it's things and variations, but the consequence of all of these are both and undermining of civil life and and undermining of the capacity society. because money is diverted from education. it is different from investment, and as we're having an increasing youthful population in the world, there are not the resources to educate them, to provide them opportunities. and all of these things work in conjunction with each other. >> we have been discussing a book called "dirty entanglements: corruption, crime, and terrorism" by louise shelley. thank you very much, and thank you very much for the third interesting conversation. and thank you all for coming. [applause] [inaudible conversations]

>> and you're watching booktv on c-span2. here's our primetime lineup for tonight. that all happens tonight on c-span2's booktv.

>> up next on booktv, "after words," with guest host james swanson, author and urged fellow. this week james mcpherson and his latest book "embattled rebel: jefferson davis as commander in chief." into the acclaimed historian presents confederate president jefferson davis as an astute military strategist whose failures, he argues, are not the reason the confederacy lost the civil war. this program is about one hour. >> host: jim, let's start at the beginning. it's november 1860, the republicans won the election but lincoln is president-elect. who is jefferson davis in the fall of 1860? >> guest: to jefferson davis and the fall of 1860 is a senator from mississippi. he has served in that capacity off and on for about eight years, interrupted in the middle 1850s by for years as

secretary of war under president franklin pierce. he was one of the most prominent of the southern senators. he was not a fire eating secessionist but he did believe in the right of the south to secede. but because he had a strong affinity for the union, for which he had thought in the mexican war, he was a graduate of west point, class of 1828. he was put on a committee of 13, a senate committee of 13 to try to find someway out of the crisis precipitated by the response of the deep south states, starting with south carolina, to lincoln's election. south carolina immediately called a convention to consider seceding from the union, and everybody expected that they would pass it. so when congress met in december of 1860, davis was put on this committee.

and i think he hoped at first that it might be possible to find some kind of solution to the burgeoning crisis of this union. >> host: so davis was really not a hockey. he was a man of reason. .. >> guest: maybe we should set up for ourselves. but for the most part, he was known as a reasonable southern

nationalist, but also an american nationalist. >> host: and davis liked the north. he traveled widely in the north, he had northern friends, he gave talks. at one point in his career he said with your great industry and our great agriculture, we'll conquer the rest of the continent. >> guest: yes, absolutely. and, in fact, in 1859 he had taken a summer trip to new england where he had given a number of speeches, praised new englanders. actually, when he got back to mississippi after that trip, he was criticized by a lot of other politicians and newspaper editors in mississippi for kowtowing to the north. and you're quite right, he did have quite a few friends. actually, the man that everybody expected to be the republican candidate for president, william h. sue ward, was a close friend of davis' until, of course, the split came. and other northern senators as

well. >> host: so how did a man like this, a man who liked the north, who fought for the united states, who held a cabinet position, was in the congress, was in the senate was not an avid secessionist? how did this man end up as president of the confederate states of america? >> guest: well, once the state of mississippi seceded and once it became clear to davis that no compromise that would be acceptable to the south was going to emerge from this committee of 13 or from the congress itself, he threw in his lot with the con fed rahs is city. rehe resigned from the united states senate, giving a final speech in which he said that he did so with regret. >> host: people in the audience were reduced to tears in the gallery. >> guest: that's right, they were reduced to tears. and went back to mississippi and was immediately named as the general and chief of the mississippi state militia. at this stage of the secession

process, there was no confederate states of america yet. there were six and about to be seven states that had seceded from the united states, and it was clear that these states would be facing potential military conflict if the united states army moved in and tried to, quote-unquote, coerce them to stay in the union. so he was named as the general in chief of mississippi militia and began organizing the mississippi militia. and looked forward with regret but realism to the possibility that there would, in fact, be military conflict. and while he -- then he went home to his plantation, davis bend, along the mississippi river where he owned 113 slaves. he was a large slave owner x.

