that's true of both content so to speak and noncontent or metadata or transactional data. there's sensitivity in both categories. >> absolutely. i don't like the term metadata because it encompasses too much. we should talk about what we are talking about. there's a broad range of data that is what did or even created or inferred to use of online

service. some of it is benign. we call things, put a metadata label on things like the amount of storage you are using in your online storage or the average file size. but even that has implications and we embraced the idea of transparency and consent, and all of that data. as you go up the scale with may be content being the end, the most private, the stuff that people have the highest expectation of privacy around. but other things about new york communicating with our right up against content. in terms of what that can reveal about people's relationships, associations, thoughts, beliefs, et cetera. there's very important privacy locations around the.

>> you mentioned transborder issues and the fact that people around the world recognize privacy as an interest, in many cases a human rights. where'd we stand, what are you aware of or what do you know about, is there any progress being made multilaterally or bilaterally or in terms of developing standards for transporter surveillance, transborder government access? anything in the works we should be aware of? >> not that i'm aware of specifically. there's certainly more discussion happening in recent years and have been in the past around a number of constituents and interested parties on privacy around the globe.

the chairman and i recently at an international conference where these issues were loudly and vigorously discussed and debated. that dialogue is happening but in terms of actual progress towards making headway in terms of developing an international framework for this stuff, the short little more work to be done. >> i would ask you and others as well as members of the audience if and when did you become aware of things that are making progress, please let us know. we remain interested in that, in the transborder question. we've talked about the privacy by design. been your experience to technologists give adequate consideration to privacy as a

design product -- as they design products? what more could be done to encourage or promote privacy by design? >> in technology we build things that are reasonably well-defined. i recognize in the previous panel there was a discussion that you don't necessarily need to define privacy to be able to enforce it. on the technology side if we are able to build a model that represents a need, then we are very good at building. i think part of the reason that the mapping a very human, very societal concepts such as privacy into the devices that we built, the services that we build and reuse, sometimes it's

simpler. to answer your question i see it a great deal of attention, a great deal of interest in the notion of privacy, privacy by design, trustworthy by design, special infield that we are dealing with a model and security of the device when we release it and it goes to the field in a mutually distrusting system. you don't really know. it's one thing -- let me take a step back. it's one thing to build a server the word have full control over the actual device and you have to control the flow of information, the software that is their analogies. it's another thing to build a device and leave it in the hands of users, and guessing what they want to do. and then it's one thing to have a notion of privacy as we do and build a system based on that. is another thing when you take a look at this, should i call this

a generation gap, there's this company called snapchat and they have promised whatever picture you take it will disappear. everyone knows things like this in a possible. you could simply take a picture of that device, but we call it job security. when they realize that this was not really possible they announced and there under the oversight of for 20 years to make sure they do things right and they're paying attention. i know they're paying a lot of attention to make sure they get things right with me take a look at the users. i think the status, staff, but asked college students, 50% to more than 50% of college students said yet, we still use the snapchat the they are aware. they understand. i don't know how to reconcile

that. there's a new generation that has, i don't know whether it's more or less but certainly a difference expectation and definition of privacy, and there is a vagueness of what does that mean in terms of a system that could be built. once those were in a reasonable state, we are really good at systems that satisfy those rules. my opening remarks as to our model and industry and in technology. we understand the rules. we are very good at creating those rules and building systems, devices, services and a being that enforce those rules. but it has to be buildable and it has to be enforceable. the attention is certainly the. >> the first premise is the rules have to be clear, it cannot hurt you don't know to build the. >> semi-clear what the. we salute and will be for 2007 that everything had to be

really, really well-defined. it's no longer this. we have a new generation of hackers that do not abide by the rules. therefore, we have to create systems that are almost ready. we're seeing it in programming language comes in and design system, seen in self-correcting system. sometimes somehow somewhat accurate will do. >> did you want to respond to that in a minute remain? >> sure. this reminds me of one of talking about proctor coal encryption. -- practical encryption. i think there are times in certain applications where that risk is fine, and there are other times when it's not find. that's where guidance from pclob can be very helpful in terms of configure what are the files and when it we can a pretty good roles in wind we have to have very tight, accurate 100% certainty kind of rules.

