thanks to c-span always. absolutely calm indeed. god bless you my brother. ..

>> >> based on the research from his experience does well is in the situation room of the white house. so to introduce my colleague the director of my center

for foreign relations apple make the formal introduction of ever speaker. >> will show you the book eyelet get the presidency from jfk through obama i will use as for critics to passes. but my book. >> host: at the end of the crisis or decision making problem in the white house truman through obama that is an interesting background so you see with jfk with the decision making with the cuban missile crisis how aggressive he was so it is an intriguing book and the

author has been a career naval intelligence officer for 20 years and with the nixon white house. a.m. and a we are of the situation room in the white house under reagan's second term. and he brings a very interesting background. he also writes when he is on the golf course to sports and the 1920's. so here is the author. michael bohn. [applause] >> thank you for coming. but i visit the white house and got to see how president

reagan would handle a crisis. in it occurred to me people on the sidelines don't have a clue how hard it is to manage international crisis that comes after the 3m phone call. the unanticipated crisis in those on the sidelines of opposing politicians and pundits that oppose the president's policies don't have a clue and can say anything they want without consequence of their dumb idea and it is both sides of the aisle with no skid in the game so that all have to worry if their idea does not go well. nothing happens to them. so my initial message is, it is harder than deluxe. -- get looks. i will open with an anecdote

during the iran hostage crisis and ended the minutes mcgregor and finish the oath of office in the iranians but the hostages go. et was a difficult situation for president carter because if he was too aggressive to solve the hostage problem he would kill the of hostages so he tried to be cautious. andy was generally but governor reagan was running in the republican primary in march to april of 80 leading up to the 1980 election. and he had a lot to say what jimmy carter ought to be doing and said this is the national disgrace. so i would give him an

ultimatum for crop so five years later hezbollah terrorists hijacked a twa to beecher -- airliner over europe to take all passengers accrue hostage. are they flew between beirut and algeria several times to let the of hostages off time to mount on the tarmac and ultimately he made ted deal to meet this terrorist demands to promise a side he would not make them is somebody asks about it you did make a deal. then he was in jimmy's issues. then the "wall street journal" called him reagan

because he betrayed the policy that he would take swift and effective action. but the point is as people look back to president reagan in here to tell you it is much harder than but he said people do when he became president. i was active duty riding the situation room. and i was recruited to take over the room because it is not just a conference room but the president's intelligence center his alert center with staff that works 24/7 over there. calling people in the middle of the night with

communications and head of state. it is the nerve center that is the name of my first book. and i have a front row seat and allows me to gave interviews with heavyweights from succeeding administrations. people like bob mcnamara from the kennedy administration and johnson and on and on. and interior tell me what happened in the crisis meeting. then god bless kennedy he taped the conversation so that was very hopeful.

so with those models much battered regions like a narrative. it is as if he were in the room and people that came from the meeting itself it is fun and to read to take you through the suspense. i got started with an article from the mcclatchy newspapers from the 2011 of the tenth anniversary i had that good fortune to interview the people on duty in the sit room that day and the head of the situation room as the economy vice representative she explained what bush did that day all the places he went all the conversations.

so with a profound presidential crisis the following year i did this same fate for the cuban this is -- missile crisis for mcclatchy. from acreage and the sacramento. piano wire service. we had the good fortune from one of the kennedy advisers. with the office of emergency preparedness. and he kept a journal in day gave copies to me. but then in 2013 with the hot line.

as you hear about with a red telephone with record communications with us teletype. he did not want a telephone. but during the '80s '67 war. so my best -- research led me to believe i'm the last one to use that for real purpose ever since 1985 all they have done is exchange test missiles. this was a handwritten letter from gorbachev to reagan that came over the hot line into the sit room my officers called me in the middle of the night.

i had three phones and they said what do we do? there were 13 pages this was the first page. i called the national security advisor to one reseller translator? he said way to. i have the english translation. i had to in the basement of the white house at the east wing who ran a the white house end of the hot line. they have rudimentary that date needed to coordinate. they got their dictionary out and worked with idiosyncratic questions. every since then here is a picture eyehole of the fatah

hotline but they gave me a to work with an old telephone that was not connected to anything. everybody says where is the red from? that is a joke. and then to coordinate with moscow. so it has come a long ways. then to have some opportunities to use it. and putin and obama it is the separate line that piggyback on the hot line. so those three stories led three to the book and what i

did is i picked the anticipated crisis starting in the 1950's. and i picked the crises that our most meaningful that is a teaching or a dealer in experience of the demands of the international crisis. so with the invasion of the southland eisenhower to the missile crisis johnson and then carter and reagan and bush with the persian gulf war.

