>> as i said in our previous hearing, i want to make sure things get done. and so i want you to get back to us exactly when you expect -- i would like to have that in writing, when you expect these things to be done and provide the committee with that information, because we want to hold you to that, all right? >> as the inspector general has said, there's also going to be a review and a -- of our compliance as well, so it's not only you, sir, the inspector -- >> we'll call it double coverage. >> exactly. and i will get back to you on that. >> mr. starr, representative wes moreland discussed with you 2013 audit that took place before the creation of the high-threat director program at the audit phenomenal some security deficiencies at posts it

examined. is that correct? >> yes, sir. >> mr. starr, in our last hearing, the inspector general's office released its 2014 reported on high-threat programs directorat. one of the inspector general's key findings in that report is that this newly created body was, quote, helped create a culture of share responsibility within the department and has forged strong partnerships with regional security officers and counterparts in regional and functional bureaus as well as within the inner agency community. i think that's an extremely positive finding given the fact that the accountability review board considered the lack of shared responsibility around security issues to be systematic failure just two years ago. mr. starr, could you discuss how you think the creation of the high-threat program has created a culture of shared

responsibility and state department? and then my final question, to tell us, how does this culture of shared responsibility that the i.g. praises at our embassies abroad. >> thank you for the question, congressman. we have addressed this in many different ways. the high threat directat itself, just by the fact that we concentrate on looking every single year at our top 30 posts, the ones that we worry about the most, the vp2 process, the fact that we have written into every senior officer's job description and every officer in the state department, their individual responsibilities for security. the fact that i have officers that are attending the meetings of the regional bureaus every single week, in some cases every single day.

and when we are looking at the programs, we are also talking about the security implications, therefore, i think have highlighted the fact that none of us can operate independently of considerations of security at this point. i think there has been a culture change in the department. i think having to weigh the importance of our programs and why we're in very danger places under the vp2 process has brought a laser focus on why we're there, what the real threats are and have a clear understanding of the threats, not ignoring the threats, what we've done to mitigate those flets and then a decision at the end of that is our presence still adequate and is our presence warranted, despite all these things, i think, has brought a new culture to the department in many ways. i think i have never seen security taken as seriously as it has been in the last two years. and i say that not lightly

because i've been here a long time and security has been taken seriously for many, many years in the department. but i think this -- some of these processes we have put in place this time are new to the department and are doing exactly what the arb wanted and what you're talking about. is it working itself into the culture? >> right. and the culture is very significant. it's one thing when you have ab ragss. it's another when you actually believe in something, you're doing it every day and it becomes a part of your dna. that is, the dna of the state department. >> yes, sir. i would add one other thing, sir. the officers that are reaching the senior ranks of the department today, in many cases have spent significant amounts of time over the last decade in places like iraq, pakistan, afghanistan, yemen, cairo, other places where we have true

security problems. the officers i work with today, every single day at my level and above, are keenly aware that security must be balanced with our program implementation. they've lived it. >> thank you very much, chairman. >> thank the gentleman from maryland. the chair will now recognize the gentlelady. >> are you familiar with the 1997 oig recommendation with the need to prioritize using a methodology based on the ospb security standards? >> i'm vaguely familiar with -- i wasn't here in 1997. >> were you aware it was closed in 1998? >> i think that's right. i think that's right. >> and wasn't -- to the extent you can answer this, it was closed because the department

amended its memorandum of agreement with the marine corps to include procedures for establishing the size of existing detachments and procedures for activations and deactivations, is that correct? >> i don't recall why it was closed without looking at documents. >> well, in 2014 your office again looked at whether -- at where and houma reason security guard detachments were being utilized at the state department post overseas, is that correct? >> that's correct. >> were you able to determine whether there is a methodology for prioritizing and assigning new msg attachments to overseas posts and whether that methodology was effective? >> our auditors found in that report that there were no formal procedures to select or identify posts. they couldn't show how the marine security guard units compared with other posts. there was no formal plan for

expansion. they simply just didn't have the processes and procedures that one would normally think you would have. >> so, you weren't able to make -- figure out how ds makes the determination of where these marines go? >> we were not. >> okay. and it's the same or similar issue, to your knowledge, i know you don't seem as familiar with the 1997, but the inspector general then told ds to create a process or methodology to select posts, so this is a similar situation, correct? >> i'll accept that premise. >> so, how can we on this committee have confidence that recommendation 11 from the benghazi arb made just two years ago that the department and dod will provide more capabilities at higher risk posts? how can we have the confidence that that will be fully implemented? >> well, that's the challenge of closing recommendations. we have a compliance follow-up group that i can tell you what

