decisive storm is being actually mounted by the arab countries and some non-arab countries in order to deal with the issue of yemen. this is a, an historic, i think, move and certainly we're going to deal with that. now, if i move on to the record mike referred to it, but let me mention very quickly. one, be you look at the data, the -- if you look at the data the statistics of last year we had some 11,000 incidents throughout the world. in other words, it is an increase from 2013 and prior to that in general. already the first three months of this year we see an escalation throughout the world all the way from egypt and libya and syria and pakistan nigeria and so on and so forth.

it seems to me if this trend really continues unfortunately 2015 will be recorded as the bloodiest year yet since 9/11. mike mentioned one of our recent obligations related to terrorism in north africa and the impact regionally and globally. we do have copies for those who might be interested. let me just mention that we're covering a broad area all the way from -- [inaudible] health security, for example, the ebola crisis, and in general i think we have to look at the record. and the record of last year 2014, for example, there is an increase of 30% in north africa

over 2013. and, again if you look at 9/11 from 9/11 you look at that particular region which really underscores the nature of the threats, there is an increase of 800%, and so on. and so today we're going to discuss several of the countries in the region. again, there are many terrorist groups involved in this activity. some are regional and some are foreign fighters and so forth. so i think we're going to deal with both the domestic situation, the internal situation as well as the external support of violence in that particular region and elsewhere. i think what is really important for us is not only to identify the threats, but also to develop

as i indicated before some best practices to deal with the problem. we do have some suggestions in our report. you can look at this and, again, this is only one region. and mike mentioned also the report on europe and particularly i would like to also mention a study that we completeds that is now in production on nato dealing with issues in europe itself such as the ukraine, afghanistan and elsewhere around the world. it gives me great pleasure to introduce the first speaker today. as i mentioned, ambassador bonnie jenkins, she has a very rich background. i'm not going to go into --

[inaudible] bios of the speakers. i would only mention that she covers a great deal, i think, of areas of the all the way from the global security agenda to weapons of mass destruction. and she, obviously, has a very rich background also in the academic community working with many universities and think tanks, and she publishes extensively. so i asked ambassador jenkins to provide some context for the discussion today. thank you. >> i think i'm going to actually stay here, if that's o.k. >> would you like to come here? >> no, i'm just going to stay here. thank you. thank you for inviting me, yonah, to this and to the organizers, and it's great to see everyone out here today. i know that we have a distinguished panel here so i'm going to try to keep my comments brief.

my work in the government really focuses on ways in which we can keep weapons of mass destruction materials and weapons out of hands of nonstate actors. so my perspective in terms of international cooperation in combating terrorism is that it's very important to have international cooperation. the only way we can really address the problems of terrorism is to work together on a global small to work bilaterally, multilaterally with partners. and the work that i do really does foster that effort and really does foster ways in which we can develop programs to actually make sure that we do not have opportunities for these nonstate actors to use chemical, biological nuclear or radiological weapons. the u.s. has developed a number

of tools and initiatives to to address this issue whether they are through international organizations, working with international organizations, whether it's working through specific initiatives, whether it's working on the ground bilaterally with countries, there are a number of ways which we have been focusing on addressing a very complex threat when you're trying to follow individuals around the world who may want to actually get access to pathogens, to precursors to nuclear materials so they can use it for harm. there are a number of things that i work on at state the president in this arena. -- at the state department in this arena. i've worked suns 2009 on a nuclear security summit which i'm sure some of you have heard of. it's an effort that was started in 2009 by president obama in his first speech, his first prague speech where he announced that nuclear terror is one of the greatest threats the world faces. and he announced that we would

have a security summit to bring together leaders around the world to focus on this important issue, recognizing that in order to prevent nuclear terrorism you want to prevent the access of nuclear materials. so as you probably know there have been a number of nuclear security summits since that speech. there was one in 2010 here in washington followed by 2012 summit in seoul and 2014 in the hague. and there'll be a p final summit under the current format in 2016 in the united states, the place and time to yet be determined. due to these summits, we have worked with 54 leaders of four national organizations included in that working to provide commitments, communiques and other efforts to insure that states who are working with us are doing what they can to secure nuclear materials. we've done this through a number of national commitments, there have been a number of what we

call gift baskets which are actually commitments by groups of countries or particular areas of nuclear security. and we've done it through, as i said, through communiques. and in 2010 we had something called a work plan which was about a suggestion-page document -- six-page document that outlined activities countries could do to secure nuclear material. so through this process of the nuclear security summit, we have been providing ways in which we can consolidate nuclear material, get rid of excess nuclear material and really focus on ways in which we can coordinate and work together internationally and with international organizations like the iaea interpol and the u.n. and the e.u. to work together to prevent nuclear terrorism in the future. as i said, there's another summit that's being prepared for now among a number of countries, and you'll be hearing a lot more about the upcoming summit in the next few months. one of the other aspects about

international cooperation is the recognition that we need to work with not only governments but entities outside the government as well. the nuclear security summit has been a process of working closely with nongovernment organizations and industry which are very important parts of insuring that reduced secured nuclear material. so when we talk about international cooperation we're talking about all the entities that exist around the globe that can help insure that we prevent nuclear terrorism. another entity that exists that i am the u.s. representative to is something called the g7 global partnership. this is an initiative that was started in 2002, and cannon asked us under the then-chairmanship of canada and the main focus of this as the title entails which is the global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, was established for the main purpose of making sure we do not let wmd

get in the hands of nonstate actors. it's been in existence since 2002, and it was set up to be a ten-year commitment amongst the g8 members with the united states putting in $10 billion matched by 10 billion of the other members. it's grown a lot since 2002. it was extended in 2011 to include looking at all areas of wmd. for the first ten years of the global partnership the main focus was destroying nuclear, russian nuclear submarines and russian chemical weapons. we spent over $23 billion in the first few years in the global partnership. now the global partnership is looking at all areas of chemical biological nuclear and chemical weapons to prevent those from getting into the hand of nonstate actors. and as i said, it now has 28 members who are a part of this initiative. some of the activities that the global partnership has been

engaged include under nuclear and radiological security the physical approximate of nuclear materials, securing the transport of nuclear materials, radioactive security, prevention of illicit nuclear trafficking material management verification and compliance and work on export controls. in the area of biosecurity, there's work in securing and accounting for biological pathogens, preventing deliberate biological attacks, strengthening disease surveillance and detection reinforcing biological nonproliferation instruments like the biological weapons convention and the safe and secure responsible conduct of biological signses or what we sometimes call security culture. in chemical destruction, the global partnership members have cleated the projects -- completed the projects remaining assisting in destruction and

activities in syria and libya and prepared to assist in the destruction of newly-declared stockpiles. in addition, i should mention that last year the global partnership has been having meetings focusing on cbr security in ukraine. ukraine is one of the members of the to global pickup, it has been a -- partnership it has been a pen since 2003, and as a result of recent activities in ukraine, we have been meeting and working with ukraine and trying to address some of those cbrn threats they have right now in the security arena. as we look at 2014, which is one of questions in this effort, in this panel, 2014 was an interesting year for the global partnership. as i've mentioned, the global partnership is now a g7 entity. last year during -- russia, of course, was pregnant at the g8 -- present at the g8 at the time, but as a result of their action in ukraine, it was decided they would no longer be

a part. now it's a g7 partnership, but there were a few months where there was no chairmanship. fortunate fortunately germany took over last year and so we've been having meetings again as a result of that. there's been a lot of work as i said, in syria. it was really all global partnership members that were involved in the destruction of chemical weapons. denmark, the u.s., italy germany, the u.k., norway finland, sweden, canada and others are all global partnership member so athought played a significant role -- they all played a significant role. and as i said we've been working with ukraine on some of their issues. in looking beyond, there will continue to be work on the cbrn security issues in ukraine. in the biosecurity area, we'll be continuing to focus on biosecurity projects. i should also mention one other area that's getting a lot of attention. it's something called the global health security agenda.

for those of you who don't know what this is it's an effort that was started last year in the united states with a launch in washington, d.c., the focus on how do we try to address infectious disease threats, trying to reduce those threats like ebola. this is an effort that was started in february last year, so it was, of course, prior to the ebola -- the attention that ebola received. but the focus of the global health security agenda, which is led by the white house, is to reduce disease threats and now 44 countries are working on this effort. it's both a security effort it's also a human health and animal health effort. it includes law enforcement. and as a result in the united states, you have quite a number of departments who have traditionally not been working on threat reduction programs who are now involved because we're looking at infectious diseases and how to fight infectious disease from a prevent, protect and respond lens.

which means that brings in a lot of different departments in the united states. we've been working on this effort with a number of countries, as i said, 24 countries are now involved in this effort to try to reduce infectious disease threats, and there are a number of actions that these 44 countries are looking at. this is an activity that the global partnership is also working with and as i mentioned the nuclear security summit global health security agenda is very similar and focused on the bio area. those are just some of the programs. i could keep going. there's quite a few things that we're engaged in and trying to insure that weapons of mass destruction do not get in the hands of terrorists. these are just a few of them. the gold partnership, the nuclear security summit, i can go into detail but with so many distinguished guests on the panel, i think i will stop now and turn it over to our next speaker. thank you. [applause]

>> thank you very much ambassador jenkins. next speaker is dr. alaa babb call the siz who is the political counselor of egypt in the u.s. and formerly from the embassy of egypt in syria between 2012 and 2014. so he obviously, has a great deal of experience and knowledge also elsewhere in the region, and i would like to mention that also he worked at the united nations regarding a project of african peacekeeping operations. and he has a ph.d in international relations from helsinki university in finland.