while he and his wife rena were making rose cuttings on the morning of february 10th -- i think it was february 10th, 1861 -- a messenger came with a telegram. the telegram was from montgomery, alabama, where a convention of delegates from the six and soon to be seven seceded states were meeting. and the telegram informed him that he had been named provisional president of the confederate states of america. and i think there were two basic reasons why they named him as president. one, that he -- he was known as a moderate and not as a fireeater. and the confederacy was trying to present to the world and especially to the eight slave states that had not yet seceded -- and, for that matter, even to the union states -- an image of reasonableness and moderation. and, second, his military experience. he was a graduate of west point,

he had served seven years in the regular army, he had commanded the mississippi volunteer regiment quite courageously and effectively in the mexican war. >> host: wounded in battle. >> guest: yes. came home as a wiewbded warrior and served -- wounded warrior and served on the senate committee of military affairs and as secretary of war. so there was probably no man in the south who was better qualified both in terms of his political experience, but especially his military training and experience to lead this new nation which its founders anticipated might have to fight for its existence. >> host: he was possibly also the best qualified man in the south to know the challenge that lay ahead. he knew about the railroads, the ships, the northern industry, the guns, the cap non, the firearms -- cannons, the firearms. he knew every disadvantage that the south was going to face, didn't he? >> guest: he was very much a realist. he had traveled all over the

country. he could read the census returns. he knew that while the south produced cotton and other staple crops and had a majority of the exports and earned most of the foreign exchange in the american economy, it was an overwhelmingly rural and agricultural society, and if war did come, it would be confronting a much more modern, diversified economy. so he was well aware of the challenges. and when other, once the war began when many other southerners expected a short and victorious war -- >> host: a march to washington. a conquest. >> guest: he warned them this was likely to be a long and very difficult contest and that they should recognize that it was not going to be an easy task at all. >> host: well, he did have some advantages. what were some of the advantages the south began with? let's start with the territory, 750,000 square miles, a huge

agricultural empire. and the union wasn't there except for a few forts. there were no union troops in the south. >> guest: yeah, that is exactly right. and that's something that a lot of people don't really appreciate because it's so obvious that it escapes attention. that is, unlike most rebellious or revolutionary movements, the confederate states of america began life in complete political and military control of nearly all of the territory that they claimed to control. they did not have to fight to gain control of the territory, of the resources, of the political institutions. they already had it. so basically, the con fed rahs is city could win the war merely by surviving. that's a huge advantage because it takes a lot more to invade and conquer than it does to defend and survive.

another advantage or at least another quality that the confederate states had was potentially strong military leadership. not only davis himself, but a large number of fairly prominent army officers, graduates of west point made the commitment to join the confederacy, their names -- once virginia joined the confederacy, their names are very well known; robert e. lee, joseph e. johnston. stonewall jackson, a good many others. these were some of the most talented officers in the old united states army, and they were making a commitment now to lead the new confederate states' army. so davis, even though the north had more than twice the population and several times the industrial resources and commercial resources that are

valuable if a nation is going to mobilize for war, the south still had a lot of advantages which made it possible for davis -- although he expected a difficult and long war -- also to be confident that the south actually could win in the sense of surviving. >> host: well, after the first opening moves, the firing on fort sumter, lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers to suppress an insurrection and rebellion against federal authority, the secession of four more states after lincoln called for the 75,000 troops, after that happened what was the plan? did davis sit down with his top generals in his cabinet and say, all right, what's our plan, how do we fight, how do we win? what were his first strategic moves? >> guest: basically, it was to mobilize an army and to train that army, point -- appoint the

officers and administrators that were going to organize and lead that army and to station troops as they began to, the volunteers began to come in. and the confederacy had to rely entirely on the state militias or the state volunteer regiments. it didn't have a corps of a regular united states army. it was the united states that had the core of the regular united states army a. so to organize -- army. so to organize the troops and to create an army was the first task. and davis, because of his experience as chairman of the senate committee on military affairs and as secretary of war, was quite capable of doing a good job with that. his secretary of the navy, steven maori, turned out to be a very good secretary of the navy. the person that davis appointed as secretary of the army turned

out not to be very good, roy walker. so davis, in effect, from the very first day was sort of his own secretary of war. that led to problems later on. >> host: uh-huh. didn't he have five secretaries of war? >> guest: he went through five secretaries of war, and some of them felt that the office, that their office was nothing more than being a mere clerk. but it was an advantage in the initial stagings of the war because davis -- stages of the war because davis did a very good job. he also sent rafael simms to the north to purchase arms. this was before the war actually began. and he sent agents abroad to begin purchasing arms. so the initial steps of creating an army, the confederacy did a very effective job. then the question was, what do we do with this army? >> host: do you defend the entire confederacy? >> guest: well, that's what

