the time of deploying large ground forces with big military footprints to engage in nation-building overseas, that's coming to an end. and going forward, our military will be leaner. but as your commander-in-chief, i'm going to make sure we keep you ready for the range of missions that we ask of you. we are going to keep you the best-trained, the best-led, the best-equipped military in the history of the world because the world will still be calling. and that's why it was so important that folks in congress, democrats and republicans, came together and passed legislation that i'm

going to sign to keep our government open and funded for the coming year. and that includes military operations, the support and commissaries that your families depend on, a pay raise for you, health care for our wounded warriors and our veterans. [applause] you've always been there for us. we've got to be there for you. and let me make one other point. at this time of transition, i know some of you will be returning to civilian life. i was talking about this with the two generals that i rode over with. we want to make sure you can enjoy the american dream that you helped to defend. so we'll keep helping you with the transition assistance and the credentialing and the licensing to help find civilian jobs worthy of your incredible talents. we're going to keep funding the post-9/11 gi bill, and keep working with colleges and

universities to help you and your families realize your dream of a higher education. and as many of you know, michelle, the first lady, vice president's wife, jill biden; everybody at joining forces, we're all going to be saying to every company in america, if you want somebody who's going to get the job done, hire a military spouse. hire a veteran. that's the difference you can make here at home. because that's also american leadership, the jobs and the opportunity, and the country that we can build together as one american team. you understand that. you've trained for it. and when you get in the job, that's what you deliver every single time. so i want to leave you with a story of somebody who has a special understanding of the american spirit. i just met them before i came out here, but before i came out,

yeoman carrie chavez and staff sergeant ashley montgomery, they did the pledge of allegiance and sang our national anthem, and i had a chance to take a picture with them out back. and i asked them where they're from, and they're from jersey, of course. and, in fact, ashley said that her dad had served at this facility 30 years earlier. so i asked her, had she ever left the base -- [laughter] and she said, yes, she had been deployed at four other bases. but that's one example of american service, a generation passing the baton to the next generation; entire families who have served our country nobly, dating back in some cases over a century. but then there's another part of

the american story. there's another young man i met. his name is nelson rieu, and nelson is here today. wave, nelson. there's nelson. now, the reason i want to tell nelson's story is because, unlike ashley, nelson wasn't born here on base, he wasn't born in jersey. he was born in the republic of congo. and when his country slipped into civil war, he and his mother became refugees. and that was a terrible civil war, over a million people died in that civil war. that was a hard life. when he was 20 years old, he and his mom got some incredible news, the best thing that's ever happened to me, he says. he had the chance to come to america. so they land in los angeles, and

nelson said it was like being in a movie, all these glistening buildings and freeways. and they settled in arizona. and nelson barely spoke a word of english. so he took high school classes, english, american history. he earned his high school diploma. and then he signed up to serve a country that wasn't even yet fully his own. he raised his hand, took the oath, joined the united states air force. and then, this past fourth of july, he put on his uniform, he raised his hand again, and he took another oath to become a citizen of the united states. the fourth of july, he says, is my new american birthday. and today, airman first class nelson rieu is an engineering apprentice here on base, helping to keep his fellow airmen safe. and at 24 years old, he dreams of someday joining the special forces.

and he says, freedom is the reason why i am in this country and why i wanted to be part of those who sustain that freedom. it's a great feeling to know you're the backbone of the greatest nation on earth. so you think about that. you've got folks whose dads were born on, or who were born on base and who served going back generations. but then you've got new americans with that same patriotism, that same sense of what we're about as americans, that same creed that we can all pledge allegiance to, regardless of what we look like or where we come from. we're fighting on the same team for the same values and the same ideals.

so thank you for your patriotism, nelson. [applause] and that's one of the things that makes america exceptional, and what makes our military the absolute best in the world. it's not just your training, or your equipment, or your technology, although all that's important. what makes us special, what makes us the best is all of you. it's your character and your willingness to say, send me. your dedication to duty, and your courage, and your readiness to defend our values and our ideals of freedom and liberty, not just for us, but for people all around the world. you are the backbone of the greatest nation on earth, and you always will be that. and for that, america is eternally grateful, and i am incredibly proud to serve as your commander-in-chief.

