missed more by his older brother sandy, who is a ranking member on the ways and means committee in the house. they have served together in congress for 32 years. i've said this on the floor before, i'll say it again -- i remember carl levin for a lot of things. i was in the house. i came over to visit with him. i was thinking about running for the senate. i said carl, you know, i came to the house with your brother sandy. he looked up at me. he said sandy, you know, is not only my brother, he's my best friend. that speaks well of the person that carl levin is. it's really been a privilege and honor to serve with carl. i'll miss him so very, very much. i'll miss having somebody to take the difficult issues to him to get his view as to what we should do, how we should handle it. his voice will be missed here in

the senate. i congratulate him on his comparable career in the >> i wish him the very best. senate -- incomparable career in the senate. i wish him the very best. i would like to say two other words here. i want to make sure there is a separate place in the record for what i am going to say. i ask consent for that to be the case. >> without objection. >> it is said that you don't chose your family and that is true. we are born into our family and we have no way to determine the family we are born into. jay rockfeller chose to make the people of this area his community. how did that happen? born in new york to one of the most famous people like this end

up in west virginia. i was an undergradate student at harvard and he decided he didn't like things they were doing so he left and dropped out of school. he went to japan and spent three years there. he became an interpreter and knows the japanese language well and loves the japanese people today. he started out at harvard and came back and was there for three years. i -- he returned to harvard and got a degree.

he could have done anything, gotten any education, started any business or sat around on one of the beaches around the world and done nothing. but that is not jay rockfeller. he want today do something. he didn't know what why wanted to do. this rockfeller wanted to do something that was different. a friend of his published here for many years in a magazine called the" washington monthly" called pete peters. he was a man around town and everyone liked him. he was very close to jay rockfeller. so jay talked to him trying to find what he should do in life. here he is, one of the wealthiest men in america with a harvard degree, what should i do? and pete peters told him what you should do is go some place and work with poor people.

where should i go? west virginia. so he joined americore as a vista volunteer and moved to the small mining community of emans, west virginia. that was in 1964. this man of names and stature and noterity went to this small town in west virginia. it wasn't easy for him. suddenly, he found himself in the setting he had never imagined. the first six months he was there, he could hardly get anyone to talk to him. he is an intimidating man at

6-7. but his goodness came through and the people of the area and west virginia started talking to him. but from 1964 when he moved there he knew he wanted to identify with poor people. and that is what he has done since 1964. in 1966, he was elected to the west virginia house of delegates and chosen to serve as secretary of state in the state of west virginia. he then became president of the university in west virginia at westland college and served for three years. he was twice selected the governor of west virginia serving from '76-'84 and in 1985 he became a senator. from the time he stepped on the senate floor, he made it clear

he was here for one reason: to fight for the people of west virginia. he fought to health caprovide he and was part of the chip program, the insurance program that is one of the most important health initiatives in american history for kids. he thought to preserve medicaid for half a million west virginias and millions of america americans. senior member of the committee on finance and chairman of the homeless committee and the intelligence committee. what a remarkable career he has had. he has fought very hard to protect american people from president bush's efforts to privatize social security and protected retirement benefits by

doing that for millions of americans. his efforts helping west virginia haven't been confined to this building. he is a big man, i repeat 6-7 with a huge reach that he used to bring jobs to his home state as governor and senator. because of his recruiting for thousands of thousands of jobs in west virginia -- kurhe plant created thousands of jobs. ng case spark plugs is another company that governor rockfeller helped bring to west virginia. the people of west virginia have been blessed to have him as a

family member and having his integrity and tenacity looking out for him in the senator. my respect for him is unlimited. he has been my colleague for the entire time i have been in the congress, 32 years, and now as his time in the senate comes to an end, he is going to be miss. i am sure he is looking forward to spending more time with sharon -- this wonderful women who by the way his father was a united states senator. his children. i so admire this man. i congratulate him on a distingui distinguished career. and i wish you the very best in life. >> tonight on c-span 2, our

conversation with cyber security report kim zetter on the communica communicacommun communicat communicators and then a discussion on the military role in combating terrorism and then a talk on foreign policy issues at a recent forum held in washington. >> c-span. created by america's cable companies 35 years ago and brought to you as a local service by your cable or satellite provider. >> host: the book is called "countdown to zero day: stuxnet and the launch of the world's first digital weapon" and the author wired magazine recorder, kim zetter. ms. zetter, what is this?

>> it was used to attack the uranium enrichment plant in iran and the worm was designed to mani mani manipulate the control and speed them up and degrade the uranium and destroy this. >> host: what is you unique about this? >> this was designed to jump out and it was really sophisticated. it is designed to increase and slow the speed of the

centrifuges. but while it was doing that it did this remarkable trick which made the operators at the plant think the valperations were normal. it recorded the activity, played it back and then played on the monitoring machine. the vendors were aware and they were expensive to find and develop exploits for them. so usually we only see one and this used five. >> host: where and how was

stuxxnet developed and by who? >> we believe it was developed by the united states and israel and tested here in the united states and israel. this was a process that took a number of years to develop and multiple teams were working on it. we had multiple teams working on the centrifuges to see what affect stuxxnet would have on them. how speeding them up and slowing them down affect them. and then you have a team looking at the controller and the commuters controlling the centrifuges and you need vulnerability in that and a way to get the worm on the system to hide it so no one can discover it. and then we had a third team developing the spreading mechanisms. so multiple teems over a minimum of six month and the centrifuges

research took a couple years and then it came together around 2007-2008. >> host: when you say the united states is this the defense department? >> guest: getting the worm on the system requires the agency that has covert authority, the cia in this case, developing a code requires elite programmers. we look at elite teams with the nsa. the snowden documents pointed to a lot of the activity of those elite teams that are designed to do deep espionage and attacks and that is in conjunction with the military. the u.s. cyber command is an

umbrella of the nsa and the military. >> host: where did the name come from? >> guest: it was named by microsoft. they combined two names of two separate files in stuxxnet into one word. >> host: so private companies were involved in this? >> guest: they didn't help design the attack but when the worm was discovered multiply anti-virus firms and labs were taking it a part. microsoft was focus on zero days because they were attacked in

their area so they had to determine them, figure them out and release patches for them. >> host: what was the effect? >> guest: well, there is a missile, which is the carrier that gets it to the target and then you have the pay load which is the explosive end. stuxnet had two pay loads. one was designed to close valves on centrifuges in order to trap the gas and then the gas would condense and become a solidify and throw the centrifuges off balance, causing them to possibly crash, and also destroy the rooters. you would get wasted gas and

they didn't have a lot to work with so the more gas you can destroy or waste the less material they have. the second weapon was designed as i mentioned to speed up the centrifuges and this would have been a more direct attack because the gas and pressure is a buildup over time. the second payload was speeding up centrifuges, reducing the speed, and again, you would get declining uranium. they expected a certain grade at the end and they would have a lower grade than expected. >> host: this was in 2010. has iran recover? are their nuclear processes recovered? >> guest: remarkablely it did. in fact, a lot of the centrifuges appeared to be destroyed around the end of