davis initially hoped to do. and part of the reason why he hoped to do that was political pressure from state government, state legislatures. it became clear that the heaviest -- once virginia seceded and once the confederate provisional congress -- the same convention that had formed the confederacy constituted itself as a congress -- once they made the decision to move the capitol to richmond after virginia seceded and unviolated them to do so, it -- invited them to do so, it became clear some of the heaviest fighting would occur in virginia where the two capitols, the two countries were only 100 miles apart. >> host: was that one of the first bad strategic decisions of the confederacy? i realize they had to appease the state of virginia, and that was part of moving the capitol. was it a bad strategy to put the confederate capitol within 100

miles of washington, d.c.? >> guest: well, i don't think so. as you know, it took the united states army longer to capture rush monday than virtually -- richmond than virtually any other part of the confederacy. so it turned out to be quite successful in terms of defending the confederate capitol. early in the war the confederates lost nashville, they lost new orleans, they lost memphis, they lost a number of other places. but it took four years for them to lose richmond. and so maybe it wasn't such a bad strategic decision. in any case, it was, i think, an important political decision, and that was the main reason for taking that decision in the first place. davis was well aware that the, that one of the cardinal rules of military strategy is the principle of concentration. you should concentrate your

forces in a substantial army that's capable of taking on enemy armies or in two or three substantial armies. that would have seemed to dictate concentration of one army in virginia and perhaps another in the mississippi valley, let's say in tennessee which was the northernmost confederate state in the mississippi valley. but because of political, for political reasons davis could not adhere to that strategic principle of concentration because the governor of georgia, governor of arkansas, governor of louisiana and so on was insisting that their borders had to be defended from yankee incursion too. >> host: yes. well, i remember the golf of louisiana -- the governor of louisiana said we have 30 regiments, and they're all up north. >> guest: that's right. >> host: governors didn't want to send troops, uniforms, weapons, one of their resources did they want to sacrifice to

other states. now, isn't that one of the big dilemmas davis faced from the outset? he's the president of a nation or a confederacy founded on states' rights. >> guest: that's right. >> host: the rights of the individual states. but to win the war, davis has to try to consolidate these states, make the governors of these states tow the line. so he's got to, essentially, violate states' rights to try to win the war. >> guest: that was davis' biggest headache, the tension between states' rights and all of the political pressures that go along with that and the smart military strategy. in the american revolution, the united states had given up huge swaths of territory to the british but eventually had won. and eventually that, of course, happened in the confederacy too. but in 861 it was -- 1861 it would have been politically impossible for davis to strip the gulf coast, the south

atlantic coast of troops in order to defend, let's say, virginia and tennessee. he had to defer to some degree to these political pressures from southern governorrers. and -- governors. and, of course, the disadvantage of that is that you've got small groups of troops scattered around the perimeter of the confederacy. it's sometimes called the perimeter defense or a dispersed defense or a cordon defense. and sooner or later the enemy is going to breakthrough that thin, gray line and, of course, that's what happened with the loss of fort henry, the loss of new orleans -- >> host: failure in kentucky. >> guest: failure in kentucky and western virginia. the enemy begins to penetrate this line. and as a consequence of that, davis actually admits concern -- not publicly, but privately -- that it may have been a mistake

to try and defend the entire upon frontier of the confederacy, and he changes the strategy. in the course of doing so, provokes an awful lot of controversy and dissent from governors like joe brown of georgia, for example. >> host: yeah. and it's almost too late. in late '64, early '65, davis says -- and i think publicly -- no single point is vital for the existence of the confederacy. >> guest: that's right. yeah. >> host: if he had had that attitude in 1861, no state, no port, no city is vital for the confederacy, he might have had more freedom of action to be more successful. >> guest: well, he might have, but i think it was politically impossible. it's one thing to say that in theory that's right, but another thing to say that in practical fact i don't think he really had a choice. >> host: right. >> guest: in 1861. but in 1862 he does begin to concentrate the bulk of the first line troops in the confederacy, and three or so

major field armies in virginia, in tennessee and mississippi and, well, those three states primarily. and he carries that one step farther not only to cons trawtion, but also -- concentration, but also the development of what he on two or three different occasions called the strategy of the offensive defensive. >> host: uh-huh. >> guest: a modern analogy to that would be a football analogy, the coach who says that the best defense is a good offense. >> host: right. >> guest: and robert e. lee, who became davis' principal military partner, not only his best general, but i think his closest confidant among confederate military commanders, was a practitioner par excellence of the offensive/defensive. that is the best way to defend a confederacy, was to seize opportunities when they presented themselves to take the