so, happy holidays, everybody. god bless you. god bless your families. god bless our armed forces. god bless the united states of america. thank you. [cheers and applause] ♪ ♪ ♪ ♪

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>> today british foreign minister david cameron appears before the british house of commons to discuss the uk's climate change priorities and efforts to combat extremism. live coverage at 11 a.m. eastern on c-span. >> today, a discussion on the ebola outbreak and research to create a vaccine. dr. anthony fauci will take part in the event live 3 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> monday, donald trump spoke at the economic club of washington, d.c. about the trump brand entrance into the d.c. business community. he also discussed the potential for a presidential run in 2016. you can see the entire event

anytime on our website the c-span.org. here's a look at a portion of his remarks. >> are you considering to be getting into politics as a candidate running for president or you're not sure yet? >> i've been building buildings all my life. we have done a great job as you understand. one thing about david, if he didn't think we didn't do a good job i wouldn't here tonight. i am considering it very strongly. a lot of people think i have fun with it, that i'm playing games, that enjoy the process. i do enjoy the process to a certain extent that the country is in serious trouble. we just as you know, we just brooke $18 trillion in debt, largely indifferent places like china and others. we are in very, very serious trouble so am considering it very strongly. >> when you think you might make a decision? >> sometime after the beginning of the year. copy sometime in march, april or

may. >> c-span2, providing live coverage of use senate floor proceedings, and every week and booktv now for 15 years the only television network devoted to nonfiction books and authors. c-span to created by the cable tv industry and brought to you as a public service by your local cable or satellite provider. watch us in hd, like us on facebook and follow was on twitter. >> the cato institute hosted a conference on surveillance, national security issues and civil liberties. next, a discussion on the power of law enforcement and domestic surveillance. it is one hour 20 minutes. >> welcome back. thank you again and welcome to our c-span audience who are joining us now on the inaugural cato institute surveillance conference. as a program note, unfortunately jack gillum was stranded in vermont.

he won't be joining us and chris soghoian will join us. the second panel though of course when we talk about surveillance, nsa and intelligence surveillance, are often foremost in our minds. the technology they use and the ideology of large scale collections and data mining are finding their way to your local police department as well, in a way you're more likely to be surveilled by your local police department and by nsa probably. so it's important not to keep focused on the sexiest and glitziest form of surveillance, but also the small but persistent surveillance that is happening at the local level. to discuss the important topic i'm very pleased that we have

jack gillum of the associate press who certainly know something about being domestically surveilled. thank you. >> hi, good morning. can anyone hear me okay? i'm supremely awkward at the eventual apology. of jack gillum of the ap. for the last year and a nap i've covered technological surveillance, particularly how government uses that surveillance even to setting up a fake social network in cuba using the u.s. agency for certainly. the last panel talked about portugal. this time this is something really hits home and that's what's happened in the china, not just with surveillance but with what local police department to do with that data. just the other week i think was an eric garner protest in chicago there were people tweeting an emergency measure vehicle in chicago that are driven by that miraculous started disrupting peoples cell

phones and there's wide speculation this was a sting ray device that gathers data on those devices in the area. whether or not the city of chicago would be transparent and what they're doing with information is interesting. i wanted to introduce the panel, chris soghoian, technologist at the american civil liberties union is running a little late. when he arrives we will get right into it but i wanted to introduce some folks are going to read i don't screw up anybody's job title. to my left is harley geithner. is the advocacy director and senior counsel for the center for democracy and to don't you. to my right, pat eddington, a policy analyst for homeland security and civil liberties here at cato institute. my far right orin kerr, a law professor at george washington university. so i would like, we will have a free discussion. we will leave about 20 minutes for questions just because i'm sure there's a lot of interest in this and these are fine

experts who i'm sure would be, would love to answer those questions. i'd like to start out with asking, need we can start with orin. this idea that we are, this paradoxical idea where in both a surveillance society, the nsa or domestic law enforcement were scooped up what they can with or without a warrant. that juxtaposed with hi this ida of going dark. if you must go the fbi director has pointed out for cases, and we will get to that, saying using cell phone encryption, encrypting a device is really going to be damaging for law enforcement. i'm just curious if we can start out by framing it that way, about how these perceptions and even the technologies are fueling these dichotomy perceptions. >> i think the two perceptions can be true at the same time. what we are seeing is a shift from a world in which the government would traditionally collect physical evidence. eyewitness testimony. instead they're collecting

