journalist's point of view is not just federal although you do see the obama administration in arizona quietly sec it is the state public records issued, under state public records, chicago and other police departments come back and go denied, denied or -- redacted. and the entire page is black photocopy. on a similar vein, how the public is impressed with that first amendment to get at this when that transparency, whether it is a judge in baltimore -- or state legislature to stay you need to turn this over, curious how we are supposed to know this? that transparency doesn't exist. >> i want to make the comment,

your recommendation focused on cases and bringing civil actions, as that is beyond the expertise and financial means of most people and it should not be understated the importance of actually contacting the government yourself, not just the federal government but local and state as well. that is something everyone can do. i am not talking in 3 tweets because they are not reading or tweets or news articles, that is not activism. actually organizing among yourselves, this audience, they need to you, not just the people in this room the people watching on c-span. it is the only thing that will work is if everyone is charming in about it and it is not just about degrees. >> back to what we were suggesting before, the encryption. imagine hypothetically that the fbi developer buys some technology that allows them to intercept and decrypt. doesn't matter how this would work. that technology will be really

useful, so useful, even more useful because there are people saying things they would never have said because they think it is encrypted. that technology will be so useful those agencies will do everything they can to keep as close as possible. what we will encounter over and over again with every new law enforcement message is they will do everything in their power to keep that technology a secret because they will say if we discuss this in court it won't work anymore. what do we as a society do when the sources and methods must be kept secret from us and particularly what do we do when the techniques don't just invaded the privacy of the one person being targeted but like a stingray with tens or hundreds of thousands of people when they are thrown on an airplane over us city? the average person is never

going to learn airplanes flying over their house with devices on board with information on their phone, they will never be told. were it not for one reporter working for the wall street journal we would have never learned that program existed. >> i am curious going forward on where we stand with this. very recently with rightly versus california, the court was unanimous in its holding about the idea and they're very blunt in their language that the police want to search a phone, get a warrant. this is very clear with general regard to searches or the id of the police, i'm curious going forward. most of the lawyers up here but not necessarily limited to that where we're going to go in the next 10 or 20 years. what is our society going to look like in 20 years? the technology and amata data and the protections that if

congress doesn't act with the patriot act or the judiciary? >> a great question. will be a while as we saw in o'reilly versus calif.. the supreme court surprisingly ruling not only is this a bit of a surprise based on prior lot but warrant was required and they did so unanimously and we have lower courts intervene challenges intersection 215 trying to figure out whether smith vs. maryland is viable or narrowed in some way going forward, that is not clear but the supreme court in the next few years, cheeses yesterday, the fourth circuit heard a case on oral arguments in a case weather multi data is protected under the fourth amendment, there's a split on the part of the supreme court, it is protected, these are all issues in the supreme court. in general the justices tend to

be relatively sensitive to how technology changes privacy. if you look back to 2000, and of thermal imaging case, jones versus the united states in 2012 and riley versus california this year, those are all cases where if you look at the case law, the president, you assume the government would win and these are all three cases back to government loss in jones and riley they lost unanimously. they are attuned to these concerns so we are seeing fourth amendment law evolve and if we had a functioning congress you would see the congress active but the statutory picture here caught up on the broader dysfunction of congress. we see more action at the state legislature saw one example would be license plate readers, 12 or 13 in the last few years

enacted some regulation of data collected, and if our government collecting all the data what are they doing with it? how long that the keeping it. these are important questions that should be asked, the legal system is responding in its slow and cumbersome way what is happening and it is delayed. >> cumbersome and very mysterious sort of way. the jones opinion to me was a win but very murky and does not offer a clear direction. they will avoid the use third-party doctor and reasonable expectation of privacy only so long. and it is supposed to protect from unreasonable sources and seizures. drawing the line in court is

going to be very tricky. one of the big problems with courts is the rulings are very narrow. it is a great example of that ruling on the narrowest ground possible, putting the tracking device on the car, that was it and could have been much more broad with that. it is hard to tell the these issues are going to come more and more to the fore and they have to grapple with them and begging congress to do something. >> interesting you bring up the reilly case. i was reading all the briefs as they were filed and that the last stage the point at which no one could respond the government raised the issue that all encryption is a future threat and we don't have time to get a warrant. if someone is encrypted the moment they talk about that, as that is what we need to go to

the phones. it is all -- the court did not a too much attention to that but a year later, apple has a big change. had apple and google announce their changes before it rises it is a little different. the decision we got the supreme court made the door open to accidental searches without a warrant when technology made it necessary. threats like encryption. the court did not spend a lot of time is there, there are existing exceptions and they will apply on a case by case basis. i am interested in hearing -- my fear is what we will get with the availability technology and the devices are being built to be more secure and we will find

ourselves in a world where law enforcement agencies are sitting waiting to pounce and the moment they see the target to make a caller erase e-mail's they will jump on them and grab them and pushed them to get the device while it is unlocked and i think technology pushes us in that direction. that kind of seizure when the devices unlocked means they can avoid the other issues we discussed with the compelling someone through the fifth amendment and getting back's, if they get the phone at that briefest moment when it is unlocked they get everything they need. like dread by roberts and sitting at a public library in san francisco and they waited until then and disguise his bookshelves and use a lot of force. i think what we are going to see is an increase in the force in