offensive against enemy armies and to knock them back on their heels. >> host: let's turn to the snake pit of davis' inner circle and the generals. let's talk about some of the men who commanded these armies and what thorns they were in his side. joe johnston. bragg, bow regard. talk about the jealousies, the rivalries, the disobedience. isn't it really the case that just like lincoln, davis had a terrible time managing his generals? >> guest: that's quite true. both davis and lincoln had some of the same kinds of problems; outsized egos among some of their principal generals. i suppose an outstanding example of that in the con fed rahs i was pierre gustav beauregard who had a very high opinion of himself and a very low opinion of davis or increasingly low opinion of davis. and they came into conflict

fairly early after the first confederate victory of the war, the battle of manassas or bull run. bow regard was quite concerned for taking credit about that. he issued a report in which he took full credit and blamed davis for not turning him loose to do even more damage to the yankees. davis basically sent bow reforward to the western theater in 1862, and after albert sidney johnson was skilled, beauregard came hander of that army, second in command, and then he took an unauthorized leave of absence, and davis removed him from command. well, the two of them never got along together after that at all. joseph johnston, who was the senior commander in virginia,

enter into into a quarrel with s about his relative rank among the generals in the confederate army and then as commander what he called the army of the potomac. it's sometimes very confusing, there were two armies of the potomac in the latter half of 1861 and the first half of 1862. the better known union army of the potomac, but the confederate army was also called at that time the army of the potomac, and its commander was general johnston who believed that he knew better than davis, who believed if he kept davis fully informed about what he would do, davis would overrule -- unwisely, from johnston's point of view -- some of his command decisions. who feared a leak of information if he kept davis informed of what he was going to do, and the relationship between those generals began to deteriorate. and when it looked in may of 1862 like johnston might even

give up richmond in order to keep his army whole, they came not exactly to a parting of the ways, but into pretty sharp conflict. and if johnston had not been wounded at the battle of seven pines on may 31st, 17862 -- 1862, who knows what might have happened. but he was wounded. he was out of action for six months. robert e. lee became commander of the army of northern virginia. and there, of course, began a very positive partnership between lee and jefferson davis -- >> kansas which he -- >> host: which he never really had with johnston. time after time, he couldn't trust johnston to carry out a task on schedule or where it was supposed to be carried out. didn't johnston even surrender at the end of the war without informing davis or seeking

permission? >> guest: that's right. of course, by that time the government was basically dead -- >> host: but they were able to reach each other by telegram -- >> guest: it was constantly in character to defy his orders because he had done so so many times during the war. >> host: he's gotten a bad rap in history as being irascible, jealous, unfriendly, egotistical, unyielding, impossible. but i noticed in your book at the end you really say that generals are more to blame than davis was for these relationships and these souring of connections. >> guest: yes, i think that's right too, and i think it's especially true in the case of beauregard and johnston. some others as well, but especially in those two cases. davis did have this reputation of being austere, rigid, holding a grudge, thin-skinned about criticism. and that's not entirely a myth. i mean, like most stereotypes,

there's something under there. there's a little bit of fire under that smoke. but i think his character, his personality has been defined down the years by his opponents, by his critic. not only among the generals, but also among certain state governors; joe brown of georgia being the foremost example. certain senators, louis -- [inaudible] of texas being the outstanding example there. certain editors, robert barnwell of charleston mercury and john daniel of the richmond examiner. these were people who either hated davis from the outset or came to hate him. and they have shaped, i think, much of our stereotype perception of davis' personality defects. and i think that it's, that he was never able to fight off some

of these stereotypes except among inner circle, people who knew him well like robert e. lee himself or like his chief cabinet official, judah benjamin, and others who had a good, positive and close relationship with davis and found him to be warm and personable among the people who were close to him. he did not have much of a sense of humor, unlike lincoln. there's, i suppose in some ways, one of the greatest contrasts between the two commanders in chief. but he could be warm and personable with people that he liked. and who liked him. but i think that he's been defined more by his enemies than -- >> host: and he hasn't, he didn't suffer fools gladly. >> guest: absolutely not. and he had to deal with quite a few. >> host: i agree with you, he was very much unlike lincoln in that way. it's interesting, the mihm image

