to you the u.n. high commissioner for human rights, zeid ra'ad al-hussein which took office september of last year. and i won't say anymore. i will go straight to the high commissioner. >> good morning ladies and gentlemen, of the press. permit me if you will to begin my remarks by speaking as a jordanian and the u.n. human rights chief. i am filled, filled with anger and disgust at what the sectarians and sergei to my compatriot, moaz al-kasasbeh, to the two japanese captives to the british and american captives, to the men and women and children and many others in

the form of burning beheadings and raping, sometimes of children. .. is a betrayal of the islamic tradition. it is forbidden in custom. it is forbidden in international humanitarian law geneva conventions and previously to that or prior to that the haig

regulations. and human experience it is forbidden period. what virtue or courage is there in beheading someone defenseless, raping a young girl? does a person who calls themselves a fighter believe this is, this is a definition of courage? these people are an smile eighted -- annihilated conscience are so far outside of human experience. young adherents seeking to join them must know what they purport to join is not some adventure. it's a road to destroyed, utterly criminal existence. if you're looking for some meaning in your life, do good deeds. that will be your salvation.

this is the first official trip for a high commissioner for human rights to washington in eight years. it has been important for me, and my office to re-engage with the administration and with members of congress particularly during these troubled deeply troubled times. just as a first step, i hope to be back for more visits of course, to cover other issues. and this is a preliminary visit. not surprisingly, given what is going on in syria and in iraq and nigeria somalia, and elsewhere, the main focus of the discussions has been violent extremism. this was brought into stark focus on tuesday with the

appearance of the video showing the horrendous killing of m muath al-kasaesbeh. his killing as well as gruesome killings of others who damages overshadowed my meetings and i had serious discussions about this and related issues with many of the senior state department officials who i met as well as members of both the house and the senate from both parties. as you may be aware yesterday at an event kindly and very appropriately hosted by the holocaust memorial museum i laid out some ideas about how we should and how we shouldn't attempt to deal with the spread of extremism and violence carried out by the groups such as isil, boko haram and

al-shabaab and others. in addition to some government forces and and militias in iraq and syria. of course it is not simply syria and iraq but also an increasing number of countries especially in the middle east south asia and all across the northern part of africa. libya is in an extremely alarming state. yemen is deeply troubled. the central african republic and south sudan could easily plunge back into religious and ethnic violence. and boko haram is rampaging across parts of northern nigeria and now increasingly in cameroon slaughtering and kidnapping people wherever they go and laying waste to towns and villages. i have suggested that a kurt response, an armed response

clearly not enough. we are been ponding in that way for more than a decade now and yet these groups have simply pretty and grown like on particularly remember you lent cancer feeding off our efforts to contain them. lives taken pains to point out isil in particular for all its barbarity is extremely quick and clever in the way that it exploits our reactions, our overreact hundreds, our mistakes. we must be extremely careful not allow them to drag us into betraying our own core principles namely the powerful system of human rights protection that we have built up after world war ii. when we do it helps their recruitment. it feeds their fiendish nilistic killing machine. if there is one small silver

lining in all the horrors we have seen in recent weeks, it is that we have starting to understand this. later this month the united states will convene a summit on violent extremism, designed to understand it correctly, to delve deeper into the complexities of dealing with this increasingly lethal phenomenon. i hope and believe that we will develop more sophisticated ways to undermine isil and the other groups. simply bombing them and denouncing them is clearly not enough. and more and more people are think starting to realize this. we have to fight their ideas with better ideas. stop undermining our own worldwide system of human rights because they push us to do so. tackle the hopelessness and disillusion that is providing them with the apparent endless stream of young men and even

young women. sucked in by their apparent success in confronting a world that is in some way offering them too little hope. we are in a very grave period confronted by a pham none that we have failed to comprehend. how we handle or mishandle these issues may affect us in increasingly unpredictable ways for many years to come. i thank you for your attention. i will be happy to answer any questions that you have. >> be grateful if you could identify the media organization you work for when you ask your question. >> [inaudible]. >> the, as i said in my

statement that i just read out, i think for all jordanians, the killing of al-kasaesbeh was so shocking but in one way no less shocking than everything else that they have been doing. that it has galvanized the jordanian public into realizing these people must be resisted. the arguments that many of us are making when looking back over the many years that the teteries have been operating across many parts of the world is that it would seem that armed action taken against them is simply not enough. there are attempts of course to

seek out the funding mechanisms that keep them going but we also believe that there must be a new battle line in the form of an idealogical battle line that responds to what it is that they say and they do and the letter issued by 126 muslim scholars back in september is a an initiative, i think that is worthy of support. that if the muslim world and muslims take it upon themselves to answer back to the the ideas that they hold that this will be the first step in terms of unwinding what it is that they

seek to, sort of promote in terms of their ideology and i think this would be good. >> [inaudible]. first of all members of the national council which to commend you for taking on this very formidable and very important post. we of course know your office is concerned with the universal declaration of human rights. is there a corresponding universal for governments on all levels to foster the recognition of these rights and protect them? >> yeah. it's a very good point. as you know the declaration was adopted by the general assembly soon after it was written up. from the declaration drawing inspiration from it a number of key treaties and conventions

were developed whereby governments undertook upon themselves accepting these treaties certain obligation. our office is to remind the governments these obligations are not simply declaratory obligations that bobble flyingses must be implemented at all stages. there should be no diminution in the support given to them. so, that we believe this is absolutely the right way to proceed and in particular, when you look at certain treaties such as the convention against torture, for example, it is self-executing treaty, the moment you accede to it, it is applicable in your law and it's a very clear convention very

clear convention. there are no exceptions. no exceptions. that can be provided as grounds for breaching the treaty. and that is very clear. so when governments undertake these obligations we hope, and expect that they will abide by them. what we are worried about is, in an effort to overturn extreme it violence violence that we see that governments feel inclined at times to, and they would justify it as temporary measures, to breach some of these treaties. and, what we are saying is that these obligations relate to treaties that were developed as response to wars and torture. that have been part of human experience for the past few

millenia. the treaty attempts to this experience as couched with human on through human wisdom in a law that reflects that experience. and so, there should be no grounds for justifying any breach of them. and i hope, this is something that we will continue to press upon them. >> okay. my name [inaudible]. i sit on national institute for law here at the university mr. ambassador. i work in the health sector. obviously and there i bring the principles of rule of law and governance to assist ministries of health to implement their obligations and it's my

observation after being in this field for over 20 years that too often government the to not know how to actually how to operationallize their obligations under the law. i note, some of the materials i read about yourself and your thinking about the work you're setting out to do is that you are also looking at the health sector and that we could look at education. we could look at the court system, we could look at any number of institutions within government are probably failing in a lot of places where terrorists are rising up. in recent years i worked in afghanistan where just a few days ago i read about the taliban constructing courts to actually hear cases disputes between people because the court system is failing. so i wonder if with in your thinking perhaps it is premature in your tenure, if you had some thoughts around how to operationallize and how to as

sis countries to operationallize their obligations so that institutions can be rebuilt or built anew so we can provide this level of support to citizens in countries. thank you. >> no, that's an excellent question. six million of our youngest people little people, people between the ages of one day old and five years of age die every year from preventable, preventable causes. and in many instances as you were so rightly pointing out it is because the authorities that are, at least nominally responsible for their health are delinquent in the discharge of their duties. six million is the equivalent of

many average size countries. it is quite amazing. if we were to to say isil was killing six million people a year you can imagine the reaction. why is it we're not as determined when we say six million people die as a result of preventable causes and they're very young and we're not more determined to do better? and i even said it at one stage, in some cases it must amount to criminal negligence. there should be more local authorities held to account for deaths in this regard. you're absolutely right. if people do not see government stand up to their obligations in respect of health and education it creates cases of those were

more extreme idealogical bent to destroy this and we have counter violent extremism so i agree with the opinion. thank you. >> anymore questions especially from the journalists present? >> follow-up question. in regards to society stop pushing for exceptions during times of war and violent extreme, how do you suggest governments encourage and foster these ideas in most basic levels of society? it is important governments take the view and societies at the

fringes are okay with allowing for alien nation and are now determined to end it we will have adherence attached or we'll have young people attach themselves to philosophies or let's say ideologies of the more extreme and human experience as i said before, especially in the 20th century is filled with violent drama, which we really do not want to see replayed in the 21st century. we really do not want to go back to the horrors of the 20th century that just pad. so we have to take stock and learn what it is that contributes to the tumult to the, these spasms of violence that led to the deaths of millions of people violently and understand that we can not put