cases of computer or other features. is my paranoia crazy? >> i don't know about the average use of force. from a law enforcement standpoint, you have probable cause to arrest someone and there is evidence on the phone you know you need a warrant to search the phone but using to are not going to get access to it if the phone is not in use the if the person is using it it will get past the taco. i agree law enforcement, as far as fbi agents wait for the person using the phone to do is that. part of this depends on a question that is back to you. empirically there will be a question of how often is the government stymied by encryption this, how often will they bypass it either through encouraging someone to give your pasco and a

person might given up in that context and most of the time that happens, sometimes they will guess and get through that. there is a question how often they will find the investigation and it might be that it is not that much of a barrier to law-enforcement in which case the claim of circumstances becomes weaker and is a barrier in which case the claim of circumstances becomes stronger said to stem extend the question depends on the legal question depends on the technological question of how much it will stop the government. >> i was surprised when the attorney general criticized apple and google. i was surprised not because they were criticizing the company but because in the last five years i have been watching these things unfold and this is not the first time the government has complained that companies are rolling out technology that might make life more difficult i've never seen the government

call lot of a particular company by name not because they don't want to offend the company but they don't want to tell the bad guys to use this one technology into won't be able to monitor you. it has been consistent that they will talk about classes of technology or ip addresses and phone networks that are causing problems but they never watched that, as this particular carrier or outfit, it makes sense. they would be idiots to broadcast to the world the area that is the weakest so wyatt a calling on avalanche google by name? the best theory i have, i am speculating but the best theory i have is what the attorney general in fbi and broader national security committee are worried about is not encryption on the device. that is not a huge problem. they're are back cuts, people choose bad pass words. i don't think it will be a major

problem for law enforcement, not the kind of problem that would warrant the fbi director and attorney general going on national tv to criticize companies. what they are worried about is the end to end encryption of voice, video, and text communication. it has built into their products and is used by 300 million users. the encryption of real time or at federal communication is the thing that terrifies law enforcement. what they're working for is a way to apply pressure to these companies that are looking for a way to direct the attention of congress at this sector are at this problem without telling the public is this particular technology. and this part of the apple product portfolio is the one causing problems for us but on the issue of real-time voice, i

think it will make life more difficult for law enforcement and that is the point. it will make life more difficult for criminals to spy and foreign governments to spy. that technology will be impact will in a way i don't think any of us imagine and i do think the wiretap members will start to drop or we will start to see usage of hacking by law enforcement we have never seen before. if they get malware on to your phone it doesn't matter what is encrypted. they get the microphone and the web can and everything going through that device. we have been involved in an effort recently wed the o.j. asked the court for the authority to hack into computers around the world and the response to encryption for law enforcement isn't an increased use of orders compelling people to be decrypted. the natural response to encryption is hacking and it

will star with the fbi where it already is and will trickle down to the marshals and every other federal law enforcement agency and like state and local acquired stingrays and other devices we will see state and locals get hacking so the future of law enforcement particularly driven by encryption is a world in which every law enforcement agency either has hacking tools or wants hacking tools. >> they know about the fbi in for breaking that. we have 10, 15, 10 minutes left. we covered a lot of ground here. if we have the system, pass the microphone around and ask questions. >> why congress is not thinking about this to visits and the military equipment to begin a look at intelligence or the

sting ray material? >> with the introduction of legislation in some cases it has never gone over the finish line. there is a lot of legislation in congress that touches on one surveillance topical rather, some good, some very good, some bad, some very bad. the problem is getting it through congress and congressional leadership has proven to be an incredible bottleneck. as i tried to say before the best things that happen for moving along is for people to stay mad about it and contact congress. it sounds almost simple and enough people do it. >> this year you saw a perfect example, the most promising, one of the most promising reform measures got passed by the house

this morning but you have a circumstance where house leadership on both sides of the aisle are very pro surveillance. they bought into this mean we discussed your the year today about collecting more being the answer when it isn't and i can't emphasize strongly enough that members of congress hear from everybody about this that it is of priority for americans and this is the only way it will change and it will take a lot fresher blood folks in the national security committee, they love having these authorities. it is that simple. they won't give them up without a fight. >> we haven't seen letters go out from senators to the attorney general and the secretary of dhs with answers about stingrays and one had ten additional senators, that is a pretty good sign. we have not had a hearing on stingrays and i hope we will get

a hearing on stingrays. i testified at state hearings in texas in michigan the state representatives were furious to learn about these particularly when law enforcement refused to testify or answer any questions at the hearings and would love to get letters out the door about hacking tools and hacking techniques and would love to see a hearing focused on hacking because when members of congress, the fbi can't control someone's web cam. and would make for great c-span moment. >> just to hear, wait for the microphone because speaking of c-span we have viewers joining us. if you wouldn't mind stating a name and affiliation and speaking to the microphone if you have a question. >> miley name is paul waggoner. you discussed the increasing use of encryption or likely

