of this economic downturn in russia. .. >> and in that instance the eu is maintaining its sanctions and we consider sanctions in march. if, indeed, there's a change in the sanctions regime come march,

most likely it will be weaker although again the eu has threatened of russia recognizes the upcoming elections, they will increase sanctions. so it's going a lot of different directions right now. but if the sanctions are weakened in march, and there are lots of european countries who are advocating for lessening the sanctions, including italy, hungary, luxembourg, a whole bunch of countries are being hurt themselves by the sanctions. so indeed it is a change in the sanctions policy, then putin would've succeeded in kind of pursuing this divide and conquer strategy that will give him more leeway in terms of how he deals with the eu. there are lots of different variables in terms of how you approach the ukrainian question. >> what about venezuela? venezuela was a constant thorn in side of the united states partly because it would use its oil resources to prop up the cube and other countries.

how does this decline affect venezuela's projection of influence? >> it's a great question. what we see is that venezuela is starting to scale back it's a to diplomacy programs. last u.s. open basically completed eliminate debt arrangements they had with argentina, paraguay, uruguay. this year we see the patrick kariba a programmer by the government loans to members, countries and central american and caribbean has declined a lot as well. we see but a twitterverse a reduction in exports to member countries. actually even cuba looking at the export numbers for cuba, that they're down, down about almost 40% in the last two years but i think if anything the lower oil prices just accelerates the governments,

their need to scale back his programs. i think that is really significant ramifications for these never countries, especially cuba, but others such as the dominican republic, jamaica and nicaragua. it offers an interesting opportunity for the use to engage more in the region were venezuela has been pretty dominant in the past decade. >> talk about a situation for nigeria, for the ongoing insurgency interfaces with boko haram. >> the recent u.s.-africa forum we had a lot of talk about regional anchors on the continent and nigeria is one of them. it's important for a peacekeeping perspective, remember in the 1990s it almost unilaterally bankrupt peacekeeping. think about expanding operations, it's a lot easier and better for nigeria to deploy

better use of troops to deploy. a lot of financial and fiscal burdens that this drop in oil prices, if it were sustained, could affect nigeria, which initiates capacity to do so. it's also the issue that nigeria has a growing middle-class, and it's a really important market for consumer goods, or services, et cetera. nigerian banks are syndicated across africa. significant presence would undermine competitiveness and viability of a lot of these thee banks and where greek habit not just niger put in a number of other countries. what does this mean in terms of stability both in the northeast and in the south?

it's difficult to say right now, but what a lot of analysts seem to believe is that there's a connection between the scale of oil theft and the flow of small arms and light weapons into nigeria and also the funding of the groups that perpetrate violence. should we see a consolidation or violent competition for dwindling resources? they could put pressure on a nigerian army that is obviously ill-prepared to address a lot of these challenges. so worst case scenario we would see worsening of insecurity. best case scenario, we would see a whittling out of a number of -- enable the government and its international partners to focus on the few that become

prominent. so we could go either way. from a u.s. foreign policy perspective i think it behooves us to understand the dynamics now to start disaggregating the influences from the spoilers and understand how you disincentivize the spoilers and to provide the influences with the space they need to start making the much-needed adjustments that nigeria needs to make. >> david, you are touching on a situation saudi arabia and iran but to what extent is saudi arabia's behavior vis-à-vis the price, driven by desire to stabilize iran as part of its larger shiite sunni rivalry in the region? >> that's a good question, which reminds me of, you know, what was the reason for saudi behavior in the mid '80s, without to help sink the soviet

union by helping to drive prices down? actually i look into that and as far as i could see that much more to do with the rivalry among the opec members and market share, and its impact on russia was secondary. i mean, it was kind of collateral damage and not the main reason for doing it. but it did have quite an impact on the soviet union. yes, there in this incredibly rivalry with iran right now. it's kind of a showdown across the levant and the gulf and the levant. but i think it's really once again saudi arabia's concern for its position in opec, and it's showing it has ability to control, that it is a price maker or the price breaker.

and their determination to maintain a key role over the oil market in front of all these, this competition coming at them from even their own allies, even iraq and kuwait. we saw this in the opec struggle of the mid '80s. so i think that a lot more to do with who's going to sheikh saudi arabia determined to maintain it wants to be number one in china's market, as the main exporter of oil to china, about a billion barrels now. it's got a lot more to do maintaining its market share than it does politics, undermining iran. spitting kind of a secondary benefit. in a few minutes we will turn to some questions, so if you have

questions, put your hand up. i would like before i do that, get your questions ready, jan, unlike ascii which is heard how for example, this drop in the price of oil makes life harder for russia and venezuela. has interesting dynamics for iran and nigeria. a year from now with the united states look back at this and say this was an event that made the united states position stronger in the world or weaker, or unclear? >> well, i think part of that has to do with the leadership that the u.s. exerts. this is a continuing challenge in my opinion partly because of the dysfunctionality of our political process here at home and partly because our bandwidth in foreign policy terms is so focused on the immediate threats we face in the middle east and such. i think that there is opportunity here, a window which is not a very wide one, for doing some very significant things in energy diplomacy.

one of these things has to do with the pipe band. the saudis have expressed explicitly in the past the u.s. an interest in encouraging you can't dominate come you can't control and market like this but the saudis have a very important swing importance to try to move things in the direction of more particularly and stability in energy pricing. i think that's in everybody's interest. if you have swings they are going to hurt people on both sides. and especially given the fact that consumers are now producers, producers or consumers. it's a mixed bag and we have to really keep our eye on the ball in terms of what we can do internationally to take advantage of the. the other thing is here at home, celebrating and i will too, $3, $2 i thought actually in one of a gas station where i live. that's wonderful, but i would be much more reassured, and i know that is simply politically

beyond reach for reasons that i find unconscionable. we should be pushing hard for $3.25 or whatever it is price point, after which we established an energy security trust where anything below that price point which goes into badly needed infrastructure spending here at home. if you look at the transmission lines, for power here in the united states, they are in terrible shape and with all these shortages that we all know but in the summer. this is the time would have the advantage of an energy dividend to show leadership, whether it's here in the united states or overseas. you know, we have to get in the mindset now of being proactive instead of reactive on issues of energy security. >> thanks very much. let's take some questions now. we will start with you there. >> thank you.

my name is thomas o'keefe from the foreign service institute. my two questions are directed to risa grais-targow. you mentioned that if the economic situation in venezuela continues to deteriorate one of the things you foresee is a regime change. what exactly do you mean by that? are we talking about and impeachment, a military coup? and the other question i had also was with the pullback in the caribbean and central america you also mentioned that you foresee increased u.s. engagement with a part of the world. what type of engagement specifically? thank you. >> the regime question is a good one. i think that the military, the idea of a military coup, some

sort, is difficult to foresee in the sense that the military is already in power. it already is a military government and i think since he came in office has been increasing the role of the military and his government to help ensure his survival t wheni think about transition scenarios, that's why i see being something that has to come from within the voter base, and a scenario where there are massive protests were the basis out in the streets at which point i don't think the military would necessarily be willing to defend the government. that also means no doubt i think there are different factions within the military. we have a very divided opposition. what to think about the transition scenario i also think there's a possibility that just something that is very messy were certain parts of the military are siding with different leaders within should be snow, others at its heart is

a clear path out of the. but i think any transition scenario would probably be one that is quite messy when we think of something, any scenario happening before his term is up. in terms of petrocaribe, one area and a jan was alluding to the fact is that very limited bandwidth, one area where the u.s. can work with member countries is that these countries have been very slow to update their grids or move away from fuel oil dependence because they have this cheap oil from venezuela. in an environment where this country are increasingly thinking about alternatives, cheaper alternatives like coal and gas because they are not receiving the cheap oil i think the u.s. and u.s. companies, especially those in the power sector can play a role in helping these countries move their energy policies in a different direction. so that's one area i see a lot of room for cooperation.