ourselves in a situation where we can not arrest the trajectories from taking us in to that sort of outcome. and so it is important for governments to few, not just that their people from, or through a security prism to protect them and security terms but that security terms, that security paradigm has to be seen with a big s that it is not just security in terms of physical protection. security in terms of food. in terms of health. in terms of basic rights for all parts of the population. and if you can have that, and surely you can and you immunize yourself better against the forces of extremism, there is something else. i think that we have to be clear about. that societies that are open to

scrutiny that are willing to accept scrutiny, are better positioned for the long term. societies that shun scrutiny are more prone to sudden shifts and instability long term. and so we as the human rights office we'll remind governments and they will be uncomfortable when we do this, they have obligations that they need to uphold but we also believe that we are not, we're not doing them a disservice. we're actually doing them a service. may be sometimes uncomfortable with what we say but all of us are pushing in the same direction and that is for the betterment of the, the people of the country concerned. we're looking for them to enjoy a better standard of life with

the full protections of the law provides for them. so, thank you. >> time for i think just one last question. >> i have a question on ukraine. i so i wonder what is your concern on ukraine the on going conflict right now? could you talk about this issue with u.s. officials with it and what their reaction and, what do you think the united states and russia and both sides should do to de-escalate the situation? >> thank you very much for that question. the office which i lead has a monitoring mission in ukraine that has been in place really almost ever since the crisis began in the eastern part of the country. we have periodic reports that we

make available to the international community and and yes, we discuss ukraine with a large number of countries. naturally it is of great concern to the international community at large, this is a very serious crisis. and, and we have seen of course even though we have all of us, have, called for full compliance with the minutes k accords. we have seen the cease-fire unravel. the other day i issued a statement and i made clear that now, what we see in donetsk and lou hans is bus stops, marketplaces, schools, hospitals, and residential areas have all become battlegrounds and at risk 5.2 million people

in the eastern parts are now vulnerable. i mean surely and i think all of us share this, surely no one wants to see this crisis deepen and expand. and certainly the 5358 people who have been killed are 5358 people too many. we appeal of course to all sides to de-escalate this crisis. the world can ill-afford to have a crisis of this sort, given everything else that we have to deal with. and, so, we will continue to make this appeal alongwith all of the other u.n. agencies and, departments across the international community. i do expect in early march, to, be discussing ukraine with a

number of key officials when they come to geneva. and at that stage i will address members of the press on the outcome of those discussions. thank you. >> we can probably take one more what is your view on -- [inaudible] >> i won't comment about the actions taken by individual states because of course our monitoring mission is monitoring the situation there on the ground. we're not monitoring the performance of other states in respect of ukraine as such. and what concerns us of of course is that unless there is determined action to restore the

minsk accords and have the cease-fire put back in place, that the unraveling will continue and again surely this is not to the advantage of anyone in the international community. >> very last question. we have to then rush off. >> remain neutral or you couldn't have a list of like the top 10 worst offenders of human rights and if so, how would america appear on that list? and what is the tie-in here for to you come to georgetown law to this venue? >> a top 10 list, you have just given me an idea. we haven't had a top 10 list. we we remind all states i think just to review of all the comments that my predecessors

and now myself have made in respect of many many countries around the world. we don't pick on any one country or one region. we we continuously review and study the comements states themselves make. when they come to geneva. especially under the so-called, universal periodic review. i shouldn't call it so-called. it is universal periodic review where all states submit human rights performance to the scrutiny of the human rights council. they all of course will point out that they have been able to accomplish x, y and see. there is still some issues outstanding. they're told that they should do this and that and then they will accept those recommendations or not. we remind them of their the

recommendations that they have accepted. and we hope that they, then do so. there is no ranking as such. but maybe one day there should be. this is the first press conference where the press are not just asking questions but making suggestions. so thank you. >> [inaudible]. >> well i met prior to the press conference with members of the faculty and students at the law school. very enjoyable discussion, and at times somber as well given the state of the world so. thank you. >> thank you very much indeed. and. >> thank you so much. thank you. >> according to the cdc, 121 cases of measles have been reported in 14 states and the district of columbia since the start of the year. today the senate health committee holds a hearing on

vaccine preventable diseases and whether they should be man e mandatory for children. you can see it live at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. the senate finance committee today examines the u.s. tax code and lessons learned from the tax reform act of 1986. the committee hear frogs former senate finance committee chair bob pack wood and former committee member bill bradley who both worked on the legislation. live coverage starts at 10:00 a.m. eastern on c-span. -- c-span3. the political landscape changed with the 114th congress. not only are there 43 new republicans and 15 new democrats in the house and 12 new republicans and one new democrat in the senate, there is 108 women in congress including the first african-american republican in the house and the first woman veteran in the senate. keep track of members of congress using congressional chronicle on c-span.org.

the congressional chronicle page has lots of useful information including voting results and statistics about each session of congress. access on c-span, c-span2, c-span radio and c-span.org. >> this week president obama is expected to issue a request for authorization of military force against isis. last week the washington institute for near east policy host ad discussion on the fight against isis and role of iran and syria in the conflict. this is 90 minutes. >> good afternoon. welcome to the washington institute. my name is the david schencker. i'm the director of the program on arab politics here. it is nice to see such a large crowd and good to see you. we're here today for policy forum called the fight against

isil shiite militias and coalition effort and talk about the release and talk about the release of two new fascinating institute studies. for anyone had any doubts the video released earlier this week of burning alive of the jordanian captured, pilot. muath al-kasaesbeh. six months into the air coalition campaign against isil which commenced with the beheading of american journalist james foally, the results have been mixed at best. the driven isil out of kobani in syria however overall today the group controls actually more territory in syria and iraq than it did six months ago when the war started. air power alone will be insufficient to degrade and ultimately defeat isil. to roll back isil, the organization is going to have to be countered on the ground and we're witnessing right now the initial stages of this new phase

in the campaign. in syria the administration's strategy of training up moderate vetted syrian opposition remains a distant if realistic option. meanwhile though in syria iran and the assad regime are deploying series of shiite militias to combat isil. across the border in iraq, baghdad in cooperation with washington is working to reconstitute and field an integrated internal security force. discuss, to discuss differing, these differing approaches to isil today we have a great panel featuring michael knights phillip smyth and p.j. dermer. michael knights is fellow at washington institute. ed study of the lang howl rebooting u.s. security cooperation in iraq. of phillip smyth is researcher at university of guinea. the author of the large

hizballah call val cade. his study, the shiite jihad in syria and regional effects. commenting on their presentations really lucky to the have p.j. dermer a retired army colonel who served multiple tours in the region including two in iraq. he participated in standing up civil and defense institutions in iraq and served as senior military advisor for iraqi forces in baghdad in 2008. before we start quick reminder. put your mobile phones on vibrate. we're live on c-span today apparently. so we'll start with mike knights >> well, thank you very much for coming today. it is great to see such a full room and my colleagues on the,

on the panel with me it is real honor to be alongside them. so i'm going to talk today about some of the themes coming out of our new study the long haul rebooting u.s. security cooperation with iraq. and i want to go through the study in detail. what i'm going to do is maybe try to pick out some of the i think the key issues and quandaries that come out of our security cooperation with the iraqi state, with the kurdish peshmerga and our coexistence at the moment alongside the popular mobilization unit that played such a significant role in the war so far in iraq. nows just to run through a couple of graphics quickly which are in the study which is available in pdf form online for you to download, we include for instance a full brigade order of

battle for the iraqi army and minister of interior and popular mobilization forces graphically represented and it demonstrates, for one thing, how much of the iraqi combat power is pooled around baghdad and immediate environs. how few of iraqi mill tear units are able to deploy over long distances, distances required for instance to commence a mosul operation in the second quarter of this year. it will be very difficult to do that. and also the lack of combat effective iraqi army brigades with the strength required to undertake a very complex, costly operation in mosul. it indicates that the nine brigades u.s.-led trained and equipped program to build oversized combat, capable deployable units that that can continue operate after taking the casualties required in urban

combat, that nine brigade training and equip program is vital. it indicates to me not looking mosul commencing q3, q4, 2015. some people are even more grumpy bit than that. so yeah again on this slide you will see the graphic in the study, iraqi army in yellow. ministry of interior in black and the popular mobilization units in red. if you're interested in looking at detail go look at the study. likewise we've done the same for peshmerga in terms of slightly rougher but quite, probably the most detailed order of battle you will see out there. what the peshmerga looks like right now and how it is structured. now on this, on this slide we see, and you know, even from the back it should be fairly visible, the blue is kurdish regional security forces.

