if that larger hostility is significantly reduced as a result of the nuclear deal that is when you will see an opportunity for the common interest that way much heavier than the hostilities and provide the opportunity to utilize that. whether it's in iraq or in

israel or in afghanistan. i think it's important to understand the extent to which common interest between societies can be explored. >> president of palm has clearly invested a lot of political capital in his talks i think the opposite is true that president rouhani has invested even more in the negotiations. is this a make or break moment for him? what are the implications if there is or isn't a deal for the future of the rest of his term and what are the effects of the other issues like human rights? >> i think for mr. rouhani it is not what i would call a break or make but if this were to fail in a very negative way it clearly would undermine his decision. his agenda on these other issues on advancing social development and rights would really have to

be put on the back burner. it's unclear what would happen to the foreign minister who is the public face of the negotiations whether or not he could survive a failure in talks. but beyond that i think it wouldn't spell the end to mr. rouhani because i think for the leader he is playing a positive role. i think the leader is happy with how he has handled the economy for example. as one iranian insider told me rouhani has prevented the collapse of the iranian economy. he is a stark difference to his predecessor mr. ahmadinejad who now has openly talked about in iran his management skills decimated the iranian economy and i think mr. rouhani has proven himself to be an asset. so i don't think we see his

disappearance that we would certainly see the conservatives and the hardliners, how with their knives to make a play to gain power. keep in mind that the iranian parliament has an election coming up. i think certainly moderates, reformists would be undermined in that but it would be a cascade effect that would not be good for those who are more reform minded. >> i think i agree this would not be the end of her hahne's presidency. he would however risk it being the end of some of the organizations that he has been pursuing. it could be an end to part of the foreign-policy approach because what it would do is they would indicate in my view the wrong narrative in iran. there's a hard lied narrative in iran the schism ultimately the west is not trustworthy, you

cannot negotiate with the west. the west is only pursuing its negotiations in order to be able to find a new way of putting pressure on iran to come into iran and depriving iran of technology. every time iran tries to negotiate they find a way to add pressure to iran. there's another narrative that says negotiations have to be tried because their common interest. the world is changing and the region as defined not by the united states but the isis in the state of radicalism and if there is a real negotiation and to negotiation and a give-and-take if iran can show strategic utility to the united states a different relationship can emerge. if these negotiations collapse it will be an indication of the wrong narrative and that will put back into charge the people in iran who prefer to drive a more confrontational foreign policy.

>> britney from congressman's merkel cam's office and actually had two questions. you have been talking a lot about the difference in kind of the u.s. and iran cooperation if this deal were to go forward but i'm just wondering other than the mutual interests what is the power that the u.s. gains from this deal and also there was mention of for lack of a better word -- if the oil prices are dropping and it was said three to four years or something like that. so i was just wondering what kind of negative repercussions we could see from those as a result of this deal? will there be negative backlash as a result?

>> do you want to address that a little bit? that could stabilize the price found some of their somewhere around -- a barrel. in the talks in vienna there's no sign that they want to do that at the current time. they protect the market share and not focus on the price. if that policy continues iran will bring back oil prices so it will be a question of what response you get elsewhere. this point in time we don't know because it's just a scenario. it's not a real alternative and of course the saudi's, the emirates, israel are all opposed to the deal as the open door for developing nuclear weapons over time. not immediately but over time changing all found -- balance of power in the region. saudi arabia and amherst have large economic research.

if you had the low oil price that might encourage the recovery at the bank so by 2018 the oil price might be starting to recover. after we had the big price decline and the sanctions. >> on your first question how would the u.s. benefit beyond what we are the disgust, well i think first and foremost the threat of another war in the middle east would fade so that's a big plus. but beyond that i mean when you think about the history of the u.s. iran relationship, we have not had a normalized diplomatic relations for 35 years now and i often think, i don't always agree with henry kissinger but i think on this particular quote he got it right. he said something like there are no two countries on earth that

have more common interest and less to fight about then i ran in the united states and i think he's absolutely right. if you have traveled there you immediately feel that there's an affinity between americans and iranians. so i think the potential to reestablish those diplomatic relations is a big one. i would love to see us have an ambassador in tehran and for iran to have an ambassador here in washington. i would love to see the economic relations that we heard about earlier come to fruition. and you know as much as anything i think the iranian american diaspora here in the united states which i know trita can talk as eloquently as anyone, want to see this. they are very successful part of our population. they want to see the

relationship between our two countries, our two governments flourished and i think we would all benefit from that. i think when we look at the past 30 years, the lack of people-to-people exchanges between our societies i think has hurt us and with the deal i think we could see that move forward and build the relationships that we once had with iran. >> if i could just add a couple of points to that. the obvious first benefit of course is that deal would close off any path iran would have and that's the big take away of course. that's critical. if the iranians agreed to the additional article you would have inspections that go beyond anything that would have existed in the past that he would make it essentially impossible for

the iranians to pursue anything in secret. this is obviously critical because we have defined a potential proliferation of weapons is the primary u.s. national security threat in the middle east. if that is gone and that certainly is a huge benefit. but beyond that in order to understand and imagine the benefits of the deal it would be good to assess what the costs of this bad relationship would be. if you just go back 12 or so years we see immediately after 9/11 the u.s. and iran during george bush jr.'s presidency start to collaborate and coordinate against the taliban diplomatically, politically intelligence wise as well as militarily. the collaboration is so successful that when it comes to the effort to put together a new constitution after the taliban has been defeated this was a joint u.s. iran operation in which the current foreign minister zarif negotiated for

the iranians and ambassador dobbins envoy to the present coordinated the taiwan conference that they manage together to make sure that not only was the military campaign won by piece was one. six weeks later george bush puts iran in the axis of evil and all that potential collaboration that could have continued and could lead to a different scenario in afghanistan is gone and the u.s. and iran started competing in afghanistan just like they had before that brief period of collaboration. and we saw what happened in afghanistan. we have seen the great difficulties the u.s. has had the major cost to u.s. soldiers etc.. imagine if that hadn't happened. imagine them going forward for the next 10 years that you have three more cases in the middle east in which the united states decide to compete rather than collaborate and then you get an idea of how beneficial a deal could be. the last point is with respect

to the diaspora, the diaspora of course has a lot of different views in the iranian american community. like any community it does not have one view on this issue but there is an overwhelming amount of support for the negotiations which is driven partly because of course they don't want to see the spread of nuclear weapons but also very much driven by the belief that if there is a deal, if tensions are reduced it will ultimately be a big beneficial thing for the pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders in iran. the ability to move anymore political traction very much depends on the extent to which iran has hostile or nonhostile relations with the west. >> right here, third row. >> yeah, what is the impact of a deal or no deal on israel in all this?