>> okay, thank you. at this point other members of the board will pose questions under the five minute rule and we will go in sort of reverse order down the line starting with rachel brand. >> thank you, jim. and thanks to all of you for being at the that's a good segue because first which i was going to ask was doctor, i was interested in what you're saying about in terms of identification, domestic violence context you want it to be perfect perhaps. can you explain what you mean by that? what's an example of identification methods that might be good enough but perhaps not perfect? a non-technologists as you know he could help me out that would be great. >> so there are certain cases of studies have been done, for instance, when the netflix put out their data online and then

researchers went and looked at the internet movie database to try to see whether they could we identify people. they had resources but it was wrote the variable information. this context i don't think anyone was personally hurt by it. there might be cases where that kind of identification could be extremely damaging. we talked earlier about aggregation of databases and how ability to link different kinds of information across different kinds of databases could actually be detrimental but it can also help find the bad guy. so that's attention to so when is it okay and when is it not okay? are there instances, for instance, for netflix or something that's available online that's just not where you want to school or something is not very important. it may not be really necessary to worry about where you had

dinner. but in context of a group that is actively trying -- that's important. >> how do you do it? or example how to do the perfect -- spent i think your typical. i think we have technology that's pretty good but not perfect. and so the idea is, do you keep the data unencrypted and then easily accessible, or because it's not very important, or do you actually encrypt it and then use reasonable, practicable anonymization on top of that? it just depends. i think this is one the cases where technologists would welcome guidance in helping us to pick up one of the risk

profiles because technologists don't have access to sometimes to what the risks are within the counterterrorism context. >> you said something along the lines in the national security context, some of the phipps must apply the methodology and. can you elaborate on what you? >> sure. first, the historical point which is when the he report was issued, i was just reading my pages 34 consider five, we just about the standards clearly all of them can apply to all intelligence records but some of them must apply because the risk that you because the risk of joined up with one of some protection. to put the more concretely the difficult ones our individual participation and transparency. i think there are ways to address these a lease on an aggregate level, that would be really powerful.

so i think in a 702 context the board, and to take a step back, i think it is, it is shocking that one half years after the disclosure the american public doesn't even a rough sense of how many have had their information collected. take the telephone records program. people think it's everyone in your news report saying only 30% of calls are actually recorded. and so in a 702 context the board has recommended measures to identify the scope. and all my time in the senate i never saw anything that would lead me to believe was actually impossible for the nsa to produce an asset base and statistical sampling of a number jews persons collected in 702 data. in the 12 triple three context number think you did quantify scope. i think there are ways to address these principles at the aggregate level if not at the individual level.

spent december else have a thought? >> in terms of transparency, this is another way in which, for instance, this technologists could be helpful. because when you have, if heidi says, whispers in my ear, -- by the time it gets down i spoke to jim about wearing flannel, something completely give up her so we were talking together from the nsa and the fisc about technology, and you don't have the technologists there to ask questions like, or make suggestions about we could actually com, have you thought t including discover metrics, collecting the data or instrument of software in certain ways? we can approve to have more transparency and more oversight in technology with those discussions bring everyone in the room. >> thank you. >> i'm going to try to get a question for each panelist so i would appreciate a brief

response. annie, you surprise me when you said encryption is -- i guess i would like to understand more. understand having mandating a backdoor weakens protection but why can't it seem as if the terrorists can hide the mutation which seems to be detrimental to counterterrorism. >> i think it's a better, a better when everyone can hide their information. and if, so there was a case in greece where there was a phone and someone was able to actually start because of the backdoors and the known exploits they were able to listen to the conversation. basically do it wiretapped on the prime minister that's what happens when you don't have encryption and security. and to think that the terrorists are not going to do the same thing i think is naïve. >> alvaro, you talked about the expectation of privacy but if i heard you correctly, we talk

about what not what to expect of privacy to be because i can put up a sign i'm conducting video surveillance and i can store the, what it should be. >> i'm not saying that. that's a separate wonderful powerful argument. what i'm saying is technology is making us realize we do expect privacy in scenarios that didn't exist 10 or 15 years ago. i think technology can expand our notion of privacy but i think the fourth amendment doesn't protect me and you. it protects us and society but it's at the base for relationship between government and citizen. >> fourth amendment, you talked about the bouncing government request in your customer's privacy. do you think the government should either work every time it hacks into your customer's records? >> serving in the law for the context we've advocate for reform on the backside that