>> yes, right there. >> my name is thomas brinkley. recently, an interesting documentary has come out called pump which touts lexie fueled, fuels at the gas pumps and claims that the oil companies are resisting lexie fuels which would have an important impact on biomass-based fuels such as methanol and ethanol. have you seen this documentary? in any case what is your opinion about flexi fuels? >> jan, i would ask you to take that one.

>> i'm not a technical expert with chevron are and what else but i will take that from what i've heard, and i've not seen the documentary but would've heard about the opposite should to this, it's not th the old companies as much as the other industries which is like the idea of having its warranties put to the test by fuels that the machines may not process as well as they should. i think the question should be less digitally as th these you submit as to the idea of diversifying the fuel mix, there's already as you know indeed 10 requirement, people talking e-15. i personally think the idea of using food for gas is actually absurd. we shouldn't be going to e-15. we should be looking at food security just as much as energy security. as to other fuel sources, yes, anything we can do to diversify

the mix that meets the requirements of the machines and make sure we don't get into trouble when we need our cars to the offices is something i would favor. >> i'm not an expert on flexi fuels but putin is an outspoken opponent of fracking. [laughter] he is develop a strong environmental conscious at this stage. >> i'm jeff, independent investor. i'd like to ask you, doctor pomerantz, what is your opinion after the fact that lower oil prices might have on the developing relationship between russia and china in their energy relationship? >> well, obviously russia like other countries uses time as it new port and marketed for but

it's signed agreements with the chinese to increase the delivery of oil and gas to china. so it sees that as a market and part of the russia's broader strategy of its own kind of civic towards asia. i think the risk that russia faces in the short term is not mr. finding new partners but how does russia get through this short-term financial crisis. i think in many ways since western financing is closed to russia, i think there's an increased possibility that russia will have to turn to china if, indeed, this crisis continues over a longer period of time. and then russia will have to consider what are its own -- where are its foreign policy consequences for having, for being so indebted to the chine chinese. >> the chinese of course do not feel required to accept higher

russian oil prices are gas prices compared to lower ones that may be available elsewhere. so the russians have not only a bilateral relationship worry, they have a competition to we but globally as far as supplies to china are concerned. >> the most recent deal between the russians and the chinese, the russians never include the gas is going to china which was assigned was quite as good a deal as the russians made out to be. [inaudible] >> i believe it since it's been those types of contracts. >> yes, but i think he is right on point, that not talking about gas price suggests the chinese had the idea that the gas price will be lower and the russians have the idea will be higher. we have seen this for a long time. they call this the deal of the century. i think this might take a century for the deal to materialize. [laughter] >> a deal of the century that doesn't actually include the

price. why don't we have -- okay. >> i'm formally with the world bank to i think the question is for jan. you alluded in your marks to the impact of low oil on the new u.s. unconventional energy, fracking at such. walk us through a few scenarios how long does it take with prices at this level for the industry to really be hurt. how well capitalize on the to ride out a bit of low prices, these kind of issues. >> good question. part of the answer is that the industry started developing really through the well covers. it's -- well captors. the independence movements in the majors came in after that in order to develop it further. as you can see from that and,

indeed, still in terms of expanding the horizons of shale gas you see any been spent a very important role. the capitalization of the naked is much higher than the capitalization of the independence as well as the well -- the well captors. they do depend on returns that are predicated at $80 loss you can see that the ones i really the pushers for getting us into more, even larger shale gas position would be much more exposed much earlier. as far as the majors are concerned they might be able to ride it out more. i don't see the majors up and in in the field for very good reason. to the extent that are licensed requirements, and often there are license requirements in fields of this type, they need to make sure that they are still actively certain extent in order to meet the requirements.

as i said before much of this is privately based. so it gets back to the asic economics of shale gas business, and if the $80 price point is quite important in that. >> i think the scenario could be also in the african countries, the new oil countries, countries along the southwest of africa, the great lakes region. we have a lot of independent perspectives going in. most of these countries, some of them have already started to dissipate fiscal gain, et cetera, but false predicate in something around 80, 85 but anything lower than what we've seen in a number of african countries is as the small independence would walk. and then the governments would be left high and dry. i know i talked just about nigeria, but from the african continent you have the old oil,

establish world countries that do have a lot of the majors, but then you have a lot of other countries are entering a market now but it is vital independent, and that is problematic. >> we have a question back there in the far left corner. >> i think raymond referenced -- i hope i got the name correctly, you made reference to the oil drying up of nigerian crude oil exports to the united states. which is a fact, they just used to be the number one destination of exports of nigerian hydrocarbons. now, do you see a possible shift or downgrade of political relations are doing --

[inaudible] between this major economic shift? both president bush and junior and clinton before him did pay to nigeria. did upgrade relations between washington and nigeria in various ways and capacities. we haven't seen president barack obama even mention about nigeria or even boko haram. thank you. >> thank you. pretty complex question. let me see if i can take it in bits. the reduction in the nigerian export to the united states is not a function of foreign policy.

so it's not a function of the foreign policy, foreign policy decision but it's mainly a market-based decision, that the bad thing was the downside for nigeria is that the quality and type of oil that is exported, very, very close to the shale oil. and so there was a substitution effect that took place, and that's why nigeria ended up being disadvantaged. nigeria has taken steps to diversify and finding it difficult of course because it's not so easy to enter a lot of lucrative markets but it has diversified northward and eastward, and also in its neighborhood. the u.s. nigeria relations, will they be hurt by this? i don't think so. i think that the are a lot of other things that u.s. and nigeria could collaborate up on.