>> suzanne? >> well obviously i think if there is a deal the u.s. government, the obama administration would have to continue to make a special effort to provide israel with the reassurances that it needs to feel comfortable with iran having an enrichment capacity that is now internationally authorized and that is going to take a lot of work. i think in recent days we have heard various positions coming out of israel that have been consistently concerned about the direction this is going so that's going to take a special effort. it may mean boosting israel's defense capabilities to make them feel that reassurance that make no doubt about it, that will be a diplomatic effort that

will require just as much attention as it will probably reach this deal with the iranians and i think it would be well worth it. my own belief is that this is the comprehensive nuclear deal with iran that prevents it from a nuclear weapons capability. not only in the u.s. interest but in the israeli interest as well. >> if i could add a couple of points to that. think suzanne is absolutely right. the israeli government since 1993 has made a point that seating nuclear weapons in iran would be a disaster. they call that the local threat. some have like netanyahu has called it a existential threat. if they reach a deal that would end a path towards a nuclear weapon. that clearly is a major benefit for the israelis. now it doesn't necessarily mean president netanyahu will view that as a benefit or at least

politically he will find it deal that's beneficial. i think the israeli government and fortune has increased the cost of israel the deal by taking on a very very first is public position against these negotiations and against a deal. if you take a look at i don't know what to call it, that graphic that prime minister netanyahu had the u.n. not this year but the year prior to that, the essential take away was that the israeli redlien as articulated for the first time by an israeli prime minister, there have been plenty of israeli redlien but they have never been articulated by the prime minister. that red line was enormous. you had 250 kilos of 20% enriched uranium. at the moment the prime minister gave a presentation the iranians had 190 kilos of 20% enriched uranium. that's the type of in unique

that if you enrich its 93% you can build a bomb. thanks to the interim deal the iranians have zero, 20% enriched uranium. that entire stockpile has been eliminated. that without any question is a significant benefit to the israeli side. based on the criteria that the israeli prime minister himself was put forward publicly. beyond that if you have a u.s. iran deal and you have a reduction of tensions between the united states and iran as i mentioned before as that will lead to less competition and rivalry between the u.s. and iran and other theaters in the middle east that will also have a positive impact on israel because it will prompt the iranians to be less hostile towards israel. hostility towards israel from the iranian site side has very much at times been a function of their competition with united states and israel. if that competition reduces the utility of iran taking on a

tough position vis-à-vis israel also reduces. just take a look at the posture of iran since the negotiations began under rouhani and the posture of iran prior to these much more serious negotiations under ahmadinejad. it's almost like a day. that's just as a result of the negotiations. imagine what that could be for israel if there actually is a deal. >> questions? right here. >> so i was wondering, there have been some groups here questioning whether iran has complied with the joint plan of action particularly with regard to testin testing on advanced centrifuges. i was wondering if he could unpack that a little bit and make clear is iran comply with the joint plan of action and furthermore what would be, are there any viable of both -- alternatives to a negotiation?

thanks. >> does anybody want to talk about the allegations or the violations of the interim deal? i think you know there was a think tank that said iran may have violated by feeding uranium into the ir-5 centrifuged. if you want to address that at all? so there was this allegation. i think the frustration was pretty clear at the outset of the negotiations that testing of the centrifuges, this r&d work was actually written into the deal is being permissible. and so the activity that was highlighted was actually considered as r&d work. that being said, the administration after this allegation was made they did announce that they contacted the iranians and that even though this was not a violation they asked that the iranians not continue to do this work and the report is that they did so this

actually demonstrates how important the channels for diplomacy that would actually have our in addressing those issues. >> if i could add one thing to that. at the end of the day the iaea has come out of verify that everything the iranians said they were going to do everything the u.s. and the p5+1 said they would do under the deal has been done. the iaea is tasked with overseeing the implementation of this so their statement is the final word on this. at the same time from the u.s. side as well as the e.u. site they have also confirmed their belief that the iranians have looked up to their end of the bargain. there is an area outside of these negotiations between the iaea and iran in which there has been some delays. there have been some tensions. there have been some problems but that is outside of the joint plan of action. that's an ongoing issue that the iranians have with the iaea in those two should not be confused.

>> and then the second question? >> essentially is there any viable alternative to negotiate a solution? >> so i think -- is there any universe in which there is no deal and there are some solution short of back? i know that there were murmurs that the iranians were saying that if there is no deal that they would still comply voluntarily with some of the inspections. is there any credence to those reports? is there any signaling that the sides could actually withstand a continuation of the status quo in the interim agreement on a voluntary basis? >> short of the deal, could we imagine muddling through for a little while? probably especially the iranians continued to adhere to the current parts of the interim agreement and as jamal said i am

hearing that the iranians have even said even if there is not a collapse but just some sort of extension, of course the iaea and inspectors would be able to stay in and maybe even if there was a collapse they would keep the iaea in. but that is i don't think a solution. it's not a sustainable long-term solution to getting this deal done. and if we play this out and if we have a muddling through approach we can imagine those voices that have been advocating military strikes against iran's nuclear program coming to the forefront again. and i think that would be, it could be very hard to manage this time especially if the iranians pull out of the joint plan of action. you could see a potential spiraling back to where we were or perhaps even worse where the military option was being considered and i think certainly

from a u.s. point of view, with our attention focused on defeating isis, and dealing with crises throughout the world not only in the middle east but ukraine and elsewhere, i just can't imagine that this administration would want the situation to deteriorate to that point because once it gets to that point, there is no guarantee that a spiraling like that can be managed. >> if i could just add something to that. i think the lead negotiator put it very well but said that there is no deal the name of the game on both sides will be escalati escalation. and that is the worst-case scenario which susanne pointed out would be a relatively good case scenario if there is no deal but that is placed on the u.s. side would mean more

sanctions and potentially gravitation towards military confrontation on a rainy inside. all the limitations that existed under the joint plan of action on the deal would be taken away. the iranians would probably go back to 20% enriched uranium and expanding their centrifuged count etc. etc.. so the idea that in no deal scenario leads to the continuation of the current status quo i think is something that we have to be very cautious about. it's probably the opposite and no real scenario will lead to the deterioration of the current status quo militarily, diplomatically, economically. >> israel threatened 18 months ago to launch the reactor that was going to create plutonium. israel said that was clearly a military plan, clearly something they could attack and was going to be above the ground in the desert. but someone at the pentagon said to me the building was so visible that have the word attack written on the roof. anyway because of the agreement we had last year with iran

construction of this reactor has been slow down. may not produce plutonium. it may produce something else but basically this threat has been removed at the time. the negotiations completely collapse and iran reverses to what i was doing a year ago building this reaction it could clearly set the stage for israel which would again make things worse. >> data can i ask you a question? imagine what the price of gas would be if there's a deal. what would it be if there is no deal and you have this escalation? >> i think if we had a military attack on iran by israel the price would leap $10 a barrel. how far would they go in retaliating? do you would know but i would say oil prices would leap up $10 a barrel. depending on how it all played out. china has some major and just in this because they get half their

