tell her so i said well the guy is a bigot and you don't say this hemap. they are going to kick you into the streets. [laughter] they are going to shoot you dead. you want to do a show for the mac, listen to this. [laughter] vietnam vet schardt lined large dog. [laughter] [applause] you don't forget that. >> it's just three words. i just want to thank you so mu much, so much. [applause] >> hold it one second. i want to thank you so much.

[applause] if you live long enough you were interviewed a lot. this was absolutely great a in v you are going to ireland. were you born in ireland? >> my husband's family is 100% irish and we are going to celebrate her ten-year anniversary there. >> i couldn't be more grateful. [applause] now you can stand. [applause]

up next on booktv "after words" with guest host james swanson author and heritage fellow. this week's james mcpherson and latest book "embattled rebel" jefferson davis as commander in chief. and it's the acclaimed historian present confederate president jefferson davis as an astute military strategist whose failures he argues are not the reason confederacy lost the civil war. this program is about an hour. >> host: gem lets start at the beginning. it's november 181860 and lincoln is president-elect. who is jefferson davis in the fall of 1860? >> guest: jefferson davis in the fall of 1860 as a senator from mississippi. he has served in that capacity off and on for about eight yea years, interrupted in the middle 18 50's by four years as secretary of war under president

franklin pierce. he was one of the most prominent southern senators. he was not a fire being secessionists but he did believe in the right of the south to secede. but because he had a strong affinity for the union, for which he had fog in the mexican war, he was a graduate of west point 1828. he was put on a committee of 13, a senate committee of 13 to try to find some way out of the crisis precipitated by the response of the deep south states starting with south carolina. to lincoln's election south carolina immediately called the convention to consider seceding from the union and everybody expected that they would pass it. so when congress met in december of 1860, davis was put on this committee and i think he hoped

at first that it might be possible to find some kind of solution to the burgeoning crisis of this union. >> host: davis was really not a hothead. he was a man of reason. he didn't put armies in the field. he would have preferred the secession would not happen. >> guest: i think that's right. at times during the 18 50's at the time of the crisis over the admission of california in the proposal for what became a compromise of 1850, but he sometimes talked like a fire-eater. he sometimes said that if the north does not grant us our rights and buy the rights they meant the right to take their slaves into the territories, the right to recapture escaped fugitive slaves in the north, maybe we should set up for ourselves but for the most part he was known as a reasonable

southern nationalist but also an american nationalist. >> host: and davis like the north. he had northern france. he gave talks on the north and at one point in his career he said with your great industry and our great agriculture we will conquer the rest of the continent. >> guest: absolutely an impact in 1859 he had taken a summer trip to new england where he had given a number of speeches, praised new englanders. actually when i got back to mississippi after that trip, he was criticized by a lot of other politicians and newspaper editors in mississippi for kowtowing to the north. you are quite right he did have quite a few friends. actually demand that everybody expected to be the republican candidate for president william h. seward was a friend of davises until of course the split came. other northern senators as well.

>> host: how did a man like this, mandy like the north who fought for united states who helped gather their position was in the congress, was in the senate, was not an avid secessionists. how this man end up as president of united states of america? >> guest: once the state of mississippi seceded and once it became clear to davis that no compromise that would be acceptable to the south was going to emerge from this committee of 13 are from the congress itself. he threw in his lot with the confederacy. he resigned from the united states senate, giving a final speech in which he said that he did so with regret. p.. >> host: people in the audience were reduced to tears. >> guest: that's right, they were reduced to tears and went back to mississippi and was immediately named as the general in chief of the mississippi state militia. at this stage of the secession process there was no confederate

states of america yet. there were six and about to be seven states that had seceded from the united states and it was clear that these states would be facing potential military conflict if the united states army moved in and try to quote unquote coursed them to stay in the union. so he was named as the chief of the mississippi militia and began organizing the mississippi militia. and looks forward with regret but realism to the possibility that there would in fact be military conflict and then he went home to his plantation along the mississippi river where he owned 113 slaves. he was a large slaveowner and while he and his wife were

