we've already been directed to use that model. we now have to go to the court to access the data. >> is the government no longer collecting located? >> the data continues to be provided to us. now to access the data we have to go to the court to get permission to access the data. >> why continue to gather the

data is both administration and the and i don't think this is the best approach to? >> guess i'm confused because i don't think i've heard the president or the di said access to the data is not a value. i think what i've heard is the question gets to be who should hold the data it the president directed in his remarks will continue to implement the program right now while congress works to how we'll make long-term changes. we will do that on a 90 day interval. so every 90 days we have to go back and ask for continued permission. >> one last comment. i know amount of time. if the administration believes, and understand that they do, that the better model is to go to a paradigm where companies hold onto the own data. it is a mix and forced to continue the collection of bulk metadata. we are not legally required to add to the reason that to move

from the model and begin the transition now. i yield back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. admiral, thank you for being here today and the work that you and your team are doing at nsa. it's important work to the country. we had a discussion a few minutes ago about potential insourcing in terms of cyber intrusions. over the past several weeks the american people have seen disturbing number of cyber related incidents, including the state department, the white house, postal service and industrial control systems that control our critical infrastructure. we found some certain amount where. these come on the heels of other major attacks or intrusions such

as the jpmorgan chase, target, michael's, the south korean banking, on 60 minutes last month fbi director comey said there are too and i quote two kinds of the companies in u.s., those have been hacked by the chinese and those who don't know the impact by the chinese. the other nation states are doing council criminal enterprises consider. to date we have seen these focus on data breaches and international espionage but what keeps me up at night, and i'm sure you as well, is the worry that we could face a true cyber attack. one the action causes significant damage that would get the same kind of facts through cyber that traditionally you would see through use of

kinetic weapons. we know that technology is out there, as you know, and so my question is, we know who and how we would respond if we saw an attack using kinetic weapons, missiles or bombs. we have either the pentagon or the law enforcement agencies would respond to protect us in those cases, or national guard. but what confidence can you give to the american people, what can you say to the american people that would give them confidence that we have a plan in place and we would know how to respond if either we saw an attack within the planning stages ready to be executed or if it was being, if the order was given, sort of underway and we could stop it? at this point is their syndicate -- significant methods in place

absent presidential authority or would it require presidential authority to step in in order to intervention whereby we could prevent that attack to protect the country, protect our critical infrastructure, et cetera? basically do we have a bridge in place to do with the bureaucratic and legal hurdles or does that presidential authority at this point? >> the short answer is i'm pretty comfortable that we have a broad agreement, a broad sharing of how we're going to do it, who would you want. the roles are clearly defined but if i go back 18 months ago, we were spinning our wheels but who was going to do what. we are way past that. we have good delineation within the federal government as to who has what responsibility. we've got good, broad agreement as to how we go by providing the

capability in the snow you will talk about with a taxi is critical infrastructure. clearly presidential authority is required for part of it, for example, asked me as a dod entity to provide support in the u.s., to partner with others outside the dod of rita. that's required. if part of the response is going to be an offensive capability yes, i would need approval of the present to do that. we've got broad agreement. the challenge to me is we've got to move beyond the broad agreement to get down to the extra should level of detail. you take those broad concepts of agreement and to train and to exercise and you do it over and over. that's what we got to do next. >> what about direct attacks? cyber espionage, some could certainly argue for hundreds of billions of dollars lost in cyber crime and cyber espionage,

some which is highly methodical and systematic, really a massive threat to the american economy, to jobs. but when does that become economic warfare? how do we respond to? >> first of all i think we're still trying to come to grips with when does it become economic warfare. we have tried to make the argument that we tried to differentiate between the capability of the nation's detroit understand the world around versus point the capabilities of a nationstate against the private sector of another nation to generate economic advantage. that's the major difference among the major differences between us and our chinese counterparts where we have argued we don't accept that. we don't use our capabilities to go after private industry in other nations to use that as a vehicle for us to gain economic advantage. that's not what we do. to your broader question, i think the shorter entries we are clearly trying to work our way

through all those issues. we tend to treat right now, you talk about criminal actors. we can do good right now as a law-enforcement issue. the fbi, primarily be there with director comey. i would argue clearly that approach is not achieving the results we want. we are spending our time dealing with the repercussions of the penetrations. what i'd like to do is how can we forestall those penetrations in the first place? we talked today, it's about those norms, about those rules of behavior, about those ideas that deterrence. clearly those are areas where we still have a lot of work to do. >> thank you. i appreciate you will -- i appreciate the work you're doing. i have questions i will submit for the record. thank you for what you're doing. yield back. >> there's about one minute 15 seconds left. >> i'm going to be very brief bit on the other side of this, what can you say to assure the