oil from the persian gulf. they are active investors and iran and they have a close relationship. they would probably tell the iranians please don't close the strait of hormuz because we need that to be open but again we don't know what iran would do. the radicals might take over which case you might get extreme action but we just don't know. it's a wild card. >> i think there was an official close to negotiations but it's a saintly and that his failure is not an option. so we will be watching with baited breath what happens over this weekend leading up to the 24th and hopefully we will be mindful of the many benefits of a potential deal. i want to go ahead and thank our participants, david hale, suzanne dimaggio and trita parsi and the club -- plowshares fund an archive foundation for helping to sponsor this event as well as congressman moran for

offering this room and i want to thank you all for being here today. thank you again. [applause]

coming up next the discussion on u.s.-russia relations. followed by an encore presentation and q&a with evan osnos who was recently named the winner of this year's national book award for nonfiction. >> former national security adviser steven hadley and former deputy secretary of state strobe talbott were part of the discussion today on u.s.-russia relations. topics include russia's energy goals its relations with them in international community and the ambitions of russian president vladimir putin. on the aspen institute, this is an hour and 40 minutes.

[inaudible conversations] >> welcome everybody. ambassadors really good to see you. it's good to see all of you. i'm walter isaacson the present of a espinace is in one of the great joys of being present at the aspen institute is occasionally get invited to sit in with the aspen strategy group with my friends drove and angela and steve and of course run by nick burns. the crisis with russia every day takes another step but these are the people best adept at dealing with it. in fact the group was started 30 years ago with really the crisis in russia in mind. with that i would like to turn it over to nick burns the director of the aspen group and a professor at the kennedy school at harvard. thanks nick for doing this.

>> good afternoon everyone. it's a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you here to the aspen institute. this is the washington ideas roundtable series and the first thing i want to do is thank michelle smith and robert the robert h. smith family foundation for making this possible. i also want to recognize some important guests and iran. we have four ambassadors from allied countries. we have ambassador finland, ambassador of estonia, ambassador of latvia and the ambassador of denmark. they also have three former members of congress jim moody, jim slattery and jim walsh and it's always perilous in a room like this to recognize special friends but we have two special friends given the topic which is the crisis with russia over ukraine. ambassador jim collins who is

extraordinarily effective american ambassador to russia, longtime russia specialist and a great friend to all of us on this panel and ambassador steve pifer who is ambassador to ukraine longtime russia ukraine specialist. think all of us have worked with steve as well so congratulations to both of them and thank you for being here. what we are going to do today is talk about one of the major strategic challenges to the united states in 2014. president putin's invasion of crimea the annexation of crimea by the russian duma, the consistent efforts by president putin and the russian government to destabilize eastern ukraine over the last nine months and the reaction by the west by the united states, canada and europe in by the nato countries, the sanctions, the building up of american and nato power in the baltic countries and poland and romania in the standoff that continues to this day. we do this based on a book that

we are publishing today and i think all of you have copies. for those of you on c-span and c-span is televising this event this is a book published by the aspen strategy group about the crisis in russia. the aspen strategy group in his 30th year. back in early august aspen colorado is weaker for you to take on a big subject in this here this time partisan group republicans, democrats, independents independents mostly americans but joined by several european and asian leaders met to discuss what the west should do in response. to commend this book to you. it contains a lead essay by strobe talbott and i will introduce jovana man who gave the earnest memorial lecture. he tried to frame this issue in historical terms and in terms of the evolution of russia's path since the fall of the soviet union in 1991. it contains essays by many other americans and europeans. how do we think about this

crisis? what our president putin's motivations and strategic ambitions? has the west reacted significantly and effectively? would have implications for global energy? what are the implications for china and china's relationship with russia and the west? so we will talk today about these issues but i do want to commend this book to you. i would ask you to tweet about it. i would ask you if you have an interest in it, purchase it on amazon. that helps to fund the expenses of this nonprofit organization. our leaders are brands grow crops to does not gain an introduction to this room and joan knight. for 30 years they have been of the opinion that america should be able to have serious discussions about the major international challenges to us in a nonpartisan environment. that is what they have created and that is what we celebrate today. we are going to have a discussion for the next 30 to 40 minutes with three panelists.

strobe talbott present at the brookings institution and a solid b. a solid you know served as deputy secretary of state and the clinton administration, lifelong expert on russia. has been interested in russia since he was a very young man and we will ask stroke a series of questions about how he sees the crisis with russia. angela to my right professor at georgetown university, longtime soviet and russian expert is also served at the national intelligence council for the u.s. government. finally steve hadley. steve has worked in the ford administration with george h.w. bush demonstration and as you know i'm a george w. bush administration and national security adviser. steve is well with the soviets and the russians since the 1970s and so has a long perspective as to -- just angela and strobe on these issues and there's a fourth person steve beacon who is a big part of her discussions. steve knows a lot about russia,

served with great distinction in the george w. bush administration now vice president of ford motor company. my thanks to you for all of his support intellectual and otherwise make this happen. without further ado we will have a conversation go through a series of questions to try to get to the heart of this crisis. once we have finished i want to invite all of you to offer your point of view and asked the most challenging questions you can think of for this distinguished panel. let me start strobe with you. strobe you kicked off our aspen strategy group for days together in colorado and tried to give us a historical framework so we could understand the motivations of president putin and the russian leadership. both a relationship with us but more partly the relationship with ukraine and the other former republics of the soviet union. i wanted to ask you and i will post the same question to angela and steve now that we have seen at the end of 2014 how shaken

confidences between the west and the russian leadership, and a dramatic impact it has had in a negative on our relationship, how serious the crisis is the sin do you believe we will be able to continue? >> very serious. in three dimensions, with regard to russia itself, i think there is an all too plausible scenario whereby particularly over the last year but also in the run-up to not just the annexation of crimea that the virtual occupation and pseudo-annexation of much of eastern ukraine will be a catalyst for a process over time that will greatly weakened the russian state and could even

lead to the russian state going the way of the ussr which is exactly opposite of course of what president putin has in mind. he intends this to be a show of russian strength in the face of what he regards as western weakness. but the essence of his policies, both domestic and foreign are essentially a resurrection of the policies that caused the ussr, and you all recall there was once a very large state called the ussr, to end up on the trash heap of history. and that would be an ironic and by the way a very dangerous outcome for the whole world. this is not to wish for something bad for russia. it's to fear something bad for the world. second, there is unquestionably

a crisis for the western community, the atlantic community which up until a few years ago was moving in a direction that involves integration of the russian federation itself as well as its neighbors into an expanded international community that would be playing by the same rules, they would have certain norms in, and and that would lead to not just a peaceful 21st century but also a 21st century in which russia would be not just have a seat at the board of directors of the world but would be a collaborative and cooperative power. and what we are looking at now is i think a nontrivial set of complex and potential conflicts