making rose cuttings on the morning of february 10, i think it was february 10, 1861 a messenger came with a telegram. the telegram was from montgomery alabama where a convention of delegates from the six and soon to be seven states were meeting and the telegram and formed him that he had been named provisional president of the confederate states of america. i think there were two basic reasons why they named him as president. one, he was known as a moderate and not as a fire-eater. the confederacy was trying to present to the world and especially to the states that had not yet seceded and for that matter even to the union states an image of reasonableness, of moderation. and second his military experience, his graduation from west point.

he had served seven years in the regular army. he had commanded mississippi volunteer regiment quite courageously and effectively. he came home as a wounded warrior and served as chairman of the senate committee on military affairs and as secretary of war. there is probably no man in the south who is better qualified both in terms of his political experience but especially his military training and experience to lead this new nation which its founders anticipated might have to fight for its existence. >> host: is possibly also the most qualified man in the south knowing the challenge he had. he knew about the railroad, the ships, the guns, the canons and the fire rounds. he knew every disadvantage that the south had faced, didn't he? >> guest: he was very much a realist. he had traveled all over the country.

he could read the census returns. he knew that the south produce cotton and other staple crops and had a majority of the exports earning most of the foreign exchange in the economy. it was an overwhelmingly rural an agricultural society and therefore did, it would be confronting a much more modern diversified economy. so he was well aware of the challenges and once the war began when many other southerners expected a shorter and victorious war -- he warned them that this is likely to be a long and very difficult contest and that they should recognize that it was not going to be an easy task at all. >> host: he did have some advantages. what were some of the advantag advantages? let's start with the territory.

750 square miles the huge agricultural empire in the union wasn't there except for a few courts. there were no union troops in the south. >> that's exactly right and that's something that a lot of people don't really appreciate because it's so obvious that it escapes attention. that is unlike most rebellious or revolutionary movements the confederate states of america began life in complete political and military control of nearly all of the territory that they claim to control. they did not have to fight to gain control of the territory, of the resources, of the political institutions. they already had it so basically the confederacy could win the war merely by surviving. that's a huge event because it takes a lot more to invade and conquer than it does to defend and survive.

another advantage or at least another quality that the confederate states had was potentially strong military leadership. not only davis himself but a large number of fairly prominent army officers who had troops at west point made a commitment to join the confederacy. once virginia joined the confederacy their names were very well-known. robert e. lee, joseph e. johnston, stonewall jackson and a good many others. these were some of the most talented officers in the whole united states army and they were making a commitment now to bleed the new confederate states army. so davis, even though the north had more than twice the population and several times the industrial resources, commercial

resources if our nation is going to mobilize for war the south had advantages which made it possible for davis although he expected a difficult and long war also to be confident that the south actually could win in the sense of surviving. >> host: the firing at fort sumter, lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress the intercession and the secession of former state senator lincoln called for 75,000 troops. after that happened what was the planned? did david sit down with his top generals in cabinet and say all right what's our plan? how do we fight and how do we win the? what were his first strategic moves? >> guest: the first strategic move was to mobilize an army and to train on army, a point the officers and the administrators

that were going to organize and lead that army and to station troops as they begin, the volunteers began to come in. the confederacy had to rely entirely on the state militias for the state volunteer regiments. it didn't have a core of a regular united states army. it was the united states. so to organize the troops and to create an army was the first task. davis because of his experience as chairman of the senate committee on military affairs and secretary of war, was quite capable of doing a good job of that. his secretary of the navy steven mallory, turned out to be a very good secretary of the navy. the person that davis appointed as secretary of the army turned