2009-early 2010. within six months iran had pretty much recovered from that and increased the number of centrifuges in a cascade. they increased the number of those, and increased the number of gas and ultimately they didn't come out too far behind where they would have been heading anyway had they stayed on track. but i should point out that iran's uranium enrichment program was stalled by multiply programs. they started enriching in 2007 and it took, you know from 2007-2010 to get up to speed because there were other sabotages going on and sanctions and diplomatic efforts to halt the program.

multi-pronged approaches to slow it down. >> host: what was it like trying to research this? >> guest: it was a complicated book to write. i was trying to do multiple tracks. i had the uranium enrichment program i had to look at and the history and the politics around it. the technical details around the worm itself and what it was designed to do, what was significant about it. there are a lot of clues in the virus and worms that i had to follow the trails and third telling the narrative story about the researchers. i wanted to tell the story of stuxnet and the security community and the labor that goes into this process of taking it apart and figure out what they do. >> reporter: was stuxnet considered successful? >> guest: it was considered successful by many because there

were estimated iran would have had enough uranium enrichment, if they chose to build upon, there is still no evidence that was the course they were going on, they would have had enough uranium enrichment by 2010. that was the estimate. and afterwards it was estimated they were pushed back about three years. that is the estimate of the us state department and others. it really depends, i think the western intelligence agencies haven't had a firm grasp on the nuclear program in iran. there is still no hard iran was headed in the direction of building a bomb. and in terms of knowing how far along the uranium enrichment program was there is guessing there. >> host: were you able to discover or figure out the cost of developing stuxnet? >> guest: this would have been

several million dollars at the least. we are talking about the testing -- you know you have to build a plant for the testing, you have to do a lot of testing on the worm itself to make sure when it gets on the system, it doesn't conflict with anything on the system and expose itself. they had to make sure stuxnet wouldn't damage other systems it got on. it had a narrow configuration so it would go on any computers but only unleash on ones that matched up. to do that, you have to do testing to make sure the worm isn't going to cause problems on the other systems it is spreading to. the way it was discovered was it was crashing systems in iran. so regardless of the testing they did, they missed something and that caused it to get

exposed. >> host: kim zetter, four years is a long time in the tech world. has there been a stuxnet 2.0 developed yet? >> guest: we assume there is. just like it was hidden for three years we assume there are other things out there. we can get a hint with the snowden documents, the level of the espionage and offensive programs. the offensive ones are doing the attacks. there is a lot of activity and a flurry of activity. but stuxnet showed us the rules of engagement were not formulated when stuxnet was released. so they are catching up for how and when they can release this and that has slowed down the use of attack weapons, at least, to a certain extent.

there are people saying stuxnet was the first released because of the legal issues and the concerns of collateral damage and the proof of concept to show something like this is possible. but i don't know that for sure. i am assuming there are other weapons that have been unleashed or developed. >> would you consider this the stuxnet attack a form of cyberwarfare? >> guest: this is the first example of cyberwarfare, i think. i know people use that word a lot but the other attacks don't reach the level of what we understand cyberwarfare to be or warfare in general and stuxnet equalifies as the first digital weapon and example of what cyberwarfare is. >> host: we often hear from generals at the pentagon that cyberwarfare is the new frontier. how threatened are we in the

united states by that? >> guest: well, we are very vulnerable. any country that is very connected in the way the united states is, that are relies on computer systems for critical infrastructure. and what stuxnet showed was this is an attack that happened on computers that were not connected to the internet. they had to device a method for spreading it on a usb flash drive. so even if you take systems from the internet talkers will still find a way to get on the system and destroy it. it is unclear to the extent, there are a lot of estimates of a cyber pearl harbor that would happen in the united states. i don't think anyone knows the full capacity of what could happen because we don't know how thinks are connected. that is the danger of cyberwarfare.

when you unleash a weapon like this the damage isn't geo graphically finature like -- finite -- like other systems. it is hard to determine in advance the route of the weapon will take and the extent it will have on other systems you don't expect. >> host: did your book have to be vetted? >> guest: no, it wasn't vetted. >> host: did you have sources inside cyberwarfare within the government? >> guest: i will not talk about the sources but there were a lot of people i spoke with that have past experience in developing the program for offensive operations in the united states. the offensive operations program started in the mid-1990s around 1996-1997. so it didn't start out with

attack. it started out in the defense mode. the defense department realized how vulnerable the united states systems were and developed weapons to protect and then they realized if our system is vulnerable than others are as well and that opened up a new round of possibility. >> host: are there other cyberwarfare attacks the united states has committed that perhaps are not as public as this was? >> guest: there have been cyber operations and that can be taking out a monitoring system. so for example, when israel went into syria to bomb the suspected nuclear plant there there are reports that the radar systems

were taken out. you can do that through electromagnetic or electronic means that are not necessarily digital. but in this case, there are reports in addition to those means, there were computer attacks that were done from airplanes so it would have been from ground to air attacks digitally. >> host: kim zetter, what was israel's role in developing stuxnet? >> guest: it is unclear which groups did what. there are suggestions israel was helpful in gathering intelligence for the development of this but they may have more of a role in the spreading of stuxnet. the zero days were in part what got it caught because it spread wildly. it would spread to any windows

compute but only release payload to the configuration. it spread to thousands around the world and it did so because of the zero days added to and there is bones of contention on who is responsible for that. >> host: what about other countries? are they conducting this type of cyber offensive? >> guest: more than half a dozen countries have cyberwarfare programs and capabilities. russia, china, the uk -- there are a lot of countries that have announced plans to develop them. iran has announced plans to develop their own and obviously israel. so there are a lot of countries playing catch up at this point. stuxnet showed the viability of using a digital attack as an alternative to diplomacy and

kinetic warfare so it opens a lot of possibility and levels of playing ground because actors who ordinary don't have the resources or the skills or the equipment to launch a physical attack against an enemy can do it for much cheaper: a digital attack. >> host: do you think how the flash drive got to the iranian computers? >> guest: there are a couple possibilities. one is that the contractors who work in the area and their belief is they became affected and became accomplishes in bringing the worm into the protected facility. there are other suggestions there might be insiders that helped implant it.

there are two versions. the first doesn't have zero days like i said so it seems to indicate there was a more intimaint intimate connection with the computers affected like maybe the first version was planted there and maybe they lost that access in other versions and that maybe why they had to add zero days to spread it. >> host: kim zetter has been with wired magazine since 2003. are you a techy? >> guest: no, i got into tech journalism not by chose and found i loved it.