american people in the absence of legislation that would address their concerns over the mass collection of metadata and concerns about privacy that despite the failure of the congress to pass legislation what you may be doing differently that could assure them that their privacy is protected to? >> so what we're doing differently is you heard in the president's remarks on the 17th of january he indicated while i haven't seen nsa violating the law or attempting to systematically undermine the rights of the privacies of our citizens, i'm concerned about the potential. therefore, i'm going to overlay a couple of additional requirements on nsa. for example, with the metadata, i want you cannot go to the courts. not enough use your own authority as the director so speak. not want you to go to the fisa court. we didn't have to do that. he also directed when we went

into, in those instances when we went into the data we used to be able what we called three hops come to about the time we default the string so speak. the president came back and said i tell you what, again i want to put another level of protection. i only want you to do the two hops if you think there's a connection. we are not authorized to follow the string as deep as we used to be able to. terms of metadata those are the changes we've met with, in addition he has provided broad guidance in the form of unclassified document that the government has generated which in a very public unclassified way outlines the general principles that we want to make sure that we applied in conducting signal intelligence, the mission of nsa. so we're putting those principles in place. in addition we completed over

the course of the last 15 months or so a fundamental review of everything nsa does, what we collect against. that's all been reviewed to ensure we are comfortable from a policy perspective of what we are doing. >> thank you. >> one thing on that, basically the adult just said it's in our bill which the senate afford to did not take up. >> and just quickly, i think this is so important because i think there was some confusion here. you're a teen information for under section 215 the of the court, are you not? don't you have to go to the court? >> that is correct. i thought he indicated, every 90 days with to go to the court to get permission. >> the court overseas -- >> continues to look at the justification. >> is the content on those phone calls? are you taking, collecting,

storing content on phone calls to? >> no. >> the information you get is metadata. doesn't contain pii in that metadata? do you store the pii to? >> because, again i would have to talk to war but you could argue i get a phone number is pii. of course, the challenge is, not the challenge but we get the number, not a name. >> so there's no names, no addresses, information of which are collected and used that as an analytical tool. do you believe that that information is valuable in any counterterrorism effort that the united states undertakes? >> yes, i do. >> do you have personal knowledge of that information has led or assisted in any counterterrorism investigation counterterrorism investigation to help defend the to? >> yes. i think it has been a value to our efforts. >> i just can't make sure, this is really important to me. no content is collected under section 215. you get a review by the court

every 90 days, meaning you to go back every 90 days with what you done with it and how your processed it and how you've handled it. and if you want to go for another 90 days you have to make the case? >> yes, for the next 90 days. >> there's some notion we shouldn't be participating in this, i think was a bit confusing. i think we try to get this right by ending the bulk metadata collection by the government putting it all in one place, even those protections replace i think that you are conscious of america said it was legal, constitutional but maybe that's not the way to do. you have adjusted to that, is that correct? a jessica the new requirements. the are two competing bills trying to get this right. i would be cautious about shedding that before there's any legislative direction on fixing that. would be my caution as i know some others have called it something different. and cycling on the pii for companies, don't you have the capability to strip pii for

information, the nsa? >> right. i would think we could do that in an automated fashion but again it's one of those things one of the reasons why i would want to have a discussion of sexual can of information we are talking about because i can build in the production in terms of the technical -- >> that was an important part of this conversation but even if the company does have the capability today that says i have this malicious source code, looks like this, i'm going to give it to you, you have the ability to strip the pii before it ever got into an analytical database, correct? >> i think we could do that. >> that's what the nsa has told us. my only fear is, again the biggest debate, you want congrescopiesto purchase but bes voluntary. we need to make sure the liability standards are right if they are, in fact, in good faith trying to provide malicious source code without pii that these companies are not held to

some different standard when accidentally, could happen, pii gets through. you would want the company's making some effort. you would want an essay to have a system to strip the pii before got into the database which is easy for you to do i would argue down a multitude of thousands of companies trying to share malicious source code that they've originated in russia or china or iran or north korea, or some international organized crime element. i just want to make sure we have the full and open discussion about what that looks like and why there are concerns about limiting the number of companies that participate. it has more vulnerabilities to the whole system. i just wanted to make sure we made that clear and was on record to admiral kime your saved by the bell. the clock shows is your but again i want to thank you for your service to the country. thinks are stepping in at a difficult time. thanks for improving the brow of the nsa folks and hope you will take back as a committee to in a

bipartisan way is pretty does oversight. i think you've seen that already. that we have the utmost respect for the work that the doing and thanks for their patriotism and staying on mission, despite what they might read in the newspaper. so thank you, sir, thanks to the men and women of the national security agency. >> thank you, sir. [inaudible conversations] >> i say to my good friend from north dakota was no. >> thank you, mr. speaker and i thank my good friend. >> i would just say to my good friend from wisconsin that was part of the story. >> i think my good friend from california. >> sponsored by my good friend cory gardner from colorado.