>> thank you very much. let me start by thanking the potomac institute for organizing this important event, and, of course the special thanks to professor alexander whom i know has put a lot of effort into this event today. i think best way to discuss the issue of international cooperation to the combat terrorism is to try to start with a global image of terror u.s.es today. terrorists today. starting from africa, by all means i think boko haram, the terrorist organization in nigeria, is now deeply rooted in the nigerian society compared to four or five years ago. not only this, boko haram has gone through important transformation process. it started as a nigerian organization, and now it's a

transnational organization working very effectively in other societies like cameroon, chad niger buy key that faso, south nigeria, of course. i very much recommend that a you read this excellent report professor yonah just mentioned about terrorism in north africa in 2014. clearly, the numbers here show that terrorism is growing in africa whether we are talking about north africa, the saw harare area or west africa. if we move to asia, i think the reason why the u.s. administration or decided recently to keep more troops in afghanistan is that there is a rebirth of al-qaeda and taliban in both afghanistan and pakistan. these reports have shown that these two organizations are now

adopting more efficient approaches to recruit more young people in both countries. we move to the middle east, we have, of course, isil, the so-called islamic state for iraq and the levant, or dash which is controlling a lot of lawyers in iraq including the second most important city mosul, and areas as well in syria. they are active also in countries like libya, like egypt i was trying to get some info about dash recently, and i discovered that during the last six months only -- only in six months -- 31 different organizations announced their support or allegiance to isis. and those 31 organizations are working in 16 different countries. some of them are with majority

of muslims like as i mentioned egypt or libya or indonesia, and is some others are with non-muslim majority like india. if we move to europe, recently the e.u. counterterror coordinator said that there are 4,000 foreign fighters, european fighters fighting alongside isil in iraq and syria. 25% out of them have already returned back home. they are back home with better knowledge, better skills and better networking. if they want to use this knowledge and skills and network in conducting small terrorist organizations in any european society. i once asked a u.s. security expert, is it the same with your

country? he said, no, fortunately, we don't have thousands of americans fighting alongside isis, we have a couple of hundred only but this doesn't mean we are safe because out takes only one to have another 9/11. point i'm trying to make here is that we are facing a growing challenge, not a declining one. and this is, i think the first lesson we should know about our enemy in this regard. the second lesson is that we are facing a transnational threat, so no country can face or combat this threat on its own. we need to build regional as well as international coalitions in order to fight this threat effectively. a third lesson is that we need to have our object tives as clear as possible -- objectives as clear as possible.

are we aiming to degrade these terrorist organizations contain them or eliminate them? depending on our objective, we will be able to define the ways and means we are going to adopt in order to fight terrorism. a fourth lesson, i think, is time. time is of crucial importance. professor alexander mentioned that i was the charge d'affairs in syria this month they are celebrating the anniversary of their revolution. let me remind you in march 2011 when this revolution started there wasn't a single terrorist organization in syria. not a single one. you have the international community who was reluctant to support this revolution, now we have isis, we have al-nusra, we have tens, maybe hundreds of

terrorist organizations in syria. i hope we the international community, are not repeating this mistake again in libya. that's why egypt, many cooperation with libya, other countries, was very keen to urge the security council to adopt a resolution to elect a legitimate government the libyan legitimate government to combat terrorism. finally, two days ago, the security council adopted two important resolutions in this regard. i hope we will have the courage and the will the political will to implement these two resolutions. the final lesson i think is the

military tool is, of course very important. but it's not enough. ideology is of crucial importance. that's why we have been calling for a revolution in islamic thought recently, the need to revisit the islamic thought and develop a counternarrative for the ideology of terrorist organizations in order to show the young people in the islamic societies that this is a misinterpretation of the quran and the real islam and it's a sort of manipulation from islamic -- from the terror arist organizations. terrorist organizationses who have been sending scholars to societies suffering from terrorism like this knew nigeria and iraq and syria in order to listen to these terrorist narratives and come back to develop a counter one translated

into local languages, put it in a book and go distribute it in schools and mosques and lock communities in order -- local communities in order to make sure that the right interpretation of islam is there. fighting the finance of terrorists is also important. to make sure that terrorist organizations are not controlling oil refineries or border crossings, they are not getting ransoms, they are not even collecting taxes or receiving international financial support. socioeconomic development is also important. recent studies have shown that it's much easier for terrorist organizations to recruit young people who are jobless, so that's an important element to take into consideration. for example, in egypt while we are fighting terrorism now you

have allocated powers for development, now you have to make sure we are creating jobs hand in hand with fighting terrorist groups in sinai. finally, stabilization and humanitarian assistance is also equally important. tomorrow we have a very important ministerial meeting in kuwait for international donors in order to raise funds to support syrian refugees internally displaced. we have humanitarian catastrophe of 16 million people suffering only with -- [inaudible] if we add the iraqis, the yemenis, the picture will be -- [inaudible] and i think i'm going to stop here. yeah, we can get back to this point during the q&a. thank you very much. [applause]

>> thank you very much. we are moving down to mrs. wafa bugaighis. not only is she a foreign policy expert but also an engineer, educator and human rights advocate. and, clearly, there are many of us who are very much interested in your views, particularly to clarify the confusion about libya at this time. >> thank you so much. can you hear me? it's okay? thank you so much. let me first thank the potomac institute for organizing this event. thank you, professor yonah alexander. ladies and gentlemen, honorable guests, it's my pleasure to make

a presentation about libya and what's going on and our vision for countering the wave of terrorism that we've been hit by lately. each day as the future of libya is being discussed by various parties the morocco, the fierce battle for my country's soul and democracy continues to be wild in streets and in the indifferent towns. we and the world cannot wait for the formawtion of a new unity government -- formation of a new unity government before we act in a strong united front against the scourge that's terrorizing my home and my fellow club januaries. libyans. ladies and gentlemen, as i stand before you here, young men are being recruited into joining

extremist groups and shipped across borders to come and create havoc in my country. right now as i am speaking to you, men in my country are dying while trying alongside our military troops with minimal support and resources to fight back the new evil that's trying to the steal away our dreams -- to steal away our dreams, our values, our culture, our history and our wealth. huge -- ladies and gentlemen as i'm talking to you here weapons are being delivered to terrorist groups, funds are being provided across borders to buy more weapons, to fight our young democracy and prosperity to fight tolerance to send

messages against peaceful, tolerant religion. to fight the same human rights in the international conventions and charters that we are all in room signatory to, to reverse the right to life the right to freedom, the right to good living and to goodings. >> designed to be a little different from our usual council on foreign relations meetings in that we are loosely simulating a national security council meeting. as the national security adviser, i will try and interrupt frequently i will try and ask can a lot of questions -- ask a lot of questions so we can discern a matter of answers so that we might be a able to put policy prescriptions before the president. after all that's our job on the national security council. so the way we'll structure this

is that we'll begin with i'll begin with what i believe to be the current u.s. policy vis-a-vis isis. we'll turn as a group to discuss what we believe the policy to be and the way it's working. we'll expand into a conversation about the strategic enters of the united states in the region -- interests of the united states in the region, and then finally, we'll try and develop some policy options, assuming that we don't have consensus is and that these distinguished panelists have relations for the president we'll try and hammer out what those are. and like any typical nsc meeting, i expect it inconclusively and e are resolve that we need more meetings to come up with a new policy. [laughter] ..