in then two things from the obama era of spring with that libya intervention in the chemical weapon redline. and then i tried to assess each of the 17 crisis in the first was held pulled the president's response was. and then successful of a long-term failure. then not just my analysis but assessments from experts in then made aggregated graded -- grades instead i tried to put them in the appropriate quadra.

and it was cautious. with those cautious success over here is the bold success over which have the times on them and then these are the apple failures. >> as it succeeds as the aggressive response. people that find that go against history. the best was kennedy. i will get to that. so very briefly from each crisis stop me if you have a question. just to give you a highlight with a key finding.

to start the career of more to give trim and a lot of credit he made some serious mistakes. he had the term groupthink where people got together with no devil's advocates and then look for consensus among themselves then pretty soon they are doing things they might not have done before because there is no devil's advocate in the room. and that is because everybody in washington became intoxicated with the success. letting him change his mission. not just pushing the north koreans back to the 38th parallel but punishing them to invade north korea ago to the chinese border and with

approval put them into a trap. with that counter-attack fed rate ended up with the stalemate. so with the galloping consensus you would think intuitively competitive is one end of the to edge sword. but at the end after the counterattacked truman writes in a press conference got mad at the reporters and misspoke about giving macarthur the authority to use the atomic bomb if he chooses to. said he would use that a bomb the case said the president losing control of his emotions so his advisers said his mouth got ahead of

the brave -- the brain. eisenhower, to from the war that he had the sewer rat - - the suez canal they had a secret agreement with the israelis to attack egypt with the rescue on the canal and they take control. when they did it it made him mad they lost his temper relying on the principle is to aggressively push back on the fringes of the british to this release. with the 1956 election so

domestic politics is much further than this in the international crisis. always a consideration. but he later called it the greatest foreign policy. once they fail they never regain their status and vegetate their own nuclear weapons. and both britain and france never had a doubt in then dixon was the vice president.

rhee had been flying that high altitude for years. with that missile gap that everybody thought we were suffering from. and the photography dispelled all that with where we were relative did it was said 24th mission over the soviet union with the anti-aircraft surface-to-air missiles could not get that high up so the imagery is verde take off from the soviet union to land in norway with a one-way trip. then the soviets shot them down. we thought the pilot had perished in the plane had disintegrated.

he survived a had him in custody with the wreckage and i corrected that know that. he lied to cover up the whole thing. and then the bottom fell out through the kremlin and then i closed up because he was lying about it. that is one way not to the ice to a crisis one of the fundamental rules that applies to of new ordinary scandal to tell the truth. that is a lesson everybody can take from i ixia delaying. showing that imagery then the cuban missile crisis but

the mythology that cave not of that crisis had kennedy forcing the soviets to back away. and invaded deal to his brother with us soviet ambassador to remove the jupiter missiles from turkey worthier missiles from cuba every promise not to invade cuba. both men and back each other into a corner with their catches it and they both realized they figured out how to get themselves out of that. it was the best serious crisis. from the day after there would not let photographers in those meetings.

and the six-day war in the seizure of the uss pueblo. this photograph is a the sit room bill looks like your room in the holiday and. with the basement paneling. is still blowing smoke out of his nose with they were down there virtually the whole six days. to get the superpowers involved. with that hot line they did not know how to address the letter so they have

technical people from the kremlin how to address them. they put them on the cable and the russians thought we were being flippant. and they thought it was a mistake to figure it out later. but again in the mideast war to fit it handily but to put them in a tight spot with the political side but what he did publicly privately he told the israelis said kidder over with in and make it quick. they did. then north to rio foreign sees it in international waters. to overwhelm the crew did

would seize it. they tried to throw that classified information over the side. and in the deliberations of the white house they don't want to start another war in asia. you have to be patient. that is what they did the interesting way. at the state department at kidder one day they said why don't we just say when reselling an apology we don't mean it? that was the solution it one of to the top floor of the state department. u.s. citing his apology and north korea we're inside their waters but we don't mean this. it is dalai. we may get up.

we can do whatever we want to do. that is to disavow the agreement. and johnson had flexibility after the seizure about his actions. and they came back around with that same situation. another mideast war six years after wanted to start the war with the hostilities to make peace. i never talked to him but it happened several times the

crisis was sent the second or third week and always after kissinger about what he was doing but he was completely withdrawn which was the modus operandi. when it came to push came to shove on the 24th of october kissinger had told the israelis to ignore a the cease-fire that backfired because they saw them to keep fighting. so they sent a cable to kissinger to intervene if we did not stop the israelis.