would in effect require a warrant for access to any content regardless of the age to precise location information of sensitive data. i'm not sure we would go so far as work is required in every single case for every single data type. we certainly need to update the rules so that there is appropriate judicial review of surveillance programs and request with you for david. >> in terms of third party documents which you not have it be an absolute exception to the fourth amendment, but where would you go with it to revise some protection? >> the loss that we deal with provide a sliding scale in effect. it will provide some reasonable oversight and protection something below warrants,

probable cause and we take it as you that's appropriate for some types of subscriber data, et cetera. >> you talked about, how much information should be collected, you talked about enforceable rules for collection but you also said that collection would be faster, cheaper, more connected. be tax will increase in compliance with rules may be more difficult. professor felten talked about abuse of information in breach. how would you strike the balance between collection, collection rules and use rules? >> that's a very good question, every difficult one. i don't know if in the technology, i don't know if we really know where the balance is. when you take a look at the system, take a look at the

capable is, take a look at, in effect all of these impact all of these exploits are becoming so advanced that i used to be the one concrete example. i used to me to be physically around the engine has to be able to lift a fingerprint and then have access to your phone and then use that fingerprint to mount an attack and use your biometrics. with the resolution of the cameras that we have these days, sometimes, very high resolution camera i just need to have your picture that was taken somewhere in china to be able to zoom and zoom in to lift your finger print and mount an attack. how did reflect things like this collection we build systems that whenever there's a finger print it smudges it and we don't expose the? there are things like this that might encompass all those, one can get across is coming up with

the rules that define those capabilities or things that should be done and shouldn't be done is a very complex problem. >> thank you. >> thank you, guys for another excellent panel. my first question and this goes back to what i said on a previous panel, which is i view our job to be translating his ideas, these concepts, these concerns into practical recommendations. starting with you, mr. hinton, what have you found effective as a privacy officer to ensure your very large, complicated workforce dealing with emerging issues takes privacy services, your rules are enforced, and that from beginning to end privacy is a part of your culture? do we have a new privacy officer? this is a free advice to the new privacy officer over at nsa. >> well, thank you.

as i alluded to in my opening remarks, one, there is no silver bullet. you need to take a number of approaches. we've taken a number of approaches to drive awareness and sensitivity around privacy to our workforce through a number of steps on mandatory training that is required for all employees that cover a range of ethical and compliance issues. deeper role-based training the specific to software engineers and specific to sales and marketing people, that specific different roles that people play in the company that impact customer privacy. we have as i mentioned not just sort of told people what the rules are and crossed our fingers and hope they abide by them. we have put in checkpoints in the way that we develop internal system. the way you develop software and

get out the door that has to go through certain checkpoints and reviews to ensure that privacy issues are not overlooked. there's a number of things we've done along those lines to make sure people are aware and have the tools available to them to do privacy right. but then there's also different checks along the way to ensure that mistakes don't get me. nothing is perfect of course but we try to do a multifaceted approach or multilayered approach to make sure we catch those things. >> let me follow up and give a somewhat specific example, a hypothetical. have you found training to be more effective, or effective enough in the absence of pairing with mechanisms -- that was a horrible question so i'm just going to start over again. so 707 '02, the program has certain legal requirements. in the private sector would you

train to those legal requirements or would you also have, for example, when an analyst is sitting there attempting to target or select a whatever they're going to do also have the screen or processor or how they're doing it rules reflected in the computer system there attempting to? >> we do both. to the extent that you can use technology to enforce policy, that's always the super effective because you get past, or you reduce the potential for human error. but that's not always possible. you can't completely prevent mistakes, oversight or intentional bad acts. so you need to do more than that. you have to have, you have to build the awareness so some inadvertent stuff is reduced to

get to build in the technology tools to try to prevent that from happening. they need some level of checks to make sure that everything went right. is that somebody was intentionally trying to circumvent the policy for whatever reason, that there some way to catch that before it creates a negative impact. >> i think i have time for one other quick question. in section 215 program, one of the features, not all of the records went to the government. in fact, names are not provided to the government, subscriber information, numbers and numbers but would it be an example of the identification and non-identification? >> sure. >> that was my only question. >> i have a couple of very brief questions, which i think you can answer very quickly.

