challenges, we are going to continue to see the cycle of violence that generates threats throughout -- rather than opportunities from this region. is my pleasure to introduce these distinguished panelists behind me and they are going to be expended on these challenges but i hope also finding opportunities as well. i can attest to all of their expertise and knowledge and contributions to rant on a regular basis and i work closely with them. karen elliott house is former publisher of the wall street journal. ..

ambassador james dobbins is a senior fellow and distinguished chair of diplomacy and security at the rand corporation. he most recently served as director of the rand international security and defense policy center. next, we have seth jones amount directs the national security and defense policy center at the rand corporation. he served as the representative to the commander of u.s. special operations command to assistant secretary of defense for special operations. so please let's all welcome them. [applause] thank you, dalia. and excuse me, feel like i'm turning my back on all of you

there. we are any time in my 30 years, 30 plus years at least of going to the middle east where i think there are more divisions, chaos and depression than i can ever remember. we will try, as dalia said, to focus on some opportunities. i hope my colleagues will have some. it is really an honor for me to get to moderate the panel because i'm yes, i trust year -- trusty her here but i would says even if i weren't, because i'm a consumer of the product. these really are three of the best experts in america on this topic. all of these divisions that are so aptly listed in the little blurb on this arabic version, sunni-shia, arab-israeli,

autocratic dictator versus demand for liberalism or fundamentalism, one or both, are not new. i mean, arab persian is older than islam. sunni-shia is old as the early days of islam. and even the jewish arab dispute is hardly new. so i would like to start by asking each of you to briefly say of this, why is this set of what i would regard as set of old issues such a toxic rue now? what's made it so divisive and toxic? all of the elements have been there. >> i think first of all, recent events really, there is a

fundamental change in what we are seeing now in that some of the structures that were established a century ago during and in the wake of world war i are coming apart. as these artificial borders dissolve, as some of these governments, autocratic governments have been removed, what we're seeing particularly in iraq and in the series is we are seeing in a sense the control being ripped off and to all of these have come up to the surface again. we are seeing all the conflict. the second thing that's so different for the united states is that at one time these conflicts were seen from this country as distant conflicts. in the shadow of 9/11, they are

somehow seen as having the ability to directly impact us. in fact, concerns about fears that it might impact us directly here in the united states has been certainly viewed as a justification for a more active policy. things are coming apart but it's not just there. it affects us in a very, very direct way because there's a difference now between a frontline and the homefront. >> jim. speedwell, first of all i was it's kind of important about what's going on in the middle east and little bit of perspective. we that regional upheavals of the sort pretty continuously since the end of the second world war. in the 1950s, '60s and '70s it was east asia that was in turmoil. he that hath a dozen wars going on, more than 100,000 american soldiers killed in two of those worse. you have much larger numbers of

civilian casualties and refugees in anything we are seeing in the middle east today. in the 1980s it was mostly latin america and africa. again you at more than 20 wars going on. again you have more casualties and more refugees than anything we are seeing today. we also have more terrorism. american planes were getting hijacked every few weeks for a while and flown to cuba. americans were being held hostage and murdered in the middle east. american soldiers were being killed in several countries. american ambassadors were being killed in several countries. in the 1990s it became the balkans and we for different international military interventions went on in the balkans in the 10 year period. the civil war and boston was just as intense as the civil war in syria today. so what's different is now it's the middle east but it's not east asia, it's not africa,

america. all those places are relatively quiet. it's not the middle east. that's one difference. a second difference is the middle east is an unusual homogeneous place to give a single, dominant ethnicity. they are all most all air. of the single dominant leg you pashtun language. yet the single -- every single dominant religion and all part of a single country, less than 100 years ago. instead of having half a dozen somewhat autonomous conflicts going on with a certain amount of contagion among them, you have what appears to be an upheaval in an entire civilization. and the conflict is much more cross-border, much more intense. it has several conflicting strands, the ones you mentioned, and so that's one thing that makes a difference.

second thing is the immediacy and intensity and volume of the media content. so americans were being killed in as brutal a fashion as the journalists who were beheaded in the 1980s. one poor man in a wheelchair was pushed overboard. when a hold the entire ship was hijacked. but there were not videos. >> if there had been videos are only three tv channels and none of them would have broadcast it. those pictures never would've gotten out. no one would've ever no one would've ever seen the. he read a news story, doesn't quite the same immediacy of seeing mr. foley actually being beheaded and -- in almost real-time. i think that also gives it a bit of immediacy. and, of course, 9/11 as a background also as brian indicated makes it much more real. and apparently more threatening for americans although i would argue levels of terrorism are not as bad as they were in the