increasing use of encryption and that would clear the survey of agencies targeting the devices themselves and so on and how can use this trust -- seems like they would go after the operating system or even the hardware outside the encryption so how can users possibly trust companies, microsoft, apple or intel, motorola, in the face of secret orders or voluntarily interact with the government, any way we can trust them whether it is threw open source hardware, software or other models? >> i knows this is a law-enforcement panel, not a national security panel. in the national security context there is good reason to be concerned about financial relationships between large u.s. chip and other equipment

companies, it is troubling when you have a government service division of the companies that makes chips that power the encryption that we all use. that creates a serious culture concern but even if there was capabilities companies were building in or revealing information that wouldn't make it easier for the government to intercept, those capabilities won't be used in the law-enforcement context. and if there's a secret back to work in intel's generator feature it is not going to give them to the fbi to use in a drug case. the average person doesn't have a reason to harbor back doors or that kind of thing. where it comes to trust what worries me is the most is for good security reasons we have automatic security update in our web browsers and operating systems or what we have on our smart phones and that means googles and apples and

microsofts push software updates. normally moved for good reason and a few incidents in the past where companies use their ability to remove books from thes devices. amazon remove copies of 1984 from people's kindles a few years ago. i am very concerned at some point some of these companies will receive an order to deliver malware to a target under the guise of automatic security updates. i am very worried about that. we don't have a copy of that kind of order that is adjusted that is coming. these companies have the ability for software devices. as devices get more secure and the company's end-users, law enforcement agencies and allies leverage anything they have and that ability is one that is so powerful light cannot imagine they won't use it at some point.

>> the gentleman down here. >> john petty from mclean, va.. i disagree with the early discussion where they talked about the back door being out to compromise between issues being raised. prevailing encryption systems use static keys, they are server based and aback board is just as often to and hacker as it is the fbi. infighting that is open sesame to the hacker community. there is an alternative, standard approve for 15 years and endorsed by the industry,

technology anyway. it is the key recovery system. is a dynamic key and not static. it is not server base. the network the owner can regenerate the key at any time and that can be responded to by warrant or judgment so you have the control system and off-balance between broad encryption system as available for national security reason under approved a laws and is measurable. >> what the chairman is describing is keep, the system that is proposed -- >> because thinking of the static key, i am talking dynamic key. >> the distinction here is your employer or the government has a mechanism, some kind of key mechanism that they can send on

a case by case basis -- >> only the administrator of the network has control over that. dynamic keep creation. >> regardless of who has the additional key, the administrator of the number or your employer or apple computer or the fbi. if there is an additional key there is an additional target people will go after and the computer security community is in widespread agreement that we don't want any more keys. the only person who should hang on to your key is you. those schools have not been adopted out by enterprise settings where there is legitimate use for as them. if an employee quits you want the data where possible. >> that analysis is not correct for a dynamic key situation. >> most security experts don't want to have anything other than akee held by the user. >> the gentleman right here.

>> i am sure it is not just judges who have not heard of sting ray technology. can you give the 30 to 60 seconds description of what it is, what it does, why we should be afraid of it? >> there is a woman who would like that question answered. >> the quick version of stingray is it exploits of fundamental security flaw in the older generation of cellphones which is your phone has no way of proving it is talking to at&t power. any cellphone tower or any device that is effectively a tower can decide what it wants to call itself, it can collars of an at&t tower or verizon tower. you don't have to be verizon to

call your device a verizon tower. the sting ray impersonates the cellphone infrastructure on the phone network and the fbi drive to a neighborhood, turn it on, it has higher signal strength than legitimate power nearby and suddenly, there is a new tower i haven't seen before. it has great signal strength, let me use that for the calls and in the process of that happening it causes every cell phone in the neighborhood to identify itself to that stingray and reveal the serial number and allows the sting ray to locate those phones and in some cases these devices are used to intercept incoming, outgoing calls and internet connections. for all intents and purposes the government is your phone network when they use this device and when that happens they disrupt the normal functionality of the phone network you may not make telephone calls when the devices in use. it is very destructive and

invasive and requires a degree of impersonation that is not appropriate. on top of that it is requiring the government sent penetrating signals to the house. i think the idea the government can drive through a neighborhood to find the one bad guy down the street. that is a step too far. >> thank you so much. i am with the community to protect journalists and i have a specific question for the law enforcement threats to journalists and lawyers who depend on the ability to discuss confidentiality with their sources and or their clients. the issue raised with pushing out malware is a real one if you remember in do by the government

own telecom pushed out malware to blackberries and journalists there. for reporters who are not working in a repressive country were able to report on it. that is an important dynamic. the aclu and human rights watch an important report and they think it is important to raise the specific threat to human-rights or lawyers or journalists or hear about those threats. >> you have your own thoughts but i will say one of the great things that happened post at ed snowden is journalists are trying to take visual security seriously. it is now widespread among national security, definitely wasn't the case, to help people and friends and colleagues help people, the journalism community has come a long