there is the power africa initiative that is very important, and education in nigeria, important downstream issue. you also have the new approach to peacekeeping, and nigeria is a life or peacekeeping so there are number of other things u.s. and nigeria could and our continued to collaborate on. i don't think that this reduction in the share of nigerian exports to the u.s. is a foreign policy driver. >> yes, right in front of you there. >> first, nigeria and south africa our two countries now opposing 2017 date and i'm glad both economies are facing problems. and in this case we know that our lobbying with him will

increase them to support united states, otherwise they both will be shredded. >> thank you. [laughter] >> how about right here. >> another venezuela question. two parts. first part, how many quarters worth of debt service would venezuela have if oil prices stay in the '80s? and the second part is if debt service gets to the crisis proportion, are they going to cut more from petrocaribe or cut subsidies or other social spending? >> it's a good question. with oil prices at 80 and assuming the maintenance the current amount of imports or cut them a little bit and then get some sort of fiscal adjustment, i think you'll have to devalue in the next few months. they can service their debt in 2015 and potentially 2016 but it will get increasingly uncertain. in terms of their resources, i

see them both right now scaling back on petrocaribe but also very much focused on increasing exports in general but we seem scaling back petrocaribe which they will be more aggressive about next you can maintain a minimum amount for cuba. she was interested in is about 40,000 per day and have been getting 100,000 barrels a day using the rest is basically a fiscal subsea i see them cutting back further but we also see them actually renegotiating terms with china. they've been exporting around 330,000 barrels per day to china as loan repayments if the import figures from china show that those numbers are down to around 200,000 barrels per day in crude and product. that's some additional cast they had to work with. i see the government right now as, they're in a very short term focus survival mode with your looking for cash anyway they can

get it. the cash generating export looking for additional loans, whether some sort of swap or the main goals i think the domestic subsea is really hard to touch a special with the government facing elections next you can national assembly elections. they been talking about for a long time. venezuelan oil is about 9 cents per gallon domestically. if they cut that they could generate about $13 billion a year. it's huge but i just think this is a government that is really terrified to do anything that could have political ramifications, and that one is potentially destabilizing but i think that's off the table for now. officials more unless told me that. i think maybe you will see some sort of domestic fuel subsea cut back in 2016-2017 but i would also expected pretty gradual. i don't see them eliminating it outright. >> i would like to ask you a related question which is saudi arabia supports a very generous

welfare state because of the oil but to what extent, is that threatened by the decline in price? to what extent is saudis own recent lowering of the price controversial within saudi itself? >> it is somewhat controversial inside saudi arabia. one of saudi arabia's leading billionaires wrote an open letter to the oil minister a couple weeks ago saying this could be a catastrophe if the prices keep going down, and urging the government to effect keep prices up by cutting production. now, we've never seen anything like that before in saudi arabia, someone coming out like, a member of the royal family.

so it's highly unusual. i do not think it would be a catastrophe for the economy or the spending level of the government to have oil at $80 or $75. nonetheless, it's declared as a debate within the royal family about whether they should cut production in order to keep prices up. and i don't know how this is going to turn out. i think it has a lot more to do with whether the other opec members are willing to go along with production cuts on november 27. if they are not i think the saudis will maintain their production level, which is going to force down prices considerably below 80.

>> what was his concern? why is it a disaster from this point if you? >> i couldn't figure out why he thought he was going to be a disaster. i think it has something to do with the dissidents within the royal family and the often come out and attack privately, or publicly the rest of the ruling royal family, which right now is king abdullah. so to me it was more something going on among the ruling family members that was over the reality of this being a possible catastrophe for the country. >> interesting. at me see. right here, please. >> i have a question or doctor pomerance on the other nuclear talks and the impact of the lower oil prices on the russian

position. i would imagine that getting to a deal or to a breakthrough if ever that would work out what in the medium term also seen easing of the sanctions and increased of the iranian oil exports which could've impact on global oil prices. my question is, do the russians have a negative incentive given the possible impact on the oil price in getting to a deal on the iran nuclear talks because i think russia does have divided incidents in terms of how they approach the nuclear talks. and yes, i think rush is very much aware of the consequences of somehow enabling iran to have the sanctions reduced or lifted from iran. and what that means not only for russian sales of oil but also central asian sales of oil. and all the various pipelines

that have been created over the last 10-20 is which is major avoid iran and find ways to get the products delivered to europe and international market. if, indeed, the sanctions were to be lifted on iran, and suddenly all of could flow north to south again through a vent and not have to go through the first pipelines that have been constructed, then yes russia loses another advantage that is again over the last teen years in terms of the distribution of oil to europe. so yes russia does have various conflicts as it approaches these negotiations, and yet russia from a certain standpoint is one to let another put onto the international market would be competing with russia on a variety of levels. >> we have time for one more question.

>> i've come across some articles of some data about the republic of congo, and that they've got a lot of oil over there. i was wondering what effect do they have right now on the global demand? and you see an increase in the near future? >> sounds like one for you, raymond. >> x. republic of congo and a number of other african countries are at the exploration stage right now. looking at new deposits and trying to bring them to market. the impact that this decline in global oil prices is likely to have is that investors would be very apprehensive about entering these markets to margins will be tight so you probably wouldn't get, you wouldn't get the major

technical event out firms coming into the country's, and those for steps as we know could be problematic with the impact going for many, many years after the contract is signed. and so i think that's the bad news. the good news is that it should probably force these countries to be a lot more judicious in the engagemenengagemen t and then the contract that they signed. and understand the implications and also who bears the risk for these investments? many of these countries and the state bears proportion of the risk and important to quantify who is up front. >> were drawn towards the end of the event as i'd like to finish off with a question that occurred in as a solicitor of the thing you're talking about. of course, the defining characteristic of a petrol state

is that what is the only game in town for many of them. many of these countries have very few other significant industrial sectors to fall back upon. what are the prospects of what we've seen the price of oil sets in motion the persecution in some of these economies so they become less petrol state driven and less -- let's sort of go down and start with you, raymond. >> in nigeria there has been a creeping classification pick it remember the pacing of the economy recently, what emerges is that telecoms, financial services were real movers a lot more than we anticipated. at the problem from a fiscal perspective is that the tax effort has always been directed at the oil sector. nigeria doesn't know how to garner fiscal revenue from a non-oil sector. but we have the capacity.

they need to do that, and also have a lot more investment in infrastructure that supports the non-oil sector to make it happen. so this might be a wakeup call. it all depends on how long this downturn lasts. >> i think venezuela if anything has been going in the other direction and concentrate more and more on oil. i don't see this really changing that strategy but i think of anything the government has been choking awful lot of other sectors of the economy. what i do think we could see is that government moving a bit more progressively on oil policy but venezuela does have the largest will reserve in the world and there's a lot of potential. there's been some very key policy bottlenecks that have slowed investment, particularly from the foreign partners. i think that is going to be more on increasing production even at lower prices than trying to move away from the oil sector.

>> the russians have been talking about diversification from the collapse of the soviet union, and have never managed to do it. what's very interesting about this particular crisis is that the cyclical nature of this crisis should play to russia's advantage, the collapsing ruble should make the exports more competitive, should promote domestic manufacturing and attract foreign investment to those of the standard arguments. and yet when you look at the russian economy today, one doesn't anticipate that any of those will occur during this crisis. it doesn't export that much. it doesn't have an entrepreneurial class. indeed, a lot of the art of minerals have found themselves in jail as opposed to being able to engage in our to prevent activity, and the sanctions make foreign investments very difficult. they don't have it is diversified economy and they're not in position to take events of some of the things that are available.

