becomes a failed state. gore right before the second world war after germany invaded russia and before we had gone in, harry truman suggested that when the germans were winning, they kill as many men as possible. right now the muslims are doing a good job of killing the muslims, which could be distracting them from bothering us. am i right? well, that may be -- >> there is a diversion at the outset. anyway, who would like to start? >> we have one more question. >> please go ahead. >> okay, [inaudible]

in the way that you ask your question that you know that it is not easy and it would be very un-american and there's one thing here, you know first that it is an open crisis and then you let this become more complicated. and then it's no more or less part of local prices. and so the idea that you can have a local crisis is going against everything that we know and 90% have original dimensions

. and one thing is to pay for the refugees who want to pay in terms of security. and so the idea may be intervening and when you do this you need to talk about boots on the ground, but maybe also to do something before that. so that includes the question of the agenda and my point would be that you have to stop thinking that you can ignore crisis. i watched this debate in 2009

and what happened five years ago , at some point we have to oblige to this. because it would destabilize all of them. and instead it was a reasonable strategy and instead of doing that we do a search, and then we will go talk about it. and if there is one there, it would be to stop playing this game and try to deal with the crisis. and think about all that we have been talking about in regards to changing the game.

>> on the u.s. policy question, the u.s. has inherited an imperial power since the 70s, we are tied to a network of authoritarian regimes come in the history of our involvement in that region has been a succession of confronting broader threats be a the union or others, and now it is transnational terrorism and i think these strategies of confrontation and containment have blinded us to things that are creating additional threat down the road. and so i've co-authored a policy with a colleague that in the rush to solicit arab support against isis, we are ignoring trends inside the states that could lead to greater terrorism. and so i would argue for just

greater scrutiny what is happening inside the state that we call our allies and i'm not talking about a return to the very vocal democratization agenda, but perhaps a greater focus on the rule of awe, performs, insurance policies down the road, looking at the prison systems in these countries, but it's not all about an extra of containment strategy. i'm worried about the lack that we have allies that have signed up for this campaign and there are other states as well where we have a major strategic presence there and sometimes there's a radicalization threat with them as well. and so this is an age-old problem and it just strikes me as i mentioned with the title of this book about the choice of enemies, that we have always been confronted with a series of trade-offs, how well do we manage long-term threats looming

on the horizon. and we can't underestimate this and financial, psychological, it's going to be very hard to see a constructive policy emerge. >> will go back to the audience. >> please speak up. >> thank you. you know, we could say here until tomorrow at this time and discuss all of the mistakes that were made in these wars.

but setting aside the initial decision to go into iraq, and setting aside the catastrophe in syria over the chemical weapons deadline, one can ask the question whether the logical argument you are making just simply arrives at a bottom line that the u.s. should never have gone near it. because it seems to me that we talked about the failure to find allies and then a few minutes later about policies that actively destroy the state that we were trying to create and those policies were generally policies to create allies among

various tribal entities and leaders. and at the same time, you know, the president's initial conviction about syria was an attempt, i believe, to learn the lessons of iraq, that you don't go in unless you can see at least the outline of a political solution. and nobody could find such an outline. on the other hand the world has hated the u.s. attempt to wait for such an outline. and it's called withdrawal. the u.s. feels naked without the u.s. providing the security that it has provided since the end of world war ii. that allows everyone else to

live and grow in relative peace. so i am sympathetic to the arguments being made. but i must say that i cannot see a logical conclusion other than the we should never have gotten in and that doesn't seem like a highly risky strategy or recommendation in and of itself. so i wonder if you could take on this situation and it seems to be a significant contradiction in your criticism of u.s. policy. >> thank you.

>> it all depends upon a crisis. and it could be absolutely clear. but at the same time showing them the no-fly zone, which was a way to destabilize the area and i don't think i'm wrong about this. for the good comparison was to compare this and there was a huge part of this situation and many refugees came back.

so let's imagine now that the u.s. did not do this in 1991. and i have been in refugee camps and it could've been a really bad situation. so you limit the scope of the crisis. and i think that in syria at the idea was not to send troops but to be doing this in a very efficient way. so this is the most difficult and there is no clear answer,

but there is a difference between short-term and long-term. in both cases this from time to time. and i would say that it is at the same time were drones are very much having an effect on local society. and so this includes to make the tools and its working and so we

want to understand that this can be part of it. and so all we can do business. and so i don't see that there could be a solution. and i'm sure that we would agree. >> let me just say one thing, this is not about an initial decision and is also a way of conducting this. and of course we have a lot of

objectives and i think it made a lot of sense. and the way things are productive, there are a number of things that could have been done and we need to do a lot more to be smarter afterwards and there are things that can work differently. and that includes so as to facilitate the intervention. and then you introduce a problem within the local dynamic that will make it impossible to solve later on. so in many ways it's also paying for mistakes as well.