including on the periphery other than ukraine itself that could lead to armed conflicts, and here i am particularly concerned about three nato member states that have been constituent republics of the ussr namely the baltic states, even though the u.s. and others in the west have never accepted their annexation under the hitler stalin pact. the last crisis i think is for a positive future for the process of globalization. we cannot have a salutary syst system, international system if rush is not part of it. it is simply too important both in its size, its clout and its ability to be either obstructive or helpful in dealing with the big issues of our time. >> stroke thank you in and angela maybe i can ask you the same question to ask you to

expanded a little bit. you are a long-time putin watcher and you've written about putin about his motivations. what does he want? what is he trying to achieve strategically by this very big move into both crimea being destabilized the major state? >> as i said question what does he want to achieve but really when you listen to him and you see what rush is doing we know what they don't want. so let me just agree with what strobe said. i think this is the worst crisis in relations with russia since before mikhail gorbachev came to power and i think when you go back to putin this is the culmination of probably from his point of view at least 22 years or 25 years of frustration, feelings of humiliation. after all remembered he was in the gdr serving as a kgb officer and when the wall came down seeing all of that happened, coming back to the soviet union and having them lost his country and feeling if one is to believe

what he says that for the past 22 years russia has suffered a series of humiliations. so i sat there a few weeks ago when he delivered his three-hour bromide against the united states in sochi and was present in the discussions with other officials. it's quite clear that the message they want to convey is that they will no longer accept the rules of world order that they claim were defined by the united states and impose on them and do not take their interests into account. so this is broader than ukraine. i really think that russia or some people in russia at least i think the president himself believes that russia is at war with the west that by rush is behaving more like a revisionist power calling into question the cold war settlement and making legal arguments for what it did in ukraine by referring back to other things that have happened in the past years but again saying that double standards and

we need the new world order. now i'm not sure that the russians actually know what this new world order should be but i think we have to take seriously when we look to the future but that will probably be other areas where russia will believe that it can reinterpret the rules. we already see the resumption of a lot of cold war tactics in terms of harassing long-range bomber flights in the gulf of mexico, all these kinds of tactics that look as if it's the cold war although of course is not the cold war. i think this is a broader question of how this world order continue and of course that affects the process of globalization to. >> thank you very much. steve hadley you were present in all or nearly all of the significant meetings that george w. bush had over eight years with president putin. there were times when just after 9/11 president putin was in many

ways a friend to the united states. there were times the iraq war when he was supposed to us. knowing him or getting a sense of his worldview do you agree with angela about what his motivations are and how do easy the crisis that has developed? >> i would defer to strobe and angela but i think putin has moved over time. i think when he started out he thought as he said the dissolution of the soviet union was one of the great tragedies of the 20th century. i think he meant that sincerely. i think early on when he came to power he thought there wasn't much he could do about it. he had a very small economy and not great prospects. i think we also made a pitch during the first of to try to convince him that his legacy would be to move russia permanently into the west and to integrate with europe where russia i should've been.

we spent four years trying to find various ways to convince them that this was his calling and his people dealt with him. we had a strategic dialogue that i managed with my counterpart. the word we got was gas putin understands this is his historical opportunity but there are dark forces in russia and you have to let him do it his own way. and i think as he saw an opportunity to split with us on iraq and the common cause with the german and the french as they made some smart fiscal decisions and in their is the price of oil went up he became stronger decided he had perhaps more options. i think we don't really know. one of the things we learned from georgia is he is a real opportunistic person. he sees opportunities and he seizes them and if he succeeds

and is not resisted his objectives grow over time. i think that is what we face here. so where are we now? one he has already ripped up the post-cold war consensus on europe. that is to say borders would be respected. sovereignty would be respected. force would not be used and countries could choose their own alliances. well he has ripped up all those. second i think his objective is to keep ukraine weak, divided on the hope that it is not permanently lost but after period of time after a lot of pressure and failure of the state and help from the west ukrainians may be two, three or four years from now would decide the crimea's were right and maybe it's better if we moved east and not wes. clearly i think that's on his agenda. the question is whether it be succeeds to the subject has

become more extensive? he is already doing a lot of things in the czech republic, slovakia and hungary to put divisions within the e.u. to weaken the e.u.. i think it because this estero mentioned this destabilization campaign in a place like the baltic states it will be to show article v nato and the defense commitment doesn't mean anything and isn't worth the paper it's written on which will be a blow to the willingness of countries in europe to stand up to him. and the bottom line the big payoff for him would be if he could reestablish russian influence in the former soviet space and in central and eastern europe comparable to what the soviet union had. this is not sending in troops and occupation. this is influence so these states have to take into account and do take into account russian interest in russian desires. to me, if you asked him what is

his dream, that might be it. that might be yet and that's the kind of year that i think would be bad for europe and bad for us and ultimately bad for russia because i think well it vindicates russian nationalism and feeds their ego is not sustainable over the long term and takes russia away from what its real objective should be which is to become part of the 21st century. >> steve thank you. we want to get to whether or not the west europe canada and north america have been effective in trying to counter putin but leave before we do that there are two questions for on the table very briefly. the first of this. i don't want to leave the witnesses but when you encounter russians and i have in many international conferences over the last 78 months the line sometimes is you americans drove us to this. it was the expansion of nato in 1997 and 2002 when he took 10

countries in nato, three of which have been constituent parts of the soviet union. he drove us to this. it was your aggressiveness. i don't agree with that at all but i wonder how one should respond to that? i think i know how but we have all had this question. any misgivings about what most of the spam were involved in. that poor sensitive sole putin did we hurt his feelings and drive him to this? >> if you are looking at me. [laughter] 's passing strange that the debate over the expansion of nato would be once again in the forefront of controversy not just between those of us in the west, which by the way is a geographical term that we thought was expanding to include

many in the east but it's also a point of controversy here in the u.s. particularly among those of us -- you can call us the walker or -- they won't or the policy elite. original rationale for expanding nato to include countries who had either been released from prison house of nations by the reformist government of gorbachev or were released from prison house of nations which was the ussr, not by some plot from the west but by reformist leaders driven by public opinion inside the ussr that that would and the bifurcation of the world

being the free world in the communist world and there could be institutions that would among other things provide security, including in partnership with the former republics of the ussr and former members of the warsaw pact. and by the way that rationale was accepted by the russian government at the time and there were some very significant episodes of collaboration particularly in ending the mayhem in the balkans that i think would not have happened or at least would have been much more difficult and taken a longer time if it would not have been for russian participation. so all of those positives have created a movement towards what i think has now been not just stopped to put into reverse.