the u.s. is of course engaged in striking military targets today, and we should explore whether we need more what that means and whether it should be expanded

perhaps beyond the advisory role that our u.s. servicemen and women are in now and whether we perhaps should even commit more ground troops, ground troops to the effort. finally, the state of the iraqi security forces is unclear. in many cases some of their success is at least in part attributed to the shiite militias operating across the region. we should discuss whether we think we are winning today and ultimately whether u.s. interests are being served when apparently if we believe it to be true that the u.s. is, as max has put it in an article, being the u.s., being the air force for the iraqi shiite militiamen. finally we need to discuss what our posture should be vis-à-vis the kurds. they are very frustrated they

haven't received armed directly from the united states, and they are angry about our policy that everything should be done by with and through the central government in baghdad. and, finally we will turn to syria. we get some targets there but our policy is ostensibly to arm a moderate rebels so that they may become more of a fighting force to force a stalemate in series a so that eventually we will be able to get to peace talks. and then as i understand our policy to be, we will then insist on the departure of assad. we need to discuss also whether, in our campaign to defeat basis, whether assad moscow or whether we need to make greater common cause with him as we move forward on the campaign. janine let me start with you. you're a senior fellow for defense policy at the council on foreign relations. you're a former pilot and air

force officer. when you were deputy assistant secretary in the obama administration huber charged with reviewing strategic plans and military plans. as recently as august you wrote america has no policy to stop isis. you used to believe that? and can you give us some sense of what is happening on the ground today? is our policy working, and are we making progress against isis? >> well, thank you for presiding and for the overview. i think you pretty much hit the outline of what's happening pretty much correct. i think what's happening now is there is a recognition that there is no short-term there is no purely military and there is no purely united states approach to this. that's going to solve it that's going to win going to defeat isis. so what we have is we have a policy to defeat isis, but we have actions that have been sort

of slow. so we may have missed some windows actually. we can get to that a little bit later, but to the extent that we need to arm moderate rebel force in syria where are they? what's left. on the military side, i think that the outlines of the military strategy is about right for the iraqis but it's a bit of a rubic's cube because you can't just address the iraq issue. you have to address the isis issue, which is a cross-border issue. that's what i originally when i said we'd have a strategy against isis. we have an iraq strategy. we don't have much of a serious strategy. >> as an air force officer is the air campaign working? >> the air campaign is working to the extent it's like resolve the problem. it is necessary but not sufficient. the air campaign is mr. but not sufficient to military action in general businesses are but not

sufficient what i mean is it's very clear that compared to last summer when it is lightning sweep across iraq isis that kind of activity has been put in a box. airstrikes can suppress that. they are not able to max forces and do what you need to do to continue to take territory. so it's like a band-aid on the problem. to get to the next up, however, in a military way you're going to go into the cities and that's where air power is a lot less definitive. you can't win wars with air power alone. >> let's talk about that. max is a distinguished author and cynical at the council on foreign relations. you've been a scholar on counterinsurgency activities and terrorism in general. from some of your writing you seem to be a skeptic of the air

campaign. you wrote very recently that we are setting as iran's air force, as the individuals on the ground apparently doing most of the heavy lifting are the shiite militia forces, apparently armed and trained by iran. can you do this a sense of whether you believe the current policy of airstrikes is working, or are we ultimately going a self-defeating policy by enabling iran to exercise still more influence in iraq? >> well, if the objective is to increase the iranian strangled on iraq, and i would say the policy is working brilliantly but i would question whether that should be in fact our policy. in fact, i think we need to widen the aperture a little bit. one of the issues is a the administration has been so narrowly focused on trying to combat isis that it has lost sight of the bigger picture which is that if we can push isis out of iraq and

theoretically maybe we're on a project you were that might be possible by the end of the year, knock on wood fingers crossed et cetera, but if we're able to do that, if the price of doing that is to deliver iraq into the hands of the iranian quds force that is a poor bargain in my mind. what we need is a strategy that is not just counter isis but counterradicalization extremism throughout the middle east of both the sunni and the shiite and we should not be losing sight of the bigger picture here. in fact, what i think we're doing. because right now we are bombing certainly put if you look at for example, what's happening in tikrit, be the case that iraqi force that they can tikrit who knows? they have named victory in the past but let's say that's true. you've got to be pretty credulous if you think iraqi are taking tikrit are actually the iraqi army forces. leaving aside the fact that the iraqi army forces are affiliated with other militia groups to begin with the reality is from

everything i've read the vast preponderance of those forces belong to various shiite militias, which basically report to the general who is the most powerful man in iraq in spite of actually not being iraqi. is the head of the iranian quds force. i think we need to be extremely careful about empowering bad guys like him as a price of trying to push back isis in a vector that is just the that is just direct out of the way of any policy in street. i don't think how we will push isis out of anywhere in syria on the current trajectory but as far as i know they've been expand their area of control since we started bombing them last summer. >> but max so we will definitely in the course of beating get option towards the end, but am i hearing that you would pause --

>> i'm getting more prescriptive than descriptive. >> that's fine. would you possible bombing because apparently in your mind it has only been a fitting iran and wait until we have either retrained up iraqis agree forces so that they can play the lead, which enough content is being led by general soleimani? >> i'm not sure that we are just all the bombing to extent that the bomb is necessary to keep isis from advancing them to keep it in check but i think it may make sense and especially if we have good targets that we're act of servicing. it may make sense but i just don't think we have to be running close air support for an iranian directed offensive but that's what we should not be doing. what we got to be focusing on is, when we get into more options side of the meeting is without to be focusing on building up indigenous sunni forces that will oppose isis. >> treat is a distinguished professor of international relations at george mason

university and the author of how terrorism ends. you've made a great contribution to our understanding of terrorism. you must isolate published an essay in this months for affairs where you caution policymakers that isis is not al-qaeda. you wrote that it is a pseudo-state led by a conventional army. can you address this and what it means for our current policy and what policy might flow from its? >> sure. there are two different questions. one is specific about isis and the fact that the way we have treated isis since it arose as if it was just a new form of al-qaeda. so therefore, we turn our very elaborate counterterrorism strategy and policy in the direction of isis and try to apply the same kinds of tools that we've used for counterterrorism isis. and they don't fit because counterterrorism against al-qaeda was in part aimed at trying to undermine al-qaeda's

narrative and al-qaeda was very concerned about mobilizing forces in order to have that narrative attractive, where as isis have is very different isis -- different narrative, different set of ways of going to bed. and that is they want to shove brutality. they want to show strength, they want to show power. so when the united states is focused on the brutality that isis carries out, they are actually strengthening isis because isis ones to be considered to be -- [inaudible] i don't think counterterrorism as a broad over all strategy or policy for the united states works well with isis. i also don't think that counterinsurgency is the right strategy or policy. counterinsurgency depends upon having a very powerful and to some degree in control of the territory government. the government in baghdad has underlined its own credibility, and to some degree i believe its legitimacy, and what is happening in iraq is more of a

civil war than an insurgency. and so one of the developments that you did not mention is that what the iranian shiite forces who are called the popular mobilization forces by many iraqis are actually wanting the united states to step back so they can take a bigger role. and this is causing a problem for the current baghdad government. because they want to win and it's not always clear exactly whether it matters who carries out the actions on their behalf. so counterinsurgency is the wrong strategy. with a tendency to think about iraq as if we were still there in occupation. we spent a lot of resources and lost a lot of allies in that way of thinking about iraq. but that iraq is not the iraq of today. the iraq of 2006 is very different from the iraq of today. so i would say that the best policy with respect to isis is

containing their current advance, but also thinking about american interest in a broader sense. we've been talking a lot about policies and operations and we are not thinking about what our american interest in the region. because you can't decide how exactly to respond to isis or how to respond to security or exactly how to respond to iraq and whether airstrikes are the right means unless you actually think about what it is that the united states to try to come push within the region. >> all right. let's drill down on the what are the u.s. strategic interests in the middle east right now? >> well, i think there are four. others will disagree but this is where my thinking comes from. the first is that the united states should protect its homeland and its people, its citizens. the second is that the united states should protect its allies. the third is stability within the region.

i think that is in interest for the united states. if the region has its wheels flying off it's going to destabilize the whole world. and then finally and i would put forth now because of the change in the degree to which the united states is dependent upon energy from the region but nonetheless the fourth major interest is global sex -- access to energy. so i think developing our policy within the region becomes a little easier and more clear. at our strategy. it's a broader strategy that has many layers and many players. >> but your article and to writings about al-qaeda, is isis defeatable? >> of course, yes. well, i personally believe that it's likely to be defeated by the turn away from support of the extreme ideology that isis represents by many of the sunni and baathist sort of tribal factions that are currently

aligned with isis. i mean remember, isis didn't come into iraq without help. many of the people that were aligned with us during the surge, are the ones were actually leaving isis military operations. that's a bitter reality and that's what also i think makes it not a counterinsurgency. because if you had the very forces that we are working with before supporting isis now that tells you that they feel that there's nowhere else to turn. >> well, we will get back to this can insurgency issue but max, let me turn to you. he wrote a "wall street journal" editorial recently about the president's mideast policy. i wonder if you might tell us if you agree with on trees prescriptions of our strategic interest are in the region -- on trees. of which one would you add or subtract? >> i agree with the way that audrey put it, but i would say