and again there are lessons that can be drawn from that and i'm not sure that that's something that we can all do. >> let me refer to two experiences in foreign countries. one that ended badly, one that ended successfully. the one that ended badly is israel and lebanon. they went in there and they stayed for years and they tried to create a proxy army. and they failed. and how long could this last? the success, vietnam and cambodia, they went in there and they cleaned it out and they were destroyed. they went back across the border

and cambodia was not a failed state, not libya. so what did they do and what did the vietnamese do right? what did the israelis do wrong? maybe we should look the on our own experience and gain lessons from what other companies have done. [inaudible] >> hello, the question is if you look at this and how we have effective government, my sense is that if you can carry it out, it is the right thing to do. >> are there any other questions? >> yes.

>> i have a comment on the u.s. coming out in january 2013. and i was on the ground for the last three years, it was very clear what was happening and we knew what was happening and we were screaming at the top of our lungs, all of us. and my comment is that there are plenty of teeple were willing on the ground, 20 of potential allies on the ground and i just think that we need to understand that this is a lack of will or is this a lack of competence in the american government and its affiliates to communicate with the ground and use all the resources to make small changes happen. >> thank you.

who would like to answer first? [laughter] >> perhaps we could keep this debate for later on. but i think there is something as to what is going wrong in lebanon and could you elaborate a bit on your question. and to be honest, i have tried to look at what is going on and there's very little literature. i would like to see a study on it because of all the interventions, that one seems most successful. and they totally crushed it. they went back across the border

and cambodia had survived. and i would love to know how they did it. >> what i think is bad or is the situation in syria and its obvious because the structure is very different. so we should start at in this way because it's not a good idea. because that kind of intervention can certainly work. and the problem in washington is

that when you say i want to be a part of this or don't want to be part of this, the problem is that everybody is playing politics and at least i would argue that that includes the solution that is the key to answering it. and that includes it was really clear that we will bring us together and clearly the strategy of this state was very easy to understand courier and

they can be very complicated. and it can be quite simple, actually. and so it was part of the next six months. >> in a sense, it is coming back to the question of what do we mean when we say what we say. and that elaborate somewhat chill was saying. and in the sense that looks like there is always a sort of situation and it can only make

sense as far as policy rights. and the interventions can be worse when it comes to these policies. so i would not elaborate on that but i'm pretty sure that they have done their best in regards to this. so if we look at the islamic states, we have to see the movement and we have two very different movements. and you don't engage with the taliban and the way that you engage with islamic states. that includes any integration for them and the american

citizens and that someone that is acceptable to them and the taliban is facing exactly that. but they try to oppose this is a precise example and we have this dream who is international order and we should not look at them in the same way. >> thank you. are there other questions? >> hello, i was a scholar in 1968 in indiana. i continue to read the india story. and it's hard to formulate a good question for a panel like this because you are brilliant and that as a compliment. and i'd like to ask you to give me a scenario for the retaking

of this large city in northern iraq. and as one of the colleagues in the room said they were using foreign experiences, the anon, lebanon, cambodia, israel and etc., we had a civil war in the united states that lasted for years. and this is the war territory. it's an iraqi city and it is in the hands of another self-declared state authority. so each of the four of you or five of you, if you will, mr. moderator, davis a scenario of how long it would take before the city is like the city of atlanta or georgia and part of a unit again. >> would anyone like to answer that? spirit yes, please. [inaudible conversations] [laughter]

>> well, the problem is this "new york times" article billingslea elated. we are dealing with a military that has been hollowed out by corruption. it includes the other militias. many of them come from the places like this themselves. it is a provincial movement and armed wing under this national guard and there's probably going to be some sort of effort to split the pragmatists within the ranks that can be brought over and the question is not so much the liberation but the government structures that are going to replace it. and this is the long-term

struggle. and we have indigenous forces. and we have these militaries that come in and as we heard they were declared dead and this includes what kind of government we will replace here. >> [inaudible] you are right, it is a strategy and you cannot break them up. the problem is that we have the

iraqi army. and it is not a solution and you have to deal with this but also with our own groups. and so you maybe you can negotiate this and it is impossible and there are lot among them, maybe trading them for two or three years and then

it will try to make the competition between them to know which one increases this and they are not convinced at all about this. then we have the iraqi army and the shia military. [inaudible] [inaudible] and they will keep continuing and it shows that it's very difficult for the army to make progress with itself. and they have to go through their own militia and on the last run i spoke with people

still living there, they have no fear as they come back to the city and it will be something that we are not ready for. and so it will take time. >> thank you. okay, we have time for one more question and then it is time for each of the panels to conclude. >> i have a really simple question, we have signifying changes in the term of national security.

can you explain this? >> i am not sure who else can answer that. [inaudible] does this signify a change across the country? ..