and the green is the areas where the federal government is contesting. one of the interesting factors in this you can see a little thin green line running from the iranian border to kirkuk. that is the iranian line of supply that directly supports the popular mobilization units who are gathering and building for a major operation south of kirkuk at bashir. i will talk about the progress of the war against isis. we'll do that in other forums in other days through our written products. what i will say to reiterate, i believe the war against isil in iraq initially is highly winnable and in fact slowly slowly we're on that trajectory now. for many people the velocity will not be fast enough but the vector the direction is in that in that direction towards cutting them down to the stage that they are a serious

insurgent and terrorist movement. unfortunately today's best-case scenario were 2013's worst-case scenario. the goalposts have shifted dramatically over the past few years. what we're hoping in the next year or so we can cut isis down until it is our worst nightmare from 2013, we start again and start working our way to cut them down to where they were in 2009 when the security operations were at their most effective probably. and then finally bet them down below that to the hopes we had in 2009. what i will talk about today more is what if we defeat isis but lose iraq in the process? what if there is another, possibly graver threat out there which is the threat posed to some extent by the allies that we're working alongside? i'm thinking here about some of the popular mobilization unit elements who are strongly iranian linked.

all the movements that phillip is going to talk about in great detail after me? what if we defeat isis but lose iraq to easy billionization to iraqi security sector. -- hezbollahization. i may sound a little direct in that direction? is this america's yalta moment in iraq? some people look at the yalta conference in early '45, they say the u.s. government was being realistic. the soviets were going to dominate eastern europe. nothing could stop. that others would say, would have an emotional reaction. we were consigned to 50 years of communism. you know left behind the iron curtain. even though i don't think it's a perfect analogy, where i think this is a bit of a yalta moment is that we're in the midst of a war. the war's not over yet.

but it is time to start asking tough, churchhillian questions how the war ends. why we're fighting to war to the end, who are our allies are and how they will act say if mosul is liberated? how they will act towards us and how they will act towards other elements in iraq. in the old days afghanistan was the good war and iraq was the bad war in 2009. it is 2014 iraq seems to be the good war and syria is the bad war. but, in reality iraq will be a lot more complex. i don't think iraq is, i believe it is a war worth fighting. involving the u.s. but it is not a complex or simple war. any sense of us being in any sense allied with iran in this war against isis in iraq is fraught with danger and far more complex than many people would, would believe.

now one thing i've noticed since i started the study in researching, talking to a lot of people, just to complete the data collection on it, throwing ideas out there about this pyric victory we could win if defeat isil but in the process hand iraq over to hezbollahizeed iraqi security structure. it instruct me, i don't think i ever heard kurds and seia arabs swent so many eight hatred each other. isis's enemies are remarkably divided, remarkably resentful of each other. it's sad to see. because the fighting hasn't even vaguely stopped yet against isis a lot of young shia guys will usually say to me, what have you against the popular mobilization

units? they're fighting isis. they're fighting isis. they're fighting and dying. are they really so bad? and don't you hold them to a double-standard if the peshmerga, did the same thing would you criticize them as, as fiercely? you want to build up the sunni satwa, the awakening movements. didn't do all these things in the past? didn't they kill americans too? we need to think hard about these questions. we have something of a emotional reaction against the popular mobilization units. so let's look at that. let's dig into that for a second. are these bad guys? i don't think so. they're brave fighters going to the front line. many of them are not psychos. many of them are not trying to undertake sectarian massacres. they're just normal people. i had a similar feeling when meeting hezbollah infantrymen down in southern lebanon in '99.

seeing them with their families in their houses. but behind them often far behind them there was the islamic revolutionary guard corps, quds force i never did meet. they had a different attitude. i became aware of difference between in their midst, not their target in southern lebanon, to later operating in iraq being actively targeted. there is something under the surface of these predominantly shia popular mobilization units we need to look at very closely. you know, again, just to underline the point, on the left-hand side in the top, we have the satwa guys. they look pretty scary. they're supposed to be allies going forward. in the top right pressed popular mobilization units backed by iranians? who looks scarier? i would argue for number of reasons i come to for a second guys on the left we treed to

treat both with care but the guys on the right are not as cuddly or as safe or trust worthy as they look. the guys on the left in some ways, because they are cut off, i think from major state support because they are not intrim cattley networked into the islamic revolutionary guard corps quds force, because they pull in smaller increments. because they are divided rather than having potential to form into one large hezbollah-like shadow defense institution, that could threaten and overwhelm ultimately things like iraqi ministry of defense, ministry of interior, believe the guys on the right are bigger threat. likewise look at the western, private security vehicle taken out by extraordinarily and effective explosive projectiles fired by shia groups. on the right, marine corps,

lptp ripped to pieces by sunni ied way back. both have killed us. both probably would kill us again given, if they needed to, if they felt like they wanted to. personally i'm more afraid of the capabilities of the irgc quds force based special groups. as late as june 2011, if you remember, they killed 16 americans because it seemed like perhaps we were going to rethink our withdrawal from iraq. i think they're much more dangerous than the sunni-led groups but i will go on to talk about why very quickly. two main reasons. one, the an increased involvement of iranian backed popular mobilization units particular any areas to the north like mosul tikrit, places out in western anbar where they're at the moment being welcomed in piecemeal but i think they will wear out their

welcome pretty soon. i think involvement overreliance on these units will lengthen the war against isis. these guys, if you look at this i blanked out gruesome images of dead body suspended from a light, lamppost in baqubah and left there by the pmus. likewise a mosque massacre bottom left. these are not images from the most recent massacre from alleged 72 massacre. top right, heavy artillery bombardment of sunni villages. they may be mostly depopulated with isis in them. nonetheless, these guys come heavy when they come. interestingly the bottom right hand image you say say there is a bunch of young fighters holding up iraqi flag, what could be wrong with that? in and of itself nothing wrong with that but they're holding it up on the main road south of

kirkuk and taunting kurdish drivers with it. this isn't smart and it is not helpful. and it is indicator even when these guys are not out abusing civilians, and undertaking counterproductive military operations or at least military operations with counterproductive elements they're also a source of constant friction in many of the places they're operating alongside the krg. likewise the second main point, these iranian-backed militias, if not put under some form of control, will ultimately undermined the strategic independence of iraq and potentially state stability. i think, you know, we see some of the images here. behind the eagle in the top left-hand side sits deliberately concealed abu mahdi. a u.s. designated terrorist

since i think 2009, who has been pursued for various terrorist offense right the way back to 1983 involving kuwait. up there at the front lines taking iraqi senior leadership on a tour of pmu successes, but carefully, carefully hidden in this picture because it was recognized, it might cause offense perhaps. likewise former pm maliki, vice president maliki now, meeting up with senior leadership in hezbollah. likewise on the bottom side u.s. mrap i think it is a bit after stunt, u.s. m-1 abrams with flags attached to it. i wish our information operations was as good as these guys. everything we do when we achieve something, what do we do? we like to fall into the background. better iraqis take credit for the things they have achieved.

well you know what? 100% wrong. when they when the irgc quds force guys have any involvement even if they have no involvement in a successful operation they get their most senior leadership right there and plaster their faces across every media outlet and social media outlet they can find. i think we need to be doing more to demonstrate what the u.s. and the international coalition is doing to stablize iraq because we're really on our back foot when it comes to information operations. so, you know, these guys are ambitious is. they are not some kind of minor small, group of concerned local citizens former satwa, et cetera. in 2009 when the satwa was being set up, these guys never disbanded. these guys never did biometrics. most of the movements came, in sign ad little piece of paper, did biometrics which the iraqi

holds on them. they said we might stop fighting you and but one day we'll fight you again but for now we are willing to take the paycheck for being in, quote, a son of iraq. these guys are not from the minority like the sunni satwa are. and these guys have a serious state sponsor. these guys are in charge of mechanized unit capability now. these guys have multiple rocket launch systems and a regular resupply of ammunition coming from iran. these guys have got irgc quds force compartmented intelligence skifs linking them to irdc quds force drone operations overhead iranian air support potentially or iraqi air support facilitated by iranians in some ways. they're a powerful entity. they're well-armed and networked into the ministry of interior

and key iraqi military headquarters. they're transnational. they're linked to other aspects of axis of hezbollah,irgc quds force. these are not, these are people who will undermined iraq's strategic independence going forward. luckily, bringing us around to the solution in the end. i think a lot of moderate shia leadership in iraq recognize that, whether they're in the political fear. whether they're military men or whether they're in the religious sphere. iraqi military does not like militia. it never did. it didn't like operating alongside pmus. even though it recognizes they have contributed blood, sweat, tears, blocking isil's advance. i have to give them that. they have to deserve our respect as fighting men. many of us deserve their full respect as fighting men. they have given everything including their lives to bring isis to a halt.