that there's an overriding interest which goes back to and i'm going to speak now, or speak well of a present i know we don't speak well of. jimmy carter. going back to the good old carter doctrine which may remember from 1979-1980s the reaction to the soviet invasion of afghanistan and the iranian hostage crisis that we were not going to allow any hostile powers to dominate the persian gulf region. at that time we envision a hostile power probably being the soviet union but today i think it applies equally well to iran and we said -- we should not be allowing iran to try to dominate the region. as they are well on the way to doing with proxies and control in the route damascus -- beirut, damascus baghdad and known much of yemen as well. there's an iranian power grab going on what you think we need to oppose at the same time as we oppose the power grab editing

the important thing to keep in mind is that these extremists really feed off one another. this is part of the race what our current policy is so incredibly self-defeating because in the eyes of the region, we seem to be aligning ourselves with iran. and iran seems to be a leader at least the anti-isis coalition which is literally true in the case of on the ground operations for example, in tikrit were iranian directed forces are in the lead. what do sunnis think we may see this? they go shrieking in horror and it drives them into the arms of a isis which is the point that audrey was making about how there are a lot of our former awakening allies, a lot of former baathists who are in league now with isis because they essentially the isis not because they love of isis or its programs but because they see isis as the lesser evil which protects them from iranian domination and the kinds of abuses that iran and its allies inflict upon the sunni community. to the extent we are seen as furthering iranian power grab

it's driving sunnis into the arms of the extremists like i suspect those two extremes are the quds force on one end and isis on the other. they feed off each other. mopar one gets the more power the other gets in its community. >> just to follow up on the iran question. the administration, the united states has had a policy of trying to arm some of our allies, especially the gulf arabs around the world, notwithstanding the nuclear negotiations. we generally try to at least diplomatically opposed iran, but what more should the united states be doing to oppose iran as would say my lines influence around the region's? >> certainly if you talk to our allies in the region whether they are our allies in israel or saudi arabia or anywhere else it would not agree with that assessment that we are trying to oppose iranian designs. they see us basically lying down to an iranian power grab because we don't want to mess up the

nuclear negotiations going on now in geneva. i think if we're serious about opposing iranian designs we should have a counter iran strategy to not just can't isis but counter iran strategy. we are sort of being dragged willy-nilly into a convention in yemen because what the saudis and egyptians are doing but that is not being driven by us. you heard general austin testified he was barely getting any heads up before the saudi started bombing yemen. these sunni states are clearly taking the law into their own hands trying to do with iran as best they can because they see this complete power vacuum obviously. they don't see us mobilizing in this traditional anti-iran alliance which we been a leader ups ever since 1979. we need to reinvigorate that cannot be so sanguine about the fact that iranian allies have essentially taken over from smh and, not only in beirut but now in iraq syria and yemen as

well. i think we need a strategy to empower our local allies to try to push back against iranian designs and to do some of the things we did, for example, in 2007-2008 during the surge putting successfully to use especially our intelligence as well as our special operations assets to target iranian agents and to neutralize the influence of the greatest extent possible. i don't see us trying to do that right now. >> janine, i want to get your view. we do have united states is a coalition, jordan and the uae, among others have supported us militarily. could you address a little bit about our standing in the region and whether we need a more aggressive diplomatic strategy to buttress the military strategy for isis's? >> i think the diplomatic and the military thinks are related and i think also backs, he gets the outlines of the iran problem

right. a conundrum for america here is how to amp up our involvement to fill that vacuum and push back against iran, but not go so far especially and also with respect to isis as to then turn this problem that is until about as more about us. which is also what audrey gets into. we're all focused on isis and their nasty and violent and brutal and the of in our community, but they are not an existential threat to us right? iran is a bigger threat, but we can make the isis threat more of a problem for us. talking about u.s. interest by overreacting, by taking the fight completely into our own hands and then we are once again occupying and invading and in the region, which ends up fueling the narrative that isis

has. and so i think this is you know unfortunately there are few good options with respect to what america should do. i mean, you can say we can come with a strategy for it needs to be done to be the isis over the long run, but that isn't the same thing as what america needs to do in the region. and so to your point about building the coalition, so airstrikes create pressure on isis, and they hold in and so the weekend and deal with some of the political coalition building that needs to be done building the regional security forces trying to un-farc all the problem, these are the who are you empowering more the shia the reigning supported shia militias, or the sunnis that we're trying to get back in the tent that we lost. and all of that has to happen in a combination of military and --

>> am i hearing consensus that most of you believe iran influence in the region is a greater threat than isis is? audrey, do you want -- >> well, i would only say that one of the reason why iran has gained influence is as a direct result of american policy over the last 12 years or so. so i think we deserved of a certain amount of humility when it comes to naming iran now as the broadest threat. i think that iran and isis are both threats but i think we're operating at different levels of kind of a chessboard if you will. we have a global level we the iranian nuclear talks and some aspects of transnational terrorism. you've got a regional level where you've got the saudis and the arab coalition and the iranians, and there's a lot of jockeying going on between the two. i agree with max that that is a serious concern and then at the local level, you've got yemen

syria, iraq. these are complex that have these are not completely discernible levels that are not intertwined but if you think about the fact that these are interest that occur at those levels, not every player plays at every level. so the united states place at all three levels. there are other players that also played at two or three of the levels. let me just observe you're not going to solve the problem in syria, for example without russia. and you are going to be deluding yourself if you think the future of iraq is going to leave aside any influence from iran. it's a political question. to getting back to your question what should the united states be doing, i think it needs to be able to walk and chew gum at the center. same time. needs to have a complicated strategy that keeps the interest of a mention at the beginning at the heart of it. >> okay. let's tackle syria. we've got about five minutes and then we're going to do something quite novel. we're going to handle syria in five minutes.

we're going to do something quite novel for a national security council meeting. in about 50 mess we're going to take questions from the audience. -- 15 minutes. so please get your questions ready. let's talk a little bit about syria. max, is it absolutely necessary that assad be deposed for us to have a successful mideast strategy? >> yes. >> why? what is what is it that today the isis have to get rid of assad? >> it's because of this a come as is that i don't think defeating isis should there only is your only objective. we need to defeat iran as well. but also the point i made earlier, there's a dynamic where the more that iranian backed shiite extremist are soon to be in control of these countries

more that sunnis will flock to groups like isis. there is no way to get the isis with that also defeating assad. what we are trying to do right now there's no way in hell it's going to work because what we're doing is essentially what trying to say for the free syrian army, okay guys, sign up with us and fight against isis adult fight against assad. we are not going to do anything to protect you from your homes and your loved ones from assad whose air force is dropping their bombs on your neighbor china because we don't care about assad because we have gone from calling for assad's overthrow to essentially supporting his continuation in power. and we want syrians who hate assad to ignore him. this guy who was killed over 200,000 of his country and has been responsible for forcing at least half the population to leave their home. and we want to caution on the only group that we care about in syria, which is isis. that dog ain't going to hunt. >> let me drill one more time

down on the. i agree our policy has been that we need to remove assad. not within some of secretary kerry's comments in recent weeks weeks. >> make you put that in the past tense. our policy has been to remove assad but it don't look or is spent isis has come on the scene. we were going to arm the syrian rebels which is something i'm going to get to in the second but tell me again just what is a straight line between you know if the aim is to defeat isis why do we have to take out assad to do that? >> well because i think as long as assad and his iranian backers are on the scene to destroy sunni neighborhoods, that sunnis will continue to look to the al no, sir front and isis for protection. the only way you can defeat those jihadists organizations is by decoupling them from their sunni base of support which is what we do so successful in iraq in 2007-2008 when we turned to sunni tribes against aqi, the predecessor organization of

isis. right now the dynamic which exists in both iraq and sunni -- iranian proxy. as long as that's the case you will not succeed in decoupling them from isis or the al no sir front and there's not i should hasten to add there's not an easy straight line from let's overthrow assad and two days later i says will be overthrown. ..