digital evidence, that means the data that is out there and sometimes a conflict a lot of data that is not that helpful and they might want to do that anyway. sometimes they can't collect the data that they really need to build a criminal case. so you can have on one hand, the government is not able to solve the cases they used to, maybe get data. so we are seeing a real shift. some cases, some investigations are likely to be successful more than before, others less more than before. an example, the computer hacking statute, computer fraud and abuse act, that's the law that regulates all computer hacking into united states. if you go online, you are aware there is a lot of computer hacking that goes on. how many criminal cases does the united states bring every year for computer hacking or unauthorized access? the number is remarkably low, about 70 or 80 cases a year and has been for about 20 years. that's because these cases are

difficult to investigate from the fbi's perspective. they just can't find the people who are behind these attacks. are difficult to attribute. so from their perspective they say the internet has made it much harder to do our job. going dark technologically is tougher. and yet there are other ways in which there's much more data if it will in other cases. i think we're seeing a shift in trying to work out which of thesthese narratives is true but they can both be true at the same time. >> what i think is really interesting, and this kind of goes to what's happened with respect to the snowden revelation, in addition to these other things that orin has referred to is what i refer to as a digital resistance movement, right? so this comes in the forms of things like secure messaging applications, nsa take notes. you have things like wicker. your clinics that are being put on to teach the public how to

engage in encryption can using encryption, things of that nature. we've seen a real rise in this. that's also been concrete with public polling that shows folks are actually changing their behaviors because the surveillance activities. they're not necessarily going to websites that they would otherwise have gone to. cannot mess wit miss the associh people at the other was an associate with. i think it's important to understand in this case or not talk about people who been charged with any crime, either those or think about writing about something or engaging with somebody or the individual to pretend to think about trying to engage in a dialogue with. when i hear folks talk about a lack of real harm or nsa surveillance is essentially benign. americans are not targeted. but even if you take it on face value, just act of government surveillance itself is having a chilling effect on our society. i think we need to have a much more robust dialogue about that.

>> we think about government surveillance which, of course, talk about the nsa, and there's a lot that local and state and federal law enforcement doing, particularly fbi. i curious if you speak to some of these acts like wickr, these apps that are becoming, they are becoming mainstream and this pushed the tech companies like apple is encrypted. arbiters of the evolution of the public policy were even my mother now who doesn't know anything, hardly follows the news, knows that barack obama might be sniffing or any of their countries to see a tech companies has been responding to this spin your original question you asked about the perceptions of going dark versus the society come anything they feed on each other. fbi is complaint we're going dark in part because of the things you just mentioned, encrypted operating systems and secure messaging systems are they think of themselves as living in a surveillance society

and the going dark because the government didn't take some more and more intrusive surveillance. in the absence of reform i don't think this is going to be a helpful cycle for anybody involved. >> if i may, and this gets to the issue ultimately of trusting governmental institutions, right? that's why we are seeing a century this explosion of this kind of technology is that folks increasing we don't trust the federal government. with respect to their personal privacy, data and all the rest of these things. i agree with hardly. it's a cycle that needs to be broken into what it's going to be broken is when folks on the government's id just and they need the ultimate hard to shut high standard when it comes to these innovations. spent what computer do right now is inappropriate response in the absence of any real reform. so thus far congress has done virtually nothing, virtually nothing to rein in what we know from the stoughton disclosures which shocked the entire world,

and in the absence of a reform companies and individual are taking matters into their own hands and encrypting and securing their data. we think that is a great response. >> if there were reforms would you tell people to stop encrypting their data? >> we would not tell people to stop but i think there would be less urgency felt by both consumers and businesses to encrypt the data to the degree they are right now. we have seen an explosion in secure apps, secure system since the snowden disclosed has become a lot more popular. because there is the realization now that we are under mass surveillance. >> i would also make the point that a lot of the services that are out there, i avail myself of a virtual private network in order to help kind of hide myself from hackers essentially. and try to protect my data that way. even if we managed to get the governments surveillance