1980s. the dangers are not necessarily greater than those we saw in most disputed i would like to have a discussion on the threat level as soon as trying to get through. >> he will undoubtedly threaten us. [laughter] >> i would probably say to issues are of interest, and maybe new in one sense. one is, and brian alluded to it earlier, we are seeing unprecedented levels of westerners travel to the middle east, particularly from europe to go fight in both syria and to a greater degree over the last several months in iraq. there is a connection. when you add jim's a dimension of social media, twitter, myspace, youtube, facebook, a connection that we can make it homes in the united states that have encouraged people from denver, from florida to go fight in this area.

in the case of abu sal is a very interesting one. there's a kid north of miami, radicalized here in the united states in florida, goes over to fight with al-qaeda affiliates in syria, al-nusra front. comes back to the united states for six months. no one in the u.s. law enforcement system realized that he'd gone to fight with an al-qaeda affiliate. makes the decision to blow himself up. thankfully does that they're rather than h he because he stad for six months, returns in and blows himself up. that connection with the unprecedented numbers makes this i think given to the second issue really with the islamic state of iraq in the levant, isil, whatever acronym you use, we have an interesting situation to a nonstate actor has made a pretty serious bid to takeover pretty important parts of one of

the larger states in the middle east, iraq. we've seen elements of this with hezbollah and lebanon but this is been a blitzkrieg strategy in a major middle east state. i think that's something we haven't seen much of in the last couple of decades. so you put those two together and you have a very volatile situation with westerners coming to fight. >> can you try to explain to all of us what makes the islamic state, or al-qaeda, what makes that fundamentalist jihadi philosophy appealing to young americans or young arabs? what is it that makes you want to be a jihadists? >> i'll start. i'm sure jim and brian, and brian, i think it's up there. i will make a pitch on a recentr recent publication but brian has a publication on america and

other european find that it got over particularly to syria that's just out, which hits on some of these -- >> when jihadis come marching home. >> i like the title. >> i think you need some sheet music to that. [laughter] i'm sitting on a panel for the new fbi director with among others the former head of washington -- bruce klafter one of things we looked at going to the field offices is what has inspired people to go over. the are a couple of things, this really begs for a more analytical ranch-style project. in the absence of that there are a couple things -- rand style. up your to be motivating. one is taking territory appears to have inspired some individuals. the isis, the videos of what looks like success on the

battlefield has drawn some individuals, particularly since june, to go fight with a group that appears to be winning. and the group, i was on cnn a couple of nights ago to comment on this video that came out, two or three days ago. what's interesting is it was clips of people on fox, on cnn, on msnbc, americans, former generals, former intelligence officers, state department diplomats commenting that isis is gaining ground. they took those clips can use them in a propaganda video and pushed it out. they have been using our own words to make the case to her own population to it's an interesting use of social media. that argument, the dominant argument appears to be one reason. some of these people that got over to fight also have been clearly looking for something. they tend to come from, some of

them come from broken households. some impoverished, some have dropped out. i wouldn't call most of these individuals that have gone on particularly well educated. you can see that in the leadership structure but there are things that they're being drawn to that bring them, that makes them want to be part of a group that appears to be important as well. i wouldn't point at least from the data i've looked at to anyone factor, but several of them happening over and in their own lives appear to be drawing them to go over. >> it's interesting it is so attractive. i was just in saudi arabia and advocacy and imam that i talk to over a half a dozen years. is 18 year old son is begging to go to syria. and she told him no, you shouldn't go. not that you can't go. is that i don't want to be like

an arab government dictating. so he encouraged them not to go because he said, you don't know enough about islam to do the proper thing in the circumstances you're going to be in, and to do the wrong thing is bad for your salvation, shall we say? .com and he says a lot of young men in his mosques are asking him, seeking his approval and encouragement to go. and and a religious lady i lived with her son has already gone, and she's happy about it. i mean, what is your sense of why it is attractive? and are the reasons the same for americans as for arab? >> no, i don't think so. when you look at the motives why people have either gone to previous jihadists fronts in afghanistan, in yemen and

somalia or elsewhere, you get very diverse motives. certainly if you talk to them or look, listen to what they say, expressions of faith are there. certainly the absorb the ideology of al-qaeda, that is an individual duty to take up arms struggle against the infidels of the west. islam is under assault, that's an important ingredient. there are also other unspoken but these other motives that seth touched on. but their desire for adventure to do something meaningful, participate in an ethics struggle. personal crisis is a big part of those, particularly from the united states going. it's a very individual decision. the young man from florida that seth spoke about, and one of his

comments he basically said his life in florida soft. that's a quote. >> that makes it harder to try to defuse if there's not -- >> it's a difficult for us. first of all that's good news for the united states. there is no exodus of volunteers going off. the numbers are very, very small. publicly identified since 9/11, we that approximate 120 americans that have gone or tried to go overseas to join jihadist fronts abroad. we know that there are somewhere around beyond that, somewhere around 100 or more than have gone to syria. but this is out of an american muslim population of approximately 3 million. and so we're talking about a