i love the issues around private security and that attracts me. >> host: what was it about stuxnet that inspired you to write a book? >> guest: it wasn't a simple worm or attack and wasn't like anything we saw before. the were multiple ways to approach the subject that fascinated me and i was fascinated to tell the story of the security researchers because i have been reporting on the work they do for over a decade and i think they are brilliant. i wanted to showcase that work and the skills required -- this is a mystery and they had to take it apart bit by bit and it took months before they understood what it was doing. i wanted to highlight that. >> host: have offensive and

defensive attack tools become poplar in silicone valley? >> guest: not necessarily silicone valley. there are small boutique companies that specialize just in finding vulnerabilities and selling them to the government. but we have the defense industry as well. those companies that were used to seeing in sort of the conventional warfare realm are now in the digital realm and they have teams that are also looking for vulnerabilities and designing digital weapons. >> host: is this a case where contractors would use hackers? >> guest: the contractors are hackers. if you have the nsa you have the internal teams doing the hacking but you have contract firms that

will work for the nsa and design weapon and zero days on a full-time bases. >> host: i don't know if you want to answer this or not but what would an all-digital war look like? >> a lot of people have scenario about this. i don't know that we will see an all-digital war. i don't think that digital war can accomplish everything you need to accomplish in a war. i think it is more something that is used as an adjunct to conventional warfare to get at systems and information you cannot normally get out and to, you know, someone was describing it to me that in world war ii despite the carpet bombing that occurred you still needed troops on the ground and i think that is the same with digital warfare. you can disable and attack computers and systems that are

conne connected to computer but ultimately you will need boots on the ground and seize territory so i am not sure we will see a full digital warfare. >> host: has there been efforts or standards to develop when it comes to cyberwarfare? >> guest: we are seeing that now. in estonia a group of experts from the united states and other countries looked into the laws of warfare in relation to digital warfare and if they apply or if we need new laws. they came out with a volume examining that to assist in nato countries in defining in rules of engagement and developing the cyberwarfare program. i don't think we fully have all of the answers. i think the united states began

developing the rules of engagement around 2011-20112 and we are further along with stuxnet was released and discovered but i think there is still a lot of questions that we as a society have to answer about how we will conduct warfare in this manner. >> host: are there political -- is there political opposition to some cyberwarfare by the united states? >> guest: in cyberwarfare? >> host: right. in congress or whatnot. >> guest: there is little talk the whitehouse has never admitted to such. reports were classified so we are just getting a peek at this. the government never wanted to go on record acknowledging it was developing these

capabilities. and as a result of that, we have not had the discussions that we need to have. i think we need to have discussions about the use of zero days and stockpiling of zero days because when you have them and you withhold and don't tell the vendor about them it leaves everyone else vulnerable to the same attacks. while stuxnet was exploiting zero days, we don't know who else knew about them and was using them. we have not explored the full consequences of an attack like stuxnet and explored all of the other issues. stuxnet, the attackers, stole what is called a digital paper to sign the malware to make it look like a legitimate code and

they are owned by legitimate companies so when you do that and use it to sign malware you are creating problems for the company itself. they created an espionage tool call flamed that undermines the windows update system which is used by millions of computers to obtain security patches so you are undermining the trust we have in the digital infrastructure and we have not discussed that and partly because united states won't open to creating the tools and until we examine that i think we will put critical systems in the united states in danger. >> host: kim zetter, we talked for 30 minutes. let's end with this again: the definition of zero day >> zero day vulnerability is a

security hole in the software that the vendor doesn't know about it. the exploit is the code hackers develop to attack the hole and obtain access to the system and install a virus or trojan horse. i describe it like a burglar using a crowbar to break into a house. >> host: kim zetter is the author of this book: "countdown to zero day: stuxnet and the launch of the world's first digital weapon." thanks for being here. >> guest: thanks for being here. >> c-span is brought to you by your local cable or satellite provider. on the next washington journal david price looks at governmental funding set to

expire and then george collins descri describes transparency in the health care law and the alleged torture by the cia. washington journal is live at 7 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> the house oversight committee hold as hearing tomorrow to look at health care enrollment under the affordable care act. it will include economist and health care advisor john gruber and marilyn tavenner who heads the medicare centers. that is live tomorrow on c-span 3 and you can join the conversation on facebook and twitter. here are some of the comments i

received from viewers: >> i think you need more programming for people to conduct with civil tones but be in opposition. i applaud you for having that. ideology can be overcome to reach a common ground and i think there should be more programming. thank you so much, c-span. >> i listen to c-span on a daily bases and find it to be informative and a look at all of the politicians so that citizens can understand exactly who we elect and what is going done in

congress because it seems that dollars are undecided or also fighting. i appreciate c-span and regardless of whether or not it is poplar with mainstream culture i just want them to know that there are young people, i am 18, and i watch c-span on a regular bases to understand what is happening in our country because i care. >> the american history tour starting with the battle of little big horn. i just watched that in it's entirety and it is priceless. so many people of the world don't understand their own self but if they watch american

history they can see the progress of the great and wonderful nation of all of the people of the worlds. >> and continue to let us know what you think about the programs you are watching. 202-626-3400 is the number to call or e-mail us or send a tweet at cspan #comments. coming up next, a discussion on the military's role in combating terrorism. and then some of a recent forum on defense and foreign policy with texas senator ted cruz and louisiana governor bobby jendel. a discussion was hosted on the military's role in combating terror ism.

topics were current threats from isis, the bases of regulating force, and the resigning of chuck hagel. this is just under two hours. >> okay. i think we will try to get started here today. welcome again to all of you. and i think this is probably the 250th seminar he is going to run or some number like that. we have had a few before on the topic today about the military role with terrorism and we will touch on that. on behalf of the ceo and board

of regence i want to welcome you. this looks like a particular distinguished group and i am sure they will have a set of interesting messages for us. my opinion is there is never only a military role. it has to be a team effort and cut across all of the elements of nag nags nags national power and influence. i would ask you to keep that in

mind as we hear about this today because we make a big mistake in my opinion when we talk only about the military and only about what can be done and so on and so forth. and clearly, in this kind of environment, there is more than ever a distinct need for what many determine interage and cooperation for working together and exceptance. i will turn it over to the leader. you have it. >> thank you, general. i am a soldier. i would like to thank the atomic

institute and my colleagues that are here with me. and also those who are not here, but they worked with us for a long time. the centers for national security from west virginia and this gentlemen is a graduate who came back and i would like to first introduce the panel and then general gray is going to talk for a while. first, we have regular general richard gross from the united states army who is the legal council to the chairman to the joint chief of staff. next is the regular general from the us marine core who is aon

the strategy division at the u institute. and next to him is the political council at the embassy in the united states and formally at the embassy in syria for two years. and finally of course i mentioned don wallace. now, we welcome, of course, the audience here, the academic, as

well as representative of government embassies and diplomat generals and so forth. and we appreciate c-span's effort very much to communicate actually globally and bring the messages around the world. so we are very grateful for that. and as usual, we try to say one word in terms of the dedication and we will say in honor of the men and women who are serving in the armed forces, combatting terrorism, we have to recall their sacrifice and express sympathy to the families of those who have fallen during the battles. in fact, just a couple days ago,

there was a joint united states and yemen raid conducted in yemen. they rescued about, i think, eight hostages but unfortunately they failed to rescue five others including an american, turkish, british and south african. but this failure is critical and we will discuss it. one more academic footnote before i turn it over to general ray is that he mentioned the seminars we conducted and i would like to mention that we tried to develop academically a project dealing with the run of the military in combating service and this is part of our effort. also, we are dealing with that

particular aspect through other partners and weapons of mass destruction and we are co-sponsoring also a blue ribbon study group on bio trends. actually we have a been admitting yesterday with the co-sponsor, the institute, and it is co-chaired by senator joe lieberman and governor tom ridge and we have other distinguished people participating in that. the general mentioned the number of seminars that we have going on all the way back -- we act of course generals from the united states and many other countries. egypt, israel, turkey, india,

pakistan, etc over the years and we are publishing the materials. the most recent event we had was on security just about a month ago dealing with ebola and the role of the military and also combatting terrorism. i say this is about other al-qaeda groups and so forth. so we left some information for you, i think, to look at this particular sign and you will work on, of course, with us about cooperation and we take your advice on the various projects we are involved with. i would like to introduce general gray who needs no introduction. we are talking about leadership.