>> this has british lineage. it comes from parliament hundreds of years ago what if you've ever seen the proceedings of the house of commons they say something similar, the right honorable gentleman in which has a similar meaning, kind of a thinly veiled approach to trying to be polite to somebody that you don't really care for. at least in the house of representatives where there are 435 members a lot of these men and women don't even know who each other are when they're saying my good it's kind of disingenuous to use another phrase from the book. in the senate is only 100. they probably know each other but they might not like each other but at least there's a better chance of them being at least a quaint as if that actually good friends. >> journalist david mark on the world of political terminology sunday night at eight eastern and pacific on c-span q&a. >> in his senate confirmation hearing today nicholas rasmussen, the nominee to be director of the national

counterterrorism center discussed a variety of security threats including isis, iran and cyberattacks. he is currently deputy director of the agency. senator diane feinstein chairs this hour-long hearing of the select intelligence committee. >> [inaudible conversations]

>> this thing will come to order. let me just say that the assumed to be chair of this committee this is not my usual way of operation. i like to be on time. we got into a bit of a problem in the caucus and i just wanted to say that to you. the committee will come to order. we meet today in open session to consider the president's nomination. mr. nick rasmussen to be the trick of the counterterrorism center, or as we call it nctc. mr. rasmussen is well-known and respected why the committee. he has appeared numerous times in closed session as a deputy to her of nctc. and since matt olson's resignation as the acting

director, it is my intention pending today's session to move this nomination quickly to the senate and seek his confirmation before our adjournment in december. mr. rasmussen has been the deputy director of nctc since 2012. prior to this he served from 2007-2012 as the senior director for counterterrorism at the national security council. he is well-versed in terrorist threats to the united states and the growth of terrorist groups around the country. mr. rasmussen's government service goes back in 1991, with a series of positions at the department of state, the nsc and nctc. mr. rasmussen, i enjoyed reading in the background materials for this hearing the public service is part of your family. i am pleased to welcome your family here who have been in public service as well.

i know i speak for the vice chairman of the committee, senator chavez, who regrets he can't be here with us today, and for myself, when i say that we need a full-time senate confirmed director of the national counterterrorism center as soon as possible. i won't go into the threats to our nation they will go into the record, and it's clear i think to all of us who do in this situation with the islamic state of iraq and the levant, or isil and iraq and syria. we continue our efforts to defeat al-qaeda in the fattah of pakistan and the number of acute affiliates and other terrorist groups across the world is growing. so it is a real problem and it is escalating. these groups now have safe havens in syria, libya, across other parts of north africa, and in many places online.

the threat from isil, the khorasan group, aqap in particular pose a direct threat to the united states homeland. both from external attack and from directed and inspired the wolf attacks from within the united states. the nctc needs to be at the front of our efforts to identify these attacks as it has done many times in the past. at the same time, the director of nctc is the national intelligence manager for counterterrorism and the official in charge of governmentwide strategic operational planning to defeat terrorism. so, mr. rasmussen, you have a day job before you. i've gone through the answers to the questions that you submitted. i see no problem whatsoever. but it's a great pleasure to welcome you and your family here today.

i would like to asking in this consent to put into the record the letter of support for knicks nomination from former nctc directors like lighter and matt olsen. admiral william mcraven, former director fbi, former deputy fbi director sean joyce, former national deputy nationals good advisor juan zarate. and interest of moving forward at me stop, welcome the nominee and ask senator burr for his opening statement. >> thank you, madam chairman. nic, let me first that want to thank you for your many years of government service, state department, the white house, the odni and nctc. and i think you for the time that you spent with me the other day and your insight into the areas of interest to had an opportunity to talk about a guy like to welcome your wife, your parents. i know all three of you are