programs can go back in the box where they belong, they'll still be in the i think, an increased need in fact for these kinds of technologies just to protect us from other malicious actors. >> i think that's important point to make in the whole going dark debate, which is in our view, use of strong encryption will make, it will cost and difficulty for law enforcement to get data. overall it will increase this could of regular users beyond just those were already security conscience. it will help protect them against cyber criminals, phone thieves, et cetera. so overall we think it is a net good for society. >> when the fbi director in october brought up for examples of gender the ap, to put it politely at best were dubious in terms of these examples in which law enforcement really needed encryption is going to hurt them, there is the issue of 20 years ago to even now people don't have an iphone, if they don't have web app, the using

messages and they're in the clear, storing cell provider, one investigator i talk to about an investigation has said it was because of those sms messages were able to get off of the phone that they were able to force through a plea deal. notwithstanding any other special circumstances your i really just and interested in fairness say if we entered this world for everybody uses an iphone, uses i am message which is encrypted device to device, what does that mean for law and do they just go back to the era when security before reagan had cell phones? how does that affect the investigative powers that they have? >> i mean, it cuts them back into the question is how does law enforcement respond? i look at these issues like a game of whack-a-mole and since you said will have more privacy are but the it's not like the government is going to say okay,

then we will stop investigating those cases. they're going to try to come up with ways of getting warrants to instead of accessing the device, access the device was connected to a device they will try to come up with ways to get them. it's a cat and mouse game which is a dynamic, not static. we can never say this is now done. its agenda going to be in the public interest for certain amount of criminal activity to be able to be investigated and salt. we would not want a world where you can commit crimes and they basically can't be investigated. that would be bad. there needs to be some legitimate role of law enforcement and the question i think is sort of looking for technologically what is that will going to be. >> do you think, i know there's this talk of the golden key which in the cryptographer would say, that goes back to the era of clipper chip. but what does that look like?

isn't a backdoor? is a forcing someone to turn over the password so they can get access to the phone? i'm just curious how we also protect people, as harley says, they want their data secure and they wanted to encrypted. what is that balanced? >> i would imagine stiffer penalties for refusing to decrypt one's own device, there would be a certain amount of privilege for the most part in cases with known to be a person's own phone. i think you will get, it will be harder for the comment to access the device without the person's help and then the law will probably come in and add extra pressure to put the person to help not voluntarily but involuntarily, facing criminal punishment if they do do do. something like that is probably where we're going. >> so you think as opposed to the golden key? >> a better approach spent the golden key idea is awful from

both a business and security standpoint. i mean, if there is, when was the golden key we are taught but a backdoor access into encrypted products and services which can be exploited by other governments, possibly by cybercriminals. somebody backdoor access, will be very good, very sound device. companies that resources perhaps and less likely to be exploited by hackers. if it's a mandate which has been discussed on offices as we will see small businesses, startups trying to build this thing and go be a variety of different holding keys and backdoor for different service. it will put people in a vulnerable position. not just with regard to hackers but also foreign covers that can exploit the same backdoor as well spit holding on what harley said, the of the problem i think i have with any kind of backdoor, and those of you who are privileged enough to see congressman thomas matthew of kentucky give a very, very eloquent explanation of this this morning will know that what

we are talking to you when the government wants to try to mandate these so called back doors into electronic devices is something that represents an absolute mortal threat, not just to the privacy and individual liberties of americans, but to the tech sector of the united states. we've begun to see more than ample evidence of orders here with american companies that were going to be going over to europe and making money there or in asia and elsewhere in the canceled. this will have a snowball effect. it comes down to both an issue of individual liberty and privacy but is also an economic issue and the jobs issue for folks here. that's what the nsa and others are trying to do i would reference "the intercept" stored result of the so-called aurora gold program we are trying to basically dig into every cellphone network in the entire world. that is a prescription ultimately to see the american tech sector collapse if the government does not get in here and prevent nsa from going