can survive as a unitary country. if there is any hope for long term of syria it would involve getting rid of assad with some kind of large-scale multinational peacekeeping force but hard for me how to imagine that would work in practice. so i don't have a whole heck of a lot of hope for the near term in syria. i don't have a magic policy prescription but i'm just observing i don't think that we can ignore assad and try to go after isis. that strategy has not worked and will not work. >> okay. janine, going after assad would that, you seem to worry a little while ago if we got too involved in the region that would be ultimately detrimental to u.s. interests. trying to topple assad, should that still be our aim in our counter isis strategy, or would that be going too far? >> i agree that assad is a criminal and that he is, you know he doesn't deserve to be

in control in syria. that said, you know, if there is one thing the last 10 years should have taught us it is that you can't just pop the top on these countries and expect magic to happen afterwards. so you have to be very careful especially if it will be us toppling assad. if you could have a massive international, multinational peacekeeping force in there, that is, you know, governing the country, a la, the balkans you know but could we do that? i'm not so sure. but i also do agree that we missed some windows. 2012, free syrian army, where are they? everybody in that region is making a calculation on a day-to-day basis how to survive. and to the extent that isis was able to grow, in iraq and then through into syria because of in iraq maliki and in syria assad ostracizing the sunni population, that is growing to

continue to be the problem. so the sunnis are the key to defeating isis. say one more thing about isis and i don't know whether audrey will agree with this or not but you know isis is i believe a quasi-state. they're not a terrorist group. they're not an insurgency state but they're a lousy state right? they will not succeed in their large-scale caliphate as long as they are unable to continue to recruit. so we take a long-term approach to isis and we calm down a little bit think about what are interests are in the region. that problem i'm not saying it will take care of itself but it is definitely a state that is not going to be able to continue to do what it needs to do, it has to keep growing. it has to keep generating taxes in order to do it. it will not be able to keep doing that. >> audrey, do you want to respond with that? >> generally i agree with that. i think it is a very long-term

process because isis as a pseudo state is very good using extortion and channeling black market oil. having its own forms of self-sustainment. are also good attracting foreign fighters what i would call migrants females who go there to be brides and not actually fighting once they get there but there are a lot of people coming from the west who are flooding into syria and iraq, to some degree we've begun to manage that much better with the closing of the border by the turks but isis is a long-term problem. i don't think they will be effective governing their pseudo state. that is the hope in the longer term. if the united states thinks this is all about us fighting isis, we're leaving out all the other major players in the reason and there are a lot of other people, there is to government in the world that supports isis or islamic state. so to the degree that we are responding without thinking about the position of the turk,

the russians, the other neighbors within the region i think we're being very foolish and in fact we can if we're foolish enough, put ourselves right into the narrative that isis projects, which is that they are reaching end days, end times and that you know the westerners who would be americans, the so-called infidels are a force against more people should mobilize. >> just make a comment on that. this is a point that both audrey and janine have made. yes, there is the danger seeming to make this fight about the united states and allowing them to posture as adversaries of the great satan that's true, that is a danger we should keep in mind. keep in mind, you're really choosing your poison, if we're not in there actively opposing isis which we've not been doing president obama has tried to pull back over the middle east over the course of his presidency. the result of that is to create a power vacuum they fill. isis is so successful in part

because they have been successful in the past. they created this caliphate unlike al qaeda, they control territories. everybody is saying now they're more or less a state. a lot of their your remarks attractiveness for recruits, the reason they're attracting 1000 foreign recruits a month because they do control territory. if they were suddenly to lose control of that territory that would be a biggest blow they could possibly suffer far more significant than counter radicalization things on twitter or anywhere else. what will destroy their appeal, if they cease to control territory. and they're pretensions to be this modern-day caliphate are exposed. that is ultimately the way to, so in other words, way to defeat isis is pretty simple. you have to defeat isis. >> in theory we all agree efforts to arm the so-called moderate opposition have not been successful. i think we all agree? >> i think basically a two-sided fight now. between the assad government.

either death by assad or join isis for most people that live. >> keep in mind isis and assad have not been fighting directly one another that much. they have been observing more or less defacto, not complete or defacto cease-fire. isis concentrates controlling sunni regions. assad has a stake building up isis. it is either me or isis. that way he gets the west on board with him. >> one thing i disagree with you, matt, i don't think it was power vacuum by the united states to enable to grow. i think it was power vacuum by maliki post. they were taking action against their own sunni minority to be undermined. >> which occurred after we pulled out all the troops out after we lost all ininfluence in iraq and refused to do anything about the burgeoning civil war creating huge power vacuums on both sides of the border which isis expanded into. >> in terms of what policy

options we have left do we believe the moderate syrian opposition is still viable? janine, can we salvage this as policy option, arming them? >> i think in the long term, there may be some hope that you can gather you know, some rebel fighters back. but we definitely missed the more important window, like i said, back in 2012 when there were people quitting like crazy in assad's army. those guys were ready to go. and, where are they now? so it, i don't think that it is something we should necessarily give up on but it is definitely a much bigger mountain to climb now than it would have been. >> janine, max i think i hear a policy option there yes, we should be cautious about this but over the long term we should try and continue to arm the syrian rebels. >> not just, i would say not just arm them. i think we need to do i think we need to do stuff i and others

have been arguing we need to do since 2011, creating no-fly zone so assad air force can't continue to bomb civilian areas and create safe zones on borders of jordan and turkey where syrian government exile can govern on syrian territory without fear of being annihilated by assad's forces. >> so apparently president obama was against arming the syrian rebels in part because he didn't want to have proxy war in syria perhaps with russia cacking the assad regime and us backing the rebels. does that dissuade you at all from russia's involvement here? i think i know the answer. >> not too worried about the russian legions marching into syria. the russians to me -- >> proxy war? >> it is no the a proxy war with russia. it's a proxy war with iran. the russians are a nuisance factor, i don't think they're major or decisive -- >> we agree to redouble our

efforts to find and arm and train and perhaps give safe havens to a moderate syrian opposition? do we agree on that? >> i would go along with max on a safe haven except i was slightly differently express it. moderates are not available to be armed right now that will be a rebuilding process. >> we have to find them. >> if they exist if they're not all dead. but more important, and or at least as important i think we need to seriously ramp up our humanitarian aid for that flood of humanity that are in lebanon jordan turkey. i think that is more important than this two years late effort to try to arm people that really, i mean the cia has been in there trying to work with moderate syrians for a while. so you have this inneragency friction between cia and dod and there are not enough people there for them to work with as it is. so we need to rethink what it is that we're doing in those

countries that border. >> okay, before we go to questions from the audience, janine, max wrote in "the wall street journal" recently, mr. obama is launching airstrikes against the islamic state but refusing to commit any ground troops even though they are essential to insuring the success of airstrikes. would you support the use of u.s. ground troops in iraq to defeat isis? >> like i said, i think the more, our ground troops, we have to be very careful. ground troops to assist local forces i think it is helpful, training coaching helping plan and there is a mushy line there. when we take the fight on unilateral that is when we make the fight about ourselves. that said. >> are you either way for boots on the ground? >> it looks like a u.s. fight that will feed their narrative.

i know it is uncomfortable, this is the uncomfortable thing about it. >> take the shackles off. >> i'm not as, freaked out, ground forces for various things in general. i agree with audrey. if we're serious about one of our core values in the region which is, helping civilians who are, you know, massively displaced and hurting -- you have to put, you have to put people on the ground to help people and we have been hesitant to do that because there's risk involved. but i would take risk in order to do that. i would not be afraid to, put some forces on the ground to assist the actual combat forces that need to go into these cities. i will say one more thing. i get the sense when i hear max talk about we need to defeat isis yeah, it needs to be defeated but, people talk about tikrit. they talk about mosul. when you take back these cities, there is a danger of catastrophic military success

here right? you go so quickly and then you have, you still have popped the top on this shia-sunni problem which i think you saw happening in tikrit which is why you see the u.s. holding back, right? then the iranians sort of failing in their ability to do it. now you see the u.s. going in. so the u.s. has a delicate balance to play to make sure they're not supporting the wrong sides. it is not going to be easy to do that. the best way to create even more chaos in the region i think is to, you know, very quickly and catastrophically overthrow tikrit and mosul and then have shia militia running all about. >> let me, before we go to questions, max, i want to give you an opportunity to respond to audrey. general petraeus has written that what we need in iraq, is a coin strategy not led by u.s. troops, in his estimation, but by iraqi troops, except audrey seems to say, that, coin is no

longer applicable here because it is not like the up rising in iraq in twix, 2007. we need a strategy that is not coin-based. why should we would have a coin strategy? >> well i mean i think a coin strategy is basically the only strategy that has any track record of success. it is not an easy strategy but it is only strategy that has any track record of success in dealing with an enemy that is entrenched among the people. a counter terrorist strategy, which is most commonly alternative not by audrey but by others essentially picking off individual terrorists will not defeat an entrenched terrorist group. in this case a conventional offensive is not probably going to succeed either. what will happen, even if you do the clear phase even using massive firepower to clear

cities like tikrit and mosul and push isis out for the time-being, at the risk of creating massive civilian casualties you still have to be able to do the clear and hold phase because, when you do the clear, that's, that enables you to do the hold and build phase. and to do that, you have to have forces that are able to essential create some kind of governance on the ground. if you don't do that, then the terrorists will infiltrate right back in and you haven't really achieved anything. so fundamentally i mean the solution to groups like isis is fundamentally, you have to offer better governance. i mean the reason why isis was able to step into syria and iraq because there wasn't any governance effective in those places. iraqi army fell apart because it had been compromised by shiite secretaryians and corrupt officers. so there was no effective counter. the obvious counter to isis is effective governance 24/7 and

places likes anbar province and nineveh province where isis has toon root. obviously one option is u.s. forces which is what we did in 2007 and 2008 during the surge. there is obviously not the will to do that at this point. i think our best bet is working with local forces. if they are seen as legitimate they can then take out isis and replace its control with control that is more benign in u.s. eyes. but the, so the difficulty there we have have to create those forces because buy and large they don't list. very little left of the iraqi army. we should work with the small core that is left, iraqi special operations forces. much the fighting being done by shiite militias which have no effect in sunni areas and could not employ a coin strategy if their lives depended on it