number one, i would like to mention the book that really should attract the attention of people in the united states and all over the world about the true nature of the military. this is the marine core and we will have speakers in a minute. now, just a little footnote related to general gray and it would be historical in the sense that i checked to see how can we describe general gray and it isn't easy. of course, there is the formal, i think of the marine core, etc, but i discovered that king phillip of macidonia, the father

of alexander the great, he observed about 2400 years ago, and let me be careful saying what he said. and he said and i quote: an army of veer led by a lion and more to be feared than an army of veer led my a deer. so general gray isn't going to talk about the lion but i will say a great american. now it is all over. [applause] >> you just gave your last speech. i apologize that. that wasn't in the script or needed or programmed. and besides i am a relative of

ga ga ganges con. we will get into the real reason why we are here. we have a graduaate of west poi and came into the army as an infantry officer because he majored in computer science and that is how they do it in the army. he served in seven years mainly in the airbornee organizations and in 1993 he was granted into the business. it is very crucial we have people like the general who have a very, very good background in matters military and infantry and what soldiering is all about and move into the jag operation as such. within that construct he has been about everywhere with anyone who is anybody in try trying to help out with the

legal ramifications of what we are involved in. he has been in afghanistan, the central command, he has been everywhere where the action is the loudest, if you will. so it is really a great privilege to introduce you and take over. >> thank you very much. it is a tremendous honor to be here. this panel is a little intimidating to be sitting next to such amazing people. and this audience is intimidating. i saw the roster and talent out there. i was getting more nervous when every time he said lion he looked at gray and when he said deer he looked at me. i am not sure how to take that. you forgot your glasses?

all right. just the normal speaker's caveat. any of the views i say are my views and not the department of defense, joint staff, united states army or the chairman of the joint chiefs. i am afraid my talk will sound like the military lawyer in combating terrorism. you invited a lawyer so this wile be a lawyer's perspective and necessarily focus as much on the law as anything because that is where i focus my efforts. my client, my boss, obviously is the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and by law it is his job to give the best politicalitary advice to the secretary of defense, the president, the national security council and to congress as one of the instruments of national power. and general gray said it isn't just the military that combats

terrorism and he is right. it is inter-governmental and our partners throughout the world that help us in combatting terrorism. so not just the military but today we are focusing on that. when the comes to combatting terrorism, my boss, and his role is to present options to the secretary of defense. present the options as part of a variety of other national power and instruments of national power. these are options, mr. president and mr. secretary, that you could use to take on a particular situation or solve a particular problem or combat terrorism. as part of that, i give him legal advice on the options and advise on if i think they are

legal and my staff reviews them as part of the challenge. and one of the challenges for the military, and it isn't really legal but feasibility, is that is we are seeing a declining military in the united states. as we look at the military instrument of power and options, we are in a resource-constrained environment. we are facing global challenges as well. i don't think i have ever seen the level of challenges around the world that we face today in any time throughout my 29-plus year career. as you examine the different options that the military can bring to bear, one of the things the chairman and vice chairman and others have begun to think about and present to the secretary and press president are the cost. when you present the military

there is something compro -- you are not doing. when they are in afghanistan, they are not back home training and on the rifle range. so if there is a wing or an aircraft carrier in a particular part of the world then obviously they cannot be in another part of the world and they are not available to support our global plans. so opportunity costs become an important part of the military advice that my military boss provides to the president and the secretary when it comes to considering how to combat terrorism or the number of other challenges we face today. as i give advice i am looking at the legal bases for the use of force particularly when it comes to combating terrorism.

we look at the international force first. and there are primarily three and those of you who are lawyers are familiar with this. typically you have to have a security counsel regulation, the consent of the nation involved or a national self-defense bases and that could include a collective defense agency. as i analyze the proposed option the chairman presents to the president to combat terrorism the first thing we look at is if there is an international bases and i advise on that. more critical is the domestic bases. what is the domestic base to use force against this terrorist threat or any other military challenge. the first one that often comes up is article two of the constitution. the president has power as the commander and chief to use the

military to sustain our national interest and that is often the solution that can be used for the president to use military force. but as many commentators have said, the president's power is as venus, if you will will, if he acts in accordance with authorization of military force. and that is one of the items you have seen in the press and that is the debate about the authorization for use of military force. as we combat al-qaeda and associated forces of al-qaeda and the taliban we used the 2001 use of military force that congress enacted after 2011. and we use the 2002 report as well when authorized to go into the iraq. ...

but what do i look for is a military lawyer when i look at an authorization for the use of military force and as you start to consider an amuf -- and aumf and authorization for use of military force, often there's a tension and any statute, any resolution that authorizes force between flexibility for the

military commander and the president and transparency and clarity. so what do i mean by that? if you tell me that i can go after al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula and aumf, if you tell me that's the group that i can go after the math a lot of clarity. that's a lot of transparency but it may not have the flexibility for other groups to pop up as we have seen so by change the statute and say you can go after al qaeda and associated forces that gives the commander, that gives the president more flexibility but there's less transparency. there's less clarity because we now have to determine what's the associated for so if we examine it and aumf there's always a balance i think between clarity and transparency on one side and flexibility on the other. that is again something for policymakers and congress to take up and decide where that

balance should live. it's one of the things as you consider and aumf to think about. typically as a military lawyer i look for an aumf and i look for certain things in a statute that gives me, that i can advise my commander, my chairman, my client on here's what you have authority to do under the statute so i look at a number of things. these are things that could be written into a new aumf or modified in aumf could be used to do the thinking about the military statute. first of all who is the enemy calexicans, am i authorized to use force? in the current 2001 aumf we knew we could use force against al-qaeda taliban associated forces. that was -- and else is that we in aumf should tell me who the enemy is. who am i authorized to use force against? the next thing is what is my mission? what am i to do with that

particular statutory authority? is a full combat or to something less than that and tell me that in the statute. we have seen debate in the press or in congress and the press and other places about what means should force be used and you have seen for example some of the proposals in the current fight in iraq and syria. you have seen proposals for should we limit what means can be used in a fight. as you think through those, there is a trade-off between flexibility and transparency and clarity so things to think about. another component that could be in aumf is a geographic limitation. where can -- where may force be used or where should force be used? the current 2001 aumf gave authority essentially had no geographic limits although there

are certainly other provisions of international domestic law that limit your ability to use it. within the statute itself no geographic limitations. certainly a statute could include those in many academic authors have written about the idea of that. finally you could add a time limit on any aumf. the current 2001 aumf and the 2002 a iraqi aumf a time limit. as you know the president has authorized force under those two statutes currently to use in iraq and syria. there are time limits on those two statutes but certainly there could be in a future there could be time limits whether that's a sunset clause or some other provision for re-examination. so that is kind of the coverage of the domestic legal basis for using force that i look at as a military warrior. we also pay close attention to the use of force within the complex itself, what we would