proud of the progress of his career, and i thank you for sharing him with the country. because it is invaluable. over the last 10 years you focus primarily on analyzing the terrorist threat to our country and devising policies to address those threats. nctc is going to need your experience in the years to come. 13 years after 9/11 we continue to face al-qaeda in afghanistan, al-qaeda affiliates and somalia, yemen, north africa, syria and now the indian subcontinent. boko haram in nigeria, al-shabaab and somalia, isil and al-nusra front in syria and iraq, and the list goes on and on. these groups raise money via criminal acts, growing business enterprises and in some cases state sponsorship. extremist with technical degrees special skills and expertise holding ieds are being lured to support complex attacks

plotting western fires exploding local and regional conditions to train before returning home. here at home we face the threat by homegrown violent extremists, extremists often utilize the information in connections from online and print smaller scale simple plots that are harder to detect. these terrorists are capable, well organized, well-financed and they aspire to attack u.s. persons episodes abroad and at home. the terrorist threat is more distributed and complex than ever before. we no longer have the luxury of focusing our attention group or on one region. you are being asked to lead our nation's primary agency for integrating and analyzing all intelligence related to the terrorist threat, and you do have your work cut out for you. this committee will endeavor to provide you with the resources you need to address the threat and to keep our nation safe. but the truth is we are going to have to make some difficult choices in years to come.

nctc is a capable organization with excellent people. i fully expect you to leave an effective agency under our watchful eye but i can also assure you that moving forward we are going to challenge you to improve the center and to search for efficiencies. we are going to ask tough questions and push you to be better, and i look forward to you giving us direct and candid answers. i thank the chair, and pledge we have of vice chairman chambliss and this side of the aisle, madam chairman, you can't move too fast on this nomination for us. >> thank you very much. would you stand please, mr. rasmussen? which repeat after me? i, nick rasmussen, do solemnly swear that i will give this committee truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help me god?

[inaudible] >> thanks. do you agree to appear before the committee here or in other venues when invited? do you agree to send officials and nctc and dedicated staff when invited? do you agree to provide documents or any other which was requested on the committee in order for it to turn out its oversight and legislative responsibility? >> i do. >> will you ensure that the nctc and its officials provide such material to the committee when requested the? >> i do. >> be a great -- [inaudible] all members of this committee on intelligence activities and covert actions rather than only the chairman and vice chairman? >> i do. >> would you promise to brief the committee within 24 or 48 hours of any terrorist attack or

attempted terrorist attack if requested by the committee? >> yes. >> thank you for much. please be seated, i and would be interested in your opening statement. >> number members of the committee. let me start by thanking you all very much for considering my nomination to be the next nctc director. i want to express by appreciation for the efforts of the committee staff. their sentiments about the work that goes into their preparation and review to support any confirmation hearing and i'm grateful. i would like to recognize and introduce my parents, mary jo and gary rasmussen, and my wife, maria. their love and support means everything to me and i'm glad you're here with me today. as he remarked i briefed this committee several times as recently as last week in closed session in my capacity as the deputy director of nctc. this is my first opportunity to appear in open session attitude welcome that opportunity.

i'm honored by the presence of trust and confidence in my ability to continue to serve in our enterprise. public service came naturally to me growing up in the washington area as i ha had to look no furr than to the own family for example, and inspiration to my father and my mother moved to northern virginia from wisconsin in 1952 so my father could pursue a career in public policy. he was a career federal employee begin at the department of agriculture working on capitol hill for a short time as a junior staff them on the house side and retiring almost 40 years as the most senior career official at the department of education. my mother was a public school teacher while playing an extremely active role in a local church and serving for over 10 years on the board of the northern virginia community college. i have one sibling who was in active duty military officer with two tours of duty in afghanistan and another brother who works in local government in fairfax and volunteers in his church committee.

everything i wanted to learn about public service and commitment i learned firsthand from my family. i have a long way to go be serving in government as long as my father but i'm currently on your 23 i started my career while i was a student at wesley and university to work as an entered at the department of defense working on the korean desk. after finishing graduate school at princeton i joined the department of state as a presidential management intern just as the tim train it was liberating kuwait during operation desert storm. during my tenure at the state from a was given many, many extraordinary opportunities whether working on efforts to dissuade north korea from pursue nuclear ambitions, establishing formal structure gentlemen they didn't peace accords in bosnia, or latest in my state department career working toward a lasting resolution to the arab-israeli conflict. my career took a sudden turn in mid-two does one would accept a position on the national security council staff.