they do now. they do look very closely at the actions that the department takes to close recommendations. they wouldn't close it unless they felt that there was significant progress. >> mr. starr, i'm going to follow up with you on this point. according to the oig, only 40% of the new msg detachments have been assigned to posts with high or critical rating for political violence, terrorism. in light of your last statement in the previous questions, you said you've never seen security taken so seriously in the past two years. well, how does the fact that only 40% of the high-risk, high-threat posts have these marine security guard detachments, how does this satisfy the arb recommendation 11 expand that program to provide more capabilities and capacities at higher risk posts? >> thank you for the question,

congresswoman. there's actually a very clear, very simple answer for this. most of the posts that are high-threat, high-risk already had marine security guard detachments at them. that's why the 40% number is there. of the 30 posts that we ranked as our highest threat, highest vulnerability, 19 of them already had marine security guard detachments. we've added two to those. of the remaining nine posts, five of those posts, there's no one there. the post is in name only. we don't have people on the ground. mogadishu, harat -- >> let me interrupt you for a minute. mr. linick, do you agree with those numbers? >> i haven't confirmed those numbers, soy don't know. >> and there are several other posts. there's about four posts in that high-threat list where we would like to put marine security guard detachments.

the host government has not allowed us to do that. >> okay. so -- >> but the reason that figure seems very strange is that in the vast majority of cases, we've already got marine detachments at those places. >> let's be clear about this, mr. starr. how many current high-risk threat posts do not have msg detachments? >> of the 30 highest risks, highest threat level posts, 9 do not, but 5 of those 9 are not functioning posts. they're closed, so four. >> do you agree with that mr. linick, or do you not know? >> i don't know. >> is there a timetable, mr. starr, in place for assigning the msg attachments to the -- you say four posts. is there a timetable? >> i would like to do it tomorrow, but i will tell you, i find it unlikely that i'm going to be able to assign marine detachment to those posts. >> you say because host nation problems -- >> host nation problems. >> when i talked to you last

time three months ago, it doesn't seem like we've made much progress, but i asked you, you know, what's your plan with the ones that you don't, if you've got host nation problems, are there other ways to get security there? and you said in your testimony, if we find that we don't have those types of protections, you listed adding ds agents, several other mitigating things. but you said, if we don't find that we don't have those types of protections or we think those risks are too high, then we won't be there. so, why have we not made progression on those four posts that you are stating now, we still don't have those protections in place? >> the host nation has stood up and given us high levels of protection. in some cases, i have a tremendous amount of other resources there, including diplomatic security agents and armed contractors that meet the threat. in some cases, we have made a

determination that the host government is standing up and fulfilling its responsibilities. while we'd still like to have marines there, the fact we don't does not mean that we cannot continue. this is some of the things that we're looking at as we do this vp2 process. when we weigh why we're at a post, what the threats are, what resources we have overall. and as i say, marines are one tool in our tool kit. >> mr. linick, i want to take mr. starr's answer and follow up with you. do you think that's sufficient? >> my question is along the lines of the report. what are the plans, where are the plans, where's the meth methodology? what plans are there to negotiate with host governments unwilling to take us? those kind of things. >> and you have not gotten a clearance from ds on exactly how this is going to be handled, correct? >> all the recommendations are open at this time. >> all the recommendations are

open. and based on the questions from ms. brooks earlier, open means they're unresolved and there's no evidence there that they're doing anything to make it better? >> well, actually, there are a number of open resolved recommendations, in other words, the department has agreed in principle to comply. but there are two recommendations which are unresolved which means we just disagree. >> of the six, there are four unresolved -- >> no, two -- >> excuse me. four resolved and two unresolved. >> that's correct. >> but even the resolved, you've just gotten them to say that they want to do something, but you have no actions to back up their words. >> that's correct. >> so, we still have, according to mr. starr's testimony, we have four places, very dangerous places of the world, where american lives are at stake because we don't have the proper

security in place. >> congresswoman -- >> wait, this is for mr. linick. is that correct? >> i mean, have i to accept that that -- those facts because i don't know independently whether that's true. >> recommendation 6 of your report recommends that ds marine security guard program conduct a staffing and resources assessment and then judiciously allocate appropriate resources to facilitate compliance with the benghazi accountability review board report to upgrait grade security for personnel at high-threat posts. has this been done? >> not according to the facts i've heard. >> so, in fact, the department has yet to comply with benghazi arb recommendation 11, correct? >> we believe benghazi arb 11 intended for there to be marine security guards at all high threat posts. >> so i want to hear you say -- >> yes, that is correct. >> thank you very much. i've got 24 -- 22 seconds left.