institution they're a part of, and forces sit behind these often very good fighting men we need to look extremely closely at them. luckily a lot of senior iraqi leaders agree with the u.s. they are a threat. luckily we've seen many cases in the past iraqi shia vote for iraq rather than vote for sectarianism and vote for iran. for instance iran-iraq war. not really a shima of an uprising against the iraqi state during the iran-iraq war. hundreds of thousands of shia serving on the front lines. likewise basra separatism. basra could break away and become abu dhabi if it wanted to. by and large they believe in the iraqi state even though they have had a shocking deal from it particularly over the last decade. pm maliki, in charge of the nights, he recognized i think he did it partly for his own political benefit that he needed to cut the legs under from

underneath from the militias before they took iraq's crown jewel basrah. national guard law being pushed through now. iraqis understand senior leaders understand they need to do something about the pmus and the satwa one day. they need to confine them to barracks. partially demobilize them. governors in individual provinces. we don't need a national guard provision for this particular province. we're secure. reduce militia take over in key provinces like basrah. under administrative defense and administration control. under p.m.'s office control. all these things are built into the national guard law and they need to be. struggle will be implementation. because these badr guys and these iranian militias hard as they can take the thing, take all the bits we like. we want to get paid and have pensions and light armored vehicles maintained by the government. light arms provided by government but we'll keep our

rocket launchers and ties to irgc quds force. that is how they play it. they always do. we need to stay on this. this brings us back to the final point. by the way some of these individuals, dawa party trying to keep a hand minister of interior run by a leader killed kasari and some senior deputy positions within omi. you see on last hand side he is running the portfolio, i guess the national security advisor. again, some conservative elements of dawa party. conservative they don't want a radical change of nature of power i think in iraq. they don't want to be one dayjet tis sonned, those are politicians, we, iraqi hezbollah, keep in the cupboard and bring them out when we want to look acceptable. they don't want that to be end point where iraq goes. we have allies we can work with in iraq.

only way we'll get those allies if we outperform iran as security partner. we can't ask for everything we have want from the iraqis unless we demonstrate that we are serious committed about going forward. not just until isis is gone. not just until mosul is liberated but finally, until, we have no end point. what we need is visionary decades-spanning re-engagement with the iraqi government for a deep lasting, security cooperation relationship. and why wouldn't we? this is not lebanon. no disrespect to the lebanon. but if we lose iraq to hezbollahization security structure this is with same oil as saudi arabia. 35, 40 million and going up. connected to every key regional state. this is like losing china the '50s. this is not, this is not some small country even though in some i think some people within the administration have put it

in a small box in their mind. that is not what it is. we need to do more than the minimum and leave. we need to demonstrate we're there for the long term. we need to say that openly. as i explained and phillip will go into more detail, iranians are seriously playing. they're doing what we used to do. they're there with joint terminal attack control on the ground. iranian revolutionary guard for air force, crows air controllers. pilots who know how the su-25s above iran gave back to iraq work. they're doing this really well. we need to do it really well. one of the things we need to start doing is to put more of our special forces closer to the front line because if we don't demonstrate commitment to the iraqi army they will continue to rely on iranian-backed pmus as their primary offensive weapons system. and they can't retake back mosul that way. they will not accept it eventually. it will cause more problems. and even pmus probably don't have the force to take back

mosul. if we want to finish off isil in iraq or even get heavy in that direction, we need a major iraqi army buildup and need to demonstrate u.s. commitment and need ultimately to outperform the iranians as a security partner. now on, finish off by leaving something up. just as i wanted to, we've got issues 5-k run walk cameron run regional park in alexandria, virginia, may 9th, 2015. if you're interested, there is the url at the bottom. sicfiraq.org. it's a booed cause. support it if you can -- good cause. [applause]

>> not going up. well okay. well sam's slides i will have to try to work with this. what is really going on in syria right now? we had a jihad seems like nobody even noticed was going on. everybody picked up on isis al qaeda al-nusra, a section of al qaeda fighting there, and this was described as the jihad going on inside of syria. but people neglected the fact sorry about that guys. back to the main story. people were neglecting this. this is another jihad, a major jihad, that just seemed to float under everybody's noses. maybe it looked more organized or maybe just organic and shia coming to defend this shrine in

the back which is south of damascus. that was all it was to many people. that okay, well a few shia fighters went to syria and just wanted to defend the shrine but it's not. it hides something that is much much larger. we're seeing it in iraq. we're seeing an idealogical spread iran is trying to push their ideology among iraqis among other moderate shia i don't like to use the term moderate shia but shia who do not believe in their radical khomeni concept. this is happening in syria in a nutshell. we're seeing this on this kind of regional plain. it is shocking not as many people were noticing it. there are a few myths and fact about the shia jihad. unfortunately in the press because it is hard to cover the issue a few things popped up. i actually collected quotes from people who i know were asking me bit as i was doing research. one of them said, don't all

foreign fighters come in sunni? i included a chart here from the "washington post" which cites isis fighters and other sunni fighters. it just lists them as foreign fighters. one of the largest if not the largest foreign fighter continuing anti-inside of syria had nothing to do with al qaeda. . .

nobody has anything to take it off or even investigate it. i could go here if we facebook up i could find one in about five seconds. they're doing this quite openly and not hiding it. they're putting up extremely graphic images. ones that many of us have written hashtag about. much the same material. there's another issue. i talked about iran's control of these organizations and the routing of these fighters. one of the lines that was given to me by a friend, she will probably not be my friend anymore, was that all these groups look pretty independent. the devil is really into detail at it's about a granular look. don't miss the forest for its trees but focus on the boards. a lot of the groups were fighting and openly -- fight in soviet, they were below the radar.

fighting alongside lebanese hezbollah, a devoted proxy to the iranians. there was a lot of interconnection. they were training in iraq. it would then be shipped back they were dying to iran, not directly back to iraq. they are not that independent. they are directly controlled. another line has been, you know they're not as brutal and we are fighting the same enemy. this makes a lot of sense, kind of if you get past the whole narrative structure. these groups cast a narrative structure that says that all syrian rebels were muslims who wanted to accuse other muslims of -- and could be killed. this is how they cast u.s. moderate, so-called moderate allies. this is a larger narrative process that they underwent and now it's coming to full force. not that i think it's not i system a lot of the fighting but they have passed the sunni any of theirs as.

it doesn't mr. cicilline that they are your buddies. -- doesn't necessarily mean. these groups were for quite sometime, decades even. i'll give you an example of an organization in iraq. the iranians created from helped create them from iraqi refugees who went over to iran in the early 1980s to fight saddam hussein. even dominic the interior ministry. these groups have been around for a while for lebanese hezbollah has been on since the '80s but that doesn't mean they're not growing at rates we've never seen before. because there's a new crisis we have a new organization. the other main thing is iran's reach in this is totally overstated. i can't say how much annoyance that actually causes me because they are so open about this about how they controlled these organizations. again all you need to do sometimes is going facebook or follow iranian media. here's the weird thing and

doctor knight brought this up if they're not directly control of the group who claim to do and then begun to help them try to influence some with cash and weapons and support and then guess what happened quickly become another little micro hezbollah. i would actually say in this you can never ignore this top 10 strategy just because these people are recruiting from a wide stream of shia. i'm not saying everyone is like that. not everyone believes in absolute -- there's a top down trickle-down structure but how many of you a few decades ago would have said lebanon will be a great place for the absolute because we all know how religiously aware and radicalized the shia population is there. i'm pretty sure not many. now look at it. these are main issues and hopefully i have cut through some of that. so we now have a narrative of jihad. why would be the -- people going to fight in sequence how did

this lead to shia militias fighting against isis? first and foremost a religious crisis need to be manufactured. when i say that there was the supposed threat against this major mosque and shrine which is in southern damascus, a lot of interesting, weird granular connections to iran with the shrine. actually build that that's what has a nice pretty golden dome. what they cast this was to get fighters to go into syria. they needed people who would go for religious reasons. a justified reason, a justified reason was there doing their shrine defense. but it wasn't just that. just sang shrine defense doesn't fit in with their narrative that was being pushed. why would they need to defend it? their defending against those zeid ra'ad al-hussein i mentioned earlier but who pushed the tremont to this? america, this individual. it was the west.