there was always with the expansion of nato would build. the secretary of defense at the time called the hedge factor and that is it was possible some day in the future russia might break bad. that too was the reason why all of the countries that were taken into nato which i think represent something like 100 million europeans now have the protection of that and before we even get to the russian complaint the notion that the west created this problem is turning what i think are the facts on their head. imagine how the polls would feel now if they were not in nato. it's a counterfactual but i would guess that were the three baltic states not member states of nato you would just have little green men creating that

mischief in those countries. you would probably also have russian boots on the ground. let me just stop with that on that one point that you have raised. >> i would add steve and i worked together on this when we took the seven new countries at the summit in 2002. the russians were very unhappy that we had lots of conversations with president putin and his staff and we created the nato russian council subsequent to that. we began to work with russia. the russians had an ambassador sergei carefully often we try to work with them on big security issues. we didn't try to exclude russia from security conversations. we try to bring the men and it did work out so well. i want to ask angela the second question. you mentioned it. you think president putin may intend to confront nato in the baltic states? you mentioned at least it was a

theoretical possibility. would he try any initiative that would weaken nato's article v commitments in the next year or two? is a possible? >> it's possible. i think it would depend on his calculation of the risk to reward trade-off. it's one of the reasons why i have always thought we need to have them fail in the ukraine so he won't be tempted to try to do something in the baltics because i do think that risks here. who would have thought we would be talking about war in europe. that is why you think the policy needs to be strengthened. i think we have focused too much on sanctions. i understand why we have done that but they have some unfortunate effects. they encouraged the russians. they are weaken the russian economy and you can decide whether you think that's good for the russian sense of itself and its foreign policy. also encourages it to de-integrate its economy with

europe and the rest of the world. i don't think that's good for russia. i don't think that's the reason stroup said that's good for stability over the long-term. and i think thirdly the russians have made it clear that they are prepared to accept economic historically economic hardship in the interest of the dream of russian greatness. so i think we are underplaying other elements of influence that we need to get in place now. i think we talk about strengthening nato. i think we have to get nato troops and u.s. troops on the ground now in the baltic states and poland and in the balkans so that putin understands that if he goes into those areas there's a risk of a direct military confrontation with the united states. i think we need to strengthen the capacity of the state to defend themselves not because they are going to defeat the russian army but because they are going to raise the cost to russia if it does do something.

we know from the reactions in ukraine that there is sensitivity to casualties? the casualties are a problem for putin politically. you have to make it clear that if he tries this people are going to fight. then we need to reduce leverage over the long-term. we have got to get a new energy policy that reduces europe's reliance on russian energy thereby reduces its leverage. we have got to get the trade and investment pack'n play's to tie europe into prosperity sphere with the united states and i think that these are a number of things which in the short-run raise the cost to rush into putin if they should think about this kind of adventurism and in the long run reduces leverage. that said i think at the same time and i'm sounding very

hawkish on russia, think we have to recognize that ukraine is a historical and economic problem for russia and we need to leave the door open for an arrangeme arrangement. the best arrangement would be if the e.u. united states ukraine and russia were to get together and talk about how to stabilize the ukrainian economy and get them moving in a positive direction. that would be a better neighbor for russia actually but putin asked has to be willing to engage in that kind of conversation. for the moment i think he's not. the question is do we miss an opportunity under yanukovich when they initial discussions about ukraine joining the e.u. and russia taken may be an honest conversation in the e.u. said no. was that a missed opportunity? belt now. we should leave that door open that port to work putin will have to walk through it and for the moment he doesn't seem to be inclined to do so. >> okay so steve is leading us into what's the proper way to respond.

i want to turn to you and steve and i want to bring you in here too. chancellor merkel who has been a very important figure to western response and president obama and made a decision early on that we were going to fight for ukraine that there was no legal or ethical obligation for nato to fight for ukraine. instead he try to isolate the russians politically. you try to build up a steve has described the nato position in the baltic states and poland as a deterrent device and that we would drive up the cost through economic sanctions. we have had a couple of rounds of sanctions. they were quite weak and they were slow to develop until they shut down the malaysian airliner in mid-july. ben's fairly significant sanctions the e.u. and nato before the second week of september but since then angela the russians have put more men, more apc, more tanks across the border in ukraine. they are clearly intervening against the u.n. charter inside

ukraine ukraine. is it now time for the europeans and americans and canadians to race a strength of those sanctions? >> the challenge is how do you deter uncontained russia in his own neighborhood? you have to start off with the premise ukraine is an existential question for the russians. they have defined it as such and that ukraine moves west this is detrimental to their own security. it's not an existential question either for the european union or the united states so we are faced with this asymmetry from the beginning and then the question is is this asymmetry and since they are going to care a lot more about this than we do how do you determine them going further in what they are doing? and so we have had several rounds of sanctions. they have clearly affected russia economically. we have had people in this room that has followed this closely. the economic situation is deteriorating.

you have the fall of the ruble $28 billion just on october. we can go on and on. he can be very detrimental but instead of leading russia to step back in this hybrid war it has redoubled its efforts even recently. the minsk cease-fire agreement of september the fifth i don't want to say is in tatters but it's not working well. we have had hundreds of casualties and it's really questionable whether more sanctions and i guess the sanctions would be tougher sanctions again on energy and the banking system, whether that is going to alter russian policy there. i think steve is quite right that the other way you deal with that is you have to build on the credible military posture for those nato countries who are allies and make sure that russia doesn't think it can go any further their. it's also i think we have to

think twice about whether we want to isolate russia more than we have now. there's this calculus if you isolate particularly a leader like vladimir putin and the situation now where he appears to feel very beleaguered and under attack from the west and we can argue about that is that going to achieve the goal that we want? ..

>> to. >> when did he think president above the share offer military assistance so they can defend? >> had the same since then effective to take a worsening economic performance of russia and

forcing it to this date so without a doubt the russian economy feels the weight of the sanctions is it effective change the behavior of russia? no. it depends on what your measure of effectiveness is. but with military assistance is a sovereign democratically elected government that have the right to arm themselves and defend themselves at the same time they do have to defend themselves but to initiate hostilities there not a position to achieve any success of the ground and we're not in a position. yes they should have access to all material necessary to defend themselves as a government but also let me touch on other things.