of these two men 100 miles apart -- >> guest: they were also born about 100 miles apart. less than a year apart. >> host: exactly. so many similarities, even in physical type. both had calm, reasoning minds, they weren't hotheads. but i've always thought that they had one ultimate thing in common which is this: neither one was going to compromise and surrender. i like to think of davis and lincoln -- and i don't mean this in a pejorative sense, just the facts -- i think of them as the two greatest killers in american history for this reason. they were willing to send hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths to vindicate the principles that they believed were right. and they would have sent more. i don't think either one would have given up. davis wouldn't have given up slavery and independence, lincoln would not have given up liberty and union. you quote this line from lincoln in the book: the issue is distinct, simple and inflexible, it is an issue that can only be

tried by war and decided by victory. and davis, lincoln said of davis, he cannot voluntarily reaccept the union, we cannot voluntarily yield it. would they have ever come to a peaceful solution? >> guest: no. there was no possible of a compromise peace, negotiated peace. >> host: but what was behind these peace conferences and these little entreaties? >> guest: well, both lincoln and davis faced a very powerful peace movement within their societies. ..

the last confederate standing. everybody else in the south, by may 1865, had given up, but not davis. he was still trying to get away, escaped, hoping to get across the mississippi may be to texas to kirby smith's army was virtually the last letter at -- and the army to surrender, and continue the war from there. the war was not really over until davis was captured and imprisoned. >> host: people forget, unlike john most big -- john wilkes booth, he wasn't trying to escape. he wanted to fight. he kept moving, and dental, the

proclamation, the dental proclamation what he said was uncovered and unconquerable hearts. the confederacy would live. another time he said i will lead the cause if there is one man who will follow me. at one point during retreat when the soldiers have mostly split off and you've slept with an entourage of 20 or 30 minute and his family, his wife and several children, there was a war conference. davis said, what's wrong? why don't you want to fight on? we can do more. they said the war is over, mr. president. and then with a disdain, he said why are you with me now? they said, we are with you not to fight on, not one man will sacrifices life to fight for the confederacy. all of us will die to save you, your wife and her children but its over. >> guest: that's right. he never would admit that. i think even to himself, although it's not quite sure. we ca can't be quite sure what e thought privately but he would not admit it publicly. >> host: do you think it's

because he wanted history to record that he held nothing back, that he gave his all for the cause? there wasn't one more thing he could have possibly done? >> guest: i think that's right, absolutely. >> host: you've written no chief of american history was so involved in war planning. as jefferson davis was. was that micromanagement counterproductive? would he have been better off being general in chief and not the president? was he to involve? >> guest: he might have been -- excuse me. he might have been better off if he had been general in chief or maybe secretary of war. he was a workaholic. he was a detail man. in the sphere that he really cared about which was the military. he could not delegate authority, and that's why he went through

five secretaries of war. because he, in fact, was sort of his own secretary or for many of the major decisions, and even some of the minor administrative aspects of managing a military establishment. davis we put in long days. he would sign off and approved, even the promotion of lieutenants and things like that. he would have been better off if he had been willing to delegate some of the authority. if he had not worked so hard and managed to get enough rest and enough regular meals, i think he would have been in better shape to make some important strategic decisions. i think that part of what people saw as an irascible personality

was the result of stress and poor health. not only was davis more involved in hands-on military leadership in planning than any other chief executive in american history, but he also suffered from more maladies, more sickness, more illness than any other chief executive in american history. and he was virtually blind in one eye. he suffered from serious neuralgia and pain, serious headaches, recurrence of an old malarial fever, what was called dyspepsia which is a kind of a catchall term for stomach problems. he may well have had ulcers. >> host: at the same series muller that killed his first wife. >> guest: that's right, which in some ways never got over either.