so that was wrapped in within. a civil conspiracy wrapped in within the if you look at the long-term real big long-term problem with this kind of outlook, it now casts this vision that maybe the united states really did want to push for the shrine debates to destroy. reviews was pushing these moderate rebel groups because they wanted them to be al-qaeda. they said america has been trying to push al-qaeda into syria. for most of us it sounded kind of ludicrous. but that's been a narrative. so there's that. be on all of this by doing this now they are actually executing a really grand regional strategy that doesn't just target shia. it targets a lot of minorities and i think we saw a lot of this -- sorry. and. i'm running dry. i get excited.

and all right. so in addition to this way to do with the minority issue. if you remember back when hezbollah first had to deal with syria pulling out of lebanon, what did you? they had outreach and by doing so they attend this wonderful catholic ally and they could put this veneer over them and say hey, we are lebanese nationalist. don't worry, we are for the lebanon since. beyond that when they're trying to push the whole concept, it doesn't make sense to a lot of us. this is an islamist ideology. and iran christians are not treated all that well but then they are playing into these fears of drowning in the sunni seed. they been doing this with christians. if you've noticed the push this message appeared if you don't align with us if you don't align with the shia, the sunnis will come in and brutalize you

destroy you. so there's been that of the move that's been pushing him in that direction, kind of pushing a minority line. they also pushed the good sunnis versus batching his line as i like to call it where sayyida he would make a sectarian message a pro should message and say we're not against sunnis. actually these are not sunnis these aren't even muslims. he was declared them all of these as enemies. so there was that other categorization that was going on simultaneous with all of this. but the biggest thing that's going on by the pan shia themes, and they're trying to cast this narrative that iran is the protector for the shia in the region. yes, they are still testing the home in his message that says we are hand islamic that ayatollah is for all muslims, not just

shia. starting with the she first began to think about any geostrategic sense, if you're trying to form clamps around main enemies namely the saudis, the gulf and also the israelis it makes a lot of sense and you also have forces in those areas. so those that have been a big thing but then there's this. they have tried to minimize their link to this while also trying to say that we have maintained a shiite. it's kind of strange. they don't want to show that there do political interest that is at stake. if they lost city, they would potentially lose their most valuable ally which is lebanese hezbollah. out of syria, that bridge. if they lost to that would be no good. of course, it would be accredited to drive a the jihad no? but if they said that, if they said were driving persian iranians can we're having a jihad just to defend council interest, not many people would buy into the and that all traces back to the shrine. i attached attached a photo in emphasis from what my favorite, it's not

come if the song has been played played, and it says and rough translation we're not here fighting for bashar. we are fighting for the shia. that's been the message and that's how they have tried to cast but if we're looking at iraq and looking at how a lot of these fighters have filtered back their investment back there, what are we seeing now? we are protecting islam protecting, to them islam is shia ism. that's out there doing it. so if you look at this have to focus on the actual militias which militias are really going, send people to syria. there's a lot of confusion about what else i was doing. the firebrand cleric, this terrible guy, a bomb americans killed americans when we are in iraq but this kind of a great area when it comes to this. the great area is the worst thing because there's a lot of things going on on like to try

to say that china is fully aside them in street. but there's also evidence to say that maybe sadr did donate a few people to fight ensued. we just don't know. but for the most part there a lot of people what we would call splinters. factor in the iraq war when we were there, a problem happen with sadr what he was trying to maintain the army invested work out so well. he pushed back against the iranians. not a great idea and so what do they do must be encouraged these splits in the tried to build separate organizations. the interesting thing as i stood this research i tried to look up people who helped form this group. this network, the initial core of commanders almost all of them were sadrists splintered people. one of them was killed, they would call them -- he was killed on tuesday december 2012.

this is a person who actually served with mr. delaney, a sunni confront to shi'ism who eventually was in a network inside iraq and the also rated the provincial headquarters for the american forces, killing five of our guys. so he was in some way related to the. the old expression, it stinks on ice, a kind of does in this is that because they made them promoting a lot of trendy image and some other things but they had cleared direct link to the iranians. so going down more we have the old standardbearers. when i say old standardbearers i mean good old iranian proxy that we know so well. mainly lebanese hezbollah summed initial forces that were sent by the iranians into syria. they were serving as advisors also serving as direct combat

advisors but also they were helping form of localized militias made up of shia and also alawites. when you look at the organization what did they do? bay simultaneously while building their own process and render own fighters into city were also building new special separate groups inside iraq taking some their members, putting them into anything now that this new group is formed we're going to send these people to syria. for instance, one of the new groups -- one of the first martyrs was actually the son of a prime corps commander who is coming years ago celebrated by the organization, and to some of semi-killed fighting which is kind of came out of nowhere in

our 2013, and this is kind of the connection that they have. i guess going past that we also have -- i'm sure again a lot of people remember these groups, the espn american soldier, killed a lot of coalition forces and also some these guys are the first into iraq. the interesting thing with it is to go to iran and then take a syrian air flight into damascus, unload, get off the plane and everything was fine, they would pick up a rifle and go and fight. they were not even hiding this earlier when they're coming into the country. they were not hiding to fight. they were openly advertising it on facebook pages, which is kind of shocking that makes you think about this. we can go into syria whatever we want who is going to stop us? the biggest issue here has been

the synthase groups local actors, or at least they cast them so that local actors. initially the syrian the intelligent grouping, try to help form a ball of localized shia militias. the main what came out of this -- just can expand it out think of it like an octopus with a million different little groups that were associated with it. could we write some of these groups office subdivisions of the larger network, like a battalion underneath a larger army group? i would say yes, if they think they are all networked together but they've taken on their own separate names, separate identities in some cases. they've taken on their own separate recruitment activities both in iraq and syria. they have their own commanders. a lot of them coming out of the initial network. so this is kind of the next reform. so iran's proxy and i put the

picture of her of them holding hands. he's a guy who helped found -- as i went through before buddies for special groups that we saw in iraq but what is he doing now? he is leading a group another group like this. so you can see through these trails it looks crazy but there's a million different little links here there ended where. why would he do this? a lot of people have asked me how does this make any sense for a grand regional strategy? i will get to this. now check this out. wait, there's more. when we're looking i've tried to track down all the different connections, and she wouldn't let us. i put up a radical cleric with some of his fighters and people who have claimed that there with them have gone.

i'm sorry if i'm making the c-span guys angry but all these different groups companies and put in black and white over that simple, that was formed by the iranians to run afghan fighters. they put this in and then what did they do? the minute they got to see they were not fighting under the banner of treachery they were fighting under treachery, with patches on conservative commander, sometimes they have their own sub regiments but all of this, this confusing jumble, i had to put a line through sadr, if you had all of this. when you get, another thing that happenedhappened after they splattered 4000 different ways, what did we end up having? they did it again. it's just crazy. they did it again. so in august the actual group that is run by -- formed a group

