>> how they can shoulder all expectations for the region. expectations now are so diversified. it is happening after the text. it isn't just a sort of job between the two giants. it is a job of the entire region. but given some sort of the diversity, it isn't easy to united states and china to operate firmly and adaptable to

what i would say a cruelistic interest and demand. the problem is, i think, the whole nation. they should stay away from a new cause of regional issues. it may not be possible to look up, but i think it is a reminder all of the things we should have in mind. but the promise -- the reason the case to get china-us in tension is some sort of say a small power trick. then there is the question of coming out. it is a great power game. among with a small power trip. so then the regional security pictures have never been more complicated.

of course after the united states is china so we need to compete and cooperate. but we need to develop a shared vision. everybody knows we should have a shared interest. we should have a shared convergence interest and how can we develop a shared vision? i think the key case is how to deal with what the master politics and what was left. china is a very unique system. there is a poplar figure but i never heard any positive words in the western media. so how a gap can be overcome gently and adequately is a test. another thing is americans are

seeing china as a declining pop. the government is rarely in trouble but without politics the united states is engaged. so i think the chinese is struggling now to take out some sort of a very adequate understanding of the western united states is. but i don't think china now sees an window of opportunity now the united states is declining and china should take advance of this. that is a total misperception. another point i am responding to the panel in the presentation is mack. and we talk about this being a

cornerstone to deal with the united states and china regulations. forget it. china has never done that. we feel very satisfied in the ways of nuclear deterance. that is why china is over sensitive to the united states missile defense systems. we learned a lot during the cold war when they developed nuclear deterance it collapsed. it is so costly and so far i think china will continue to follow that with a limit ded nuclear deterance. it is small and efficient. i don't think the issues are coming back and laying out a new security between the two.

and another point i think i will make is that it is very, very interestingly and that is how to maintain a power piece. the question is we are also seeing an equation about state's power and the vision power. to me, i think the state is some sort of evolution system and the key criteria on weather -- whether -- or not the fiscal change could undermine the security. put as it is how the evolution of the change -- but -- such as the build act in the term of the joint efforts and the collaboration. in the chinese it is studied to the regional integration and so

my view is don't just very statically and rigorously see that china's behavior is a cochanger. we need a co-revolution. let me come down to my conclusion. there are regular points where we should set free of all relations and get out of the high jacked by the extreme political force and i think it is a very iluminating point and my view is that china is far behind the united states. they are very ultra powerful relations. that is the problem with perception and sidekey pouring out in that way and china is now a very, very strong competitor.

but china's view will continue to see the imposition to corporate while competing for the co-interest of the chinese. co-interest is sovereignty, political safety, it is china's unfinished revolution. so i would like to see the powerful relations being based on very actions. china should not just over rich. then the question for the united states is washington also shouldn't over react to a rising channel. let me stop here. >> thank you. professor from auckland

university. >> thank you very much. let me focus on the international security order in northeast asia and then u.s.-china relations. my task here is to make my place on the podium speak more. let me identify four things. first thing is the future of bilateral relations between the united states and china. second one is north korea's nuclear c nuclear creation. thecced second and china's new initiatives. let me be straightforward here. before the summit meeting there was growing talk in the united

states on obama's positive attitude on china's new power relations. but it seems to me the outcome was the good but i question whether the united states really embraced the concept i am asking the panel what are the prosspects for the new race-power relations in the united states? this is my first question. second question is about the north korean nuclear section. will you elaborate on north korea's increase over its nuclear capabilitiecapabilities. there has been a widening criticism in korea around this. the united states has no north korea policy so how will you

respond to this kind of criticism? a few months ago, general cook was the commander of the united states force in korea and he said north korea has the capability with nuclear tip missiles and it was confirmed by others as well saying in the near future we will face north korea's proliferation and this increases the chances of the nuclear activity in the region and many experts expect them to explode over many things over the next half year. and then i will ask what is china's policy to deal with this kind of issue? is there any specific policies?

shouldn't they take new initiatives to the policy? if north korea has nuclear devices how will china respond to it? my first question is also talking about facing a new factor in northeast asia we cannot rush into. there is a prosspect in the summit meeting between 2015 and how would you vary the russian interest with the nuclear issues? also, what is the new promise of

china? china is saying there is a new normal and what is the new normal and the implication to the word? and my last question is about south korea and obama's policy -- yes or no? are we living in the yes or no? this opens up the earth of nature and typical cases of the aiip missile defense system

create tremendous pressure from the united states and china and the like of others. how do we handle these kind of issues? i would like the advise from respectable chinese scholars and american scholars. thank you very much. >> actually we started 20 minutes late. so i think we should get 10-15 minutes back of negotiating. i am like trying to keep up with how much money they have. i try to manage and in the end i end up with no money and a deficit. i will read the three questions. can you summarize the prc

strategic goals in the south china sea? how do these goals shape china's concepts of the relations with vietnam and the philippines? this is from michael marshal, global peace foundation. the second question is -- if this isn't censored i am not going to do it. if the north korea's nuclear program served chia's strategic interest by instructing u.s. and enableling beijing to play role of responsible state holder --

okay. this is for everybody. the third question is china's population has peaked and it is now declining. has there been a case of rising power with a declining population? that is a question to be pondered. okay. let's just go around with the questions and maybe two of you answer the last one. >> for america the will is probably more important than its capacity. about number two question, i think china's nuclear strategy