very tiny turnout, despite the efforts of al-qaeda and isil through very slick internet campaigns and social media to attract these people. they are simply -- hang on. they are not selling a lot of cars. they just art. the decisions are very individual, not community, not community supported. that's good news. bad news is of those who ago, some will acquire competence as a result of their experience to they will be even more radicalized. some clearly will be disillusioned and come back and maybe determined to continue their campaign. >> can you, jim, talk about the issue you started to talk about of what is the threat of s. to

the u.s.? is it really a big threat? isn't a longer-term threat, and immediate threat, a threat to the homeland or just a threat to our close friends in the middle east? >> no, i think it's a threat to the united states ultimately come although it's a threat to all the other things as well. what distinguishes isis from the other terrorist groups, including al-qaeda, is that it claims to be and disintegrate is already a state. that is to say commit takes and holds territory. something al-qaeda has never tried to do. now, if you talk about the building of terrorist groups to organize themselves to strike at great distance, they can organize themselves and operate in highly unfriendly environments with very effective governments like germany or

canada or even the united states but they have a great deal of difficulty doing so and they limited capabilities as a result. they have a slightly easier time in states that may be unfair to them but also very incompetent. so yemen would be an example for pakistan where they may be under pressure but it's not much because the states are incompetent. they can pose a greater threat to long distance targets. they have an even greater ability to operate in areas that have no government at all like somalia for much of the last 10 years. but the biggest threat is when operate in a state that's friendly to them, where they actually have the act of assistance of the local government. that's only occurred once in modern history and that was in afghanistan before 2001. that's where the threat, the planning of the operational control of 9/11 occurred. to see another state emerge in

the middle east which becomes a launch platform for terrorists with larger aspirations religions to replicate what we have spent a decade preventing in afghanistan. and thus creates the possibility of threats of that dimension again. so i think denying isis and similar groupings the capacity to take and hold territory is important. >> but what is the goal right now? is it or is it taking and holding more territory and knocking off the saudi regime? yesterday they called on the saudis to overthrow the royal family and were coming to mecca. in their priority list, where do we rank the? >> i would say in answer to that question the groups name indicates its priorities are areas in the levant.

they would tend to be areas from about iraq into syria, essential parts of lebanon and jordan, and israel and palestine. how well they would be received by even sunni groups there is an open question. it's at least a regional issue and i think the name action highlights the areas they're most interested in. at the same time what's been interesting but with isis, i'm am just back from both the middle east and south asia, is they've adopted a strategy recently that is more similar to what al-qaeda has operated over the past 10 years in even outside of the areas that their primary operating in. they have reached out to jihadists groups and other places. some of them, and through encouragement have pledged loyalty.

we saw that within the last week, a jihadists group and assign it has been fight against the egyptians and israelis. we've seen isis members in libya going around, got one group that has pledged loyalty. south asia, interesting in pakistan we've seen some support from groups like the pakistan taliban to isis. support really means pledges of support rather than willingness to bring in fighters. so there is also a willingness to expand their networks in a broader area than just the one that they're fighting. just briefly, where does the u.s. set? i think in general if you look at the loves of violence that are going on, they are primarily focusing on local regimes, the assad regime in syria and the iraqi regime. that's where most of the energy is directed. it does appear to be an interest

in inspiring others outside of those areas to conduct attacks, including in europe and potentially the u.s. but i would say the focus of the effort right now without doubt is their own region. >> the taliban and never had any intention of striking the united states to the taliban had no ambitions whatsoever but they're willing to host groups that did and facilitate their operations but it's hard to believe that isis wouldn't do the same thing, whatever its own intentions are if they were allowed to take and hold territory and set up a state. state. >> can i follow through on that? look, the idea of the islamic state, not just how many square miles they hold on the ground, the idea of the islamic state has excited islamists around the world. it's galvanized people around the world. and we are now in the process of an air campaign against it. that's going to have

consequences. and to the extent that we ultimately -- to the extent that we become an impediment to the achievement of their goals, or even the survival of that enterprise, is going to have an effect on their strategic calculations, both as an organization as well as individual jihadists who are there who may be scattered and motivated by ideas of vengeance, as well as other groups that are not there. so we're going to be getting with this for a long time. -- dealing with this for a long time. when the jihadis comeback year, they will mostly be arrested if we can identify them. that there's a bigger problem in