i did want to touch a little bit on the local guard force. real quick, mr. linick, if i can just get to the findings with you. a, b, regional security officers took it upon themselves to vary the vetting and approval process and failed to ensure that the security contractors provided all the required documents. that's correct? >> that's correct. >> so, did any of the security companies that had contracts fully perform all vetting required in their contracts? >> no. we looked at 87 personnel files and none of them -- none of the security contractors performed all of the vetting requirements. >> and of the six embassies reviewed, did any of them allow guards to work before being fully vetted? >> yes, a number of them allowed

them to work without vetting. >> i just -- mr. charnlgs i do not understand how this can be. just two years after four americans were killed in benghazi, we have local guards that are not fully vetted that clear -- that clearly, mr. chairman, show that we have a severe security threat in very dangerous places where american lives are at stake today. thank you so much. thank you for being here. i yield back. >> thank the gentlelady from alabama. the chair will recognize the gentleman from california, mr. schiff. >> thank you, chairman. thank you, gentlemen, for being here. appreciate your service very much. mr. starr, i just wanted to ask you for historical perspective, because i think many americans may be under the impression that what took place in benghazi was

extraordinary in the sense we've never had attacks on our diplomats or tragedies. i wonder if you could shed a little light on the last 20 years. how many times have our facilities been attacked? how many times has that resulted in injuries or fatalities? is the problem getting worse because the world is now more unstable? it seems like there are more high-threat posts now than ever. is that just an impression or is that the reality? and what does that mean in terms of the prioritization you mentioned at the outset? and that is, the priority is for a diplomatic post to implement the policy of the united states. that has to be done in a way where we can protect our people. but they're there for a reason. and there are many posts where we are, where we could ask the same questions. why are we in yemen?

why are we in iraq? why are we in any of these places that are inherently dangerous. there are foreign policy objectives in these places, as there were in libya. we have increasingly difficult calls to make about where we post our people, what risks we're willing to undertake in furtherance of our policy. that's why i have such great respect for the people in our diplomatic corps because they're at risk. there's just no avoiding it these days. but can you set a little of the historic trend for us. what has been our experience with violence at our facilities? to what degree is that phenomenon changing and is it changing for the worse? >> we have more posts today categorized at high or critical threat for civil disorder or terrorism than at any time in my service in the department.

i think we are seeing a lot of different threats emerging. i don't think that's a surprise to anyone. we are challenged in many ways, but again, going back to what we've been doing since nairobi and dar ra salam, which is when al qaeda first came in our view full face, that we had to recognize, that we had a determined nonstate enemy against us, a lot of the programs we put in place and the buildings we built have helped make us and balance that security. congressman, as you say, over the last ten or more years, we have had multiple, multiple attacks on our facilities and people in iraq. many, many attacks in afghanistan. in harat last year, we had a horrific attack with two truck bombs, eight suicide bombers

trying to kill our people at the consulate in harat. our security systems worked. we killed all of them. we lost tragically some third-country national guards on -- security guards and afghan police officers, but no americans were killed in that. as has been eluded to here, at the same time as the benghazi attack, we had huge crowds and mobs that were coming over our facilities and attacking our facilities in cairo, in tunisia and in sudan. and in the last two posts, 8 1/2 hours before the host country came to our support, our facilities held and no americans were injured. we have had and lost certain foreign service officers in one-off attacks, lone wolf type attacks, including john granville in sudan, not too long ago. we've had rpg attacks, truck bomb attacks, car bomb attacks, car bomb attacks on our

motorcades, we have had aircraft that has been shot at. we have had almost innumerable attacks on our facilities over the last 20 years. and you are right, they are going up. it is a challenge. i would first say that it's a testament to the foreign service that our officers still want to get out and implement the important foreign service goals that we have to. it is a testament to their willingness to take new types of training and for the department to take on these security risks. congress has been a very important partner in how we have met these risks, particularly since the 1998 bombings in dara salam and nairobi and we appreciate that. we'll continue to work on these things. i don't think it's a surprise to anybody that we are living in a world where there's a high degree of instability in many countries. there's a lot of open discussion about how extremism is drawing inqzqíño new youth, disaffecte

personnel and has a calling that is being heard by certain people. we have our challenges cut out for us. we'll do the best we can to meet those challenges while still implementing the foreign policy of the united states government. >> thank you, mr. starr. let me drill down on a couple specifics that i think have manifested themselves in light of this increasing threat environment and increasing number of high-risk posts. and that is, more people that are on temporary assignment. and people that are of short duration in some of these high-security threats. many of us that have visited our diplomatic facilities overseas meet people that are there for short tours. you talked about one way of trying to fill the gap with retirees.

