite understand. >> my question is whether some of the measures at the iaea can take in order to prevent the misappropriated use of dual-use material and what do you envision is the role of -- in this issue? >> we are not in charge of the dual-use of technology but with technological material dual purpose or not for military purposes can be diverted. our function and our responsibility is to prevent the diversion of material for the

use other than a peaceful use. it doesn't make a difference whether the technology is dual material but the basic functions to prevent the material and equipment for military purpose. >> i know you have other appointments and you have a busy schedule in washington. i think you and i think our audience because i think they have come up with a range of questions that you note covered the waterfront. you have got a hard job and we wish you the best. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] ..