overboard in that respect spent trying to sell asia and nsa ready phone. >> there you go. >> the golden key or an attraction backward is a third way of course, compelling someone to give the government a password. curious really from a legal perspective, what does caselaw stand on, hypothetically, fourth amendment free zone and the government or police officer, whoever says you need to get me this password to unlock this device. what rights do i have? >> it depends on the circumstances. the legal issue here is really whether being forced to decrypt, whether forced to enter in your own code, forcing yourself, forcing the person to testify about something. what they implicitly saying and whether they're saying something that is known or not don't already. if it's someone's cell phone and it's good it is their phone, you

call i the number, it rings from that phone and what a load call a foregone conclusion that they in fact possess the in fact possess the comfort in those circumstances there should not be a fifth amendment privilege that blocks the government from ordering the person to enter into passcode. on the other hand, if it's a laptop computer that is using true crypt and is not clear if there's any encrypted data on the computer, telling the person, give me your decrypt the data which may be on this laptop. that would trigger fifth amendment that is because it's not know whether there is, in fact, any decrypt the data that is ultimately hidden by true crypt it depends on the circumstances. as with most legal pitching questions, gets messy. >> when we talk about, we got into the encryption route, this is not cannot talk about these issues in the abstract but these are very real issues. if a consumer, someone's to password protect a, then want to encrypt their data at rest

whether it's anywhere else in the cloud, the our real-world consequences. julian mentioned the ap know something about being surveilled. my colleagues, work on a struggle for akin to the ap which led to the justice department subpoenaing their phone records. this is a real threat to one or i could personally say that even though my phone records were not subpoenaed and this was used to at the ap, i still have problems sometimes with sources who point to that instance and go, no way, thanks. we will get a beer another day. i'm just curious we can talk and maybe harley, start with you, these real-world implications of why this encryption, ma why people want encryption, why they want to be protected from the government and what their options are for them out there. >> i think people don't know how the information will be used against them both now and in the

future. it makes people that could be, whose actions could be construed in a negative or even possibly criminal or shameful light very cautious about taking certain actions, whether that's talking through a borders or even looking things up on the internet in order to educate themselves. there was a study about internet search terms has changed since the stoughton disclosures but i think this has a real chilling effect on the actions of people do, freedom of as well as attachment that's aside from the very large business applications as well. >> it's tricky because in any particular case you have to be careful of distinguishing between a chilling effect caused by and with what the government is doing and a chilling effect caused by fear of what the government may be doing that may or may not be true or a chilling effect that is not direct

related to the kind of surveillance the government is doing. an example might be section 215 which is collecting the two from information involving phone calls that are placed by people across the united states. that's not something that encryption can solve because it should the numbers top of the phone and can't b encrypted because it has to go to the phone company. to the extent people say the nsa is watching you, i'm going to use encryption to stop the. that won't interview with a particular kind of program. it's part of the reason perhaps nsa wants that program is encryption can't be used against the. but it is i think a difficult question. we ran into this and going back to the debate over the patriot act where there were some aspects of the patriot act which were narrow and other parts of a broader but some of the narrower provisions were reported incorrectly as being very broad. a lot of people were worried about surveillance in the patriot act based on what was misreporting of a law was doing.

he said the patriot act has a chilling effect. isn't from the misreporting aspect of it quits is it with the come is a doing? it's hard to tease it out. but it's a hard cause and effect question spent i'm glad he brought up the patriot act because i would like to throw a generalized question of there. which is, why was the patriot act passed? >> 9/11. >> right. so the basic frame that the government has presented over the course of the last 13 years is basically this. we had to pass things like the patriot act and fisa amendments act and surveillance authority because we just didn't collect enough data in the google to uncover the plot and get the bad guys. that's one of the biggest lies, and i use that, to come out of

the post-9/11 era. 9/11 happened for one reason and one reason only, and that's because federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies failed to do their job of utilizing the information they had at their disposal, which was more than enough actually to uncover these plots and prevent them from happening. that's not simply my opinion. that's the opinion of the 2002 congressional joint inquiry and, of course, the central point of the entire 9/11 commission inquiry itself. so that's what i keep coming back to when i talk about surveillance issues generally, whether we speak about the foreign aspect of this, the domestic aspect of this which in a globalized communication age is almost a meaningless extinction -- distinction after congress passed laws to address the nonexistent problem. it's not like that hasn't happened before, but it's had an incredibly distorting effect on our society. that's why i think we need to go back and put it this is where he really needs to be, which is on