out not to be very good and that would be rory walker. so davis in effect from the very first day was sort of his own secretary of war. that lead to problems later on. posted didn't he go through five secretaries best guess so he went to five secretaries of war and some felt that their office was nothing more than being a mere clerk but it was an advantage in initial stages of the war. davis did a good job. he also sent to rafay also assumes that turned out to be a great naval hero of the confederacy to the north to purchase arms. this was before the war began and he sent agents abroad. the initial steps in creating dharmic the confederacy did a very effective job. and the question was what do we do at this army? >> host: did he defend the entire confederacy? >> guest: that's what davis initially hoped to do and part

of the reason why he hopes to do that was political pressure from state government, state legislature. it became clear that once virginia seceded and once the confederate provisional congre congress, the same convention that had formed the confederacy constituted itself as the provisional congress, once they made the decision to move the capital to richmond after virginia and seceded and invited them to do so, it became clear that some of the heaviest fighting would take place in virginia where the two capitals of the two countries were only 100 miles apart. >> host: was that the first bad strategic decision for the confederacy? i realized they had to appease the state of virginia. was it bad strategy to put the confederate capital within 100 miles of washington d.c.?

>> guest: well, i don't think so. as you know, it took the united states army longer to capture richmond then virtually any part of the confederacy so it turned out to be quite successful in terms of defending the confederate capital. early in the war of the confederates lost nashville. they lost to new orleans. they lost memphis. they lost a number of other places but it took four years for them to lose richmond. so maybe it wasn't such a bad strategic decision. in any case, it was i think an important political decision and that was the main reason for taking that decision in the first place. davis was well aware that one of the cardinal rules of military strategy is the principle of concentration. you should concentrate your

forces and a substantial army that is capable of taking on enemy armies or two or three substantial armies. that would have seemed to dictate concentration of one army in virginia and perhaps another in the mississippi valley which was the northernmost southern state in the mississippi valley. but because of political, for political reasons david could not -- davis could not adhere to that teaching principle of concentration because the governor of georgia, the governor of arkansas and the governor of louisiana and so on were insisting that their borders had to be defended. >> host: i remember the governor of louisiana said we have 30 residents colluding in the army and they're all up north. the governors did want to send troops, uniforms, weapons.

isn't that one of the big dilemmas that davis faced at the outset to? the present of a nation are confederacy bounded on states rights. the rights of individual states but to win the war davis had to try to consolidate these states and make the governors of the state's total allies essentially violate the rights to win the war. >> guest: that was davis's biggest headache, this tension between states rights and all of the political pressures that go along with that. and the smartest military strategy. in the american revolution the united states had given up huge swaths of territory to the british but eventually had one and eventually that of course happened in the confederacy too. in 1861 it would have been politically impossible for davis to strip the gulf coast, the south atlantic coast of troops

in order to defend what they virginia and tennessee. he had to defer to some degree to these political pressures from the southern governors and of course the disadvantage of that is that you have got small groups of troops scattered around the perimeter of the confederacy. sometimes called a permit or defense or a first offense or accordance defense. sooner or later the enemies going to break through that and of course that's what began to happen in february 1862 with a loss support hendrie and fort donaldson and the loss of new orleans. the failure in kentucky in western virginia. the enemy begins to penetrate this line. the consequence of that, davis actually admits not publicly but privately that it may have been a mistake to try to defend the

entire frontier of the confederacy and he changes the strategy. in the course of doing so provokes an awful lot of controversy and dissent from governors like joe brown of georgia for example. >> host: and it's almost too late. in early 64 early 65 davis says i think publicly no single point is vital for the existence of the confederacy. if they had had that attitude in 1861, no state, no courts no city the survival of the confederacy might have had more freedom of action to be more successful. >> you might have but i think it was politically impossible. it's one thing to say in theory that's right but another thing to say it's a fact. i don't think he really had a choice in 1861. but in 1862 he does begin to concentrate the bulk of the first line of troops in the confederacy and three major

field armies and tennessee and mississippi and while those three states primarily. and he carries that one step farther not only the concentration but also the development of ytd on two or three different occasions called the strategy of the offense of defenses. a modern analogy to that would be a football analogy, the coach who says the best defense is a good offense. robert e. lee who became davis's principle military partner not only is best general but i think his closest confidant among the military commanders was the practitioner par exelon. the best way to defend the confederacy was to seize opportunities when they present themselves to take the offensive