because they're seen as enemies of local people. we need to mobilize the local sunnis into anti-isis coalition. once that happens, if you create awakening type forces they can dot counterinsurgency type operations with a good deal of credibility. >> there are a host of issues we weren't able to get to, maybe we'll get to them in q&a and what to do about turkey and isis in libya. we'll return to that if we have a chance. we invite the audience members to join the discussion. please wait for the mikes phone please speak directly into it. please stand and state your name and affiliation and keep questions and comments concise so we can allow as many attendees as possible to speak. i see two right here. let's dot lady in the green. then the gentleman right there in front of her. go ahead. >> trudy rubin from the "philadelphia inquirer." also a member. the premise seems to be that iraq is in better shape than syria but as max boot said, you

would need to train tribal forces in order to have forces on the ground. there is no sign in baghdad that that is going to happen. the money is not being put aside. so my question is, why do we think that there would be any offensive even in coming year in iraq that could take back mosul? the iraqi army weren't be ready. the tribal forces won't rise because they don't trust a central government and shia can't and shouldn't do it. if that's the case, are we going to see isis in its state two years from now with nothing much changed and what would be the consequences of that? >> janine, do you want to take that? >> you know it is interesting because recently i was an at event where major general retired iraqi jabor. jon: who was so-called mayor of califar, partnered with u.s. troops for the surge gave a

talk. and he said the sunnis that fought with you americans are ready to fight with you again. they would they, but they can not be convinced until the iraqi government makes some assurances gets rid of debaathification which is still in effect and on the books in many cases in iraq, oh, by the way, the original sin of the american invasion. then the demille at thattization. -- demille terriization. your point is right on. key to defeating isis comes with sunnis. they decided especially in iraq that isis is lesser of two evils which they decided in 2005 al qaeda in iraq was until they were able to rise up against them. so there is a potential there but it's, i think i think we are forgetting to forget about coin.

coin comes in lots of flavors and sizes and isn't always exactly what it looked like in 2007. it is counterinsurgency, the people in iraq feel like that civil war has insurgency-like elements meaning people are embedded among the people. than there are counterinsurgency-like approaches. we forget the political element right? you can govern with a heavy hand with military troops in a city and provide security to the people and economic development and all those other lines of operation you read in the counter insurgency handbook but if the leader of iraq like maliki did continues to ostracize and crack down on one part of the population you're never going to get there. you have a massive hole in your bucket. >> i could emphasize what janine just said because i violently agree that the decisive line of operations has to be political. essentially in order to get the sunnis to fight against isis which is only way you will

defeat isis because the sunnis are the center of gravity in this operation. the only way you do it, offer them a better political deal. you will not do it if you tell them please help us fight isis risk your next and we'll leave again as we did in 2011 you have to deal with shiite sectarians in baghdad. that is not going to work. tough basically, and this will be very difficult to do, but this is what we have to do, we have to engineer some kind of a deal guaranties, sunni autonomy, similar to the kind of set up the kurds have in the krg. probably guaranteed with american defense guaranties in the future we'll station troops there or nearby maybe in the krg or anbar, we will defend sunni rights, gurantors of their freedom. if that were the case you might see the current situation reversing quickly as you did in 2007 and 2008. tough give the sunnis a reason to fight against isis and right now they don't have it. >> i actually think you nailed

the situation reasonably well, trudy. and i agree with much of what has been said. the only thing i would disagree with, is that if there is a political deal, it has to be political deal offered by the iraqi government not by the united states. if we learned anything, it is that the united states does not have either the power or the consensus to single-handedly have an open-ended occupation of iraq. >> okay but i'm not advocating open-ended occupation of iraq. remember that the iraqi government is not really in control of its fate right now. they're being dominated by the iranians. if we manage to achieve something by getting maliki ousted from power which was an advance. i think prime minister abadi is an improvement on prime minister maliki. but prime minister maliki is still not the most powerful hand man in the country. we have to serve to political counter weight to iranian influence. iranians won't offer a deal to the sunnis. why would they? >> let's go to the second

question here. we another one right here. >> thank you. richard downey strategic consulting. thankthank you really interesting discussion. i would like to touch on a point audrey made. you said we don't need a counterisis strategy. we need a middle east strategy. martin indyk of brookings wrote a piece that essential essentially to achieve the objectives you mentioned audrey, there are two ways to do it. you either work with iran as a dominant power in the region which max says we're effectually defacto doing or work with the pillar nation, egypt, saudi arabia israel, to work with either one of those. seems to me, my question is, do you think we are in fact as max suggests going towards this defacto relationship with iran? or are we just doing these things badly all of these pieces badly? thank you.

>> like to start? >> thought i heard your name invoked. >> yes you did. i think you have identified a very key point which is that our relationship with the region depends upon a number of different actors. i do think that our handling of iran has been remarkably naive i would say in the last 12 years. and, that we need to develop a lot more complexity in how we look at major powers within the region. i do not think that the arab coalition led by the saudis and including what is it, nine other arab states taking action in yemen is a bad thing. i think that the fact that they are taking that action independently and are using force and are acting as a be to some degree a kind of a military counter balance with respect to this regional balance with iran, is not a bad thing from the american point of view. because if you truly believe that stability is one of the american interests for the

region, you have to have some tolerance for people within the region, developing that balance between them. >> it is interesting because i agree with what you're saying. it's uncomfortable but you know it has been our policy for years not just obama but to, support local actors to take responsibility for their region. 3 this is why we do security force assistance. this is why we do foreign military sales. we spent the last 10 to 15 years arming up this region and helping them professionalize their militaries. it is sort of those be careful what you ask for type of things. you want no though what it looks like for region to take control of their security? step back take a look. questions what your role is then. are we sideline coach? are we in there leading from the front? what exactly is, does it look like? for this strategy that we've been focused on for a decade in the region to help them gain

control of their own security? what does it look like? >> may i jump in quickly on the saudi intervention in yemen. i'm not necessarily opposed to it either. i just question whether the saudis actually know what they're doing. and whether to get back to our counterinsurgency question do they have a coin strategy or bombing strategy. at the moment i see bombing strategy. they're blowing things up. which may be okay. how do they get from there to defeating houthis and al-qaeda in the arabian peninsula and pacifying yemen? i'm seeing the big question mark. i'm not sure saudis or egyptians know what the answers are. i'm not sure they thought it through. i'm concerned about where this is going. >> i'm sure they had same question when we invaded iraq in 2003. do we know what we're doing. >> they had a good point. >> this lady right here around you in the backpack. >> margaret monroe, booz allen. i study extremist groups online

presence and social media which is everybody's favorite topic nowadays. as long as they can use social media and other online tools to attract foreign fighters throw themselves in the meat grinder they will be pretty hard to defeat. what i observe u.s. and other western governments countering that message online is laughable and at worse galvanizes op line community to post propraganda. is there any group that has credibility to counter online messaging? who is it and how would they go about it? >> as i was trying to say earlier i don't think you will defeat them with online messaging no matter how effective it is no matter what groups it comes from? the way you end their appeal is defeating their ability to hold a huge chunk of territory in syria and iraq. that is basis of their idealogical appeal is they have create ad caliphate. if the hold on the caliphate was destroyed i think you would see

their idealogical appeal waning pretty fast. >> a lot of people focus on social media and i think it is important. i'm not so sure it is the exact way the teenager decides to join however. we were talking about the patterns of foreign fighters coming out of london for instance and or england. they go in threes. they join with their buddies. primarily are approached personally face-to-face. i mean i think that the online probably helps on a greater sort of level and it freaks us all out and maybe there is other things happening online where they are sharing information at a different level but in terms of actual recruitment of those for return fighters, that come from western countries especially, they're being approached individually, face-to-face and so my sense is, that the way to counter it is actually at local level with some of those sorts of programs that they're developing now, if

you -- >> i actually think that having a better stratinti and policy with respect to how we respond to new media is important to degrading isis's attraction. i don't think this is either or. i think a key part of a broad american strategy towards isis, an absolutely essential part is to use private actors and individuals that are not directly members of the u.s. government in subtle ways not ngos. there are a number of great organizations working on this but they're not nearly well enough funded. there are also a lot of private actors working on taking down isis twitter accounts. this is happening but it isn't nearly sufficiently well enough funded and supported through back channels by the u.s. government. so i think that is a kes part of any kind of sophisticated u.s. strategy towards isis. >> that was good to raise. yes, sir right here.