you talked about how it would be good for us and you already have technologists on board. how has the government -- [inaudible] based on your knowledge, does the government have technologists who worry at all about privacy? i know they have technologists, but is this as the result of your observations and study in the field something they consult with the technologists about hate, we need this kind of information for national security? art we like to get or as much as we can once the balance -- any of that kind of thing go on inside the government with technologists? >> so having worked a lot for the government, i know that they consult technologists greatly with security, with privacy, with compliance issues and how

do we ensure software that takes all that into consideration. i think if we look at the past five years or so, six years or so that you will see that the nsa was really, really focus on compliance. i think the results of the report and the oversight have shown they have done a good job with that. when there's been an issue that dealt with a period i think someone mentioned the new cpo at nsa. i think what we'll sector but that is not only are we complying with the law going to be something that is factored into all of the software was developed and all of the tools and techniques and procedures but also now just because it complies with the law should we be doing it? what's the extra step are going to take to consider privacy? >> you sound reasonably satisfied with the fact that they're taking a series and doing the best they can? >> i absolutely do. i actually feel very comforted by the fact the government has a

ton of oversight and a ton of laws to comply with. i personally am much more worried about the large collection and not enough collection is taking place in industry that people don't understand. >> so i can get on to my next period mr. bedoya, you talked about how important it was to limit what was necessary or purposeful, et cetera. but in light of so many of the experts on both panels have talked about almost like an inevitable momentum of collection collection collection. what would you look, what part of the government or where would you look for the mechanism to try and limit the collection or get that kind of impediment or violence? >> certainly. so i think folks have been saying that it's inevitable that industry is going to collect all

this data. i don't think folks have been think it's inevitable that government will collect a. and i, for one, don't think it's inevitable that industry will but taken as a given, i think the question is about reconstructing the firewall between government and industry with respect to data collection. and so i'd be surprised if anyone on the panel thinks it's inevitable the government collect all this data. one quick point on your previous question. i should note i believe the congressional committees to conduct oversight on fisa and on foreign intelligence certainly the senate judiciary committee lacks technologists and i think that's an issue. >> i think we talked a bit about that on the first report. mr. hintze, you talked earlier and said one of your principles was there shouldn't be any both data collection. terminology is buried all over the place would help me if i miss legitimate bible

collection. let me just say one gathering -- -- bulk of collection. the great importance of public health data, especially when academics come along or that sort of stuff. so when some of that come under your plan against all bulk of data collection? >> i was talking specifically about government surveillance programs. >> i just wanted to clarify that because, and what do you mean by -- give us an example of what you call both data. this has been a debate whether this program or that program falls in both data. >> i had in mind the 215 program in particular where a government -- >> it's not targeted. >> yes, it's not targeted, correct. >> i think that's all i have. >> we may be able to go back to

board members for additional questions. i would like to continue with this up until the top of the hour. we have one question from the audience which i will read, and we welcome others if others want to pose questions. in 2005, the national academy of sciences studied weather pattern-based data mining can anticipate who is likely to be a future terrorist. it concluded that this wasn't feasible. the question is, is pattern-based data mining, is it feasible today? and will it be seasonable 10 years from now? would anybody like to address that? hadi? >> i don't know specifically about terrorism, what a dimension as we have limited data. but there is a program that

there's been running in los angeles, lapd, we may not necessarily still be able to identify specific criminals, but our predictive modeling systems have been -- are able to make a recently good predictions about where the criminal activities are more likely. it is not precisely the question that you're asking, but i can assure that it is just becoming better. i can assure that any service provider who has amount of data that we are generating and it's becoming more and more and more generated, it's just a honing and fine-tuning and polishing their model. whether they'll be applicable to antiterrorism methods, i don't know. all of these models are heavily data-driven. so a lot of data. but to the point that these

models, predictive modeling are able to predict the things that they were laid indirectly to terrorism or criminal activity, the systems are are saying we are going that way. >> other thoughts on the question? there's a system in chicago the chicago police department has deployed which both has been touted and criticized, but it does somewhat the neighborhood or block level predictive, predictions as to criminal activity, as well as understanding individual levels identify people who may be either victims of crimes or perpetrators of crimes. again, both touted and highly criticized. any thoughts or comments speak with one quick one which is a

few predictability crime on corner x., you watch corner x. like a hawk, you see every crime and, therefore, drop in over represent example of crimes at corner x. >> this is certainly not my area of expertise. however, predicted his being able to reconstruct after the fact. so can we use these things when something's happening go back and find whether we missed certain people are still involved? yes, i do but that is the case. i think we have a ways to go. and i can do with it what is going to be -- crime in my neighborhood. we are getting there. >> at some level that's just all over again.