europe and this is a fascinating problem. europe has someone in the neighborhood of about 2000 people that have gone, primarily from france, united kingdom, germany, belgium who have gone off to fight in syria and iraq. some of them are going back and forth. the polling data indicates in some of these countries an extraordinary level of support for the islamic state. >> in the european -- >> among the muslims but i'm talking about extraordinary levels of support. because in many cases they are coming there from marginalized communities and this is seen quite differently. when these jihadis comeback to these committees and europe that are already emboldened by the christian of the islamic state to create an instance many islamic states, neighborhoods where they're going to enforce

sharia, then that becomes the catalyst for a confrontation -- >> with the government. >> not only the government but we have the other phenomenon going on in europe at the same time and that is the rise, ultra right wing nativist other political groups. europe has not just the terrorist problem, not just a police problem -- >> so what is not a domestic problem that can become -- >> can become a societal problem. that's the point. >> i think it's important to underscore o'brien just said about the excitement, certainly saudis but arabs in general i think feel about the islamic state i mean the idea that democracy movement didn't work and many of them are still unhappy with their government, and this is kind of a new way to get that we can have justice and

freedom, that we can get the kind of idea what society we had in the profits time if we just didn't get the islamic state. i don't think it would be such an idea that society but declared it does seem to excite people in way that i think a lot of americans don't understand. so what should we be doing about this? leave aside what's going to ask that we are bombing now, but what should we do to protect ourselves? is a good enough to just contain isil, which is probably the maximum if the bombing can do that? or do you have to do more? >> this is at the heart of the current -- >> a few contain it, will it ultimately whether because it's not succeeding? >> this is the heart of the current debate.

the air campaign is beginning to succeed and degrading some of the capabilities of the forces of the islamic state. whether or not an air campaign by itself can destroy, degrade and ultimately defeat and destroy, whether they can defeat the islamic state is another question. some people say that we have to do more. this gets into the argument about boots on the ground aren't we have to accelerate. board we have to find we have to persuade of the sunni tribes in iraq to again switched sides as it was before and turn against al-qaeda. i'm not sure how much of a stomach there is on the part of the sunnis in iraq. there is some movements now against isis. i'm just not sure how much of a strength of feeling they are is on the part of the sunni tribes

in iraq right now to take on the islamic state, special on behalf of a government, although the government has changed. it's still not an inclusive government. it's still the shia thing in baghdad. >> we see the view that the iraqis can defeat them so we need to get the turks, and the turks won't do it unless we go after assad. so are we getting sucked deeper and deeper and back to the original question, what should we do, jim? >> there's no doubt that isis will eventually be driven out of the population centers in iraq, or at least lose control of them. they may go underground but they will lose control. because they are a minority of the sunni population which is a minority of the iraqi population. and so the kurds and the shia between them with whatever

marginal help they get from the sunnis are eventually going to retake that territory with our assistance. and i don't think that means that you have to put american infantry on the ground. there are boots on the ground. there will be forward observers and advisers, and some of them may get killed but that's a different level of engagement. the real question is syria. this group emerged out of city the many of them are iraqis but essentially emerged out of city. it's the syrian a civil war of that hotbed from which much of this violence is coming. the situation there is much more complicated because the sunnis are in majority there, not a minority. the government represents the small ethnic minority. that conflict is complicated by a great deal of international involvement on both sides with the russians and the iranians on

one side, all the of the sunni governments on the other side. i think the one -- >> and trying to stay out. unless we are trying to -- >> we are doing both. we are bombing in the series it. we are arming will be considered moderate factions of the syrians. we are seeking eventually to overthrow assad but not now. so it's a question of sequencing. these regional conflagrations really do eventually burned themselves out, but the question is how much damage they do. the quicker you can accelerate that, the better. the one factor that may change this dynamic is if we succeed in getting an agreement with iran on their nuclear deal, we will find that in iraq our interests are coincidental and we can begin not just operate in parallel lines without communicating with each other but actually communicate with

each other which would make our assistance to the iraqis much more effective. and perhaps eventually being able to broker a peace, some kind of peace agreement in syria. which would require also cooperation with russia. i think that's ultimately what will happen. the question is how many years will it take? how many more people get killed and how many more people get radicalized. >> i want try to do and then we'll go to your questions but i think it's fair to say if there is an arena deal of the form that is under discussion, while it may have the teasing that you suggest, it's also going to outrage our sunni arab friends, especially my dear friends in saudi arabia. go ahead, seth. >> i just wanted to add two things. one is i do think we need to continue to ask not just what should we do, but what are our

interests here? do we really have interests? i would say the connection between the west and westerners going, and iraq and syria in particular makes this important to us. these are countries, if their names don't get identified and put on no fly lists, for example, that through visa waiver programs, can come to the united states. these are countries where we have visa waiver laws allowing them to come. a part of the issue is i think if we don't do anything and if the area continues to attract westerners, the small numbers that brian is talking about americans, but larger numbers of europeans, i do think this presents a problem, particularly when have a small al-qaeda contingency industry that is plotting attacks in both europe