why is it -- it may be desirable to bring in the retirees on who have great experience, but why is that necessary? are we having trouble to attract enough personnel to go to these high-threat snoes is there a mutually reinforcing cycle where people who go to a high-threat post, therefore, get recommendations from people in those posts for future assignments and are kind of locked into high-threat posts? what is the impact on our personnel of the proliferation of dangerous places where they work? >> congressman, the situation that we face is that most of these high-threat posts are unaccompanied. we're asking more and more of our personnel to take unaccompanied tours away from their families for longer periods of time. generally, these have been one-year tours, but we're now at a point where we're asking more of our officers to serve two-year unaccompanied tours overseas without their families. we have rotated many of our foreign service officers and many of my security agents and

security personnel through multiple hardship tours without their families at these high-threat posts at this point. the foreign service has a certain amount of personnel. we have not had to rely particularly on very many tdy personnel. some of the other personnel available rat our posts overseas have greatly relied on temporary duty personnel. not so much the department. we have had officers that stood up and continue to stand up and serve at these places. but it is not without, you know, cost. it is not without, in some cases, fracturing families or, you know, are we putting people -- asking them to serve tour after tour in high-threat posts? multiple times at these places do we have behavioral problems and other things coming out of this. the answer in some cases is, yes. so in many cases where we have a need to put our best people in

some tough places, where we're asking sometimes for temporary personnel, but sometimes for longer periods of time, the department is asking to bring back some of the retired people. somebody's going to use that vast experience they've got and they're going to pay them for it. we would like to avail ourselves of that as well if possible. but i do think that the state department's been at the forefront of filling our positions with mostly full-time assigned personnel, although we, too, rely on tdyers occasionally. >> just one last question because i only have a minute left. i wanted to follow up on -- i think we all recognize the importance of having high-level attention paid to the arb recommendations by the top principals in the state department. and i feelly concur that secretaries clinton and kerry have embraced and even established this is a best

practice. you had mentioned it was codified in the foreign affairs manual very recently, but the embrace of that by those top principals, that was from the very beginning. in fact, that was a standard they set, was it not? >> i think it was very evident from the statements of secretary kerry and our principles that we were in this together and everybody had to get on board. what we're now doing is bringing it around to putting it in the policy. as steve point out, that's important, we need to codify this going forward and we need to do that. but i agree with you, i have spent many hours in many meeting with the deputy secretaries and many others. and i've had discussions with the secretary about what security means to us. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >> thank the gentleman from california. the chair will now recognize the gentleman from illinois, mr mr. roscum. >> thank you. secretary starr and mr. linick,

thank you for your time. i find your argument inconsistent in this sense. i just want to bring to your attention statements you made to my colleagues, some of the realities that i perceive and walk you through my thinking. a couple of minutes ago you told ranking member cummings there has been a culture change in the department. and if there has been a culture change in the department that presupposes that you basically offer everything up that's an obstacle and reflect, look, this is a problem and we're going to rid ourselves of every single problem that was an obstacle to a remedy. a couple minutes ago, you made the argument to mr. schiff -- not an argument, but you made the point, increasingly dangerous world. nobody here disagrees with that. it was compelling. you used words like extremism, disaffected youth and these posts are unaccompanied because they're miserable places to go, presumably. and yet one of the things that is the remedy to that is the

waiver authority and recommendation number 13 that the department continues to cling to. so, the recommendation of the best practices panel in number 3 it is says, it says waivers to establish security standards should only be pursued subsequent to the implementation of mitigating measures as agreed by regional bureau or other program managers advised by ds and informed by the department risk management model. that is a great idea. now, here's the problem. the department -- and i don't know where you were in the discussion, but the department has said, we don't think that's a great idea. in fact, we think this, in certain cases involving national security -- i'm going to come back to that, because that's such an ambiguous term -- an exception can be approved based on the mitigating measures already in place. presuming there are mitigating measures, i might add. even though future mitigating measures may be planned to bring the facility even closer to or

in con for answer with the standards. in such case when time is of the essence to further national security interests the department requires flexibility to grant exception of the planned mitigating measures. so, here's my point. that is a gaping exception. that is an exception, mr. secretary, that anything can get through. and i mean, anything. so if it is simply, look, this is national security. all of a sudden that becomes a laminated hall pass for someone at the department of state to say, we're declaring this a national security. yeah we've gone through the whole process. the process you described, that is, identifying the high-risk, high-threat posts, going through vp2. so far, there's no restraining include. then there's two choices. either recharacterize something as a special mission compound or something else, or go through

another process. and even within the other formalized process, there's still this waiver authority and people around you, mr. secretary, are saying, give it up. and by your own argument, i might add, you're making the argument you should give it up. there's a culture change so big you're describing it to ranking member cummings and a world that is so dangerous that you're using all kinds of words that we all agree with. so why in the world hang onto this thing? >> for a very specific technical reason, sir. we pick a place. sometimes the best that we can get in a short duration if we're going to go back in. we have to make decisions on what needs to be done and what level of things we can't possibly do. i can't create 100 feet of setback when there isn't 100 feet of setback and we may have

to accept that. at a certain point we have to make decisions, are we going to accept that? do the rest of the things we need to do. or are we just going to say, no, we're not going to accept that? and then continue looking until we find a place. by the way, i've never found a place to lease in 30 years in the department that actually had 100 feet of setback that was available. >> secretary starr, what is different than the reasoning you just articulated to me just now from the reasoning that put us in benghazi and that allowed four people to be killed? what is different? >> there is -- i will admit that there is some measure of risk in what i am saying, but -- >> huge risk, based on -- >> no, i don't agree it's huge risk. >> you just told them it was a dangerous world filled with extremists and disaffected youth. that was five minutes ago. >> true.