assistance have been available to police for decades. one question and i will go down the road in an outpost the question and i think we can go down the road with additional boat members if they have additional questions. in talking to each of the panelists i didn't want this to be a panel about going dark and the implications of encryption. but several of you have alluded to encryption and the significance here. i would ask any of you who want to comment on the following, which is, there is a growing trend towards more and more devices, cheaper and cheaper, wearables, the internet of things.

more and more data collection occurring. is also it seems a trend towards more encryption a default, whether it's at the device level or as my chances was referring to, in terms of encryption of data flowing between data centers. so it seems to me like we have two things going on at once. which is not unusual. somebody referred to the modern era, the era of the internet of things and big data, ubiquitous data flows as the golden age of surveillance. and it seems to me that both trends will always be there. more and more information available to the private sector and possibly to the government,

and increasing pervasiveness, or at least increasing diffusion, diffusion of encryption. comments on that as a premise, first of all, the premise of my question. am i right? and secondly where does that leave the government? do you agree with my assumption that there will still be huge amounts of information available to the private sector for its purposes as well as to the government but let's go right down the road. professor. >> so, i believe that there will still be a lot of data that's available for government. when i say that i really support encryption by default, i also really think that our country really, we were the code

hackers. it was really critical in world war ii. and i think that instead of, or taking a lazy approach, and taking the that the backdoor, we should just get better as smoking the code. because they're getting smarter and we need to get smarter. so i lived to the lawyers to decide what the legality of when you can actually apply that are breaking to a system, but being satisfied with just having a backdoor means that we are not advancing our state of the craft in this country. we're going to be left behind as a result. >> my thoughts, the two trends seem to be occurring simultaneously. >> we are certainly seeing an expanded use of encryption, encryption between customers and service provider and encryption between data centers, devices,

et cetera. that's been driven by customer demand. customers are concerned about the security of the data. they're not just concerned about the security of the data. the hackers and bad guys are concerned about the security of the data on the cover. there's a concern out there that is driving custom -- customer demands and companies will continue to invest in that. does it mean there will be no data available? i don't think so. in nature of many cloud services, suppliers, service provider access to it. you can't run an effective e-mail system without being able to filter the content for spam and malware. so there will be a point in the communication chain where data is available, that means if it's available to the server provided it is available to government through lawful commands.

>> hadi, any thoughts on this? then i will yield. >> first off, i want to agree with annie's point. we cannot ask, don't encrypt, don't do anything. i would love to all that when chinese and russians also follow that as well. so that's just not going to work. i'm very respectful of the problems that law enforcement agency has come with the current state of affairs. we just have to get better. and at the end it's going to work better for us as a nation. so that's number one. i fully agree. some things, so going dark, i don't know if it's going dark. i know that we're currently in a state that we are really able to think certain way about the system design, about the system security, about maintaining privacy. that world has changed.

the world and the industry has changed rapidly. the rest of us are catching up. so i think it pays dividends if we figure out sometime figure out what are the rules of this new world where we don't necessary need to rely only on a computer i'm a big fan of encryption. i think it's one of the tools that sector professionals. but there are others. the fact that something is encrypted is not on its unnecessarily the end of the world. how many times, i know michael mentioned the fact where overusing this notion of metadata. but if you think about metadata a something about the data, it is meaningful when you see some encrypted data as being accessible but more than a the. once we start learning how to deal with assistance in you could maintain encryption, maintain strong encryption. we could also do with the cases

where we don't have access to clear. i think our law enforcement, i think our government, i think our legal system, i think us as a society are learning how to deal with this new world where things that we knew in the past no longer apply. lastly, ma the new generation could have. i think they're doing a lot better. they are figuring out that you cannot expect everything is going to be fully protected for you to a figuring out ways to live in the world whether posting a lot of things on facebook, us probably won't do. they're trying to learn how to deal with the system that you may not have the capabilities of the asserting her privacy the with our generation did, but still have an expectation about your rights. >> there's a particular -- does a particular board member have a question? yes. >> several of you have

mentioned, refer to oversight in one way or another. i just want us to question about that. in my view, oversight is especially important in the intelligence context because of the nicer level of secrecy in all areas of government but especially here. at the same time when you start to layer on exercise and paperwork, as a point of diminishing return and jet oversight for its own sake because it doesn't actually deter misconduct. do any of you have thoughts on principles for what effective oversight as opposed to just another box checking exercise? >> i certainly have a few thoughts for the legislature. i think that there's been a lot of soul-searching around how executive needs to change its practices with respect to turn oversight. there's some producers problems at the legislature. one of them is a technology issue the dimension to another is clearances.