my first day on the job was monday september 17, 2001, 6 days after the 9/11 attack. since that day 13 years ago i've been focus for every day of mike weir on the nation's counterterrorism efforts. those years included career positions at the white house under both president bush and obama and the nctc. over those years i've seen what i believe are vast improvements in the characters and capabilities and policies. but that said, challenges remain and there's much work to be done. this is what makes the work of the men and women at nctc so essential but it's what i would very much like the opportunity to lead them to serve alongside him as their director. the u.s. working with allies and partners has made great strides in dismantling the al-qaeda organization that attacked us in

september 2000 that the threat we face continues to evolve. as the president said at west point for the foreseeable future, the most direct threat to america at home and abroad remains terrorism. the committee will understands instability in the levant, the broader middle east and across north africa has accelerated the al-qaeda movement. the movement towards global focus under osama bin laden is no being driven by local and regional conflict and factors. all across the unstable regions we are confronting a multitude of threats to the u.s. from long-standing well-known terrorist groups but also from newer and much more loosely connected networks of like-minded violent extremists who operate without regard to national borders established organizational norms. this committee better than almost any audience i ever engage with understands in greater detail the diverse and multifaceted threat picture we face from al-qaeda and its affiliates. that picture also includes other senators groups to include isil.

it includes she online groups like hezbollah and a bronze could force and even includes homegrown violent extremists who live almost as here inside the united states. to some of the threat picture in my view we face a broader array of threats are migrated variety of groups and actors than at any point since 9/11. further complicated the picture our losses and click of result of unauthorized disclosure, the spread of extremist messaging by social we indian an in different ways and the need we face to balance technology-based analytic tools with people focused human resource intensive izod analysis.

today the threat we face is different from ben and i would argue we are far better equipped to respond that we were in 2004. earlier this year as nctc commemorate its 10th anniversary we were on herees both authors of that landmark legislation. senator collins, you told the assembled workforce there is no doubt the information sharing is far superior to what was prior to the passing of the law in 2004 and no doubt a talented workforce at nctc has made a huge difference. i'm not sure you could see the crowd very well through the stage lights at the auditorium but i can assure you members of the workforce were beaming with pride when they heard your words. 10 years later i firmly believe we can declare that your vision, the congress is vision for nctc has, in fact, taken hold to that vision called for integrated and

motivated nctc workforce fully empowered with access to the right information and armed with the best training and tools. i believe that vision is growing stronger every day. we all know this is no time for complacency, self-satisfaction can either at nctc or anywhere else. we understand the civilian challenges remain. the attaches we face are consistent and adapted and we must learn and change into their everyday. we must exceed their determination to attack us with her own will to make certain they don't succeed. in the current position as the deputy director and acting director i'm reminded of 9/11 and the threat we face every single day. if confirmed by this and i would bring the focus and urgency born of that terrible day 13 years ago to everything idea as director. i would and to ensure the best and brightest continue to fill our ranks a at nctc and i wouldt nctc and i'm interested equipped with the tools and the training

they need to meet the threat. in my 23 years in government service i want a number that's working in different government organizations. no label means as much to me personally over that time as the label member of the counterterrorism community. everyday i'm privileged to work with truly outstanding friends and partners all across that community at fbi, cia, nsa, defense department, homeland security, justice, state, treasury, state and local partners, international partners, white house and here on capitol hill with you and your staff. a job for which i've been nominated demands very much but i'm thankful for the loving support of my family, my wife, parents. and i like to take this opportunity to thank her and thank them publicly today. they have always been there to support me as i pursued my career. i've been part of the family since its inception in 2004 even when serving president bush and president obama for soviets on the nsc staff at the white

house. i felt connected to the remarkable organization at nctc, its vital mission, its workforce and it's terribly critical place within the intelligence community. there's no place in government where i would rather serve. chairman feinstein, senator burr, senators, thank you as always for your support for the women and men who work every day at nctc and for considering my nomination to be its next director. i look forward to questions. thank you, madam chair. >> thank you very much. mr. rasmussen, in a written statement for the record you wrote, and i quote, attacks either link or inspired by isil in belgium and canada, recent arrests in europe and australia demonstrate that the threat beyond the middle east is real, although thus far limited in sophistication. however, if left unchecked over time we can expect isil's

capabilities to mature. at a threat to the united states homeland ultimately to increase. could you expand on nctc is viewed as a threat from isil to the extent you can in an unclassified setting, please? >> i would be happy to. i tend to think of the threat i suppose is currently as being somewhat in concentric circles. because the capable is chris in iraq and syria right now i think our personal are potentially greatest at risk, particularly anorak where our embassy security is of course as you know a serious concern. in the front-line states of iraq and syria, jordan, turkey, syria, lebanon, saudi arabia, we worry that isil has the capability and ability potential to carry out attacks identify and mobilize personnel who could engage in attacks against u.s. personnel and interest. beyond that, the next outer ring