is reactive, modest, gradual and still evolving and given the reactive nature of it it is relative. in other words, whatever the u.s. is planning to do, china will respond. therefore it will change for china. and i think it will be unwise to think china's nuclear strategy will be fixed even into near to long-te long-term. and then north korea's nuclear: i think what we should do now is to prevent them from having more bombs and prevent them from exporting bombs overseas but in order to do that we need to talk. and that is exactly where we are stuck. if we want to talk -- we have a long experience of talking to

the him -- but for it to be effective there has to be a principle channel for communication which are not going to be possible. second, this whole process of talking to him is promised on the assumption that he is still at some point going to abandoned this nuclear weapons program and i am not sure that is a well-grounded assumption. third, whether or not there is going to be a fairly high level of coordination among the populus involved. i am not sure if it is going to be forthcoming. therefore we are stuck without a good solution. we all know the talks are not affective as far as the under lining is concerned but we don't

have any alternative. now finally about the stability of the u.s.-china relations. i think this is true for all bilateral relationships and that is how to prevent domestic politics from getting involved. i have done some research on many of the survey series in the united states on american's view of china -- many reports like gallop and so forth. this year for the first time, china is conceived as america's number one enemy for the first time since 2001. so i think there are changing percepti perceptions of china because of the changes in china. and finally, one point, i think as pointed out, most of the united states and china are

asking this particular question to regional states in east asia and that is are you with us or against us? for instance the asian investment bank, the asian security and so on and so forth. i think the more frequently the u.s. and china ask this question the more fatigue they will have about washington and beijing. i don't think this is going to be healthy down the road. >> thank you very much. you want to continue in >> thank you. i was asked in a comment about how the new model of major power relations is received in the u.s. and other questions about the competitive institution building of north korea. i want to say a couple things. i think the new model of power

relations is useful if it is a means of discussing, you know, the fundamental differences and visions. the problem is that it isn't becoming that. there is not been a discussion on those different visions. and therefore it becomes a way of sort of muddying the waters and essentially a distraction. i care much more about the substance of these strategic dialogue and what they are. the one thing that came up that, i can, bears more attention and i heard a few times and that is china's position evolved and it will evolve over time has it ris rises. i think this is something china should be careful about. if your power is rising, you need to, in a way, if you want

others to be sure of your rise, you need to impose limits on what your ambition is so they will not worry it will evolve to a point where it will step on their interest. this is quite an old problem and a an old model of power relations but it fits well. when germany was rising, bismarck had ambitions but after he accomplished his goal of unifying germany he imposed limits on the ambitions and adhered to them. one of the problems in asia is there is no sense of clear limits on what china's ambitions are. there are ways to go about doing that like adopting a code of conduct but i think it is unlikely. and i think over the long term and giving predictable about what the evolution is going to

be is an important step of reassurance. i think it will be hard to get there. >> two points. i agree with you about the united states being in good shape and still the most powerful country in the world. but if you look at the united states policy you will find it defers from the past. it started ten years ago. i understand in such a way i think the united states is so powerful it is always using a force. politically they didn't benefit from that and learned a lesson from that. today they depend more on dip m

diplomacy rather than force. will is more important. the second point is about the nuclear issue. what is a north korean having another nuclear test? i think the policy of every country today is how to prevent another attack. after the third nuclear test, you call the north korean ambassador and a strong protest and the chinese government is committed to impose sanctions on north korea. i think what envision is they

were there as a nuclear test but others will join in and we will all determine to put more sanctions that. what i can would happen but isn't a promise. it is about the new normal policy and issue. a new normal turf. it is very new. i think if you look at the foreign power. there is a lot new and they are in different dimensions. and stuff i said if this is south korea or north korea this is speaking a lot about the chinese differences and policies. and there is the co-interest and the ideas and the other thing new was whether this wasn't going to elaborate on the policy. and the third part is about whether or not north korea

serves the interest of the go. and in north korea's nuclear program poses a more immediate threat toward china and south korea who are the close neighbors of north korea. and channels more concern about north korea nuclear and it might lead to a nuclear ambush. i think china is equally determined as south korea and the united states to denuclearize north korea. and this is a very determined policy. i think it isn't detrimental to the policy but look at the chinese proliferate and the code word with neighbors improving a lot. the only problem around the neighbors is north korean.

this isn't in china's interest a a andagainst their interest. >> thank you very much. you can respond to the question that is addressed to you. >> thanks for question for me. the south china sea is a controversial subject and issue. the main components are identified. i think beijing -- should i say they have some sort of

traditional rocks or islands. yes, some would say there is a strong history behind them and you know the controversy about where the line is drawn. it isn't this sea it is our sea. so under the hand, when taiwan holds the line still and the b south china sea's sovereignty there is nowhere for beijing to back off. the second is china's growing

maritime groups. china is building into maritime power and what that power means, i think it is still an unanswered question but anyway this the south china sea has the 18-party congress in china now and beijing's emphasis on the growing national economy from the sea and from the ocean. so then we recognize the maritime economy will be a leading driver for the china's future economic growth so such a new passion is also automatically spilt over to their interest in the mari sk e

skare -- maritime. and the last is beijing needed to build out measures of sorts. so with the multiple reasons now just to driving china for some sort of maritime endorsement. but the problem as i mentioned is south china see so far is a very questionable.