against the enemy armies and to drop them back on their heels. >> host: let's turn to davis's inner circle. let's talk about the man who commanded these armies and what forms they were in his side. joe johnston, bragg, beauregard. talk about the jealousies, the rivalries, the disobedience. is that really the case that just like lincoln davis had a terrible time managing the general? >> guest: that's quite true. both davis and lincoln have some of the same kinds of problems. outsized egos among some of the principle generals. i suppose an outstanding example of that in the confederacy was peer beauregard who had a very high opinion of himself and a very low opinion of davis or at least increasingly low opinion of davis.

they came into conflict fairly early after the first confederate victory in the war. the battle of manassas orb bull run. beauregard was quite concerned about taking credit for that. he issued a report in which he took full credit for davis not turning him loose to do even more damage to the yankees. that began a process of deterioration of the relationship between those two generals. davis basically sent beauregard to the western theater in 1862 and after albert sidney johnston was killed at the battle of shiloh, beauregard became commander of the army, second in command. then he took an unauthorized leave of absence. the two of them never got along together after that or at all. joseph johnston who was the senior commander in virginia,

entered into a quarrel with davis about his relative rank among the general sink confederate army and then as commander of what he called the army of potomac. sometimes very confusing. there were two armies that potomac and the latter half of 1861 in the first half of 1862. the better known army -- but the confederate army at that time is called the army of the potomac and his -- as commander was joe johnston who believes he knew better than davis, who believed that if he kept davis fully informed about what he was doing davis would overrule unwisely the point of view, some of his command decisions who feared a leak of information if he kept davis informed of what he was going to do. and the relationship between those generals began to deteriorate and when it looked in may of 1862 like johnston

might even give up richmond in order to keep his army, they came not exactly to a parting of the ways that into pretty sharp conflict. if johnson had not been wounded at the battle on may 31 come 1862 who knows what might've happened. but he was wounded. he was out of action for six months. robert e. lee became commander of the army and northern virginia and there of course began a very positive partnership between lee and jefferson davis. >> host: which he never really had was johnston. time time after time he couldn't trust johnston to carry out an attack on schedule where were supposed to be carried out. didn't johnson even surrender at the end of the war without seeking his permission? >> guest: that's right. by that time the confederate government was virtually dead.

>> host: but they were able to reach each other. >> guest: they were able to reach each other and it was entirely in character for johnson to divide davises orders because he had done so many times during the war. >> host: let's talk about davis's personality. he has gotten a bad rap in history as being irascible, jealous, unfriendly, egotistical, unyielding, impossible. i noticed in your book in the end he really say the generals or more to blame than davis was in these relationships and these connections. >> guest: yes i think that's right too and especially true in the case of beauregard and johnston. some others as well but especially in those cases. davis did have a reputation of being austere, rigid, holding a grudge, then scanned about criticism and that's not entirely myth. like most stereotypes there is something under there.

there's a little bit of fire. but i think his character, his personality is being defined by his critics. not only among the generals but also among certain state governors. joe brown in georgia being the foremost example. certain senators lewis week full of texas being the outstanding example and certain editors robert barnwell and john moncure of the richmond examiner. these were people who either hated davis from the outset or came to hate him. they have shaped i think much of our stereotyped perceptions of davis's personality defects and i think that he was never able

to fight off some of these stereotypes except among the inner circle people who knew him well like robert e. lee himself or his chief cabinet official judith benjamin and others who had a positive and close relationship with davis and found him to be warm and personable among the people. he did not have much of a sense of humor. there is a suppose in some ways one of the great contrast between the two commanders. but he could be warm and personable with people that he liked. and you liked him. i think he has been defined more by his enemies. >> host: i agree with you he was very much unlike lincoln in that way. it's interesting these two men