-- so the force of the hoc. so this is their iraq these contentions that is fighting there but a bunch of other groups have also taken on the name, tons of them actually. a lot of them have connections back to the original. is this a deliberate move? possible. if it's not i really don't know your they need to get their stuff together. but a bunch of these different groups that have done this. the group that was formed in december of 2013 at least that's when they announced, they even started their own iraqi contingent. so all this is going on. it spread, the movement and the networking continues. if we're getting down to brass tacks on this one when we look at it i think a lot of this is just a little game that a lot of

people in irgc like to play. a lot of these people will share members, vilified in the same front, said a same front sega lost this a member. it's all a big game so that i can figure, suck down my diet method and slamming it against the table as i'm looking for yet another militia group. in addition to this i want to focus on my favorite, this is my white whale of commanders. ii have followed this guy since he had his first facebook page. i kid you not an event himself. he also had this great haircut, he wears awesome turbine and everything about him was his own personality. but when you're looking at it what is his presence represent? this is a major thing and i mentioned in in my report. initially came out and it was announced, this new group through the organization that he was a commander in a level. imagine this. nowhere near damascus that they're supposed to be defending prevented about him as a

sadrist. that was a picture of him put up after the skilled. -- after he was killed. he came back to iraq in the spring of 2014, didn't hide this at all but then he was named as a commander. the greatest thing about this that after listening, he had two music videos dedicate to him and he appeared in one. not making this one up. but afterwards another shift seem to happen. nobody mentioned the other group in more. did it vanish? did it disappear in thin air? i didn't see any mentions an iraqi press or on the tv media which i live on most of the time. but then they showed him with others. by showing that is there was a new or decision that was formed in iraq, by the second digital.

kind of the real push behind that. so this is set to states that the much deeper connections then we probably realistic interest for enough after being pictured with him he was never named as one of their guys. when he was killed yet unofficial martyrdom poster and a funeral. all of a sudden his name and face spread all over the shia militia web. so he was marketed as this big time the market. a huge thing that i realized what is doing this research was recruitment factor online. something i really truly believe nobody's been all that much attention to. they have been posting phone numbers and all sorts of things. is one of the initial ones that was posted, taken with a put up a popular committee member. they hide in the integer you're looking at and put this all into. a little bit more needs to be done because guess what i have called into these numbers. there's somebody sitting in the

audience was called in with me to these numbers and we've had conversations with these guys. initially not that hard. what did they accomplish? i love this picture. it fits in with that narrative that we are pushing isis. what have they done? they have secured damascus secured the rule for bashar al-assad, hands down. this is not the republican guard, not some magical local syrian militia that data. know this is hezbollah, the other allied organizations i don't even describe these as links. they are all part of the unified network and that's how they're developing this. so while we've done is they've taken a ton of of geography in the series you. they been able to construct the new goal on front. -- goal in front. air infiltration and iraqi governments and also within syria is i mean answered it's almost like complete.

they are the main fighting force. and then on top of that for the iranians building this narrative of strength, projection and protection for shia groups in the middle east, this is huge. when you feel you're under an existential threat, i think any shia come if i were a shia and an iranian irgc guy came and said i would give you money i will give because, the americans are dawdling right now, not doing enough for you and they never will. they are the great satan. i'm pretty sure i would take it if i thought the isis was going to destroy. they are playing off of that so effectively. so bigger things, probably the bigger thing i put all all of you. there are other regional consequences to the growth of this group from the shia jihad in syria. i heard this question, will be magically moderate after isis is defeated? i don't believe so. i don't think so at all but it's kind of like saying did lebanese hezbollah moderate after the

israelis pulled out in southern lebanon in 2000? they most certainly did not. they kept their arms. the same thing happens when we pulled out of 2011 joined the iraqi government said we will drop our arms. never did. but here's the biggest thing. my buddy over there, does anybody know what poster this belongs to? what group this post to belongs to? this is a new smaller like young who came out of the federal 14th youth movement in bahrain, put this up for him. that kind of says something. there's a post over at has the phone numbers on it and if you notice that red blotch behind the fist. what is that a map of? the map of bob ryan. why would you put that if you're pushing jihad for syria or for iraq? then we have a poster of the men

jailed for speaking out against the government. cause célèbre. if they execute him we will retaliate against the saudis we will strike them. so now they have a new cause to fight, and it would keep going like that. this is a regional struggle. when i talk about shia jihad in syria it's not just syria. it's iraq, the gulf it's going to encompass a lot more. ignoring it will not make it go away. aligning with it will certainly not make it go away because i actually would say that manipulate this process right down to a t. they've done a good job at it. i don't really see it going away anytime soon come which is sad. [applause] >> can you hear me okay?

good morning. i'm going to take a breath your after that, phillips rethink trying to digest all that. my name is p. j. dermer, i'm a retired military officer, started as an infantry and went aviation of both conventional, special forces. and my last years were blessed blessed with multiple, multiple tours in the middle east. i'm going to take a look at of a slower approach bring it up a little higher and hopefully i will get out get through this without a lot of tears because these movements after our emotional to the south and a lot of us who served on the ground trying to figure out what to do with the information like phil had, without and briefings would go to try to figure how to put all together in a practical sense. and give a bubble -- couple policy recommendations. i think i would start off by saying dave asked me to give a small synopsis about the papers. i'm in pretty good concurrence with mike.

i think what mike and philip outlined today is not obligated even more so the region has there been comforted by how complicated things are now. we tend to work within borders and nationstates but we tend to work in fundamentals of regional actors. we tend to work in fundamentals of the theory that action reaction, rational actors daydreaming i punch you you punch me back. or i put you, you get mad and just about the anything out of those two spheres, why did you not punch me that? we get lost in our own feces. while trying to do good thing but i think what both authors have pointed out is particularly phil is driving down of the shia line of block charts is quite obligated, how do you maneuver? i would put out to the crowd today that it's not new. so what phil is pointed out is not new but we have seen these kind of demarcate --

demarcations in the lebanese civil war. we have seen the ministry before. i was in syria in 1982. they asked what i was doing the? i was backpacking, and, of course, they never believe me. never mind. you get to see these splits. there's a lot of personnel involved, a lot of personal quest for power, a lot of personal interest. at the end of the day who knows what actors do what they do? 2008 winners in negotiations set up a general petraeus, very small group, mike was with me sitting in the audience back there. just what great article saying how the iranians with the best thing the isil could have. the targets of the human analysts and guys with this intellectual brilliance of phil come,and any backup would come immediately at these charts, this guy talk to this guy and he phoned called him three times and they would stick away for the weekend and it said that.

as the person who was responsible for going face-to-face with folks we're goinggoing to get you both in the sunni and shia side, a lot of them in prison, a lot of them not, we would fly around the middle east, look at the chart and go wow a lot of names, a lot of numbers. so who can i talk to? number two is, when i'm with them what do i say? at my meetings in the back of the? nice to see you for lunch. flew in a long way. glad to see an r-rated what is and would like to be? isis in essence behind all this is olivia to bring down to practical level. i think the point raised today is how much, much more obligated the ground is that it think if there's still of mike in phil are saying i think we're fundamentally understanding, or if we understand it let's say we do our actions are not be laying the fact that we do i become we are currently barred

on i would, train and equip in order to defeat isis campaign, i would say. that's the focus of where washington is and the great americans that have been redeployed to iraq knowing can imagine, to build up forces to defeat isis. well, great but i think what the authors have pointed out and i would agree, first off how did it get this bad? i mean when i saw the isis had taken over mosul engine, besides through my phone out the window and my computer out the room as a practical operator that i thought these guys so hard, i saw the youtube in the newscast of the shia marching in units all the way down to basra. and which is his first off they're all in uniforms. they are in uniform they have modern weapons all of them but a couple of him a couple of them

like yesterday, two guys in the squad would have weapons and the other guys had wooden rifles. and include some and more sophisticated stuff like the explosive formed projectiles. i don't know if you've seen those but they are 12 to 14 inches, very, very happy which killed most of our mates in the fighting and blows through armored vehicles. they will penetrate anything. they are information and marching at even the clerics are dressed up. so that didn't happen between the time crisis took mosul in the time the news guys got there, meaning it'd been going on for a very long time to include while we were there. not just since we were deployed. that's the basis and now we get to the isis part and the schisms that are not developing as phil like a. it's government faces takeover to perhaps a religious conundrum throughout the middle east again unfortunately not new in history but in our time new enough. how do you act? that's the tough question but it's nice to get the briefings,

nice to see the charts, but somewhere in this world of issue, where do you plug into the first plausible thing to do? right now we're going to go get isis and mosul or get isis. okay but the rest of the general crowd out there, as michael pointed out it's a tactical thing for them. isis is not a strategic issue. i think we need to rise to that level, to look at the strategic fault that is out there. i'm a believer in approaching it from fault lines and other metals. in other words, there are certain fundamental issues and believes in any sphere, middle east as well that exist. one of them i think is still true, how do we place another one, very much the erica irene divide, this issue need to fight, the persian persian arab history gulf. that is not a small fundamental. might prove in this is in the got to iraq and my first trick

was building the city council, and with all over iraq just iraqis from nine to 10 months building the new m.o.d. and the army. i was the main recruiter. all these bad characters all although want to like are left to like him don't know where they are and most of them are dead or gone. okay but to i.t. to a tee you have in the room and then have the sidebars with the poll you cite one on one to achieve a common thread was no malign party influence, political party. no party hacks. we want technical guys go scientific eyes, meaning proper training for the task ahead. okay military that same thing. we didn't find a lot of schisms. the only guys against part-time or some the clerics but they weren't on top of the world like they are now. moreover it crossed boundaries. it crossed boundaries.