i can say with moderate to high confidence that most united states senators lacked a staffer with clarence. i hope i'm wrong but i don't think i am. the fact is that all of the key briefings for the centers are conducted at the level. as a staffer, a lot of staffers en route to you don't send your boss into a meeting about soybeans without -- you don't send in any meeting on an issue that seems very easy without a staffer. all these folks are going in and step. thankfully folks on judiciary and intelligent a folks for the committee that they can rely on. outside of those committees you are often flying, i don't want to save line glen pritchard of the resource you need to conduct a serious oversight. >> i have to follow-up questions for dr. anton.

on identification. one is, you commented earlier that phone numbers -- [inaudible] identified an education. [inaudible] >> i stand corrected on the. >> then i guess you also commented earlier that having a lock on your door was a pretty good protection against burglars but not a perfect protection. i guess the question is in the context of a massive database, burglars may not have the wherewithal to break into it with some in the community but with a database, brutal force attack you might be able to get a very valuable return on its own but does that suggest that it needs to be stronger i mean that even the sufficient?

as you point out on the netflix example, there have been articles about the ability to identify. >> you can see all of this program online at c-span.org. we are leaving u this and taking you live to the senate floor as they gavel in. confirmation votes for district nominees today as well as a house passed bill that we offer is a federal program that helps low income families pay child care. c-span2. georgia. the guest chaplain: let us pray. father, you are the maker of us all. you are sovereign over every nation. you are the giver of wisdom, and your wisdom teaches all of us, and most certainly our leaders in this senate who i lead in prayer today. i ask you to help them to heed your wisdom which teaches all of us to be humble, to help them seek humility, to be honest with themselves first, then each other and then us,

to be just and seek justice for all. teach them to hunger and thirst for righteousness and not self-righteousness, to embrace repentance when they fall. most of all, teach them to walk in integrity and not to fear accountability, and finally to seek unity and not position. have mercy on us, give us grace. thy kingdom come, thy will be done on earth, in this nation and in this senate, as it is in heaven. through jesus, i lift this prayer to you, o god, amen. the president pro tempore: please join me in reciting the pledge of allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

mr. durbin: mr. president? the president pro tempore: the democratic leader. mr. durbin: it's my understanding the senator from louisiana has a unanimous consent request. the president pro tempore: without objection, the senator is recognized to make a request. ms. landrieu: i would like to have five minutes of the leader time, five minutes to speak. i ask unanimous consent for up to five minutes. the president pro tempore: without objection, so ordered. ms. landrieu: thank you, mr. president. i know that we're going to have some discussions between the leaders about the agenda coming up. i just want to take a few minutes to make it perfectly

clear that i think one of the first steps that we need to take to assure voters that we have heard the message and i myself have heard that message is to get our work done on the floor of the senate. now, i'm a centrist, i'm a proud centrist. the record expresses that i'm a centrist, and as i said a thousand times on this floor and 10,000 times at home, i have been part of the coalitions that have helped make this place work when it did, and i have been part of the coalition that's tried to make this place work even when it didn't. the record is clear. i don't have to say more about that. but yesterday when i arrived in washington thinking that it would be a very good time, a very good time to begin our work and came to the senate floor, i was actually really, really, really surprised that neither

leader on either side, neither our leadership, neither harry reid or mitch mcconnell, was prepared to move us to a vote that is so obvious that we should do, and it's been obvious for a long time, and that vote is on the keystone pipeline. as chair of the energy committee, i moved this out of my committee months ago as chair. i said i would and i did, and worked every day that i could to get this vote up on the senate floor. i want to submit to the record and talk for a few minutes about it because i came here at 20bg yesterday. it's 24 hours. what difference -- what a difference 24 hours can make when a senator is willing to stand up and speak and lead. my leadership didn't give me permission to do this. nobody asked me to do it, and i