call use embolo or complies with the law. it's not just what logic should the conflict in the first place or authorizes you to be in conflict in the first place but also what law governs their actions within a complex itself. we are barely involved with drafting precise and clear rules of engagement so that those operators who do go to combat terrorism know what they are left and right limits are if you will. they know what they are authorized to do. they understand the limits of their authority to act so the commanders at the operational level and operators of the troops that we send out to do these missions understand when they can use force and when they can't. those become very critical. then included within rules of engagement we had to make clear policy on things as wide-ranging as detainee operations, when we can detain, whom we can detain

and for how long we can hold them in the conditions under which they are held so we had to have clear policies in place in our orders that we direct sent down to the combatant commanders for them to take on terrorism. all those are very critical roles of military warriors assert me of my level in the majority staff and so forth. even operationally and tactically they are military lawyers involved in counterterrorism operations and they provide a very critical role as well. we have military lawyers who review operational plans and they are involved in the drafting of this plan in helping operators and commanders think through how they are going to take on these missions to combat terrorism in order to make those operations legal. and to keep them within the authority that they have. we have military lawyers drafting supplemental rules of engagement so as we pass our rules of engagement from our level down to the soldiers and commanders in the fields they

look at that and say what else do i need? whatever authority do i need? look clarification on these rules of engagement are necessary for us to do our mission so we often have lawyers at all levels of the tactical level combat up to us and asked for supplemental rules of engagement. we have military lawyers reviewing the techniques tactics and procedures that are in use so all the policy in all the rules of engagement while it are good are worth anything if the troops in the field are doing things that don't comply with those. you have military lawyers who advise-and-assist commanders and ensuring they are doing the right things as they are combating terrorism. we have military lawyers briefing rules. we found that is critical not to just throw up a powerpoint slide and say here's your rules of engagement. i hope you remember them a month from now when you are in afghanistan. that just doesn't work. what we found is rules of

engagement work when our troops are trained on them when they have gone through vignettes in the classroom but more importantly out in the field setting where they are faced with a scenario and they have to react as they would in real combat. the closer you can replicate combat conditions and training and test and train those rules of engagement the better our soldiers will be able to protect their own lives and do the right thing. and then of course when there are civilian casualties that weren't included in the rules of engagement, when there were situations that required investigation are military lawyers are also involved in advising commanders on how to investigate in the aftermath when things haven't necessarily gone the way they should have. so they are military lawyers involved all up and down the chain in helping commanders in the operators fight terrorism. now i have talked a lot about lawyers because i am a lawyer and that's the focus of what i do but i think it's important that we shift as the panel back

to the operators. back to the servicemembers and the troops who are out in the field risking their lives every day to combat terrorism. that's really where i think we need to focus the bulk of our time here because that's what's important. i'm very much looking forward to the dialogue. i'm looking forward to my palace comments and i look forward to if there are any questions kevin said i could pick a few questions now and i will be around for the rest of the panel as well. thank you very much for having me back here. [applause] >> do you want to take some questions now? >> yes sir absolutely. you are in charge. >> we have six questions or less. >> seven. >> okay. no speeches, just questions. >> george michaels and policy consultant for counterterrorism and special operations. he talked about statutes and everything else. the former dni a couple of years ago mentioned we have title x

that covers the military. we have title l that covers agency different rules and restrictions potentially for title lx. can you speak to that and do you see in a value of having a title lx? >> well first of all i have had people say can you bring title x to my office and if you are a lawyer you know the title x is enormous. titles and covers everything from the salary of a second lieutenant to the authority of the secretary of defense has two run that department. it's enormous but it's often used as code words for title x as the authority that the military has to conduct operations in title l is the authority that other agencies have two to accept covert action. so i think there are clear roles and responsibilities for the military, clear roles and responsibilities for the intelligence community and others. i think there is a value they are to keeping those roles and

responsibilities clear and there are certainly conflict. we all work together. particularly since 9/11 the interagency has gotten good at working together but i don't see any need to merge those. when the military at react under the law of armed conflict and under title x our domestic law. we do things a certain way required by law and i think mergers might not recognize those critical distinctions. yes sir. >> thank you. the last time i looked i understood the law and war applied if and only if the combatants were recognized as such and that is one party takes off their uniform or does not put one on. they forfeit their rights under the geneva convention and generally under the laws of war. is that still the case? >> it actually never was and

that some of the mythos of the geneva conventions and the customary international law and armed conflict. the first thing is we have the law of armed conflict governs our actions when we are in international armed conflict and noninternational armed conflict. there's a sense of law within each of those types of conflict. by policy the u.s. military follows the law irrespective of how we determine whether it's international or no noninternational armed conflict. i think what you are speaking up is due certain combatants gets certain protections that you would have as a uniformed armed soldier under the law of armed conflict? do you get prisoner of war status? do you combatant immunity and the answer to that is it's a fact case-by-case basis. typically if you are not fighting and complying with the geneva convention, complying with what's required under the

law of armed conflict and you are purely and severely -- civilian close you made not have combatant immunity and he will be treated as a prisoner of war and i think that's what you are referring to. we treat everybody, we go in as a policy matter something we are going to treat everybody the same and sort them out as we go. yes maam. >> thank you. i'm from the polish embassy. two quick questions. first of all we see in the press about the discussion between the congress and the white house and the aumf. what are your feelings about all that? what is the process. the second question involves the legal base because iraq is quite

clear but syria i have my doubts. >> the first part of your question is do we need a new aumf click the president has determined he has the authority for the actions taken against iceland in iraq and syria under the current 20112012 aumf international law so he is determined if there's a war powers resolution filing available on line that we set out and then there is a i believe a letter from samantha powers to the u.n. stating our basis for use of force and report under the u.n. charter. those documents are out there and i would refer you to those. for the international legal basis of our actions in iraq we are using the collective self-defense of iraq. we have the request of iraq. we have the consent there and so

they're self-defense plus the consent of iraq. then we have got the 2001/2002 aumf of the present has has determined gives him the authority to authorize those actions. yes sir. >> mike with former affairs department. the use of armed drones has been one of the show we say innovations. can you describe the role that targeting and the relationship of the cia in determining the validity of targets and limiting collateral damage? >> what? >> what i can addresses the role of j.a.g. andy o'dea operations. the first thing i would tell you is a drone is a weapons platform. as no different than an f-16. in fact often the display of that particular weapons system would be the same whether it's manned or unmanned. it just may be the pilot is 20000 feet overhead or 5000 miles away so it's a weapons platform.