>> saudi arabia believe it or not be working quite hard on diversified that the main reason is their internal consumption of oil is very going to do is going up very quickly what is limiting what they can export. solar plans, developing it, gas rather than oil. they're running their desalinization plants. so they are very conscious of this, believe it or not. and they have the money to do it. >> can come any final thoughts? >> i think this is again an example of what do we do with the window that i was talking about which is not going to be there for a very long time. to my mind one of the most important initiatives that can be undertaken at this point is one that deals with energy poverty. over 1.4 billion people do not have access to electricity in the world.

if we have a dividend, it seems to me that their domestic economic initiatives that could be taken to take advantage of the dividend. international initiatives. we can have borderless transmission lines is we can get into development of -- for people who are in poor countries. these are important steps to take. one has to have some imagination, not just say what do we do about -- they will be there and other people will be more poor and more corporate that will be the general perspective. there are positive things and have to be done soon in order to take up this window of opportunity. >> that sums it up what we are seeing in the price of oil means a lot for some cultures that it means a lot for the whole world, a big impact on development consumption standards of living. i learned a lot. thank you very much. like to thank the panelists and

thank all of you for your questions and your interest. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> today a panel of political reporters examined the 36 governors races. and you make of state legislatures around the country and imitations of some of the ballot initiatives that were passed the we will be live with his it hosted by governing magazine starting at 9:30 a.m. eastern here on c-span2.

>> the 2015 c-span studentcam preview competition is underway opened on the high school students to create a 5-7 minute documentary on to the theme the three branches and you, showing how a policy, law or action by the executive, but such a judicial branch has affected you or your community. 200 cash prizes for students and teachers to $100,000. for the list of rules go to studentcam.org.

>> next, the brookings institution host international atomic energy agency director general amano to discuss the agency's role in monitoring iran's nuclear program and its compliance with the p5+1 interim agreement. this is one hour 10 minutes. >> good morning. my name is bob einhorn. i like to welcome you to brookings, and to today's event which is part of the alan and jane batkin international leaders forum series. our speaker today is yukiya amano, director-general of the

international atomic energy agency, the iaea. years ago when i spoke to groups all right briefed reporters, i would simply use the initials iaea. then i would catch myself and remember to sound out the full name of the agency. today, you don't have to do that anymore. the iaea has practically become a household word. it's an indispensable effort. it's an indispensable player in international efforts to prevent a nuclear, prevent nuclear proliferation. it's safeguard system is highly sophisticated monitoring system is an essential element for providing assurance that nuclear programs are truly peaceful, and

for detecting possible violations of nonproliferation obligations. the agency has been at the center of compliance controversies with north korea, iraq, libya and syria. and now it's heavily involved in iran, in the iranian nuclear issue. the agency has monitored iran's implementation of the nuclear elements of the november 2013 interim accord between the p5+1 countries and iran, so-called joint plan of action. and since december 2011, it is thought iranian cooperation in

resolving series concerned that these in the past iran carried out research, experience, and procurement activities related to the development of nuclear weapons. but so far iran has largely stonewalled the iaea's investigation. at the end agreement is reached between the p5+1 countries and iran on a comprehensive solution to the nuclear issue, the responsibility will fall to the iaea to monitor iran's compliance. yukiya amano was elected director-general of the iaea in 2009, and he is now serving his second term of office. before becoming director-gener director-general, he had a distinguished career in the japanese diplomatic service.

his last post as a japanese diplomat was as japan's ambassador to the iaea from 2005-2009. and as japan's representative to the iaea, he served as chairman of the agency's board of governors in the 2005-2006 period, and in that capacity he accepted the nobel prize on behalf of the agency for its work in iraq. during his tenure, director-general amano has done much to enhance the iaea's reputation for professionalism, integrity, and objectivity. his predecessor, in my view, sometimes strayed into highly political matters, providing his personal advice on policies that

iaea member states ought to pursue. yukiya amano has kept the agency focused on its original technical mandate. the area -- its area of special competence, and it's been extraordinarily capable, capable instrument of nonproliferation policy. and this emphasis on the agency's technical mandate has restored, and i think increased the agency's credibility, and credibility is the iaea's number one asset. director-general amano has made some tough calls on issues such as the syrian nuclear reactor, and the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear

program there he called them the way he saw them, as wanted i the information collected and analyzed by his very capable professional staff. now, it's predictable that governments that were identified by the agency as having violated, or likely violated their obligations, would attack the agency and its director general, accusing them of bias and of being the tool of countries like the united states. but yukiya amano has made clear that he won't be deterred or intimidated by such tactics. he will continue to follow the evidence wherever it leads. he has been a staunch supporter of the agency's strength and

safeguard system and a staunch defender of that system against efforts to weaken it by countries with not so hidden agendas. but he and his agency are not only focused on safeguards and nuclear nonproliferation. they boosted the agencies technical cooperation program to ensure that member states, especially those just embarking on civil nuclear programs can fully benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. in the wake of the fukushima daiichi tragedy, the iaea has been at the forefront of efforts to ensure the highest standards of nuclear safety throughout the world. and with the worldwide terrorist threat continuing to grow and the worldwide increase in stocks of nuclear and radiological material, the agency under his

leadership has significantly expanded its role in the area of nuclear security. so the iaea's agenda is full. this role is critical, and the challenges it faces are daunting. fortunately, we have yukiya amano at the helm. so, mr. director-general, we look forward to hearing your mark. [applause] >> good morning, ladies and gentlemen. i am very pleased to be here today at brookings. this institution has a well-deserved reputation for the excellence of its research and the high caliber of its experts.

for more than a century, you have made a major contribution to public policy, both within the united states and internationally. it is a special pleasure to see bob einhorn, a distinguished veteran of arms control and non-proliferation, with whom i have worked for many years. i have been asked to talk about the challenges of nuclear verification and, in particular, about the role of the iaea with regard to iran's nuclear program. before talking about what the agency is and does, let me tell you what we are not. we are not a political actor. we are not an international nuclear police force. we do not take sides. the iaea is an independent

technical organization within the u.n. family. one of our core activities is to verify that countries are not diverting nuclear material from peaceful activities to make nuclear weapons. we collect and analyze all relevant information and provide factual, objective reports to our board of governors to facilitate its decision-making. the iaea statute states that the director general is under the authority of, and subject to the control of, the board of governors. under the statute, the iaea's role in nuclear verification is to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, are not used in such a way as to further

any military purpose. in addition, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons requires all non-nuclear-weapon states to commit themselves to use nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes. these countries non-nuclear-weapon states under the npt, are required to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the iaea and submit a declaration of all nuclear material and facilities to us. our inspectors visit facilities to verify that the declarations made by countries are correct and inspectors continuously follow up. the iaea safeguards system appeared to work well until the 1990s. however, the discovery of a