so he would have to take to his sick bed for days, sometimes even weeks at a time frequently during the course of the war, but one thing about him when he did take to his sick bed, he continued working. >> host: 12, 14 hour days. >> guest: long hours but i think his ill health and the stress and the overworked contributed to what other people saw as his irascibility and his temper, and his bearing a grudge is against some. and he would have been better off if he had been more like ronald reagan and let other people handle it. he could not let other people handle the. >> host: didn't also decide people who thought were working for the own personal benefit? he viewed himself as above that, that he would not do anything for himself. i remember when he was informed by soldiers, that the union on was closing and plantation and

he was asked should we send troops to save your plantation and get your slaves and safer property and your valuables? and david said, the army of the confederacy does not do personal favors for the president. and he really did himself above doing anything for self-serving reasons. if you thought you were person who did that, he would write you off. >> guest: that's right. >> host: were some of the best times? if you look back over the whole course of the years, what with his two of the greatest moments? would appoint would almost one? is their particular day or a couple of days when they almost pulled it off the? >> guest: his first high point was the battle of first manassas july 1861. davis said very much wanted to be with the army when it faced its first major test. him but he had to stay in richmond because the confederate congress was scheduled to meet there for the first time.

july 20, but on the war morning of july 21 he commandeered a special train, showed his way up to manassas and a ride on the battlefield at more or less at the moment of victory. and joined the two commanding officers, joe johnston and beauregard, at their headquarters that evening and actually urged them to follow up this victory with the continuation of the attack. amel are less talked him out of it. >> host: didn't he show up on the field on a horse? did he say i am jefferson davis, follow me back to the field transferred there were stragglers of course and some of them did follow them back to the battlefield. i think both beauregard and davis but especially beauregard thought that davis was trying to take credit for the victory by this kind of behavior, and that was i think a source of some

tension between beauregard and davis, the beginning of it perhaps. but that was certainly a high point for davis. and while he didn't think that that was going to win the war the way so many other southerners did, we want this battle, we won the war, it's all over. >> host: lets me stop at that point and we move on. you write that neither lincoln nor davis knew at the outset what this war is going to cost them what they would commit. let's say one side or the other knew at the beginning what is going to cost in the end. if they could look into the future, with one side has made in all our absolute commitment in 1861 that we now know is unimaginable to them? if the confederacy knew what it was going to sacrifice would they have thrown everything they had to try to get washington in the summer of 1861? or would they launch that fall offensive in 1861 which they failed to do? >> guest: we can't really know the answer to that question.

davis did want to follow up first manassas or bull run. i don't think he necessarily thought that they could capture washington, but they could inflict more damage on the enemy army. the other question you asked though, if lincoln or davis, or both of them, have known in 1861 what was going to take a carry on this war for four years, would they have made that commitment? well, we can't know the answer to that question either. what we do know is that as the war went on and as the cost did become clear, all of them were determined to fight on rather than to concede. so if that's any indication, they would have been willing even knowing the cost in 1861. but that's something that we can't know for certain. >> host: talk about some of the other high points.

>> guest: i think another high point probabl came in in june and july 1862, june, july and august of 1862 when davis appointed robert e. lee as demand of the army in northern virginia. lee emulate beginning planning and offenses. davis supported. lee carried that out, drove mclell from richmond, then moved to northern virginia and one the second battle of manassas and invaded maryland. the confederacy was on a roll. the british and the french were talking about intervening in this war by offering their mediation to bring this war to an end on the basis of confederate independence, and recognizing the confederacy, even if lincoln refused an offer of mediation.

clearly, a high point for the confederacy came in the summer of 1862, the battle of antietam and the battle of perryville, kentucky, and the retreat of both the confederate armies after those battles came as a real setback in davis' eyes. but the confederacy bounced back. >> host: fredericksburg. >> guest: fredericksburg and chancellorsville and the invasion of pennsylvania, which again davis gave lee full support for the. he wasn't able to give lee as many troops as lee hope for an invasion but he did give lee entire support for the even of some members of davis cabinet had wanted to weaken lee's army and sent a couple of divisions to tennessee or mississippi to deal with the threats there, especially at vicksburg.

i think that's the third high point for davis and the confederacy. may be one more is the summer of 1864, when davis is actually out of, out on the battlefield in virginia as both grant and benjamin butler are closing in on richmond, but lee and beauregard now are carrying their blows as the sum of 1864 goes on, even though sherman is making progress in georgia. the cost of the war to the north and virginia is causing a swelling of peace sentiment in the north, and it looks like lincoln is going to be defeated for reelection, at least a democrat on a peace platform will win the presidency.