and you're next. >> david iic. thank you very much. one, let's make two assumptions of the first assumption, let's assume that iran is as much of a threat as any other threat in the region. i know one or maybe two of the panelists assumed that was so and it was so obvious really we don't have time to argue it. but for the moment let's assume it is right but let's assume one other thing. let's assume that given the arc of u.s. involvement in the middle east broadly, certainly in iraq, i don't see why anybody in the region would assume that the u.s. would sustain, i think this was a point you made audrey the u.s. would be able to sustain an occupation or something kind of like an occupation for any even medium term period. is the necessary implication of those two assumptions that ultimately we're seeking a a

partition of iraq? isn't that a necessary implication? and if that is a necessary implication of those two assumptions, then does it, do we still care how sunnis in that small sunni state above baghdad would defend themselves whether it is with or with out generals from the region who defected to isis? are we ultimately seeking a partition of iraq? >> well -- vice p.e.t. biden right? let me first place take issue with loaded word of occupation. nobody is in favor of quote unquote occupation. you tell me. u.s. troops have been in kuwait since 1991. are they occupying kuwait? i don't view it that way. as stablizing force enhancing security. because we may have troops in

the area doesn't necessarily mean we're occupying it. for example, there is a lot to be said for a long-term military presence in the krg where kurds would love to have us and a way for to us influence events in iraq regardless of what the central government in baghdad thinks. but in terms of, should we be partitioning iraq? i don't know that a partition necessarily is, is the solution. and certainly by itself it is not going to solve anything because if isis remains in the control of the sunni part of iraq and the quds force remains in control of the shiite part of iraq that's a problem. that's not the solution because you're basically handing iraqi oil wealth to iran and you're handing the sunni population over to isis. so i think that there is an argument to be made now as i was making before, i think there is something to be said for greater decentralization greater autonomy in iraq especially for sunni region for a way to get

sunnies to fight against isis. we still have to be concerned even if that were the case, we have to be concerned who governs in the shiite region which includes the vast majority of iraq's oil wealth. we can't simply hand that over to general sulimani and his proxies in iraq. so i think autonomy can be some kind of a g ater autonomous relationship, and certainly we should be paying less heed to the central government in baghdad to the extent that it is under the iranian domination. we should certainly not funnel our military aid through them so it can help support shiite militias. we need to help sunnies in particular on our own if necessary, even if the government in baghdad is not in support of that. but, so i think we should, certainly should not, it is a complicated answer. we should not wrap ourselves around this totem pole of iraqi sovereignty and refuse to do anything that undermines, quote unquote, iraqi sovereignty which

is not real at the moment. at the same time we should not realize that there is some magic partition solution that would make all the problems go away. >> yes, ma'am. >> i'm penny star, cbs news. give iran and all the domination in this chaos what kind of impact with the deal with iran which the obama administration is trying to broker very moment, today is the deadline, what impact will that have if they come to a deal on this whole scenario you've spoken about? thank you. >> what if there is a deal tonight, audrey? >> i think this is where that multilevel game comes into play. i think a deal at that global level is better than the alternative of no deal that allows the iranians to move even more quickly to being armed with a nuclear weapon. i don't necessarily seeing it change, see it changing the dynamics in the region dramatically the dynamics at

other two less, the regional and local level. that is my position. other folks in, up here may disagree but on the other question, on the question of occupation, i think there is a difference between having troops in a place and stationed in a base and having them in a conflict area where they're actually tearing out operations against domestic members of the indigenous population. that is what i personally mean by an occupation, something that is contested. i think that is something that would be more likely to be case in iraq than as is currently the case in kuwait. >> janine, would would an iran nuclear deal that perhaps legitimatizes iran embolden then around the region? or would they say, well, now we're semiadmitted back into the community of nations and we'll

begin to pull back? >> what we, the thing that would embolden iran the most around turn them into the most hostile actor is the alternative to the deal that people are promoting which is bombing iran. that sets the clock back three years at best, compared to the deal that everybody hates everybody loves to hate which puts 10 to 15 years on the clock. so best-case scenario or would i say least worst-case scenario, all these options are bad, it is a difficult problem but is that it creates some space. if there is no deal if, or if there's another drumbeat for bombing iran it is just going to make things a lot more heated in the region. it will give actors across the region even more justification for wanting to get their own nuclear weapons and it is just i mean i think that we're playing with fire. >> max, is it harder to fight iran's maligned influence if we have a nuclear deal with them?

>> yes. because i think it will be seen as putting american impremateur on iranian power grab in the region. a, they will announce a real deal tonight. at most they announce some vague principles with all the hard stuff, remaining to be ironed out, the fact it has not been ironed out in 18 months suggests that they may not reach a deal on extremely generous and liberal terms that the united states is offering iran. but if we were to reach some kind of a deal on terms that have been leaked where it would maybe somewhat constrain the iranian program for a decade, let them to allow thousands of centrifuge, not come clean about past nuclear activity, not allow unfettered inspections not allow them to take fuel out of the country on those terms we agree to lift multilateral sanctions right away, this would be seen as stunning capitulation not only in israel and the sunni

states. it would make the situation first. the obvious countermove saudis will go nuclear themselves if united states is act key esing to a nuclear program in iran. that to my mind is pretty frightening scenario. >> we have a little over five minutes. i thought i saw a question in here somewhere. does anybody, then i saw someone back there. i think you're next. you're willing to step up. >> dod. you all kind of have this view of iran iran bogeyman, stuck in my opinion 1980s areas that have stronger iranian influence are most stable right now and have been for a while. my actual question why hasn't there been focus on saudi arabia as that salafist ideology coming from saudi and fueled isis and lots of money from saudi what fueled isis. i find it interesting that no one mentioned saudi as part of the problem as opposed to part

of the solution. >> well, i think the reason why we tend to focus on the iranian bogeyman as you call him, is because in iran, the customary chant of the leadership akin to "heil hitler," the in germany, the customary chant in iran is death to america. and in fact, fighting the united states has been a defining characteristic of the iranian revolution ever since that little incident you may recall, even though it happened a while ago, called the iranian hostage crisis which was followed by unceasing iranian orchestrated attacks against u.s. targets in lebanon including the deaths of hundreds of our marines and embassy personnel in bombings of our embassy and marine barracks in beirut. kidnapping of our citizens followed by iranian terrorist attacks on american and other targets throughout the region. most recently in the last decade when iran has been directly

responsible for the deaths of hundreds of american servicemen in iraq. an account remains to be squared. that is why i among others, am pretty concerned about so-called iranian bogeyman as you put it because iran has been waging war on the united states and has been doing so pretty successfully, as well as waging war on our ally israel as well as waging war on our moderate sunni-arab allies in the region, trying to undermine all of them, trying to achieve a position of predominant influence in the region. that is not to say i'm not worried about things that saudi arabia may do, although i think saudi arabia has done much better in countering terrorist financing and countering support for terrorist interests. they are they're not 100% pure. neither are emiratis and others but by and large saudi emiratis others are much more closely aligned with american interests in the region than iran which is revolutionary power which is trying to take

over the region. and that is a clear and present danger tonights of our allies. i hope that is clear enough explanation why i'm concerned about so-called iranian bogeyman. >> janine, i feel like we would be remiss if we don't discuss turkey. what happened to turkey? at first they were gung-ho getting rid of assad. i haven't heard anybody really mention that they should play a role as one of the regional powerhouses here. what should they do about the rise of isis, especially in syria? what's happened to them? where are they? >> that's a good question. at minimum they need to be worried about the border which is a bit of a positive development of late and they have a spillover problem as well. they have refugees we could be helping them with. but earned, erdogan has not been exactly a big part of the solution here. if you technically they're a nato ally. so what happens if there's --

>> why not? what calculation is making not to seemingly play almost no role here besides taking care of -- >> i don't know what is happening behind the scenes in terms of his pushing and pulling but his primary problem and you guys can chime in here, is that, he, wasn't going to jump in with both feet unless the target was also assad. so again we have a rubic's cube of, problems here with respect to america's interests. you can do one thing at a time. you can't do everything at the same time. and you can't get all of the coalition members lined up against the crocodile closest to the boat as my husband would say, if there's still having individual agendas. >> we've got time for one more question. before we take it, this meeting has been on the record. did i see someone? >> now we know. >> should have been at the beginning. >> shoot. >> this will be last question.

