and i needn't detailed the mass killings that preceded falling following throughout the 20th century. furthermore they are also expressing in a very eccentric and bizarre way an unease with the nation-state which served us well during industrialization period in mobilizing the country for warfare but it also, it's not so good now that our society is becoming more global, whether we like it or not. we are inextricably combined with one another. economically when one market goes down the other markets throughout the world plummet that day. what happens in the middle east will have a blowback by the

west. we cannot live without one another and yet our nationalistic ideologies encourage us to focus too narrowly on the nation and that is particularly true in the middle east where the nation-states set up by the british and the french 100 years ago were arbitrary, bizarre and put together a whole lot of incompatible peoples and told them to create a nation. very difficult to do. all this set up to fail. and also they are modern and very successful in their economic handling of all the oil that they have been acquiring from their travels. ..

>> i wish i knew. i got into this, this skyped of -- kind of study not because i am filled with religious affilation but because i am filled with dread as i look at where we are going. there is an -- even in our circle tolerance western world

there is a lot of bigotry that reminds me of the bigotry in europe in the 1930's and '40s that ended in the concentration camps. and i feel terribly we are not going back to community -- fear -- and we are into our cell phones, computers and personal facebook. we are retreating from community into a virtual age sort of. and where, i think what we need, if we don't want to do religion anymore, we need to cultivate other ways what the religions did as well as promote warfare and violence and that is telling us to love our enemies and the stranger. if the stranger lives within

your land, do not molest him. you must treat him as one of your own people and live him as yourself. for you were strangers in egypt according to the bible. we have to learn to reach out to the foreigner. in britain we are not doing that at all. we started to demonize the european union. we are all about immigration and keeping them out now and we don't want strangers living in our land. but we are living side-by-side with strangers and unless we manage to create a more inclusive ideaology and reach out as the religions taught us, to include all creatures, not just concerned for your own group, i doubt we will have a viable world to hand on to the next generation. >> karen armstrong, thank you so

much. your book is an absolute riveting book. i honestly couldn't put it down. it has so much history and it is a great story. so thank you for coming on. >> thank you, sally. thank you very much. >> that was after wards. book tv's signature program in which authors of the latest non-fiction books are interviewed by people familiar with their material. after wards airs every weekend on booktv at 10 p.m. an saturday and 12 and 9 on sunday and 12 a.m. on monday. you can watch it online under the series and topics list on the upper right hand side of the page. up next on booktv, after wards

with guest host james swanson. james mcpherson and his book " embattled rebel: jefferson davis as commander in chief" in it the acclaimed historian says the con federate present is an astute strategy man and his failures are not the reason for loosing the confederate war. this program is about an hour. >> host: jim, it is november and lincoln won the presidency. who is jefferson davis nathaniel philbrick fall of 1860? >> he is a congressman and interrupted in the middle of the '50s by the war. he was not a fire eating secessionist but did believe in the right of the south to

succeed. but because he had a strong affinity for the union, for which he had fought in the mexican war, he was a graduate of west point, class of 1828. he was put on a committee of 13. a senate committee of 13 to try to find some way out of the crisis precipitated by the response of the deep south states starting with south carolina to lincoln's election. south carolina immediately called a convention to consider succeeding from the union and everybody expected they would pass it. so congress met in december of 1860 and davis was put on this committee and i think he hoped at first that it might be possible to find some kind of solution to the virgining crisis of this union.

>> host: so davis wasn't a hot head but a man of reason. he didn't fantasize about leading in the field. he would have preferred the secession didn't happen. >> guest: i think that is right. at the time in the 1850's over the crisis in california and the proposal that was the compromise of 1850 he sometimes talked like a fire eater and said if the north doesn't grant us our rights and they mean the right to take slaves into territory and recapture the slave then maybe we should set-up oursel s ourselves. >> host: and davis liked the

north. he travelled in the north, and had northern friends and at one point he said with your great industry and agriculture we will conquer the rest of the continent. >> guest: absolutely. he praised new englanders and when he got back to mississippi after a trip he was criticized pie other politicians for kowtowing to the north and he did have a few friends. he was a man that everybody expected to be the republican candidate for president. steward was a close friend of davis' until the split came and other northern senators. >> host: how did a man who liked the north, caught for the united states, held a cabinet position in the congress and senate, how

did this man end up as the president of the confederate states of america? >> guest: once mississippi c conceded and it was shown nothing acceptable to the south would emerge from the congress of 13 he threw in the lock with the confederacy and resigned from the senate. >> host: people in the audience were reduced to tears. >> guest: that is right. he went back to mississippi and was immediately named as a general and chief of the mississippi state militia. at this stage, there were no confederate states of america yet. there were six and about to be seven states who had succeeded

from the united states. it was clear these states would be facing potential military conflict if the united states army moved in and tried to quote unquote coherse them to stay in the union. he looked forward to the realism that there would be military conflict and then he went home to his plantation at davis bend along the mississippi river where he owned 113 slaves. she -- and while he and his wife were making rose cuttings on the morning of february 10th, 1861 a

messenger came with a telegram from montgomery, alabama where states were meeting and he was informed he was named the provisional president to the confederate states of america. and i think there were two reasons for that. he was known as a moderate for one and not a fire eater. and the confederacy was trying to present to the world and especially to the eight slaves states that had not conceded and even to the other states an image of reasonableness and moderation. and second was military experience. he was a graduate of west point and served seven years in the army and commanded the mississippi regimen.

>> host: and wound in the mexican battle. >> guest: yes, he was a wounded warrior. so there was no man in the south who was better qualified in terms of political experience and especially military training and experience to lead this new nation which its founders anticipated the plight. >> host: he knew about the challenges ahead with the railroads, the ships, the northern industry, the guns and cannons and sirens and every disadvantage the south would face. >> guest: he was a realist. he could read the census returns. he knew the south produced cotton and other staple crops

and earned most of the foreign exchange and had the majority of exports but it was rural society and if war did come it would confront a more modern, diversified economy. so we was well aware of the challenges. and when other -- once the war began, when other southerners expected a short war, he warned them this was likely to be long and difficult and they should recognize it is not going to be an easy task at all. >> host: what were some of the advantages the south began with? 750,000 square miles, a huge agriculture empire and the union wasn't there except for a few forts there were no union troops

in the south. >> guest: that is right. and that is something a lot of people don't really appreciate because it is so obvious it esca escaped attention. and that is unlike most rebellious movements, the confederate states of america began life incomplete political and military control in all of the areas they claimed to control. they didn't have to fight to gain control of the resources of the political institutions. they already had it. so the confederacy could win the war merely by surviving and that is a huge advantage because it takes more to invade and conquer than defend and survive. a lot of -- another advantage or at least another quality that the confederate states had was

potentially strong militarily leadership. not only davis himself but a large number of fairly prominent officers from west point made the commitment to join the confederacy. once virginia joined their names are well known. robert e lee, joseph johnston, joe jackson and a good many others. these were some of the most tale talented officers in the old united states army and they were making a commitment to lead the new confederate state army. so davis, even though the north had twice the population and several times the industrial resources and commercial resources that are valuable if a nation is mobilizing for war, the south had a lot of advantages still which made it possible for davis, although he

expected a difficult and long war, also to be confidant the south could actually win in the sense of surviving. >> host: after the first opening moves, the firing on fort sumpter and the rebellion against authority, the secession of four more states after lincoln called for the 75,000 troops, after that happened, what was the plan? did davis sit down with the top generals saying what is the plan? how do we fight? what were the first strategic plans? >> guest: to mobilize an army and to train that army and point the officers and the administrators that were going to organize and lead that army and to station troops as they

began to volunteer and come in. the confederacy had to rely on the state militia or state volunteer regimens and didn't have a core of the regular army. so to organize to troops and to create an army was the first task. and davis, because of his experience as chairman of the senate committee on military affairs and secretary of war, was quite capable of doing a good job of that. his secretary of state, steven malory, turned out to be a good successor for the navy. the person who davis appoint as secretary of the army, roy walker, wasn't as good. so davis in affect from the very first day was sort of his own secretary of war.

that led to problems later on. >> host: didn't he have five secretary? >> guest: yes and some felt the office was being nothing more than a mere clerk but it was an advantage in the initial stages of the war. he sent sims, who later turned to be a great naval hero for the confederacy, to the north to purchase arms before the war began. and he sent agents abroad to begin purchasing arms. so the initial steps of creating the army. the confederacy did a very effective job and then the question was what do we do with the army? >> host: defend the entire confederacy? >> guest: that is what davis hoped to do initially and part of that was the political pressure from the state government and legislatures.

it became clear, once virginia succeeded and the confederate congress, the convention that formed the confederacy, constituted as a congress, once they made the decision to move the capital to richland after virginians succeeded and invited them to do so, it was clear the heavy fighting would be taking place in virginia where the two capitals of the two countries were only a hundred miles a part. >> host: was that the first bad decision of the confederacy? i realize they had to appease the state of virginia but to put the confederate capital within a hundred miles of washington, d.c. that move. >> guest: i don't think so. as you know, it took the united states army longer to capture

richmond than any other part of the confederacy so it turned out to be quite successful in terms of defending the confederate capital. early in the war, the confederates lost nashville, new orleans and they lost memphis and a number of other places. but it took four years for them to lose richmond so maybe it wasn't such a bad decision. in any case, it was i think an important political decision and that was the main reason for taking that decision in the first place. davis was well aware that one of the cardinal rules of military strategy is the principle of concentration. you should focus your forces in a substantial army that is capable of taking on enemy

armies or two or three substantiate armies. that would dictate one army in virginia and another in the mississippi valley like tennessee, let's say. but for political reasons, davis couldn't adhere to that strategic principle of concentration because the governor of georgia, arkansas and louisiana was insisting their borders have to be defended. >> host: i remember the governor of louisiana said we have 30 regimens and they are all up north. governors didn't want to send troops or uniforms or weapons, no resources wanted to be sacrificed to other states. wasn't that a dilima he faced?

to win the war he has to consolidate the states and make them tow the line and violate state rights to win the war. >> guest: the tension between state rights and all of the political pressures that go along with that was his biggest headache and the smartest military resolution. in the confederation, the united states gave up swaths to britain and they eventually won. and that happened in the confederacy of course, too. but in 1861 it would have been politically impossible for davis to strip the gulf coast, south atlantic coast, of troops in order to defend let's say virginia and tennessee. he had to defer to political

pressure from southern governors to some degree and the disadvantage of that is you have small groups of troops scattered around the parameter of the confederacy. it is sometimes called had perimeter defense or a corded defense. and sooner or later the enemy breaks through the thin gray line and that happened in february of 1862 and the loss of fort mcdonald and louisiana and failure in kentucky and west virginia and the enemy begins to penetrate the line. and as a consequence of that, davis actually admitted, not publically, but privately, it may have been a mistake to try defend the entire frontier of the confederacy and changes the strategy. and in the course of doing so provokes an awful lot of

controversy and descent from the governors of people from georgia for example. >> host: and davis says in 1865, and i think publically, that no single point is vital for the confederacy. if he had had that attitude in 1861 he might have had more freedom of action to be more successful. >> guest: he might have. but i think it was politically impossible. it is one thing to say in theory that is right but another to say in fact. i don't think he had a choice in 1861. but in 1862 he does begin to focus the bulk of the first line troops in the confederacy and three or so major field armies in virginia, in tennessee and mississippi and those three

states primarily. not only the concentration but the development of what he on two or three occasions called the strategy of the offensive/defensive. a modern analogy would be the coach that says the best defense is a good offense. and robert e lee who became davis' principle military partner. his best general and also his closest confidant among military commanders was a practitioner of saying the best way to defend the confederacy was to seize opportunities to take offensive against enemy armies and knock them on their heels. >> host: let's turn to the snake pit of davis' inner circle.

let's talk about the men that commanded the armies and what thorns were in his side. joe johnston, beau regard and talk about the disobedience. is it a case of having a hard time managing the generals? >> guest: that is correct. he had a hard time managing the egos of the general. some had a high opinion of themselves and a low opinion of davis and they came into conflict very early after the first confederate victory in the war.

beauregard was concerned about taking credit for that. he issued a report taking full credit and blamed davis for not turning him loose to do more damage to the yankees. that began the process of deteriation of the generals. he sent him to the theater in february of '62 and beauregard was commander of the army after being second in command and then took an unauthorized leave of absence and he was removed from command and they never got along after that. joseph johnston, the senior command in virginia, entered into a coral about his rank among the generals and then as commander of what he called the

army of the potomac. there were two armies so it is confusing in the latter half of 61 and 62. but the confederate army in virginia was also called the army of the potomac and joe johnston was the commander and he believed he knew better than davis and believed if he kept davis informed on what he would do, davis would overrule his command decisions and feared a link of information if he kept davis informed on what he was going to do and the relationship between those generals began to decline. when it looked in may of 1862 like johnston might give up richmond in order to keep his

armys they came in sharp conflict. if johnston wasn't wounded in 1862 who knows what would have happened. but he was and robert lee became the commander of northern virginia and there began a positive partnership between lee and jefferson davis. >> host: he never had that with johnt johnston. he could not trust him to carry out an attack. didn't he surrender even? >> guest: that is right. but by that time the confederate government was almost dead. it was in character for johnston

to defy davis' orders because he did so many times. >> host: talk about davis' personality because he has a bad rap of being jealous, egotistical and unyielding and impossible. but at the end of the book you say the generals are more to blame for the relationships and the souring of connections. >> guest: i think that is quite true and especially true in the case of beauregard and johnston and others too but particularly this cases. he had a reputation of being ridged and holding a grudge, thin skin about criticism and that is not entirely a myth. like most stereotypes there is something under there is a little bit of fire under that smoke. but i think his character and

personality has been defined by his critic downs the road not only among the generals but state governors like joe brown of virginia being the best example. lewis wigfield of texas being an outstanding example. certain editors from the charleston mercury and john daniel from the richmond examiner for example were people who hated davis from the outset or came to hate him. and they have shaped, i think,much of our stereotype perceptions of davis' personality defects. and i think it is that he was never able to fight off some of these stereotypes except among innercircle and people that knew him well like robert lee and his

cabinet official and others who had a positive and close relationship with davis and found him to be warm and personalable among the people who were close to him. he didn't have much sense of humor like lincoln. that is the great depressiest c suppose between the commander and chief. he could be warm and personable with people he liked and liked him. but i think he has been defined my enemies more so. he had to deal with quite a few people. >> host: he was unlike lincoln in that way. being the men are a hundred miles apart in their whitehou

whitehouse's. >> guest: and born less than a hundred miles away as well. >> host: they were similar types. they were calm headed. and i thought they had one ultimate thing but each

one set conditions they knew were not acceptable to the other. so neither davis nor lincoln had any confidence or hope that peace negotiations would results in actual peace and that is why lincoln made the statement and davis would have agreed a hundred percent with that statement. davis was the last confederate standing quite literally.

everybody else in the south, by may of 1865, had given up. but not davis. he was still trying to get away, escape and hope to get across the mississippi to texas maybe to kirby smith and his army was the last confederate army to surrender and continue to the war from there. the war wasn't really over until davis was captured and implies. >> host: davis wasn't fleeing for his life trying to escape the country or find refuge. he wanted to fight off and formed the danville proclamation. >> guest: and another time he said i will lead the cause if there is one man who will follow

me. >> host: at one point during the retreat when the soldiers split off and he was left with his wife and several children, there was a war conference and davis said what is wrong? why don't you want to fight on and they said the war is over mr. president and with disdain he said why are you with me? and they said all of us will die to save you, your wife and children but it is over. >> guest: we cannot be sure what we thought privately but he would not admit it publically. >> host: do you think it was because he wanted history to record he held nothing back and gave his all to the cause? there wasn't one more thing he

could have done? >> guest: i think that is right. >> host: you mentioned no one was more involved with war planning than him. would he have been better off being general and chief and not commander? >> guest: he might have been better off -- excuse me -- if he had been general in chief or maybe secretary of war he was a wo workaholic and he could not delegate authority and that is why he went through five secretary of war because he was his own secretary of war for major decisions and even the

minor administratorive aspects of managing a military. davis put in long days. he would sign off and approve even the promotion of lieutenants and things like that. he would have been better off if he had been willing to delegate some of the authority. if he had not worked so hard and had managed to get enough rest and enough regular meals, i think he would have been in better shape to make important strategic decisions. i think part of what people saw as a irascible personality was the result of stress and terrible illness/poor health. not only was davis more involved

in hands-on military leadership and planning than any other chief executive in america history but he suffered from more maladies and sickness and illness than any other chief executive in american history. he was virtually blind in one eye, suffered from serious pain, serious headaches, reoccurrence of old malaria fever, and what is called dispepsia which is a catch-all term for stomach problems. >> host: he had the same malaria that killed his first wife. >> guest: that is right which he never really got over. he would have to take to his sick bed for weeks at a time but

continued to work 12-14 hour days. but i think his ill health, stress and overwork contributed to what other people saw as his irrascibility and his temper and his grudges against people. he would have been better off if he had been more like ronald reagan and let the other people handle it. >> host: didn't he di dispespis people who would not do the same. davis said the army of the confederacy doesn't do personal favors and he viewed himself

above doing anything for self-serving reasons and if he thought you were a person who did that he would write you off. >> guest: that is right. >> host: if you look back at the course of the war, what were the two or three greatest moments? were there points where they almost pulled it off and won? >> guest: july 21st, 1861 was the first big day. davis wanted to be with the army when they faced their first touch but he had to stay in richmond because the confederate congress was scheduled to meet there for the first time on july 20th. but on july 21st, he took a special chain and chucked up

to -- train -- chugged up there and arrived on the battlefield at the time of victory and joined the two officers at their head quarters and urged them to follow up the victory with continuation of attack. they more or less talked him out of it. >> host: didn't he show up on the field on a horse? >> guest: yes. and he said follow me back to the battlefield and some did. beauregard thought davis was trying to take credit for the victory by this kind of behavior and that was, i think, a source of tension between beauregard and davis -- the beginning of it perhaps. that was a high point for davis. he didn't think it would make

them win the war like many other southerns, thou-- southerners. >> host: you might neither davis or lincoln knew what the war would cost. let's say one side knew what it would cost at the end, if they could look into the future, would one side had made a commitment in 1861 we know is not imagineable to them? would they have done everything they could have done to take washington in the summer of 1861 or would they launch the offensive which they failed to do? >> guest: we cannot know the answer to that question. davis did want to follow-up to the bull run but i don't think he necessarily thought they could capture washington. but they could inflict more damage on the army.

the other question you asked, though, if lincoln or davis or both had known in 1861 what it would take to carry on the war for four years, would they have made that commitment -- well, we cannot know the answer to that question either. we do know as the war went on and the cost was clear, both were determined to fight on rather than concede to the en y enemy. so they would have been willing if that is any indication in 1861. but that is something we cannot know for certain. another high point for the confederacy came in june, jul

and august of 1862 when lee was commanded and he planned an offensive immediately and davis supported him. and lee carried it out, moved to northern virginia and won the second battle and baited maryland. the confederacy was on a roll. the prelateish and french -- and this was the battle of kentucky and retreat of both of the

principle confederate armies after the battles. it came as a setback in davis' eyes. but the confederacy bounced back. and then the invasion of pennsylvania which davis gave lee full support for that. he was not able to give lee as many troops as lee hoped for in that invasion but did give the entire support for that even though some members of the cabinet wanted to weaken lee's army and send divisions to tennessee to deal with those threats. that is the third high point for davis and confederacy. maybe one more is the summer of 1864 when davis is actually in

the battlefield of virginia as grant and butler are closing in on richmond. the cost of the war in virginia is causing an upswelling of sentiment in the north and it looks like lincoln is going to be defeated for re-election and at least the democrats on the peace platform will win the presidency. >> host: i do believe lincoln's note. i think there was a time he thought he was going to lose. >> guest: no question about it. here is how the confederacy

could have quote unquote merely won the war by holding out and not loosing. so while i don't think davis necessarily saw this as a high point in the same way that the actual victories, back in 1861, 1862 and 1863 were high points, nevertheless, the outlook appeared promising because it looked like the north was going throw in the towel. and then the greatest blow to davis was atlanta and he blamed joe johnston for that and he was probably right about johnston's failure to carry out more effective defense and davis removes him from command. >> didn't someone say joe johnston would have fought the

battle in florida? >> guest: he kept retreating and at key west he could not have retreated any further. >> host: i want to pause on the myth of gegettysberg. is it today what it was then? did lincoln or davis think that was the low point where they have lost the war? >> guest: in the eyes of the confederacy, it wasn't such a disaster. in the eyes of the northern people not so much lincoln, it was a huge victory and got a lot more press than the capture in vicks berg even. in part because the media center of the country as was in the northeast and the army of the

potomac, most of the soldiers came from the eastern states in that area, so it had a huge impact on northern public opinion. but not so much in the south in terms of the actual strategy of the war. i think vicksberg was more important. in terms of the politics, the fall of atlanta was more important. but gettysburg had a special place more in retrospect than at the time. he was disappointed he didn't follow up the defensive tactical of the union army with on offensive strategy that might have inflicted even more serious damage on the army of northern virginia as it was trapped north of the potomac river for ten

days. we would have maybe had more aggressive general after that. >> host: maybe grant would have stepped in to took care of that. >> guest: it is possible. >> host: i notice in the book you confess you began with a bias and didn't think much about davis. you were union man admittedly. as you got to know davis better by working on the book did you develop a sympathy and understanding and any affection? what do you think of him now? >> guest: i still think he was on the wrong side of history and the wrong side of the victory.

i think if the confederate succeeded it would have been a disaster for the course of american development. so i have not changed my mind on that. but if you grant davis his principles and perception and i came to have, if not more sympathy for him, maybe more empathy, would be the right world and i can put myself in his place. and now i am a confederate and pro-slavery man. i am jefferson davis and these are my convictions and i will stand by them and here is how i want to defend them and defend the new country that i have played a principle part in creating. i came to have more of an understanding of him if you grant those things. and in part that was because i

conceived a dislike for some of his strongest critics people like beauregard or joe brown of georgia. i think they were more harmful than davis and in a sense i came to have a certain degree of empathy and that surprised me. >> host: i wondered what you would say about that because i had the same dilimia. at one point in the book i thought is something wrong with me? am i starting to side with the confederacy? i wasn't but i developed the empathy you did and looking at the issues he faced.

it was an interesting feeling because i didn't come out of my book pro-slavery just like you did not but it was interesting to put our several in his shoes. >> guest: when i started the book, i wasn't sure i should even be writing it because i didn't think i could put myself in his shoes but the more i got into it, the more i was carried along by the story and the drama of the story and my attempt to understand and even appreciate what he was doing. >> host: can you give a list, two or three or four, of the best generals? the go-to men he could rely on? >> guest: there is no question robert e lee was the foremost one.

and i came to have sympathy with brag than i had had before. i had accepted the usual stereotype that he was a poor general. and in that case, davis stuck with brag too long. i changed my mind on both of those. i don't think brag was as bad as the critics who were self-serving and within the army of tennessee. and i think davis did try to replace brag. he tried to get joe johnston to take command of that. ...

>> guest: cost him an arm and a leg, yeah so i guess you could say that was one of davis's best generals but he is one that davis had a growing confidence in and that is why he appointed head as johnson's successor. and hood after all did keep sherman out of atlanta for six weeks and looks to davis whether he was right or wrong but looked to davis like johnson was going to abandon atlanta. >> host: and he and johnson

was no better than lincoln's mcclellan. >> guest: that's right, absolutely. johnson was davison's mcclellan, that's exactly right. i guess the advantage there goes to lincoln because he got rid of mcclellan and sooner than davis got rid of johnson. >> host: during davis' presidency was he ever nationally beloved? was he a great hero of the south or did that really belong to the generals? it's my impression that davis became a beloved hero of a lost cause after the war and his long lifetime after that. he survived lincoln by 24 years. did the first love of the south during the war belonged to lee and stonewall and not jefferson davis? >> guest: yes that's true. on the other hand i don't think davis was as unpopular among the ordinary people in the confederacy as the image we might have from the newspapers and h