we discussed as a group, one is to the point of the essential nature of deterrence of nato members. if anything were to happen happen, one of two consequences we defend that the november then have a worsening crisis or we don't so either way there is no good choice to have one iota of doubt about what happens. the article five guaranteed that today's states will meet that commitment. but that does the audience to the real question moldova, central asia, we need much more effective policies to engage these countries because this is

the highest likelihood. second, ukraine has to be at the center of the policy to redouble our efforts with the european union to strengthen the economy and political stability without it economical increase as long as there is the question, there is a temptation. we have to getting closely to research those policies. third, the one that i don't want to leave the unspoken is we have to engage russia. yes behalf to deter more problematic behavior in discourage or avoid what is happening but to engage them

and remained in gauge with the russian economy to strengthen the interdependence and also people to people contact to do everything we can to promote exchanges to isolate russia is not an option it is too big of a country and to pour. isolated behavior's of the russian government may be a priority but we have to stay engaged with russia. >> this conversation has taken an interesting turn. all four have talked about how to construct containment against president putin and his expansion. we're struggling to put all the pieces together but is it fair to say with legal assistance greater economic assistance, to reinforce nato and steve talked about

that does president abominate to go into a new conflict to build up american policy? that is a precluding question that we will open it up. >> i will pick up on something very important. you craig is the existential issue. the two cultures the two populations are interwoven in a way that's leads many russians to feel the independence of ukraine at the end of 1991 was like having a limbs severed and they still feel pain. in the west we do not have

that feeling about ukraine. but alongside that the independence of ukraine is the existential issue and that includes many, many russian-speaking ukrainians. of course, steve will be stoking -- speaking for the remainder of the conversation but that leads into those appointments but i think it is almost imperative with the ukrainians say to us we need help in defending ourselves, our state, our forces come our population from russian forces on our territory and are firing mortars at us and killing us , and giving us the

reports we have the means to identify where those forces are, but not giving us the means to knock them out to. that should be a no-brainer. it is under debate and i completely agree with steve let the debate should be resolved in favor to give the assistance. the argument against it is if we give the lethal defensive assistants to the ukrainian government and provoke the russians they are already rogue. the argument should be just the opposite. if we don't give them the assistance it will confirm putin that the west this week and will let him do whatever he wants. >> but if we do give them

the sole defensive weapons it could also mean an excuse for russia to redouble their efforts to increase the presence there and we have heard a hint of that. we have to be very careful to think about what type of equipment it is that you are giving. going forward remember we don't have all european allies with us. the policy will be less effective it is amazing to see the changes in germany from chancellor merkle and try to get the europeans behind it but as somebody said would get hungry or the central european countries, if the facts on the ground continue in is

not a successful ceasefire it will increase the excuse to say some things have stabilized so let's engage russia people are suffering from these sanctions let's get rid of those sanctions are of the europeans at least. so going forward we need to deal with is and declared warfare and to one thing fed is very clear is the information war between russia. nobody even knows the facts and russian media balances. you have your fax we have ours. the disadvantage that they

are controlled by the state's. i did as a class with my georgetown students. with with totally different understandings of what was happening. we need to do better even though we are democracies democracies, we need to do a better job to counter the coming immigration. >> steve? north thoughts can i take with europe today in the u.s. administration with challenges they wish this one would go way. there is the tendency to think we have to do something so do sanctions we have been in that business

it is easy to do. the problem is we're not taking the in electric -- innovative and ambitious strategy but it is getting much worse. we put a lot pieces on the table but nothing that is effective long-term we will be with this for the next 10 years it is a long-term challenge to have integrated strategy over time with me just say three things quickly. angela is right there is the information in a war going on every day. and putin has a great propaganda operation almost

exclusive media and control it is doing very well. of spreading them around the globe. and thinking about the film assistance that is what you have covert action. to resend of message to putin? now we tend to talk too much and act too little. sometimes of what this will just show up. and i am all in favor of tourist but it's behalf to find a way to do defeat the

strategy for those conflicts to freeze the states and another world. we have to say that will not stop us in a continuing to bring those states to the west. but we have to do that in the right way with its ties to the east but to step that crisis down it could be a way long-term. >> into inventory.

we have an economy facing challenges and rehab the attraction of the rules based democratic society using a the market these are our strengths and we need to fall back. that is the first. and patients. we need to be acting but also a patient. but i suspect served in the administration with more than its sheriff national security challenges around

the world but there is a point that is likely taking over with two years left the fatah spending any significant time were political capital on russia is probably pretty unappetizing. there could be the view that this would be left for the next president. we cannot be asleep on the set of issues because only worse can come from it. so might suffice to the current administration it has to be a high priority. >> i would just suggest if you would like to speak put your hand up we will call on as many as we can. we have 37 minutes left.

the first comic jim collins what they did for their ambassadorships the question that i have is knu crane be helped? so that effort to sustain an economically with massive corruption and failed states and their hard to help the base of your personal experience if he gets his way we have a major expansion does it do any good? >> thanks for a very good bill that has outlined the pieces of the problem in the solution to the policy response. i will take a of a crack at that question but if there will be a solution to the

crisis you have to get ukraine economically stable. and that will require additional credits and resources before the european union can consider that they have to make sure they do the necessary steps to adopt the necessary reforms. ukrainians have to take the steps they have not taken for the last 20 years. if they don't they can throw lots of money at an. but ukraine is in a global situation. the single biggest reason is for the past 23 years the ingredients made the decisions. they were fearful of the consequences and raised the

price of energy and they have a completely energy creasy energy system now. and i think the previous president was a prime example. but ukrainian leaders have to take the decisions now. if not to-do's beyond the ability to help. but a point to re is the panel has made good comments but the idea now that he has resources but i wonder of his understanding outside of russia. with the ada that may be put to the things he kid get ukraine back.

and he may believe that witches divorced from reality one of the most annoying things that was changed since i was there in the '90s was the sense of the ukrainian national identity. flags everywhere. but the important part he has lost a generation of ukrainians. because we have seen for the last seven months because they a have spoken out against it. because their neighbors that will not change but it is the question everything putin has done has pushed the ukrainian people away.

there really does one make me wonder if your honor stands would is going on in ukraine. >> now will turn to embassador jim collins for russia but also previously a long time a russian expert. to suggest a time of crisis should have been effective channel so we could talk and listen because if you read the book all of us to a decrease to oppose putin and counterterrorism in the middle east do you agree for a channel to sustain a relationship with russia with a global issues? >> before i answer that.

let me underscore my agreement with steve. if we look at what is at stake it will be economic. but certainly there is a requirement for funding they get them through the coming year or two. >> but this second point is a coup and. henry will except where russia is doing so maybe that helps to get a better result there's henry have had this problem.

from the european union and the united states for a tariff and a make something up the sofar we find it unfortunate i have sent back and forth quite a bit but is not just mr. putin that will not solve the problem. ran the problem basically this year romantic security system is not resolving the issue. but had recruiters sells out of the mess?

but i have to agree very much. there are things within never control of the alliance and the united states, that we could do without having much cooler thinking through the night. pray. weekend to other things as in the alliance reship taking measures its to give confidence we will not be pushed into and alan princeton and it is an arrears keep. but the second thing is to find a way to engage him. but the real problem is we

largely are not asking the right questions. we need to go to mr. putin to say we have a mess on our hands. what is your idea? because i don't think mr. putin has the answer of how he will not lose or how he will win. my sense in eastern ukraine does he go all the way to kiev? i don't think so. that i don't think he has the capabilities. so there is a lot of bluffing. and with a groundswell of support just dash as if in the crimea.

so the time to talk to him so my suggestion repeat 25 and though way to go to him to put on the table what do we do to get ourselves out of this? is there of us can afford to go belly up economically it won't benefit. what do we do? >> the second thing about policy is that the mood that is taking hold about isolating russia that the narrative is we're under siege with the forces in

washington are trying to destroy a russia to undercut and what you have created is a sense if validating is a line of argument of the visuals in groups and societies. with this stadia of self isolation and those that don't encourage for the united states and europe.

is budgetary some of it is political. some of it is because they smelled the way the wind is blowing. we need to encourage as much as we can and as a central part of russia's future. >> let me ask my panel to respond. >> if any country understand russia the finish perspective. >> thank you very much.

fate you for including us. i have the feeling he is looking at the u.s. so to discuss at the moment so how would you make it as a president? and what would be the agenda? because it is much better

than i do. . .