forcing the government to do its job with the available data. they did need 215 of 40 and the patriot act but they didn't need any of the patriot act, in fact if you go and do as i did when i worked on capitol hill and also when harley was there, i went in october of last you, i went to the cbo, congressional research service and government accountable in office which are the three support agencies for congress and asked a very simple question. can you point me to any public evidence, particularly evidence offered by a federal agency or federal official, to indicate that any of the 182 provisions in the patriot act have thwarted any terrorist plot against the united states? and answers i got back were no, no. and no. if you step back and think about it, that makes perfect sense. because it wasn't a lack of information collection that was the problem. it was the analysis and the dissemination of it that was the

problem. we know those problems are still with us because we saw it in the infamous underwear bomber case and we saw just last year with the boston marathon bombing case because of the problems that our government should be focused on and that's another reason why we need to roll back the surveillance laws in order to get the focus on the right problem. >> but the pushback on that a little bit because i think there's a difference, difference to about what was in the patriot act. i think it's wrong, the patriot act is some sort of big, scary thing with bad things in their animus have been bad and it's been a good or. i think it's helpful to go through what was in the patriot act and let the approach to with a story. around 1999-2000 i was in the justice department in the computer crime and intellectual property section and i was part of a group of career lawyers. we were cast, coming up with a high-tech crime bill, ways of improving the surveillance laws which were out of date, a lot of the language was total specific.

it wasn't clear if privacy protections apply to the internet. general updating of the lost due to be done. nothing that was designed to shut the level of government power but good government updating the laws kind of thing. it was understood i left the justice department some of 2001 and interstate with those somewhat difficult to get past because of the controversial to the members of folks who taken a look at it but that was the status of things. 9/11 hits and a few days later the antiterrorism bill comes out, and good enough. much of, some of the electronic surveillance parts of the antiterrorism bill are actually this high-tech crime bill, which is not about terrorism but it was also not about expanding government power. it was sort of improving their surveillance laws generally. i think what happened was this got packaged as the patriot act the if you look at what ashcroft was a.

you assessing this was some dramatic expansion of government power. using it was sort of improving the surveillance laws, already more modest claims. but it's in the public mind took off as this dramatic expansion of the law when actually it's true, it was not about terrorism but it was also not an expansion of government power in most of the provision. trying to figure out what unit of the patriot act. do you accept that it was sold as an expansion of government power and say was that necessary? orgy look at it sort of piece by piece and said was this i a good idea or was that a good idea? i think you end up with a different narrative. one except one part which will is an important story is section 215 power which was on its face and narrow, i'm objectionable authority. basically a subpoena power for national security cases, was interpreted in secret by the surveillance court to allow the

telepathy medicaid program which i find extremely unpersuasive interpretation of the statute. the modest power was interpreted to be very broad, and for that i think the who do you blame question to my mind, we blame the foreign intelligence surveillance court judges that accepted this interpretation, more than we blame the drafters of the statutes that on its face is much narrower. >> i was about to call section two taking some pledge he did. that is a huge expansion and the extreme secrecy surrounding its interpretation leads many people to i think reasonably wonder what other provisions of the patriot act are being construed in a very broad way as an expansion of government power. >> it's important to member during the debate over the authorization for use of military force to go into afghanistan in 2001, then sent majority leader tom daschle was pressured by the white house to

include language that would allow for the ward was surveillance of americans here at home. he refused to do that and the administration's response was to set up the illegal program on the backside. to me it gets back to what orin was saying to another part of the problem here is a fairly overall congressional oversight to pushback aggressively against these kinds of things and probe them aggressively to prevent this kind of abuse and access power spent i know it's going to sound a little odd for someone from aclu to defend the patriot act and but there's actually a provision in there that we like very much which is protect the rights of copies of want to build encryptions into the product. bringing this back to where it was before, companies are actually permitted right now by law to build encryptions into the products and encryption of which they don't hav have a keyd they don't have way too surveil.