we should have a good neighbor policy with the south china sea and not just undermining china's foreign policy principle is a big test. secondally is one way china gets to confirm the claim while also listening to the regional concern. that is a test for china as well. there is no easy avenue for china to meet the two ends. >> about your first point, it was 11-dash line. it became that in 1952. >> yes, it is 11-9 in the eyes of china it makes no difference. because, two, let's say such a

dash has come from the pumpkin bay and that is because they both concluded successfully with the delimitation and the two dashes are just really a way to help. >> okay. thank you very much. we have a couple questions in my hand but then we have run out of time so i am sorry they will not be addressed at this session. i want to congratulate our speakers for their great job and thank you for your participation. coffee break for 15 minutes. thank you.

>> tonight, nih director discusses the promises and challenges facing cancer research and describes innovation paired are declining federal resources. that starts at 8 eastern on c-span. on c-span 2 it is books in prime time. first the worthy fight, a memoir of peace and then robert gates talks about duty. and then we look at stress test; reflections on financial crisis. book tv is all this week beginning at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span 2. tomorrow on washington journal

we will discuss mortgage trends and the impact on the economy. and then the book stonewalled examining the struggles of covering the obama whitehouse has a report. and we will talk your phone calls, e-mails and tweets. washington journal is live on c-span. c-span 2 providing live coverage of the senate floor proceedings and every weekend book tv. c-span2 created by the cable public industry and brought to you as a local service by your local cable or satellite provider. and now more from the brookings institution on the u.s.-china and south korea. we just had a look at advanceing

peace and security on the korean peninsula. this is an hour and a half. >> in the name of the bilateral c conference on northeast asia and the united states. we will talk on the topic of korea and major power. basically, my role is what is the talk about. to make the discussion more interactive i would like to introduce two points. first point is that this year we celebrated 10 year anniversary

of the agreement that was signed in 1994 between the united states -- 20 -- and north korea. through the last 20 years, it has been crystal clear that north korea totally lost their creditabilitie creditability. they are still striving to get recognition as defacto nuclear power. the talk has been stalemated as everybody is aware of. unfortunately, time is not on our side. north korea's nuclear capability has had a drastic upgrade during the last 20 years. now it is high time the member

state of the sixth parties talk to come up with new ideas to make a new brick road. at the same time, next year, as it was mentioned this morning, we celebrate 50 year anniversary of diplomatic relations between korea and japan. and seven-year anniversary from japanese.

i would like to invite three presenters. the first is a professor you already know well. he is from the school of international studies and he joined as a researcher twice from 85-86 and 2001-2002. and one of the interesting characteristics or features is

he has a special status as a member of the defending committee and foreign affairs committee of the national committee of the chinese political council. and also there is a membership of political party that is not chinese communist party. this party is china democratic lead. kind of a united states version of democrats. now it is your time. >> thank you very much for your kind introduction. i guess my focus is on the

evaluation of what is going on with the relationship between china, u.s., and south korea. how should we evaluate the collateral relationship between these three countries during the past year? the answer is it is mixed with positive and negative developments over time. in terms of the positive developments, one finds that the united states and south korea relationship is quite stable despite from more misgivings as it was pointed out. it has never been better. china/south korea's relationship can also compete in that sense

in that it has never been better. our two leaders have very good personal relationships. and the recent signing of the fta is very significant in terms of our relationship. in terms of china-u.s. relationships, i think after suffering the repeated setbacks, the relationship appeared to be back on track again and back on the right track again with the key obama summit in beijing. the two leaders had extended talks and the two governments

agreed on specific targets on climate change and also they agr agreed an acceleration of the dit between the two countries and agreed on reduction of spying technology and there were two mo's between the militaries on duty measures concerning military maneuvers into the high seas. on the negative side, one finds the united states' pressure on south korea like the issues of the deployment of the fact system in south korea and also what is south korea's aaid are really making south korea quite

frustrated in a way. they don't want to offend china allegedly the chinese post to this and also try to invite south korea to join the aid. finally, the opposition to the fact deployment and also chinese efforts to enlist south korea to join the aib are making south korea's life a little bit more uncomfortable at the same time. and also, despite the success of the key obama summit in beijing, i think differences between china and u.s. on a whole range of issues remain ranging from

how to deal with the north korea more effectively on the nuclear issue to how to address the south china sea maritime issue. they have a lot of differences. and both governments are concerned about -- or quite concerned about the other country's approach. the three countries do agree as to how to deal with north korea's nuclear issue which is allegedly sparing no time -- i mean north korea -- developing a nuclear weapon and planning to have another nuclear test. how can we explain the negative development? we can explain the positive but how can we explain the negative? i think first there is a deepening suspicion between

china and the u.s. on the one hand and also between these three countries and north korea. so there is a lot of suspicion as to what the other's intentions are. the second factor is the rise of china. the rise of china. china is in the middle of the rise and china is both a developing country and a developed country. a weak country and strong country. a poor country and rich country. an ordinary power and a non-ordinary power in some ways. and as a result, the chinese are confused in terms of how to define their interest and let alone to carry out to the