secret nuclear weapons program in iraq after the gulf war of 1990/91, and developments with north korea's nuclear program, showed that concentrating only on facilities declared to us by countries was not enough. we needed tools that would enable us to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a country. in response, our member states approved the model additional protocol in 1997. when a country implements an additional protocol, the agency acquires more tools to implement safeguards, including additional access to information, to people and to sites in that country. the additional protocol is essential for the iaea to be able to conclude that all of a country's nuclear material

remains in exclusively peaceful activities. the number of states with additional protocols in force has grown steadily and now stands at 124. this is good news. ladies and gentlemen, the world in which we implement safeguards today is very different from that of our founding fathers in 1957, as are the challenges we face. new technology and modern communications have made it easier to access knowledge, materials and expertise that would have been much more restricted back then. that makes nuclear proliferation easier. the number of nuclear facilities coming under iaea safeguards

continues to grow rapidily, by 12% in the past five years alone. so does the amount of nuclear material to be safeguarded. it has risen by around 14% that period. iaea resources are limited, demand from member states for our services continues to grow and our budget is being squeezed. that means we must constantly find ways of working more effectively and more efficiently in all areas of our activities, including safeguards. we have developed important new instruments, such as the additional protocol, as i mentioned. we also make increasing use of modern technology such as remote monitoring and satellite imagery. ..

>> if you are interested, i can coe back to this issue later. the important thing to remember is that the state level approach, if implemented instructly within the scope of -- strictly within the scope of existing safeguard agreements. youi would also like to add that the assumption in the 1950s would only be developed and

processed by governments. today there are concerns about the possibility of nonstate actors developing nuclear, employeesive devices. therefore, i have become increasingly active in important related areas such as nuclear security which involves helping to insure that terrorists and other criminals do not obtain nuclear or other radioactive material. the iaea is now playing the center role in enhancing global nuclear security. that main safeguard issues on our agenda in recent years have concerned iran, north korea and syria. these are very different cases. what they have in common is the fact that these countries have failed to fully implement their safe guard agreements with iaea

and other relevant obligations. this makes it very difficult for us to do our job effectively. as far as the iaea is concerned, the iran story began in august 2002 when media reported that iran was building a large underground nuclear-related facility in natanz which was, had not been declared to the agency previously. iran subsequently acknowledged its existence and put it under iaea safeguards. let me say at this point that it is vitally important that the iaea and its director general should be impartial. that means applying the same principles to all countries. for me the fundamental principle is that all of the safeguard agreements which we conclude with our member states should be

implemented fully. so should other relevant obligations such as resolutions of the united nations security council. when i became director or general in late -- director general in late 2009, i applied this principle to iran. i felt that spelling out the issues with clarity was an essential first step towards resolving the problem. my quarterly report from february 2010 stated that nuclear material declared by iran was not being diverted from peaceful purposes, but i also stated that iran was not providing sufficient cooperation toen able the agency to conclude -- to enable the agency to conclude that all nuclear material in iran was in peaceful activities. i urged iran to immoment -- to implement the additional protocol and clarify the issues

to what had become known to possible nuclear dimensions to its nuclear program. the next important question was how to approach these possible military dimensions. our technical experts had spent years painstakingly and objectively analyzing a huge quantity of information about that program from a wide variety of independent sources including from the agency's own efforts and from information provided by iran itself as well as from a number of member states. after cowerfully reviewing -- carefully reviewing the issue, i decided to present the director's report in november 2011. in that report i stated that the information assembled by the agency was, overall, credible. it was consistent in terms of technical content, individuals and organizations involved and

time frames. the information indicated that iran had carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. the information also indicated that prior to the end of 2003 these activities took place under structured program -- [inaudible] might still be ongoing. i would like to be very clear on this issue, because there have been some misunderstandings. the iaea has not said that iran has nuclear weapons. we have not drawn conclusions from the information at our disposal about the possible military dimension to the iranian nuclear program. what we have said is that iran has to clarify these issues because there is broadly credible information indicating that it engaged in activities of this nature. in other words, iran has a case

to answer. in response to my report, both the iaea board of governors and the united nations security council adopted resolutions asking iran to cooperate to clarify the issues. do they think the military operation dimension in order to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program. on the basis of these reservations, the agency had talks with iran over the next two years. however, no progress was made. at times we were going around in circles. last year we started to see some movement. -- cooperation with iran under which it agreed to resolve outstanding issues past and present. we agreed to take a step-by-step approach. initially, iran implemented the

finish. [inaudible] which it agreed with agency under the framework cooperation very well. however, since the summer of 2014 progress on implementing agreed measures has been limited. two important measures which should have been implemented two months ago have still not been implemented. the agency invited iran to propose new practical measures for the next step of our cooperation, but it has not done so. clarifying issues -- [inaudible] the possible military dimension is not an endless process. it could be done within a reasonable timeline, but how far and how fast we can go depends very much on iran's cooperation. i have made clear that agency will provide an assessment to our board of governors after it obtains a good understanding of the whole picture concerning

issues with possible military dimensions. it is then up to the board to decide the future course of action. as you may know, there are two tracks of negotiation on the iran nuclear issue. one is the iaea/iran track. the other is called the so-called p5+1 and iran track in which the iaea is also involved. these six countries -- china, france, germany, russia, britain and united states -- agreed on the joint plan of action with iran in november 2013. the aim was to achieve a mutually-agreed, long-term, comprehensive solution that will insure iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. all seven countries asked the iaea to undertake monitoring and verification of voluntary

measures by iran which we are doing. the p5+1 negotiations with iran are continuing. i should mention that iran is still not implementing the additional protocol. this is contrary to the resolution of the board of governors and under security council. implementation of additional protocol by iran is essential for the assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the country. the current status of affairs, in fact, iran's nuclear material under iaea safeguards is in peaceful purposes, but we cannot provide assurance that all material in iran is in peaceful purposes. in order to provide that assurance, iran has to clarify the issues relating to possible military dimensions and implement the official protocol.

what is needed now is concrete actions on the part of iran to resolve all outstanding issues. i remain committed to working with iran to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. but i repeat, this is not a never ending process. it is very important that iran fully implements the framework for cooperation sooner rather than later. the iaea can make a unique contribution to resolving the iran issue, but we cannot do this on you are our own. the sustained force of the international community are needed as is iran's full cooperation to resolve all outstanding issues. i will now be happy to take your questions. thank you very much. [applause]