i would look at is in western europe where the very language that you cited in your question indicates that isolate so europe as a potential theater of operations were making out attacks. lastly the homeland, where we believe iso has aspirations of time to develop the capability we need to carry out the homeland attack. at this point we assess we are far more at risk presently of attack from individual homegrown violent extremists who may be inspired by but not necessary directed by isil here in the homeland. the point about if left unchecked we worry the longer isil is left unchecked and is left to pursue and develop a safe haven, the more the capable is allowed to grow to carry out attacks in each of those theaters that i mentioned. >> thank you. i saw in your responses to our present questions that you wrote

that you'll be hiring more than 40 officers this year. it's my understanding that in addition to these 40, nctc still has many vacant positions it needs to fill. so the question is with respect to contractors, which we have some concerns about, how do you plan to fill the vacant spot at nctc? >> first of all thank you, madam chair. to support nctc receives from this committee and our efforts to maintain the best possible workforce could not be better. we are very grateful for that. the numbers you cite of 40 individuals w we're looking to hire this year reflexively call people who are hired and worked in the office of the director of national intelligence. as you know and most of the committee knows well, nctc has appointed workforce which includes permanent cadre employees would also detailed personnel from other intelligence committee and not

just intelligence community but other intelligence organizations as well. that is the real lifeblood of nctc, the expertise, the taliban get from other departments and agencies. >> will be 40 be transfers? will they be a next? >> they will be new direct hire. at the same time in parallel we are pursuing a similar effort to try to get our detailee numbers up from soccer reason i just said. we need the topic on some other intelligence of partners. all of those partners are willing and very strong supporters of nctc as an enterprise. the challenge comes year in and year out as you keep the numbers up. they have their own staffing needs innovative budget uncertainty they themselves and sometimes struggle to meet their own intro efforts to staff themselves. it's a constant dialogue with them and as i was is a very positive dialogue with them to make sure we can get talented officers from places like fbi, cia and other partners in the

intelligence community. >> thank you. senator burr. >> thank you, madam chairman. nick, the committee as you know is charged with providing beaches and oversight. a couple of questions that really go in line with what the chairman had you rise and raise your hand and swear to. would you agree that the committee, to conduct effective oversight, that we should have access to the intelligence products produced by the intelligence community and in some cases be provided with the wrong reporting that contributed to that analysis? >> yes. i believe in some specific cases it would make sense to have access to the reporting. >> we commit to providing the committee complete and tom access to all nctc products, reporting and staff if necessary? >> yes. >> i won't get into staffing because i think you covered that with senator feinstein.

earlier the institute of peace released its 2014 index. the report indicates that deaths from terrorism are at an all time high, significantly, specifically the number of deaths attributed to terrorism is five times higher than it was in 2000. we've witnessed a 61% increase in the last year alone. would you agree that the threat from terrorism is at an all time high? >> i think as measured in the array, variety and dispersion of terrorist threats across different regions the answer is certainly yes. >> what is nctc as executive agent for our nation strategy against terrorism going to do about it? >> the role nctc place in carrying out planning in support of the government is one that has us tied closely to the nationals could council staff and the policy development

process for pursuing strategies against counterterrorism. we work with the national student council staff to develop whole of government plans -- national security staff. not just one single theater, as you will expect, senator. the efforts to help stretch against isil is particularly at an energetic pace right now. but our strategic operational planning capability is also brought to bear on the whole a rate of challenges we face in africa, in asia, in south asia, and the region you can think of. and i would consider our java nctc to make sure we are not leaving any holes in that fabric a stretch as the look out across the different challenges we face. while at the same time reorganizing were effort needs to be most energetically directed. that, of course, right now would argue for a lot of effort to be directed at the challenges we're facing in syria and iraq.

>> are you confident that nctc can discover and enable, or are enabled to disrupt plots and homeland? >> i would say that our ability to detect potential disrupt a plot involving a complex object of with a number of terrorist actors and a fair amount of communication, i would assess our odds of being very, very good at being able to detect and disrupt that kind of plotting. the more the plotting looks like what you and chairman feinstein talked about interns being an individual normal actor, perhaps with no direct connection or even indirect connection to an overseas terrorist group, perhaps only a self radicalized individual working a lot on the internet to develop his own capabilities, that decreases directly our ability to use traditional ct tools to detect