coherent foreign policy. so when china sends out conflicting signals, the u.s. gets confused. the u.s. wants to know what the chinese really want. what the chinese are really up to. but the problem is the chinese don't know so americans can't find out. now the americans adopt a policy and of course china -- when chinese look at the united states adopting a hacking policy they adopt their own version of the policy. so as a result, the interaction between china and u.s. can easily get into a negative cycle. and of course, on top of this, we have the domestic politics problem. in china you have rising

nationalism and suddenly people realize china is not weak. they thought china behaved in such a way because china was weak in the past. now they think they are no longer weak but push the chinese government to push the interest in a more forceful way. and on the part of the united states you have politicians who try to capitalize fear and frustration with china out of concerns for self-interest. this is a time, you know, to make china's case so as to be successful in the elections. what do we do about this? i think first of all, we need to exercise caution. china's in the transition and a

lot of things are in flux. we don't want to make hasty conclusions or draw hasty conclusions and hostile policies toward each other that one may regret to the days to come especially between china and the united states. this problem is really acute. and also, the two country's give the time and chance to put rhetoric into practice. china needs more time to figure out what its interest are and i believe that chinese are wise enough to make the right choices overtime. and we need to be innovative. china and the united states, if you think about welcoming each other to participate in their own respect projects.

aaid, bip and others. anyway, somehow we need to make accommodations to each other. we need to be flexible and innovative. the united states and south korea -- i mean they need to spend more time to explain the system better to the chinese and they cannot weaken chinese nuclear deterance capabilities. think about deployment of another system that chinese think is less threatening. china and the south korea -- china should probably give more consideration of those concern over aib and the structure. south koreans want to have more say in that well let them chip in more money.

cooperation of north korea and i think the three countries should think of working more closely together to form this united front to offer treasures and incentives to encourage north korea to give up nuclear weapons. and finally we need those of pragmitism. whatever action the country takes, it should address the concern of the other two countries if it wants to be successful. the united states and south korea should try to eleaveate the regime change of north korea. china and the u.s. should relieve those concerns over the relationship with the other country whether it is china or the u.s. don't push them too hard. and china and south korea probably should try to get rid of washington's concern and tend

to minimize the role of the united states in the region. so if we try to go innovative and pragmatic and cautious i think the relationship should be less bad, if not much better. thank you. >> thank you for your presentation. if i may say my personal comment on your argument on aaib. you argue there might be some pressure from your side. i don't know if there is a united states side of questions on our shoulders. but if i am correct the biggest problem is that china wants to take 50% shareholders based on

the gdp. a little higher than normal per c capita. so if china take 50% of the shareholders, korea has difficulties. that is my understanding. but this should be discussed during the third session because we will deal with the economy issues then. and if i can just respond to your argument on chinese government attitude and the north korea issues. we just casted, you know, 2009, china became more assertive about barrowing terminology. and since then there is clear

talk of the changes of the chinese attitude of the policy. that is up until now, there was balance in the objects. one is euthanizing and one is security of asia. but sense that time, there is a change of in korea's emphasis with the common object in conflict. you know, i worked for the china prieratize security over the denuclearization. so i went in with basic changes on the chinese policy and maybe you could respond to that. my next sticker will be professor -- speaker is going to

talk now. he is invested in the human rights of the korean population. >> thank you. let me first say i greatly appreciate the korea foundation, the brookings institute and the university for this great opportunity to exchange very frank dialogue within a revelation and very helpful process. the panel's title is korea's

relations with major power. as far as i know there are four major powers but i was made aware of the fact that we have ten minutes to discuss korea's relations with this major power and after the introduction that gives me less than two minutes per major power which is a mission in possible. so i have taken the liberty to eliminate two of the four major power status, russia and japan, for no better reason than i don't particularly like mr. putin because i think he is a bully and i am not particularly fond of the japanese. so i will focus on korea's relations with the united states and china.

first let me turn korea's relations with the united states. let me first say that both korea/china and korea/u.s. relations, if we are able to isolate the two, and look at them independently, it is as good as it can get. we have heard that but from the chinese delegation here and we heard it from the american delegation here. in fact, during the summit meeting between president obama in april 2013, president obama was saying that korea/u.s. relations is more than just an alliance. this year in june u.s. congressional report was saying that korea-america relations is

at their best state since the establishment of the alliance in 1953. and earlier, the keynote speaker ben russell was saying in his career in the state department that it is really at its best state. we have had multiple summit meetings already and counting. we have had a good number of -- i can count seven foreign minister meetings and we are not into two years quite yet. we have had two plus two meetings. and of course the security meetings. in fact, the 46th scn at the defense minister's meeting in

may this year, the united states and south korea agreed to postpone the transfer of the war time operational control. no date set this time. the transfer takes set when the condition is appropriate depending on the views of both countries. i guess in particularly in terms of the threat from north korea. this is a very positive development in korean relations. that is not to say everything is rosey in the relations. there are outstanding issues and it needs to be ironed out between the two. one is the nuclear agreement which i guess will move into 2015. that is a very complicated issue and it isn't easy. there is the on monopoly going

issue of the united states relocation but having said that overall i think the bilateral relations is in great shape. likewise, south korea's relations with china is also in very good shape. and everyone has been talking about the personal chemistry between the two presidents and you know they have met for the first time in 2005 when the president at the time was the chairwoman was the grand national party. at that time, the grand national party was the opposition party, not the ruling party. and the president at that time was the governor of an area. so probably safe to say both of them were not at the height of their stature which probably reinforced their chemistry because they were undergoing some issues at the time. and that friendship has lasted

and both of them ended up becoming leaders of respected countries. they made a state visit last year in 2013. we had the return visit this year in early july which was mentioned to be a significant visit because for the first time a chinese leader visiting south korea before north korea. ...