100 miles of a part in their white houses. >> guest: there were also born 100 miles apart. >> host: exactly, so many similarities. even in physical heights. both had calm reasoning minds. they weren't hotheads. they had one ultimate thing in common which was this. neither one was going to compromise or surrender. i like to think of davis and lincoln and i don't mean this in a pejorative sense, think of them as the two greatest killers in american history. for this reason. they were willing to send hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths for their principles they believe are right. i don't think either one would have given up. davis would not have given up and lincoln would not have given up liberty in the union. you quote this line from lincoln in the book. the issue is distinct, it's

simple and inflexible. it's an issue that cannot be tried by warren decided by victory. and lincoln said of davis he cannot voluntarily except the union. we cannot voluntarily yield it. would they have ever come to peaceful solution? >> there was no possible compromise negotiated peace. >> host: what of the little treaties? >> guest: both lincoln and davis faced a very powerful peace movement within their societies. they had to appear to be willing to consider the possibility of peace negotiations but each one of them set conditions that he knew was unacceptable, were unacceptable to the other. so neither davis nor lincoln had any confidence or any hope that peace negotiations would result in actual piece. that is why lincoln made that

statement and davis would have agreed 100% with that statement. davis was quite literally i think the last confederate standing. everybody else in the south by may of 1865 had given up but not davis. he was still trying to get away, escaped, hoping to get across the mississippi may be to texas. >> host: kirby smith. >> guest: smith's army was virtually the last confederate army to surrender and completing the war from there. the war was not really over until davis was captured and imprisoned. >> host: people forget i'm mike john wilkes-booth davis was not playing for his life. he wasn't trying to escape the country. he wasn't trying to find refuge. he wanted to fight on. the danville proclamation. what he said was unconquered and

unconquerable hearts. and then another time he said i will lead the cause if there is one man who will follow me. at one point when the soldiers had split off and he was left with an entourage and his wife and several children there was a war -- and davis said what's wrong, why don't you want to fight on? >> could do more. they said the wars over mr. president ended with disdain he said why are you with me now? they said we are with you to fight on, not one man will sacrifice his to fight for the confederacy. it's over. >> guest: that's right. he never would admit that i think even to himself although we can't be quite sure what he thought privately that he would not admit it publicly. >> host: do you think it's because he wanted history to

record that he held something back, that he gave his all for the cause? there wasn't one more thing he could have possibly done? >> guest: i think that's right, absolutely. >> host: no cheap of american history was so involved in war planning is jefferson davis was. was that micromanagement counterproductive? would he have been better off being general in chief and not president? was he too involved in all the war decisions? >> guest: he might've been better off if he had been general in chief or maybe secretary of war. he was a workaholic. he was a detail man. in this that he really cared about which was the military he could not delegate authority and that's why he went through five secretaries of war.

the fact was his own secretary of war for many the major decisions and even some of the minor administrative aspects of managing a military establishment. davis would put in long days. he would sign off and approved even the promotion of lieutenants and things like th that. he would have been better off if we had -- if he had been willing to delegate some of this authority. if he had not worked so hard and managed to get enough rest and enough regular meals i think he would have been in better shape to make some important strategic decisions. i think that part of what what people saw is an irascible personality was the result of

stress and poor health. not only was davis more involved in hands-on military leadership and planning than any other chief executive in history but he also suffered more maladies, more sickness, more illness than any other chief executive in history. he was virtually blinded in one eye. he suffered from serious neuralgia and pain, serious headaches, recurrence of an old malarial fever, what was called dyspepsia which is a catchall term for stomach problems. he may well have had ulcers. >> host: he had the same thing that killed his first wife. >> guest: that's right which he in some ways never got over either. he would have to take to his