>> certainly partners that have a big interest in your part of europe. >> i know that you have been watching them for at least several years. how do you see all this, what is your toughest challenge for this panel. >> i want to take up a thought that insulin darted. that is that for russia and the ukraine, it is an existential problem. for the it does not appear to be

an existential problem. as they have begin to talk about it as the chair of the senate armed services committee, the question then comes up over many decades now that the united states has been involved in this without a clear definition to itself and for itself about in what way does american military involvement satisfy the direct interests of this country when the ukraine and the support of the ukraine can somehow address that central issue. how is that from the direct security interests of this country that we go to the extent of surviving legal military assistance. that would be my question. >> let me ask the panelists.

who would like to respond to the ambassador? >> the question is if presdient vladimir putin and obama were able to achieve a consistent dialogue, what would be the agenda and the purpose of that? >> it is very difficult and one of the problems is that president putin, angela merkel said he's living in a different world than some people said that he sort of lost his mind. this is a shrewd tough guy. but let me tell you that i worry about the information sources, which are very much in the hands of the intelligence service says and i'm convinced that we need to give him an accurate and true picture of what is happening in the world and that they have a lot of instincts and i says. when you serve someone you have

to be careful of serving biases rather than giving information. the president is was here and he said it was a problem that every time we are talking to a different latin america wouldn't. and after two or three hours i can get him to begin to understand and maybe i can get some movement. but then when i don't talk to them for a week, it is him back believing his propaganda. this is a very difficult guy to manage at this time. and second, why do we focus on him? so far as we can tell, really the only decision where he's not talking to anyone, but he is will manufacturing this with all the rest. and so that is why we keep talking about him. because third, what is the agenda? we have to be careful about this

one. but someone said to me once that one of the problems with him is that he would hit with american presidents and explain things an american president would say, okay, great. i will go fix it and he said to this person, i didn't want him to fix it, i wanted him to understand. and that is a very interesting comment. so i think that what we need is not to talk about the cooperation and that sort of thing, but can sit on and say that i am prepared to say here and here everything we have to say because i want to try to understand where we are. because this is a problem that needs to be fixed and that is

how we started. an unfocused agenda. we would spend a lot of time doing listening. i went to ariel sharon in 2005 and the president sent me to hear everything he had to say about settlements and i'm supposed to stay here until you told me everything that you think that he needs to understand to know your view about this. and he said no one has ever asked me before. and he began to build a basis of trust whereas late in the day i don't see any other way to do it and i think that is where he starts. >> this one briefing on the agenda. we all know what is being said. the security architecture that was created in the 1990s was created in such a way that

russia doesn't have a stake in it and really never had a stake in it. and that's something that we do have to address. that is the fundamental issue if you take away everything about new world order, it is a question of how do we regulate that and the last time this came up he presented his power of european security, they said we don't want another health issue type conference, we don't need it. but now we need something else. so i think that that that is the big agenda item in order to get there obviously. other steps have to be taken, including restoring what is left of the ukraine territorial

integrity. >> i will just take the prerogative and share briefly with great respect with whether what we gave them a stake in this. we created this russia council in spring 2002 to bring russia into the heart of nato in brussels. and i know the president was serious. and secretary colin powell is serious that there would be no mistake, let's plan strategically for how to safeguard security in europe and let's bring russia into some of our peacekeeping missions and the ambassador turned it into a debate. he wasn't serious. so i just think that we gave them their chance at a critical moment post 9/11. >> i agree with you, and they never took it very seriously. and i think that we are at a point now where the system is broken.

>> i just wanted to come back to a couple of comments that jim collins made. and by the way, he has been not just one of the best colleagues and friends that we had, but also a mentor in russia over the years. and i think the most important thing that he said was to underscore the stupidity of isolation in the overall goal of u.s. policy. it has to be a nuanced combination of containment, which is the right word, and engagement. including a diplomatic engagement. jim, i am a little skeptical on the pushback against personalization of this around vladimir putin. i think it deserves to be personalized and i think it is a defensible proposition that vladimir putin is the most

powerful kremlin leader since josef stalin. he's not as powerful as joseph's on. he had some administrative techniques of his hand that put him in a whole different league. but every leader since then has either had to report is kind of a board of board of directors that could fire him as they did with chris jeff or those that have political weaknesses of his own. my guess is that if we could find this, what he would say in one word is let's do minsk. and what he would do in one word is let's do this. in other words, he is playing a double game and he's getting away with it and he will continue to play the double game as long as he gets away with it and we have to keep them from getting away with it. >> okay, if there are two

front-line states in this conflict, they are latvia and estonia. two nato allies who deserve and have the protection of article five, and we have the ambassadors here. so maybe i will start with you. >> thank you. i want to thank all and i think you have contributed a lot personally to the achievements of the people in the region and we celebrate this anniversary of the fall of the wall and i would like to express my appreciation to all of you and i know what you have done.

so i appreciate your thoughts today and i think that i have two comments and one question. and i think that where we are today is not as bad weather but a climate change. so it's really difficult to reverse the climate change, as we all know. and we have bad news but also good news. and so i'm not going to repeat that. but the question is really what are the important issues that we have to tackle. were the issues that we need to tackle right now. and i think that there are a few points that are important from all perspectives.

and first and foremost, the transatlantic link and the synchronicity of the united states and europe and it's not only european allies and nato allies but also the european union. and i think that we see this in the effect of that transatlantic unity that comes to the sanctions and this is one area where i probably disagree with the sense that i got from the sanctions in which we are working and i think that they are working. and they are changing the whole atmosphere inside russia. but we need time. and it could be a long time. but we should be ready and we should continue with the sanctions. and i think what really came as a shock to the russian

leadership was the very united front that you had in august and september where they were putting forward the sanctions. and so long-term readiness to continue his important. one issue that was brought up is energy security and getting europe out of the russian energy and influence. and i think that we see lots of things happening in this regard and that takes time as well and probably five to 10 years to see the real result. but this is a very important issue. so that in 10 years time we can

diversify from this and say, well, you cannot use this as a political tool anymore. and the third point or fourth line is that there is the presence of allies in the territories and this includes the front-line countries which are very important. and i think that the united states sent troops to the region after crimea was invaded. what should happen in the past six months in that sense is the american engagement, the nato engagement and also european allies in the region, it's more than we have seen as we waited for this in the past six years and now it's happening. we have this division in the region and we have a very -- we