now we have over 8 million travelers. in 1992 when the two countries normalize with each other it was 130,000 mostly of course recently the fta was conquered. they also seem to have a common front in targeting japan. i don't know if that is a good thing or a bad thing but in terms of korea it has contributed. so on an independent basis great

relationship but when you start to look into and the relations in the larger context of u.s. china relations, things are more complicated and things don't look so rosy. this is despite the denial in the indicted states and china that there was a logic that does not apply and i think they do. what do i mean by that? save jokes to positioning of the old traditional order and the emergence of the new order. the old order is the traditional international region where the united states plays a very

central role. it is supposed to reinforce this old order that has existed since the end of world war ii and the success of this pivot is contingent on a close revision especially with south korea that other variables are in a constant state and in fact one of the variables is making some tectonic noise and that is why china is rising and in particular as a maritime power in this region. you might say it is challenging in the asia-pacific region but even if you deny that there is no question china is trying to carve out a greater role and

influence in this region. you might call that a grand strategy. this is a very significant development because if you look at the vision it does represent three continents with china playing a central loop of good information as well as infrastructure. what is the endgame box eventually it is spilling over to create a cultural economic bloc where china plays a leading role and they want korea to be

part of this block and herein lies the dilemma. we are very much entrenched in the new order where china wants korea to play a role. now this is a problem and i may be wrong to suspend is not seen as being complemented but rather competing and this has already been mentioned to push for joining and also the open opposition where it has nothing to do with china but this interview. they look at it from the

perspective of the u.s. china relations and this is the background where there is a discourse over the dilemma of south korea. the united states is south korea's ally. china is not an ally. it's a very important partner of south korea that's not an ally. they covered these issues in the

various microscopic issues but i have some microscopic questions based on the human rights issues the general assembly was recommending the prosecution of the leaders at the international court even though they s. 'b. council it would be headed into china and do you think that this new approach will increase the chinese or korean nuclear issues

[inaudible] in the brookings institution. >> to flip the order around first and foremost in the career foundation chair in korea as a part of the program i'm very fortunate to have an incredibly wonderful intellectually and personally wonderfully set of colleagues on the fourth floor of the building and our fearless

leader richard bush is here and he sets the tone for the integrity and quality of work. there are many things to be given that everybody has given the traditional thanks to the traditional people. i'd like to give in on traditional thanks. the senior scholars were very much a part of preparing for the presentation and also discussing together some of these ideas. i'm going to take a different approach from the conventional approach when we talk about south korea in the context of the age of powers.

i don't know if we can stomach another comment on the ticket or another panel sandwiched between china and the u.s. or another intensive seminar on the history between japan, korea and china so i would like to try something new that's part of a book project but i am beginning and i tend to be a long-term thinker and i think that in this audience is the right crowd to be doing that kind of foreshadowing or more in-depth thinking about the future of northeast asia. so i would like to talk about demographics, the mystic politics, the demographic change that leads to the politics to the changes in the foreign-policy priorities including the relationship with the united states, with china and also the non- major powers in east asia which we have

tended to beat out in our discussion that we know they are very important for a variety of reasons. my basic question is how might the demographic changes that are rapidly occurring in south korea in particular going to affect the role and relations in east asia in the future? the society is in the throes come in the next and the struggle of the demographic change socially, politically, culturally that had serious implications for the economic performance as well as national security pair of using foreign-policy priorities. there are two major factors. one is the very low birth rate and the society that most of you know that characterizes south korea. it is the lowest in terms of the

birth rate. the lowest birth rate among all the countries and the fifth lowest in the world of south korea's fertility rate is lower than japan. and south korea as we all know tends to catch up very fast. i'm not so sure that this is a good area in which south korea should have cut off so fast but none of the lists, statistics or statistics and they tell us certain facts. the second area is the demographic change happening from migration. those are from the detectors from the north coming up to the south who amounted south who amounted to approximately 30,000 at this point. the number seems low compared to the near 50 million south korean population. however, they hold much more potential clout in determining the foreign-policy trajectory especially in the relations with

china than we might give them credit for at this point. i have papers i'm working on and i am happy to talk about it during q-and-a, but i will focus on another area of the demographic change just the which is the transition from an ethnically culturally facial features to one that is inclusive of the multiethnic and baltic cultural south korea and the government officials labeled literally translating as multicultural family or in chinese for many of our chinese speakers the literal trans- -- translation. i thought what on earth does

this mean. i realized it's the literal translation from the multicultural society which has never existed, that concept never existed until recently. migration takes place over the all over the world but how rapidly they have picked up this issue as a major policy priority both for increasing the population and increasing the labor pool potentially and also to accommodate, make accommodations for the newcomers so that they might try to integrate better into the factory society. it is an assimilation policy which many ngos and advocates of the groups and the immigrants themselves criticized because they are not in favor of the assimilation per se. but nevertheless, it is a serious attempt, and i would say