and the united states. i don't think we could afford to just stay out of this. i think we run into the same problem we had with afghanistan in the 2001 here you'd. you can't expect staying out makes you more secure. been a problem is what you do? one issue i would say is the what we don't want to do and i would strongly urge staying away from is the introduction of conventional combat forces in this area. as we saw both after 2003 in iraq in particular, levels of radicalization what way up with large-scale american forces moving in. i would strongly stay away. we have a presence on the ground. it tends to be our clandestine intelligence and special operations unit. the other thing i would add, this is where we do a very poor job of combating this, this really is, all of us i think of noted, this isn't part of the war, a struggle of ideas.

we do a very bad job of pushing back. one of the things that's interesting in early 2000, the saudi could effectively with defectors from al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula this gave the defectors a forum to speak about their time in al-qaeda. tv interviews. we do have people, i mean, i know this because i know their names and i know the locations. with people that have gone the street and come back to the united states and are completely disillusioned. they believed that what -- they were sold a bill of goods. this is a bad used-car salesman deal that they got to go over and fight with jihadists. what they found they didn't like. that stuff is not coming out y yet. >> why don't the tv networks -- i should think -- >> i don't think our law enforcement agencies have been willing to identify those people spent why don't those people go volunteer if -- are they afraid? >> that's a good question.

it sends out a counter message that all the propaganda we are hearing on the news is not, it's not reality. >> questions? >> i have a question about the rise of radical islam in southeast asia. you mentioned, started to talk about it. we were just in cambodia where i heard references to the presence of some islamic fundamentalism. of course it exists in indonesia. that's part one. part two is what we've been reading about the repression of muslims in myanmar indian-china, will that create a kind of

radicalism? >> great question. it's interesting. since come in and some random work we've done over the last couple of months we have looked at the numbers, levels of jihadists activity. between 2010-2013 it was a 58% increase in the number of jihadist groups. most of those tend to be the middle east, not southeast asia. there's a doubling of jihadist fighters during that same time period. and the rough doubling in the number of attacks by these groups. most of that is happening, interestingly, in north africa and the levant, syria and iraq. southeast asia has seen some swings back and forth over the past several years. the philippines, for example, that have been weakened severely

because of philippine efforts. but one of the things i wanted to highlight, people here may have forgotten, the u.s. has been involved in a very significant struggle in the philippines since 9/11. it's primarily special operations forces and intelligence units, not conventional. you don't see it in newspapers. it has decimated the jihadist groups in the philippines right now. it's decimated groups like the mlf which a note on the other jihadist groups. saw that area right now, we have seen a slight revival in the area of pakistan, in india where they have created an additional affiliate. but i would say across the region are some concerns about the growth of jihadist groups.

i would just say across the board, the levels are still lower than what we are seeing in the middle east and north africa, and probably in south asia as well. jim is in a better position than i am along these lines, but the decision about what the u.s. does in 2016 and after in south asia, in afghanistan have a lot of implications about the jihadist activity by 2017, 2018, 2019. that's going to impact on other areas, bangladesh, probably cambodia under the bridges along those lines. >> i don't know if brian has anymore on -- >> just talking recently to some indonesian officials. they again underscore the fact that the islamic state idea does have full. it has awakened some sentiments

that the indonesians thought they had pretty much under control. keep in mind when there was an original wave of activity in indonesia, it was both a crackdown and an attempt to deal with it through other means. the group that was responsible for much of this come a group with the initials ji, and ji ultimately backed away from violence but the term they used was an interesting one. they disengaged. it has a contingent quality about that. >> meaning you could reengage. >> you could reengage. it's not turning off, ending, finishing or anything like that. it has this ephemeral quality to it.

>> can i ask you, jim, do so else would ask a question? sorry, go ahead. i'll get back to iran later. >> my question is for brian. regarding radicalization in european countries, what do you see on the possible solutions to that and what is the appetite of the european conference to handle this in a decisive way? >> the europeans have a much greater problem there when i say europeans, that's a huge generalization. there are large populations, immigrant-based populations and a handful of countries, germany, primarily from turkish workers, france, primarily from north africa, the united kingdom, primarily from south asia.