sova to happen in the sit room mix in was upstairs strunc. he was not participating there decided to raise the military readiness to send the soviets as a signal to stay out. that got a lot of attention in the media. the editors out just to not pay attention to the military apparatus was domestic purposes only to help the president in his hour of need. so that was not a dangerous moment maybe that was the

best thing to do the kissinger later reacted -- a committed he overreacted which is discouraging to say the least. ford became president when it at the gulf of thailand so ford had to take aggressive actions ted turner doubt to be the overreaction that militarily most of them happened after their release. so when the crew is released it was apparent with the upcoming 76 election.

is the aggressive faction with 41 military people after the crewmen were already released. over reaction trying to prove he could be the president. but then with the hostage but he made it into their national disaster with a presidential rhetoric would drive a crisis. challenge to the national honor but not one team to do too much and you remember those large numbers but after that everett took over.

but jaime every, february every, february, march, 1980 primary season. he'll lose his day couple of elections. thinking we better do something. so split into the two groups one which pursued the military situation that led to the group thank. so he decided in a manner that was unusual that the secretary of state resigned in protest because he kept urging caution in patients but i have a passage in the book that the secretary of state points to the

negotiations but then said that was not the election year. back to domestic politics. that patience paid off but to pard's with the book called the surprise to make ted deal with the iranians to keep the hostages until after the election. the other part was intel reagan was inaugurated. they wanted to release before he got into office but it was to complicated.

and then sitting on the runway when reagan was inaugurated. i talked to the guy who was on the phone petri in the cockpit and the tower is soon as he said so help be gone -- god there that can go. then the space engine that they have he raised his glass to toast the release of the hostages as if he had done it. to just depends who you want to believe then that gets us into the tricky part of reagan. syracuse had to questions. with the hostage release

could you project that? >> everyone had the view of that. it was an -- terribly risky. going from the helicopters and special forces with the rest of the force then in the middle of that they lost three helicopters and due to recant local problems then one ran into a fuel ship setting everything on fire. it was a terrible outcome. it appears as if he put the risk of side with the potential to the yen toward circumstances because he thought he had to share a backbone.

>> so would allow them to release the hostages is the ayatollah of gained control of the parliament. then he did not need the hostages anymore. when that happened they mated overture to unfreeze the assets in the united states will let the hostages go it isn't because of what we did but internally within iran. but i will not speculate beyond that. reagan's first crisis in a was day debacle.

and i cannot say much more than that. the next one taught -- hijacking a twa the new deal deal and then to lose one petty officer sailor. to go back and forth with libya we would. catherine v. i. but they would respond if he would go back and forth. then the libyans bomb to berlin the 286. we bombed targets in in libya because reagan wanted to show he would take action but immediately libya had bet agents highjack the pan

am flight he killed the hostages in beirut then pan am over lockerbie. it was pulled but effective. seven the persian gulf war is successful to push iraqis out of kuwait is much more complicated than that. just $100 -- hours in some of which read some titles of the varying reactions to the crisis. one by james baker was a triumph for american diplomacy. this is a report with a triumph without victory from

their book from a complete success to call a strategically inconclusive then to get farther out to to say it was a botched war that it would resolve this thing is a woman's. to make then a different conclusion. bush 41 did not one to have day quagmire to drag on for years but his son did that later on. it is harder their looks. they can appreciate the complexities. this is one of my favorites going back to domestic

politics as clinton was in the lewinsky scandal at the time getting ready to testify before the grand jury. and suddenly he decided completely at of character with a quick decisive decision and to retaliate. normally he would dither over these decisions but not on this case and shot over 100 missiles into chaos and it is a nerve gas factory in sudan on the. is a pharmaceutical company

but but it did is a put al qaeda and been bonded on the map to making the huge day care in the arab world. and as set clearer case of the tail wagging the dog. because the president made up of phoney crisis to take attention away from him. and that is exactly from 1998. then closer to home with 11. but to interview the people involved at the time in then to your travel with everything that they did.

so they would stay behind in their blood:the dead lift. that is the origin of the newspaper article. that people were curious to go in to the government continuity program. so he took off on air force one and was in louisiana when they landed airforce one did not have the broadcast capability then they go one step further with a strategic command bunker and there was the video and dave would be to our from year the pentagon

with the most disturbing sites. so the thing about this crisis is a responded against the television with the safe haven. but it immediately shifted to iraq. two hours after he was meeting with his advisers to say you need to sweep iraq into the problem because a lot of people believed iraq was behind the 9/11 attacks which they were not. it is not a long-term crisis management success because he turned away from afghanistan and al qaeda. over to iraq.