waited for mitch mcconnell and john cornyn to call for a vote on the keystone pipeline and neither one of them did. i want to read to you what leader mcconnell said yesterday because at 4:00, he is going to come to the floor and try to convince us that he said something else, but the reporters have the record, i have the transcript, and i'm going to take just a minute to read it now. okay. i'm going to get that in just one second because i have it, but i'm going to paraphrase it now while the staff brings it to me. mitch mcconnell came to the floor -- and i was here when he spoke, so i know it pretty well -- he came to the floor and he took a few bows for the win, and then he said there is some work that we need to do in this lame duck. he did not mention the keystone

pipeline. it's not in the transcript. it is not in the transcript. he said three things, and i'm going to -- he said something about the budget. he said something about retroactive taxes, and he said a third thing. i'm going to read the transcript into the record in just a minute. so i waited patiently, hoping that he would say something about the keystone pipeline since it was talked about a lot on the campaign trail last year, but he didn't. he said he has his agenda and it was clear that there were a few things we had to do in the lame duck, the keystone pipeline wasn't one of them so i was disappointed. i had to wait for the second leader on the republican side john cornyn to speak and there is a lengthy transcript that he has, and here is the mcconnell transcript. let me go back. this is what mr. mcconnell said yesterday.

now, this is 24 hours later after this senator stood on the floor and made some pretty pointed remarks about the leadership on both sides here. this is 24 hours later, but this is what mcconnell, leader mcconnell said yesterday. in the weeks that remain in this congress, we should work to accomplish the essential task of funding the congress and preventing retroactive tax increases, period, stop. we must address the expiring authority passed earlier this session for the department of defense to train and equip the moderate vetted syrian opposition, comma, and we must continue to support the efforts to address the ebola crisis. no mention of keystone, not one. if i were the leader of the majority party and came back and said there is some unfinished business after talking incessantly about keystone for the last six years, the first thing i would do is say --

unanimous consent for three more minutes. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection. ms. landrieu: the first thing i would have done is come to the floor and say listen, here is a list of things that we need to vote on. we don't -- we can have a short thanksgiving break, we don't have to have a long break for christmas. the problem is we haven't been working. here's my list. he mentioned three things. keystone was not on them. then to shorten this, john cornyn came, the senator from texas, to the floor and he gave a very long list. he did, in fact, mention keystone but it was in the context of as soon as we convene again, as soon as we convene in january, a long list, we will vote on keystone. now, i came to the floor yesterday and said that was not good enough to the leader of my leadership and the leadership of the republican party and said you know what? i'd like to vote on keystone now. and so yesterday because i gave

that speech and because the public wants us to do this. more than me, the public wants a vote on keystone and have wanted it for a long time. the house of representatives took the bill that senator hoeven and i had drafted, stripped the language of theirs which would never have passed the senate of the united states and would never have gotten to the president's desk, put our language in. like i would be upset about that. i'm not upset about that. i'm happy about that. i am grateful that i was able yesterday in three hours to move the leadership of the democrats in the senate, the leadership of the republicans in the senate, the republican leadership in the house to get a vote on keystone on tuesday. so i'm going to come back and say more about this, but for the reporters that are not used to people being as direct as i'm being now, go read the transcript for yourself, so when they call press conferences later today and claim victory,

please remember who was on this floor talking about it, because mitch mcconnell didn't mention it. the transcript is right here. did not mention the word keystone. he mentioned -- john cornyn mentioned the word amnesty several times. and keystone once. i'm the senator that came to this floor as chair of the energy committee to say let's get our business done, let's start now, and that's what we're going to do, so i'm glad we're going to be voting very soon. i yield the floor. mr. chambliss: madam president? i would ask unanimous consent to speak for up to three minutes. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection, please proceed. mr. chambliss: madam president, i rise today to welcome my friend, my fellow georgian, dr. george dillard, who is the senior minister at the peachtree city christian church in peach tremendous city, georgia. as he prayed so eloquently, as is our tradition here in the senate, i'm just very pleased

that dr. dillard had a chance to come join us today. he and his wife renee of 26 years have three children, tiffany, alexis and stuart. i appreciate them sharing him with us today. george has been my dear friend for many, many years. i have had an opportunity to pray with him in public, pray with him in private, hear him preach in his church. he is a very eloquent individual and is such a great public chin certificate elephant in that he is so active, not just in peachtree city christian church but all over the community of peachtree city. he -- he has been the guest chaplain at our across the capitol neighbors, the house of representatives on a couple of occasions. he regularly is the guest pastor in the georgia legislature under the gold dome in atlanta. and i am just very pleased that he's here today. i thank him for taking time to join us and thanks for his