but i think we have to be able to make decisions to progress. in some cases, if we're going to lease a new facility, we're going to have to admit that we're going to have to get give waivers in order to fulfill -- >> what is the difference between -- >> the difference is, we have to do the waivers. there has to be a decision process. >> yeah, but then why don't you -- why don't you agree to the mitigation? that was the key finding of the best practices -- >> because in some places we can't get the mitigation. i can't -- >> if you can't -- >> i cannot get a blast-proof building unless i build it. >> then why do we ask people to go to these places? >> because in some cases the foreign policy imperatives of why we need to be there mean that we're going to take reasonable levels of risk. now, what we have to be careful is that we don't take unreasonable levels of risk. there has to be an open and fulsome discussion about why we need to be there, what risks are

we really running? do you really understand the threats? as you -- >> best practice panel recommendation is trying to codify that risk discussion. and if you rewind the tape today and you listen to the answers that you gave, and i was carefully listening to this, earlier in the last -- in our last discussion time, the last hearing, ms. robey asked you a question and you and i had an exchange about your answer. but just to refresh your memory, she asked, is it possible for the state department to open a temporary residential facility. you said, we don't have any at the moment i can't imagine we would or that i would approve it. you, singularly, mr. starr. earlier today in part of the exchange you said, i am committed to keeping our people as safe as possible. now, i get it. that's opening statement language. there's nothing wrong with that. you then told ms. sanchez, i turned that down.

you then told mr. joer darngs i have access. your bristle was up a little bit because he was pushing you around but you were saying, i have access to the secretary of state. now, here's the problem. when you're gone, that next person will be confronted with the same discussion that you admitted is basically that there's nothing really different about the thinking that went in on benghazi, to your knowledge, because you told us you weren't there. i'm telling you that i think it is very similar, that line of thinking that says, yeah it's dangerous, we have to get them, we've got to go, there's no time, we have to check these boxes, yeah, yeah yeah, and you have this national security exception that the exception like i've described is this big and we're right back into this situation. notwithstanding the culture change that you've offered up. do you see where this is going? which is why people around you are saying, give it up. offer it up. you don't need it. >> i think that that -- relying

on one recommendation -- >> this is not one recommendation. >> no, that's one particular recommendation we don't agree with. because of a technical reason that we have to be able to say in advance and write the waivers and say, we're going to accept wavering that security standard gives us the ability to do these things. >> look, in your answer -- >> but the larger issue, though, is things like vp2 and having processes in place. and i recognize that this one particular one is confusing in terms of, it seems like we don't want a process -- >> oh, it's not confusing to me. >> it doesn't seem like we want a process -- >> there's nothing confusing about this. you're basically saying we're not going to mitigate -- you're not basically saying. you're saying we're not going to mitigate. the answers the state department offers is presoefs mitigation in place and relying on a speculation of possible

mitigation. in fact, it says it may be planned. may be planned. that's speculation beyond speculation. it's speculation upon speculation. do you see how it is people are coming to the conclusion that in a post-starr era that like it or not is coming, in a post-starr air remarks when special committees are not around, there's going to be every bit of possibility and pressure based on the national security exemption which as i described it, is this big. all of a sudden, we're right back into this situation and we're grieving the loss of life. i ask you to revisit this. i ask you to reconsider this. this is something you're clinging to and that you ought not. i yield back. >> thank the gentleman from illinois. chair now recognize the gentleman from maryland. >> the -- you know, mr. starr, ms. robey asked mr. linick about

the vetting of local security guards. i'm really -- i thought she had an excellent line of questioning. i want to make sure i understand what's going on here because when the dust settles again i want to make sure what people are saying. in june -- when we talk about the vetting, can you tell me why there is no vetting in those -- i think it was four countries? >> six countries. six contractors. >> congressman, the answer is that it is not true there was no vetting. what the report points out is that they didn't fully comply with the vetting requirements. there are places around the world where we work that our normal vetting requirements,