sick bed for days, sometimes even weeks at a time frequently during the course of the war but one thing about him when he did take to his sick bed he continued working. >> host: 12, 14 hour days. >> guest: long hours but i think his ill health and the stress on the overwork contributed to what other people saw as his irascibility and his temper and his bearing of grudges against some and he would have been better off if he had been more like ronald reagan and let other people handle it. he could not let other people had it. >> host: people he thought were working for their own personal etiquette. he viewed himself that he would not do anything for himself. i remember the union army was closing in on his plantation and he was asked should we send troops to save your plantation and get your slaves and save

your property? davis said the army of the confederacy does not do personal favors for the president. and he really viewed himself above do anything for self-serving reasons and he thought fewer person that would do this you would write you off. if you look back at the whole course of the war but were his two or three greatest moments, the confederacy as one of the greatest moments. is there a particular day or a couple of days when i almost pulled it off? >> guest: his first highpoint was the battle of first manassas july 1861. davis had very much wanted to be with the army when it faced its first major test. but he had to stay in richmond because the confederate congress was scheduled to meet there for the first time. july 20 but on the warm morning

of july 21 he commandeered a special train. brought his way up to manassas and arrived on the battlefield at the moment of victory. and joined the two commanding officers joe johnston and beauregard at their headquarters that evening and actually urge them to follow up this victory with the continuation of the attack. they more or less talked them out of it. >> host: didn't he say i am jefferson davis? >> guest: some of them did follow him back to the battlefield. i think both beauregard and davis but especially beauregard thought that davis was trying to take credit for the victory by this kind of behavior and that was i think a source of some tension at rainbow or guard and

davis the beginning perhaps. that was certainly a highpoint for davis. while he didn't think that was going to win the war the way some southerners did, we won the battle only when the war. it's all over. >> host: lets stop at that point and we will move on. you and the book that neither lincoln or davis do at the outset but this war was going to cost and what they would commit. let's say one side or the other new at the beginning what was going to cost in the end. if they could look into the future would one side of made an all-out absolute commitment in 1861 that we now know is unimaginable? if the confederacy knew what it was going to sacrifice what they have done everything they had to take washington in the summer of 1861 or would they launch in 1861 which they failed to do? >> guest: well he can't really know the answer to that question. davis did want to follow up first manassas or bull run.

i don't think you necessarily thought they could capture washington that they could inflict more damage on the army. the other question you ask though, if lincoln or davis or both of them had known in 1861 what was going to take to carry on this war for four years, would they have made that commitment? well we can't know the answer to that question either. what we do know is as the war went on both of them were determined to fight on rather than to concede. so if that's any indication they would have been willing even though it was a cost in 1861. but that's something that we can't know for certain. some other high points for the confederacy.

i think another highpoint probably came in in june or july of 1862, july and august of 1862 when davis appointed robert e. lee as commander of the army in virginia and immediately began planning an offensive. davis supported him. lee carried out that offensive and drove mcclellan away from richmond and then moved to northern virginia where the second battle of manassas invaded maryland. the confederacy was on a roll. the british and the french were talking about intervening in this war by offering their mediation to bring this war to an end on the basis of confederate independence and recognizing the confederacy even if lincoln refused. clearly a highpoint for the confederacy came in the summer

of 1862. the battle of antietam and the battle of perryville and katechi and they retreated of the armies after both of those battles came as a real setback in davis's eyes. but the confederacy bounced ba back. >> host: fredericksburg. >> guest: fredericksburg and jasper help and the invasion in which davis gave lee full support for that. he was not able to give fully as many troops as we hoped for but he did give me an entire support for that even though some members of davis's cabinet had wanted to weaken lee's army and send a couple of divisions to mississippi to deal with the things there. i think that's the third

highpoint for davis and the confederacy. maybe one more is the summer of 1864 when davis is actually out of the battlefield in virginia as both grant and benjamin butler are closing in on richmond but we and beauregard now are carrying their blows. as the summer of 1864 goes on even though sherman is making progress in georgia the cost of the war to the north and virginia is causing end up slowing of peace sentiments in the north and it looks like he's going to beat defeated for re-election at least on the peace platform. >> host: i do believe, think there was a time when he