and i say that not to be clever or cute because it does make a difference in the analysis as you look at it. so as we have seen more and more there are j.a.g.s involved at every level of all military operations irrespective of the platform. i had a congressman asked one time how many military lawyers review this before get to the white house and i think i said five. obviously have not conquered them uppity of their personal level and lawyers looking at the operational plans as the targeting data and all the various things. that goes up in a package for approval. then you have is a ghostly layers you have the combatant command advocate and his staff so you have a colonel be it africom or sound come looking at those and it comes to my office and i have my operational attorneys look at it. i look at it and existed to the general counsel for the department of defense and his attorneys and he looks at a

personally before it goes outside of our building. so multiple layers of legal review as well as policy review, operational review and commander review so there is quite a bit of scrutiny on those types of packages. yes sir. >> i'm on the advisory board for terrorism research. i have a question in a operational situations who may decide that a person may be detained and how common is it that decision is reviewed by somebody other than the first person who decides to -- someone? >> typically, let's say afghanistan or iraq. let's start there. typically i mean it will literally be the senior person

at whatever level of command is involved in the operation. so it may be the squad leader and they encounter an individual that is detained. it would be the squad leader who might make that decision. it might be a platoon leader or a company. it just depends on who is the highest-ranking person. the decision might literally be made by the soldiers of the marines holding the weapon that comes upon the individual. thank you again for raising it. we have got to make sure we have given clear rules of engagement and they have been trained on that. they know who they can can detained and then they shouldn't detain. so they know their rules. they know when to detain them when they have to release. the other thing is it's temporal. somebody detain somebody that certainly the next level of come and can say okay that person needs to be released right now where they have restrained him and determined they are not a

threat or an enemy so they release them. there is almost continual review of detainees at each level and by different individuals to make sure we are continuing to obtain only with what we should and if not what they are transferred in some cases for example in afghanistan they be transferred to the afghan government. they might be released to the international committee, the red cross and so forth. we have almost a constant review i would say. not a formal review by the informal and when you have formal reviews they go on as they get into the theater internment facilities. it is that the hook aurzada question? >> i hope it's not a hook. this is the second time i've heard you general gross and once again i'm enormously impressed. operators don't like lawyers. i think, my second is it's a

profound shame that the world does not realize how important law is. the most impressive members we have are the j.a.g. generals. the world doesn't know it. the world thinks of the united states as a colossus, a bit of a rogue. they don't have any idea whatsoever how log on we are t the. can you be talking about that little bit more? >> i try to take opportunities to speak in places and to share. we care passionately about the law. we care very passionately about doing the right thing. i don't see a lot of lawyers out there saying here is how you get away with something that is wrong. it's not what we do. our job is to say to the commander haight sir you can't do this. here's another way to do what you want to do that is legal and ethical and that is moral. we are not there is moral advisers but we have that

perspective. my title is legal counsel so i think i have a role to play in legal advice but also as a counselor. i think about that seriously and i've been blessed with clients like general mcchrystal, general medicine and now general dempsey who are going to take that council and its legal adviser that i'm the only one in the command giving them legal legal advice and they respect and understand that. if it's just here are some thoughts that aren't legal then i recognize and they recognized its one among many that it's a perspective from somebody who thinks about these issues. i appreciate your kind words. that's very nice. >> do we have time? >> general would you present your book to him? [laughter] thank you very much.

>> come on up here, dave. our next speaker is general dave reese who of course works with us here at the institute. he has a long and distinguished background principally in logistics and what that means. when you really understand what logistics is all about there is no more important aspect of military operations. i know when i was privileged to be on the joint chiefs commandant of the marine corps during the first gulf war i worried about two things. logistics and bullets and ammunition for forces that were about to be deployed and who is going to run the 18 childcare centers back on the basis. the warriors took care of everything else. dave has probably arguably said

anti-american dealing with the tribal chiefs and all of that in iraq i think you'll find what he has to say very interesting. so dave, you've got it. >> thank you. dr. wallace and dr. alexander thank you for including me in this panel also. it's always dangerous to follow a lawyer. stick around, i might need you after my comments. there are rules in law that died with the military can do and then their perceptions on what the american people and the military should do. also let's remember that there are limits to what the military is able to do both from a capability standpoint and from the vantage point of what is required. enthusiasm not capability does not make it so. i will attempt to address this topic from the perspective of a former practitioner and simply

as an american citizen. although, to be confined to u.s. military leveraging allied and coalition capabilities are likely crucial to attain the desired end state for a variety of reasons. military does possess a wide array of skill sets and their organizational construct is very attractive to be called upon. simply when given a mission the military puts a single person in charge and they focus on mission accomplishment. anything short of this is failure. now the single commander gets a lot of insights and we don't realize the ability to respond quickly due to resources, training and readiness coupled with the scale of those capabilities can be applied is unmatched. the complex issues of declaring war on terrorist that is preemptive or defensive operations are all factors that need to be carefully considered.

most feel that the preemption of terrorist action is warranted. get them before they get us. this involves the development of intelligence and assets across the interagency and our allies to be effective and this is expensive and difficult. it also involves potential use of military capabilities that some call into question as a mission for military forces. if a threat is emerging in country x is country x a candidate for nation-building or no engagement? our military forces placed on the ground in an attempt to shape behavior for u.s. advantage or in our image and gain insight that could do harm to the u.s., or do we watch country x by engaging with country y that happens to be adjacent to country x. if we discover terrorist intentions when do we act and if the actions are conducted to

late the average american will ask you knew about this and it didn't stop it because of, fill in the blank. last there's a local populace that harbor those terrorists willingly. there is also the image of u.s. military in a foreign country as anon wanted entity by that country trader nation should be aware of perceptions both by citizens of our country and the country we are deployed to. there's a delicate balance between assisting in the military being perceived as sampras force and this balance is timeless. there is also a danger of a knee-jerk reaction in employing military forces. at times the military might be the only tool that can be applied quickly but may not be the right tool. the allied forces may be a better solution for a host of reasons. common cause and a willing coalition is difficult to put

together at times. whether the military is the right or wrong approach i would like to offer a -- to the fiber of the young men and women who are performing these tasks. we have an all volunteer all recruited force. in dealing with terrorists the high-visibility forces gaining the attention of the news media with high-profile ratings. there simply are not enough forces when the military deploys a nation-building or any other type of mission that projects the faith of the united states to another country. it is the basic corporal or lieutenant that is the face of the united states in country x. they are superb also. they need no training to exude the ideals of the u.s. and demonstrate caring and compassion. this can be articulated by state department generals but the

impact by example and demonstrating righteousness is powerful and lastly our young men and women would lead well will never let us down in this forum. whether a farm kid from iowa or a gang member from chicago. also the employment of the total force is critical. the reserve component in the guard buffer capabilities approaches and ideas that are sometimes found, not found in the active-duty force. this likely applies more to nonkinetic solution sets but the applicability of skills is potentially priceless in taking the fight to the terrorists in creating the most robust toolset possible. thank you very much for the invite today and do we want to go right to dr. corbett for any questions? [applause] >> any questions?

b can i ask you? >> it's your forum. >> as i mentioned we had one seminar yesterday on the biodefense and again and again the role of the military became so critical and we talked about this but can you make any comments for that for example and the recent ebola situation and also in general a weapons of mass destruction how the military is prepared to respond to such an attack? >> yes, thank you. first of all the military capability in responding, sometimes it's the only entities that can get there the quickest.

that's a unique capability and that's cap by her national command authorities for those reasons. the ebola case is an instance where i think we have leveraged the military capability and the training along with some of the interagency across-the-board that we put together. we talk about weapons of mass destruction all the combatant commands dealing with weapons of mass distraction and once again that is one of those capabilities in response but i want to go back to a couple of comments especially from intel perspective. it's that inclusion of intelligence across the interagency. obviously that's been highlighted since 9/11. it's critical. we still see instances where sometimes intelligence is not shared properly. that can be firewalls and clearances as much as anything else. we will continue to need to get

better along those lines but it's those catastrophic threats. ebola that some people consider one of those things were wmd that we have the capability where the military will respond. we have a force of biological and incident response force. those capabilities are in a defensive mode, not offenses and there are laws that govern those kinds of things. the military can just do it sometimes and that is why they are asked. dr. wallace. >> general i think you put your finger on everything. you explained the military, the american military tremendous capacity we have been all sorts of varieties. my question is this.