laudable attempt to pay attention on the part of the government to be in pressing for the technical skills in other integrations required because of the growing presence of the foreign nationals and their children who are what some people might say many of the foreigners are from asia so they very marry the nationals and become asian order of multiethnic multicultural multiracial backgrounds. they amount to approximately 200,000 in number. they are korean citizens by birth because in 1997, south korea did something that some commentators called the ethical change in the phenomenal resolution from the lineage by

father so that a korean mother citizen who is female and a mother can bestow the citizenship. this is brand-new. they've been changing legally and of course in terms of the phenotype and culturally and policy wise. it just to give you a couple more statistics, south korea in terms of its population projected into the future by 2030 about a quarter currently out around 50 million will be 55 and older. by 2045 this is not long in the

future by 2045 i will be 95-years-old if i'm around. by 2045 the average age will be 50-years-old when it comes to the economic productivity in the labor force that is able to sustain a fast-growing age and population. between the 24,000,044,000,000 from the current 50 million or so. in the projections that about 100 years south koreans.

i'm not adding the unification scenario but i don't believe that it would solve the demographic problem and that could also be safe for q-and-a. >> by ten minutes are up? >> to give me ten more minutes please. [laughter] >> i'm the only female on this. i'm talking about the minorities. i can claim all sorts of crazy things. impact on the economics. the total size of the labor force is expected to peak in 2016, 2017 and to decline thereafter. it would be about half of what it is now by 2050. that is a significant concern to be had. to maintain its economic military, political, cultural

power and increase where it is needed that is an increase of at least 1.8 from the current 1.25 over the next decade it would be mounted to south koreans alone. national security implications. there will be a shortage of 123,000. it would be in the relevant korean ministries. this would result in a shortage of the 30% of manpower in 2030 and a 45% shortage by 2050. what is very interesting is that

they are aware of the declining number of the potential recruits in south korea and have put into place the reductions from 552,000 to 387,000 by 2020. that is again very soon in the future. if we are to maintain the current level of military personnel to government needs to recruit 276,000 people per year. that isn't sustainable under the current conditions. i have other statistics but i will leave it aside. but it's also what is also interesting is the south korean government has been responding quickly to these changing demographics such that in february of 2012, the draft law, the military service law was formalized.

only the full ethnic ^-caret h. ^-caret china military. so this is the highly society i get no judgment give no judgment to that of distress to the policies are based on that assumption of nationalism. but since 2012 all male citizens regardless of ethnic background are expected to perform the necessary service. i have other things i could raise raise but i will the bible just leave these questions for you to think about because these are the implications for the foreign-policy. if the foreigners and the 200,000 growing children who come to the south korean citizens that are heavily marginalized and discriminated against due to not get integrated into the society and are not able to develop a national identity that is in

accord with the larger society we need to ask questions about what will come in the future and how tight while the alliance be. how feasible would be to improve or potentially to see setbacks. the overwhelming majority in south korea with residents on citizens come from china that they are marginalized and korea. on the other hand we have defectors from the north who are the vanguard of activism criticizing the chinese foreign-policy regarding refugees, economic migrants and what have you from the north soviet diplomatic tensions between the south and china because of the defectors, the

left activism and the south korean rights activism on the refugees and human rights. we have multiple ways that we are watching and diversifying the foreign-policy. in the first year as the head of state to come to south korea the current president of the philippines to visit all of the major southeast asian states in her first year of presidency she has a new foreign-policy. so they are diversifying the policy and it isn't a coming sense that the demographic changes that are occurring having to draw from the population in the amount, indonesia, thailand etc..

so i leave open the question of how might the domestic demographic changes in south korea affect domestic identification in terms of political identification with south korea's current interest versus the future interest and how might they grow up to help the society in ways that are aimed towards peaceful relations in the greater northeast asian mass. >> thank you for your purchase on the issues. now it is time for us to invite the discussions.

the first will be mr. robert. he served as the secretary of state a long time ago. he is usually working on the north the north korean nuclear issues since the first nuclear crisis. in the nuclear case this year it raises some new options such as the dialect in the negotiations. so this could be in comparison

with today's lessons in that issue and since the lifting of the failure to color was prevailing so i want to know the longevity. >> i will ask the question first and then in my comments i'm going to strategic patience. we don't know if there will be an agreement on the five plus one countries and if there is, it is likely to permit a very limited enrichment program. people have asked what is the precedent for dealing with the program in any agreement i

believe it would not be possible to permit any enrichment or processing program. they have a long-standing track record of violating commitments. one of the early early commitments it violated on the nuclearization commitment in 1992 when the the north explicitly agreed not to have any enrichment processing capability. so, i wouldn't regard the agreement on the enrichment as a precedent also i do believe that if they manage to achieve an agreement with iran, this would improve the prospects for the productive negotiation with the north. and on the other hand the

failure would further reduce the negotiations with the dpr k.. so the panel is korea and the major powers. picking up on the queue i will talk about north korea and the major powers. both the relations in the nature power is clearly its relationship with china that's the most important. china is the main supplier. it's the biggest trading partner and china has made a conscientious and persistent effort to get north korea back on the path of the nuclearization. but china has been fairly