there are problems of assimilation of immigrant communities despite the fact that in the case of germany some of these communities have been there for multiple generations, in france as well, but they are more marginalized. there is much more, public opinion polls indicate extremely high levels of support for these ideas. so it is a much greater problem there. our challenge here is identifying specific individuals who go for very individual reasons. there it is much more a matter of dealing with communities. in so far as how they deal with them, the europeans having debates among themselves how to deal with the latest group that has gone to syria. some of them are taking a law

enforcement approach, ma and that is passing new legislation that will prohibit going abroad to join these groups, pickup passports, make it a crime. others are taking the position that we must welcome these people back, monitor them and rehabilitate them into society. it's a typical european kind of -- [laughter] >> that was the saudi way of dealing with it. first wit listed in prison, if u will, and then rehabilitate -- >> rehabilitate them in prison. >> and then get them a wife, a car and house and let them live happily ever after. >> i am a member of the political cycle here, and rather like ebola, i so seems to do. in the last three months, at least for the general public. it wasn't any awareness of it before. i was wondering can you

mentioned the syrian connection. where do they all come from? were any of them working with al-qaeda? how does al-qaeda get on with isil? are they the first one to come up with the idea of an islamic state? what's the sort of local politics with all these jihadi groups? >> i think the reason why i says has suddenly appeared so prominently on the horizon, not so much that we didn't notice it was there before, i think the government and others did it was there, it was the collapse of the iraqi army and it is suddenly overrunning most of sunni iraq. that's what was new, otherwise it was just another radical jihadi groups in syria, of which there are a number. it's when it moved into iraq and the iraqi army collapsed. what was surprising was the collapse of the iraqi army, not the existence of the isis. >> wanted you can address the

relationship between al-qaeda and -- >> let him to do that. i want to come back to the ebola topic. >> this is a really good question. this group has its history, a real brief history of this group is afghanistan of the 1980s in the west. zarqawi create an obsession. they went to iraq around 2002, and zarqawi became affiliated a pledge this organization to al-qaeda. they changed the name to al-qaeda in iraq and became an affiliate. by december 2004, at which point they thought the americans and the iraqi government for the rest of the u.s. incursion. u.s. leaves in 2011. what happens real brief at this point is that the syrian

insurgency started facing the cells industry to start getting involved, which becomes, what we now call the nusra organization but by al-qaeda in iraq wants all to syria and iraq in its come in its area. it wants control of operations. >> this is like a feud between an inner-city gang. >> in early 2014 ahead of al-qaeda, hawaii, and adjudicate the growing dispute between individuals in the syria from a nusra and a kind and iraq on control of area. he comes down and says that al-qaeda and iraq should keep iraq and that al-nusra keeps syria. is are two separate organizations. al-qaeda in iraq says we don't authorize come we don't agree with this decision so they are kicked out, and there's a really funny jon stewart episode.

because jon stewart says actually there's some truth here. al-qaeda in iraq has become so bad, so difficult to deal with the al-qaeda in of itself felt that they were too bloody, to violate, now that you to be for al-qaeda leaders to geek out other organization. so this is the origin of the isis. it claims ask of all region. and so we see is some tension, clear tension between al-qaeda and isis over the past 10 months, particularly in north africa, in south asia, compete for a range of different jihadist groups. they fought on the ground in syria against each other. i would say we have now two competing major global jihadist, regional trend five -- jihadist movement.

isis has a long history any american marine or army officer, intelligence officer that fought in anbar province fought against the process of organization. we know this group well. >> it's interesting how often metaphors from the field of epidemiology and public health coming to our security row. -- security realm. in ebola one of the debates was issued we really tried to intervene there in africa and the stamp this out there before it becomes a pandemic and increased bigger problems for us in the future here? or the idea that we can somehow quarantines ourselves, and that is we will cut off the lights and go to all sorts of things to insulate ourselves. same kind of debate going on with regard to a to isil or the islamic state.

and that is do we really tried to revise our visa waiver program, identified these carriers before they come back, stop it at our frontiers? board are we obliged to go there and try to stamp this thing out before it becomes something more serious, there will be a continuing problem for the world for the foreseeable future. >> very good analogy. it makes the case well that we go there. >> the american policy currently is to withdraw all american combat forces from afghanistan in 2016. would you please comment on that? was that a good policy? >> i will let -- >> that's a gym question. [laughter] >> no.

and i think it will probably be reviewed. if not by this administration, by the next. after all, what happens in 2017 is the next president's decision and i guess it will be debated in the campaign leading up to it. i think the decision to withdraw entirely by the end of 2016 was made a few weeks before the emergence of isis, and the object lesson that that provided, the cost of having left iraq prematurely. it was a mistake to go into iraq in the first place, but having gone and it was a mistake to leave i think is naturally accept. it's pretty much the common wisdom. i think the afghan government, the new afghan government which has a much a relationship with washington and with the u.s. congress will probably at some point ask the president to reconsider that decision. if things are going well it would be pretty easy to say yes,

but if things are going badly in afghanistan, it will be somewhat harder to say yes. so ironically if they don't need as we will stay. if they do need is we will have a harder time deciding whether to stay. but, and again, i don't think it necessarily means staying in larger numbers, but i think even the draw that at the end of 2014 may be too large. so i think we will have to see how 2015 goes with only 9800 troops. how much pressure the afghan armed forces are put under. it could be quite considerable. i hope that before the end of the year there will be some consideration as to whether the next level of 552015, 16, is actually feasible or not. and again as i said i think the decision to leave entirely at the end of 2016 will probably be reviewed.