i see a total dilemma because what the u.s. military has is an unparalleled capacity in history but the fact that we have that may not necessarily work that well in some parts of the world where as you suggested -- notwithstanding the idealism, in other words there was an exemplary quality and how do we do that? i'm sure the answer will be to train them up the iraqis or the afghans. i do think that's a key issue. >> that goes to the heart of it. many question whether nation building should be involved. when you embark upon that with united states military that's a long-term commitment as opposed to a foreign internal defense that can go in and out and do some of those things. i mentioned the allied countries and the coalitions.

they are better poised sometimes possibly because the country might not like this for whatever reason. but what i saw in iraq and i think most of us have seen everywhere you might not like the country but when you put that person on the ground they relate. our corporals and lieutenants when they get talking and get working there is magic there. that is where we make our progress and that is where our message needs to be. i would offer that we don't try to over control or oversight provides that. we let our young women and men be themselves and they will never let us down. i have watched that time and time again. they are absolutely superb. notwithstanding sometimes it's better not to put a u.s. base put a us-based therefore never reason for fear of being grabb grabbed, thousand things and that's that is where allies can be far better than we will ever be. there was one in the back.

>> general you raise the issue of the use of weapons of mass distraction. we have exactly one case in a.q. khan network where we have seen the takedown of a.q. khan network no forces were involved. as a matter of policy do we want to be able to have the kinds of teams necessary to do that sort of thing? >> way above my pay grade. i think we have to have that. i would offer though that more than anything else where we get our best insights is not from us looking from the outside but those on the ground working in their own neighborhood. we all grew up in different neighborhoods. we all knew what was going on in that neighborhood. we knew who the good and the bad

kids were in when the bad kids did stuffs hopefully someone turned up men and parents did something. what i have witnessed in iraq is the locals knew exactly who was in the area. the leverage that those bad actors put on the locals not to talk and that's an issue that you can only appreciate if you live in their shoes or potentially if you come from a bad neighborhood in our country. that's something that might sound all too easy but it does not work that way. the intel side of the alignment with allies in the u.s. we are going to get that intel and hopefully we get it before we have to do what we have done on your question. do we need capability? the impacts are far too severe for you don't have that, yes. >> thank you very much.

[applause] >> our next speaker really doesn't meet -- need much of an introduction for anybody who's familiar with the department of defense being an academic type or anything else like that. the corps has had a distinguished career and more importantly an enormous influence on not just the military but on the entire operations of the pentagon and elsewhere. he has his doctorate in political science read way back when he was a navy aviator and the like and retired from the naval reserve as captain. he has been a professor at the university of dayton and other prestigious institutions and the like and for four or five years he was the boss of manpower and the pentagon and as everybody

knows that controls about 70% of the pentagon's budget. he is a distinguished author. he has edited or published for help with over 20 books and over 100 articles in the like. i could go on and on but i think you will find him very interesting. larry it's good to see you again. >> thank you general. it's good to see you again. to lighten things up. do we have any redskins fans here? i want to tell you a joke that's making its way around the pentagon. given what has happened with hagel and all that a reporter called me the other day and said what you think of this? he said chuck hagel was our 23. bruce allen who is the general manager and susan rice who is the director of national security and guess who was dan snyder?

obama. then of course if you follow it ash carter is mccoy. so anyway. to kind of put this in perspective, think we have to be careful with terms. we are talking about military goals in fighting terrorism. what you have to say is which groups are you going after? i think this is how we got ourselves into trouble after 9/11. we started the ground war on terrorism. we are never going to win. i was talking to someone in the fbi on "cnn" one day and he said we still have neo-nazis. hitler is dead so you're never going to get rid of it. i think that's important. the other thing is that the generals have talked about we have a lot of challenges but we don't have an existential threat. in other words, i hope iraq

turns out well but if it doesn't it's not the end of the world. isis or isil could they cause problems? i was in new york on 9/11 and it was terrible. 3000 people died. during the cold war you had an existential threat. i came on active duty at the time of the cuban missile crisis. we thought it was over. it's over guys. and we were lucky because we had something like 600,000 soldiers and marines in florida getting ready to go to cuba and the soviets had delegated the commanders the authority to fire nuclear weapons and we came very close. so i think that's important to keep in mind. it's already been mentioned yet the military is important but it's not the only thing.

all the tools have to be there. for years i argued we have to have a unified national security budget. you tell me how much you want to spend only pentagon and you come up with the amount and let's see if we can allocate it better in terms of do we need more soldiers or do we need more aid workers or whatever it might be. do we want to buy a new weapon system or provide a? i think that's important and i'm not saying defense is too high or too low. you tell me. you give me what's in your bid ajit i will tell you hayek and spend it better. we have to be careful about terms. obama says we are going going to degrade and defeat isis. to degrade them we are not going to defeat them. it's an ideology and as long as people believe that what you have to do is undermine the ideology. if the military undermines their

narrative that helps. you have people that are going to buy that ideology for whatever reason because their lives are terrible and they are not getting the opportunities. look at all the folks that are going over to fight with them. some are from our country and a lot from european countries. i think we have to be careful. the other thing is handed has already been mentioned here, we can't can do this by ourselves. we need other countries to help us. because of the fact that they give us legitimacy. we are an exceptional nation. i think we are very good. we are not perfect. we make mistakes and we think when we go into a country that we are going to be greeted as liberators. no. i remember the first time i went to iraq.

they brought a group of us together to value if the situation in the fall of 2003 and i was talking to this guy at saddam hussein university, and she ate -- a shiite guy and he said do you know who else came as liberators and not occupiers i said yes, the british. the president said it. i hope someone would have told him that but that's what you have to understand. i remember when i was a kid in vietnam and one of my last jobs was to coordinate the air attacks with the swift boats which by the way when kerry was running and people started beating up on him writing on a swiftboat was the scariest thing i've ever done in my life. but anyway one day we got lost. we weren't even armed.

we are used to flying planes so we are not used to this. my french was better than having gone to catholic schools and everything. so behave yourself or you might meet your maker in french french. as a commander let's go there maybe they will give us refuge. we went in and they were really nice and they talk to us. the commander said you guys talk a lot. what else did he say else did he say? i mama tell you this. why do you think you will make out any better here than the french? we are not the french but we were perceived that way. i remember talking about the tv shows when i was on with bill o'reilly which is worse than combat i can tell you that. we are on the air and they came up about bush's military servi service. he said to me what difference do

you think it would have made if bush and cheney have been in the military and gone to vietnam? i said tim the same thing. they would have recognized they are not going to be treated as liberators in this country. it's tough on the same kids when they go there because they want to do the right thing. as the general said they are motivated and all that but that's not how we not how we are perceived unfortunately unfortunately in many of these countries. there's an incredible amount of media comment i'll just area -- al-jazeera and they say my goodness and that's the narrative that you get. in fighting this war which has been going on in one form or another since 9/11 and we talked about the brave young people in these kids are terrific. let me tell you something. let me set up the volunteer marrow -- military people forget there were three components.