[background sounds] >> director general amano, thank you very much more your presentation. i have a few questions to pose to you. i'm sure our audience has many that it would like to pose to you. i know iran is going to be a big focus of attention, so therefore, i'll start off talking about the agency and its role. and i particularly want to raise the concern that i and many others have about the growing politicization surrounding the board of governors and its discussions about the agency's role. i remember when i used to attend

board of governors meetings, general conferences. usually there was a consensus among board members on any particular topic. it was very rare that there was voting in a divided membership. now it's almost the norm on lots of issues for there to be voting and differences. you mentioned the state-level concept or state-level approach. i think this is a very innovative approach to safeguarding. i think it would enhance the agency's role. but yet you and the secretariat have received criticism from a number of countries, and i can name them -- russia, argentina, brazil, some others have raised questions about this innovative approach to safeguarding. could you talk a little bit about what i've described as the

growing politicization of the, surrounding the agency? >> i firmly believe that the iaea is a technical organization, and it should stay so. but the reality is that everything we deal with is very political. verification of or nonverification is very political. we have the mandate on nuclear power. nuclear power, use of nuclear power is a very political issue in any country. and so i think the irk a -- iaea is a technical organization which is operating under a very political environment. this is the irony. in order to make ourselves stay nonpolitical, technical and impartial, we should have

objective standard. and that is why i mentioned that use of standard which is the full implementation of safeguard agreement and other relevant obligations. as far as we stick to this principle, we can be very impartial, neutral and partial. i said fully, but fully does not mean 100% or 0%. we are living in the real world. in the real world there's no 0% or 100%. so i repeat, credible assurance. credible assurance is a concept of ours. when i say free, it means the country have to implement the safeguard as fully as possible. they should be as transparent as possible. and by sticking, in sticking to

the universal standard, we can avoid that politicization. it is true that nowadays a lot of issues are put to vote compared to the past when they were adopted by consensus. but if i compare the working environment in i have general that -- vienna, geneva or new york, we are not in the best shape. important thing for the iaea is we are not a -- [inaudible] we deliver concrete results, and we are delivering concrete results not only in non-proliferation area, but in nuclear security, use of nuclear power, production of nuclear -- application of nuclear technology for peaceful purpose and elsewhere. we have difficulties. we are living, operating entirely in that environment. but i think there is ways to

make our soft power impartial, nonpolitical and deliver concrete results. >> um, let me just press you a little bit on this. if the iaea is to meet the tremendous challenges that are in front of you, it's going to have to be pretty aggressive, independent, strong. but there are those who seem to be challenging the agency in a number of ways. you reached the conclusion, i think, on the basis of evidence that your staff had compiled that the syrians very likely had a nuclear reactor. now, that finding was challenged, and it's challenged to this day. and there are those who really don't want you or your secretariat to have a strong, up dependent voice. and i see this as a real problem

for the future of nuclear non-proliferation. are you concerned by the challenges you've been receiving? >> when i came to this job from my predecessor, there are three outstanding issues; iran, north korea and syria. we keep on following this issue, but the main issue was iran and syria. on syria we have had a visit to the site twice, we have collected our own information, and we have had quite good knowledge of the facilities which was destroyed. then the option for me was to postpone the drawing of conclusion board by board and perhaps forever or to conclude,

provide a conclusion based on the findings that we have on our own. and i thought that if i can do it, it's better to do it. sur ya did not agree to give access to me and to the agency after i became the director general. we did not have as much information as we wanted, but still we already have sufficient information to draw a conclusion. that is why i drew a conclusion on syria, and i do not regret it them refusing cooperation is not the best way. even under such a situation if we have enough information and facts on our own, we should be able to draw a conclusion. >> let me turn to iran.

you mentioned a few moments ago how important the additional protocol is to providing confidence that a state is not engaged in undeclared activities inconsistent with its safeguards obligations. the iranians have agreed with the p5+1 that if there's a comprehensive solution, they will adhere to the additional protocol assuming their parliament agrees to it. but it seems to me that for many of the measures that will be, that will have to be monitored by your agency, it will be necessary to go well beyond the additional protocol, something the iranians have expressed reluctance to do. now, obviously, we don't have an agreement, you don't know the provisions, but if you could

speculate where the agency is going to have to go well beyond the additional protocol, do you expect that you're going to be add to do that -- asked to do that, and are you prepared to do that? >> we do not yet know the content of other comprehensive solution, if there is any. but we heard from time to time from various sources that in the negotiations they are considering the measures beyond additional protocol. and it is foreseeable that implementation will be given to us. we need to see the content of the agreement once it is agreed,

but very important first step is that they need to be enforced, adopted by the board of governors. we are operating under the authority and control of the board of governors and just take the case of plan of action. it was agreed between p5+1 and iran and the iaea was asked to monoor to have and implement -- monitor and implement the agreement. i convened a special board of governors, and they agreed that the agency implement these measures. i feel the member states are to contribute necessary funds, and they responded very positively. so we have received the mandate to implement the measures agreed under the joint plan of action,

and we have given the means to implement it. so we are now implementing it. in this case i will be of good reference where we consider the implementation of measures to be agreed for a solution. >> mr. director general, you discussed the agency's efforts to gain clarify caution on these -- clarification on these possible military dimensions of iran's military program, and i think it's clear from your remarks and what's been reported in the press that so far at least iran has not provided much cooperation with your investigation. so what happens if iran continues to stonewall in this regard? you don't get the clarifications you need? what do you do in that circumstance? do you simply report to the board that you haven't gotten the cooperation that you seek, or do you draw some conclusions

as you did in the syria case on the basis of the information available to you? now, you know, iran continues to argue that it's a so-called evidence, it always says so-called evidence is based on fabricated material, falsified documents and so forth. but i think on the basis of your analysis, i think you called the information credible. indications of these associations with a military nuclear program. so what do you do? do you simply report that we didn't get cooperation, or do you make an assessment based on information available to you? >> um, first, regarding the measures with possible military dimension, we have agreed in november 2013 with iran that all

the outstanding issues are issues of past and present and should be resolved through cooperation. we understand that there are older up resolved issues past and present include issues with possible military dimension. it was a step-by-step approach, and we have agreed to take up one issue with possible military dimension; namely, the explosive bridge wire detry discuss. and -- detry try discuss. and we have received some information from rapp, and we are now -- from iran, and we are now analyzing it. so at least one measure was addressed. we agreed to take up two additional measures. agreement was made on 20th of may. we started the clarification of

these two issues with iran, but the progress is slow to clarify the issues that we have agreed. and we are encouraging iran to come up with a proposal on new measures to be taken, but so far we do not have a concrete proposal from them. this is where we stand now, but a very important negotiation is ongoing. we have iran/iaea path, so we need to do everything to clarify the issues past and present. the question is on the syrian case is relevant to iranian case. i think as i said in my statement the iranian case and syrian case and north korean case are very different. and they are non-proliferation issues, but each case is

different. the majority is different, volume and nature of the information is different, complexity of the issue is very different. so as far as the possible military dimension issues of iran, i think the best way is to continue the -- [inaudible] with iran. we have already the basic understanding of of the situation with clarity that it was included in my first report in 2010, and i repeat the same, i provide the same assessment in my quarterly report. we know where we stand now. in 2011 i provided a report in which i identified 12 areas to clarify. so the questions to be answered are clear now. we have now the tool to clarify it, the framework for cooperation. so the best way is to implement it.