in 2008 after fighting in basra and baghdad i was a senior military adviser in baghdad an iraqi division commander came to us and said, this is really a great day. i said yes. sadr has retired from the battlefield. hoeven-murkowski retire from the battlefield mainly because maliki took the gloves off of us and the iraqis came forward with a we did a lot of fighting, particularly in sadr city the baghdad areas. but special groups as phil pointed out, special groups did not play in that fight the special groups will be indicted and sent from a different place. but i think that's key to understand between the nationalist point to all get to a second what he said in his speech gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, great americans great iraqi patriot, today is the first in the battle against iran. this division commander was shia. a sunni would say that anyway, but he said that. this commander by the way just

affected and is now in the states seeking asylum but he was given command in the south. i won't say where, just a few months ago. one evening he got a call from maliki, a maliki said i have some visitors coming to you and want you to put them to work embed them in your staff thank you -- they will help you achieve stardom or the division commander, recommend, not division, above division, said who are you sending to my staff? they knocked on the door and they were from -- and the commander said prime minister maliki? yes. do you have orders? where would you like us to go? and the great patriot shia iraqi said, not here. i don't have a place for you. they said, that's great, we love your opinion but you don't get to decide. this commander got on the phone with maliki and this is a story related by him and i've had it

corroborated once. i don't have complete 100%. i put him in power in 2003. got on the phone to maliki over 45 minutes with arguing back and forth and said i can put them in the patrol have them do food duty, but there cannot be in my general staff headquarters and they cannot be on the streets with my soldiers. maliki says thanks for your loyal opinion take them or else. two days later i got a call and he was in istanbul. i got very mad at him because i said what are you doing in istanbul so fast? are you crazy? he left his family and everything. that's so intensely he took it and the rest is tried to work out right now. he is she and he didn't think that was the way to go. so i think -- he is she you. the fundamentals don't fail. the question is okay if so how do we work with in that compound we operate in that environment? operating in a religious

environment which is the fight in iraq and syria and in the gulf, in yemen are all happening under the guise of religious no breakup, which is bigger that we started with we would have a tough time because we work in fundamental ways here on earth. in negotiating with bad guys, we never had a problem getting one on one with a bad guy, getting a dialogue with a killer. never had a problem getting along with ago. soon or later you can find the ground where you could work out something, even with the sadr group i had some neat things happen. but the minute we were approach with the opening line -- okay if the what more interreligious dialogue after that to include saying that we are prepared to die for our god today, we have two ways to respond to we were prepared to help you, okay? okay, we are very much so, to include when we walked out of this building.

or i can't go there. i'm not at that level, with all due respect, we're going to do bow out of this part of the negotiations because i don't speak for my god and the guy next to me he's got a star for my. this could get rather confiscated. now, if you're willing to come down a level of whatever level you want to call it come up a level, i'm not going to speak to you, let us begin. but at the point of you at that level, i don't know where you go. we had a chaplain in one of the units in baghdad, a great guy 6'6" really into the reconciliation council, have the white board with meetings and all this. i offered that he should take lead of this. you and your gang should be leading, not us. this is not our bailiwick. it never came to the fore. so number one the complications are vast. number two, understand the fun e-mails. three, and i agree with michael, very much so did in the big

game. became of isis is bad news. those guys, gals whatever their made up of are really projecting themselves in a way that we all agree is pretty macabre. again, not new unfortunately. but that's not the game. we are not in that game. the kind of military is unleashed and allowed to play in the sandbox can do a lot of damage, but you've also got to understand that is not just information of guys in black with weapons. isis is not i would argue not a formidable -- its former role but it's not a very structured and if we push it out of mosul or export interest in it will go there and be there for a beckoning with our air power. no. understand what it is to filter has been a very good job of helping explained that are pushing isis out of mosul it's not a bumper sticker. it's not a bumper sticker. we have to be integrated game

editing the great again as outlined by dave and mike and, of course, the iranian influence. some people said i don't know what that means. what do you mean? they get first cut. that's what it means. they are the first ones in the morning, the last ones out of my. they get six hours a day, we get 45 minutes with allah body in between whatever. we will take the six hours. you know what? you can put your office inside the embassy in we so decide. but we're not in that game. and i've seen this time and time and time again. i've done deployments with the team before christmas, other place in the middle east where we show up high you were here. what he wanted to? we're meeting at is whether you're going to play? he guys going to play? whitey keep getting on on the plane and leave? the french are here the british are here. where you guys? okay hold that thought, we'll be back in a few months in the next meeting. you have to be really and again. i also would argue that this is

not, this is not a conflict to be far away from. if you really want to play in this game, we have to adjust the balance between the force protection concepts that we have fallen under and the ability to meet face-to-face. you have to ask the question ask the question where did the shia militia get all the armament under our noses? what happened since 2011, or pick a date before isis i don't care, in terms of the diplomatic needs? the guys are living out there day in and day out, and supposed to be with her partner to where was that influence? can we get it back? if you get six hours a day, we have an uphill fight to get the influence that we should have to get back but it's interesting because there's a conundrum, a contradiction but you won't meet anybody on are not on shia-sunni, that doesn't look at you as an american and won't

tell you to do something. and what they will tell you is, is be the power. you are the power. be the power. stop playing around. if you are not the power, and evidently didn't happen with the problem of -- about what's going on at here. for reasons we don't understand that it's your business to another you are ready to quit playing possum come on out but in the meantime i've got to talk to them because they are here. in the anarchy of needs yes we are alive. so understand the fundamentals the and again understand the complexities. and last i would just add, i would agree that with mike and also with phil that concentrated on the fringes which it looks like now we get the views of their campaign, the number of sorties, the number of kurdish movement even kobani, as deadly as that was, is not where it

lies. this fight this struggle lies in the capitals. it lies in the capitals of power. our pressure, our priority, as much as enjoying the freedom of the skies in iraq right now, i don't know what we're doing in the city, lies in baghdad and damascus and riyadh. and i've never been out in a place at a level that never always wanted to go higher. the first version if you are you in who you represent? there's no way when we were negotiating as negotiators are general petraeus and ambassador crocker, the two, three or four of us who are out that was the first thing we had to establish, are you speaking for your grand self, colonel or have you been formally sent here in a position of tax? that's where it lies. the playground of phillip so brightly outlined these guys are being manipulated for me to

become as in the. one day they will solve this and the next event but there are reasons for doing things are really at the end of the day i argue not that propagated. up top where the real game is is where we need to be. the one or two people that i was never happy to go in with in the classroom, and always, always on my game if i had a game was the guys that were doing the thinking the guys were doing the information operations, the guys with the mouthpieces, the guys who were the whispers in the ear of a nine and others. because these were the good looking guys. they have an isis clothing and they were very intellectually astute. very well studied in whatever world of they came from. not my world but their world nevermind, and they could spend you if you were not careful. i would want to join by the time i left the root of the wasn't careful. it was going to happen but sometimes i felt, i don't know. the point is is that intellect

is out there as many boos as it can be, and you have to be first of have to take an hour worth of lectures against the great satan. got it yeah i know we are the worst. where the worst but i know one worse than us. over there in khomeini land but at least we live good intentions company school, hospital whatever. at least we intend to. what they're going to be i don't know, but you will do what they tell you no matter what they tell you for the rest of your life. so this is not easy but these precepts have to be joined in to do. so i think to sum up i would argue that mike has done a great job. and phil has done something that very few can pull together and all with open source information which is extreme importance to understand, especially today in the communicative world. i would be in baghdad inside the command center of baghdad watching or advising the senior,