things like requiring a police check, can't be accomplished. there are places where we are or the contractor is not allowed to perform a background investigation. this is of all places -- one place in italy we cannot vet contractors in italy because of statements they have in law. it does not mean we don't do our best job to vet the people that we bring on board. now, i will -- i want to say one thing clearly. when steve and his inspectors go out and they find a circumstance where they say, hey, we don't think the contractor's living up to the vetting requirements, i want to know that. and we take that seriously and we go back and say, okay, what's happening here? in some cases we may find there's a reason the contractor isn't fully vetting the people. he may have to use alternate methods. but there are -- there may be cases and steve's people may find out that he's trying to put some shortcuts in place and

doesn't want to pay for the vetting and we need to know those things. that's valuable guidance that inspector general's teams are bringing back to us. so, i think it's a dual answer. one, i want to know what they're finding because these inspections are part of our backstop and they're important to us. second, there may be reasons in some cases that there may not be a full vetting. there may be certain work-arounds. we can't do police checks or they don't -- you just buy a police check, essentially, we're looking at family ties, you know, does everybody know this person? does this person really want to work at the embassy? and people have known his character for a long time. there may be work-arounds. and finally, there are places where we know that we have significant issues hiring locals to be guards. in those places, we bring in

third-country contractors at tremendous expense because there's no other way to get the vetting done and we don't trust the people. so, it's a holistic answer. i don't want to say that we don't value, and i necessarily disagree with the ig on some of these things. they play a really important role. the inspection process is important to us. and when steve's people come back and say, hey, something's not right here, we look at it. we try to correct it as fast as possible or we have an understanding it doesn't quite meet the needs and we'll have an open recommendation and we'll go back and forth with the inspector on that. i would note, sir, that our guards have stood by us through thick and then. some of them have stayed years after we've closed our facilities and protected them. we have never had a green i don't know blue incident with any of our guards. in many cases, they have showed loyalty to us far beyond what we could ever do.

are our programs, are our guard programs perfect? no. we strive to keep them up to snuff every single day with the highest compliance of the rules and regulations we put in place. steve plays an important role in keeping us there. so it's -- all told, i need those guards and we're going to continue doing it. and i think we're doing over emgly a very good job. are there some things we need work on? yes. when we find them, we'll work on it. >> are you familiar with the june 2014 inspector general's report with regard to an audit of the department's oversight of the vetting process, used for local security guards. you're familiar with that audit? >> yes, sir. and he reported and explained that contractors are challenged in vetting local security forces because of local privacy laws, lack of credit reporting services and difficulty in

obtaining official records. in the host country. and how do you operate within those kind of constraints? you get -- you do as much as you can and then -- i mean, how do you -- you want to vet. and so is there a certain point you say, well, there's just not enough vetting we can do that we can hire these folks or -- i mean, how does that work? >> when we make a determination that we really can't do any vetting and we have no confidence in the guard force, that's when we may turn to this alternative, third country nationals we bring in from another country we vet if we can get permission from the host country to do that. in many cases it's more subtle than that. as i say, sir, when the police check may not be worth the piece of paper it's printed on or where there are privacy cases, in many cases we look at who knows this person? what recommendations have they

got? are they family? are they tied to the embassy in some place? we've got to have guards. we have to have people manning the posts and checking the people coming in and checking packages and inspecting the cars. and even when some of those vetting procedures may not -- may not comport with what we do as a security clearance back here in the united states, we have a great deal of faith and confidence in them, even in some cases we may not meet every requirement. we may not be able to cross every "t" and dot every "i." at some point we have to take some level of risk. >> mr. starr, we spoke extensively about risk management. during our last hearing you spoke about how important it is to assess both the willingness and capability of the host country forces to provide local security. how does the state department consider the potential issues with local guards today when considering whether to operate

in a certain country? and how has that change the since benghazi? i don't know that that has actually changed since benghazi, sir. i would say it's been an ongoing issue for us. there are some countries that will not allow us to have guard contractors. in some cases we can hire them directly. there are some countries where we have made that determination that because of counterintelligence issues or because we may think that the guard force is -- could be infiltrated and we don't have faith and confidence that we may use third-country contractors. this has been an ongoing issue since 2002. we look at every country very carefully.

we make a determination how we can best fulfill the security requirements in that country, whether it's a contract, whether it's a pas, district hire guard force, whether it's a third-country national guard force. we rely in great part on the experience of the rsos in the field and the contracting officers and the general services officers to give us advice here in washington and listen to them. and then make recommendations and decisions based on the best knowledge we have. >> well, let me say this. i want to thank both of our witnesses for being here today. we really do appreciate it. and we appreciate your willingness to work hard every day to make our people safer. as i know, mr. starr, that we've -- i know we pressed you hard today. please recognize and understand we do so to ensure the department's feet are held to