>> what effect does what happened in the middle east have on other allies especially japan, south korea, philippines and vietnam when they see what the middle east is put very shortly, we screw our friends and, yes our friends and are nice to our enemies? >> i just, i actually coincidentally just happened to return from a trip to japan and meeting with government officials there about a week ago i think there is a lot of concern. i think when obama allowed the red line with syria to be crossed with impunity i think that was a devastating blow to american global leadership and credibility which resonates from ukraine to the south china sea everywhere i think our allies are wondering to what extent they can trust our security guaranties anymore. to some extent they can't trust us anymore has potentially a positive impact. you're seeing japan, for example, spend a little more on defense and trying to do a

little more for their own security when they're facing, intercepting something like 800 chinese flights a year bordering their airspace. they feel the threat pretty keenly there. they're starting to do more. i think overall cards are ong'6ú 9 i2z n2t%t÷qt;ñj£gru:÷; í# aw)

i wouldn't generalize in every case and in every capital they react how we're doing in the middle east with respect to what is happening in asia, there are some things you said, max i sympathize with. i think we do have to be clearer about exactly what our interests are and how we're pursuing those interests. but i actually think if you were in tokyo or in seoul or another major capital within asia you would probably have more concern about the degree to which we're squandering our economic resources in one region versus another. >> janine, you have 30 second. >> yes sir. >> stay on time. >> i also am a big believer in american leadership in the world. i do think we've been a force for good. that doesn't mean we haven't messed things up here and there and we're not sometimes ham-fisted when they do it. that said being a leader is not always the easiest thing. so not acting in places like syria can resonate and have people question whether our

security guaranty is as strong as it was. you hear that in japan and elsewhere. but then, also overreacting and being so heavily engaged in the middle east for 10 years also had an effect when i was in the pentagon. are you too bogged down? like you can't win right? you can either go all-in accused of being defacto or accused of doing nothing. >> i want to thank all of our panelists. this has been a very healthy, spirited discussion. i think we got some good -- [applause] i think we've got some very good policies options to kick upstairs. thank you all for coming. and this concludes the event. >> if you missed any of this discussion from the council on foreign relations you can find

it online. to go c-span.org. we have prospects for asia, with tony blanken. that is live from the brookings institution. polls show mayor rahm emanuel holding up substantial lead over his challenger, jesus garcia. that is 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. this week on c-span2, on core q&a. today, dr. francis jenkins author of, the teenage brain a neuroscientist survival guide raising adolescents and young adults the talking about raising two teenage sons as a single mother. alcohol abuse and mental issues with teens and effects of digital invasion of the teenage brain. tonight, 7:00 eastern right here on c-span2. >> this weekend the c-span

cities tour has partnered with cox commune stations -- communications to listen and hear about the literary life of oklahoma. >> he was famous for writing this land was your land. he is a more famous than that. weighs born in oklahoma. we're very proud to have his work back in oklahoma where we think it belongs. he was advocate for people disenfranchised. for those people who were migrant workers from oklahoma, kansas and texas during the dust bowl era. who had found themselves in california literally starving. saw this vast difference between those who were the haves and have-nots and became their spokesman through his music. woody recorded very few songs of his own. we have a listening station that features 46 of his songs in his own voice. that is what makes the recordings that he did make so significant and so important to

us. >> this "this land is your land," this land is my land, from california yaw to the new york island -- >> watch all the events from tulsa, saturday at noon eastern on c-span2's booktv. sunday afternoon at 2:00 on american history tv on c-span3. >> former chair of the federal reserve, ben bernanke spoke yesterday at the center on budget priority policies on achieving full employment. what that could mean for the u.s. economy. at his remarks the u.s. discusses employment policy this is two hours. [inaudible conversations]

>> good morning, everyone. good morning. i'm bob greenstein, president of center on budget and policy priorities. i want to welcome all of you to this exciting event sponsored by the centers full employment project. i want to particularly thank the open philanthropy project for its very generous support of the full employment project at the center which made today's event possible. many of you know the center on budget for its work on pressing issues to reduce poverty and inequality and for our contributions to important budget and tax debates both in washington and the state capitals. under the leadership of jared bernstein, the full employment project has broadened our work, to include various economic policy issues that are critically important but may be longer t rm in nature and extend

beyond current policy battles. now i'm happy to say, with the support of atlantic philanthropies, we are creating a new part of the center on budget which we call, policy futures. that will apply the kind of longer term perspective that the full employment project embodies, to a broad range of key policy issues he and of which the full employment project will become a key part. policy futures will focus on long-term, federal and state fiscal challenges on new approaches to reduce poverty and strengthen opportunity. on retirement security, on health reform which more is still needed and on the intersection of climate change, poverty and fiscal policy as well as of course is on full employment. if you're interested you can find a one-page brochure on

policy futures in your packets this morning. today's event with our very distinguished speaker and excellent panel is a strong example of the kind of intellectual focus we plan to bring to these longer-term policy challenges as we're doing today. we'll be engaging inciteful and creative thinkers, commissioning papers placing a spotlight on innovative policy ideas. you will be hearing more about policy futures in the months ahead. with that, let me turn things over so we can commence today's event. let me turn things over to jared bernstein, the director of the full employment project. [applause] >> all right. thanks bob. really happy to see everyone out here today getting our week started on a what i think is going to be an enlightening

morning. bob noted that today's events is part of our full employment project. the goal of that project is to identify and advocate for policies that help get us to and keep us at full employment by which we mean a very tight matchup between the number of people who want and need to work and number of jobs. it's our firm belief that full employment is one of the best ways to insure that the benefits of the economy's growth don't just accumulate to the top of the income scale but are broadly shared by families at all income levels. all the work of the project including a video of today's event and various papers we commissioned can be found online at center's website, center on budget.org. here is the plan for today. our keynote presentation will be followed by a short q&a we'll take a few minutes to set up our panel which will include valerie wilson andy levin maurice emsellem and myself moderated by date west sell.

following the -- david wessel. before we begin i like to thank alexander burger and the open philanthropy project for support of our work. i want to thank from the bottom of my heart, ben spielberg and michelle who were absolutely integral making this event happen along with many of my other cbpp colleagues, including susan stein mets and larry haas. i want to thank kelly hunter from csis. i want to especially thank ben bernanke and david wessel, along with my awesome panelists for their generous agreements to be here today. ben bernanke hardly needs an introduction. he was of course the chair of the federal reserve from 2006 to 2014 around a member of the fed board of governors before that. he has made more important contributions to our understanding of macroeconomics, economic history and monetary policy than i have time to note here. i have always thought we were extremely lucky to have him where he was during the great recession. the other thing many of us

appreciate about ben harks back to the old adage, if you really understand something you can explain it to anyone. ben has tried harder than many who sit in such influential positions to be extremely clear to avoid obfuscation and tell it like he sees it. i was one of many highly influenced by his important insights decade ago what he labeled global savings glut and impact on economies across the globe. you can imagine my excitement when ben graciously agreed to reflect on those dynamics today. please welcome fellow blogger ben bernanke. [applause] >> good morning. thank you, jared. thanks for the center on budget and policy priorities for this important conference on employment jobs. you know economics standard economics at least, focuses mostly on people as consumers

and jobs are something you have to do to get the income you need to consume. i think that's, sociologists and others tell you that is a little bit defective. people are also producers. that is important part of how we view ourselves. what makes us feel like we are creative and accomplishing things in our lives. so in trying to develop a healthy economy that will give everybody december and meaningful work, we are addressing not just the issue of income but also issue of personal satisfaction. now, my perspective the panelists are mostly going to be not entirely, some on microeconomics of full employment. my perspective obviously is from a macroeconomic perspective and full employment is of course a central goal of macroeconomic policy i'm not going to, i'm disappointing reporters i will not be talking today about

propeck spif -- prospective monetary policy actions out of respect for my successors and ex-colleagues but i do want to say that, when i was at the fed obviously we took a lot of, took very seriously the full employment part of our mandate and it figured very much into our policy decisions including in particular, famous qe3 quantitative easing, open-ended program which explicitly tied our policy to quote, a substantial improvement in the outlook for the labor market. i'm glad we have seen not as much improvement as we would like but certainly meaningful i am room. in the labor -- improvement in the labor market over the past few years. now an important question going forward is whether or not macroeconomic policy, which i mean primarily monetary fiscal policy can rebliley,

sustainably achieve full ememployment in our economy. i want to talk about two frameworks which give similar but not quite the same answers to that question. one of them is the secular stagnation perspective that larry summers has recently revived and the other is, as jared indicated to update a bit what i talked about 10 years ago as so-called global savings glut. i will explain what those are in all could have minutes. but i will take the opportunity since jared raised it, to note they've kicked off a blog today. jared said i need to buy new pajamas so i have the appropriate costume for doing that. and i mentioned it today because tomorrow and wednesday my blogs will provide material related to these remarks this morning including background data, et cetera. so, if you didn't get everything i said today just go to the brookings website and you will get more information. so let me talk a little bit

about these two frameworks and in particular i want to talk about what they mean for the longer term future of our economy and for policy, the policy implications. secular stagnation, the idea goes back to alvin hanson who spoke about it in his 1938 presidential address to the american economic association. hand son of course was speaking at the latter part of the great depression. there in fact had been a second recession in 1937 38, unemployment was still about is 7% as best we can tell. hand son -- 17%. hanson expressed a at that time about the economy toable able to sustain full employment in the near future. dem graphics were improving. slower population growth. he was concerned about productivity and technological change. he argued that going forward it

would be likely investment spending in particular and consumer spending might be chronically weak in a way that would prevent the economy from achieving full employment going forward. . .