>> what about the neighbors? what is the relationship of the neighborhood with turkey and the kurds and all the other countries? this is not necessarily good for their world. why are they allowing this to settle into an extended long period of conflict? >> i think we have to understa understand, while we are focused on the isis and to integrate the civil war in syria, these other countries are all find at least six conflicts. so they're involved in the arab-israeli conflict. they are involved in a sunni-shia conflict. they're involved in the arab-persian conflict with their involved in one way or another. at least all the states that have kurds in the state versus kurd conflict, and the authoritarian governments don't even like democratic islamists. so all of these governments are

constantly recalibrating their policy, depending on what their top threat is at the moment. as soon as a threat receives even a little bit then they go on to the next threat. the contradictions and inconsistencies in turkish policy is just a sign there being jerked in several different directions at the same time by their equities in all of these conflicts. it's kind of a six dimensional chess, for each of these commentgovernments are playing d that's what all the coalition's are temporary. all the commitments are conditional, and all of the coalitions will tend to fade as they begin marginally to have some success. >> but, you know, look, the default decision on the part of any of these governments is we can get the americans to do this. so if 300,000 iraqi soldiers are insufficient to contain isis which has 20, 30,000 fighters,

the americans can do this with their air power or with forces on the ground. one of the good things about the coalition is the current air campaign. we can get some of these people to at least step up closer to the plate. there are, if we take the saudi air force, jordan's air force, turkey and the emirates, i mean, there are, oh, six to 800 combat aircraft parked around the area but it's the united states that leads the campaign. and we have to take care that we don't take on immaterial missions. a hypothetical young boy today aged 13, this country has been at war for his entire life. and maybe that war hasn't

affected that young boy directly, unless he's a member of a military family, but we are talking about conflicts year that are still going to be going on when he finishes university and goes on to postgraduate school -- >> when he has a 13 year-old. >> when he has a 13 year-old boy. that is something we have to consider very, very carefully at. what our level of commitment is going to be two contests that have been going on in some form or another for centuries, and could well put us in a situation of open-ended warfare. what does that mean for our society? >> just to briefly pick up on one of the countries you mentioned which is turkey. it's been a very, very fragile position, more so than many --

many may not quite understand during the 2003, four, five, six war in iraq the primary front movement of foreign fighters into iraq was through damascus and syria and then into iraq. that was the pipeline. when syria begins to implode, that pipe line reverses from iraq into syria. from iraq into syria which is part of the problem now. virtually every major jihadist come into this region right now comes from turkey. by land, usually also by air. it is the primary area that her department of homeland security has been monitoring air flights into, although they're going to europe now and traveling by land. but turkey, so the point here is this country now, which is a nato ally, is now bringing -- not the government but we see so

many foreign fighter pipelines to come through turkey. if there was a decision by some of these groups to start striking against our embassy there, against the government can we have a very, very serious problem on our end. i think the turks come at a just in the region, the turks are clearly concerned there country is going in. >> the people of the government? >> i'm talking about the government. people may be less -- >> does present order one think of doing something? he seems to believe he will benefit from the creation of the islamic state and the revival of the ottoman empire. even though one of our trustees suggested the revival of the ottoman empire is a way to stabilize the middle east. 10 or 15 years ago. it may not be so stable as it comes back. unfortunately, can we take one more question from your? no?

all right. we are finished. thank you very much for your attention. [applause] and thank you, guys. [inaudible conversations] >> c-span2 providing live coverage of the u.s. senate floor proceedings and key public policy events. and every weekend booktv now for 15 years the only television network devoted to nonfiction books and authors. c-span2 created by the cable tv industry and brought to you as a public service by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd, like us on facebook and follow was on twitter. >> and the senate is about the gavel in. they will be swearing and senators bryant shot the lights and tim scott of south carolina

to of south carolina to send her to shots is finishing the term for center in the who died two years ago. senator scott is finishing up the term of jim demint who resigned last year. members will hold confirmation votes on nominees to be yes ambassador to argentina and hungary and also work on procedural votes on to other nominations. they will recess for party lunches at 12:30 and back for a final round of votes that for o'clock eastern time. we take you live now to the senate floor here on c-span2. eternal lord god, our shelter in turbulent times, as voices throughout the nation cry out for equal protection under the law, use our lawmakers to ensure that justice rolls down like

waters and righteousness like a mighty stream. thank you for not leaving or forsaking us, for you continue to be our ever-present help in trouble. we are your people and the sheep of your pasture. shepherd of love, continue to provide for our every need from the rich bounties of your grace. in a special way, bless the lawmakers who will take their oath of office today. we pray in your great name. amen.