frustrated with with the dealings in north korea over their recent the recent years and it's been frustrated by the provocations by north korea by the continued programs and its renunciation of its commitments to the denuclearization in the september 2005 and 2006 joint statement. there has been a cooling of relationship between china and the dpr k.. i understand and our colleagues can elaborate but there is a fairly lively internal debates within china about whether it is more of a strategic asset or

more of a strategic liability to china. china has been prepared to apply pressure against north korea but it's reluctant. it's been reluctant to use all of its leverage available to it in order to press the north koreans. it could end up destabilizing the regime in the north and lead to instability on the peninsula and in northeast asia. they have been engaged in a very active and diplomatic outreach effort. it's part of the kind of charm offensive by the pyongyang regime. it's released and sent a

high-level delegation to meet with south korea and in china at the time of the games. they visited the european capitals into the delegation recently visited moscow and the discussions between north korea and japan although i don't expect anything useful to come out of that. what are the motivations for this diplomatic outreach. one of the motivations is a desire at present. it's to the international

criminal court and i think the outreach is designed to try to dissipate those pressures. i think the outreach is also designed to try to decide the major powers from each other and to try to get assistance for the north in pursuing its economic development objectives. but to get that assistance without having to make compromises and sacrifices in terms of its nuclear weapons program, i think it's very important for the major powers, for north korea's partners in the six party process to remain united in continuing to make clear to the north that it can't achieve the two objectives simultaneously. the objectives of strengthening

its economy and the objectified continuing to pursue its nuclear and missile ambitions. but in the meantime it's clear that north korea's nuclear and missile programs are progressing. i agree with you, ambassador car time is not on our side. the north koreans have recently increased the amount of plutonium they have available for nuclear weapons. they've doubled the size of their program and undoubtedly in my view they are enriching uranium and probably producing the highly enriched uranium on the nuclear weapons program to continue to work on long-range missiles including the range that would eventually be capable of delivering a nuclear weapon

to the united states. so i think it's important that we act to stop this momentum in the destabilizing nuclear missile programs and i think the only way that we can stop the momentum is by engaging with north korea. but we can't engage on north korea's preferred terms. it's preferred terms is to have discussions among the countries that are armed with nuclear weapons to limit those capabilities. that cannot possibly be the objective. the world community cannot accept north korea as a permanent nuclear weapons state. the purpose of any engagement with north korea on the nuclear issue is to reconnect to the

goal of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula and it's important that north korea take tangible steps to give credibility to that commitment. now, i don't think that it is realistic to expect north korea to take tangible steps of restraint before the six party talks have commenced. they've made it clear that they are not prepared to do that and i believe that to be the case. but i think we can engage and north korea's neighbors can engage them in any formal exploratory discussions to test whether the north would be willing to commit to certain steps once the six party talks have reconvened.

who should hold these exploratory informal discussions with the north koreans. i think clearly the south koreans should. they are an interested party and they should have every right to explore with the north but also from the united states should. china served as an intermediary between the north for quite some time but it's important to sit down directly face-to-face with the north in an unfiltered way to get its points of view across and after all, it is the alleged u.s. hostile policy against the north which is the primary justification for it nuclear program. i believe the united states is prepared to engage the north and

east talks. this morning the assistant secretary mentioned that the u.s. has long been willing to have these talks. he also mentioned the u.s. should not be the exclusive interlocutor with the north and i completely agree. others have a stake and need to be involved in the process of the deep nuclearization. but it's very important i think that the u.s. engage with the north. but i think so far it's been the north that has been reluctant. you talk about strategic patience. if there was it is an awful long time ago and i think the u.s. has been ready to engage with the north but it's been the north of late it's been very reluctant to have this dialogue and i think it's important for the major powers of the world

including north korea's neighbors to make very clear to the north that unless it is prepared to engage in peace exploratory talks leading to a recommitment to the denuclearization then it will only face additional pressure. >> next speaker is the professor at the university and also board member of the foreign policy analysis and the general of the diplomatic studies. >> thank you for the introduction. this is a very important talk. when i was asked to discuss the panel the first idea came to my mind we look at a map korea was

located in europe or latin america or africa is a big power but unfortunately it was located in such a place. there is a problem in the development revisions within the big powers but having said that condi are also in the very important position. we look at the change of the international structure korea has always been a vital. for the first time they were in 1894 or 1895 after the japanese war and they started up in this area. the second time that the international relations changed and it was after the second

world war when the cold war started it was cruising along the parallel and today the development in the peninsula will demonstrate where we will go into his very meaningful in this regard. so all of that is very interesting views to discuss both the positive and the negative side of the relationship in that area. and it discusses the relations between minds is to talk up at the relationship between china and south korea. if you look at the relationship with north korea should be added that there was a time so we see there is some kind of a relationship between korea and

north korea. so we are thinking but will south korea do in the world that they are not playing in this area so another important relationship in this area or feature of the relationship in this area is we see south korea has developed a very substantial relationship and south korea was with china and more than the trade volume with both the united states and japan. but at the same time, south korea developed a very close relationship with the united states.