the fire because it's important for all of us that we do this right. and i remind you again, it is our watch. your testimony in september and october update, the updates you provided us. we appreciate. and your testimony today shows continued progress. and we appreciate your willingness to work with us and anyone else who helps to make our embassies safer. so, i want to thank you for that. and i want to thank you, mr. linick, for all that you're doing because you, too, help us keep these feet to the fire. with regard to the arb, i think we're making good progress, but i want to make sure everything is done. and i noted there are some arb recommendations, quite a few of them from past arbs. i think we need to take these opportunities and and try to address as much as we possibly can even back then because those

things are still ongoing, right, mr. linick? there are still problems? >> yes, that's correct. i want to thank both of you. mr. starr, don't forget we want to know when those other recommendations of the arb will be completed and to let us know when they are, in fact, completed, all right? okay. thank you, gentlemen. >> yes, sir. we'll get those answers to you. sir, i expect to be pressed pretty hard. this is tough business and it's important business and you can press as hard as you want. myself and steve, we're both pretty tough guys and we appreciate even the tough questioning. the opportunity to put these things on the table with you in an important committee like this is important to me, too. >> thank you very much. were in libya?gentleman from

and i'm not going to ask you the same question, because you made it clear, you're not the right person for us to ask. and i'm going to respect that. but i want to make sure you understand why jimmy would ask you that question and why all of us are asked that question with alarming frequency in our districts. the last hearing we had, you did a very good job of explaining to those of us who are not in diplomacy that you have to weigh and balance. i think you said, you have to weigh and balance the policy with the risk to determine whether or not you should have a presence. and it just struck me there's no way you could possibly weigh and balance policy versus risk if you don't understand what the policy is. and then i started thinking what jimmy was talking, i wonder where the question came from? and i knew i'd seen this somewhere. do you know someone by the name of ben rhodes? >> i don't know ben rhodes personally. i know the position he was fulfilling. >> i don't know him either, but

there was a memo three days after four of our fellow americans were killed in benghazi. and i will skip over goal number 1 of his communications memo -- actually, i won't. it says to convey the u.s. is doing everything we can to protect our people in our facilities. it just struck me, if you were doing everything you could, we would not have had 50 separate recommendations after he wrote that memo and this now the second hearing to make sure that those recommendations were implemented. but i'm going to skip over that goal to get to the second goal. the second goal, secretary starr, was to underscore that these protests are rooted in an internet video and not a broader failure of policy. so, i'm going to skip over the video part of that for now and get to the second clause, the dependent clause in that sentence. not a broader failure of policy. how can we judge whether or not a policy has failed or succeeded if no one tells us what the policy objectives were?

i mean, how can we do that? how can you weigh and balance the risks? jimmy's gone through the risks. members on the other side have gone through all the escalating episodes of violence in benghazi. and it may well be that the reason for us to have been there supercedes all of those episodes of violence. but how -- i mean, how can a committee of congress know that if no one tells us while we were there? so, you're not the right person to ask. who would you ask if you were us? who should we bring to explain why were we in libya? >> the policy questions, i think, should more properly be directed to the nea bureau that had responsibility -- >> i'm looking for a name, preferably. who would be able to tell us

what policy we were pursuing in libya was so important to skip over all the things that roscum pointed out and to weigh and balance the episodes of violence in such a way that the presence outweighed the violence? >> at the risk of having her never talk to me again, the assistant secretary for nea, ann patterson, i think, is the highest ranking person in the nea bureau. and at the time of the attack was the u.s. ambassador in egypt. and i think ann or one of the deputy assistant secretaries in the nea bureau could give you the best answer on that. >> well, i thank you for that name. and i want to make sure you and i are on the same sheet of music. do you understand why we would have that question? i mean, do you think that that is a fair and legitimate question for us to ask, what the policy was so we can then weigh and balance it, as you instructed us to do? >> i think that's a reasonable question, sir. >> well, thank you. now, secretary starr, last time you were with us, we not only

discussed the most recent arb recommendations but we went back and highlighted some from the past. and one in particular from 1999 caught my attention. the secretary of state should take a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility for ensuring the security of u.s. diplomatic personnel abroad. it is essential to convey to the entire department entire department that security is one of the highest priorities. secretary, just in case somebody missed that part of the 1999 arb, the authors reiterated that point with this. the secretary of state should personally review the security situation of embassies and other official premises, closing those which are highly vulnerable and threatened. to previous arb recommendations that you could essentially lay

on top of one another. they are identical. and i don't think they're identical because they forgot that they put the first one. i think they're identical because they were trying to send a message to us, this is really important and it is deserving of the attention at the highest levels of the department. so here is what i want to do. i want to specifically with respect to benghazi, in october of 2011, there was a specific request for a machine gun to defend our facility in benghazi. in august of 2012, just a month before the attack on our facility, a document again lists a machine gun as equipment needed and requested. do you know who denied the request for those machine guns and why? >> no, sir, i do not. >> who should i ask? >> you can ask me and i will research that. >> will you do that in is. >> yes, i will. >> have you watched the video surveillance from the night of the attack?