>> host: i do believe lincoln snow. i think it was a time he thought, he thought he was going to lose. >> guest: absolutely. no question about it. apps adobe. here's an example of how the confederacy could have called unquote one the war nearly by holding out by not losing. so what i don't think davis necessarily saw this as a high point in the same way that the actual victories back in 1861, 1862 and 1863 have been high points, nevertheless the outlook appeared promising. because it looked like the north was going to throw in the towel. but then, of course, came the fall of a plan to come and that i think was probably the greatest blow to davis. and he blamed joe johnston for that, and i think he probably was right about johnston's

failure to carry out a more effective defense. and then, of course, davis removes him from command and that's the low point. >> host: did someone say joe johnston would've fought the battle of atlanta in florida by flying south country he kept retreating, and key west he could never traded any further. >> host: i want to pause for a moment about the myth of gettysburg. today, gettysburg is zagreb. we have both gone there countless times. is gettysburg today what was then? did lincoln or davis or lee think that that was the high point or the low point? did people think then, we've lost the war? we've won the war? >> guest: in the eyes of the confederacy gettysburg was not such a disaster. in the eyes of the northern people, not so much lincoln put in the eyes of northern people

and press, gettysburg was a huge victory. it got a lot more press even bend the capture of vicksburg. in part because the media center of the country then, as now, was in the northeast and the army of the potomac, most of the soldiers in that army came from the east. so gettysburg had a huge impact on northern public opinion, but not so much in the south in terms of the actual strategy of the war. i think vicksburg was more important. in terms of politics, the fall of atlanta was more important. but gettysburg came to have a special place more in retrospect i think meditated in defining itself. and, of course, lincoln was very disappointed that need did not follow up the defensive tactical victory of the union army at gettysburg with an offensive

strategy that might have inflicted even more serious damage on the army of northern virginia as it was a trap north of the potomac river by high water for 10 days. >> host: maybe lincoln should've said that i mailed letter to general meade aspect maybe we would'v would have a me aggressive general after that, i don't know. >> host: maybe grant would've stepped right in. i noticed in the book you confessed that you begin with a bit of a bias. you didn't think much about jeff davis but you didn't admire him in any way. admittedly, you know, we are union men and you announce that in the book. as you got to know davis better by working on this book, did you develop -- what's the word -- a sympathy, and understand, any affection? what you think about him now? >> guest: well, i haven't changed my mind in one area, which is that he was on the

wrong side, the wrong side of history, the wrong side in this conflict that led to the civil war of the conflict over slavery. he was a proslavery man. i think that if the confederacy had succeeded it would've been a disaster for the course of american development. so i haven't changed my mind on that. but if you grant davis' principles and his perception, i came to have if not more sympathy for them, maybe more empathy would be the right word. i could put myself in his place. instead of being a union men and anti-slavery man, i am now a confederate and proslavery man. i am jefferson davis. these are my convictions. i'm going to stand by my convictions, and here is how i want to defend of those convictions, and defend the new

country that i played a principal part in creating. i came to have more of an understanding of him did you grant those things. and imparts that was because -- in part that was because i conceived a dislike for some of his strongest critics, people like bo regard, or even joseph johnson or joe brown of georgia. i think that they were more egregious characters and davis. and so in a curious sense i came to have a certain degree of empathy for him host but i wondered what you would say about that when i got to the end of the book. because i had the same dilemma when i wrote my book on the last month of abraham lincoln and jefferson davis. i did know very much about jefferson davis and i began to the research. i knew what had been said about him, all the stereotypstereotyp es. at one point in the book i

thought there's something wrong with me. am i starting to side with the confederacy? i wasn't but i develop the empathy like you did when you look at more closely, looking at him being in the position in the issues he faced. it was an interesting feel because i didn't come out of my book pro confederate aren't proslavery, just as you did not but it was interesting to put ourselves in his shoes. >> guest: yes. and when i started the book i was skeptical that i should even be writing this book. because i didn't think i could put myself in his shoes, but the more i get into it the more i was carried along by the story, by the drama of the story, and by my attempt to understand and even to appreciate what he was trying to do, even if i thought what he continued to do what he was trying to do is dead wrong. >> host: can you give me a list, two or three, maybe four,

who were his best generals? who would become to mean he could rely on treachery there is no question but robert e. lee was the foremost one. in a curious way, i can have more sympathy with bragg than i had before. i have accepted the usual stereotype that bragg was a more general. but davis, and davis stuck with bragg too long. i change my mind on both of those. i don't think bragg was as bad as his critics who are self-serving in many cases. they were his subordinates within the army of tennessee. and i think, and davis did try to replace bragg. he tried to get joe johnston to take him into that army in april, in march of 1863, and johnston again defied davis' wishes on that. i won't say that bragg was one of his best generals but i think