thought, he thought he was going to win. >> guest: absolutely, no question about it. absolutely. here's an example of how the confederacy could have quote unquote won the war by holding out by not losing. so while i don't think davis necessarily saw this as a highpoint in the same way that the actual victories back in 1861 and 1862 and 1863 had been high points, nevertheless the outlook appeared promising. it looked like the north was going to throw in the towel but then of course came the fall of atlanta and that i think was probably the greatest blow to davis. he blamed joe johnston for that and i think he probably was right about johnston's failure to carry out a more effective

defense and then of course davis removes him from command. >> didn't someone say joe johnson would have fought the battle of atlanta and florida? >> guest: the catcher treating and he could not not have retreated any further. >> host: we will pause for a minute. today gettysburg is underrated. we have both gone there countless times. is gettysburg today what it was then? did lincoln or davis or leave think that was the highpoint of the low point? the people think ben oh we have lost the war on the were? order was gettysburg not nearly what vicksburg and fredericksburg was? >> guest: in the eyes of davis gettysburg was not such a disaster. asa the northern people, not so much lincoln but in the eyes of the northern people in the press gettysburg was a huge victory.

it got a lot more press than the capture of vicksburg in part because the media center of the country then as now was in the northeast and the army of the potomac, most of the soldiers in the army came from the east. so gettysburg had a huge impact on northern public opinion but not so much in the south in terms of the actual strategy of the war. i think vicksburg was more important. in terms of politics, the fall of atlanta was more important. but gettysburg came to have a special place more in retrospect than it did in defining itself in a course like it was very disappointed that mead did not follow up the defensive tactical victory of the union army had gettysburg with an offense of strategy that might have inflicted even more serious

damage on the army of northern virginia as i was trapped north of the potomac river by high water for 10 days. >> host: may be lincoln should have sent that on male pleasure to meet. >> guest: well-made would have to sign that maybe we would have had a more aggressive general after that. >> host: may be. >> host: maybe grant would have stepped right in and taking care of it. i notice in the book you confessed that he begin with a bit of a bias. you didn't think much about davis. he didn't admire him in any way. admittedly your union men and he announced that in the book. as you go book. she got to know davis better by working in this book did you develop, what's the word, a sympathy, and understanding, any affection? what do you think about them now? >> guest: i haven't changed my mind in one area which is that he was on the wrong side, the wrong side of history, the wrong

side in this conflict that led to the civil civil war. he is a proslavery man. i think if the confederacy had succeeded it would have been a disaster for the course of american development. so i have changed my mind on that. but if you grant davis his principles and his perception -- i came to have if not more sympathy for him may be more empathy would be the right word. i could put myself in his place instead of being a union man and an antislavery man i'm now a confederate and a proslavery man. i am jefferson davis. these are my convictions. i'm going to stand by my convictions and here is how i want to defend those convictions and defend the new country that i have played a principle part

in creating. i came to have more of an understanding of him if you grant those things. and in part that was because i conceived a kind of the dislike for some of his strongest critics, people like beauregard and even joseph johnston or joe brown of georgia. i think that they were more egregious characters than davis. so in a curious sense i came to have a certain degree of empathy for him. >> host: i wonder what you would say about that when i got to the end of the book because i have the same dilemma when i wrote my book on abraham lincoln and jefferson davis. i didn't know much about jefferson davis when i began the research. i knew what had been said about him and all the stereotypes at one point in the book i thought is there something wrong with me

and i turn to the side of the confederacy. i've built up that empathy that you did when he looked at him more closely, looking at him being a position in the issues he faced. it's an interesting feeling because i didn't come out of my book proslavery just as you did not but it was interesting to put ourselves in the shoes. >> guest: yes and when i started the book i was skeptical that i should even be writing this book because i didn't think i could put myself in his shoes but the more i got into it the more i was carried along by the story, by the drama of the story and my attempts to understand and even to appreciate what he was trying to do even if i thought i continued what he was trying to do was dead wrong. >> host: can you give me a list of two or three, maybe four