number one a comparatively small act of force and now you have to pay people. generally you and i remember what we used to get, $200 a month. so you have to pay a living wa wage. you have to have a smaller active force. then the general mentioned you will have to have a guard and reserve that's ready to go. i'm not sure we have volunteer military. we were serious about it but now you are going to be serious. and the third stool was draft registration. we are still registered. people forget that. one of things i had to do was persuade president reagan to keep it. he campaigned against a libertarian and all that type of thing. one of the arguments i made was

look you may have a prolonged conflict and you will want to be able to mobilize. we did not do that at the height of the wars in iraq and afghanistan and to me that was a disgrace. because and yes but you know the army and the marines had 80,000 moral waivers to take people in. and yes you have great people but does anybody know who private steven green as? private steven green is serving life imprisonment. he had three misdemeanor convictions, was a high school dropout and had a personality disorder. they recommended not to and they sent him anyway. while he was over there they raped a 14-year-old girl and killed her and her family.

then they discovered, they didn't know this happened and of course it came out and the other two people with her confessed in the serving life in prison. why did he take them and? because we were desperate. why did we have conscription? that would have gotten american people about. sure you can pass aeo mouse but do you know how many people read the classified intelligence about the war in iraq? only members could read it. only members, okay? 20 senators. let me tell you if you had conscription they would have come in and read that. i have not read it. obviously i'm not a member but talking to senator bob graham he says if you read that you have a case for going to war in iraq is somewhat shaky. if this continues and gets worse

with activate the selective service commission and get a stan mcchrystal said the american people with skin in the game. let me conclude with this. we talked about the defense budget. let me tell you something. in real terms even with sequester defense is at the level of 2007. i'm talking about the base budget. this is not korea or vietnam or the end of the cold war. do you know in the middle of the 70s where we were for the base budget? 350. we are 500 billion. again bob gates and stan mcchrystal who i worked with on the council on foreign relations and after he got the boot, it's funny how washington works. after he got fired i called them up and i said you can't have

lunch but would it have coffee at starbucks. everybody wants to talk to you on the way up but nobody wants to talk to you on the way down. he talked about how when he was on the joint staff the money was flowing and we weren't worried. you have got to worry about the money. the money is plentiful. we can sit down and tell you about the things we need to do. are they going to be done? are they hard to do? i've got to tell you everybody talks about lobbyists in washington. let me tell you one of the worst lobbies. do you know what admiral ryan makes? does anyone have any idea of? close to $700,000. whenever something comes up, we are going to change it.

chuck hagel wanted to take it down to 95. oh my god we were taking our veterans and all this type of thing. when ryan and murray tried to say -- cola minus one until you are 62 they were bragging talking about them. not talking about the fact that these people their return when they came in was 40% and all these other things. then they said you are hurting all veterans. how many enlisted marines were retiring? you guys are running back to football. the enlisted people in the infantry don't retire at high levels either. so we need to do that and if we don't, we don't because the budget may go up a little. it's not going to go up a a lot.

the military are going to be fighting this war, this battle against isis and they're not going to have the resources. and then of course we had to learn semantics. here too we have to acknowledge an inconvenient fact. sequestration has occurred in part because of a growing public frustration with the culture of waste and inefficiency at the defense department that one address for too long. i long. eye when is the emergence of the military industrial congressional congress that has crippled the acquisition process. the system can now be said to be successful in one respect turning billions of taxpayer dollars into weapons systems that are delivered late vastly over budget. john mccain. thank you very much. [applause]

>> does anyone want to throw anything at me? yes. >> something general reese mentioned, that is the role of the military and civil affairs. i understand quite often you are thrown into the role of being acting mayor's villages etc.. the national guard and that is one of the nonkinetic rolls they can play. did they did it -- do it adequately or do they need to spend more receipts -- resources and training people? >> two things and a lot of people say why do you use the military? if i need a person and agricultural specialist to go to anbar or whatever it might be and i call up a.i.d. someone will have to volunteer.

when i go to the reserves and that man or woman says report to duty. the other thing is i think to the extent you have to make career enhancement. in other words it's got to be something where people can get ahead. if they don't perceive that it's not going to happen. anybody else? yes, professor. >> there are program military and terrorism. i'm not going to say anything about military could i think you know everything and more. on terrorism that tactic is not the global war on terrorism. you said comparing it to the cold war something one wants to think about. of course is not like the cold war.

but you know i think you have to look at the american side. morale is always a big issue. tolstoy once said about the russians morale is the key. the morality of american civilians like me we tend to be scaredy-cat or susceptible. we exaggerate the good and the bad. i think this is important because this explains how her congressman act. in setting up the cold war using the weaponry of the cold war is preposterous but we are going to rely on the military as everyone points out. i think when we think about what's happening it's important. >> i don't disagree but i think what you have to be careful of is when you decide are we going to send men into harm's way? and is it serious enough that we have to worry about it? the other thing i think is interesting and a seat in the debates now, who is helping us

in iraq right now? the iranians. at the versailles comfort there was a british academic who said something which was the first thing ever learned. nations don't have permanent friends or enemies. they have permanent interests. there was a story in the paper yesterday about the bombing. on 9/11 was working in new york at the council on foreign relations and i had this august title vice president and director of studies that i got a call from a rainy and ambassad ambassador. we don't have diplomatic relations with the u.n. so he said i would like for you to come to dinner and bring your scholars to work on our part of the world. it was during the yankees red socks playoffs.

so i went over, late september 2001 and he said look we condemn the attacks of 9/11. they had a candlelight vigil. we hate the taliban. we are willing to work with you to make sure your government knows that. we let condi rice know. i assume they are denuded and according to ambassador dobbins at the bonn conference without the iranians karzai would not have gotten in because they have the northern alliance and they persuaded them to support karzai. january 2002 bush puts him on the axis of evil. the ambassador calls me up like what the? no dinner this time. so when you talk about in other words you have got to do the best that you can hear. what i like to get rid of assad? sure. he fought with us in the first gulf war.

syria was on our site so the idea that we have to wipe them all out and it's a zero-sum game, no and that's the point i'm trying to make. if isil control syria for example five years from now is that more of a threat to us than assad was or less of a threat? those are the types of things you have to ask yourself where some existential you have got to take it on where do you want to or not. so yeah it's threatening but it's existential that you have to sacrifice a lot of other goals to do it. i think that is the real issue. i think you have to put into perspective. would we be better off if saddam hussein were still in iraq now as opposed to isil? yes, sir.

>> lawrence freeman from the review. since you opened up with a joke about secretary hagel i wanted to follow-up with a question. there were many people in washington and the military who say their recent secretary hagel was removed is because he stood with general dempsey on the fact that there has to be a clear mission and despite. they didn't have a clear mission and overthrowing assad. the question is we have been a secretary defense being nominated today. if general dempsey and the secretary of defense say we want a clear mission and be presidents up -- that person how does that affect the military campaign? >> again i think you raise a really good point.

harry truman's old story, if you want a friend in washington get a dog. don't tell anybody under the bus for political reasons. i worked in the obama campaign. dennis mcdonough used to be down the hall from me and he called me a lot. ..