bragg like davis himself is more -- i came to the conclusion. but certainly if i was as top jump the along with jackson as long as jackson was alive. davis came to have a lot of confidence in john gilad, -- jon daly would've but, of course, good destroyed -- post with his over aggressivaggressiv aggressiveness, and it cost them an arm and a leg is that cost him an arm and a leg. so i guess you could say that food was one of david's best generals but he is one that davis had growing confidence in the that's what he appointed hood as johnson's successor. and hood after all did keep sherman out of atlanta for six weeks. it looked, ma looked to davis what is right along but looked like johnson was going to

abandon. >> host: in the end johnson was no better than linkous mcclellan? >> guest: that's right, absolutely. johnston was a davis is mcclellan. that's exactly right. i guess the vintage there goes to lincoln because he got rid of mcclellan souter and davis got rid of johnson. >> host: during davis' presidency, was he ever national beloved? is a greater of the south? or to that honor belongs to the south favorite generals? it's my impression davis became more of a beloved europe after the war and his life -- long lifetime after the. he survived a link in my 24 years. said of the first love of the south during the war really belong to lee, stonewall and others and not jefferson davis? >> guest: that's true. on the other hand, i don't think davis was as unpopular among the ordinary people of the confederacy as the image we

might have. he was subject to savage criticism, but i think he retained a certain amount of popularity with the ordinary confederate citizens. on the three trips that he took to the deep south during the course of the war in decent 1862, again in the fall of 1863 and the fall of 1864, he spoke a dozen or more venues during those trips, all large and enthusiastic crowds. so clearly they are was some resident of support and even affection for davis among the general population. at the same time that governors, senators, newspaper editors were savagely criticizing him. that doesn't mean he was as popular as lee our stonewall jackson by any means, but i

think he was probably more popular than the popular image from within the image we would have of his place in southern affections would indicate. >> host: and in the record there is some evidence of the behavior the common people of the confederacy even during his final escape, lights out. he passed an old poor woman and she held up an infant child and said, he is meant for you. and davis took his last gold coin and give it to the woman. or when he was going to washington, georgia. it was almost over. the town through a momentous feast in honor of david's cookies with a common people of the confederacy. these were the governors and the elite of the plantation country. >> guest: at the same time though, davis in some ways in retrospect became more popular than he was during the war, partly that was because of them ordered him of his imprisonment. and even he was chained for the

first few days which made him a martyr. even at a time of his lowest popularity after he was captured, lowest popularity, the fact that he was chained and imprisoned actually made him an object of something in the south. >> host: could he have one under any possible circumstanc circumstances, could the confederacy have one of that war? or is it more righteous enough that they survived for four years? >> guest: well, i think they could have one. keeping in mind what we meant for the confederacy, which was just holding out and surviving, and warning out of the will of the northern people to continue making sacrifices to win this war. but if atlanta hadn't fallen, if lincoln hadn't been reelected, the whole story might have been different. i think once atlanta falls, some

major victories in the shenandoah valley, then it's all over. but up until that time there were possibilities. as long as link is president and as long as he retains the support of the northern people, the confederacy can't win. but it's possible they can win if lincoln is not president. >> host: whatever his flaws as a leader, as a president, was robert e. lee right when he said, no man could have done better? >> guest: i think he was. i don't think -- consider the alternative. robert krenz, howell cobb, those were the two main competitors of davis back in 1861 when he was chosen -- >> host: they would've been far worse transit i think they would've been far worse host but

under those two men the south may have lost the war of 1863 traffic i think so. so davis would probably the best choice in 1861 and a don't think anybody could have done better. >> host: how should we remember that caused today? you've already mentioned how you think of him, but what would you say, how should the american people remember jefferson davis? how should we remember this war, and how should we remember the confederacy? >> guest: well, i think that we should remember the war as the great testing of american nationality and american freedom. and the country survived that test by renaming one nation and by abolishing slavery. so that means we remember the confederacy as a challenge to that moment of testing and triumph, and jefferson davis as

the leader of that challenge. but if we grant that, then davis is somebody that we need to know more about because we need to understand the successful survival of the challenge by the united states, we have to look at the other side of the story, the leader of the party that challenged the survival. >> host: thank you, jim. ..