and disrupt. it's hard to guarantee you or give you extreme my confidence that we be able to detect and deter that kind of attack. >> do you think the administration and/or congress should do more publicly to let the american people know the threat from terrorism and the fact it is growing, not declining? >> i would certainly agree with you. that's one of the reasons why this shouldn't be an open session i think such a good thing. that 9/11 commissioners during the past year has been reviewed where we are this many years later, one of the calls was on the policy community to speak more often, more publicly, about the threat if i but that we face. i would love to contribute to that in my own way from nctc. so much of what we do is necessarily in closed session with you, your staff but there are opportunities where we can speak more directly, decorative home and aspects of the threat which i refer to a minute ago and the presence of homegrown

violent extremists and the threat they pose. >> netcom last question in response to the committees prehearing questions you indicated they did it was one of nctc's biggest challenges. i see in the china government as a whole we are really struggling with that challenge. at nctc, however, the coalition of the getting is that life and death matter. i'm concerned that this issue doesn't receive the proper attention and resources at nctc. can you assure us that you'll make this a top priority and that this effort will get the attention it needs a? >> senator, you're right to point to this vicious been one of our biggest challenges. i commit to you wholeheartedly to embrace this is one of my top priorities.

some of that will also involve developing new technological tools, taking advantage of broader efforts by the dni by director clapper degree a new architecture for terrorism and for intelligence information for the entire intelligence community. we hope to leverage nctc's work as an early benefactor of the work to create a more cloud-based architecture for intelligence information across the icy. >> i think you that i hope you'll keep the committee updated of progress on what we make of that. >> thank you very much. >> thank you, madam chairman. first of all, congratulations on your appointment and which i think is an excellent one. i appreciate very much that the president chose to put a career

expert in this final -- vital position, and i thank you very much for your generous comments about the role that former senator joe lieberman and i played in creating the nctc. i do hope you will let this committee know if you encounter difficulties in getting detailees who are well-qualified and experienced to come work at nctc. i know it's very hard for other components of the intelligence community and the fbi to let go of some of the most talented analysts, but for nctc to be fully effective in these very dangerous times, it is essential that we achieve that goal of joining -- jointness having the detailees. so please do not hesitate to come to the chairman, ranking

member, any of us if you do anticipate problems in that area. >> i will. thank you. >> one of the findings of the 9/11 commission was that border security and immigration were not seen as national security concerns prior to the attacks on our nation on 9/11. the commission specifically found 15 of the 19 hijackers could have been intercepted through more diligent enforcement of our immigration laws. as the acting director of the nctc, were you or any of your staff asked to describe the president's proposals for immigration changes that he will be announcing tonight? >> to my knowledge nctc or any of the personnel at nctc were

not involved in any of the but i'm not aware whether those elsewhere in the intelligence committed such an effort but not at nctc. >> when president obama created the 2009 guantánamo review task force to evaluate which detainees could be transferred or released from guantánamo, as i recall, the head of nctc was the executive director of that task force, is that correct? >> yes. prior service met olson held a position as chair of the task force. >> and met olson has told me that when the decision was made to exchange what has become known as the taliban five, for the release of sergeant bergdahl that nctc was not consulted in

that position. to your knowledge was anyone at nctc consulted a? >> my understanding is that intn the context, or in the process of moving to the transfer of those detainees there was a request for an intelligence assessment from the odni from intelligence committee and such an assessment was prepared to it was prepared by another element of the odni, not that nctc. >> and that was despite the fact that the nctc was acting as the executive director for the commission? >> i would just -- >> or the task force spent matt olson had that role at a previous time. and the current processes the administration is falling for considering transfer of detainees to nctc is being asked to agree to produce threat assessments of what impact on security the potential return of a detainee may have but that didn't happen in the case of the

issue you are referring to. >> i just want to be clear on this. so the normal process is for nctc to be involved in putting together a package that is used by decision-makers on how to classify the detainees, is that part of correct? >> that's correct spee. >> but in the case of the taliban five, the nctc was not as -- was not asked to put together an analysis that went beyond the previous analysis which, according to press reports, found that these detainees were too dangerous to be released, is that correct? >> again, we did not have direct involvement in the production of the intelligence assessment. >> thank you. again, i want to thank you for your willingness to serve in what is a 24/7 very demanding job, and i think we're very

fortunate to have someone with your background and expertise. >> thank you, senator. >> think you spent it looks like this is going to be a tough vote. senator rubio. >> thank you, and i want to congratulate -- >> for tv, i was adjusting. [laughter] >> thank you for your service to our country congratulations on your appointment. look forward to moving forward quickly. let me ask you a number of questions that are interesting and to everyone on the committee. the first has to do with the planned reduction in use commitment to afghanistan and the growing concern that that would have implications on our ability to conduct effective counterterrorism operations in the region. there's been one success in all of us it's been the ability to the road core al-qaeda's presence in the fall talk. if we lose territory in afghanistan back to the taliban we could very easily be won once again a busy when it was him at reconstitute strengthened and uncovered space somewhere in