they tell me there were two reasons that the ambassador discussed and the other reason someone told me that they tried to curb the analysis from participating. and another example is that in this year south korea was supposed to go to participate in the show and they said no you cannot go because you have to high-tech fighters but this shows that it's in a different position and on the one hand it develops relations with china on the other hand there was is a big political barrier that shows it's different from the other countries and the other areas of economic integration to the policy integration but we see

that the political grouping together it's the other way around so it is a very difficult and interesting phenomena in this area. and the last point we want to talk about is very new and reminds me of the research in the imbalance and impact on the foreign-policy but it also didn't have the time to collaborate because there might be a lot of work to do but it reminds me of the situation that is much more constrained

influence by the policy over the country in the area. more to change up the balance and power. it is thinking and south korea that is stronger because of the demographic composition and south korea. it's even stronger. that is another perspective in the international development in this area. it's very interesting and i think that i would love to read the book once you've finished. >> thanks for the presentation. my last speaker will be the

professor at the national university and director of studies. they will speak on japan. it's always on behalf of korea but during the break, the ambassador gave me a freedom of speech. they saved japan for me. they make take on the recent election and how it impacts the major power relations in northeast asia. it is certain that the general

election was a victory for him but i do not agree to the position that it was a lending victory. it's to barely maintain the status quo. you shouldn't forget that it was only a 42%. it was in 200959% in 2012. so, the smaller number went to the ballot which gains that they are not envious about us. don't forget that they launched the visit and then gave much more votes for that within the coalition. i checked into the voting rate was 52 but it's only 33% that

went to the ballot which means about 17% of the entire electorate supported and that means less than one out of five in japan so we should be careful about the result. it's not a landslide victory but even then it may be very weak as time goes by. on the party they had no choice and i'm a little relieved that they have only two seats left which means that the right-wing elements in the japanese society is weakening. so that is good news.

after this victory i think that here he will try his best to get a majority in july of 2016. i hope that he can be more cautious but i don't know. but what does that mean for the relations in this region? i think it is good for the united states first of all because it will push for self defense issue south defense issue and the other would be much more forthcoming. so in terms of its good for the united states you should watch carefully at that location

issue. and oh, there are the characteristics one of the candidates for elected which means the relocation would have a huddle and even though it will be pushed forward to the 55% of the respondents are against the security policy even though you won the election. for the relationship between china and japan i'm not that optimistic even though they were looking the other direction.

i think the strategic rivalry between japan and china will never come to an end and it's especially about the territorial issues and much more china is ready and willing to play much more actively than before. they are taking the history more and more. if you play the game nationally, korea and japan can hardly get together. they get together much more. i think that they know how it's going so that is a kind of concern for me. so then what about the relations

? i don't think that it's bad news either because we now know when i told policymakers that they would continue to be there until 2018, they were suspicious but now everybody believes me they will be there until september of 2018 and we have to deal with it but i have to be clear like the perception that came from our side korea is willing to talk with japan. korea became much more flexible dealing with the issue. first we opened all of the channels of communication. last month i accompanied the speakers to japan.

but all of the other talks are going on and unlike the previous approach, we make the parallel approach that rather than making history in front of all the problems we know that all of the issues are discussed as on many levels. we are much more flexible than before but i don't think that the president can make a compromise about the issue. there's all different interpretations and perspectives that i think that it is a japan problem.

in turn only inside of japan there are tons of people trying to say that they didn't make a mistake in the past which is a grave mistake. the mood in the japanese society in the sense that there is career bashing i haven't heard of the sentiment in japan even though they went from five years so they said the mood of the society doesn't demonstrate a.

first of all, the domestic politics we talk about. domestically it shouldn't be in the foreign-policy but it creates the relations in the story about the domestic politics. second you can hardly get away from it. whether they will celebrate the anniversary or to liberate more in the liberation from japan. we don't know so that is one factor. the other is china where they will try to create the ties or they will come up with a format.

so my question is to take on the meeting with japan and korea and china so i wanted to hear your view on that and finally the u.s. should play a role. i don't think they can determine the conversation but i hope they have a stronger take on that. >> thank you, professor. i would like to pass the parliaments before lunch. what would increase the pressure needed to destabilize.

>> they are working together with north korea on the development project the pipeline development despite the demand that [inaudible] will this succeed? to >> it is the same category that could be discussed but if anybody could respond it's up to you. there is a question for you.

>> north korea believes to have nuclear weapons is very important. that's why it hasn't been able to give up. i want to say a few words on the comment that they are playing a history card. i don't like that term. it we are not playing it. it is an issue that unfortunately is becoming very large between china and japan. many people have their own secret agenda but i don't think

that they are playing this in order to make south korea and japan cooperate. i don't think that it ever occurred to the government officials that this would be the endgame. there are allegations that they are playing this for the support legitimacy. you may be able to establish a relationship but to say that china wants to play this card i think that is a bit far-fetched. with regards to the position i think the voting share was in

terms of the position making and i think that some chinese also are concerned saying i heard people in serious positions saying that if we have dominant decision-making power, we would find it very difficult to say no to friends that demand lending. it's like pakistan would say let's have $5 million. should china say yes or no? probably more democratic decision-making would say well other shareholders cannot agree. if you make the decisions more on the commercial basis rather than the commercial.

that would alleviate the chinese anxiety in that regard so there are different opinions on how much of a voting share china should have to maximize its own interest. ..

>> i think we have talked quite a lot about the chinese role as a new leader in the new order. i think, to make it short, in order for china to become a bona fide, genuine g2 global leader, it has to take on certain values that are universally accepted. and. and i think in that sense, the chinese position on north korea will be a litmus test as to whether china is able to both go beyond