see the administration is working on this initiative and we go to congress soon and we want to see that to become sustainable and long-term and not just one or two financial issues. we've said see the nato is thinking deeply on what to do as you all know. and now we have to implement that and i see a political willingness from the european allies in regards to the decisions that ford. but my question is really, and i think it's crucial that this is a strategic region that was talked about here as well, my question is how do we achieve that repeated vision because

when we talk about this here, sometimes it's not the specific countries or people, but it is the western values that we defend. and we've had to be very straightforward and discerning this and the value is. and i see that sometimes that debate is missing. >> okay, if i could just ask a couple of people to weigh in. starting with you, ambassador. and then a brief comment and questions, i could ask each of the panelists to answer whatever

aspect of this they would like to answer, whatever final point they would like to make an ambassador, nato put on a great air show when the secretary general visited and there was a significant display of this in "the wall street journal" covered it. does that help? that symbolic show of support? >> thank you so much for the discussion. i think we have been missing these kinds of discussions. and especially when we are trying to put together a good agenda for the partnership summit and we have kind of a strategic way of what to do in our region.

i fully support what was just mentioned and we have the symbolism and it's very practical stuff going on right now and very serious stuff that we haven't seen since peter the great opera opened the window to our region. but it's happening right now and i think that that keeps a calm when it comes to development in the region. this i just wanted to say that i have a short one and then a question. i think my understanding it is extremely important because either we fail or we do morally things right. i still believe that it's best to do things right in the ukraine. but we are missing three points in the ukraine today and one is that they don't have a chance to

defend itself. i think that is important that they have this ability and the second is that ukraine economically is part of this. and it reminds me of a failed state today. if we provide the assistance in this way, it doesn't mean that we would need help. but it would be a mistake to wait until the ukraine goes through and provide assistance. i think that those two parts should go somewhat hand-in-hand, something when we approached this. and then one very important thing that the ukraine is missing in the current situations this perspective. when we went through the process of this, the reforms are very

painful and very costly, politicians are afraid of them and they often didn't understand for the ukrainian government to prove that these reforms would really make a difference with it is a problem for them and i hope that we will be able to do something in this way. and perhaps this is an existential question and it is unfolding with what development we can see in europe and that includes growing nationalism. it's not only russia today. we could see things happening in other parts of europe. and at some point either we fail or redo things in a different

way. and so just a few days ago a angela merkel said that it creates a problem for europe in general. my question goes to this and she said with information warfare that what we can do is part of this. >> of i could maybe just ask you a brief question so that that the panels can sum it up. >> thank you. i would like to get straight to the information and talk about what other people have said. talking about the historical revision in which putin historically initiated. here i would like to underscore what was said from a

congressional perspective and after this first war in chechnya, the russians asked for they asked for a flink got demand. it is esoteric, they have withdrawn. but the fact is that this was after the war and we wanted to strengthen the incipient democracy and this includes a vote in the u.s. senate was 100 to nothing. and it was very significant. in a very quick point in march of 1997, and it happened to do with nato enlargement on our fact finding trip. and so first we dealt with this and boris yeltsin had been at the summit in helsinki a day or two before. and we met with just about everyone who wanted to be included and most importantly was with the national security

staff in the kremlin late at night. we talked about details of possible enlargement and were they happy about a? now. were they the slightest bit worried? not in the slightest. and was there any talk that there had been a promise and that we would ever do this? now. by the end of the discussion we were talking about if russia continued on its current trajectory could it somehow join nato. so one final point having to do with the legal defensive weapons of the ukraine, the decision will happen sooner rather than later and there are at least two bipartisan bills in congress right now and unless i read it incorrectly, tony said that the administration felt that it was about time that we furnish us.

my question is, what are the implications for relations with russia and with the european allies if that does go through? >> thank you. if you can ask your question in 60 seconds or less, we will get two extra copies of this book. [laughter] >> thank you and i will be quick. i want to add a sense of urgency here. the ukrainian economy is down. [inaudible] than that we need to do on our side is assess prices in the top 10% of gdp and it is an interesting system. what the west needs to do is to spend this on top of the $7 billion and it makes this for

five or six years. >> we will deliver the extra copies to your institute. [laughter] >> asking the panelists to wrap up, whatever they'd like to say, steve, we will start with you about a 30 billion-dollar western assistance package to what your point is. >> we have written two pieces in the last two weeks which lay out the western response and want the ukrainians have responsibility for and i commend them. they are available on the peterson institute website and i agree with every word that he has written. and i do want to answer the point about military assistance. first of all with a caviar and the less it is talked about the better. but here we are. second, there are the house and what that means and we have suggested some things and are we

talking about the grant of military assistance and there's a whole variety of policy questions. but let's just take it at its most basic level. helping the ukraine to strengthen oteri capabilities. if united states is engaged in the process, we will have more influence with the ukrainian government on what exactly they do at those capabilities. let me take the counterfactual, which is to lead the ukrainian government, whether it is economically were defensively, it does not seem to suggest an outcome that's going to be better. so we have to think long and hard about whether the ukraine is something that we want to go to war over. we do not. absolutely do not. the question is what makes it more or less likely that we get drawn into those circumstances that a sovereign democratically elected government in europe would be denied the means of

self-defense to me is an extremely suspicious presumption and it's one that the united should certainly not supported. >> thank you. steve hadley? >> i will make some quickpoint. there is what i call that vietnam can see. that only the united states have the right policies, all would be right with the world. we don't have that kind of power and influence and the truth is that russia is different today because of it's own internal domestic realities virtually independent or in some cases in spite of policies that we have pursued. rush is a different place today than it was 15 years ago. it is true that there is no military solution to these kinds of problems and also no solution that does not have a military

element. and that needs to be the nato and u.s. forces, not u.s. forces but ground forces, people on the ground, that is what we need to talk about. and it needs to be to help these countries defend themselves, i would do it covertly rather than overtly, but it needs to be done. on the economic piece, the problem that came out in our strategy group is for every one that we made economically, vladimir putin has counters. and they have much more influence. this is what is tricky. how can we make the ukraine and economic success is actually russia is working to make it a basket case. >> this is tough. i hope these right, but i sometimes wonder how far the writ runs if at some point they might break up under the kind of pressure they are under.

it's not bad weather, but it is hard to reverse climate change and i think that we need to find a way to get people talking about this as we step back in how russia has changed, how europe has changed, and what is a vision going forward. because we are in new territory and i'm worried that we are not stepping back and look strategically at where we want to be and how we want to get there. >> thank you, steve. angela? >> i will make two points. on the question of information warfare, we are always going to be added disadvantage because we don't have this. but i think that we should do a better job in europe and the u.s. of just putting facts out there. there are too many news outlets that say people use the incursion or it is alleged word is