well-spoken words of getting us started here in the senate today. thank you, george. i yield the floor. a senator: madam president? the presiding officer: the senator from georgia. mr. isakson: madam president, i just want to join the senior senator who was kind enough to invite our chaplain today in the praise of george. george dillard is a great chaplain in our state, a great civic leader, a great christian leader and a great leader in our state. he has been a dynamic minister in our church, a doctor, has his doctorate in biblical studies. we would like to welcome him to washington, d.c., where we need all the biblical help we can get. we thank george dillard for his prayer, his devotion and his faith, and i yield back. ms. landrieu: madam president, i know we have to move to three votes. i would like to ask unanimous consent to speak immediately after the vote for ten minutes. the presiding officer: is there objection? without objection.

under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate will proceed to executive session to consider the following nominations which the clerk will report. the clerk: judiciary, ran dolphin d. moss of maryland to be united states district judge for the district of columbia. leigh martin may of georgia to be united states district judge for the northern district of georgia. the presiding officer: under the previous order, there are two minutes of debate equally divided before a vote on the moss nomination. who yields time? mr. chambliss: madam president, we would yield back time on our side, and i would ask unanimous consent to be allowed to speak on behalf of the northern district of georgia appointee, leigh may. ms. landrieu: i object.

reserving the right to object. that's fine. thank you. madam president, we kneeled back all time on this side. -- we yield back all time on this side. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there is a sufficient second. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: are there any senators in the chamber wishing to vote or change their vote? if not, the ayes are 54, the noes are 45678 the nomination is confirmed. under the previous order, there are two minutes of debate equally divided before a vote on the may nomination. mr. leahy: mr. president, i yield my time to the senator

from georgia, senator chambliss. the presiding officer: the senator from georgia. mr. chambliss: mr. president, i thank senator leahy for yielding time, and i thank you most importantly for working through the process of getting several of georgia's judges to the floor of the senate. we've got some emergency positions that need to be filled, and senator leahy has been very cooperative in helping us to do. on behalf of my colleague senator isakson and myself, i encourage all of my colleagues to support the nomination of leigh may to be a judge for the district court for the northern district of georgia. miss may is graduate of our two flagship institutions, georgia tec as well as the university of georgia law school. she's practiced law with the butler wootan firm for many, many years, been involved in many high-profile case us. she brings intellect and integrity to the bench. she will be a great addition to the northern district of georgia and i encourage my colleagues to

vote in support of this nominee. i yield back and i would ask for the yeas and nays. the presiding officer: is there a sufficient second? there is a sufficient second. the clerk will call the roll. vote: vote:

vote:

the presiding officer: any senator wishing to vote or wishing to change a vote? if not, the ayes are 99. the nays are zero. the confirmation is confirmed. the nomination is confirmed. mr. reid: madam president? the presiding officer: mr. leader. senators, please take your conversations out of the

chamber. mr. reid: madam president, very quickly. the presiding officer: mr. leader. mr. reid: i have seven unanimous consent requests for committees to meet during today's session. they have been approved by me and senator mcconnell. i ask consent the requests be agreed to, the requests be printed in the record. madam president? the presiding officer: without objection. mr. reid: i ask unanimous consent the next vote be ten minutes in duration, and it will be the last vote prior to a 5:30 vote on monday. and my friend, the senior senator from maryland is here. she does not wish to speak, so i'm through. the presiding officer: under the previous order, the motions to reconsider are considered made and laid on the table, and the president will be immediately notified of the senate's action, and the senate will resume legislative session. the clerk will report the cloture motion. the clerk: cloture motion. we the undersigned senators in accordance with the provisions

of rule 22 of the standing rules of the senate hereby move to bring to a close the debate on the motion to concur on the house amendment 1086, an act to reauthorize and improve the child care development block grant act of 1990 and for other purposes, signed by 17 senators. the presiding officer: by unanimous consent, the mandatory quorum call has been waived. the question is, is it the sense of the senate that debate on the motion to concur in the house amendment to s. 1086, a bill to reauthorize and improve the child care and development block grant act of 1990 and for other purposes shall be brought to a close. the yeas and nays are mandatory under the rule. the clerk will call the roll. vote:

vote:

vote: