integrated at the source. you had the professional negotiations in a certain track and you have a secret channel also run out of the state department by the secretary of state coburn's with white house involvement come, and the two were connected at the hip. so, if we did our case studies this might prove to be one of the most efficient uses of a variety of envoy types. but it would also approve the idea that you need people with the improvement, expertise and the system to be able to maintain the integrity of the efforts. >> let me put a punctuation on the particular comment because i think it is something that we haven't talked about. there was a special envoy it was just named the national security

council official until we talked out about it. and that is what happened. they ran it on the council and there was some coordination. secretary kerry was involved in terms of some of the key meetings. i do think that the example i would agree with there was a special envoy for iran. his name was bill burns. he was in the system and he was not named. all of the authority he had the undersecretary for political affairs and also backing him up with a huge amount of senior attention. and i think that it was that model you have to look at. i just don't think that every situation in which the u.s. can make a difference to have that kind of involvement for senior officials. but i think that it is a really important case. but we see this and other cases. one of the wording the workings that is in the paper is about just don't do something because the conversations as you should

do it. you need to look at how to do it but there is a way of dealing with those issues through the double concept that is mentioned in the paper. so for example in the china relations they always get a short trip to. there are people that are working on it within the u.s. government but it also gives short trip. so the congress says there has to be a special coordinator. ..what did the bush administratn do? they appointed paula dobriansky as the special coordinator for tibet and i think that did help politically for the administration as well as internally to say, yes, we need to think more about these issues and how we deal with those issues. i think that kind of fusion approach is something that is useful to consider. >> there has to be a decision taken at the outset. is the special envoy, especially when it's a publicly known

envoy, therefore symbolic purposes, or to actually do stuff? >> you concede that there can be some value in the symbolic? >> depends on the situation. >> yeah, but it's also -- it's also -- it's also somewhat deceptive to your international interlocutors. you're pretending to have a stake in it, an y'reing to if you still have the support behind it to do so. it highlights the issue, but i've known people in that situation and i described it like walking into the jungle. you are out there with nothing behind you. >> you know, princeton, there is a reality show about that. >> tom, a little bit of diplomatic experience in that. one thing, in the 2006 lebanon israel war broke out, and one of those cases where they had four

talking heads, three from congress were all very upset if we had not appointed an envoy to solve the problem. when they got to me i said i don't have a problem. i first would like to see what our policy is. it kind of struck everybody at strange that we were asked the question. what is the envoy being asked to do and is it symbolic to raise the flag and it actually hurts our interest. >> i may address the congress question. >> i decided to brief points and questions. i'm very supportive of the idea that dm kurtzer raise. it is an excellent report, but it is very clear that there is a next level, if i can put it this way, understanding the details. it would be enormously valuable as the process goes ahead and

particularly in the area of conflict resolution and i think the rest of you out there are probably tilting in that direction. the second question is a broader question. for a number of you i slid into the question of envoys who were not there to deal with conflicts is we understand the word conflicts. and they raised a different sort of set of situations, some of which are very much parallel to what the report is considered in some go beyond now. some of them i think transgress the number of the lines you have drawn that in some ways be very useful. so i raised the question, isn't it time now for somebody, whether it be instituted east, economy of diplomacy, the cute ddr process, contracting people from outside, whatever we want to do. obviously paying attention to the knowledge to do that. in many ways over the years,

there is a process in the state department of being light on these kinds of people and often gathering them to create a new bureau. then cases come in the absorption of these people into the structure was the natural elements of what had to be done. people think the state department wasn't paying attention and wanted a special envoy. over a period of time we needed a bureau with experience working with the subject rather than what i would call the attention like that are the special envoy. there is also finally the question of how does the special envoy relationship, particularly in conflict resolution accord with the rest of our policies? you have touched on some of that in the natural conflict if i could put it this way, between the functional bureaus, particularly those that deal with democracy and human rights in the more difficult questions that arise in conflict resolution. i'd be grateful if you address

the two questions to other special kinds of appointments and the other question of how and in what way the special envoys have to take care of attention to look at the rest of u.s. foreign policy analysis into the context of which aware. thank you. >> well, from your work on the qddr, you know, we didn't try to take on the whole question because the conflict had special characteristics. but putting your finger on the problem is elected the number of special envoys and it's almost the same from one administration to another. you talk about 25 or more special envoys. they are supposed to report to the secretary of state. you realize in addition to the regular structures you really have an unworkable structure. [inaudible]

>> yeah. so it is not bad to put the center, some of them under a structured euro and therefore have another secretary handling more of that. i think we have to be very careful about the proliferation into areas that it can sometimes become more symbolic. and i think it deserves more attention. on the conflict with other policies, this is very important. we try to deal with cyprus and our relationship with turkey and nato. i would touch on that in the report. i experienced it in needing the cooperation of ethiopia, absolutely critical to our policy. we had other issues over democracy and human rights. balancing not what the rest of the u.s. government, those are legitimate concerns. these aren't illegitimate when you are running up against it. what's the challenge when you

have to work it out and find out where the balance should be. but does happen all the time and that is where you need a policy prostatitis that will get at those, address it and come to an agreement. we needed a tough peacekeeping operation. the u.n. had failed there and the only ones who could go were ethiopian. now there's all these others that are my god, one more thing we are dependent upon. but we worked it through. we looked at it and everybody says you're right, we need them. you have to go through the process. >> i'll just say something briefly about combating envoys. it is a great point and i was thinking about whether i should talk about it or not because the focus of the pay-per-view it is

a challenge if you look at the 25 envoys alone on the page, there's all different kinds of things. we were very much -- i come to this issue in the context of the human rights issues, with a bureau of democracy, human rights and labor, which somewhat challenge shouldn't exist in any case and there should be part of the thematic piece of every regional bureau. but they themselves are very upset about the fragmentation of the various human rights issue and for example the office of religious freedom of the trafficking office, which is something i know most about. i think it is difficult because mike pozen are used to complain to me that he would come to new delhi and the first thing that the ambassador would complain about was the trafficking office and why were they creating such problems. he was unable to talk about his agenda appeared at the same time

come the trafficking office didn't exist. i wonder where the issue would be. i miss talking points at the ambassador like never mentioned. this is the kind of challenge that has to be worked through and thought about and it's tough. you probably have to look on a case-by-case basis to figure out the right answer. i agree with you that we should broaden his conversation to figure out when it makes sense and when it doesn't. >> so a couple quick comments and i appeared to be losing my voice. i am just so moved. one, to pick up this theme of case studies, we thought about doing the qddr on a case study model. it is really much more effective and useful from the outside than the night. there is a tendency for every after action report to say nothing went wrong, everything is perfect and the several useful if we are going to be honest and talk about individuals because i think

their comedic tendency to not want to criticize folks and if we are going to learn from this and this is something we are going to look at the qddr, how to become a more learning institution for more people are taking summer has if you understand if things don't go right it's an opportunity to learn and do better the next time and this is of course the essence of what we preach in terms of entrepreneurship and innovation in the private sector. it's about taking risk and pain off over time. we don't all the reasons, but many of the reasons in parker c. and how the reacts in the media and those kind of things. if you are basically trying to manage against failures that are managed for success, it is a deadening environment and we know we still attract the best and the brightest into these institutions. but how do we do that?

been able to get more comfortable inside and out with case studies and being able to say yes, this was the right and to try. it did not work out, but this is why. we are really trying to look at that. i want to go on the policy issue. something i wrote when i was in the think tank before i came in this amount of public record. you let that emerging for that first year and a half and structurally speaking you not only have the state on the other equities, you have something >> dab between nea and nui. you have jordan, turkey, israel and lebanon all having slightly different attitudes towards this. i think it's fair to say what the u.s. gives to the question, was it a structural problem, i think we can look at these case studies both where an envoy came in and where they didn't come in.

, congress aimed for those who does know i'm a former member of congress, so let me speak both pillows my kind and defend them a little bit. i think congress is bored. they don't pass a lot of flaws anymore. when they do, it is usually midnight in december when they're trying to go home. and so, i this makes the ability to play in some of these sandboxes more appealing. and so whether that is calling people up for oversight or issues or whether it is wanting to show that they are doing something on a particular crisis around the world. in their defense, however, and i made this clear with my colleagues at the state, the state does not always do the best job of really engaging with the hill respectfully and substantively.

i think that it can be -- we are trying to save the world here and you will call us up for another hearing, so we are going to give vague answers and try to get back to doing what we're doing. when congress acts in way that they're essentially only showing a further three minutes of questioning to show they were waiting for you possibly miss a something and not come to a headline. of course you start to manage the failure instead of success. i think i cycle is not great. there's also history over the years of feeling like particularly in some of the issues of human rights and corruption as state has sometimes aired on the state of bilateral novation ship in the standpoint of the hill that there have been more and more attempts to leverage envoys are other things because the sensitives is getting short trips, which of course means you are having -- you are having some policy coherence because the lack of officials who write

your budget have basically made a decision that you're not getting the balance right and those who are running the policy from the state believe this is the right policy. we often think about the nsc state split or functional regional split on this. we do preach democracy around the world and members of congress were elected. granted some of that is for the highest bidder and totally manufactured, redistricted mayhem. nonetheless elect it. you see this, another context. one issue that comes up a lot in the qddr has been the issue of physical security. this is relevant in this because we're talking about complex areas to some extent. this is an issue before benghazi for the kenya mall attack you can see for humanitarian organizations the complex risk out i was gone up considerably. a number of countries and

conflicts, et cetera and how we operate. then you have again with the hill relationship if i were still up there in the people to not have that be the case, people in my district and it was being asked to vote, i would want to go meet them. i'm the one who has to cast that vote. i'm the one of us to write the check. the last thing you want is a bunch of yahoo congresspeople coming down on the syrian border. i'd ink and all of these things, there really is genuine understanding. there are good arguments on both sides and i think the attitude probably has been escalating and i think that is part of what the special phenomenon comes for here at the fact that congress only has a limited set of tools, weakening the special envoy,

demand the report. to some extent we can aramark funding but that requires them to get the budget passed. this is done being where again as someone who did have to represent people and people worked their tails off to pay taxes and those are the taxes that pay for state operations and aid operations, that's got to be an important part of the conversation. >> talk about diplomacy and development. >> just to push back a little bit, there is an opportunity for a special envoy. one of the things that princeton could talk about if he had good relations on the hill, good relations and civil society mutinied those laces a force multiplier if you use them in the right way. i think a lot of times the secretary, which we haven't talked about our special envoys to some smaller cases might be good to talk about at some

point. there's a lot of issues that particular member has said they want to raise with them and talk about their own pet rock. he contacted members of congress in a travel. they can reinforce messages and so there is utility that can be done and i think you are right. the state doesn't use that in the most effective way. >> i will acrobat. i find it surprising that more chiefs of mission don't see every special rap is an opportunity to bring someone in. you can get press coverage, meanings of civil society and provide an issue in a world where government to government traditional diplomatic contact is less and less global equation and how things play out in the media i do think there's an opportunity to use each one of these offices to say hey, i'm the ambassador to sri lanka did a lot of this. i see tallgrass in there that i

can bring an and used creatively to push a message that i'm proactively doing. that is different than when you decide on a message in your country and someone wants to come in and mess up the strategy. these can be i think a huge opportunity. >> i did one other point and it cuts to your current work. that is the state department been decades behind in internal structural reform. as david said earlier in today's program, the tendency has been always to add on additional layers rather than take a hard look at the way the building is structured to do what we are supposed to so that if an ambassador feels that he or she has been bothered by the work has been decided is important for policy, then it's reflection of the ambassador's failure, but also the building failure. years ago there was discussion about doing in the state department put the military had

done in the 80s, which was in power secretaries to become undersecretaries who would then be able to make policy choices on how conflict resolution, human rights, labor issues, trafficking all fit in and should be able to call and resources the way of regional commanders do in the military. i think until we start to take a look at that, we are going to be confronted not only with problems with special envoys because they in a sense almost need to proliferate when you have it named a set policy priority choices. i think the connection between policy priorities and structure is not that suspicion. >> let me make one more. the lad. the >> did you consider the possibility that there is some conflict in which the united states is used by both and so by

the favor of one that has been significant influence with both and if they're really just his piece, we might refrain from the diplomatic initiatives, which are likely to prove futile and provide support to others that might have more chance of success. [booing] i will let dan talk about that. to some extent there was a great deal of sympathy in the united states in congress in the restoration of long wars and desire for independence and on the other side with what it happened and are for, et cetera in sudan. so opposed an issue, but on the other hand it was not a conflict at which we can step back entirely. we did in my case part because we didn't talk to the president

of sudan, relied as the print full negotiating body the africa union's panel for this purpose by south african and so we did in my case needs of an effect i diplomacy in support of the process. but we had spent as i testified with congress, between 2005 and 2010, spent $10 billion on the south sudan conflict. we had a big stake in it. we couldn't quite walk away. >> it is a different situation. most of our diplomacy was aimed at other europeans. we had a situation -- we created what was called the office of the high representatives. the first one of whom was carl bill, former foreign minister sweden. and our problem was not so much

keeping the bosnians in line as i was making sure we were more or less on the same page with the europeans. since that also involve russia, that was at times very difficult. people still called in the u.n. high representative. he was not the u.n. high records than it is because you are had a healthy destruction so it was intentionally kept separate from the united nations and still is. >> i would add coming initial and people are asking a question they are asking about the israeli conflict. i'm not trying to read your mind that it's probably a fair reading of the question. united states should be involved in this conflict resolution process to the extent those sides want us involved. the reality has been come even though we have a special

relationship of the state of israel that we do not have at the palestine liberation organization, the reality has always been that both sides have wanted us to be at least involved if not actually the primary third-party. that may be changing and today we are now coping with dealing with a palestinian move to the united nations. it is healthy for the issue to be taken up in multilateral fora. when it comes down to actual negotiating between israelis and palestinians, the go to party has been the united states. my complaint substantively on the issue has been as much as we talk about being serious as a third-party mediator, we really haven't been. we have a policy problem where we haven't imbued the secretary of state for envoy with enough authority and power to actually go out into what the united

states national interests would dictate our envoy trying to do. >> i want to give the authors the last word here. i will say one thing, which is i think one of the things that i am hopeful about what special envoys and with the state department in general is getting people in this will sound cheesy, getting people excited about peacebuilding. we are at war weary country. you see that on the right and the left. the isolationist fever isn't as bad as a year ago, but people i think it is an important moment for us to talk about diplomacy and development as part of the answer to the question, is there going to be another 795 years to not commit 10 years from now? diplomacy is part of that in the context of individual conflicts and otherwise. in some cases that is the deputy secretary. this is something where i

actually want to capture the united imagination of the united people. in the last two years of your name is in the paper that somehow is wrong. you're not to bring attention to yourself, better appeared with that in a world that can be impart about personality. holbrooke wrote a book, and more. people like the red and achieved a huge impact on our lives. that's not because he was a perfect demand and everyone got along perfectly. it was about an aspiration in this way and one of the things we're looking not in the broader context is getting people excited about diplomacy. i joke with the secretary that they have a hollywood liaison almay niece and nephews know exactly what we're thinking what a soldier inspires. they do not know a diplomat is. there's been some tv shows that

it started to play that out. but we want to look at case studies not to learn from them, but also to celebrate. the most enjoyable part of my job has been to see amazing work that nobody hears about that our folks are doing everyday to try to build peace and policy out of poverty. to me this is part of getting better. we've got to get better, that is beyond us. but we also want to tell the story about the fact that the american people, one of the things they support of this kind of effort. with that, i will hand it to you all with our thanks for the report. >> i couldn't agree more. peacemaking and conflict resolution is tough work. people wouldn't have gone to war if the words for some very difficult issues at stake. while the use of special envoys are senior members of the department so empowered, it really takes a lot of people

involved to get this done. that is why using the full instruments of the depart and, if the envoy doesn't do that it is a mistake. beyond that, multilateral institutions and allies is absolutely critical. you have to be engaged and sometimes it takes a very long time. i couldn't agree more. this is an area of the u.s. can invest a great deal more in and i think will serve us very well in the future. >> i'd like to make about six points. the first just don't take the job if you don't know the issues. the second is know the local players. you have to reach out to them. in sarajevo.net not only the politicians. and that politicians not very much. but another grand multi, to know

the cardinal, to know the head of the jewish community, these were the people who are really making policy in cultural terms and cultural tearooms are key. third in assists and set in one way or another, no dynamics in washington. if you haven't got the game down, it is not going to work. though the interest of other players. i mention the europeans. the organization of the islamic conference, nato, all of these elements have to be factored into the mix if you are going to do your job. know the limits of the possible. in the early stages in bosnia, not much was possible except preventing starvation in preventing any more mass executions. and finally, take the long view. ask yourself, how would i like

this place to look in 10 years and how can we get there? when i was in the army, where the surgeon is that if you don't know where you are going, you will never get there. also true for special envoys. >> thank you all very much. have a wonderful holiday. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations]

>> democrat tend to get a little bit more upset because i think it has brought us to the myth of the liberal media and kind of think the media is on their side. for a republican and the liberal media kind of expect that they

are going to be a not fair to me. i kind of thing -- i hope over the last four years i have done enough backing for his, treated those parties with equal fervor that people have now come to grudgingly say okay, here is someone we can do business with. i know that the senate majority pac, affiliated with harry reid, they stopped answering my questions midway through the campaign season because they felt they were not getting a fair shake for me.

>> good morning, everyone. my name is jonathan schanzer, vice president for defense of democracies. i want to welcome you here today to an event on a new report that we issued just a few weeks ago. this one bordering on terrorism. turkey comes. policy and rise of the islamic state. i am one of the authors. to my right is also one of the authors and we have endeavored here to cobble together some information that has been in at

a time organized than they can thirded fashion. the report was the first of the new center on sanctions and the list of finance. we are very proud of that. they're also very proud to welcome our distinguished panelists today. i want to quickly introduce david jackson who will be our moderator today and then he can then in turn run the show. before it do that, i want to remind everybody if you would least turn off your cell phones, including our panelists. we look forward to a free-flowing conversation that is underway. david jackson to my fire last is a veteran journalist. he was the bureau chief for "time" magazine. he has worked for the defense department. he has. he has worked for face of america state department come executive editor at the "washington times" and we are

pleased to have been here today to ask some probing questions of all of us. david, i turn it to you. >> thank you, john and thank you all for joining us. turkey has historically been known as a crossroad on a bridge between east and west. recent years has growing concerns at turkey has become a crossroad not of civilization but of terrorist financing and fighters across turkey southeastern border into the cauldron of conflict in syria and iraq. do with horror from the center on sanctions on on sanctions and melissa finances raises a lot of important issues in those issues will be the focus of our conversation this morning. the issues include the threat of terrorism, the will of nato, turkey's leadership and policies in the ongoing flight of the kurds, just to name a few. you'll see brief bios of our panelists in the program so i'll

keep our introductions even briefer. tony bridge onto my right is researched my right as research alert foundation for a democracy who is specialized in lebanon, syria and has left. he was born and raised in lebanon and has written extensively on hezbollah. jamie deborah next to him as a journalist and broadcaster with "the daily beast" as well as voice of america. jamie hazlett on every continent and has covered a range of stories as broad as its travels would apply for u.s. politics to ukraine. dr. jonathan schanzer is vice president of schanzer is vice president of accounting issues letter to the democracies has worked as a terrorist and fire a terrorist and fire eros at the u.s. department of treasury and is a research fellow at the washington institute for middle east policy. dr. schanzer is also a political author like his co-panelists has contributed to a number of national and international

publications. we are also fortunate to have his co-author of this report with us today. there they who was born and raised in istanbul brings both a personal and scholarly perspective on the region that we will be focusing on. we will start out by asking john to speak a few minutes about the report and then we'll open the discussion to our panelists and halfway through this morning's meeting will open to questions from the ideas she is the next thank you a match, david. the bottom line of fire which war of fire which war is if something reported on by many journalists at this point and actually they have drawn parallels on multiple occasions to the fact that turkey has become a shower of the new g5 e.'s. it has become the transit point for fighters, for weapons, cash

and other material that a range of jihadi organizations in the searing machine, but also the kurds and other factions in the celiac and her. this is of course deep and troubling. there are indications that the turks may not have full control over this phenomenon. there is of course 565-mile border on turkey's southeast bordering syria that would make it exceedingly difficult for turks to be able to monitor all of this activity. however, we have also seen reports that turkish border police and the military turning a blind eye or perhaps even facilitating some of this activity. we continue to see the phenomenon even not as isis has taken over territory on the

border as sales continue in turkey seems to be contributing to the financial windfall that isis has enjoyed. the question of why turkey has done this or why turkey would be doing this is something that i think continues to plague policymakers. on one hand, turkey is a nato ally of and a strong u.s. ally traditionally. nevertheless, we have seen on the part of the regime a determination to bring down the saudi regime amongst this long and brutal civil war and perhaps even to use these jihadi fighters not only to bring down saturday, but it's kurdish enemies inside syrian territory. these things are not at all clear. we and clarity on this. in fact, there's been open disagreements between vice president by again and president

theodore want in turkey, of course everybody remembers in october there was an open flap about this tensions remain. in fact today, there are people who are openly questioning turkey's place in 80 beside mine is isis continues at march the criteria and the turks have done very little to help. in fact, they have refused to allow the u.s.-led coalition to take part in military activities from turkish soil. we will look into some of these issues today. i can tell you again today this is still cloudy in terms of what the turks have deliberately done and what they have allowed to have taken place. we will hopefully discuss some of that today. would you like to talk about some of the domestic aspects of this as well?

>> yes, of course. turkey's opposition has been highly critical of the policy for several reasons. specifically with regards to isis, they have been very critical because they too share this idea on karen might have turned a blind eye and that in turn has allowed isis to establish a presence in turkey as we detailed in our report in places like istanbul and on corrupt, not even in the southeast bordering cities, but the most important domestic challenge, the political challenges the kurdish question for the atp government has been engaged in peace talks with the pkk turkish kurdish organization. but what has been happening with isis in syria and the territories they are controlled by an off shoot of the pkk has put these talks in a stalemate

because the turkish kurds are very much seen on correct is turning a blind eye perhaps in part because they want to isis to fight against the kurdish groups that are in syria right now is a political gain, as leveraging two views in these peace talks, which is causing disenchantment in turkish kurdish population. ingres in the process. >> jamie, you were just last month. how does this all look from the ground? >> is impossible really to be covering this hearing civil war for the last few years.

i suppose the short answer would be on his own site. you open your remarks by saying that additionally turkey has been seen as a bridge between the west and the east. i am not so sure that his admission that the current president in turkey would endorse. but the piasecki morte eastward in south and sees turkey as a regional player, a major regional player which can decide its own agenda, its own policy, so interest which aren't always coinciding with nato. reporters viewpoint is down on the border. the border from east to west have traveled into syria. jonathan's remarks were about its hard to monitor the border. it is very noticeable that on the kurdish side closer rat, not order is pretty well locked out. it is actually very, very hard to cross illegally.

of course they're not allowing people to cross at the moment. on the more sunni side, it is very open. the geography is slightly different. it is more mountainous on the western side. but if for example you go down to the border gate, you have the main entry point which is monitored and controlled at the turkish arms and the immigration service. there is an illegal way in right by the camp and it is never going backwards or forwards by the turkish authorities. you can meet people, for example, with ease inside turkey. a missouri on the border hides the family and is frequently visiting. whether they are for a moose or a bore isys travel on the jihadi

express biplane and istanbul usually. so there aren't any real sign that turkish authorities are trying to close it down. for months, you've been able to see from across the border isis controls the oil field in syria. only recently has there been some action by the turkish authorities to close the smuggling down a bit, but you can still see tracks filled with oil barrels going back and forth in the pipelines -- artificial pipelines being created are still functioning. there's questions raised about what turks now are doing. i didn't describe the idea that turkey is an agent of isis, but i do think the current regime in turkey sees isis is one of your agents or someone they can control for various reasons. transfer mentioned it could be

useful, but i think it was a very dramatic demonstration of the different attitudes of the authorities and angry towards the kurds in isis which they wouldn't join a coalition, but they did bomb for the first time since 2012 in southeast turkey. i think there is also the viewpoint that they are the ones who are most likely to topple assad and that is the key policy. to get rid of assad. there is also the fear that if assad is toppled, ankara is to who have some sort of relationship with jihad so they can deal with them. i think overall i see a turkey which is no longer in the days looking west, but are looking to become a power play in the region that they have to follow

or follow western interests as much as they did in 1990. i covered ken baker's visit to turkey in 1990 when he visited to discuss turkey's role in the fight against saddam hussein. it was kind of interesting of course. it could dangle this idea that america would help turkey gain entry into the european union. i am not too sure that would work now. we had this week after the round up of journalists by the authorities in turkey number of diplomats complaining about this and then we had a speech saying the e.u. should mind its own business. i think we are dealing with a change. >> tony, how do you think turkey

sees this playing out? >> first, i apologize because i'm not really a little sick. my voice doesn't carry well. i am sorry. with regard to everything discussed, the important thing in all of it is to emphasize and frame the conversation. on the one hand, the principal question you pose is how this is integrated into turkey's view of the syrian policy and its priorities in syria. when you look at the declared position in syria, establishing a no-fly zone for a thumpers on and toppling the assad regime. you can pick up the "washington post" and the op-ed by dennis

ross. it's not the strategy you're the strategic principles that syria has for all of the problems are sound. the context of the strategy has to also be put in the chronology about how to steer you pose policy has developed in the last few years. before the rise of isis in 2012 when then foreign minister comes to washington and talks to the secretary of state clinton asking for building up the free syrian army to set up the protective zone for a no-fly zone. a month after isis declares its birds here in april, you have the chemical attacks and

serious. there is then in the fall is strike of assad. the fsa kind of collapses. within the context, the ability to actually pursue and them become much, my smart constraint. there is no doubt -- there is need to separate when it talks rhetoric and what it can do. it is no question that they want the united states to the danny after. there is in fact a serious question about the capability of the turkish military to do any of the things they say they want to do in syria. once you put all that together and you have a different picture in terms of what is achievable and why the border policy, we start looking at it differently. it is important not to conflate. the picture is very murky, but

there's also an additional problem and how we talk about this when we conflate. the united states and allies are running across the border. that is the whole point. they want to support the syrian opposition. i am not sure if you can actually pinpoint an incident where you can say there's a shipment intended for isis from the turkish government. the turkish government since weapons. it has a whole bunch of proxies. a lot of them not designated. other islamist organizations that are operating under a turkish umbrella, which by the way the administration looks very favorably adding 2012 and early 2013. so there are areas of overlap in areas of disagreement that egypt

kept in question. the other thing that happens with this conflation is when you have various narratives, there's a big thing in the information warfare. so there is a lot of stakeholders with various political agenda whether in domestic turkish for the kurdish and iraqi as well. for instance when you say turkey wants to fight the kurds, turkey is also fighting against isys inner brat. so which kurds are we talking about? the pkk franchises area and they didn't come to help the franchise. let's not forget two years ago these guys were fighting a war in turkey. again, the idea that somehow turkey has to fall in line and not see its own strategies addressed an open online to a group that has been citing interior also has to be kept in

mind. and the same applies to the turkish opposition in syria as well, in turkey as well. when we talk about the criticism of turkish policy. also keep in mind that a lot of the republican parties, people's party platforms on syria when you boil it down essentially becomes a pro-assad position. when you look at the interest of the united states, what do we want to see the endgame is syria. that is what concerns me most. the narrow counterterrorism focus with the border control policy leaving domestic turkish policy. what we are looking up those from the broader -- from 30,000 feet up, we do not want a policy in which assad survives. so the question is how can the united states stepped in and take a leadership role and then

manage the obvious liabilities of the turkish role and manage it in a much more effect of whey to lead the coalition that can achieve mutual strategic interests and still profess their own at the end of the regime. >> jonathan, you report that to some of these questions. what is your review? >> i would say that tony is right that the strategic and supposed behind the series of policy are sound. there's no question about it that the regime in syria has been a dangerous regime. it has been a state sponsor of terrorism responsible for the slaughter of untold numbers of people. the death toll is 200,000, but it's likely double that. in the fog of war we will find a lot more going on beyond the barrel bombs and a chemical weapons attack.

the idea that assad must go, it's fair to say the turks are right about this. the problem is the way that they have gone about this, i understand they've been unhappy with the united states. obviously our inability to enforce around the headlines after the attack and i was one in happen and they were incredulous. they were in complete disbelief the united states would fail to enforce the red line of thought is that they were abandoned. but i will say that as much as u.s. policy has been feckless, turkish policy has been reckless and misses the key point that they have gone far beyond what is acceptable as a u.s. ally. they have contributed significantly to a counterterrorism problem. i would go as far to say if we're able to lock down the 565-mile border, we would not

have the isis problem we have today. turkey serves as a rearguard for isis and for a broad range of other actors that we would seek to curb. we need to figure out in this country how to walk and chew gum. please see figure out how to curb the assad regime and weakened significantly while also working to ensure they do not allow for isis to grow and become more dangerous than it is today. the bottom line is the turks don't truly cared who was then, what kinds of weapons going, where the weapons are going and it made this very clear. i do research for this reportedly spoke just a u.s. government who told us the conversations between senior u.s. officials and turkish officials were they told them out right that they knew this was a problem.

they knew the jihadi's are going in and the weapons were going to the wrong people. we will fix this once assad falls. we are a strong military. we can pull this together after we achieve our objectives. in the meantime when you look at what is happening in the region, the problem has become farmer complex foreseeing isis grow to a strength that we previously could not have imagined. we are seeing war crimes, beheadings, sex slaves, things that we cannot abide by. there is a sense now that the u.s. must go when and do something with the turks. it is because of the traditional turkish position here in the united states. they are still seen in you here

the state department spokesman two days ago continue to reinforce that turkey is a wonderful democracy and ally of the united states crucial to our operations abroad. that only tells part of the story. we need to go when then make sure the borders closed up and have a better sense of going in and out and we need to be more assertive with our allies because if we do not, the problem will exacerbate further and it will create strains between the u.s. turkish relationship without question. but also create a isis problem we can't fix. >> let me ask you something real quick and then you can respond to that, too. with all of these ias terrorists coming across the border, there's a lot of dangerous people, particularly journalists trying to tell this story of what's going on. are journalists able to cross back and forth as easily as before? do we have good intelligence coming from that region now?

.. with various brigades i've decided not to go with them because as i subsequently found out they have had shortages of the brigade commanders in the

currency in brokering the deal on that. i will add a sense it has become even harder they got a blank no from them and at that time they had their own brigade so we are both basically seeing that it is very dangerous for western journalists across that we are being more cautious. of course we can move along the border on the turkish side. they are trying to kidnap the journalists and it looked like they had to deal with isis to do this but it might have been a

freelance operation it's getting a little bit more dangerous and some of them abilities to become a abilities the code mobility is there is sympathies in the population. the non- kurdish population towards the jihad its including the officials that are also being pro- jihad saying that it's not so different from ours. we talked about the different agendas and interest and it is our own fault that we haven't been clear about what our policies are and we've downgraded. therefore they would have to come up with some of their own policy positions but we haven't talked about the turkish president in recent weeks.

there have been a series of the anti-western speeches with a very strong in islam narratives and in every form you can see some of the things they are saying. this would remind you of the speech about lawrence of arabia being the threat in the modern-day western and in that speech he talked about it a lot. this is something that isis talked about a great deal if you recall they make a great opportunity on the border to show. you have to believe what people are saying that if they continually say something, there lies the west and maybe you should take that at face value.

i'm interested in what your thoughts are. >> first evolved for other rhetoric has been beyond the pale. but even what i would say is more disconcerting right now is the fact isis is only part of the islamist jihad problem that we have observed in turkey. i mean, for example, we have identified here over the last several years that there are no less than 14 senior operatives based in turkey right now. the man that claimed credit for the kidnapping and killing this summer in the west bank is based in turkey. he is the founder of the armed waiting for the west bank. one of the founders we just learned went to turkey for some medical assistance and he is now remaining there today designated by the u.s. treasury dating back

to 2003, and he is one of the original militants from hamas and turkey has rolled out the red carpet and this should be deeply disconcerting for anyone that is watching the activities of this native ally. and if that were not enough, we have also been able to i think a crew a lot of information over the last several years for the fact that turkey has helped the sanctions to the tune of billions and billions of dollars. there was the gas for gold scheme that you'll did about $15 they were able to track. that was between 2012 and 2013 at the height of the sanctions regime. and also if anyone was watching the corruption scandal that has erupted over the last year we celebrated the anniversary of the corruption scandal in the 17th. but in that report, it was a 300 page report that they had to translate for us but we found 30

pages demonstrating that the turks had been helping possibly to the tune of $100 billion. so what we are seeing more broadly. it's been a terrorist finance forms to the financial action task force to the terrorism finance. they've been out of compliance for more than seven years. when you take this and you get the sense that it's not just the rhetoric or the border policies that we are seeing on the border that have helped to benefit i suspect we are also seeing a range of other illicit activity that is benefiting radicals and geologists in the region and it raises very troubling questions about the trajectory of turkey. >> let's talk about nato for a minute.

they are a member and the members are bound together by their shared values, shared defense interest. clearly one of the biggest threats to the members is the threat of trigger for some and here we have arguably one member who could be said to be working with terrorists. turkey would say we are working with them but we know how to control them. let's talk about the debate about what to do with a situation like this, and if nato were to get tough with turkey and hold it to the account for changing its behavior, what are the consequences of that backs >> maybe the officials who are

very frustrated about what is happening in the european intelligence officer committee meeting when asking about the malicious financing for turkish banks, he was saying where do you think the ransom money is being launched into this is through the turkish banks all of this going on in the authority to stop it or any warning to the banks to be custom to the policies in the uk and the u.s.. there is no mechanism to throw anyone out of nato for my understanding. it is a club to actually reject someone. i assume the former cia director of week ago in the foundation trigger for some conference and he was saying that coming you know, you normally don't get everything you want from turkey that you can normally get something. it might come back to that issue

before you could dangle could dingell for membership in front of them and now obviously you can't but it isn't just what one said about mind your own business to the diplomats. some months ago i wrote an article about the chief advisor saying they are not very interested in joining the union anymore. and it's kind of interesting that they've not been pushing entering the negotiations recently. so, it may be if there was more leadership about inconsistency and leadership, out of the policy or the strategy is to end the war in this area and overcome the problems generally, that might be helpful. we have been inconsistent in our physicians and sometimes we decide we they decide they don't want to do anything to take the lead on this and then we have to get involved. so i have a certain amount of sympathy when they would say to

me luck, they are going to do exactly like they did before. they are going to leave us because they go off and the impact is on us. but i do think we are looking and i have to repeat this at a great change in turkey. even if -- i've known turkey for 20 or 30 years of the rack up a different country from now to when it was. we talk about now turning the school teaching ottoman turkish, and i think that maybe we are behind on this and still thinking that it is commanded his and. >> i just wanted to say also that while we have looked into the question whether they still belong and nato, and maybe tony has some thoughts on this. you also have to wonder whether they've fallen down on the job

in terms of perhaps even intervening in places like like theory or ukraine. there are questions about this whether they are doing their job in the first place and that it might be turning turkey off. nevertheless i do think that when you look at that range of activities i am mentioned between isis and hamas and everything else it does raise questions about whether they do belong there when we talk about the values of nato. >> i wanted to ask you to address that in a second and also, i want to post the report that has the turkish officials saying we know how to deal with these extremist groups. my question is do they and how long would they deal with them. >> just quickly about nato, it is mutually bad. but again, this is a symptom of talking about the broad context in the theory and policy that was laid out which is there was

is a turkish jet was shot down and the theory and and attacked the village and sent car bombs to the border crossings and the kidnapping and sabotage as well. there was talk about invoking article number five in order to get a response. the white house discouraged the talk because they saw this as a slippery slope towards intervention so they left them hanging which incidentally, this is also relative to the idea of the turkish intervention against isis because there is a fear and it is not unsubstantiated but okay let's say we do something assuming that they can do anything in terms of the military power. are we going to be left hanging with no other broad scope for where the policy is going to go in the goal beyond the question. and if so, to your other

question about whether they can control them, there is very clear they had vastly overestimated the capabilities. and the intelligence capabilities. can they govern isis or handle isis. at the heart of it, isis is an iraq economical and on the

resentment toward the domination it is a kind bomber at fixed with this kind of weird jihad as entirely independent, it is a tribal iraq he/serious issue and ad hoc.

we understand they are here. the rebels are not his type. they are not jihad is an orientation and we can contain this problem. if you build the counterforce and not just the turks. it's for the both administrations that have the fact of the administration, but you have to build a third force in serious.

but now it's become much more complicated. it was incredibly naïve. what is the policy in the region the u.s. policy in the region is at this point it is very clear that we had opportunities early on to divide a strategy that can help bring down the regime and perhaps temper some of the nasty fighting that we have seen in serious and we could have certainly prevented it from spreading over into iraq the way that it has.

it's in the decision not to enforce the red lines that we've lost and a lot of the allies and i don't just mean the turks. the meaning of the other gulf countries. not all of them are wonderful allies. i like to describe the turks and the saudi's as not quite friends or enemies but more along the lines of frenemies that they are looking elsewhere and devising their own policies and they are woefully challenging the united states based on the fact that they've lost confidence in the policy in the region and i think the turks are an example. they are all doing their own way right now. and so that's really i think it's at the heart of the problem is that we really need to get a handle on all of these issues again. i think there was the sense that

we were getting ready to pivot to asia or rebalance the portfolio and we didn't want to have a role in this or get involved in another fight in the organization that was the quick and the president that isis represented to the team trying to wear a kobe bryant jersey. so i think that there's even been a deliberate attempt to try to find the threat threats and that has not resonated well in the region among our allies particularly as the death toll has mounted in serious. so, i still believe to this day nothing can replace. even though we have failed until now in the use problems, i still think a clear u.s. policy and plan of action could begin to temper some of these problems. >> but it is clear.

to engineer some kind of a political deal in this area possibly that is what the policy is and the question i agree with you completely for the commanders and the theory in refugees for that matter is remembering the red line and they just do not believe the united states anymore. it lacks critical of the. of er seeing increasingly is the fighters defecting from even the brigades that we are backing to join because they don't trust where the united states is going and they are absolutely appalled that we seem to be downgrading the toppling of a law as a

policy. and it is extremely hard to build in those circumstances. did you want to add to ask? >> we haven't just decided to take out al asad air also flirting with iran as a potential partner in the region and got a great deal of our decision not to go in to this negotiation and this would be a red wine for them and therefore we can't do anything that might cross their line and so we start to look at the entire nature x.. it all fits together and it's all incredibly complex but i do think that at the end of the day we are looking at the failure of the overall u.s. policy if we want to try to combat some of

these phenomenons. >> let's take some questions from the audience. would you please invite ourselves and then keep your questions brief? >> they are and is this uniquely destabilizing and the key is of course the sanctions working together against each other.

there are all of these and each one is going to try the ottoman empire. >> i disagree that there is a cooperation going. i think that it is a fundamental competition between then and serious and iraq as well played out obviously for a few years and iraq and within the kurdish scene in particular there is a balance of the sort of pro- turkish and others and in fact it was the accusations that they were using them back when they were fighting in 2012 to actually undercut turkey so there is a rivalry going on and that is another issue that we didn't get to touch on that much which is the fantasy of the

policy because it is dedicated on the idea of the sort of islamic comedy and business interests that would the business interests that would override the geostrategic rivalries that are structural and systemic for the decades and centuries. so i think that's here he is in the moment of clarity in that it showed. they are fundamentally at odds with each other and that is where again going back to the broader geopolitical balance of the strategy in the region traditionally had we not sort of brought on this adventure of

hugging the iranians now, the united united states -- this is what everybody expected. the golden opportunity to the linchpin of the allianz is on its back foot. where is the united states to undercut its? to lead the alliance, manage and protect the common interest as it always does. to go back the iranian interest for the pro- american status quo in a conservative state. to be at its not that the two peripheral states are united that the united states is sitting on the sideline and effectively on one side against the other the effect is on serious and iraq and lebanon. not towards the saudi side in the region and that is a fundamental issue. it's not that we were sitting passively. we are actively supporting one side against the other. that is where everything starts

going haywire because then everybody starts to reach what they can do. what they can do is either incompetent or nasty. one or the other. on top of being -- on top on and off to be unfair but let's not forget they are hosting the refugees. without them, these people would be destitute, if not dead. they are the ones with which the moderate opposition in any kind of opposition in serious would be essentially choked off and that's why there's a disingenuous aspect even within the turkish opposition to have a different policy. what you are seeing you were shutting out a fundamental argument for it to deal with. so, to keep that in mind and the fact that despite all this pressure they continue to do it and how much this is a national security strategic interest they have to have in serious, they

couldn't have gone out in this area. in 2012 and 2013 as we begin to understand the depth of the gasper gold scheme that it was significant significant and huge out of money changing hands. they likely belief that they can bring down the assad and to circumvent the sanctions and have the windfall and give it all at once. they thought this was going to be a john grisham and then for the turks, that they would just get everything that they wanted at the end and they really be the difference only a matter of time before assad with paul. about a year into the revolution , assad was beginning to waver and it looked like the

fact that they were allowing them to go in to the regime they were beginning to wobble and so why not benefit as well from the sanctions. there was a moment where the united states learned about the sanctions and the gasper gold scheme and allowed it to continue for another six months raising questions about whether the united states was allowing this as a sort of unofficial sanction for the sanctions release became cool. okay. and so there were a lot of questions that were being raised. but if you look now, i would argue that the iranian and turkish relationship is very much on the rocks. they asked the foreign minister to visit the other day. they disagreed very publicly about the syrians of war. they've been in arguments about the price of gas that is coming from iran into turkey. you get the sense that this relationship is now free to significantly, now that the turkish plan to bring down the regime quickly has failed. >> thank you. we have another question.

[inaudible] >> two years ago, [inaudible] it should be the negotiated process for the stakeholders and also it is in a vacuum to create

[inaudible] for my job i go to turkey once and i never visited the country and it's not that easy to control. [inaudible] [inaudible] i agree that as best it is a turning of the blind eye that we see the facilitation as well.

just in the last few weeks it's very hard for the kurdish fighters claiming the same thing but there is no trouble crossing the border into getting into the hospital's along the border either there is no introduction. and as you know, there is a very interesting case about a year ago to be able to remember they had a convoy with weapons being protected by the turkish intelligence people and then trying to look into this so we have a wealth of detail. the activity along the border as we point out in istanbul this could be controlled more. i think that the current

feminist or would always say how can we stop everyone at the airport but we are looking at it according to the intelligence services about a thousandth of thousand stoke on 1500 foreign fighters a month going in. they have no trouble going and recently the french tv crew got one of the numbers to facebook and they arranged the whole deal and followed it all the way through up until the border where she was meant to meet her new husband and then they would drive across. so yes, it could be controlled a lot more and still allow the weapons to go into the brigades and kept away from immediately going into their hands, so it

does raise very significant questions. >> i would just echo that very briefly. it looks like willful blindness on the part of the guards and we are guard and we are deeply concerned that it looks like there is a turkish accomplice of the. the problem is what is the official policy. that's where i think it is murky and we have a harder time trying to get at exactly what's going on. they continue to acknowledge they understand that there is a problem and they continue to say that they are doing something about it and we continue to see the problem fester. are they doing it on purpose and do they not have the capacity to fix it? i think they do have it and this is what raises such troubling concerns for us right now. one other quick note, and you mentioned how your party has been vilified for saying that you are pro- assad. tony mentioned this early on, but there's a lot of disinformation out there. there are a lot of people making

one comment or another. turkey is one of the environment right now and we try to be very careful in this report about which sources to cite because every time you cite the kurdish escort they say that is misinformation. any time that you quote them as a source they are secular, automatically anti-occupational. you cite the source and they will say of course that is information that is a lie. the problem is that when you begin to see the utility of the information and it's going to come from u.s. government officials and from all of the other sources that i mentioned it becomes impossible to ignore. that's why we wrote this. it isn't just you that is under fire for the certain policies. everybody is being vilified by the regime. that is another aspect of the problem is that the regime will continue to prosecute those that would even dare to report on the phenomenon and that gives that

perhaps there's a larger force at play. a more troubling policy at play. >> they were allowing them to cross coming from iraq into the kurdish at least to go west. they let them because they were not finding them at the top. so you're just as complicit in this kind of traffic of the fighters coming in from everywhere. these people are all political. everybody has political -- this isn't to say that the information is completely false or households. you have to kind of leaf through various forces. but with regards to one last note on the position, who was it

that wrote recently in the city op-ed representing the foreign policy principals or the secular principles cause of the recent op-ed. and the two things that he said come and this is how you fight behind the rhetoric it is the de facto policy because it said they stopped calling for assad to leave and they should stop supporting the regime. when you put these two things together you can say whatever you want about assad being a dictator. but it all boils down to that they are deeply uncomfortable and as a secretary and policy they are not behind it. you can say we want to negotiate a settlement. that's okay. they want a negotiated settlement on whose terms do you have a negotiated settlement. is it, not to get into the lead of the device to turkish politics but it is all worth

keeping that context and line. >> thank you. we have a question here on the isle. >> the nominee to be the secretary of state [inaudible] he was referred to the isis and no longer a threat is eerie and iraq. his other interests to keep it and president obama likes to talk about being on the right side of history. what is the right side of history. can it be tomorrow for c-reactive iraq? >> thank you. good question panel. >> they have had a site's the site's borders. one doesn't i supposed to be sympathetic or even an agreement with the turkish president to

suggest that maybe this idea that we could somehow keep these states as one i suspect is impossible now. i don't know how they remain one state after all this. they certainly want their statements in the north. i've often asked this question, could use it down and what to say where there's some terrible massacre and they say no. i just think on a visceral and a human level i don't see how this is possible now.

>> i want to thank all of you for this interesting discussion today. my question goes towards the running theme which is why would turkey want to turn a blind eye and i was wondering in any of the research if you could comment whether looking at this history of the turkish engagement. we know that this is in the first round of dealing with extremists for decades. they have other extremist groups especially within that challenge and the dynamic so i was wondering looking into that history if it might be helpful

at all where the history of the military apparatus with these extremist groups and the region. it is a tradition in these areas because it was a -- >> maybe i will take a crack at some of this. i do the leave the turkish position has been extremely hypocritical given its long fight and its approach to terrorism regionally and the fact that they have allowed some of this to take place. that was the target of course you would be hearing protests and they are saying even with a designation turkey was incredibly ambivalent about the nation and acknowledged the type

to all qaeda but they still thought that it was a bad idea for political reasons and it just doesn't square away with the fast approach to fighting terrorism. yes, these are long-standing routes and many of them i think has been upgraded in recent months. i think that you have seen some of these sparkling apparatuses where they've really gotten it down to a science and they cross the order to the other side and i think again with a wink and a nod from the occupation government, they kind of -- the broad comment i would make and this is something we worked on very closely in the report is you have to recall at its core it is a muslim brotherhood organization and even before the outbreak with the war in another

recording trying to rehabilitate it after decades having been beaten down by the regime and after the spring interested there is a sense that they could try to rehabilitate the brotherhood further and then certainly when it directed in c-reactive is a sense that perhaps it could become the cornerstone of a new regime that would be essentially the proxy. they deviated that abb but that they could help guide the outcome and it looked almost inevitable from the perspective they had the rise of the brotherhood in egypt and tunisia and this was what was going to happen in c-reactive and that's what they began to push for. as it dragged on it became far more complicated and my sense and i think that we agree on us this while we were writing it while each effort failed, they

doubled down yet again. it's like a bad gambler in a casino. every time they put money down and lost they would put it back on the same desk and they kept losing. they couldn't bring down the regime and so every time they made another effort the effort. co. actors became more radical and it became something that was a sort of detector policy. i don't give me that they decided right up front we are going to decide isis. i think it was a deteriorating policy because they can't see any way forward. i think to a certain extent that it claims what we are seeing today. >> you mentioned kurdish hezbollah in the riots in the wake of the we certainly saw the

kurdish hezbollah reappear and we saw a bear is a tremendous history of the turkish intelligence using extremist groups to help them and now what we are seeing is the current regime using those old tricks i have a more secular time. i think that the difference is that they are now doing this on an international stage and maybe within their own turkish realm they can control the groups more. it's much harder to control isis or all qaeda and maybe they are trying to do what they have all done, use some of these extremist groups because you want them to stop attacking you hopefully in such clutter

secular it increases your chances in the region. they are not the only ones that have done it. they have a whole host based out of london because they thought they could get intelligence from them. it's a dangerous game to play. certainly thinking back to the beginning of the said we are going to own the arab spring. they would be the new caliphate but often with business and the first trade fair in libya about a year or so after the fall encompassed all around the world with 1800 -- 800 of them were turkish, very interesting. >> we are open to questions.

i'm going to ask something of the panel to put you on the spot. if we were to get the news tonight, who would run. tomorrow? >> they are just divided. in many ways they are in their natural state in the sense that is a series historically of buffer zones more or less. you had that damascus always looking for their south. it's always a part of iraq further towards jordan and so on and in many respects the groups operating you have very few national groups that operate everywhere it operates across

the board down. but it's the local. it's very localized and regionalized now. they protected their turf very strongly. so i don't know if he will have anybody that will run serious related to the poster to the muslim brotherhood here. you have no idea what the brotherhood is. it's the trade trouble understanding. it's in shambles. they really are not that influential at all. very limited.

with the position in the region is with the exception of egypt the turkish position was ambivalent and careful and cautious about the change that's going on. they didn't seize the opportunity to push out or try to rehabilitate the regime and integrate the muslim brotherhood that take control within the regime to add their leverage and a sort of position them as an interlocutor in the west. but they didn't actually jump on the bandwagon and tunisia. it's later after the dust settled but they saw the opportunity for the push forward. >> that's a good answer to tell us who won't run. >> i've never looked to secure dictatorship.

i think that it is more beyond. and it's established tonight, tomorrow. but i think that there would be another who would take a. it could be the way to open up the negotiations along the way between what is left of the moderate opposition that the news to the problem of what to do. >> i hate predictions. >> i've been tracking the spring the last four years and i would never be so bold to try to

predict. i think anyone that thinks they know it's good to have a next has been proven wrong time and time again. but actually just to make one counterpoint we actually have, i just looked it up in the report, david may have been somewhat ambiguous about what they want with regard to the brotherhood, but they did believe that their versions of islamic infused government was the model without question. they said turkey would become the only pioneer and a servant in the middle east and i think that implied the brotherhood to a certain extent. i think that you are right about the syrian brotherhood has been a nonfactor but there was an idea in the mind of turkish

leadership at the brotherhood was the model on some level and i think it's important to remember that. >> you have the muslim brotherhood had the muslim brotherhood dominated and completely cut off on the ground >> otherwise it was nothing else. >> atop the turkish people feel that the muslim brotherhood model as opposed to the other model. >> we have a polarization in turkey as i'm sure that you've read. i can't say that they think one thing about it. there is also a strong opposition that shows how the

model is ongoing with the democracy, the pluralist worldview etc.. part of the turkish opposition would say that it's failed in turkey so how do we expect it to succeed in the middle east and i think that that is a valid question. >> i will ask one more. can the u.s. degrade into defeat islamic states without turkey's defense cooperation? >> i would say no. i think it's impossible. if tony is correct in his assessment we continue to hear about the generals that are

behind the part of this as well but i don't belief that the phenomena would have grown to where it is today without this human trafficking pipeline that is now 36,004 in the fighters that have streamed across the border and most of them could be more. it's not like they are selling up with an accountant, but we do have the sense almost all of them are coming across the turkish border. they are sitting across the border. they showed them a video.

they are against the kurds or whoever they are fighting. this is something they cannot continue when we talk about degrading, and one of critique has been if we don't have groups on the ground, we are never going to be successful without locking down the 565-mile border it won't be the end of the war but he would have a significantly weak in the isis as a result. >> it's where the money comes from and the supplies comes from. if you cut that often you do tremendous harm. they also defeat until they have a third, fourth proxy on the ground in this area as well.

>> why haven't they joined the fight in the masses ask >> there was a quote in the piece recently. if they are ruling iran i'm going to go with isis. the questions in the logistics but the phenomena isn't the sort of driving engine. it is precisely the statement from the tribals and others would have explained about the fundamental dynamic. >> that will be the last statement for the panel. thank you. i recommend if you haven't already to read the report. it's very comprehensive and authoritative. there is a lot of issues and

still more to go. thank you for joining us this morning. [applause]

is that democrats tend to get upset because they bought into the myth of the liberal media and a kind of thought that the media is on their side. whereas republicans firmly believe in the liberal media. so they kind of expect that they are going to be on the post.

over the last four years, i've done enough back and forth, treated both parties with equal fervor that people have now come to say okay you are someone we can do business with. the senate majority pac that is affiliated with harry reid, they stopped answering my questions midway through the campaign season because they felt they were not getting a fair shake from me. with china and south korea than a look at the future of coal as an energy resource. and at eight it is booktv prime time with books about african

american leaders beginning with a nonfiction work on the final year of doctor martin luther king jr.'s life. the brookings institution recently hosted a daylong conference on u.s. relations with china and south korea. the keynote speaker was daniel russell russell who's assistant secretary of state for the bureau of east asian and pacific affairs. he talked about the u.s. paid to the asia-pacific. ..

at peking university. we are grateful for the leadership and of course the participation of ambassador park and cook, president and board

chair blog choco. we are pleased to have with us a good friend and an old friend, the dean of the school who we regard as a brookings alumnus because he participated in our center is visiting fellows program as did several of our guest today. this event is in the category of what is often called track two diplomacy since it brings together scholars and experts who are intimately knowledgeable of their government's policies and you can therefore supplement the exchanges of diplomats and officials. i'm sure today's conference, which we call a trial lug because it's