i think is really, really smart of cars to put that in. sorry, it wasn't the patriot act. this was in toledo. but congress has placed this in a law that many of us think is really bad surveillance law, indications systems, congress has the foresight to predict the present afford to protect our rights. none of us build encryption technology ourselves. congress decided that encryption was important, that encryption with keys that episode was invisible and decide to put that text right in the statute. and i think we have to recognize that encryption is there, and strong encryption is protected by law and law enforcement basically has to deal with it. so take a little bit of arm-wrestling for the government to get what they want right now. a few angry speeches is going to get exactly what they want. they're going to need to change the law if they want to be able

to force the coverage to get rid of this. >> i want to talk about changing laws for a minute. speaking of -- even judicial holdings like smith v. maryland, 30, 40 years old and idea of updating these laws to be part of the drop box, i guess i could start with kris sort of where we are in the landscape of the patriot act just in terms of ecpa. what's the hindrance? >> the situation right now is civil society advocates with frequent like to say congress has updated privacy laws in 20 years. we of the 1996 electronic privacy act. that congress has given law enforcement any new surveillance power companies in the newest to do with these new technologies. what that ends up happening is that as these new technologies

come up, the government has to try and fit the new technologies into the old authorities. we have the government using devices like stingrays which of these highly sophisticated cell phone tracking device that a person in the soap collect information about hundreds or thousands or tens of thousands of innocent people. they look to the authorities they have and they said is this more like a pen register we got in title iii? is a more like a white cap, or is it nothing? they've taken all three of those positions at various points. if one for someone to hack into someone's computer they say, do we use a pen register for this quick to use a wiretap? to use the search warrants? and they didn't table triggers authorities but congress has not given the government explicit legislative authority to hack, to spy on cell phones, to do many of the most advanced surveillance technologies argues the most advanced surveillance technology to our table.

law enforcemeenforceme nt is using the existing authority without telling congress go without telling the american people and without going to the courts. to be clear i'm not saying congress should get the government the authority to hack. what i'm saying is they are sneaking these techniques into use because they have never been given an explicit authority. >> it's not just congress either. you talked about stingrays. stingray, license plate readers, what local and state law enforcement is doing and we get a transfers and will have a panel about that after lunch period how state governments are grappling with this. i think was in maryland where an investor was asked about it, either a stingray got a decent that's classified which led reminded there is a classification scheme under maryland statute. >> that was a legislative hearing. at a court hearing recent police officer told a baltimore judge he couldn't talk about the stingray technology because they

had a non-disclosure with the government and the judge had given have a nondisclosure agreement with me. the judge actually threaten to hold him in contempt. i think what you are so getting out there is, i think many people when we saw this, really, really shocking images from ferguson and we saw these bearcats and heavily armored law enforcement agencies, we are thinking holy smokes, like these are military weapons that have trickled down to state and local law enforcement agencies to many of us are terrified because there are technologies that are appropriate for the battlefield that are not appropriate for small town america. that it's not just weapons that have trickled down to dhs and doj. it's surveillance technology as well. the only difference is the bearcats looks terrifying on tv and the stingray looks like a piece of pipeline it will be. the same programs funding armor personal cares and small town

america are also finding surveillance technology. it's something not appropriate for local law enforcement to have intelligence community grade surveillance technology because these devices do not respect the privacy of innocent americans but maybe that's okay when they're being used and the battlefield but right now we have overly indexes are is technology that are trickling down to state and local law enforcement agencies. it's not happening sufficient judicial oversight. it's not happening with legislative oversight. legislative bodies are not passing laws we are only find out about it because the police screw up in one place or the invoice for surveillance device shows up on a web or check files for you and gets information to this is not how we're doing oversight and defense. this is what's happening right now in america today. >> i think people talk about chilling effects and ask about the harms that associate with surveillance and happening right now. in some sense i think it's a

question i don't want to diminish the very real harms of chilling effects. i think it's very much, it's important to also protect the future was argument could be like. we so we don't know. we also don't know where technology is going to be in a generation or two. we are seeing it become much more interested we're just going to be floating metadata in 20, 30 years to if the laws are not crafted in such a way, if it's not built in such way that we actually have some protection against the use of that metadata, the collection of it and abuses of very, very introduces surveillance technology, we will not have privacy. the chilling effect we see that will be augmented to a shattering degree. >> the point of transparency go back to the baltimore case, didn't the prosecutor in the case rather have the police testified? >> in that case i think the judge tossed the evidence.