afghanistan. what are your thoughts on the plan to withdraw in afghanistan? >> as an intelligeintellige nce community we also are concerned about what potential effect the drawdown of u.s. forces may have on the ability of al-qaeda to regenerate capability of particularly in the northeast and parts of afghanistan. effort to train and equip is an important part of the effort to make sure there is a capability to disrupt potential activity inside afghanistan. we will maintain as robust as possible and intelligence collection framework to a loss to continue to monitor, track and if necessary disrupt al-qaeda resurgence in that part of afghanistan, or

certainly in pakistan. it will be a more challenging and more difficult collection environment and we face today. >> my second question has to do with iran. there's been a lot of talk about some sort of you with regards to nuclear ambitions and the realization of sanctions against and what has not been discussed as i ran is a world leading sponsor of terrorism as a state and certainly any economic growth and prosperity to combat as a result of the relaxation of sanctions i believe would have an impact on their ability to fund and expand their robust sponsorship of terrorism around the world. i was hoping you could share some thought with those about what they might be able to grow into in the future if, in fact, the sanctions are relaxed and have more access to global capital, more money basically to sponsor these operations? >> the willingness and ability of iran to support various shia

terrorist groups has always been very, very high on the list of concerns of the counterterrorism community and the intelligence community. one of the pathways to addressing the challenge has been to try to get iran out of the biz of thinking that carrying out those kinds of ask advances their national interest, and ultimately they would see that as a self-defeating and not advancing their interests. speaking personally, and my own personal analysis than anything that puts us in a position where we are more effectively dealing with iran in a normal way would reduce the incentive for them to use that proxy network of shia terrorist groups that they do in fact have at their disposal. there's no doubt you are right, the capability of the terrorism apparatus sponsored by iran,

something that is threatening to the united states, not just in the region of the middle east all around the world and even potentially here at home. i would place a high priority in trying to not necessarily seek to defeat that terrorism apparatus on the battlefield as we have in our efforts against al-qaeda but trying to take them out of the business in some other fashion. that's how i would think about it. but there's no question as we watch and worry about how soon the shia tensions in the middle east outcome how or interest in the region are put at risk by shia sponsored terrorist groups, focus on a rainy tensions will continue to be a high priority. >> your statement about putting out of business, it calls to my the potential is with sanctions or relaxation should be linked not to nuclear program but to the sponsorship of terrorism as a leverage point to get him to abandon those sorts of things.

>> i can't speak to the pulse a context in which we would relax sanctions. >> thanks, senator rubio. senator king. >> thank you, madam chairman. mr. rasmussen, i have into your office, i've been to the cia, i've into the pentagon and have traveled recently, and one major conclusion i have taken from those visits is the incredible quality of the people we have working for us. they are pitcher, idealistic, smart and capable. you are exhibit a today and i want to thank you and i'm honored to serve this country along with you and your college. i hope you'll take that word back. >> thank you, senator. i really do appreciate that. >> we talked about this before. here's my concern. and i urge you, i know in the day-to-day work, you are

focusing on threats and attacks and dealing with fires around the world. that's your basic mission. but we have to be thinking more strategically and long-term it seems to me. we cannot simply kill these people and call that the solution to the worldwide terrorism problem. and am looking, i remember from the '50s we had the containment strategy of george kennan that really worked with the soviet union. took a long time but it worked and it was a strategy, a conscious deliberate well-developed strategy. i urge you to work with your colleagues and with the think tanks can with any brand corporation or brookings, whoever, to really work on a strategy for dealing with this problem, in addition to the military response but do you have any thoughts on that? >> that's a terrific suggestion, senator, and obviously the expertise about how to carry out effective characters and policy does not reside only within the

government, as you alluded to. research organizations, think tanks, not just in washington but all around the world have a role to play in helping us get this right. the strategy that we try to help produce a nctc in support of the fascist city council staff, and my answer to chairman feinstein, are typically whole of government strategies, not just a link on our intelligence capability or military capabilities but also trying to take advantage of abilities, the resources we have across the government to try to produce the conditions that would, over time, eat away at support for terrorism in some of these conflict locations overseas. ..o into it understanding well those efforts will ultimately take years, if not decades, to play out and to reap the benefits of those types of strategies. in the meantime, you are left to handle a very difficult threat environment.