of the best generals and who are the go two men he could rely on? >> guest: is no question that robert e. lee was the foremost and in a curious way i came to have more sympathy for bragg than i had before. i had accepted the usual stereotype. and then davis stuck with bragg too long. i changed my mind on both of those. i don't think bragg was as bad as his critics who were self-serving in many cases. they were subordinates within the army of tennessee. and i think davis to try to replace bragg. he tried to get joe johnson to take him into the army in march of 1863 and johnson again defied davises wishes on that. i won't say that bragg was one of his best generals but i think

bragg like davis himself was more sinned against than sinning payday came to that conclusion but lee and jackson as long as jackson was alive. davis came to have a lot of confidence in john dale hood but of course would basically destroyed. >> host: is over aggressiveness. it cost him an arm and a leg. >> guest: it. >> guest: it cost them an arm. >> guest: costa mannar midlake and a leg, yeah. so i guess you could say that hood was one of davis' best generals but he was one that davis had growing confidence in and that's why he appointed hood is johnson's successor. after all who did keep sherman out of atlanta for six weeks and looks to davis whether he was right or wrong look to davis like johnson was going to end.

>> host: in and johnson was no better than lincoln or mcclellan. >> guest: that's right, absolutely. i guess the advantage there goes to lincoln because he got rid of mcclellan's sooner than davis or johnson. >> host: during davis's presidency was he ever nationally beloved? was he a great hero of the south or did that honor belongs to -- it's my impression that davis became a more beloved hero after the war and his long lifetime after that. he survived lincoln by 24 years so did the first love of the south during the war belong to lee and others are not jefferson davis? >> guest: that's true. on the other hand i don't think davis was as unpopular among the ordinary people in the confederacy as the image one might have from the newspapers

and from his political entities. he was subject to savage criticism but i think he retained a certain amount of popularity with the ordinary confederate citizens. on the three trips that he took to the deep south during the course of the war in december 1862 and again in the fall of 1863 in the fall of 18 1864, he spoke at a dozen or more venues during those trips all too large and enthusiastic crowds. clearly there were some residue of support and even affection for davis among the general population. at the same time that governors, senators, newspaper editors were savagely criticizing him. it doesn't mean he was as popular as stonewall jackson by any means but i think it was probably more popular than the popular image that we would have

of his place and southern affections would indicate. >> host: in the record there were some evidence of the behavior of the common people of the confederacy even during his final escape. he passed an old poor woman and she held up-and-up the child and said he is named for you. davis took the last gold coin and gave it to one. when he was going to washington george a. was lost over. the town through momentous feast in honor of davis. these were the common people of the confederacy. they weren't the governors are the elite. >> guest: at the same time though davis in some ways in retrospect became more popular than he was during the war. partly that was because of the martyrdom of his presidency. even he was -- for the first few

days which made him a martyr. even the time of his lowest popularity after he was captured the lowest popularity, the fact that he was retained and imprisoned actually made him an object of sympathy in the south. >> host: yeah. could he have won under any possible circumstances could the confederacy have won the war or is it miraculous enough that they have survived for four years? >> guest: well i think they could have won. always keeping in mind what the winning meant for the confederacy which was just holding out in surviving and wearing out the will of the northern people to continue making sacrifices to win this war. if atlanta hadn't fallen, if lincoln hadn't been reelected, the whole story might have been different. i think once atlanta falls,

victories in the shenandoah valley then it's all over but up until that time there were possibilities. as long as lincoln is president and as long as he retains the support of the northern people the confederacy can't win but it's possible they can win if -- link it is not president. >> host: as a leader, as a president, would robert e. lee right when he said no man could have done better? >> guest: i think he was. consider the alternative. robert tombs, howell cobb. those were the two main competitors back in 1861 when he was chosen. >> host: they would have been far worse? >> guest: i think they would have been far worse. ..