so that is a rumor about a crisis management is do not draw a red wine. you may want to but that will box you in and other presidents have chosen not to. so people have criticized obama with the fact is not have a doctor in.

just like during the cold war. so now you have to think pragmatically liquidity crisis says it comes up which is more important that humanitarian idealism is to make decisions on a case by case basis. which appears to be what he has done. really know what people tell us. with that decision making process over the last or five years. >> so wagging the dog syndrome carter issued a

lewinsky forces the overreaction. which have been in every circumstance fees are things that would caution you to the crisis especially to bring a cold war and could not agree on anything. but the then the first set us that but the president

would send a mission -- said the mission and but then to agree to the oval office. talk about the red line in the balance of idealism, a democracy for the egyptians vs national interest. what do we do? in every instance humanitarian demands with intervention puts

international politics over geopolitics you cannot just turned over to the military because president stowe one into another general to try and his political future profit politics are always end of background with that expectation gap. the matter what the president thinks and should do. i talked to about skin in

the game. >> one last tory. kissinger obviously talking to the '73 war been told me of a conversation he have had with the israeli ambassador to be in the sinai desert and then to threaten to intervene. to cold the israeli prime minister to have her order stopped for hostilities for cow henry is the duck your understand how important this is?

>> bed to read more persuade any question as? [applause] thank you. >> what percentage of domestic politics plays the is in the background and others play the a greater role. no decision is ever made in the white house without a political context. i have seen it firsthand. i don't think i could put the number on it ted l. lot

of times president say i will go on tour but to have the colorization with his son of blood to it might mean estimate that was another one? [laughter] >> but with every opportunity i am wondering if you could suggest smith is the shaky subject because you don't know what i notice

with call 12 presidents no matter their party to cruz size of the hell out of them. is built into the fabric of the capital. but what the critics have to say is just general alidade because of day got specific their lives along the line for pro but they have a tendency to be vague so i don't think there's any way to solve that. >> i am intrigued by the crisis. thinking back to berlin. and the direct association between a crisis and a political event in to be

time to. >> the was that i picked i thought were illustrative caution inverses aggression. the berlin airlift would have been a good one with the south was a complete surprise is that unanticipated crisis how do we respond? and why i and it was the big story and so my criteria was what if this crisis tell us about decision making but do you have any sense with

india of the samples? >> yes. i relied on them heavily at there is a couple of with those in poverty issues in the cold war and they cited in the book a liberal is one of them to recreate all these things with the knicks in 1973 when nixon over reacted to your then debate if he just tried to shed himself of the watergate problem with the debates to intervene what do we do? it is quite illuminating. for whenever i could find them to show how often we

really didn't know what they would do but that just brought a the live wire meeting with dash meaning. if you have a chance all of the sources are cited in the back. they are available. i use them. >> i kind of teach a couple of these things with the case studies everything seems quite clear. having gone through any of them even in the sit room.

effort to be with the purchase of prince juan knowledge. so not to create tension but how vigorous they were. but you made my point. this is happening. but not to take a giant reaction if you just take though little step you know, more tomorrow than today. waiting for of better option because in every circumstance because all of them were bad he would use a

sealer word how bad they were. in that argues for any incremental steps. my editor did not like it but it is a preferred method of crisis management is the science into taking incremental steps. that way you don't go so far and cannot start over. that is how i solve them cope with the lack of situational awareness in and clarity. is. >> what tools do you have been your tool kit? >> the aircraft carrier

george jones can solve everything. therein is the phrase that is overused it is boots on the ground. but that is the question there is a sea change about how a decision making has changed about the abolition. we used to think twice. everybody petraeus back to the good old days with reagan. he was cautious as well and was forced to be. >> did he have the best decision making? >> i realize the crisis by an expert but kennedy did the best of the most serious

situation and was cautious. the quarantine allow khrushchev to back away and eyeball to eyeball never happened. that was part of the movie and part of the myth. in and we one which was full of nuclear weapons. . .

>> you know, you had asked me a question that i had not really thought of before. but he was practical and he had a lot of ideology. that is the best answer that i can give you right now. the next time that we get together, i will try to think of another one. >> i think that we have come to the end. so i would like to express my gratitude. buy the book, "presidents in crisis", it's really worth it. thank you for coming in a round of applause for our guests please. [applause] >> thank you, thank you so much.

[applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> booktv is on twitter and facebook and we would like to hear from you. send us a tweet at twitter.com/booktv or post a comment on our facebook page. facebook.com/booktv. you are watching booktv on c-span2. forty-eight hours of nonfiction books and authors every weekend. in this next event best-selling author and mit professor noam chomsky discusses his latest book of essays focusing on u.s. foreign policy. [cheers]