>> thank you. why don't we open it up. when you have a question, please, identify yourself and ask a concise question. david, did you -- >> if you do get cooperation in the list that you provided in 2011 on these issues, is it important that the iaea make public the history of rapp's work on possible -- of iran's work on possible military dimensions and what you determined or not? there seems to be some reluctance on the part of the iranians to have a public accounting, and we've heard some indications that they might be more willing to be cooperative if they thought their answers to the questions would remain confidential within the system.

and less cooperative with you even while it continued to negotiate with the p5+1. so i'm just wondering what your stance is about the need to make public the answers to each of the 11 or 12 issues that you raised. >> safeguard confidential information should be kept tight between the country and iaea, but when i find it is needed, i share information with the iaea member states. i did it in my quarterly report, and with respect to the possible military dimension, i included relatively detailed information in the annex in 2011. and that is a confidential report, but when and if it is

agreed among the members of the board to make it public, they can do so. so in reality that report of 2011 was made public and other quarterly reports of the iaea are made public by the decision of the board of governors. so in the future if i provide adjustment of possible military dimension and if the board of governors agree, that will become public. >> thanks. barbara slavin from the atlantic council. does it surprise you that iran is not providing this information given that it's involved in very detailed negotiations with the p5+1 on a long-term agreement? and is it your feeling that a

long-term agreement should somehow be contingent on progress on pmd, or can that be something that is resolved over the course of a long-term agreement? >> i visited iran in august this year, and i had an occasion to talk to president rouhani. and he repeatedly stated that iran is willing to accelerate the process of the clarification of issues with a possible military dimension. for now the progress is limited, but i sense -- [inaudible] on the part of iran to accelerate the clarification of the issues. between p5+1 and is now

ongoing -- and iran is now ongoing. now is not the best time to make rapid progress, but it doesn't mean there will not be progress in the future. i continue to hope that this issue will be clarified as soon as possible. these are the intentions of iran, to accelerate the process. it is also the intention of the iaea to accelerate the process. i repeat, as you said, this is not an endless process so with cooperation we can, we can clarify these issues. >> let me just jump in on this

pmd issue. there are experts who find it very difficult to get iran to provide a full confession of activities especially a weapons program. so it should be sufficient simply to have confidence that those activities are not continuing today and that we have monitoring measures in place that would enable us to determine whether they have resumed in the future. what do you think about that approach? reasonable time frame. -- >> reasonable time frame. reasonable timeline, you can have some image by doing some simple arithmetic. we have identified 12 areas. we have the framework for

cooperation, and one step is normally for three months. if we take, if we address three steps, three measures every step, how long does it take? two steps, one step? and it's easy to foresee. it will not be ten years, it will not be one month, but it will be reasonable timeline. and you can do your arithmetic at home. [laughter] your question is about -- >> pmd, whether it's necessary to get iran to confess all activities even providing incriminating information that those activities were directed at a nuclear weapons program and sufficient to have confidence that those activities have stopped and that we have monitoring measures sufficient

to know whether they will resume. is that, is that sufficient, in four view, or do -- in your view, or do we really need to get clarity on what they actually did do in the past? >> first, the iaea is committed. we also expect iran to be as transparent as possible. i very much value the meeting among ex-pats to talk to their counterparts. they can have good understanding of the activities. we would like to have access to people, to site and to information and have full confidence in the ex pats of the -- ex-pats of the agency. they have been doing good job, and they will continue.

then our next step will be to report the assessment after having a good understanding of the whole picture to the board of governors and how to handle it or how to move from that point is the decision by the member states. we are guided by the board of governors. >> thank you. [inaudible] how important for the future to make sure that it is a peaceful program that your people from the agency or any other agreement with p5+1 will include searches and announced visits to military sites? [inaudible conversations] >> military sites. >> i believe you mentioned earlier that we need to look at the country as a whole, and i

was wondering if it is so necessary to conduct this kind of unannounced visits and searches. >> i would like to give you an example of the additional protocol. in the case of the additional protocol, if we have a good reason to believe that some activity are undertaken in the military side, to the military side, the country can refuse that request. but then that country has to give a good reason why they cannot do access. we also offer the so-called managed access when we have access to the military side in order not to compromise their

military interests. so this concept of managed access to a military site is already existing on the existing safeguard scheme. the military purpose is not the absolute reason to refuse access. in certain cases we want to have access, and then they need to give this to us. >> thank you very much. [inaudible] west asia council. mr. amano, i'd like to ask that you think between non-proliferation on the one hand and nuclear safety on the other because recently a number of iran's neighbors in the persian gulf region have been talking about the very scary

prospect of an earthquake or some kind of a nuclear meltdown in pugh she which is not a proliferation per se, but equally difference to the future of stability in that region. i'm wondering if in your work you are also focusing on that side of this debate. thank you. >> yes, we do. we are aware that many countries, in particular the nato countries, have interest in the -- the neighboring countries, have interest in iranian nuclear facilities. we have sent our mission to review that regulatory framework of iran, and we have given some recommendations. that will help to insure or the highst level of safety -- highest level of safety in iran. this case of earthquake was also raised by some member states.

we already have ex-pat missions to review the seismic aspects of the facility, but insuring the safety and security is the respondent of each -- the respondent of each country, sovereign state. and the role of the iaea is provide assistance upon request. therefore, if we have a request from iran to address and review enhancing the safety, we are prepared to do so. >> back there. >> [inaudible] from are kurdistan tv. what do you think u.s. would do if tomorrow iran declared it is atomic bomb? thank you. >> too difficult question for me to answer.

>> [inaudible] from persian news network, voice of america. yesterday you had a meeting with secretary of state john kerry. would you say he left the meeting happier, more confident? because general feeling is -- [inaudible] that everybody has in mind is not going to happen in november. but do you think he left happier, more confident for a reasonable agreement yesterday? yes. >> i think both are very happy to exchange views on the matters of common interest. [laughter]

>> i'm from the university of maryland. i would like to ask you about the documents pertaining to the so-called alleged studies. has the agency independents verified -- [inaudible] of these documents, and my second question is what exactly is the reason behind not making these documents fully available to the iranians? thank you. >> provision or sharing document was some discussed in the negotiation between iran and iaea when we have discussed the structured approach. the structured approach is that the name of the negotiation that we engaged after the board of governors resolution in november 2011. we have discussed other modality

of sharing information during that negotiation, but that negotiation did not, did not come to an agreement. there are some good progress in many areas, in this area unless everything agreed to, nothing saw -- nothing is agreed. we have agreed, we have discussed the issue of sharing documents, but there was no agreement, and there is no specific reference to the handling of documents in the framework of full cooperation. the basic position of the iaea is that we are prepared to share

the documents. i don't say which one, but share the documents when we consider appropriate and necessary. authenticity, it was quite frequently discussed before i came to the iaea, but authenticity was not that often discussed after i came to the agency. we are asking questions to clarify issues, and we elaborate on our questions. we have given the questions in writing, we have explained the background of the questions, and so i think our counterpart understands the question well. the process and this issue is to

clarify the activities in iran. this process is not hard verify the authenticity of document. >> i'm from the embassy of ukraine, and i have a slightly, a slightly different question. your excellency, you were talking about the nonstate actors and their possibility to acquire the nuclear materials and nuclear weapons, and i would like to know your opinion, how should it work when this is actually detected? will it be the government who will be held accountable for the terrorist group -- [inaudible] on its territory or the actual terrorist group? thanks. >> in sharing the highest level of nuclear security is the

responsibility of each government. so controlling the trafficking of, illicit trafficking is the responsibility of each government. however, the international organization has an important role to play to help them. for example, the iaea has database that collect the information on the illicit trafficking. we have thousands of pieces of information already. and the information is very useful to analyze the trend, understanding the facts and trend is very useful to elicit a response. in order to react on to the possible illicit trafficking, cups need detectives or trained customs officer or border guards to use the equipment to detect.