>> i have. >> without going into great detail, would you agree with me -- do you at least see why somebody on the ground might have asked for that piece of equipment given what you and i have seen in the surveillance video? thinking back to the video, can you see how that might possibly have come in handy that night? >> in my review of what happened and looking at that, i think the agents made the right decisions at that point not to engage. i think that they were equipped with fully automatic weapons, not quite the rate of fire power of a machine gun. i agree that, you know, machine guns can be very menacing and have a tremendous affect. >> they wanted them for the rooftop. i want you to go back if you would and watch the video and see whether or not you conclude the same way that i concluded or not -- i appreciate if you could go back and with specificity i

want to know who reviewed that request, who denied that request and is there an appeals process within the state department in light of these two previous arb recommendations that the secretary of state should take a personal and active review -- that the secretary of state should personally review the security situation, is there an appeals process where someone hypothetically could say, you know what, you are giving me a no but i'm going to take this up the food chain? does that exist? >> yes. >> all the way up to the highest levels of the state department? >> i will tell you that the one thing that the department has that very few other agencies has is the decent challenge. it's a channel that we prize. if you disagree with the decision or the policy that officers in the department of state at all ranks and locations have the ability to send something in at the highest

level and say i disagree with something. and it goes to the highest level. >> in june and july of 2012, months before the attack on benghazi, the ambassador himself requested a security team be extended to stay longer. >> the security team in tripoli. >> yes. but it doesn't take much to imagine him traveling from tripoli to benghazi with an increased security presence, does it? if there is more security in tripoli and he is traveling ii benghazi -- >> when he traveled, he took additional rsos with him. there were additional rsos that could have gone as well. >> for a grand total of how many? >> five at post. >> and how many were there before the footprint was reduced? >> three. >> no, no, no. how many were there before their deployment ended? >> i don't think there was ever

more than five at that post, sir. >> in tripoli? >> i'm sorry, in benghazi. >> i'm talking about that the ambassador would have had access to. because you and i agree the number that he had access to was reduced, despite the fact that he asked for me. >> the military team, the sst team deported -- additional agents were put into post. >> what i want you to find out for me is this. this say presidentially appointed ambassador who made a pretty plaintiff pleading. i will quote it to you. our efforts to normalize security operations have been hindered by a lock of security -- host nation security support, an increase in violence and neither compound meets osbp standards. do you know who said that? >> from your context, i would think it was the ambassador. >> it was the ambassador himself in what i would describe as a

pretty plaintiff pleading for some help. this is the response he got. no, i do not -- not want them to ask for the team to stay. do you know who said that to the ambassador, the presidentially appointed senate confirmed ambassador? >> i believe it was referring to the sst and that might have been ambassador kennedy. >> it could have been. but it was actually charlene lamb. she is not and has not been and is not likely to ever be the secretary of state for this country. so when i see her responding to a presidentially appointed senate confirmed ambassador who is making a pretty plaintiff pleading for some extra help and she says do not not make that request, i want to know whether the ambassador had the ability to go above her head and go

straight to the top. and if not, why not? >> the ambassador certainly did have the ability to go over her head. sir, i do think that the one point that must be discussed is that there was quite a bit of discussion about relieving the sst, the military team that was there and only provided static security at the compound with additional diplomatic security agents who could provide static security and mobile security. i think that was why the decision was made to release the sst. we were replacing it with personnel that actually had more capabilities. >> well, my time is up. but sometimes when everyone is to blame, no one is to blame. and part of the frustration that i believe was so eloquently remarked on was the designation of the facility itself and then

you have our heretofore failure to understand what policy would have been so important -- you testified that we have how many unpersoned posts right now? five? did i hear you correctly, five? you were going through a series of numbers. you said five of those you can discard because they are actually -- there's no one there? >> correct. >> so we do close facility sies? >> yes, sir. >> i'm assuming someone did the weighing and balancing on those five and decided through the miracles of technology or whatever, we don't have to have a physical presence there. you can understand why we would like to know what weighing and balancing went on with respect to libya. and i want to know who saw these requests for extra equipment and personnel, who denied them and whether or not you believe in -- you believe there is a culture

in the state department where there would be any consequences for following the dissent channel? because some companies do say, sure, i have an open door policy, but sometimes when you walk through that open door, your career takes a hit. with that, i want to thank the ranking member and all the other members, thank both of you. you and i can get together pry have a vatly. you discuss a reasonable timetable for getting answers to the questions. with that, the members would have five additional days to put whatever they want, any questions in the record. thank both of you for your time. in your case, twice, if you would convey to the women and men who work for the state department how grateful all of us, irrespective of politics are for their service. with that, we would be adjourned.