but we know of several other cases where prosecutors have basically dropped the case or got really, really good deals with defense counsel to avoid technology to be litigated. to harley's point, all the encryption in the world isn't going to stop the collection integration of metadata. even with encrypted of voice calls, encrypted text messages, there's did edward. companies are collecting it by default the big data tools have been collected, those tools are than trickling down to state and local law enforcement agencies via these in fusion centers and other efforts. the government is going, has this huge amount but to only have more. so domestic surveillance in five years or 10 years will be only aided by the availability of metadata. >> i think we should member as we talk about essential of these

electronic surveillance technologies, there are other technologies that are being developed and are currently employed that also raise a lot of issues, biometric related technology to these are extremely scary. some of the other technologies that the transportation skid administration has over the years, those of the trouble, the misfortune of being subjected to additional screenings and things of that nature, machines in question, some of these machines, the x-ray machines, extremely invasive and also potentially a health threat. we were fortunate enough that congressman holt and congressman shays it's were able to get those machines out of tsa and out of these airports. tsa is working on still more technology will be in this arena. that's another area that think we'll have to increase and spend some time on trying to legislate. >> let me make an unknowing lawyer comment, which is, you know, normally what happens in

terms of the process of lawmaking is in the area of surveillance, government investigations is we have the government gets some new tool, technological tool, and maybe under fire laws requires a war, maybe it doesn't require a board with some sort of course order, the government uses the tool either pursuant to the court order or not, and then some sort of motion come in a criminal case the tool is introduced, the evidence from the tools introduced. there's a motion to suppress saying this was unlawfully used and then there's some court opinion saying yes, this is lawful use or unlawfully used. the press gets involved, and starts reporting on the use of the technique and did you get some to the public reaction to it, either the boxes we are comfortable with it or we are not comfortable with the. we want some sort of regulation. the court gets involved the legislature's get info. that's the traditional pattern. what i think we're seeing is consistent with that traditional

pattern. wiretapping devices in the '60s which led to a lot of legislation and fourth amendment or pen register device in the semis which led to the supreme court decision and the statue to this is the normal pattern of things. i'm not saying don't worry, there's nothing to worry about. no, we should worry but we should recognize that known what happens is the law stepped in apparently late in the game, even for example, ecpa, that was a really early example of regulation and sort of the cycle of the technology in the sense that congress was regulating internet privacy back before most people were familiar with the internet or have even heard of e-mail. 1986 was early in the lifecycle of technology, but this is kind of the traditional pattern. and so from a public standpoint i think what we should be doing is looking for these new technologies try to understand what they are.

and in the case of stingray technology, i think 1983 action brought against the officers that are using the technology. this is a great area for state aclu to step in, bring civil cases, especially to the pentagon is dropping in the cases that may involve technology. wanting to file a motion to suppress that then gets decided by an appellate court. civil cases brought to technologies that lead to cases on how the fourth amendment applies to these statutes, to the technology or a statutes apply to these technologies would be really helpful in furthering the process along. >> and there's a piece of the store you're missing out, whether it applies to stingray's recent wiretaps. for the first 10 years of wiretapping history in this country, wiretaps are first put into use about 1895 in new york. it took about 10 years for the public to even warn they existed and that was because the police

did everything in the power to keep the public in the dark about the ability of this tool because they argued if people know, they won't say things we want to get on the phones. ..

there have been a couple incidents in the last 20 years when judges ask the right question and this isn't a regular pen register. but judges news to ask, as they thought they were getting the same borders they had been getting for 40 years which is

goes to the phone company and get records and outgoing calls so that secrecy corrodes the democratic process. >> with respect to stingray devices and how they are employed if they use evidence from those in a case and engage in parallel construction or something else to hide the technology being used -- >> in florida we have seen the u.s. marshals service advising local law enforcement agencies when referring to information derived from stingrays, the information is from a confidential source or informant, i am not a lawyer but that seems pretty suspicious, that is the kind of behavior we don't want officers engaging in but what we do see time and time again are organized efforts by federal and state law-enforcement agencies and manufacturers keep everything about them out of the public eye and that is a problem. >>