the nuclear detector, detectors are not big ma cheeps. some of them -- machines. some of them are the size of a blackberry, and they can be very effective. there are much bigger facilities, more complicated, to have precise information. but these equipment should be provided and should be trained. we need guidance, code of guidance to establish good practice. we send peer review missions to give recommendation to enhance nuclear safety. and the short answer is that to prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear material is the responsibility of each state,

but there is some role to play for the international organizations, including ours, and the iaea is playing the central role in enhancing the nuclear security. >> yes, sir. >> morning. jay kramer, i'm a lawyer with a practice focused on international nuclear trade and export controls. mr. director general, let me turn you from the non-proliferation pillar of the npt to the disarmament pillar. what has the agency learned in the last decade or so with respect to its investigations in iran that would help it to verify a general treaty on nuclear disarmament, and perhaps expressed as a multiple of the agency's current resources, what level of resources would it take the agency to verify such a

general treaty on nuclear disarmament? thank you. >> the iaea has expertise in the area of verification, and if requested, we are ready to make our expertise available to implement the agreed nuclear disarmament treaties. but the iaea is not a negotiating body for nuclear disarmament agreement. in other words, we do not replace the conference in geneva, we do not replace the first committee of the united nations either. the negotiation belongs to ore bodies -- to other bodies or other countries, and once the agreements are reached and when we are asked to provide assistance by using our expertise in verification, we'll

consider such assistance. >> yes, sir, go ahead. >> thank you. mr. director general, greg giles, saic. you referenced your august trip to tehran. i'm wondering if in your discussions with iranian officials, you mentioned president rouhani, did you get the sense that the civilian leadership in iran would perhaps like to be more forthcoming and help clarify the pmd issues, but that it's the military, the islamic revolutionary guard corps that stands in the way? >> generalize. what i heard from the iranian leader, they are willing to

clarify the npt or -- [inaudible] if there is any, and they would like to accelerate the process and willing to cooperate on the iaea. i think there is some political will to clarify the issue. in reality, it is clarification is not making clear progress as we expect, but we continue to work with iranian counterparts to clarify other issues. >> hi -- [inaudible] what do you think is the biggest challenge in achieving a nuclear

weapon-free zone in the middle east? >> dialogue is very important. i joined the iaea in 2005, and there is, there was -- there is a resolution of the general conference in 2001 requesting me to host a forum to learn from the experience of other nuclear weapon-free zones. hosting forum looks like easy, but in reality it is not that easy. it took ten years before we could finally convene that forum. the iaea hosted that por rum in -- that forum in 2011 with the presidents of israel and as well as, of course, arab states,

and despite the complexity of the issue and a difference of views, we could have a very constructive discussions. so i believe that we need to continue that dialogue, and iaea is in support of the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zone in middle east, but it is not an easy issue, and we keep on following this issue. >> let me come back to the question of the agency's investigation of the possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program. you mentioned access to individuals, you mentioned access to locations. you know, we know individuals that we believed were engaged in

some of these activityies where we believed that some of these activities took place. how would you assess the relative importance of gaining access to sites, gaining access to individuals? and how successful has the agency been? obviously, the access to the par chin facility, there were two occurrences in the past where the agency was at the place that was of particular concern, and it's been rebuffed constantly in recent years. but what about access to individuals? it would seem to me that one of the most effective -- [inaudible] iranian nuclear activities is to have continuing access to individuals, not a one-time interview where the subject of

the interview might be misleading, may not tell the truth and so forth, but continuing, follow-on access to gain some confidence that people who have the greatest expertise in some of the military-related aspects of nuclear energy are working on civilian programs and are not awe plying their exper -- applying their expertise to a military program. how do you evaluate the relative importance of these different forms of access? >> the iaea is seeking access to sites, people and information related to the issues with military, with possible military dimension. but these are very difficult issues. just, for example, we have requested access to the site of parchin from a very early stage,

but that access has not yet been granted. the access to people, scientists is very sensitive issue in iran. because of their experience in the recent years. but we keep on requesting to have access to site, people and information to clarify the matter. >> hi. thanks. i'm from brook arings institution. mr. director general, i wanted to ask, you've had the opportunity to work with two different heads of iran's atomic energy agency under the ahmadinejad administration and under the current rouhani administration. could you maybe touch on the difference in approaches between the two heads and your

relationship with both men? thanks. >> they are very different type of people. [laughter] difference, but it was very useful for me to have dialogue with both of them. style is different, but both of them have good understanding of the issue, and i benefited from the dialogue. but the difference of type doesn't bother me. i'm to work with everyone. i'm ready to work with everyone. >> hi. i'm a student at sais across the street. i have a question about what is, what are the measures that the iaea can take in order to appropriate the use of material, and what do you envision the role of trade controls in this issue, and how can the iaea

support that? >> i didn't quite understand. >> yeah, sure. so my question is what are some of the measures that the iea can take in order to prevent the misappropriate use -- >> use of dual use -- >> of dual-use materials, and what do you envision is the role that trade controls can play in this issue? >> we are not in charge of the trade or dual use of technologies. but whether some technological material is dual purpose or not only for military purpose can be diverted, our function and our responsibility is prevent the diversion of material -- [inaudible] for other use other than peaceful use. it doesn't make a difference

what is under the technology, whatever the material, but the basic function is to from event the -- pro vent the diversion of material for military purpose. >> i know you have other appointments, you've got to move on, you've got a busy schedule in washington. i thank you. i thank our audience, because i think they have come up with a range of questions that, you know, cover the waterfront. you've got a hard job, and we wish you the best of luck. thank you. >> thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> veterans affairs secretary robert mcdonald outlines efforts to improve veteran services today at the national press club. his remarks mark his first 100 days in office. see it live at one p.m. eastern here on c-span2. >> today samantha power, the u.s. ambassador to the united nations, speaks at the american enterprise institute. she'll discuss u.n. peacekeeping missions around the globe and the united states' role in supporting and reforming those operations. live coverage at one p.m. eastern on c-span. >> this weekend on the c-span networks, tonight at 8 eastern on c-span, more reaction to the midterm elections. on saturday night at 8, a debate on the future of the internet. and sunday evening at 8 on

"q&a," author and television host tavis smiley on his latest book, "death of a king." and tonight at eight on c-span2, author ronald rossbottom on german-occupied paris in world war ii. saturday night at 10 on ""after words,"" jeff chang on the idea of racial progress in america, and saturday night at ten, edward o. wilson on what makes us human and different to other species. ..