one of the villains of mosul and the ground forces commander. the journal was a great guy he was a nice pen, a decent man. he really was. he just wasn't a classic wartime commander. he hated the fact he had to fight iraqis which, all by the way, was another theme throughout the armed forces to nobody in uniform in iraq, unless they have malign intent wanted to fight anyone in the population of iraq. this is what happened in the turnaround in fallujah in 2000 this was the reticence of iraqi forces to fight in basra in 2008 and in baghdad. forces only move forward when we came on the battlefield and went first. we lost a lot of guys because of it. that's when they came forth. none of them wanted to tackle this component and this was another after dilemma i would add to mike's program. once devices is defeated are

becoming background for a whole nother kind of fight. the iraqi forces no matter what they develop if they are nationalist, won't want to do it again. thank you. [applause] >> thank you very much. michael, phillip, by the current way that these studies can be found download in pdf on our website,. i know google about 10 minutes worth of questions but let me just ask first. mike, in terms of specifics how many soldiers right now isf currently being trained up? what's the order about the iraq is going to bring against isis? went of the going to bring it? would be an integrated force? that's for you. phillip, hezbollah perhaps the largest of all this operating in

syria, how does it coordinate with the other militias, and what are your estimates of their losses to date? let's make those short answers and then we'll get to the group. >> i think the real numbers of iraqi security force and peshmerga to be honest, all those figures are in the report to a snapshot view in early 2015 was around 48000 active combat strength for iraqi army. a significantly higher number for m.o.i., but again not, nowhere near where they were back in the capability of 2009 or even before isis in 2014 your the big takeover. the main thing is this. how many active force it to the

have that are capable of moving and undertaking offensive operations? that's the key measure we're looking for. with the iraqi army right now it's a remarkably small number. it's probably elements of one armored division and special forces. it's well under 10,000 guys and that means currently they are probably able to throw more offensive mobile troops in the iraqi army camp right now. and possibly even the iraqi army and the ministry of into combined. the peshmerga i would say probably have as much active mobile capability as the entire iraqi army ministry of interior and maybe even put together in terms of people they can move to a battlefield. >> in terms of hezbollah serving as advisor and also working with the syrian army initially taking in as that come

in that advisor kind of role but now it has taken on far more of a command startled. and actually if you juxtapose it to iraq coming into certain areas and taking leadership roles with some iraqi units, this didn't please a lot of guys in the iraqi army. it also didn't please the people in the syrian army. there were actually a few little firefights that actually occurred between some of these iraqi shia militiamen were with haskell and also with some of the local militias. they were essentially running the show now. they are running the show in terms of command structure and everything else. i'm not saying there is no syrian army left but these guys that have the strategic -- in terms of numbers that are lost officially hezbollah says it's in the high couple hundreds. i would say it probably goes much higher than that, toppled into the 1000 range, probably more, because they have hidden a number of the casualties or hidden them as casualties from syria.

so it's very, very hard to get a true gauge of that. >> i'm going to call on some folks in the crowd, and maybe identify yourself. wait until the microphone comes. up front, please. >> barbara slavin from the atlantic council. as claude rains would say i'm shocked gambling is going on. you know when the u.s. overthrew saddam, something like 50,000 members of the brigade came in and told them benefit as they goes defense, they came in right behind. you know hello iran is next door and it fought a war with iraq and had groomed all of these people and now it is reaping the benefits of the u.s. decision to get rid of saddam hussein. we believe that aside for now. the question is this. i am hearing from some iranians that iraqi shia don't really want to fight to take back the sunni areas. what they want to do is control

baghdad's south. simile in the city where we have a partition of the country in effect. how would all of you react to the notion that what we are watching is simply the partition of these two countries and that the u.s. would like to keep them unified, particularly in the case of iraq but the people who live there actually don't really care and iran doesn't really care as long as it has its quarter to lebanon, it's got its influence, particularly in iraq in the areas where most of the oil is. thanks. >> well, the first thing i would tell you is, you know partition sounds great in to address the map and then you go put all the layers on it of ethnosectarian, regional identity geography et cetera it ain't easy in iraq but if you look at what the iraqi secret forces have punched back to now, you can see them spreading up these scenes of

shia turkoman committees, stretch although it up into kirkuk. so no partition of the country, and there's no limit to the pmqs, they'll have to go very far north to liberate all shia area. i don't think it's neat and tidy. they're trying to maintain a life as the blackout history. that's running right through anbar province, alien areas. >> and i will pick up on the point. i think there's no reason, if you have basra which is the major income for the country, since another one, we like to say those of us who've been out there doing business that basra doesn't make baghdad. baghdad needs bossert to get the south, the oil baghdad, the capital.

why push your luck? why good into food fights out there in any land for what? you are not losing anything. and i do also believe that once victory has happened, there's a very good scheme of evidence that fights within themselves will occur, and i think phillip what a show today, supports that, started lebanon, other civil wars. we have to challenge the assumption that if the shia when, it gets a certain point of the program where they will settle and in the sunni areas are left. this worst thing they could do is just sit because the dynamics of history of the original show they will turn on the cells soon or later one way or another. all those lines that phillip showed will have to go somewhere. internally it starts first. >> thank you very much. i have an observation and a

question if you want to observation, if you look at it from a strategic point of view i think all the isis was lost which i think is a tragedy but i think we look at isis role and the venom of isis and that has no rule of engagement, its viciousness creating on its own a culture of violence which may much of it to others as well. i think of that aspect of the commission to all the shia entities, you can have a similar entity which is mushrooming out as well. so unfortunately that's the dangers. i think the key question here is, in the midst of that who are your partners and who can you work with? that i think is what the government of iraq has dictated as democratic and others as well, they are the only sort of at this moment, the safer option to work with. however to do that there has been a clear commitment from the united states. i would say one key issue is

don't repeat the last 10 years mistake and learn from it. that's what i think any real engagement test is usually take that into account. in having better culture awareness and then something to hold onto. that's on the micro level. at the macro level, at the more holistic point of view, i think you're absolutely right when you say that they have have a dialogue. that dialogue, it can't just be shia-sunni problem, because it's not. much more than that. they can't be about dividing iraq or not dividing it because that creates its own mushroom. where the u.s. has a role or not, let's be clear about that. but i think it has to be a serious dialogue. the nuclear issue is one element of that dialogue, by the way. a serious dialogue between the regions. the united states can significantly influence that dialogue and create some environment for a series of chats to take place but otherwise i think we are doomed.

>> i will take one part of that. i agree. look, i agreed on a number of things, but with all due respect in terms of the growth of isis, this is a two-way street, particularly on par. what were they do? they would go out and killed tribal leaders, kill a waiting list but it was also killed in a waiting list with all of these shia militia were going out of the power drills through people's heads and to make their bodies. this age to a radicalization process. i will say this on a personal level because i focus on the shia entities to i don't think it's gotten all that much attention. there's a few of "new york times" articles on it and that's about it but this is far more secure than just the absolute and utter disgusting brutality that is isis. it's a far larger picture and i think that if we addressed it holistically as you said, we would probably have much better results. >> bj, the what to say something

but his commitment the ambassador is talking about? >> i thought he said it well enough. he said two things don't repeat the same mistakes that 10 years ago. i would agree because i was part of those mistakes but i second-guessed methinks i did personally we did a lot of people who serve in people who serve anorexic we could've done more and i like to argue, i'm glad we didn't in some ways you know. just being honest. but not only the u.s. commitment but u.s. leadership either we are leading this thing or not. you can have it both ways as who we are and that's what we do every time we travel. there's an incredible befuddlement in the region at large as to not only will we not take charge, but the minute we leave the room and we we're somebody doing something we call them up and say don't do that. why are doing that? wait a minute, that didn't come out in the office copier i know but we don't want you to do. it's an incredible conundrum. and i don't know how parties out there get it.

>> we have a number of additional questions here but it don't want to go over today. if you have those please come up. until then thank you very much for coming. i think this is a great panel and i think everyone will benefit from looking at these publications. so thank you once again for coming. thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> life to the senate for a period of mourning debate. at 12:30 p.m. senators recess for weekly party lunches. the senate returns at 2:15 p.m. for possible work on the department of homeland security spending. three times last week democrats blocked debate on the bill because of language that overturned president obama's executive actions on immigration. also possible this week debate

on the nomination of ashton carter to be the next defense secretary. this is live coverage of the senate here on c-span2. the president pro tempore: the senate will come to order. the chaplain, dr. barry black, will lead the senate in prayer. the chaplain: let us pray. holy god, you make the clouds your chariot and walk upon the wind. we see your works in the rising of the sun and in its setting. for the beauty of the earth and