the president pro tempore: pleae join me in reciting the pledge f allegiance to the flag. i pledge allegiance to the flag of the united states of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. mr. reid: mr. president? the president pro tempore: the majority leader. mr. reid: following my remarks and those of the republican leader, the senate will resume executive session. there will be four roll call votes at 10:30 a.m. on confirmation of the noah bryson mamet and colleen bradley bell nominations, and cloture on two other nominations. the senate will recess from 12:30 to 2:15 today. there will be a series of four votes at 4:00 on confirmation on the noah bryson mamet and colleen bradley bell

nominations. mr. president, i would note the absence of a quorum. the president pro tempore: the clerk will call the roll.

mr. reid: mr. president? the presiding officer: the majority leader. mr. reid: i ask that the call of the quorum be rescinded. the vice president: without objection. the chair lays before the senate the certificates to fill the seats discriminated. if there's no or, the reading of the slier be waived and they will be printed in full in the record. if the senators-elect will now present themselves to the desk you the chair will administer the oath of office.

please raise your right hands. state your name, please. mr. scott: tim scott. mr. schatz: ryan schatz. the vice president: do you solemnly swear that you will support and defend the constitution of the united states against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that you bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that you take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that you will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which you are about to enter, so help you god? the group: i do.

the vice president: congratulations. [applause]

the presiding officer: the clerk will call the roll. quorum call:

quorum call:

mr. mccain: i ask further proceedings under the quorum call be suspend and i be allowed to address the senate on the pending nominations before the senate. the presiding officer: without objection. under the previous order, the leadership time is reserved. under the previous order, the senate will proceed to executive session to consider the following nominations which the clerk will report. the clerk: department of state, noah bryson mamet of california to be ambassador of the united states of america to the argentine republic. colleen bradley bell of california to be ambassador of the united states of america to hungary. the presiding officer: the senator from arizona. mr. mccain: mr. president, i don't usually object to appointments and nominations by the administration to various

ambassadorial positions around the world. and i also understand that there are numbers of political supporters, financial supporters. it is a characteristic of republican and democrat administrations alike. and it's never disturbed me when i have observed nominees say to a caribbean country or maybe london or paris or berlin, being with being -- reward both financial or otherwise. but now we are at a point where according to "the washington post," modern presidents generally followed a 70-30 rule on ambassadorial appointments where 70% are career foreign service and 30% are political appointees. president obama has defied this

historical bipartisan practice and in his second term a shocking 53% of ambassadorial nominees have been political. this brings his two-term average to 37, far more than any administration in the past. so it's very interesting that some of these nominees are at very sensitive positions in the world. and this is probably, this nominee of ms. colleen bradley bell is probably the most egregious example of that. hungary is a close ally in many respects, but there's no doubt that since taking office in 2010, the hungarian prime minister mr. victor orbon has centralized power, has face the duty due to action which has reduced the independence of hungary's court pushed through

controversial changes the constitution and placed acute restrictions on nongovernmental organizations. in other words, this is a very important country. this is a very important country where bad things are going on. ms. bell's experience have been largely relegated to producing television soap opera, "the bold and the beautiful." i'm sure television viewing is important in hungary, but the fact is that this nominee is totally unqualified for this position in this country. if it were, as i say, some caribbean country, some other, i would understand that. but here we are with the relationship of a, the country where, according to bloomberg news -- quote -- "orbonn says he seeks to end liberal democracy in hungary."

hungarian prime minister victor orbon says he wants to favor a liberal state citing russia and turkey as example. by the way, we have an excellent d.c.m. there in hungary who has been doing a great job. ms. bell, as i say, she has two qualifications. number, she is the producer of a television soap opera, no experience in foreign policy or national security, no familiarity with the language, country or the region, has never been there and lacks meaningful knowledge of history or economics. her only significant qualification is she bundled, as the word is used, $800,000 to president obama in the last election. and as part of the california delegation to the 2012 democratic convention, she bundled more than $2.1 million for president obama's reelection

effort. i want to repeat again, i understand that there's words for political support and grown with -- quote -- "bundling." about when we send a person who has never been to the country, has no familiarity with foreign policy or national security to a nation of this importance -- of this importance -- then, my friends, we are making a serious mistake. the hungarian prime minister is distancing himself from the values seder by most european nations. orban said they're receiving service from abroad, needing to be "monitored" as he considered those to be foreign powers. we're talking about the national democratic institute, freedom house and others. he calls them "we're not dealing with civil society members but paid political activists who are trying to help